START
REEL
no.
166
index of contents
**INDEXING DATA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>CODE NO.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION (UNWCC) Member Governments, other National Authorities and Military Tribunals</td>
<td>PAG-3/2.3.5.:445-447</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Transcripts of Proceedings and Documents of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Trials):

Defense Statement and Documents:

Document Nos.:

1290 - 1835

--- END OF REEL No. 166 ---
REDUCTION

26 X
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

DEponent: BABA, Shachi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:
1. I was born at my permanent domicile, No. 64 Shihomotomachi, Aza Shimoagano, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto City on August 13th, (the 27th year of Reiji); the present address is 1710, Shino­hara-machi, Ishikawaku, Yokohama City.

2. I went to Manchuria in 1936 (Showa 11) and studied the opium problem. I became executive manager of the Hsingking Central Anti-Opium Committee (central organ for anti-opium policy in Manchoukuo) in January 1930 (Showa 5). I was given the position of non-regular member of the Manchoukuo Anti-Opium General Bureau together with the position of secretary of the Manchoukuo anti-Opium Society until the end of the war, and in the former capacity served in drafting Manchurian opium policies. Concerning opium I wrote the following books:

"Outline of the History of Chinese Opium"
"The History of the Eastern Penetration of Opium"
"Establishment of the Co-prosperity Sphere in East Asia and the Opium Policy"
"The Race and Opium"

I attended the Opium Conference several times and travelled throughout East Asia for the purpose of investigation.


At the beginning of 1944, the government of Wang Chin­wei established a three-year program for suppressing opium smoking and issued new regulations prohibiting the use of opium and other narcotics.

With the promulgation of these regulations the old system of anti-opium administration was reorganized but to expect opium addicts in a country as vast as China to be eliminated within three years was regarded as an extremely bold political measure. The anti-opium and narcotic regulations were issued in a series during February and March 1944; a resume of these regulations is as follows:

1. The prohibition of poppy cultivation; strict prohibition of illicit manufacture, smuggling and illicit traffic in opium and narcotics;

2. Registration of opium and narcotic addicts. The registration was to be completed by August 31st of the first year.

3. Registered opium and narcotic addicts were to be treated and cured within three years. In the first year, one­fifth of all patients were to be cured by March 31st of the following year; and in the second year, half of the remainder were to be healed by March 31st of the following year; in the third year all of the remainder were to be completely healed by March 31st of the following year.
4. For the treatment of the opium and narcotic addicts, all hospitals, official and private, shall be obliged to receive patients and to treat them.

Thus the Anti-Opium Bureau, which was formerly the supervising office for the anti-opium policy, and Heng-Chi Shan-Tang (Shanghai) and Fu-Ying-T'en (Canton) etc. which were private nonopoly organizations for opium and narcotics were abolished and the Anti-Opium General Bureau was established in Shanghai uniting all anti-opium organizations. Nevertheless, owing to the vast region covered considerable differences were inevitably noticed in actual application, even though each locality followed the official instructions in principle.

Opium regulations and administrative measures under the Chungking Government were not very different from those mentioned above, but both seemed to be far from obtaining their goals.

When I had an occasion to visit the Anti-Opium General Bureau in Shanghai, I asked the chief as follows:

"Do you believe in your ultimate success in solving this difficult task merely through the readjustment of regulations?"

I remember that the chief made a grimace at my impudent question.

The Japanese Government maintained a strong stand in rendering indirect help to the enforcement of the opium policy in China whenever requests were made by the Chinese. At first the Liaison Office of the Peacemakers and later the Financial Section of the Embassy took part in this service and consular police in each place assisted in maintaining this control. The Japanese Government adopted a non-interference policy in this regard, preferring that China herself deal with matters concerning China, and took an attitude of cooperating with the Chinese Anti-Opium Policy based upon the spirit of the International Opium Convention. But because of China's request for Japan's cooperation in procuring the opium necessary for the enforcement of the Anti-Opium Policy, Japan was misunderstood in various ways, but both China's request and Japan's cooperation were inevitable results of the policy.

Supply and demand of opium in China were as follows: though China prohibited cultivation of poppy for years, illicit cultivation was made to some extent, (It was the so-called "cultivation-by-paying punishment", meaning secret cultivation was connived in by the authorities to whom penalties were paid in advance). In spite of the extensive illicit cultivation of poppy, the internal supply was always short and the gap was filled by the importation of Iranian and Indian opium. The stoppage of the importation of opium following the outbreak of the East Asia war resulted in the demand for other sources of supply, and consequently Japanese and Sinkiang opium was imported through the assistance of Japan. This stoppage of impor-
tion of Iranian and Indian opium, which importation had been carried on by the assistance of the British Government, affected not only China but also many other places all over East Asia. The opium situations in China, as well as the Southern Regions which had close connections with China in the matters of opium, are as below:

Outline of the Demand for Opium in Each District of East Asia (1942)

China:

North China ................. Tael 3,500,000

Central China
  (Peking, Shanghai, Fou-Chow) ................. Tael 2,000,000

South China
  (Canton, Hongkong, Huang-Chow)............... Tael 1,500,000

French Indo-China ............. Tons 80

Thailand ............................. Tamulun 970,000

Borneo Area
  (including North Borneo).... Tahil 1,800,000

Java Area ........................... Tahil 1,000,000

Note:

1 Tamulun - Gramme 37.6 - 1 Tael
1 Tahil - Gramme 37.8 - 1 Tael

Of course the above figures indicate the amount of opium under the control of each local government, but as illicit cultivation of poppy, illicit manufacture and illicit traffic of opium and narcotics are effected on a large scale, especially in China, a comparatively accurate amount of opium shall be estimated by adding the amount of those illicit quantities to those of the opium under the control of the government. It is regrettable that the fragmentary official reports are not enough for the investigation of the whole amounts.

For instance, in Shansi Province in North China, a territory which professed itself to be a land clean of opium under the motto of clean and honest administration, illicit poppy is cultivated on more than 500,000 Mu and raw heroin, called Chitoh-Wu, is used in great quantities. Correct perception of illicit opiate traffic of this kind moving underground is not only necessary for those who desire to accomplish anti-opium work, but also is a much more important problem as illicit opium traffic in China is inseparable from the secret societies such as Ching Peng and Hung Long, and is connected with the activities of the Comintern or Chinese bandits. I add that the complex activity of the illicit traffic has also a large and important connection with the economic life of China.
Next, a brief summary of anti-opium administration in each place is given as follows:

North China

The China Policed Council established the Anti-Opium General Bureau in Peking with nine branches under its control and charged them with the anti-opium administration.

Application of addicts registration system; sale of opium for the medical treatment of the registered addicts; medical treatment of the ex-sufferers, etc., were the outward aspects of the organization common to all. But if criticism is made as to the actual fact, the administration was still in a preparatory stage.

The national control over opium was especially difficult. Throughout the five provinces of North China, poppy was cultivated illicitly on a large scale. Nevertheless, the raw opium which the government made the Raw Opium Company (private management) buy up was not enough to meet the demand; the government therefore bought about 2,500,000 Tael of raw opium (the unit of opium weight in North China is 31 grammes for one tael) every year from Tunglin and also planned to import from Kweilin district.

The Raw Opium Company engaging in purchase and wholesale of raw opium and the Opium Paste Company engaging in production of opium-paste, were the main obstacles to the national control of opiate. As the problem of opium smoking had been neglected without adequate regulation in China, a great effort was to be made for the accomplishment of the plan. Difficulty was not merely for North China but also for all over China.

The fact that the construction of executive power was limited within districts along the railways and in cities to some extent, rendered the accomplishment of the anti-opium policy extremely difficult.

Especially the control over illicit cultivation, smuggling and traffic were extremely difficult in North China like other places in China. Except some success on the part of the Japanese Consulate police in controlling illicit sale by Koreans, things were left untouched as they were before.

The opium smuggling by Koreans was utilized as a material for publicity, and caused misunderstandings as if the Japanese Government had played some part with those smuggling. That was no more than a distortion of facts. It was a sad note that illicit doings by Koreans were considerable in number.

Illicit manufacture of opium and its smuggling into North China were on a large scale and Peking and Tientsin were the centres for distribution to whole China extending vast networks over central China, South China and Manchuria.
Def. Doc. No. 1290

Members of the Anti-Opium General Office belonging to the North China Political Council visited the neighboring Tanchau to study the anti-opium administration there and learned its institutions and success; especially they were interested in complete measures for healing addicts and its special method of healing.

Treatment for chronic addicts has been hitherto very incomplete; it was a difficult question, not only for the Chinese Government, but also to those who considered the anti-opium problem in sincerity and in earnest. Nevertheless effective method for healing was not discovered in any country of the world.

The healing method for chronic addicts which has been applied hitherto is as below:

1. Gradual healing by means of narcotic.
3. Medical treatment (atropine, iochroman, iodine, arlicatine, etc.)

Among foregoing treatments, the gradual healing was applied in general, but all treatments were not fully effective to the disappointment of the authorities concerned.

Members of the Anti-Opium General Bureau discovered the marvelous effect of Tungkuang Medicine treatment and decided to apply this method. Thus they sent students to Tanchau to study and purchased the same medicine, and establishing Tungkuang Medicine Control Bureau, began to apply the same treatment.

Tungkuang Medicine is a powder medicine extracted from a special plant (E. Temschau F.) which grows in Japan proper. Superior points of the medicine compared with others are as below:

It creates a feeling of perfect recovery; it does not give pain to patients during treatment; the time required for healing is extremely short; the nature of treatment is simple; the expense for treatment is small; the least chance for recurrence, etc.

The North China Political Council ordered nine sanatoriums under the branches of the General Bureau to apply Tungkuang Medicine Treatment and distributed the very medicine to other noted hospitals, official and private; thus started the healing and revivification of the patients efficiently. The Tungkuang Medicine in Tientsin decided to apply this method to miners in view of the good effect Tungkuang Treatment might have in enhancing efficiency of labor.
Central China District:

Though there is no knowing why the Anti-opium Bureau, an organ for the execution of the aforementioned anti-opium 3-year plan, was established at Shanghai, instead of at Nanking, Shanghai was a special area where official sale of opium paste was not permitted.

After the close of the "World War I, the opium problem in the Orient came to draw the attention of the world, being discussed with orient enthusiasm by intelligent younger generation of China. Since then Shanghai became the centre of the anti-opium campaign, but it had an appearance of a home of opium addicts partly because of its being a free city. Aside from the fact that there were so many opium smokers, Shanghai was a transit port for illicit sales of opium and other narcotics for Central China and the South Sea Islands.

Moreover, opium has helped to accentuate the financial characteristics of the city, and opium has become the most popular object of speculation next to gold bullion.

The aforementioned Hung-chi Shantong, an agency for opium traffic, with its base at Shanghai, was conducting its business both in the northern and southern regions, according to instructions by the Anti-Opium Bureau. The total annual consumption of opium in and around Shanghai was given as 1,000,000 taels.

South China District:

At Kwantung, a monopoly agency, the Fumin-tang, which was a monopoly agency under the supervision of the Anti-opium Bureau, annually produced opium paste to the total value of 1,000,000 taels and sold it in behalf of the Bureau. In this district there was also a shortage of opium paste for official sale, and Mongolia produced opium could barely satisfy the demand, consequently the purchase of privately produced opium was attempted. However, this proved unsuccessful.

In Canton there were "Chich-yen-lieisos," infirmaries for opium addicts, which appeared to be modestly successful as compared with those in other districts.

At Hongkong, during the military occupation by the Japanese forces, an anti-opium policy was established under the Governor General’s administration. and the official sale of opium paste was conducted by the Yuchon Co., a monopoly agency, using as the basic figure some 21,000 opium addicts, registered during the former Hongkong Government.

Under the British administration anti-opium facilities were comparatively well organized in this district, and the Japanese administration, in following its course, had intended to put into practice an ideal anti-opium policy in each district mentioned above, according to the International Opium Treaty, some formal measures for uprooting the opium eating habit were adopted, such as the registration of opium addicts, a complete control of the sale of opium paste, limitations on the amount of its official sale and medical treatment of its addicts. Nevertheless, the present author, who had devoted himself to the anti-opium work in Manchou-kuo over a long period, could not help regarding all these measures as superficial and unsubstantial.
Next a brief reference will be made to the anti-opium policy adopted in the Southern regions.

Malay Sector:

Prior to the World War II, Indian opium had been imported into this district by the British Government. It was refined in opium works at Singapore, and sold under Government monopoly system. After the fall of Singapore, the Japanese military administration, following the example of the British administration, adopted an almost similar policy.

Of course, opium addicts here were also registered. But most of them were Chinese overseas merchants, and the official sale of opium paste appeared to have been conducted chiefly "over the counter," no matter whether the buyers were registered or not.

Despite the fact that in the Malay sector the registered opium addicts totaled around 110,000, an annual consumption of opium paste amounts to 1,500,000 tahil (1 tahil = 37.8 gr.) In every province of this district anti-opium laws had been enforced one after another since the first decade of this century. These laws, though more or less diversified, according to different provinces, were all drafted in conformity with the spirit of the International Anti-Opium Treaty. They were, however, so ineffective that it might be said they all but left that vicious habit uncontrolled.

Under the Japanese administration the anti-opium campaign was carried on almost in the same way as under the British administration.

Java Sector:

The anti-opium policy adopted by the Dutch Government in this district also followed the pattern of that by the Malay District. An excellent opium factory at Ljakarta (T.N. Batavia) produced annually about 900,000 tahil (1 tahil = 37.8 gr.) of refined opium paste.

In Java opium addicts were registered, exclusive of those in major cities and port areas. It is estimated, therefore, that the registered number of about 90,000 constitute only a part of the actual number of addicts.

In this district, unlike other districts, more addicts were found among the native inhabitants than among the Chinese merchants. Raw opium consumed there seemed to come mostly from Iran.

Thailand:

According to the report of the Opium Monopoly Bureau, the total registered opium addicts totaled 200,000, the annual consumption of opium was approximately 970,000 tanlin (T.N. as of 1941) and illicit cultivation of poppy-plants and smuggling of opium were never done. It was said, however, a considerable amount of poppy plants were illicitly grown in the frontier districts and that in addition, annually about 1,500,000 tael of opium was smuggled from Burma into this district.

A large number of opium addicts are found among the Thais as well as among the Chinese merchants here. Usually Thais prefer eating opium paste while Chinese merchants like to smoke it with opium pipes. The licenses for opening of opium dens "yenlins", are obtained annually through auction.

French Indo-China: The annual consumption of opium in French Indo-China is estimated at about 60 - 120 tons. The addicts are, for the most part, Chinese merchants. It is said, however, not a few opium smokers are found among French nationals.

Needless to say, these French opium smokers are not registered as they are legally forbidden to smoke opium.
Like in other districts, here are enforced also anti-opium laws based upon the International Opium Treaty, and there is soon another likeness between this district and others in respect of the half-hearted attitude of the authorities toward the anti-opium work. It is said poppy plants are privately cultivated in the district up the Nekong River.

Burma District.

The annual consumption of opium in the Burma district is about 1,500,000 tael.

In this district registration of opium addicts is limited to Chinese merchants only. Accordingly, the amount of the sale of opium paste under the official monopoly system is correspondingly not considerable. In this district, however, household medicines called "Hemp" and others, containing opium, are popular among the people. Besides, the cultivation of poppy plants and private extraction and possession of opium are permitted within limited quantities. The amount of the domestic consumption of opium should not be made, therefore, regardless of these facts.

The cultivation of poppy plants is permitted in a limited area on the Salween. Its annual production is estimated at about 500,000 tael, which is not sufficient to cover domestic consumption. Accordingly, they had to rely upon opium imported from India.

NOTE: "Tael", the Chinese unit of weight, varies in different districts as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Taal</th>
<th>50 gr. in Manchuria</th>
<th>36 gr. at Nanking</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>36 &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; Mongolia</td>
<td>37.8 gr. at Canton</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 &quot;</td>
<td>&quot; North China</td>
<td>37.8 gr. at Hong Kong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36 &quot;</td>
<td>at Shanghai</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The "Southern Tael", which is used in Java, Sumatra, Malay, Thailand, French Indo-China and other southern regions, is 37.8 gr.

Outline of anti-Opium Policy Adopted by Former Manchoukuo

When it was first established, the former Manchoukuo decided to forbid the use of opium and other narcotics. In November 1932, the Anti-Opium Act was promulgated as an ordinance of the State Council, and at the same time a rescript was given to the people in the name of the Premier ordering them to break their national habit of the use of opium and other narcotics.

Simultaneously with the issue of the Opium and Narcotics Act, the new government set about the task of the long neglected administrative readjustment which was necessary for the enforcement of the new act. After a close study of the question by the Council on People's Welfare, the 10-year plan for the anti-opium campaign was formed and officially announced on October 12, 1937.

In the execution of this 10-year plan the Manchoukuo Government paid the utmost attention to the practical method for effecting a radical cure of the registered addicts, totaling to an amazing figure of 820,000 within 10 years.

It was natural that various plans for the medical treatment of the registered addicts, which were prescribed in the enforcement plans of the 10-year anti-Opium Policy, required an enormously large-scale mechanism. At the outset five anti-opium hospitals were projected, but later their number was quickly doubled and further, plans were formed to build one hospital of this kind in each of the provinces, cities, prefectures and Mongolian villages.
Thus at the end of 1941 two national hospitals and 189 minor ones, including those established respectively by provinces, cities and Mongolian villages, had been completed and they were renamed "Kangsheng-yuans". The smaller of these hospitals was equipped with 30 beds and the larger as many as 390 or more, each addict being permitted to receive hospital treatment, as a rule, for 45 days.

Prior to the establishment of Manchukuo, the unlawful cultivation of poppy plants generally prevailed throughout the region as the result of Tang Yulin's sham anti-opium policy which he had practiced in Jehol. But at the end of 1941, concurrent with the prohibition of private cultivation of poppy plants in all the provinces except two Mongolian villages in Jehol and West Haingan Provinces, the business control of purchase, manufacture and sale of opium was placed under the government management, whereby a complete system for controlling the use of opium and other narcotics was established. In January 1942, the Anti-Opium Bureau was established with the aim in view of strengthening and unifying the anti-opium campaign, and unremitting efforts were made for materializing the 10-Year Anti-Opium Plan.

But this laborious medical work of curing opium addicts, toward which Manchoukuo had made such tremendous efforts, was faced with a sad failure. Under "North China District" mention was already made as to the difficulty of the medical treatment of chronic morphine addicts. Manchoukuo had spent an enormous sum of money in the management of the Kangsheng-yuans, and their well organized large-scale facilities may have been unparalleled. All these, however, brought an extremely poor result. The addicts who were admitted to the Kangsheng-yuans totaled tens of thousands a year. The closer one looked into the percentage of the addicts who relapsed into the vicious habit after they had left the hospital, the more disappointing facts were revealed, which amazed those concerned. The percentage of those who again took up the opium consuming habit after they had been discharged from the hospital as completely cured through the "gradual reduction treatment" was closely studied and by way of coping with the sad situation a conclusion was reached. It is as follows:

1. It is absolutely necessary to give mental guidance together with moral training to those opium addicts, as opium poisoning usually causes not only physical disorders but also a collapse of will-power and conscience.

2. Eighty percent of the discharges relapsed into the opium habit within a month after their leaving the hospital (not a few of them only a few days after they were discharged), and fifteen percent of the rest within six months after they got out of the hospital. In view of these facts, it is necessary to keep the discharged under supervision as long as six months after their leaving the hospital.

Thus, the Anti-Opium Bureau took the following measures:

1. Prolonging by two months the period of hospitalization in the Kangsheng hospital.

2. The replacement of the management of the Kangsheng hospital as a spiritual training institute.

3. Education during hospitalization and the entrusting of the supervision of opium addicts after leaving the hospital to religious moral training institutions.
At that time it happened that the aforesaid medicine "Tungkuang" (Ophnodin) was discovered, suddenly bringing great hope to the future of the work of curing. In 1942, the ninth year of Kangtoh, collective labor services of healthy men were operated as one of the measures of supervising opium addicts who had left the hospital, the most noteworthy of them being completion of the construction works of a flume in Wuchang Heain.

The adoption of the "Tungkuang" medical treatment in Manchoukuo made possible the treatment of opium addicts on a large scale. Because it produced a remarkably difference in the recovery of their health, the above-mentioned collective labor service was planned with the double purpose of preventing re-addiction and of cultivating the spirit of labor. The following are a few extracts illustrating the great success achieved by the enforcement of the various measures:

1. The Construction of a Flume in Wuchang Heain in Pinkiang Province.

When the reclamation of three thousand chö-bu of rice paddies was planned, it was decided that the flume with a length of 22 kilomotors, five metres wide and five metres deep, be constructed only by the cured addicts. Waiting for the thawing season the plan was put into operation and admirably completed by early October the same year. The total number of cured addicts assigned to the construction project was two hundred and eighty thousand and its success astounded the Manchoukuoan staff and invited their high praise.


Addicts among the poorest people in Tangyuan Heain were made to organize a group village with their families and to engage themselves in the construction of a new village. In this village a barrel-manufacturing factory was newly established and by combining such projects as would enable the village children to acquire technique in occupations other than farming, they were enabled to contribute to the prosperity of the village. The construction of villages for cured addicts was being carried on at several places in the country and considerable results were expected in every one of them.

3. The Kangshong Training Institute of the Haitao Coal Mine in Tungan Province.

Tungan Province was naturally a home of opium addicts because it was once located on the border and was the producing district of secret opium of superior quality, which had such names as the so-called "Sungari River Opium", and "Eastern Opium". Since 1941, the eighth year of Kangtoh, the clearing of opium addicts in this province was planned, the Kangshong Hospital was moved to the Haitao coal mine, and cured addicts were assigned to work in the said mine.

Besides the above, many substantial results were achieved in consequence of which the anti-opium projects in Manchoukuo made rapid progress, but it should be said that it was partly due to the new discovery of Ophnodin, that is, "Tungkuang". The government invited Professor MASUYAMA of Harbin Medical College, an authority on this medical treatment, as chief of the newly-established National Anti-Opium Medical Research Institute and had him devote himself to the study of the medicine "Tungkuang".
As for the name of "Tungkuang", the Minister of Civil Affairs of the time, YU CHING-YUAN, gave the name "Tungkuang", meaning "Ex oriente lux", signifying the great effect of the medicine "Ophnodin", which was discovered in Japan, in the curing of opium addicts, and the great contribution it made to the anti-opium administration in Manchoukuo.

Thus, at the end of the eighth year of the 10-Year Anti-Opium Policy the remainder of the registered opium addicts who completed the cure was only three hundred and forty thousand. But since a stronger driving force was necessary in order to accomplish the 10-Year Anti-Opium Policy in the remaining two years, the government, with the idea of making a further advance, began to make preparations for the establishment of an Anti-Opium Association. Thus, the Anti-Opium Association was established as a juridical person by an Imperial Ordinance on the 1st of January, 1911. This was planned in expectation of the development of an anti-opium movement by the will of the people, on the plane of a national mobilization by combining all the power of educational enlightenment of educational institutions and cultural organizations, especially religious and moral institutions, throughout the country in addition to political power.

Moreover, the intention of the Manchoukuo government was that the successful consummation of the 10-Year Anti-Opium Policy by the extension of the anti-opium movement in the remaining two years lay in eradicating the disgraceful and corrupt custom which had been prevailing for three hundred years by the self-realization and strength of the people themselves.

Of course, it was the plan of the Manchoukuo government to suspend the supply of opium paste at the end of 1916, the tenth year of this policy. Together with the suspension of the official sale of opium paste, the reduction at once of poppy cultivation to those for medical purposes only was planned. The cultivation of opium under the cooperative system of joint management of capitalists and laborers conducted since 1912, was first planned on the understanding that the cultivation fields would be gradually transferred from Jehol and West Heining Province to the central region where public peace was well maintained.

KU TSU-HENG, the Minister of Communications, who had an enthusiastic interest in the promotion of public welfare in Manchoukuo, used to tell me as follows: "The most successful of the policies taken by the Japanese in Manchoukuo is the anti-opium policy, and this has borne remarkable results."

In conclusion, I will record a part of the plan of effectuation in the first year of the establishment of the Anti-Opium Association.

The Effectuation Plan of the Welfare Department

1. Full Utilization of the Kangshong Hospital.

The immediate equipping of those among the Kangshong hospitals which were transferred from the government and the treatment of ninety thousand male opium addicts during the current year.

2. The Effectuation Plan of the Cure of Female Opium Addicts by the Moral Training Society.

The accommodation as speedily as possible of female opium addicts by the 350 branches of the Moral Training Society and full effectuation of the current year's plan to cure twenty-five thousand of them.

3. The Construction of Kangshong Villages in Lanping Heien, Pinking Province.
The construction of the Third Kangsheng Village will be pushed forward after the construction of the First and Second Kangsheng Villages.

4. The perfection and expansion of the National Anti-Opium Research Institute.

The perfection of the staff of laboratory workers and replenishment of equipment for research for the purpose of perfecting the organization for cytological research in this research institute which was newly established in the preceding year.

5. The training of experts in the "Tungkuang" medical treatment together with quick expansion of activities for the cure of opiate addicts.

6. Training of "Anti-Opium Workers" in the Concordia Young Men's Association.

By promoting the third year plan of training anti-opium workers which was formulated to bring forth voluntary cooperation in the general activities for the prevention of the use of opium through the use of the cell system of the Concordia Young Men's Association, the training of one worker per each village shall be realized.

Plan for Enterprise of the Department of Publicity

1. Furtherance of the Anti-Opium Promotion Movement of the Religious Moral Training Institutions throughout the country.

To further the anti-opium movement by all the fifteen religious and moral education institutions, a united guiding organ shall be created so as to effect a structure for an organized movement.

2. The Formation of the Mothers' Anti-Opium Society.

The "Mothers' Anti-Opium Society" shall be formed by mothers of pupils of the national primary schools and national higher schools, and anti-opium thoughts will be diffused thoroughly.

3. The National Anti-Opium Exhibition of Works of School Children.

The drawings and calligraphy expressive of anti-opium thought will be collected from the twenty thousand pupils of the national primary and higher schools of the country and an "anti-opium exhibition works by school children" will be held in each school. The excellent ones shall be placed on display at the National Anti-Opium Exhibition of Works of School Children, to be held in the Spital. Individual prizes and school prizes shall be awarded to excellent works, and after the conclusion of the national exhibition, they shall be used in circulating exhibitions to be sent to all parts of the country from time to time.

4. The National Young Men's Anti-Opium Oratorical Contest.

Preliminary anti-opium elimination oratorical contests shall first be held in each city, prefecture and special Mongolian
villages throughout the country, followed by semi-final preliminary contests in each province. The final national contest shall be held in the capital among the finalists representing each province. Although the object of the anti-opium exhibition of works of school children and the semi-opium oratorial contest lies in the effectiveness of the preliminaries in each locality, the national final contest has been drawing enthusiastic interest from the third time and is growing year by year.

5. Inaugural Ceremony of the Greater East Asia Young Men's Anti-Opium League.

On the occasion of the national young men's anti-opium oratorial contest, the representatives of the young men of North China, Mongolia, Central China and South China shall be invited to Hsinking and an anti-opium young men's league shall be organized by the young men of Greater East Asia, with assistance of the embassies in Manchoukuo.


Anti-opium envoys (civil representatives) shall be dispatched to the Republic of China and the anti-opium policy shall be realized in concert with all the countries of East Asia so as to eradicate the racial disgrace.


In every school an anti-opium lecture shall be given by the principal regularly once a month. Teaching materials for the diffusion of anti-opium thought shall be put in the national textbooks as much as possible. Pamphlets with supplementary teaching materials concerning the anti-opium policy shall be published. The newspaper offices and radio broadcasting stations shall offer positive assistance in the cultivation and dissemination of the anti-opium thought. The latter especially shall make monthly plans and draw up a program for "Anti-Opium Week" twice a year.

8. Effectuation of programs for Anti-Opium Day and Anti-Opium Week.

October 12, the date of publication of the Ten-Year Anti-Opium Policy, shall be established as "Anti-Opium Day", and July 3, the date of the burning of opium by Lin-Tsitsui, shall be established as the principal day of "Anti-Opium Week". The national publicity efforts shall be concentrated on these two points.

9. Invitation of Thinkers

Japanese and Chinese thinkers or scholars who are versed in or concerned with the anti-opium problem shall be invited, one from each country, to Manchoukuo. They shall be asked to inspect the anti-opium institutions in Manchoukuo and write their views thereon. Their writings shall be published in magazines or newspapers and then published in book form so that they may contribute to the dissemination of anti-opium thoughts.
On this 3rd day of April 1947
at Tokyo

Deponent: B.M.I., Shachi (seal)

I, B.M.I.I., Yasutaro hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
at Tokyo

Witness: (signed) B.M.I.I., Yasutaro (seal)

Q.TI

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

B.M.I., Shachi (seal)
直

（姓名）

場

場

3
以上デアッタ

所クテ、従来ノ禁煙政令監督官庁デアッタ禁煙局ト阿片麻薬ノ防費

代行捜問デアッタ、民営ノ喫煙者（上海ノ喫煙者）（住民）等デ

止シテ、上海ニ禁煙局ヲ創立、ニ＝一切ノ禁煙役務ヲ統＝セリ

ノデアッタ

然シトガラ、廣大ト地域ヲ設スル関係上、特殊地情ニ基テ、各地

方政策ヲハハル実際ノ行政措置ニハ、大綱ヲハニ準拠スルハ

 EMPーカトリ相異スルモノガ見ラレタノデアル。

重慶政策ヲハニ於ケル阿片法令及ニ＝ノ行政措置モ亦以上ト大同小異デ

ziałガ＝イツレモ成功ニハカトリニ間際ガル＝ウデアル。

少々トリ＝信念ガ＝持スニトレマスカ＝ト従ハ非験ト皆問ニ及Ｂンダ
日本の政府は、中国の政策行政を支持し、シティツナルミテロの緩和を図る。各地の領事館は、中国の財務省が支援を行うように指示している。

日本政府は、この政策を実行し、中国の政策を支援し、シティツナルミテロの緩和を図る。各地の領事館は、中国の財務省が支援を行うよう指示している。

日本政府は、この政策を実行し、中国の政策を支援し、シティツナルミテロの緩和を図る。各地の領事館は、中国の財務省が支援を行うよう指示している。
南京政府に、新（な）年を祝うため、前記の同日本関係の実施機関、実質的な機能を発揮するため、対外的効果をもたらす目的を有する。
楽曲列挙

楽曲は少ないが、重要なものについては以下に挙げます。

1. 難易度の高い楽曲
2. デフォルト曲
3. セッション曲

楽曲の選択は、演奏者の技能水準やレパートリーやの幅に合わせて行います。
日本軍政下に於ケル労働狀況ハ、英労政務時代ト大同小異デアツタ。
日本の歴史において、ケルト族の文化は大きく影響を及ぼしました。特に、ケルト族は、現在のスコットランド、アイル兰、イングリッシュセントとヨーロッパの他の場所で、彼らの伝統と文化が受け継がれています。

ケルト族は、約2000年前にヨーロッパに居住していた部族であり、彼らは独自の言語、宗教、芸術、建築を発展させました。特に、彼らの建築芸術は、当時のユーラシアの文化に大きな影響を及ぼしました。

ケルト族の宗教は、自然の力、宇宙の秩序、祖先の崇拝に基づいており、彼らは、占星術、占術、儀礼のあらゆる方面で、非常に高度な知識を持っていた。さらに、ケルト族の言語は、英語、アイル蘭語、スコットランド語など、現代の言語の母語としての地位を保っています。

ケルト族の文化は、現在のヨーロッパの上で、あなたの生活の一部となり、私たちの文化史に対する理解を深めています。
The Fundamental Policy in Dealing with China for a Complete Prosecution of the Greater East Asia War. (Known for the Imperial Conference) November 27, 1942.

I. POLICY:

1. Considering the National Government's participation (T.M., Nanking Government under Yang Chia-pe) in the war as constituting an important turning point for the solution of the current situation between Japan and China and in accordance with the basic principle of the Sino-Japanese collaboration, Japan will devote herself to the realization of destroying the reason and cause of resistance proposed by the Chungking Government against Japan, and at the same time, by strengthening the political power of the National Government, and actually incorporating herself with reborn China as one body, she will proceed forward for the complete prosecution of the war.

2. Carefully observing the development of the world-wide war situation, and before the United States-British counteroffensive reaches its height, Japan will endeavour to fulfill various measures toward China on the basis of the above-mentioned policy.

II. ESSENTIAL POINTS:

A. Intensification of the Political Power of the National Government.

(1) Japan will avoid interfering with the National Government as much as possible, and will strive to the utmost for the promotion of initiative action on the part of the latter.

(2) By thoroughly adjusting provincial peculiarities within the occupied areas, the guidance of the provincial governments by the National Government shall be strengthened.

(3) Efforts will be made for a speedy abolition or adjustment of the concessions, extraterritoriality and various other extraordinary conditions in China, in accordance with the spirit of respecting Chinese sovereignty and territory. And as to the disposition of the Kowloon leased territory, it will separately be decided on together with that of Hongkong.

(4) The National Government shall be caused, with unwavering determination and conviction, to take steps for its self-consolidation in various aspects and to win over the minds of the people at large. In particular, it shall strive for solid realization of increased production, which is necessary for a complete prosecution of the war, and for the diffusion of knowledge on the war objective among the government officials and the people, and also a more rigid maintenance of peace and order, etc., so that nothing shall be left undone for a thorough cooperation in the war.

(5) Japan considers it necessary to make amendments at a suitable time to the Japanese-Chinese basic treaties and other agreements attached thereto, correspondingly with the realization in the future of the full development and consolidation of the National Government and its collaboration with Japan.
B. ECONOMIC MEASURES:

(1) The economic measures toward China with which Japan is now confronted will be to lay emphasis on development in acquiring materials urgently needed within the occupied area, as well as to strive for positive realization of every kind of materials necessary for complete preparation on the war.

(2) In carrying out these economic measures, monopolization by the Japanese side shall not only be warned against, but at the same time the responsibility and initiative action of the Chinese government and people shall be stabilized and their positive collaboration with Japan shall be encouraged.

C. MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TOWARD CHUNGKING.

(1) Japan will not enter into any peace negotiations with Chungking. In case the situation should change and peace negotiations be planned, a decision thereon shall be made apart from this.

(2) The National Government shall adapt itself to the attitude of Japan, as explained above.

D. STRATEGIC MEASURES:

The strategic measures of Japan against China shall be based on the policy which has been already established.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY.

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupies the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of two pages and entitled "Fundamental Policy in Dealing with China for a Complete Prosecution of the Greater East Asia War" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document on the custody of Japanese Government Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 1st day of April, 1947.

HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: SATO, Takegoro (seal)
未见有文献记载的无性繁殖现象。因此，这一奇特现象吸引了大量科学家和研究人员的注意。通过分析和研究，科学家们发现，这种植物的无性繁殖过程与传统意义上的无性繁殖存在着一些重要的差异。首先，这种植物的无性繁殖过程不需要亲本参与，即不需要有性生殖的参与。其次，这种无性繁殖过程中的基因遗传方式与有性生殖中的基因遗传方式具有显著差异。因此，科学家们认为，这种植物的无性繁殖是一种新型的繁殖方式，对于植物遗传学的研究具有重要的意义。
The Concrete plan Based on the Fundamental Policy in Dealing with China for the Accomplishment of the Greater East Asia War.

(Decided before a Cabinet Meeting)

January 8, 1943


   Basic agreement to secure co-operation in the war from the National Government shall be concluded with the Government in order to strive for the accomplishment of the war together with a really-new China.

2. Increase of the Political Strength of the National Government.

   In order to increase the political strength of the National Government, the following measures shall be taken for the present:

   i. The Strengthening of the National Government's Ability for Participating in the War.

      a) Efforts shall be made to cause the National Government to take every means possible to consolidate its finance, and special care shall be taken to make it develop its economic power by securing peace and order in the areas under its rule.

      b) Japan will give assistance to the National Government in its strenuous efforts in the way of financial affairs; above all, she will make some adjustments to her privileges concerning taxation based on the extra-territoriality and others; and at the same time she will give assistance needed to any rational modification of rates such as duties imposed by the
and originality, and will hasten the strengthening of her political power and her positive co-operation with Japan through her voluntary activities.

c) Japan will promote the thorough execution of the orders from a superior government to an inferior government, and will take care not to suspend or break off the execution of the Chinese policies through her intervention into minor affairs.

d) As to the authorized limit of powers of the North China Political Committee and the Central Government, necessary adjustments shall be made according to the secret exchange note (A) annexed to the basic agreement between Japan and China, and at the same time the utmost efforts shall be made to soften the atmosphere between the two and build up a closer mutual economic connection.

e) As to Mongolia, a closer economic connection shall be built up between North China and Mongolia.

f) As to the Wuhan area and Amoy, efforts shall be made to infuse the political power of the National Government into that area as much as possible following the instance of Canton.

g) As to Hainan Island, necessary adjustments shall be made according to the actual condition, taking the secret exchange note (A) annexed to the basic agreement between Japan and China into consideration.

iii. The Return of Concessions and the Transfer of Control of the Legation Quarters in Peiping.

In order to return the Japanese exclusive concession and also to
National Government, an internal duty, a consolidated tax, etc., and also to the maintenance of the value of the notes issued by the National Reserve Bank.

ii. The Adjustment of the Relations between the National Government and the Local Governments.

Special efforts shall be made to strengthen the National Government's leadership over the local governments by adjusting local peculiarities; and in doing this, care shall be taken especially not only to avoid needless friction or collision of sentiments between the central and local governments but to induce them to volunteer to create a harmonious and propitious atmosphere and to push forward in close co-operation of both the central and local governments for the accomplishment of the war as constituent elements of the regenerated China.

For this purpose, Japan will take the following measures for the present within the limits that they will not contradict the basic agreement between Japan and China and various understandings annexed thereto.

a) As to the personnel affairs of the provincial governments and the lesser various local governments, Japan will leave the matters to the part of China without intervention.

b) Japan will make it a principle to confine the Japanese guidance or requests relating to the execution of policies of the provincial or lesser governments to those concerned with operations and guarding; as for the rest of administrative affairs, Japan will leave them widely to the discretion on the part of China and will make the most of her responsibilities.
Def. Doc. 1293

and originality, and will hasten the strengthening of her political power and her positive co-operation with Japan through her voluntary activities.

c) Japan will promote the thorough execution of the orders from a superior government to an inferior government, and will take care not to suspend or break off the execution of the Chinese policies through her intervention into minor affairs.

d) As to the authorized limit of powers of the North China Political Committee and the Central Government, necessary adjustments shall be made according to the secret exchange note (A) annexed to the basic agreement between Japan and China, and at the same time the utmost efforts shall be made to soften the atmosphere between the two and build up a closer mutual economic connection.

e) As to Mongolia, a closer economic connection shall be built up between North China and Mongolia.

f) As to the Juching area and Amoy, efforts shall be made to infuse the political power of the National Government into that area as much as possible following the instance of Canton.

g) As to Hainan Island, necessary adjustments shall be made according to the actual condition, taking the secret exchange note (A) annexed to the basic agreement between Japan and China into consideration.

iii. The Return of Concessions and the Transfer of Control of the Legation Quarters in Peiping.

In order to return the Japanese exclusive concession and also to
Transfer the control of the international settlements in Shanghai and may and of the legation quarters in Peking, necessary arrangements shall be arrived at with the National Government, and at the same time Japan will take the trouble of requesting the third powers to act in concert with Japan.

iv. The Abolition of Extraterritoriality.

Necessary arrangements shall be arrived at with the National Government to establish a specialists' committee of Japan and China with a view to investigating and drawing up a concerted plan regarding the abolition of extraterritoriality.

v. The Disposition of Enemy Property in China.

The disposition of enemy property in China shall be made in accordance with the pre-arranged policy and necessary arrangements shall be arrived at with the National Government.
3. The Execution of Economic Policies.

Regarding the acquisition of goods and material in China and its control and the promotion of Chinese economic co-operation with Japan, the following measures shall be taken for the present:

i. In order to increase the amount of necessary goods and material to be obtained for the accomplishment of the war and to secure the self-support of the army and besides to contribute to the maintenance of the people's life, efforts shall be made to acquire efficiently in accordance with the war-needs-first principle goods and material urgently needed to national defence and also to get possession of the goods and material which are on the side of the enemy.

For this purpose, efforts shall be made to rationalize the control of goods and material and at the same time to wage the expropriating prices of goods and material reasonable and appropriate.

Moreover, on the front line counter-enemy economic pressure shall be taken into consideration so as to prevent goods and material needed to war from flowing out into the hands of enemy. This, however, shall not check the interchange of goods and material in the occupied areas.

In carrying out this policy too, the responsibilities and originality of the Chinese side shall be made the most of to contribute to the strengthening of the political power of the National Government.

ii. In order to promote the positive economic activities of the Chinese government and people and their co-operation with Japan, and to contribute to the strengthening of the political power of the National
Def. Doc. # 1293

Government:

a) the Sino-Japanese joint corporations shall be put under the control of the Chinese side, both nominally and virtually, and drastic adjustments shall be made regarding their funds, their component personnel, the privileges of tax exemption, etc;

b) in the production and distribution of goods and material in general also, the Japanese monopoly shall be avoided to let the Chinese participate and share in them.

4. As to other concrete plans it shall be decided as occasion demands.
The fundamental policy in dealing with China.
(Decided before a Cabinet Meeting)

January 4, 1943

1. Policy
   i.
   ii.

2. Outline
   i.
   ii.

(The above are the same as the decision made at an Imperial Conference.)

iii. The Guidance of the Public Opinion and Foreign Enlightenment.

The public opinion shall be guided so as to make the people thoroughly understand the basic measures toward China.

The same will apply to foreign enlightenment.
Certificate of Authenticity

I, Kaoru H.Y.SHI, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives and Documents Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of five pages and entitled "The Concrete Plan Based on the Fundamental Policy in Dealing with China for the accomplishment of the Greater East Asia War" is an exact excerpt from the documents in the custody of the Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this first day of April, 1947

/S/ Kaoru, H.Y.SHI (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

On the same place, on the same date.

Witness: /S/ Takagoro S.TO (seal)
第一 戦争協力確保ノ為ノ普通甚重要合理考観

第二 国民政府ノ政治力強化

(1) 国民政府ノ参戦強化

(2) 国民政府財政調整ニ付所要ノ援助

備価値等ニ付予与

(3) 治外法権等ニ付予与
西本願寺、太鼓台に設けられた「おはなさい」の鐘は、京都のものに匹敵する名物です。この鐘は、昭和20年（1945年）に作られ、重さ10トンを超えています。鐘の音は、夜の静けさを破り、時には遠くの町まで聞こえることがありました。

一面に刻まれた文字は、多くの信者に希望と平安を提供しています。この鐘は、時を刻む大切な存在であり、多くの人々に心を落ち着かせる役割を果たしています。
STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN CONCERNING
THE SETTLEMENT OF THE QUESTION PERTAINING TO THE
BRITISH AND FRENCH CONCESSIONS IN TIENTSIN

June 20, 1943

With regard to the question relative to the British Concession in Tientsin, negotiations were continued following the conclusion of the agreement on principles between the Foreign Minister, Mr. Hachiro Arita, and the British Ambassador, Sir Robert L. Craigie, in July of last year. Although numerous obstacles were encountered, these negotiations finally resulted in an agreement of views between Japan and Great Britain, and the necessary procedures for the confirmation of the said agreement were completed yesterday, June 19, between Foreign Minister Arita and Ambassador Craigie. Moreover, as the result of conversations with the French Ambassador, Mr. Charles Arsene-Henry, an understanding on principles similar to that between Japan and Great Britain was reached between Japan and France and at the same time an agreement was also effected between them concerning the questions relating to the maintenance of peace and order, and to silver and currency.

It is our firm belief that, as the result of the understandings just reached the British and French Concessions will cease virtually to be abused for the machinations of anti-Japanese elements by virtue of cooperation of the concession authorities with Japanese authorities toward the maintenance of peace and order in the British and French Concessions. As regards the result of settlement of the silver and currency questions, although it can not be considered wholly satisfactory, it will contribute not only toward the relief work among the Chinese in North China but also toward the economic stability of the Tientsin district.

The settlement at this time of the Tientsin question may do no more than create an impression that what ought to have been done. The fact cannot be overlooked however, that this question has been an impediment to a settlement of the questions of a broader and more urgent character. There are many matters in which Japan wants the cooperation of Great Britain and France in order to fulfill her national aspirations regarding East Asia. We expect that the attitudes of Great Britain and France as manifested in connection with solution of Tientsin question will be more emphatically reflected in connection with the various other problems.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of four pages and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman Concerning the Settlement of the Question pertaining to the British and French Concessions in Tientsin, June 20, 1940", is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 15th day of April, 1947

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urabe
米柱部に抜粋した図版を下記の通り
に拡大を行います。

（明治十四年三月）

米柱部に抜粋した図版を下記の通り
に拡大を行います。

（明治十四年三月）
COMUNIQUE
June 20, 1940

(Foreign Office's Announcement concerning the problem of British Concession in Tientsin)

As the result of discussions between the British and the Japanese authorities since July 1939 in regard to questions affecting the British Concession in Tientsin, the agreement has been reached on the following points.

1. Maintenance of law and order within the British Municipal Area:
   - Detailed arrangements have been made for closer cooperation between the authorities of the British Concession and local Japanese authorities for suppression of all terrorist activities prejudicial to the maintenance of peace and order and to the security of the Japanese force.
   - In particular, arrangements have been made for Japanese Gendarmes to offer information and to be present when action is taken by the British Municipal Council Police against persons in whose criminal activities the Japanese authorities are interested.
   - Such action will include supervision of dealings in arms and explosive substances, publications, cinemas, political meetings, arrests and disposals of persons engaged in the activities mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. Arrangements have also been made for the suppression of
unauthorized wireless communications.

2. Silver Coin and Bullion:

The silver coin and bullion now in the Bank of Communications in Tientsin shall remain there under the joint seal of the British and Japanese Consuls-General in that city. This silver shall remain until the other arrangement concerning its custody is made by the Japanese and British Governments except in the provisions of following paragraph 3. The silver shall be sealed in the presence of the British and Japanese Consuls-General in Tientsin.

Before the silver is placed under seal, a amount equivalent to the sum of 100,000 pounds shall be set aside to provide a fund for the relief of famine conditions resulting directly from the floods in certain areas and the drought in other areas of Northern China. Such relief includes the machinery urgently needed from abroad to drain the water from the flooded areas to diminish the danger of epidemics. The appropriate British authority will be prepared to give all possible facilities to enable the silver set aside to be allocated for relief purposes, to be sold, and to be used for the purchase of foodstuffs and other articles required.

The British and Japanese Consuls-General in Tientsin shall appoint experts who, under the supervision of the Consuls-General, will assist them in the administration of this fund and will advise the existing Relief Committee in Peking as to the distribution of the food and other articles.
In addition to British and Japanese, exports of Chinese, French and other nationalities shall be invited to assist in this work.

3. Currency:

The British Municipal Council will not interfere in the use of Federal Reserve Bank currency within the British Concession.

The British municipal Council have decided to withdraw the licences of all exchange shops not established prior to 1939. Licences will not be issued to new shops unless they are vouched by the Native Bankers Guild and have adequate capital. Licences will be renewed monthly. Any point or difficulty which may arise in connection with the application of the measures mentioned in the preceding paragraphs will be discussed locally between the British and Japanese Consul-General.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Koro, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Communique, June 20, 1940." is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 15th day of April, 1947.

(signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) K. URABE

Translation Certificate

I, George, AKABE, of the Defense, hereby certify that the attached translation of Communique June 20, 1940 (Foreign Office's Announcement concerning the problem of British Concession in TIENTSHI is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

(signed) George, AKABE

Tokyo, Japan
Date 17 April, 1947
天の交通銀行を现存する銀行及び銀行が在天の日英兩國總領事公署に
左記の三項規定モノ除く本件現現況ノ保雑ノ目的ノ利益ノ為モノ
規定スルヲ至ルまでヲ印刷シテクノモトス。本件現現況ハ在天の
北中ノ現現況ヲ封印スルノ先立テ交渉ノ委任ノ為ノ事情ノ為ノ
北中ノ現現況ヲ封印スルノ為ノ事情ノ為ノ

発行者ノ旨ノ為ノ事情ノ為ノ

ノ必要ナル食料品品ノ他ノ物品ノ為ノ事務ノ為ノ

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署

在天の日英兩國總領事ハ専門家ハ特命ノ右支事ハ交付ノ助言ヲ

他ノ物品ノ分配ノ旨ノ現存ノ在天の日英兩國總領事公署
文部省成文所

昭和十六年四月十五日

立会人

掲部勝馬

右署名

同日

於同所

於東京

保宮

（昭和十五年六月二十日ト於スル対面ナルノ正中ミテ於テ対

サレタリ）
Table of Criminal Cases taken into Consul Trial in China

Based on the Statistical Table concerning the Consul Trial
(Second Section, Treaty Bureau, Foreign Office)

Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cases accepted by the court,</th>
<th>the 11th year of SHO (1936)</th>
<th>12th</th>
<th>13th</th>
<th>14th</th>
<th>15th</th>
<th>16th</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Crime against the &quot;opium&quot; law</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Violation of the drug control regulation in China</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>1,496</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>5,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Total (a + b)</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>423</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>5,070</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Criminal offence (including a)</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>763</td>
<td>399</td>
<td>2,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Special criminal offence (including b)</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>1,632</td>
<td>1,616</td>
<td>5,437</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Prior to 1940, this was the drug and opium control ordinance of Foreign Office.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>F</th>
<th>Total (D + E)</th>
<th>430</th>
<th>344</th>
<th>645</th>
<th>1,633</th>
<th>2,400</th>
<th>2,515</th>
<th>3,021</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>( \frac{G}{F} ) %</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>Comparison with preceding year ( + or - )</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (F)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-136</td>
<td>+301</td>
<td>+973</td>
<td>+762</td>
<td>+115</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal offence (D)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-25</td>
<td>+92</td>
<td>+265</td>
<td>+300</td>
<td>+131</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special criminal offence (E)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-111</td>
<td>+209</td>
<td>+723</td>
<td>+462</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opium and drug cases (C)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-93</td>
<td>+637</td>
<td>+637</td>
<td>+377</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of cases accepted by the prosecution</th>
<th>15th year % of SHOW</th>
<th>16th</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a Crime concerning the &quot;opium&quot; &quot;law&quot;</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b Violation of the drug control regulation</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>1,635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c Total</td>
<td>1,345</td>
<td>1,661</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d Criminal offence (including a )</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>1,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>o Special Criminal offence (including b)</td>
<td>1,951</td>
<td>1,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f Total</td>
<td>3,471</td>
<td>3,524</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g %</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>On trial</td>
<td>Opium and drug cases</td>
<td>1,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total cases</td>
<td>2,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h Percentage of prosecution</td>
<td>Opium and drug cases</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total cases</td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Other than opium and drug cases</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to the above tables, the following is evident.

1. Of all the criminal cases taken into consul trial in China from 1936 to 1941, those relating to opium and drug are 60% - 63% (63% on the average). (g)

2. Of all the cases prosecuted in consul trial in China from 1940 to 1941, those relating to opium and drug are 47% - 53% (g)

3. Percentage of prosecution of opium and drug cases is 56% in 1940 and 91% in 1941 and compared with that of other cases is 55% in 1940 and 54% in 1941, these percentages are considerably high.

4. Cases and persons prosecuted but found not guilty in consul trial (including opium and drug cases) are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Cases</th>
<th>Persons</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: It is regrettable that the statistical tables prior to 1939 are too simple and that those of the years later than 1942 are not available.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE & AUTHENTICITY

I, H.YASUI, Kacru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Tables of Criminal Cases Taken into Consul Trial in China", is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 4th day of April, 1947.

/s/ H.YASUI, Kacru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: /s/ UR.BE, Katsu and (seal)
在籍裁判に関する件数統計表

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>第一表</th>
<th>裁判受理件数</th>
<th>10年</th>
<th>11年</th>
<th>12年</th>
<th>13年</th>
<th>14年</th>
<th>15年</th>
<th>16年</th>
<th>計</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>拘束強制命令違反</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>拘束強制命令違反</td>
<td>304</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>424</td>
<td>1,111</td>
<td>1,486</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>5,034</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>計 (A + B)</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>428</td>
<td>1,117</td>
<td>1,494</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>5,070</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>刑法第132条</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>2,385</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E</td>
<td>其他法律第132条</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>442</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2,515</td>
<td>5,021</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>計 (D + E)</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>1,638</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2,515</td>
<td>5,021</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H</td>
<td>前年比</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(+)</td>
<td>前年比</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(-)</td>
<td>前年比</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>区分</td>
<td>検察受理件数</td>
<td>昭和15</td>
<td>昭和16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>刑法 阿片処 = 罪</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b</td>
<td>中華民族 = アケル類業等取締合連反</td>
<td>1,732</td>
<td>1,635</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c</td>
<td>計</td>
<td>1,845</td>
<td>1,661</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d</td>
<td>刑法犯 (aを含む)</td>
<td>1,520</td>
<td>1,652</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e</td>
<td>特犯 (bを含む)</td>
<td>1,951</td>
<td>1,842</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f</td>
<td>計 (d+e)</td>
<td>3,471</td>
<td>3,524</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g</td>
<td>比 (%)</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>区分</th>
<th>議院</th>
<th>検察受理件数</th>
<th>昭和15</th>
<th>昭和16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a</td>
<td>議院</td>
<td>阿片類業</td>
<td>1,454</td>
<td>1,510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h</td>
<td>議院</td>
<td>全合件</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>2,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>阿片類業以外</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
上ノ図ニヨツテ次ノコトガリカル。

1. 昭和十一年乃至昭和十六年中華民國ニオケルレッテルノ利用ヲ中間片ヲ除クルノヲ検査ヲ為スモノガ
   60％ - 68％（平均63％）ヲ占メテアル。（注）

2. 昭和十五年及昭和十六年中華民國ニオケルレッテルノ利用ヲ検査ヲ為スモノガ
   76％ - 53％ヲ占メテアル。（注）

3. 前記昭和十五年及昭和十六年中華民國ニオケルレッテルノ利用ヲ検査ヲ為スモノガ
   89％ - 91％テノ他ノ利用ヲ除クルノヲ検査ヲ為スモノガ
   カノガ65％ - 54％テアルノ＝ハレテハルカニ高圧デアル。（注）

4. ナボ種類ヲソニオイテハレサレテソトツヲモノハ（前記検査ヲ除クノヲモノ）
   昭和15年
   7件　11人
   昭和16年
   9件　9人　ニスギナイ。
Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Deponent: -- GENBU, Minoru

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

Address: Care of Uyoda, 147 Hijashi Kojima-cho, Nagasaki.

Birth: August 16, 1904

1) Brief personal career.

November 1936 Lieutenant Commander, Staff officer of the 2nd Combined Air Force.

November 1940 Commander, Staff officer of the 1st Air Squadron.

October 1944 Captain, Staff Officer of Imperial Headquarters.

2) Career at the front since the beginning of the China Incident.

Early September, 1937 arrived in Shanghai.

From September, 1937, to December 20, 1937

On duty in Shanghai.
From about December 20 to January, 1933, on duty in Nanking.

January, 1933

Throughout the foregoing period I was a staff officer of the 2nd Combined Air Force.

3) The strength and chain of command of the air force to which I was attached at the time of my tenure.

The 2nd Combined Air Force was under the command of the 3rd Fleet.

Its commanding officer up to December 14 or 15, 1933 was Rear Admiral Ninami. After the "Panay" incident he was succeeded on December 14 or 15, 1933, by Rear Admiral Tsukahara. Under the command of the 2nd Combined Air Force were the 12th and 13th Air Squadrons.

In the 13th Air Squadron there were 12 fighters and 13 bombers. Later 6 attack planes were added.

There were 12 fighters, 12 bombers and an uncertain number of attack planes in the 12th Air Squadron. The base was in Shanghai, and later a liaison office was set up in Chengchow.

4) The military objectives of our air force at that time were to bomb Nanking, collaborate with the military operation, and to bomb the Hankow and Nanchang airfields. The purpose of Nanking bombing was to destroy enemy fighting planes and principal military installations, etc. The principal military establishments were airfields, vital government offices (wireless stations, government headquarters, nationalist government broadcasting station, etc.), communications facilities, railway stations, Haiakuan electric light plant.
and the Yuhuatai and Shihtzushan batteries. I was engaged in this cam­
paign from September 19 to September 25, 1937. From about the early
part of January 1933, we attacked airfields in Hankow, Nanchang, etc.
In those bombings we used fighter planes to support the 1st Combined
Air Force bombers.

Soon after the said supporting attack of our air units commenced,
I left Nanking and was assigned to duty in Japan proper.

During this period we continued to collaborate with military opera­
tions, but the targets of our attacks were trenches at the front line,
enemy camps and trucks engaged in transportation to the front line.

During the China Incident the bombings of the Japanese Naval Air
Force were carried out in accordance with the "Standards of Aerial
Warfare" and "Miscellaneous Regulations Pertaining to Bombing" provided
in July, 1933, and September, 1933, respectively. There were sent to
the air units by the central authorities.

The various regulations and precedents concerning the current attack
objectives were considered, and bombing was restricted to purely military
objectives. Cities themselves, whether fortified or not, were never
made objects of attack.

Even in the case of an objective which was clearly military, if an
attack on it was likely to cause serious damage to the general populace or,
if it was difficult to ascertain the location of the objective, we re­
frained out of humanitarian feelings from making attacks.

Also in our bombings we were scrupulously careful with respect to
third powers and properties belonging to third power nationals and their rights not only in the international settlement and in the Japanese residential section but also outside the concessions. Because of this our air force was very much restricted in their attack operations and suffered considerable disadvantage and damages.

6) Particularly, in order to respect the rights of third powers the General Naval Staff received maps showing the various foreign interests in the combat zone. These maps were distributed to the lowest units, and received the most careful consideration.

7) Also, before starting out on a bombing expedition the squadron commander instructed all subordinates concerning the bombing objectives were and strictly forbade the bombing of any other objectives.

8) During the time I was there the quality of the air squadron pilots was good. They had an average of about 500 hours of flying time, and two to three years had elapsed since they had become pilots. Therefore they were in a position to recognize objectives, and their bombings were good and precise.

On this 20 day of December, 1936, at Tokyo.

DEPONENT /S/ GENDA, Minoru

I, GENDA, Tatsuo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Dependent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at Tokyo.

Witness /S/ INOUE, Tatsuo
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth without holding anything and adding nothing.

/S/ GEND., Minoru (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date April 21, 1947
シタノテアリマシタ

コレ等ノ期間中敵隊ニ偽カスル上ハ幕営者ラテ居リマシタガ攻撃目

平支部際キヨスケル日本海軍航空隊ヲ鷹撃ハ兩国ノ十二年七月ハ関十

等ニヨリ中央ヨリ官ヲ下各部隊ニ催達セラレテ居リマシタ

攻撃目

ソリハ從来ノ空戦ニ関スル各種交渉ヲ行ハセアルモノハ四面ヲ拘ラズ都市目併ヲ攻撃目

而モ假令軍事目標ヲタルコトガ明瞭ナ場合デモノヲ攻撃スルベ一般民衆

ニ重大ニ損害ヲ及ポスサレアル場合デモノノ承認ガ困難ナ場合ハ人道

上ノ見地ヨリシテ攻撃ヲ難抑ヘテ居リマシタ

上記ヲアタリ第三國人及第三國ノ間スル物件（共同租界）ヲ管居留

3
POLITICAL INFORMATION

Subject: Intensification of Japanese South Seas Policy

In recent years there has scarcely been one speech on foreign political program, or one Diet debate that has not at least suggested and in stereotyped expression brought up the problem of Japanese South Seas Policy. The reason for this was besides the life and death problems for Japan of raw materials, markets and immigration, the prestige of the Navy which maintained, as is widely known, in contrast to the continental aims of the Army, the necessity of sufficient protection of peaceful expansion in the South Seas by Japan.

It is not surprising that the present day Diet is prying more than merely traditional or academic interest in the South Seas problem when one sees that the Washington Treaty has recently expired, that the English and American new powerful naval armament is causing disgust in Japan, that the question of the world division of raw materials has reached a decisive stage as a result of the meeting of the Committee in Geneva and the concrete taking up of the German colonial and raw material problems, and that lastly, the lengthy Japanese-Netherlands East Indian trade treaty negotiations have not yet shown any satisfactory results.

The Japanese government has also recently tended to show tendencies of a certain intensification of its South Seas Policy. Several measures have been taken, which at the same time should meet the endeavors, anchored generally in the internal-political reform program for the strengthening and unifying coordination of the foreign trade policy.

In this way, the Foreign Ministry here has established a South Seas Division, and its mission is to unify and lead all official work done concerning the South Seas questions.

Moreover, the newly appointed Japanese Ministry to the Hague, former Director of the First Asiatic Bureau of the Foreign Ministry Kiwashima, was despatched on an inspection tour to the Netherlands East Indies before going to his new post. His activities there will scarcely be restricted to simple courtesy contacts with the NEI officials or to accelerate the Japanese-NEI Trade Treaty negotiations.
Def. Doc. 1311

It is perhaps better to accept the view that Kuwahara, after his return to Japan, based on his impressions gained on the spot, will suggest to the concerned governmental quarters plans to further effectively carry out various Japanese projects in the South Seas, in order to, after his arrival at the Hague, lead Japanese-Dutch relations to a new and positive phase.

The highest leading principle for the Japanese policy will be in future as in the past -- this will be emphasized on all occasions -- the absolutely friendly economic development and penetration of extremely important raw material and market regions in close and friendly agreement with the Netherlands Government.

Concerning this gradual settling of the target by the government, a House of M.P. who pays special attention to South Seas problems, Hyogoro Sakurai, in his interpellation, made a point that appeared to be premature and to overshoot its target. He proposed that Japan should lease temporarily the Netherlands, New Guinea and other small neighboring islands and conclude a non-aggression pact with Holland. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Hayashi made a reserved answer and said he would consider the proposal, and utilized the opportunity to again emphasize that Japan had no territorial ambitions concerning the NIE or the Philippines.

In the course of this debate, Hayashi in the end, touched briefly on the question of Australian immigration and promised that the government would take the initiative also in this direction.

In the Diet, and therefore in the open forum of Japan and the world, all the problems included in the concept of "Impetus Toward the South" were one after another touched upon. The expressions were renewed that Japan sees in the peaceful penetration and development of the thinly populated South Seas raw material areas where Japanese labor and capital had already widely taken hold one of the most natural ways to satisfy Japanese material necessity in the sense of a justified division of raw material and colonial areas of the world.

On the morning following the debate, a Domi report from the Hague had the effect of a cold douche. According to this report, the Dutch Government's answer to the Japanese proposal was that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact was contradictory to the general attitude and
political tradition of the Netherlands, however, that the Netherlands Government was ready within the scope of the policy of the open door, which has always been maintained by it, to consider sincerely the Japanese proposal to acquire rights in New Guinea, provided it turns out to be legally valid.

(Von Dirkson)
CERTIFICATE
OF ORIGIN

I, YALE MAXON, Chief of the Document Division, IPS, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody, and control of original or copies of all documents obtained by the said section.

2. That frames 289 - 292 being 4 sheets of a photostatic copy of telegram from Dirksen to Berlin of 8 March 1937 and found in IPS Document 4040 were received by the IPS from the Office of the Chief of Counsel of the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials.

YALE MAXON (Signed)
DEF. DCC. #1312

Telegram (secret cipher process)

Tokyo. 17, November 1938. 17.40 hours.

Arrival: 17. 15.20

No. 447 of 17/11 to doce Pol.VIII 1859 of 15.10

and No. 738 of 2. August with telegrams in connection thereof.

I have presented to-day to the new Foreign Minister:

after his return most urgent protests with respect to the damage claims and the business condition in China, which I had prepared in accordance with the conversation with the Vice Foreign Minister.

1.) I have put forth lists of 126 examined cases of damage, which had been individually sent in by the verbal notes without getting any answers. I have pointed to the ununderstandable contradiction of the Japanese attitude to the English and the

German claims. While Japan promises to England, according to press reports, consideration of individual claims if she charges her whole attitude to China conflict in favour of Japan, the same thing is being refused to Germany, although Germany fulfills practically this condition out of her own
Arita admitted that the German claims are urgent. I took up Togo's proposal of consolation-money which was not known to him. I expect here Japanese Concessions in that case negotiation will be necessary as to the amount of the compensation money.

Autum concerning the business situation in China remained unsettled as a result of the change of the Foreign Ministers, and have repeated the demands on a written declaration on the preferential position of Germany's practical allocation of the newest business restrictions, notification of the future economic policy and the possibilities for Germany.

Arita wanted to grant the preferential position only to the economic block of Japan-Manchukuo-China, and to open the remaining economic possibilities to the great powers evenly. Upon my strong refusal of the equal treatment of the English-American group he suggested a preferential treatment of Germany in the practice. I expect, therefore, some measures of the Foreign Office for easing the business restrictions, the practical effect of which will depend on the local authorities, as I emphatically pointed out.

Arita promised notifications about sufficient sketch of a construction plan for China, possibility of German collaboration, indication of the competent authorities for further practical conversations.
He pointed out however that the unclarified situation of China makes a fixing of details impossible. He promised a new conversation soon. I shall continue to present the protests emphatically to General Yanagawa, the new chief of the China Office.

I have the impression that Japan now considers seriously the consolidation of her superior economic position in China.

The East Asiatic conference was summoned to Tokyo for 22 November.

Arita, especially the Army, seeks on principle the German collaboration, hesitates however (to grant) a preferential position by treaty, because Japan's business relations with England and America are vitally important.
本便書の内容についての意見を提出される。右抗議不成立に於て処理に付。訝似関係音報ニ関スルモノナルリ。
3.
November 25, German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact signed.

"... recognizing that the aim of the Communist International, known as the Comintern, is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all the means at its command; convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist International in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a menace to the peace of the world; desirous of cooperating in the defense against Communist subversive activities; ..."

「絵」が付いていない場合に適用する。' ■ 'の場合は、'■'に置き換える。

（絵）
Def. Doc. No. 1316

EXCERPTS TAKEN FROM INTERROGATION

J. VON RIBBENTROP

20 SEPTEMBER 1945

NUREMBERG

ANTI-COMINTERN ACT
That clears up one difficulty which I had.

A. No. I think that what you perhaps are thinking of is originally when the Fuehner first wanted to have good relations with Japan.

Q. Yes.

A. This was then more from the "Weltanschauung" standpoint, and perhaps what you are thinking of is the anti-Comintern pact, which I think was closed, it may have been 1936, I am not quite sure.

Q. I think the date is December, 1936.

A. But that was more of a Weltanschauung pact, which was closed against the propaganda of Bolshevism and so on, which was closed, I think, first with Japan, and later Italy joined, and then, of course, later during the war a number of other states joined it, but that was anti-Comintern. That had nothing to do with the United States then.

Q. You describe it as Weltanschaulich and at the same time as being anti-Russian.

A. Anti-Bolshevik, anti-Communistic, against activities of what we called the Comintern, which was working in Moscow and had branches, secret or open, practically all over the world. Then, you see, especially also in Germany.

Q. It is very interesting, of course, I have been under the impression that it was not only the Weltanschauung, in the manner that you speak of, but was a factor in the balance of power.

A. Well, I don't think one can say that. It was really, in the first place, a Weltanschauung matter. At the same time, of course, you know, we had a very strong anti-Bolshevik, and anti-Communistic line in Germany. It was quite natural to cooperate with states like Japan who didn't want Communist activities and so on.

Whose idea was that pact? Who originated the idea of that pact?

A. Well, I don't really know. How did it come about? The Fuehrer occasionally saw the Japanese. I saw them quite often. We have then an anti-Comintern place in Berlin, an institution which was called the anti-Comintern. While
out of this, the whole thing more or less originated, it was an idea which more or less came in discussion with the Fuehrer and with me and with the 'Japanese. We wanted to have good relations with the 'Japanese. The Fuehrer once told me - this really dates back as far as '33, that he would like to have good relations with Japan, and that he believed Japan to be a nation with which one could have good relations and so on. That dated back quite a long way. So this sort of thing gradually developed and that is the way we came to the anti-Comintern pact.

Q. I must speak rather pointedly. You and I were acquainted in Berlin and you have been the Foreign Minister of Germany, experienced in diplomacy. You do not expect me to believe that so important a step was taken simply for reasons of ideology. I accept your statement in some large part, but it is impossible for me to believe that so important a step in foreign policy could be taken on those grounds, alone. There must have been the thought of considerations, which I describe as balance of power. You can describe them how you will, but you understand what I am talking about.

A. That may be so, but there was nothing really, let us say, purely political, which came out of it. You see, it came this way. I remember that I talked to the British Foreign Minister than one day about it, and we were very much anti-Bolshevik and anti-Soviet. As a matter of fact, anti-Comintern, let us say. I remember talking to this English Foreign Minister and telling him, after this fact had been closed, the anti-Comintern pact, that it was perfectly open for Great Britain to join, for instance. I remember that. I should like to say this; it was the idea of the Fuehrer of establishing a general anti-Comunist front, more or less.

Q. So far as Great Britain is concerned, there had been an Anglo-Japanese alliance until 1922?

A. Yes.

Q. He had been in open alliance with Japan until 1922?

A. I know that the English then did not like the idea very much. They did not want to take an attitude in the matter, I remember that.

Q. Was the Foreign Office a participant, or did the Foreign Office know that this was going on?

A. I couldn't tell you exactly about that. I know one thing for sure, that it was signed, I think, by myself, on a particular order of the Fuehrer, but I am sure the
Fuehrer discussed it with the Foreign Minister von Neurath.

Q. What was Germany's earlier policy in the Far East with regard to China, for example?

A. Well, there was a policy, of course, of where we had good relations, as far as I remember, with China.

Q. Hitler ordered the withdrawal of the German military missions in China in '38, according to my recollection. However, these precise facts are not what I am endeavoring to establish, but I am troubled about this situation: the anti-Comintern pact marked a very definite change in Germany's relations with Russia. Up to that time, German relations with Russia had been marked by the Reppolo policy and, concurrently, Germany had maintained markedly friendly relations with China. The anti-Comintern pact reversed both of these important lines of policy. Therefore, I am exceedingly surprised to have you characterize the anti-Comintern pact as almost altogether ideological and without much political significance.

A. One can say this: with the getting into power of the National Socialism, the Reppolo policy, I mean with the antagonism between the Weltsäumeungen, would come to an end, which came up in the "Parteitag" in '33 when very hard speeches were made against Bolshevism. So I think one can say that the change of policy toward Russia -- later on, China -- could be marked down with the 3rd of January, '33, when it started, and the anti-Comintern pact of '36 was a consequence, you see of this fundamental divergency between the Communist and the National Socialist doctrine, which I later tried to, in '39 overbridge again and try to get Russia in an entirely new line. But at that time, I think it is not wrong to say, that the fundamental part was the question of would perception and, of course, it is no doubt that having these two Weltsäumeungen standing against each other, that there is a political element in that. There is no doubt about that. So far as that is concerned, there is no doubt that the anti-Comintern pact had a political element of some kind, but more in the way of what was very much in the mind of the Fuehrer at that time -- it is very difficult to explain an idea which the Fuehrer always had in mind, for creating a world front against Communist activities everywhere. That was one of his fundamental ideas, really, which perhaps to a certain extent, also played a role later on in the German-Russian war of '41.

I just offer you this hypothesis; That a political pact was contemplated between Germany and Japan --
A. Then?

Q. Yes -- that was intended, but it could hardly be called a non-aggression pact, because the two countries were far apart; and so Raumer had this bright idea of calling it an anti-Comintern pact because the Soviet Government had recently declared that the Comintern was not an official organ of the Soviet Government. Do not these remarks of mine stir up some recollections?

A. It is quite possible that Raumer said that name first. I think he had some connection with the anti-Comintern, it is possible, the anti-Comintern action, but he didn't create the name because the name was there. The name was there as an action with an office (SIC), I think, which was attached to either the Propaganda Ministry or some other thing. That is where the name came from.

Q. You wouldn't say that the name was more or less a false facade. I say more or less because I recognize some justice in your earlier remarks, but wasn't it a facade to cover up what was really a plain, everyday balance of power treaty between Germany and Japan?

A. I don't think that is what it was. It wasn't a disguise pact, but there is no doubt that, in general, there was the idea of having good relations with Japan. That is the way I think it came about, that we came to the Weltanschaung pact or the anti-Comintern, but it is quite possible that Raumer mentioned that first. That is quite possible, but I don't think he created it because there was always this anti-Comintern action, which was there. You see, I remember discussing with the Fuehrer later on, that it would be very good and useful, if Great Britain would enter a thing like that. I remember that. But the English didn't want it at that time. One thing is quite right, that it had its political elements, there is no doubt. It is a change I wouldn't say a change, but it was a consequence of the change of policy of 1933, you see, which came with the arrival of National Socialism, which then, of course, was anti-Communistic. This was the first step. You know, later on quite a number of other countries joined it. Italy joined it and a number of others.

Q. Tell us about the Bureau Ribbentrop. I don't know whether that was its official title, you know what I mean.

A. That wasn't the official title. It was called that. I think I have explained before about the Bureau Ribbentrop. It was an office, let us say, a part of the "national Social-
istic Party, which really consisted of myself and, perhaps, I don't know, perhaps a dozen collaborators or something like that, with a number of other people who had, during those years, looked after, so to speak, the semi-official, not official, channel of relationships with various foreign countries. For instance, we specialized, really, on England and France in those years. That is to say, with France, to get good relations with France, and good relations with Great Britain. That was more or less the chief object, I would like to say, of the Bureau Ribbentrop in those years.

Q. But it also occupied itself with the Japanese questions?
A. It occupied itself also with Japanese questions, to a certain extent, but I don't think very much. Then to a certain extent with Polish questions, but that was only later, I think, and with, perhaps, one or two or three other countries. I wouldn't say it was really formed, but it came about that way.

I was a collaborator of the Fuehrer in foreign politics since 1933 and as I wanted to have some place where to sit, that is how it really came about. I got a number of rooms in the Party office of Hess, at that time, Deputy of the Fuehrer, in the Wilhelmstrasse. I got a number of rooms where and I got a number of collaborators. Raumer, which you mentioned, was one of them. From where I made my trips, especially to Paris and London, but they were the chief trips really, I think, where I went in order to try and establish between relations with France and England. You know, of course, that we were in those years very much after and tried to get, the Anglo-German alliance; that was really the main object.

Q. Well, in effect, it became official later?
A. Well, it had an official position, no. I became official after 1934 when I moved over to the Foreign Office in 1934. I don't know whether you know that. When I was made Disarmament Commissioner, I moved over in '34 to the Foreign Office, but the Bureau Ribbentrop as you called it, that remained there and looked after these sort of semi-official relations with Anglo-German fellowship, Committee Franco-Allemagne.

Q. However, they negotiated, or assisted you to negotiate this treaty with Japan.
A. That is right.
Def. Doc. No. 1316

A. Let me see, this was handled with the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. I had, of course, use of the code as Disarmament Commissioner in the Foreign Office, but the Bureau Ribbenbrop didn't have any code, not the code of the Foreign Office.

Q. OSHIMA was the Japanese military attache?
A. Yes.

Q. Who was the German Ambassador in Japan at that time? It was Dirkson, was it not?
A. I think so.

Q. Dirkson succeeded you in London, didn't he?
A. Yes.
リッペンロップ博士国民教育
一九四五年九月二十日
ヨルンベルク

防共協定

答に、多分貴方の意でありますのは、仰も御想が始めで日でと友好
門を持ちたいと考へたものでどうかと思ふ。

答に、多分貴方の意でありますのは、防共協定のとつでなく、確か協結されたのは一九三六年だった。

一九三六年は十二月だと思ふ。

結して協結されたのだけも、最初は日でとあったと思ふ。

勿論、勿論、日中戦の多くの門が加増したから、それはあくまで
観一寸近従に聞えるかは知れないが、貴方と私とは必ずしも昔の話だから、このように
貴方がのふることを大変に於て頼するが、之等の頼を、かかる作務に難や
私があつたに相違あり。軽野の割に大々の外交役

強い利益の均衡とつくね

に呼ぶことは出来ある。しかし私の言つてあることを别つてもあるだろう。貴方では
この如何であるか。

かもいかえし、今日の総政治

のがわれがそれを。とかも少からぬ全部の事が生じたが、一方それは
多から少から総統や私や日本人と協定して生れた者だ。我々は日本と
好関係を保たうと欲した。総統は皆で私に、これといえば一九三三年に
日本とは非友好関係を保ちたい。と詰めたことがある。又日本は十分之上友好関係を保ち得るや
を問だと信ずる。
なぜですか。数回英国外相が討論したということはありませんし、大英帝国に反対主義を提出することを懸念されています。私にはこの協定の意義が何なのかと考えています。それは、大英帝国の人々が反対主義を恐れていたことと、他の国々に影響を与える可能性があるからです。

問：英国は一九二二年逓日同盟と協定したのは、その協定が必要かどうかを後で考えたのですか？

答：それは、一九二二年の英日同盟が成立した際、その協定が必要かどうかを考慮したのです。大英帝国はそれを全面的に承諾しました。

問：外務省における協定に対する特別の命令はいつですか？

答：それは、特別の命令はいつですか？特に、私は自分が調印したものです。それについての意見はありません。
問ドイツの初期の経済政策、例えば貿易に関するものははどうでしたか。

答え親政はあったと思います。

問ドイツの記憶に従って、かつての歴史について心配しているのか、何か思いがけないことがあったと、防共協定はドイツの外交関係に影響を及ぼすために、防共協定はドイツが中国を支持し、防共協定はドイツの Barbarians 的あたたかい政治的親善性のない態度に求めたのに私は一粒し

問 Barbarians か Barbarians の政策が共有としない。
反対の激しい演説の行なを一九三三年の党大宣に於て到達したのである。故に、當時政策後には賢政策の変化は、それが始まった一九三三年一月三日を以て一期を御することが出来る。そして、一九三六年の前共産党は此の共産主義期国家社会主義との間の根本的相違の一つの結果に過ぎない。後に、根本的相違の根本的相違の根本的相違の根本的相違の根本的相違として、於て特に政治的の要緊である。しかし嘗時に於ては、かうという事は全く negotiable ではないと立せしめず、そして其着に政治的的一要緊があると、つとみは勿論懸不倫地が政治的要素を有したことは見あたりましょう。しかしそれは、むしろ當時の該統の胸の中にあつたるふうに非常によく頑いのだが、何處に於てても共産主義の活動に対して世界的反共戦線を作るという為総線が常に心に抱いてのた考なのです。それ故に彼の根本的要素の一つあり、彼らく又政治的要素を有したるために、一寸とん之の假設を申し上げむ。假に日親聞にある政治的協定が企図された。
答

それで

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答

答
The text on the page is not legible due to the quality of the image. It appears to contain handwritten or printed text that is not clearly visible.
Details are disclosed of "SORGE SPY CASE".

Red Espionage Ring Active for 8 Years - Police Prove Inefficient.

Details of the Sorge case, said to be the largest espionage case in modern history, were disclosed by Max Klausen, a German spy, and Fusako Kuzumi, a member of the Sorge group, who were released from prison on October 9th, according to the Yomiuri-Hochi.

The Sorge group functioned in Tokyo for eight years unmolested by the Japanese police until October, 1941, when Richard Sorge, a Communist espionage agent, who headed the efficient espionage machine, was arrested by the metropolitan Police.

Sorge was a German, born of German father and Russian mother, and took part in the World War I, suffering wounds in combat four times. As staunch a patriot as he was, the half-cast German turned to Communism during the post-war depression period and came to Japan in September, 1933, under instructions of the Comintern headquarters. Outwardly a Tokyo correspondent for the Frankfurter Zeitung and a loyal Nazi, Sorge was the "espionage leader" in the Far East.

Soon, he was joined by B. de Vukelitch, a Croat assistant for the News Agency in Tokyo, and Okinori Miyagi, a Communist correspondent of the Asahi and an authority on Chinese problems. Its membership was strengthened further by the participation in the following year of Max Klausen, a German radio technician.

Gain'd Ott's Favour

In preparation for his ambitious scheme, Sorge first approached the local German Embassy and won the confidence of Major-General Etsu, then military attaché, who later became ambassador, by supplying him with accurate secret information. He became a member of the Embassy staff and was later appointed chief of the information section. Established in this position, he was able freely to obtain secret information regarding German policies for Japan and the Japanese Government.

Meanwhile, Ozaki, Sorge's right-hand man, resigned from the Asahi in 1939 and became extra secretary of the South Manchuria Railway Company and was later appointed extra secretary of the Japanese Cabinet. Miyagi, in the meantime, secured for "Ott's espionage machine" confidential information within Tokyo.
In that time, the Japanese government was split over peace propaganda. Army's Northern expansion policy and the Nagato tradition. The Ministry's final decision was, however, to refrain from acting in the West. When also Germany started their large-scale offensive to the East, the Communist party, with the assistance of mechanics, successfully obtained and disseminated detailed knowledge of the Imperial Japanese Army, and some of the Imperial Navy's crucial movements, and movements of staff members during this most critical period.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a memo dated 19th December, 1941, stated that it was inevitable to send the message to Moscow, immediately before his arrest, the Communist party had analyzed Japan's productive capacity, and actual war power and, predicted that an American-Japanese conflict would break out in October or November, 1941. He based his judgment on information obtained from wide, reliable sources.

That such a large-scale espionage machine could function for such a long period without police interference is, according to the Asahi, due to two facts: that the Jeppe and Oaka held high positions, where secret information was freely available, and that the two refrained from joining the Communist party, which is naturally under constant police vigilance. On the other hand, the insufficiency of the Japanese police system, especially in regard to scientific methods, is held as a contributory factor.

In the course of a trial held at the Tokyo District Court on 3 October, 1943, Sorge and Odani were sentenced to death. Clausen and de Wuklitch to life imprisonment. Naoko Kusanagi to eight years of penal servitude, and Jane Kusanagi to three years. Okinori Miyagi died of tuberculosis on August 2nd, 1943. De Wulkliitch died while serving out his term in the Karasuma Hospital for tuberculosis in the town of Nagaoka.
CERTIFICATE

I, Yasuo Kakei, certify that the document hereto attached in English and entitled "Details Are Disclosed of 'Sorge Spy Case' — Red Espionage Ring active for 8 Years -- Police Prove Inefficient." is a photographic copy of Nippon Times, Wednesday, October 24, 1945. Certified at Tokyo.

on this 21st day of May, 1947

/ / Yasuo Kakei

Witness M. Ohko
CERTIFICATE

I, Yasuo Kazama certify that the document hereto attached in
English and entitled "Details Are Disclosed Of 'Sorge Spy Case'
— Red Espionage Ring Active For 8 Years — Police Prove I Nefficient."
is a photographic copy of Nippon Times, Wednesday, October 24, 1945.
Certified at Tokyo.
on this 21st day of May, 1947.

Y. Kazama

Witness M. Ohko
日本の情報部長が、当時の大使館付武官、後の大使、陸軍少将ユニオン・オットーの信頼を勝ちもった。彼は大使館員の一人となり、後の中ソルゲの右腕尾崎は、九三八年（昭和十三年）に朝日新聞を辞職し、再び情報部長に任命された。この地位からさまざまな任務に委任され、その後も日本の軍事と政治、特にソ連との関係についての情報提供を続けた。
彼の判断は徹底して且つ信頼すべきものであった。捕縛されてからソルゲは彼の無理に信用して信頼の基を築くものであった。彼は十個部屋を勤かしめると自信を以てて語ったと云われる。

五個又は十個部屋を勤かしめると自信を以てて語ったと云われる。朝日によれば、かかる規模の大規模な諜報機関が警戒の干渉を受けずかくも長期間活動し持たれる所のものの、二つの事實に述べられる郎ちソルゲと尾崎は秘密情報を自由に入手出来ることは、共に共産党が占める高い地位を占めて居たことを及び兩人の経験の中なる如く非従来のも一つの質験的要因と見做されている。

非従来のも一つの質験的要因と見做されている。投降の下にあつた日本共産党が入会することを差控へたことである。他方又日本警備組織の非従来のも一つの質験的要因と見做されている。
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I., YAMASHITA Seisaku, who occupy the post of A Librarian of the
TOKYO Imperial University Library, hereby certify that the map hereto
attached, written in English, consisting of one leaf and entitled "
"The HOMONHAN Area" is an exact and authorized copy of a portion of
the original map (Asia and Adjacent Areas compiled and drawn in the
cartographic Section of the National Geographic Society, for the
National geographic magazine, Washington, December 1942) the custody
of TOKYO Imperial University Library.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 16th day of Apr. 1947

/S/ YAMASHITA Seisaku (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed
hereto in the presence of the Witness,
at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /S/ KAMATA Hideo (seal)
文書に住所並立成立ニ附スル証明書

山下清作、東京帝大図書館司書ノ職ニ居ル故

前スル地域、東京帝大図書館ノ保管ニ係ル地図、及び

添付スルテラックス及英語ニテ書カレノスレリナルノラレノ

地図

昭和二十二年四月十六日　於東京

山 下 清 作

同 日　於 同 所

立契人

族

夫

名

印

自分ノ面前ニ於テサレタリ

防共ニテ真実ナルナルガル可ル

案

The cartographic Society of the National Geographic, Washington Dec. 1926.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YAMASHIT, Soisaku, who occupy the post of A Librarian of the TOKYO Imperial University Library, hereby certify that the map hereto attached, written in Chinese, consisting of one leaf and entitled "The NOMONHAN Area" is an exact and authorized copy of a portion of the original map (new Chinese Provincial Atlas, compiled by TING Jenkiang. TSENG Jouhao TSENG Shihying) in the custody of the TOKYO Imperial University Library.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 16th day of APR. 1947

/S/ YAMASHIT Soisaku (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness, at the same place, on this same date.

Witness /S/ KAMITA Hidoo (seal)
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, YAMASITA Seisaku, who occupy the post of Librarian of the TOKYO IMPERIAL UNIVERSITY LIBRARY, hereby certify that the map here attached, written in German, consisting of one leaf and entitled "The MUNICH AREA" is an exact and authorized copy of a portion of the original map (Andrees Hand-Atlas, published by Dr. Ernst Ambrosius) in the custody of the TOKYO IMPERIAL University Library.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 16th day of Apr. 1947

/S/ YAMASITA Seisaku (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /S/ KIMATA Hideo (seal)
On the 18th the Supreme Commander of the Expeditionary force to China officially announced that all plants under military management in the occupied area will be returned to China. This is an exhibition of the spirit of good neighborly relations and mutual assistance, which is regarded as the basis of the Sino-Japanese peace negotiation clarified in Prince Konoye’s Statement. And it is understood that on the occasion of the establishment of the central Government of China, Japan has proven, by this statement, that her fixed policy is not that the holy war should be one of aggression against China but rather for the establishment of a lasting peace in the East with the recognition of China’s independent sovereignty through complete collaboration of Japan and China in conformity with the fundamental principle of equality between the two nations. The army, deciding that, if the property of absentee
owners had been left as it was without being put under proper care, heavy losses would have been sustained in the livelihood of the Chinese people and decided to take over the management of the property on behalf of the legal owners, in hope of making contribution towards the economic cooperation between Japan and China and the betterment of the life of the people in general. That is the reason why Chinese property within the war zone was placed under military management. It is also for the same reason that Chinese factories have now been taken from the control of the Army. At the same time it can be said that the administration of Provisional Government in the occupied area has been successful, and has produced a new order. The process of transferring the management of the plants is outlined as follows:

1. Plants under military management cover mines, manufactories, workshops and all kinds of other industrial establishments. In North China there are 110 of these plants, which are divided into 20 different kinds, and in Central China, 94 plants of 27 kinds; that is, a total of 204 plants. The management of some plants has already been transferred from the hands of the Army. For example, the complete management of the Hwainan Mine has been transferred to a newly established Sino-Japanese joint concern. The Sinfung Cotton Mill at Changchow (on the Shanghai-Hankow Railway) has also been returned to its owner, a Chinese.

2. The formal process of the transference is as follows:

First the management of the plants will be removed from the Army to the Provisional Government which will hand it over to the New Central Government.
Then an ordinance will be issued from the Central Government, requesting the legal owners of the plants to claim them. For the purpose of making investigations and assessments of the damage caused by the war and the investments made during the time of the military management and other matters, a managing committee will be formed by the managers, the Japanese Government, the Expeditionary Army, and those concerned with the management and operation of the factories.

3. Most of the transferred plants will be put under Sino-Japanese joint management so as to bring about economic cooperation.

4. Some plants, which are especially necessary for military purposes, will remain as they are for the time being.

5. As for the rights and interests of third powers, adequate measures, such as joint management, compensation, loan or restitution, will be taken according to the circumstances. In case rights and interests of third powers should be attributed to any transferred property with the intention of avoiding cooperation with Japan, it would be a matter of course that efforts should be made to make the cooperation of the two countries practically effective in accordance with the aim of the military management.

6. All plants under military management will not be transferred at once, but one after another as soon as preparation for transfer has been made. So it may require a fair time before all the plants have been transferred.

7. Property which belongs to enemy or absentee owners will be properly disposed of after it has been transferred directly to the management of the new Government. It is, however, a matter of course that as
for the investments made in enemy property a proper compensation should be recognized.

Thus amidst hostilities the property under military management has been transferred to the Chinese authorities through a sense of moral obligation. This is really unprecedented in history and will surely be effective in enlightening the mind of the anti-Japanese party at Chungking who are taking all possible steps to distort the ideal of the establishment of the New Order in East Asia, and at the same time will cause the whole Chinese nation deeply to appreciate the fairness of the attitude of our Government. Those Japanese who are concerned in this are taking the broad point of view and are also endeavoring to bring about the principle of live-and-let-live with the complete cooperation of Japan and China.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of the Vice-Chief of the Archives Section in the S.I.J Press, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "PROPERTY UNDER MILITARY JAPANESE IN OCCUPIED JAPAN IN HANDS OF CHINA" is a copy of a report on our newspaper issued on March 19, 1940.

Certified at Tokyo, (The Head Office of the S.I.J Press, No.3, Sanchoume, Yurakucho, Chiyodaku)

on this 28 day of March, 1947

/s/ KISHI, Katsumi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness:

at the same place, on the same date

Witness: /s/ IIMUI, Yasutaro (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 15 April 1947
Statement of the Japanese Foreign OfficeSpokesman

November 16, 1937

The measures taken by the Japanese forces in Shanghai for the protection of the lives and properties of foreigners have been widely recognized as completely effective by authoritative neutral observers there. Major General Smollett, the commander of the British Forces at Shanghai made a tour of inspection of Hungjao area on the 13th and found out that all residences of foreigners stood virtually undamaged despite the fact that the Japanese forces attacked the Chinese troops and their establishments there. General Smollet is reported by the North China Daily News to have expressed his special satisfaction that the Japanese forces had put up a notice of no admission at every house owned by a foreigner, and that no Japanese had entered any of the foreign houses in the area.

A group of foreign newspaper correspondents also visited Hungjao area on the 14th and were quite satisfied that the Japanese forces had effectively protected foreign properties.

According to English language papers of Shanghai the French consul at Shanghai made an inspection tour of Nantao district, and after minutely investigating the conditions of residences and other properties belonging to Frenchmen, he expressed his satisfaction that no damage to speak of had been caused by the Japanese forces on French properties in their attack on Nantao and that the institution for
charity work, "les Petites Sœurs de Pauvres", as well as Klusin Dockyard and the establishments of Water Works had been kept intact.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, IAYASHI, Kaoru, chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Statement of the Japanese Foreign Office Spokesman, November 16, 1937," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 17th day of April 1947.

/S/ K. Hayashi (seal)

Witness: /S/ T. Sato (seal)
図1.jpg

図1.jpg
Insert:

"Declaration pertaining to blockade of Wenchow and Fushow issued to various custom houses and foreign diplomats by Consul-General Liun in the name of Chinese Area Naval Commander on 09:00, 27 June is as follows." between the title and the first paragraph of Page 1.
Declaration on 27 June 1939.

1. Whereas the Naval Forces of the Japanese Empire initiate naval operations against Fenchow and Fuchow beginning on 27 June 1939, the naval as well as civilian vessels of third powers lying within the said ports are requested to shift their positions to the waters east of 121° 15' E in the case of Fenchow, and east of 119° 50' E in the case of Fuchow, by noon 27 (Japanese time).

After the said time the entrances of Fenchow and Fuchow ports will be blockaded with obstacles and dangerous objects because of necessity arising from the said naval operations, and will be made impossible thereafter for ships to pass through. We shall not be made accountable for any damage, whether direct or indirect, incurred by ships not having shifted their positions by the time specified above.

2. Locations where dangerous objects will be placed are as follows:

(a) Fenchow:

Last part of the Taitou Channel, Central parts of the North and South Channels.

(b) Fuchow:

Last part of Yuntou Channel (near the central buoy).

(c) As Fenchow, Fuchow and their vicinities are expected to become theaters of combat, it is requested that people of third powers be made to evacuate as expeditiously as possible.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Chief Inspector of the Corporate Judicial Person International Allied Research Society (formerly Corporate Judicial Person Japan International Society, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 992 pages and entitled "International Situation of 1939" is a document compiled and issued by the Japan International Society.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 15 day of April, 1947

MATSUBA, Masatoshi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness : PITAGURA, KATSUTADA (seal)
自分八社日本農業協同組合日本農業協同組合研究発表会議

昭和二十二年四月十五日

於  東京
Regulations of the KEFEI
Imperial Ordinance No. 337
(dated Nov. 29, 1938 (Meiji 31))

Chapter I. General Provisions

Art. 1. The KEFEI shall be under the jurisdiction of the
Minister of War, and shall primarily control the military
police and concurrently the administrative and judicial
police.

Art. 2. In the execution of his duties, the KEFEI shall take
orders from the Minister of War and the Minister of the
Navy in regard to military police matters; from the Home
Minister regarding administrative police matters; and
from the Minister of Justice regarding judicial police
matters. Concerning military police matters in Korea,
he shall be under the command of the Commander of the
Army in Korea; in Formosa, the Commander of the Army in
Formosa; in the Kwangtung Leased Territory, the Commander
of the Kwangtung Army. Regarding administrative and
judicial police matters, orders shall be received in Korea
from the Governor General of Korea; in Formosa, from the
Governor General of Formosa; in the Kwangtung Leased
Territory, from the Envoy Extraordinary and Ambassador
Plenipotentiary to Peking; in the South Sea Islands,
from the Minister of Greater East Asia.
Art. 3. In dealing with cases concerning the administrative and judicial police, the METEI shall follow the direction of the Superintendent General of the Metropolitan Police, the Governor of Hokkaido, Prefectural Governors, Public Prosecutors, the Prefectural Governors of the Government-General of Korea, the Public Prosecutors of the Government-General of Korea, the Prefectural Governors of the Government-General of Formosa, the Directors of Boards of the same, the Public Prosecutors of the Courts of Justice of the same, the Kwantung Governor, the Prosecutors of the Kwantung Courts of Justice, the Governor of Sakhalin, the Governor of the South Sea Islands and the Prosecutors of the South Sea Islands Government.

Regarding the enforcement of laws or ordinances relative to fortification zones and areas with defense installations in the Kwantung Province, the KMETEI shall receive orders from the Fortress Commandant or the government offices which is in charge of executing such duties; regarding the enforcement of Military Regulations in the Harbors and Army Transport, the Director of the Army Transport Department; regarding the enforcement of Faval Base and Station Regulations and Port Arthur Regulations, the Faval District Commandant or the Guard District Commandant, or the government offices.
which is in charge of executing such duties.

With respect to the military police relative to the defense of districts, the KEFRI in Japan proper, shall receive orders from the Army Commander or Divisional Commanders; in Korea, from the Divisional Commander; in Formosa, from the Commander of the Garrison Unit in Formosa; and in Sakhalin, from the senior commander of the forces located there.

In case of such anisolated fortress that the provisions in the preceding paragraphs cannot be applied, the Minister of War shall stipulate.

Art. 4. The KEFRI shall accept immediately any demand in regard to his duties whenever it is made by those who have the proper authority.

Art. 5. The KEFRI shall not resort to arms except in cases stated below:

1. There an act of violence is committed upon him.
2. There is no other means available than using arms, or when he may be unable to overcome resistance without using arms, in defense of the land which he occupies, or the place or the person he is entrusted to protect.
Chapter II. Disposition and the Staff

Art. 6. KENPEI Headquarters shall be established at Tokyo; the KENPEI Unit Headquarters for the Northern Districts, at Sapporo; KENPEI Unit Headquarters in Korea, at Seoul; KENPEI Unit Headquarters in Formosa, at Taihoku. One KENPEI Unit shall be assigned to each KENPEI Unit District and to which they shall be assigned on determination of the Minister of War.

Art. 7. KENPEI Headquarters shall have whatever sections required.

The allotment of duties to each section shall be fixed by the Minister of War.

Art. 8. Each KENPEI Unit shall be divided into a headquarters and squads, with the exception of the KURE KENPEI Unit and the 'AIZUSHI KENPEI Unit.

The Minister of War may set up detachments in the KURE KENPEI Unit, the 'AIZUSHI KENPEI Unit, or each KENPEI Squad.

The location of each KENPEI Unit Headquarters, the KURE KENPEI Unit and the 'AIZUSHI KENPEI Unit, as well as the location and district of each Squad shall be fixed by the Minister of War, with the exception of Korea where the Commander of the Army in Korea shall do so; Formosa, where the Commander of the Army in Formosa shall do so; and in the Kwantung Leased
Territory where the Commander of the Kwantung Army shall do so.

Art. 8. The KEMPFI staff of Headquarters shall consist of the following personnel:

KEMPFI Commandant, Headquarters Chief, Chiefs of Sections, Adjutant, Member Officers, Members attached to Headquarters, Warrant Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Junior Civil Officials.

The staff of KEMPFI Unit Headquarters for Northern Districts shall consist of the following personnel:

Commander of the KEMPFI Unit for the Northern Districts, Adjutant, Member Officers, Members attached to the unit, Warrant Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Junior Civil Officials.

The staff of KEMPFI Unit Headquarters in Korea shall consist of the following personnel:

Commander of the KEMPFI Unit in Korea, Adjutant, Member Officers, Members attached to the unit, Warrant Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, and Junior Civil Officials.

The staff of the KEMPFI Unit Headquarters in Formosa shall consist of the following personnel:

Commander of the KEMPFI Unit in Formosa, Adjutant, Member Officers, Members attached to the unit, Warrant Officers, Non-commissioned Officers, Junior Civil Officers.
The staff of a KE'TEI Unit shall consist of the following:

- KE'TEI Unit Commander, Adjutant, KE'MPEI Squad leader,
- Officers attached to the KE'TEI Unit, Temporary Officers,
- Non-commissioned Officers, KE'TEI Lance-Cpls.

A detachment shall have a detachment leader.

Art. 9. When the necessity arises, the Minister of War may temporarily detach a part of a KE'TEI Unit to places other than the district to which assigned; the Commanders of the Armies in Korea, Formosa, and the Kwantung Lased Territory also may temporarily detach a part of the KE'TEI Unit respectively located in Korea, Formosa and Kwantung Lased Territory.

Chapter IV. Duties.

Art. 10. The KE'TEI Commandant shall control the various KE'TEI forces and supervise business at the KE'TEI Headquarters.

Art. 10-B. The KE'TEI Unit Commander for the Northern Districts shall be under the command of the KE'TEI Commandant, control the KE'TEI Units in the Northern Army Districts and administer the business of the Headquarters of the KE'TEI Unit for the Northern Districts.

Art. 11. The KE'TEI Unit Commander in Korea shall be under the command of the KE'TEI Commandant, control the KE'TEI
Def. Doc. "1334

Units in Korea and administer the business of the Headquarters of the KEMPEI Units in Korea.

Art. 11-A. The KEMPEI Unit Commander in Formosa shall be under the command of the KEMPEI Commandant, control the KEMPEI Units in Formosa and administer the business of Headquarters of the KEMPEI Unit in Formosa.

Art. 11-C. The Chief of Headquarters of the KEMPEI Headquarters shall assist the KEMPEI Commandant and get all business of the Headquarters into order.

Art. 11-D. Each Section-Chief of KEMPEI Headquarters shall take orders from the KEMPEI Commandant and shall administer the business of each of their respective sections.

Art. 12. The KEMPEI Unit Commander (except the Commanders of the KURE KEMPEI Unit and the "IZU" KEMPEI Unit) shall control the Squads under their command, designate the methods of carrying on their duties and administer the business of their Unit.

In respect to military police matters concerning the defense of districts, the KEMPEI Unit Commanders in TOKYO, OSAKA and KYOTO, besides the matters stipulated in the preceding paragraph, shall command the other KEMPEI Unit Commanders in the Army Districts where the concerned KEMPEI Units are located respectively.

The KEMPEI Unit Commander of the KURE or the "IZU" KEMPEI Units shall command and superintend their subordinates, designate the methods of execution of their
duties and administer business in their unit.

Art. 13. The adjutant, senior officers, "en"ers attached to headquarters and officers attached to KTFU units shall be under the command of their respective superiors and administer the business under their charge.

Art. 14. (Deleted)

Art. 15. The KTFU Squad Leader shall command and supervise his subordinates, designate the methods of execution of their duties and manage the business of his Squad.

Art. 16. The Detachment Leader shall command and supervise his subordinates and conduct the business under his charge.

Art. 17. Warrant officers, non-commissioned officers, junior civil officials and KTFU Force-Cpl.s shall carry on their duties under the command of their superiors.

Art. 17-1. There will be KTFU Superior Privates in a KTFU Unit.

Art. 18. KTFU Auxiliaries may be attached to a KTFU Unit.

Treatment for KTFU Auxiliaries shall correspond to KTFU Non-commissioned Officer, KTFU Force-Cpl. or army Private according to his duties.

Art. 19. Regulations concerning the duties of the KTFU shall be determined by each minister concerned, excepting those concerning the military police in Korea which shall be determined by the Commander of the Army in Korea; Formosa, by the Commander of the Army in Formosa; Kwantung Province, by the Commander of the Kwantung Army; those regarding the administrative and judicial
Ref. Doc. "13?"

police shall be determined in Korea by the Governor-General of Korea; in Formosa by the Governor-General of Formosa; in Kwantung Province by the Governor-General of Formosa; in Korea by the Governor-General of Korea; in Formosa by the Governor-General of Formosa; in Kwantung Province by the Governor-General of Formosa.

Art. 20. Regulations concerning KMTJEI auxiliaries shall be determined by the Minister of War.

Supplementary Provisions

Art. 21. (Deleted)

Art. 22. (Deleted)

Art. 23. The present Ordinance shall be put into force on December 1st, 1898 (Meiji 31).

Supplementary Provisions

(Imperial Ordinance No. 387 of 1919 (Taisho 8).

The present Ordinance shall become effective from the day of promulgation.

The Regulations of the KMTJEI stationed in Korea shall be abolished.

Supplementary Provisions

(Imperial Ordinance No. 375 of 1943 (Showa 18).

The present Ordinance shall become effective from the day of promulgation.

Imperial Ordinance No. 441 of 1927 (Taisho 18) shall be amended as follows:

Under "the KMTJEI Commandant" in the second paragraph of Article 1 and in the first paragraph of Article 2, "the Commander of the KMTJEI Unit of the Northern Districts" shall be added.
I hereby certify that the document hereto attached, consisting of 6 pages, does not vary from the original document.

February 17th.

Chief of the Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau

/s/ Miya'zu, Yozo (seal) (Signature)
Certification

1. August 1937
   The original written order issued on the occasion when the Shanghai Expeditionary Force was activated.

2. October 1937
   The original written order issued on the occasion when the Tenth Army was activated.

3. November 1937
   The original written order issued on the occasion when the Central China Area Army was activated.

4. November 1937
   The original written order designating the area of military operation issued to the Central China Area Army.

5. December 1, 1937
   The original written order issued to the Central China Area Army for the attack of Nanking.

6. December 2, 1937
   The original written order issued by Commander MATSUI. The original instructions and maps attached to the above order.

7. December 8, 1937
   The original written advice of surrender to the Chinese army. As a result of an investigation, I hereby certify that the aforementioned documents are not in the custody of this office.
Certified

On this 1st day of May, 1947

The Chief of the Document Section of the First Demobilization Office.

HIV: I Yōzo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: KAMISIRO, Takuzen.
昭和十二年八月

上海派遣軍総司令部

佐賀

立命人

上代

敬上

昭和二十二年五月一日

略

昭和二十二年五月一日

略

昭和二十二年八月一日

略
Letter Addressed to the Commander of the Japanese Army at Nanking.

14th December 1937.

Sir: We express hereby our thanks for the beautiful fact that the artillery under your command did not direct fire at that Safety Zone and also for the fact that we could make arrangements to establish liaison with you about the future plan to be adopted for the protection of the civilian Chinese in the aforesaid zone.

(Omitted)

When a certain number of Chinese soldiers were trapped into the northern section of the city an unexpected event took place. Some of them came to our office and begged us to save their lives.

Some of us on behalf of our Commission went out to call at your Headquarters. But they found only one captain on the Han-ching Kai. Thereupon we disarmed the Chinese soldiers and interned them in a house in the Zone. We should like request your magnanimous permission for them to return to peaceful civilian life as they are longing to do so.

(Omitted)

For the International Commission in the Safety Zone of Nanking.

John H.D. Lieb. (T.N. Phonetic) Chairman.
这张图片中的文本是用中文书写，但由于图片质量较低，无法清晰辨认出具体的文字内容。不过，从排版和格式来看，这可能是一篇论文或研究报告的一部分。如果需要更准确的信息，可能需要使用更高质量的图像。
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

-vs.

ARAKI, Sadao, et al.

JUDGMENT

Defendant: GRATA, Minoru

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. At the time of the termination of the war I was a colonel in the army. Now I am taking charge of ships engaged in repatriation work.

2. I know Colonel HASHIMOTO, Kingoro very well.

3. In August, 1937, when Colonel HASHIMOTO was called up by the army and became the regimental commander of the 13th Field Heavy Artillery Regiment, I was then appointed to be a battalion commander under his command. From that time until he returned to Japan in April, 1939, from Estinburi (China) I was always with him.

4. When he arrived at the point about 8 miles (3 RI) west of Wuhu on December 11, 1937, Colonel HASHIMOTO received the following order from Commanding General YANAGAWA and thereupon returned to Wuhu immediately:

"Unit Commander HASHIMOTO shall command his regiment together with one field artillery battalion and one infantry battalion and attack at the point near Wuhu ships which are carrying Chinese soldiers and sailing up on the Yangtze."

This order came about 2 A.M.

- 1 -
Def. Doc. 1361

5. Colonel HASHIMOTO's order then to me was, "Major CBnTA shall command his own unit together with one artillery battalion and occupy a position at the wharf of Wuhu and attack the fleeing Chinese fleet." This order came about 5 A.M.

6. By order of Colonel HASHIMOTO, Lt. NAKAMURA was to advance to a point about 2,000 meters downstream and to wave a handkerchief whenever he saw the fleeing enemy ships by telescope. When I saw the handkerchief waved by Lt. NAKAMURA I was to fire upon these ships.

7. It was still before dawn and not yet light; Lt. NAKAMURA waved the handkerchief. I saw through the telescope a fleet of 5 or 6 ships all gathered and anchored about 50 meters apart. I instantly began firing upon this fleet. The distance was about 4,000 meters.

8. Even after the dawn it was very difficult to see the ships clearly because of deep fog on that day, which was very typical on the Yangtze. I could only discern ships loaded with Chinese soldiers.

9. When we fired twenty or thirty shells, one of the ships put out a black smoke screen. After covering was completed by the smoke screen, one ship sailed toward us.

10. Seeing the ship coming toward us, we thought they were about to surrender, so we stopped the shelling upon them entirely. As the ship neared its hull became clear. When it came within 3,000 meters, we first discovered then it was not a Chinese army ship. At first it was not the distance but the heavy fog which made it difficult for us to tell these were not Chinese army ships.

11. After ceasing fire and while waiting for the ship to reach the wharf, we then found out by its flag that it was a
Def. Doc. 1361

British ship and it had received two direct hits.

12. A rear admiral wearing staff officer insignia, the captain of the ship, his executive officer, and one other officer came ashore and asked us to meet for negotiations.

13. From our side Colonel HASHIMOTO, Lt. KAKATTUHA, and I, together with one interpreter, took part in this negotiation. The first question they asked was why we had fired upon them. To this Colonel HASHIMOTO instantly replied, "we fired upon the ships because they were loaded with Chinese soldiers. Their next question was why we had fired on British ships. Colonel HASHIMOTO again instantly answered, "Due to the heavy fog we were not able to see and tell they were British ships."

14. Since one death had resulted from the shelling, the Captain of the British ship asked us to attend the funeral service. We sent one representative to this funeral service. This was held at the public hall.

15. This British ship was the "Ladybird". Later I learned that the matter of the Ladybird incident was taken up through diplomatic negotiations, but as to its details I know nothing.

16. Colonel HASHIMOTO and the Hashimoto forces had no connection whatsoever with the sinking of the American ship "Panay". We, the Hashimoto force, had never seen the "Panay".

17. The Hashimoto force was stopped at Wuhu, 14 or 15 "RI" (about 37 miles) from Hankow. Shortly after the fall of Nanking this force was ordered to advance to Hankow and therefore never participated in the attack on Nanking nor did it enter into Nanking, or its vicinity.

18. The Hashimoto force did not attack Hankow nor did it enter Hankow or its vicinity.
19. The Hashimoto force did not attack Canton (Kuan-Tung) nor did it enter Canton or its vicinity.

At the place of Mr. Itsuro Hayashi, No. 877, 3-Chome, Kami-Kitazawa-Machi, Setagaya-Ku, Tokyo, on this 11th day of January, 1947.

Signed and sealed: OBA, Minoru

I hereby certify that the above said person has duly sworn, subscribed and sealed thereto on before me.

On the same date and place.

Witness: signed and sealed: HAYASHI, Itsuro

Oath

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TERADA, Masao (signed and sealed)
The last protocol re the North China Incident
(appendix No. 16)

IMP. RIAL EDICT of December 24, 1901 (translation).

It has been stipulated in the treaties concluded between China and the foreign powers that the citizens of those powers shall be allowed to penetrate into the interior.

The Court, in order to assure and maintain relations with other countries, has already published decrees ordering that most sincere efforts be made in the provinces to assure protection. Nevertheless, the local authorities having gradually grown lax (in the exercise of their duties), malefactors have caused trouble, and attacks have been directed against foreigners. Similar incidents have repeatedly occurred.

We realize that our ability is too limited to reform the ignorant people, and consequently we have made very grievous mistakes. In ordinary times, not one of the local officials has been able to make understood European affairs, and none have comprehended the importance of foreign relations. Consequently the conflagration spread everywhere, threatening the Empire, and if they reflect, they will find they have cause for uneasiness.

Henceforth each one of you must strive to overcome his resentment and to lay aside his prejudices. You should know that the maintenance of friendly relations with foreign countries has in all times been a fundamental law. People coming to from afar, whether as merchants to exchange their products, or as travelers
to increase their scientific knowledge, or yet as missionaries to
breach religion with the object of exhorting the people to do
good, have crossed mountains and seas at the risk of great fatigue.

Since China passes for a civilized country, it should practice
the duties of a host toward its guests. Moreover, the Chinese
who have gone abroad in recent years number at least several hundreds.
The safety of their persons and property depends upon the
 guaranty assured them by the Powers, who have given them their
 protection. How could we continue to treat their citizens differen-
tly?

We again command all the responsible High civil and military
authorities of all the provinces to order subordinates to protect,
in the most efficacious manner, the agents and nationals of the
foreign Powers who may enter within their districts. In case
daring malefactors should urge to illtreat and massacre for-
eigners, order must be restored immediately and the guilty parties
arrested and punished without delay. No delay should occur. If
owing to indifference, or rather of voluntary tolerance, great
calamities take place, or if treaties should be violated and no
immediate steps taken to make reparation or inflict punishment,
the Governors-general, Governors, and the provincial or local
Officials responsible will be removed and shall not be reappointed
to other offices in other provinces, or hope to be reinstated or
received any further honors.

The present decree must be printed and published to warn the
officials and put an end to all shameful customs.

Respect this!
Correct copy.

D. A. NTHOYR.
B. KRONZNSlav.
R. H. T. T. T. V. R.
G. B. H. H. H. B. R. B. C.
I, K.Y.SHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief Archives, Section Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereeto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Appendix No. 16 to Final Protocol re Boxir's Incident" is an exact and authorized extract from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 19 day of March 1947

K.Y.SHI, Kaoru
signature of Official

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereeto in the presence of the witness,
at the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: URI. L., Kitaumi (so. 1)
Def. Doc. f 1366

SPEECH BY T. T. TAKETA AT THE 70TH EMPIREAL DIET SESSION

January 21st, 8th 12 (1897)

Gentlemen! Greeting here the new year of 12, we subjects are truly delighted to see the glory of the Imperial Household. Especially as His Majesty the Emperor is in a brighter mood and in a stronger state of health. Nevertheless, it is truly possible to think that His Majesty the Emperor is constrained in thinking day and night on how to make our nation develop and how to bring about the welfare of its people and the peace of the world.

It is my great honor that I chance hereby to state the political ideas of our government in this new hall of the Diet, and to consult with you upon the great contribution to the development and expansion of our national destiny, bearing the great responsibility of political service in our minds.

Our Empire has the mission of contributing to the establishment of the eternal peace of the world, observing justice and removing evil and promoting cooperation, co-existence and co-prosperity with all other nations. It is our great joy that our nation is fulfilled in strength, our international position is elevated and we are rapidly developing in all the fields of civilization and thus we are
advancing towards the accomplishment of our higher mission through the Divine dignity and wonderful exertion of our people.

But considering deliberately the situation, within and faced without our Empire, we are faced with unresolved problems of today such as those of thought, defense, industry, economy, finance, education and many others on one hand, and the chaotic world-situation on the other. The international political situation is growing more and more delicate and the problems in our foreign relations are becoming more and more complex; thus we should be conscious of the various difficulties which lie before our Empire. In order to overcome these difficulties and to ensure the development of our nation, we have to proclaim externally the higher mission of our Empire throughout the world, and to deepen other countries' honest perception regarding ourselves; and internally, we have to accomplish a political reformation, ensuring the establishment of various institutions and the control and extension of our rational power. The fundamental policy to achieve these aims is in my opinion to make the idea of our glorious rational reality more and more clear and to carry or all things, internal and external, according to that very idea and thus to elevate the spirit of the people and to serve devotedly with their internal and vital will, with Imperial Dignity as their life-centre. The above is the fundamental of our government in serving the Divine will.
in order to in rebuild our nation.

The principle of our foreign policy is unchangeable forever in accordance with the above stated mission of the Empire. Further, strengthening of our special and inseparable relationship with Manchoukuo upon the basis of the fundamental principle prescribed, and ensuring our position as a stabilizing power of in East Asia, and also believing in the essential necessity of adjusting friendship between Japan and China with the broad view of maintenance of eternal peace in East Asia, our government is endeavoring to develop neighbourly amity, co-operation and friendship.

Our government has been keeping strict control over communistic activity which was counter to our dignified national character and which destroys the welfare of all humanity. But the menace of the Comintern is increasing much of late, and its international Bolsheviking propaganda is becoming much more skillful and profound. We feel truly the necessity of defense by international co-operation, and so have concluded recently the anti-Comintern Pact with Germany which has the same standpoint as our nation. We attach as great importance as ever to the adjustment of Japan-Soviet relations and are doing our best to that end; we have also a definite desire to promote friendly relations with Britain and the U.S. It is needless to say that we stand upon
international faith and are fostering friendship with other Powers.

Now I want to state the important policy which the present Cabinet has endeavoured to carry out in connection with the budget, beginning with the fiscal year of 1537 (Oct. 1). We have exerted our strength for the materialization of policies upon the principle which was revealed at the 69th Imperial Diet, last spring. As a result, our government has decided on concrete policies regarding the expansion of rational defense and six other items and has prepared to introduce to the Diet the "Great Bill and Rations relevant to this necessity. As I stated at the last Diet, we have many things to establish and adjust throughout every field of our administration, but in view of the present situation, within and without, and the present financial situation, we have decided to concentrate our strength on things considered to be most important, and which must be realized by all means.

The first is the fulfillment of rational defense. We should never fail even in the slightest in rational defense in order to ensure the existence of our nation, and to affirm the complete accomplishment of various policies and to achieve the sure security and power East Asia to lead a rapid progress in peace. Especially, when we consider the present international situation, we feel its importance much more. On the side of the Army, armaments should be rapidly filled up to
ensure the security of national defense in the continental area and on the side of the Navy. Preparation necessary for national defense must be provided according to the fundamental principle of "Pro-peace and No-Invader", finding ourselves in the period of no armament treaties which began on January 1st of this year. Of course, our Empire does not wish to indulge unilaterally in any armament race, but we think that the full preservation of defense is the most appropriate measure to be taken in the face of the changing international situation and in order to prevent the evils of war before it comes, and to accomplish the mission of our Empire, and to ensure the development of our rational property.

The second is the reconstruction and improvement of education, I believe that the reconstruction of our culture in response to the need of the times, and the elevation of the spirit of the people are especially necessary to us in the present situation. As popular education is the foundation of the whole education system, all other educational institutions should stand upon the sound foundation of this type of education, so we have decided hereby to put into practice the extension of the term of compulsory education and the improvement of its contents, as a prerequisite to the fundamental reconstruction of education. Together with this, we think that we should improve other fields of education suitably. Still more, we saw that it was essentially important
in view of the present situation of our country, to clarify the principle of our national reality and to correct along the line the defects of our present educated system as well as positively to plan for the emergence of the true culture of our nation with the idea of crystallising the national character. Therefore we are now endeavouring to realize the idea embodied in the report of the remodelling of education which was decided upon at the Education Remodelling Council in November last year.

The third is the readjustment of the taxation system both central and local. The readjustment of the taxation system has often been tried before, but this time the Government has drafted a bill for the reconstruction of the system with the aim of increasing revenue to meet expenses for various establishments and movements in completing the rational defence, in extending the rational strength and in fostering the rational foundation, together with the aim of readjusting the system of taxation, both central and local, to set up equality of the tax-harbour of the people and solid-scale system of taxation. As for the content of the bill, it will be explained in detail by the minister for finance.

The fourth is the stability of the life of our people. It is needless to say that the stability of the life of the people should be planned out in order to ensure the development.
of the national destiny. Many plans are to be found for that purpose, but we have decided to contribute to the stability of the life of the people in the first place with a fundamental plan such as adequate measures for preventing calamities, extension of insurance, the promotion of economy in farms, and fishing villages and the encouragement of medium and small commercial and industrial enterprises.

Adequate measures for preventing natural calamities, consist in strengthening works against the menace of floods which have occurred often in recent years, and as for the health service extension of tuberculosis Preventor institutes, the creation of a system of national health insurance, renovation of first aid services etc. have been endorsed. Thus we have provided for the promotion of health and the betterment of the physical condition of people.

With such measures as the arrangement of the system of creating and maintaining private farmers, for suitable proportion between the rent and yield of farms for promoting worth of debts in the farming villages, and fishing villages, and for subsidy compensation for loss caused by natural calamities in farming, forestry and fisheries, we have endeavoured to promote the revival and development of economic life in farms, and fishing villages. By extending and strengthening the organization of middle and small businessmen and industrialists, by enforcing the system of
Fund-Circulation and Loss-Indecency, and by taking various measures including the decentralization of industry, we have intended to attain the promotion and development of middle and small commercial and industrial enterprises.

Besides these plans, the government has established a concrete plan for the development of the profoundly impoverished north-eastern districts and has begun work on the project. The government has founded the People's Savings Banks and Pension Cash Offices to lighten monetary difficulties; and the government has arranged for various establishments in regard to the promotion of industry and the development of trade, of which I am going to speak later, thus we have endeavoured to contribute much to the stability of our rational life.

The fifth is the development of industry and the expansion of trade. To foster the foundation of the rational strength through the development of industry and the expansion of trade is a means of contributing to the stability of the life of the people and is an essential to the rapid progress of the nation. There are of course many kinds of plans, but I will refer as follows to things on which the government is now concentrating its strength.

The first is the intensification of control of electric power. In recent years, the progress of electric science has been so great, and the importance of electricity has increased
In all fields of activities. In view of the universality of electricity and the public nature of electrical enterprises, we now intend to start rational control of electric power so as to practise various rules such as the scientific development of hydraulic resources, the accomplishment of a large network of power-transmission, the establishment of uniform government rates and the fulfilment of the need of national defence, etc. These measures are not only essential to the development of industry, but also contribute much to the development of the nation and the stability of the life of people. The next is the problem of liquid fuel and iron. As the promotion of self-supply of liquid fuel is extremely urgent, in the present situation at home and abroad we are planning the extension and expansion of every existing establishment, as well as the establishment and promotion of the synthetic petroleum industry and are working for its realization, while, on the other hand, we are planning the expansion and readjustment of the executive organ of the national fuel policy. We are also planning to expand and strengthen various kinds of fundamental measures such as the establishment of a concrete policy for iron and steel extending over Japan and Manchukuo for the self-sufficiency in iron and steel and the independence of the iron industry, to improve and control
adequately the iron industry of this country, and to develop and secure the resources for iron production, etc. These things are important not only for the development of industry itself, but also for the fostering of our resources and other measures in view of the preparation for enforcing control. Furthermore, as for fibre resources, we will endeavour to develop source of supply of raw materials and the establishment of the substitute materials industry in order to secure important industrial materials such as cotton, wool, etc., or to lean the self-supply of substitute materials.

The commerce and trade of our Empire has made great strides year by year during the world-wide economic depression and have accomplished a smooth development. This is due truly to the many years' assiduity and order of the people, and the progress of productive techniques. We place confidence in the result, but as international trade is limited by various obstacles as before, the future of our trade is not always hopeful. Therefore we must exclude trading obstacles or neutralize them through co-operation with every nation as well as by taking every step likely to contribute to the revival of trade through the co-operative work of officials and the people. For the purpose, our government is ready to endeavour positively to expand trade-control, to keep a balance between industries of partner nations and our nation,
Def. Doc. 7 1366

to remedy abuses in our trading, to promote our trade satisfactorily and to open foreign markets, to turn internal towards export-industry and to protect and promote foreign markets.

Next, the fluctuation of its aerial navigation and shipping business is profoundly related to the prosperity or the decay of a nation. It is a pressing duty of ours to plan quickly for the increase in civil aviation, and to exert our strength for the positive advancement of our shipping business. Accordingly our government expects to realize various projects such as the completion and extension of air lines, the promotion and control of the aircraft-industry, the establishment and improvement of a regular aerial service, construction of high class ships, the advancement of ocean navigation, etc.

In addition to the above, we expect to contribute to the development of industry by creating means of encouraging emigration of our people and the advancement into foreign countries of our enterprises, together with neutralizing the problem of population, reconstructing the postal service, extending telegraph and telephone service and promoting railway transportation. Further, the "Low Money Rate Policy" which has been carried or since our cabinet was formed has not only decreased the financial burden of all people and contributed
to the perfect accomplishment of Public Loan Policy, but has also promoted industries in general and contributed to the development of industrial economy. Or things prescribed we prepared to continue to exert our efforts still further.

The sixth is the establishment of the important policy toward Marchoukuo. To encourage emigration into Marchoukuo is to strengthen the inseparable relationship of both countries and to contribute to the sound development of Marchoukuo. Still more, to assist the economic development of Marchoukuo is the shorter road towards the realization of Japan-Marchoukuo economic co-operation. On such accounts, we have established the plan of sending out a great number of emigrants, and have investigated measures for encouraging investment in Marchoukuo.

The seventh is the readjustment and improvement of the administrative machinery. It is needless to say that it is essentially important to readjust and improve the administrative machinery properly in order to contribute to the prosperity of the nation and the welfare of the people by carrying on administration most reasonably and smoothly which will grow more and more complex with the lapse of time. Especially in order to carry on the above stated institutions and managements effectively and reasonably and to improve their results, we feel truly our great responsibility. Therefore,
to readjust and improve central and local administrative machinery, and to do work smoothly in our administration, we are now concentrating our mind in investigation, and when we have acquired good plans, we will put them into practice one by one.

Together with the readjustment and improvement of the administrative machinery, the readjustment of the structure and regulation of the House of Representatives is also demanded. And so at the last Diet, a draft proposal on this question was decided upon. As its result, our government established three boards of investigation in the cabinet, "the House of Representatives Regulation Investigation Board", "Election Regulation Investigation Board" and "the House of Peers Regulation Investigation Board". And learned men in and out of office were made by petition to the Emperor the members of those boards to carry out the investigation. Among them, as for the House of Representatives-Regulation and the Election-Regulation, we paired answers concerning some parts on which readjustment was necessary; we are ready to lay amending bills before the Diet through appropriate procedure for your deliberate discussion. In my opinion it is important to deepen our people's understanding of constitutionalism and self-government and their idea of responsibility in order to ensure the development of constitutionalism, and I wish our government to make efforts with
that aim is in view. "Whatever the situation may be, any policy contradictory to the principle of our constitution is not at all permissible. I believe that all our people should serve devotedly the great constitution under the National policy, incomparable with that of any other nation.

As I have stated recently, to plan the extension of rational strength in all fields and to ensure the stability of the rational life and the complete firmness of rational defense are today’s pressing duty for securing the future of progressive Japan in face of the situation at home and abroad. Measures that the government is now going to take at this time may not be adequate in scale and expenditure to fulfill the above purpose, but I believe that establishments on this scale at least should be realized no matter what the difficulties. For realization, we need the decisive will and impetus of the people in advancing as one integral power. From this standpoint, our government is exerting its entire strength and service to perform effective duty, and thus we would like to hear your candid opinion coming as it does from the rational standpoint. I will respect it and we assure you we will accomplish this important policy and endeavor for the advancement of our rational destiny. Facing you will consider the need of the times and understand the intention of our government, I sincerely expect you quickly to approve the bills that the government now proposes.

Statement of Source and Authenticity


Certified at Tokyo,
the 21st day of January, 1937.

(signed) K. HAYASHI
Signature of Official

Witness: (signed) Nagaharu ODO


TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 20th April, 1937
第四条 職業生活ノ安定デアルアリスマスニシテ、通商ノ発展ヲ図タル為ニハ、道ノ措置ヲ講ず。デアルスガ、業務ヲ担当ヘリ災害ヲ防除ス、而シテ其方策ノデアルヲナラスコトトヨリシテ、従事タザル所セラルデアルマス。
※テノデアルマス

第五回産業ノ振興及貿易ノ観念デアルマス，産業ノ振興シ，貿易ノ伸張

先づ電力ノ観念強化デアルマス，既近電気料ヲ各方面ニ加電サレタノデアルマス，而シテ電気ノ電力ノ国家管理ヲ行ヒ，以テ水力資源ヲ合理

に開発，大過電気ノ完成，電力ノ国家管理ヲ立，国防卜必要充足等ノ観方

ナラズ，又国家ノ観念，国民生活ノ安定ヲ資スル所少クナノテアルマス，ノミテアルマスガ，政府ガ今後ヲカワ注イテ事項ヲ，次ニ演述ベタイト思ヒマ
In all the provinces bandits called for followers and established antiforeign societies. Various edicts were issued formally forbidding this. We repeated this many times, but, nevertheless, in late years there have been in all the Shantung districts sects under the name of Fa-tao-huie (Great Knives Society) and I-ho-chuan (Boxers), which spread everywhere, with the object of willful murder and theft. Little by little they reached the Chi-li territory and suddenly entered the capital, where they set fire to the foreign establishments and attacked the Legations. Crimes were also committed against neighboring countries and offenses against the general interest. For not having assured protection we have incurred heavy responsibilities.

You people who in ordinary times nourish yourselves and live from the products of this land, and who have all been loaded with the emperor's favors—you have, however, dared to incite these bandits with the desire to fight, to teach methods for casting spells, and to devote themselves to false practices. You have rashly resisted your officials, whom you have massacred; you have assassinated foreigners, and then you have been the cause of unprecedented calamities, which above all else have plunged your sovereign and your fathers in grief.

We can not think of what has been done without feeling a still deeper resentment. We have already formally ordered the Commanders in chief of all the regions to use their most strenuous
efforts to destroy those societies. It is incumbent that the roof of the evil be suppressed, and the Princes and ministers who have lent their support to the Boxers shall suffer the heaviest penalties according to their crimes, and in order to inspire fear, all civil and military examinations shall be suspended during five years in all cities where foreigners were massacred or suffered cruel treatment.

Fearing lest the ignorant rural populations may not hear (of these punishments), new and severe prohibitions shall be specially made in order to avoid the execution of people who have not been notified.

You, soldiers and people, should know that it is formally forbidden by law to organize or belong to secret societies. Our ancestors have never shown the slightest indulgence in the repression of societies of malefactors.

Moreover, the foreign powers are all friendly countries, the Christians are children of our blood whom the Court regards with a some kindness, and it could not allow different sentiments to be displayed towards them. All Chinese, whether Christians or not, who may be illtreated, should complain to the authorities and wait until a fair and equitable judgment is rendered. How can you lightly believe all the rumors which have been spread? how can you dis regard the penal laws?

Then, when all is lost, the clever ones save themselves by flight and the innocent are put to death. The law is slow to pardon, and all that has happened is really very regrettable.

From the publication of this present edict, each one must reform.
and repent him of the teaching he has received.

If hardened and incorrigible offenders should again secretly organize antiforeign societies, they shall be punished by death, as well as those belonging to these societies. They shall not be shown the slightest mercy.

The Tartar Generals, Governors-General, Governors, and high provincial Authorities whose duty it is to direct the population, should give explicit instructions to their subordinates to publish severe proclamations and to have the present edict printed on yellow paper, which shall be posted in all parts of the Empire. It is important that all families be notified, and urged to good conduct, and that all be informed that the will of the Court is that everyone should thoroughly understand that punishments will be meted out, in order to avoid the necessity of inflicting other punishments.

Let this edict be made known to all in the Empire.

Respect this!

Correct copy.

L. D'Auverard.

S. Aroupenay.

Reginald Tower.

G. Bohlen-Halbach.

- 3 -
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, AKORU, who occupy the post of Chief Archives Section Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereunto attested, written in Japanese, consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Appendix No. 15 to Final Protocol re Boxer's Incident" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 19 day of March 1947.

HAYASHI, AKORU
Signature of Official

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereunto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: ULMER, NATEM (seal)
1368

1368

1368

1368

1368

1368

1368

1368

1368

1368

1368

1368

1368

1368

1368
CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that the minutes of the so-called Dairen Conference July, 1933 (the 8th year of Showa)—, the Japan-Manchukuo-China Conference held at Dairen concerning matters pending between Manchukuo and China,— and the documents concerning the Railway Agreement concluded July, 1934 (the 9th year of Showa), based on the said conference, (relative to direct train service, that is, running through trains on the railways of Manchukuo and China), the Customs Agreement concluded December, the same year, and the Mail Agreement concluded February, 1935 (the 10th year of Showa) (which arranged direct telegraph service between Manchukuo and China) as a result of enquiry are not at present in the custody of this Bureau.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 25th day of April, 1947.

/S/ MIYAMA, Yōzō
Chief of the Archives Section,
the 1st Repatriation Bureau.
Def. Doc. #1373

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: BANNO, Junkichi (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 5th May 1947.
ERRATA SHEET

Def. Doc. 1375

Affidavit of T.T. DA, Masao.

The following corrections should be made on line 6, page 2; "On the same date at Tokyo."

Cmit "at Tokyo" and add "and at the same place."
Defense Document No. 1375

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

The UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

AIJIKI, Sado, et al

SHOWN DEPOSITION

ELIMINEN: T.L.O., Kasa

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows:

1. My last rank as an army officer was that of Lt General.

2. I was a staff officer in charge of operations in the Yanagawa Army in December 1937. My duties included receiving reports from the units in the field and dispatching orders to the units in the field, the area of operations being in a part of South China.

3. On or about December 10th, 1937, reports were received at Headquarters from the Nanking area stating that the defeated soldiers from Nanking were fleeing on the Yangtze River and that it was believed that some of the Chinese ships were attempting to disguise themselves by using the flag of another country.

4. On December 11, 1937 an order was issued, by Lt. Gen Heisuke Yanagawa, and delivered to the Kinugoro Hashimoto unit, directing that his unit should proceed to Wufu and take a position at that point and shell any Chinese ships attempting to flee from Nanking. It was further added that all ships carrying Chinese troops should be fired upon even if they were hoisting the flag of a third country.
On this _14_ day of April, 1947 at Fukui.

Decl. by: TERADA, MASAO (Seal)

I, TII'A, K0EI hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date at Tokyo

WITNESS: TII'A, K0EI (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

TERADA, MASAO (Seal)
自由民主党

森 高

供述書

谷 信

對

豆芽加村

其他

第

-1-
日本語

日本語

日本語

日本語

日本語

日本語
Excerpts from the "SOVIET UNION YEAR-BOOK" (1943-1944) Pages 169-170.

Five-Year Plan Period.

Beginning of the expansion of armaments.

In order to cope with the ever changing international situation and in line with the Five-Year plan, Soviet Russia began to carry out the technical modernization of the Red Army and intensified, at the same time, the fortification of the boundary zones both on the east and the west such as the Baltic Sea, the Black Sea and the Murmansk Region, especially she paid close attention to strengthen the defenses of the Far Eastern coast, and thus she gradually expanded her military preparations.

What importance did Soviet Russia attach to her military preparations during the period of 1928 to 1939 may be seen clearly from the following war expenditure, which is an index in the construction of her national defense:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>War Expenditure (in 100 million roubles)</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>War Expenditure (in 100 million roubles)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1937</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>408</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>24</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Very conspicuous increases can be seen from the above table. The figures published by the Soviet authorities of the mechanization of the Red Army based upon the Industrial Plan during the period of 1930 to 1939 show the increase of an average horsepower per head in the Red Army to 3.07 H.P. in 1930; 7.74 H.P. in 1933 and 30 H.P. in 1939 respectively. Should these figures be true, it means that the mechanization was improved about ten times during the period of 1930 to 1939. The Soviet authorities also announced that, during the same period, the number of tanks was increased by 43 times; aeroplanes by 6.5 times; heavy guns, guns, and light guns, by about 7 times; light calibre anti-tank guns, by 70 times and machine guns by about 5.5 times.

It is further reported that the cultural standard of officers and men was improved considerably and the number of Communists and that of the member of Communist the Young Men's League were increased remarkably. The ratio of regular army men and militia men in 1935 was reversed in the composition of the Red Army; the former being 77% and the latter 23%.

During this period, on June 20th, 1934, the Revolutionary Military Council and the People's Commissar for the Army and Navy were abolished, the latter being renamed the People's Commissar for National Defense and became the actual supreme command of both the Red Army and the Red Navy. And on 22nd of November, 1934, the military Council was newly established as a consultative body of the People's Commissar for National Defense.

Military Strength of the Reds
(1927–1938)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Sharp shooters divisions</th>
<th>Cavalry divisions</th>
<th>Number of aeroplanes</th>
<th>Number of tanks</th>
<th>Independent mechanized battalions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5,500</td>
<td>6,700</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>7,500</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Far Eastern Red Army.

The Sino-Soviet clash and the advance of the Red Army towards east.

It was in 1922 that Soviet Russia came to exercise her power over the Far Eastern region. For several years after 1922, the construction policy of the Soviet Government was centered mainly in the European Russia, and the eastern boundary was quiet and only small local forces too insignificant as a national defense power were stationed at some strategic points, with Vladivostok and Khabarovsk as the center.

However, in July, 1929, the Chinese authorities carried out a coup d'état to take over the Chinese Eastern Railway and the diplomatic relations between Soviet Russia and China were brought to a state of rupture as the result of which Soviet Russia rapidly intensified her military preparations in the Far East.

Upon receipt of the report of the dispute over the Chinese Eastern Railway, the leaders of the Communist Party ordered Kuibuishev, then the Commander of the Siberian Military District, to concentrate the Red forces and, at the same time, they declared war upon China. The Red forces in those days were three infantry divisions and two cavalry brigades and were roughly equal to the Chinese forces. Thus, the Special Far Eastern Army was organized and Galon (Rallukhel), former military advisor to the Revolutionary Chinese National Government, was appointed the commander of the Army. In September 1929, the first fighting took place between the Chinese forces and the Kazakevitch Unit which was under the command of the Special Far Eastern Army. Soon after this, the Kazakevitch Unit was reenforced...
by superior Red forces dispatched from Leningrad and gained a series of victories, and thus the military operations extended over such regions as the Maritime Province, Heilungchow and Lake Baikal.

Further, in the latter part of November, Bullukhol issued an order for a general attack, whereupon, the Red Army gradually subdued the Chinese forces and finally defeated them completely and dealt them a crushing blow at Djarainor in the neighborhood of Manchuli. Thus, they won a great victory with about 10,000 Chinese war prisoners and many booties. Under such circumstances, the peace treaty between Soviet Russia and China was concluded in the latter part of December of the same year.

The organization of the Special Far Eastern Army.

Since the incident above mentioned, the interest of Soviet Russia in the Far East was suddenly increased and, with an addition of one division, the Far Eastern Army was organized. Further, after the Manchurian Incident, reinforcements were sent from Siberia and the European Russia, and thus the Army came to be composed of eight or nine infantry divisions, one cavalry division and one cavalry brigade with a total strength of about 110,000 to 120,000 troops.

Five-Year Plan Period.

As the 7th All Union Congress of Soviets, held in January 1935, the late Tkachovsky stressed "the necessity for preparing a positive and independent operation on both eastern and western boundaries." This is the basis of his famous theory on the frontal and simultaneous operations on
which still survive even after his death. Thus, since 1935, the military strength in the Far East has markedly been reinforced and modernized according to the Five-Year Plan which was put in force on several occasions.

In spite of the conspiracy of the light leaders of the Red Army who were shot to death in June, 1937, and the consequent enforcement of strict military discipline, the Far Eastern Army, because of its special nature, was not regulated or reorganized so speedily as was witnessed in the case of other military districts. However, before the conspiracy of the Red Army was exposed, the Military Council was newly established in each military district as a counter-measure in the future, due to the result of which, the authority of the commander of the military district was considerably restricted.

The above decision was of course, immediately enforced upon the Far Eastern Army. The Far Eastern Red Army thus did farewell to the days when Bullukhel was its sole leader and came to be controlled by three heads; namely, Bullukhel; General Khekaniyan, new member of the military Council and Lieutenant-General Waineros, Chief of the Political Affairs Board of the Army. Afterwards (during the one year from June, 1937, to June, 1938), the above named three heads seems to have been made victims of the enforcement of strict military discipline, because there is absolutely no news of them heard up to this moment.

With the outbreak of the Changkufeng Incident in the summer of 1938, the Far Eastern Red Army was divided into two parts about the middle of September, 1938, viz., the 1st Red Army ( Vladivostok) and the 2nd Red Army.
In 1939, the Nomonhan Incident broke out, and thus it became clear that the Far Eastern Red Army had ended its defensive character and come to assume an offensive nature. Also during 1939, it was named the Far Eastern Frontal Army and both the 1st and 2nd Red Armies were placed under its control. This situation has been prevailing up to the present moment.

After the outbreak of the Russo-German war in June 1941, the offensive character of the Far Eastern Frontal Army seemed somewhat declined, but there is no apparent change in its strength and the force is as great as ever.

Besides the above Army, there is the Za-Baikal Army Group in the eastern part of Soviet Russia (stationed at China).

### Strength of the Far Eastern Red Army

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch Year</th>
<th>Total strength</th>
<th>Sharp shooter division</th>
<th>Cavalry division</th>
<th>Number of aeroplanes</th>
<th>Number of tanks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before Manchurian Incident</td>
<td>50,000</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>400,000</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At the end of about 1941</td>
<td>800,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>2,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The above table was compiled according to the estimate of this publishing company. (T.N, Nisso Tsushinsha)
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese by NISSO TSU3I Jif jftHA, consisting of 1062 pages, entitled the "SOVIET UNION YEAR-BOOK" and issued on the 5th of C Tucker, 1947, is a book which I wrote and which I had printed and published.

certified at Tokyo,
on this 24th day of April, 1947

MIYASHITA, Kenichiro (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: MORIYAMA, Toshio
Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 13 1947
蘇聯邦年度（一九四三—一九四四年版）よりの抜萃

一九九頁—一七〇頁

軍の開始

ソ聯邦は急激な国際情勢に対応し、且五ヶ年計画の波に乗って、赤軍の技術的近代化を図ると共に、西部、東部の両国境地域の要塞化を強化し、パルチアック、黒海、ムルマンスク地方、特に極東沿岸の防備強化に細心の注意を払い、逐次軍備を拡大して行った。一九二八年—一九二九年

軍事費（単位億円）
以上の如く、非常に顕著な増大が見られる。一九三〇年〜一九三九年間にその機械化が約十倍に発展していることになる。又同
年間に戦車数は四倍、飛行機数は大・五倍、重砲、中砲、軽砲は約七倍、小口径対戦車砲は七〇倍、機関銃は約五・五倍に発展したと報し示している。

しかし、将兵の文化水準の向上、軍団並に共産同盟員の数は著しく増大したと言われて居り、且調の編成に於ける差幹兵と民兵の比率は一九三五年には差幹兵七七・、民兵二三・と逆転するに至った。

この間、一九三四年六月二十日革命軍事會議及び臨海軍人民委員部が廃止され、臨海軍人民委員部は国防人民委員部と改称され、赤軍に赤色海軍の実際の統帥権を握った。又一九三四年十一月ニ十二日には国防人民委員の諮問に属する為、軍事会議が新設された。
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年</th>
<th>课程</th>
<th>军区</th>
<th>师团</th>
<th>教团</th>
<th>营</th>
<th>数伍</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>七</td>
<td>七</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>五</td>
<td>五</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>六</td>
<td>六</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>七</td>
<td>七</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>八</td>
<td>八</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ref: #1328
露支衛突と赤軍東方進出

露東地方にお営房政権の政令が出されたのは一九二六年のことであるが、それから五年、六ケ年の間は露営房政府の建設方針が主として欧露に集中され、又東方同域は平穏で露東には単にウラディオフハバロフスを中心とする要部に地方的な軍勢が僅かに駐屯しているに止まり、国防力としては些細なものであった。

かかるに一九二九年七月に至り、支那放領が南北路道奪取のクーデタを起こし、ソ軍間交が断交状態となりソ営房の軍事史は急速に改善された。司令官クイヴィジェフに命じて赤軍の集団を統一せしめ、当時のソベリャ軍管区内略々支那軍と匹敵したものであった。斯くて特別露東軍が新設され、
支那軍革命軍事顧問であったガロン（ブリュッヘル）が司令官に任命され、九月に入り特別従軍監下のカザフウイチ部隊と支那軍との間に最初の戦闘が行われ、やがてレニングラードよりの優秀赤軍部隊等の来援があり、連日、連夜、遅日に沿海州、黒龍州、バイカル湖一带に軍勢が拡大され、更に十一月下旬に至りブリュッヘルの総攻撃令が発せられ、従支那軍を制圧して滿洲里附近のジャライノールに於て徹底的に撃破した。
五ケ年計画時代

会って故トハフェフスキーは一九三五年一月の第七回全聯邦ソヴェー

ト大会ノ席上に於て一東西両国界に確実なる独立作戦ノ準備が必要で

あるが、彼の死後尚同作戦論は続続してゐる。かくて一九三五年

以来東洋に於ける兵力是極めて活潑に向加され、数次の五ヶ年計画と

共に近代化されるに至った。

一九三七年六月に結核されると赤軍八至星間谍事件並に其後の人侵軍工

作は極東軍の特殊性に鑑み、他の軍管区の如く急速な発達若しくは原

在は不適されなかつ。然し赤軍間谍事件勃発前に、その後の一對

警として、各軍管区に軍事会議が新設され、軍管区司令官の権限は著

しく制限された。その決定は勿論極東軍にも直ちに実行された。新く

て極東赤軍はブリュッヘル中心時代を過ぎ、ブリュッヘル、新軍最高統監ハハニャン大

将、軍政治部長ワインネロス中将の三頭制となつた。後（一九三七年六
一．
1. 100
2. 1200
3. 111000
CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that, as a result of investigation, it has been found that the document "Plans for the Dispatch of Troops with the Sole Object of Protecting the Rights and Interests of Foreign Residents in China and of localizing the Incident in 1937" — (a part of the document of giving the plan of operations of the General Staff.) is not in the custody of our office at present.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 25th day of April, 1947.

The Chief of the Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau,

YOSHIYAMA, Yozo.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness

at the same place, on this same date.

Witness: BANNO, Junkichi. (seal)
CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that it has been found upon investigation that the Imperial edict issued about 6.30 p.m. July 11, 1937, ordering the dispatch of part of the Army forces from Korea and Manchuria to North China is not at present in the custody of our office.

certified at Tokyo
on this 25th day of April, 1947

MIYAMA, Yozo
Chief of the Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness,
at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: BANNO Junkichi

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date May 7, 1947
Certificate

I, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section in the First Demobilization Office, hereby certify that as a result of our investigation it has been made clear that the original copy of a telegram received at the General Staff Headquarters from the Tientsin Garrison Troops and the Military Attaché in China concerning the condition of the Chinese Forces during the days from July 7 to the latter part of August 1937 is not in the custody of our office.

Certified at Tokyo
on this 25th day of April, 1947

/S/ MIYAM, (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of this witness.

At the same place, on the same date,

Witness: BANNO, Junkichi.
Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date May 7, 1947
CERTIFICATE

I, who occupy the post of Chief of Archives Section in the First Demobilization Office, hereby certify that as a result of investigation it has been made clear that the original copy of a telegram, saying "Do not take military action beyond the Yingting-bo," which was despatched by the General Staff to the China Expeditionary Forces on July 7, 1937, is not now in the custody of our office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on April 25, 1947.

MIYAMA, Yozo.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of this Witness: 

At the same place, on the same date.
Witness: BANNO, Junkichi

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date May 7, 1947
CERTIFICATE

I, MIYAMA, Yozo, hereby certify that upon investigation, it has been found that the telegram despatched by the General Staff to the Japanese North China Occupation Army on July 16th, 1937 with regard to the settlement of the North China Incident, is not in the custody of this office.

Certified at Tokyo,
April 25, 1947.

Chief of the Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau MIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed here to in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on the same date.

Witness: BANDO, Junkichi (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date May, 7 1947
在局ニ保存シテサルヲトテ明スノト
昭和二十年（一九三七年）四月十六日東京都本王支那事務局ニ
同日於同所

立會人

貞

淳

吉

右署名捺印ハ當立會人ノ面前ニ於テサルヲシテ

美山兼蔵

第一復員局文書課長

表列ノヲ参照シタ

昭和二十二年（一九四七年）四月二十五日

於東京

明スノト

同日於同所

昭和十二年（一九三七年）七月十七日東京都本王支那事務局ニ
Diagnosis for TANBEI Sadaaki.

(Apr. 73)

1. Name of disease: Pulmonary tuberculosis

2. Progress after his entry into hospital

At the time of his entry into the hospital (May 29, the 21st year of Showa), his condition was as follows:

- He was in an undernourished condition. His skin was colored yellow by azalixine.
- Physical examination of the chest showed as follows: the sound of the heart, limpid; the size of the heart, normal; the respiration, generally sharp. He complained of an oppressive pain in the left side of the abdomen and neuralgia from the left shoulder to the left upper arm. The chief complaint was a cough.

- His blood pressure was: 150 mm. at the maximum; 70 mm at the minimum (of mercuric column). X-ray photographs showed a shadow from the left upper lung region to the middle pulmonary field, a long elliptical cavity around the second intercostal part; and another little cavity under the above. It showed also an image of sclerotic infiltration at the middle pulmonary field. The tuberculosis germs contained in the phlegm showed positive reaction No. 4 according to Carrié’s (phonetic) table. A haematologic examination showed: white blood-corpuscle count -- 12,200; red blood-corpuscle count -- 4,000,000; haemoglobin -- 73.5% (CARRI (T. W. phonetic) reaction) The white blood-corpuscles had no remarkable anomaly of classification. Descending speed of the red blood-cor-
muscles, 45 mm. per hour. No remarkable anomaly in his urine.

Body weight -- 45 kilogrammes.

After the above examination, he was treated with non-surgical
treatment. His irregular fever abated some 10 days after his entry
into the hospital. After that he had coughing fit at night, and
was treated with cough-cure.

From the middle of June, we tried three times artificial
Pneumothorax, but gave it up, as there occurred no successful con­
striction. After that he suffered excess of pulsation, and a con­
tinual temperature of more than 37° C., but there was no progress
at the morbid cavities. From the beginning of December, his
body weight increased a little and his nourishment improved, but
the tuberculosis germs in his phlegm have always shown positive,
reaction. Recently, his temperature has been normal.

3. Present condition.

Nourishment -- middle class. No anemia on the skin. Physical
examination of the chest shows: At the apex of the left lung
--- the percussion sound is short and dull. At the apex of the rig­
lung -- breathing sounds are sharp. X-rays examination shows no
change from his entry into the hospital. The Descending speed of
the red-blood-corpuscles -- 74 m.m. per hour. The tuberculosis
germs in his phlegm show positive reaction No. 10 according to
Govsky's table. Body weight -- 46.5 kilogrammes. His chief com­
plaint is headache.

As he is now in the above described condition, it is neces­
sary for him to remain in bed quietly, for fear of an unexpected
Def. Doc. No. 1397

setback. Therefore we conclude that it is impossible for him to appear in court.

We hereby certify that the above statement is true.
On this 23th day of April, 1947.
At the First Tokyo National Hospital.

Hospital staff. Officer of the Welfare Ministry.
Doctor of Medicine MOTOHASHI Hitoshi.

Chief of the staff. Officer of the Welfare Ministry.
Doctor of Medicine ŌSUZU Hirobumi.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto by MOTOHASHI Hitoshi ŌSUZU Hirobumi in the presence of this witness.

At the same place, on this same date,
Witness YAMADA Hanzo (n al)
I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 2, 1947
Let.

Diagnosis:

transl. by

Doc.

Translated by

Lang. Branch

Name of Patient: TSUKIJO Koji

Date of Birth: Dec. 23, 1392

Address: No. 2, 546 Kishijoji, Higashinocho, Kitatake-gun,
Tokyo

Progress of Illness:

On waking up in the morning of Jan. 21, 1944, the patient felt his right
hand and right leg slightly paralysed. He had a little trouble in the
use of his right hand and also felt slightly difficult to walk. He
has not only been unable to get rid of his aforementioned troubles
until today but his condition seems to have grown worse. He feels
his leg frozen even in summer time. He has a slight difficulty in
speaking and his memory seems to have failed somewhat. At one time
he had concurrently developed a dropsy in the lower thigh and
suffered from disorder of digestive organs.

Diagnosis:

- slight case of cerebral hemorrhage

Treatment:

The patient was ordered to rest, staying indoors, and was given
medicine at times. It is still necessary for him to rest hereafter.

Date of Diagnosis: April 16, 1947

Doctor: M. TSUKIJO, Noboru (seal)

Address: No. 150 2-chan, Hig shide-cho,
Sugimot Ward, Tokyo.
Speech of Wang, Chief of the "Nationalist Government"  
(Weekly Report No. 217)

Now the fundamental treaty adjusting diplomatic relations between Japan and China has been concluded, and with the beginning of a new era in Sino-Japanese relations a fresh light is shed on the path of the two great nations of Japan and China who have come to act in concert with each other. It is only natural that Japan and China should be on friendly terms, and rather unnatural for them to be enemies. As the Father of our nation, said, Japan and China should co-operate in every respect. What prevented them from co-operating in the past is the faults on both sides that caused a state of distress lasting for more than three years. I am thinking of the State of mind of martyrs in our national cause on the eve of their death. Undoubtedly they would not have desired to see the fall of China, and the exhaustion and ruin of both Japan and China. They would certainly have desired the days of peace, co-existence and co-prosperity of both of these countries. This also is the real wish in the hearts of the oppressed people in the Chungking area. However they don't express it.

There would be no one even among those insisting on a war against, who do not desire to see the day of peace, co-existence and co-prosperity realized between Japan and China.
But they think either that such a day will never come, or that it is still premature. Nevertheless, the day has come when China and Japan should restore peace for their coexistence and coprosperity.

The treaty provides that both Japan and China shall respect each other's sovereignty and territory and remove such actions and causes that will destroy the friendly relations existing between these two countries. So long as these provisions are in force such a quarrel as mentioned above will never arise between Japan and China. This is not a mere declaration, and all future actions of these two countries will prove it. How the diplomatic policy of these two countries came to be agreed on that of coexistence and coprosperity, or mutual destruction and disgrace. The military economic and cultural co-operation of these two countries became not only possible, but also extremely necessary. At the present time, the international communications have so much developed that the distance between the countries of the world has been so shortened that international relations between them become closer as the days go by and the collective activity of countries has naturally become a sine qua non. In such days, even the country which adopted the slogan of "glorious isolation" in the past can not help giving up her traditional policies and accommodating herself to the circumstances. So it is only natural for Japan and China to form an axis, promote the welfare of both countries and insure the peace in East Asia. If there had not been insistence upon the war and interference with the restoration of peace on the part of the Chungking Government,
the present treaty would have been accomplished more rapidly.
Because of the hindrances to the restoration of peace between Japan and the Nationalist Government, Japan could not help continuing her war against the Chungking Government even during her negotiations with Nationalist Government about the peace treaty. Hereupon, actions which Japan deems to be necessary during the war must continue. This is, of course, painful for the Nationalist Government and is by no means the original desire of Japan. This is entirely the punishment imposed on the Chungking Government. All the compatriots of China! Japan has agreed that she will complete the withdrawal of her troops in two years after the armistice, and that she will not as before put such restraint on China as the victorious countries in Europe did upon the defeated, for example, to withdraw their troops only after the completion of reparations by the defeated, or to despatch the troops again on account of delay in reparations. The other day, I gave my last advice again to the Chungking side, because there was actually no reason why they should prolong the war, and because China would forever lose her hopes of reconstruction in the future, if they still continue the war tenaciously and waste the driving power of our nation as well as the vital power of the people. In short, to save the situation we must take a wider view of things.

The present signing of the Sino-Japanese treaty is not for momentary convenience's sake, but for lasting amity between China and Japan and for eternal peace in East Asia as well.
Although Manchuria composed of four north-eastern provinces, is essentially a part of Chinese territory, ten years has already passed since the 9.18 Incident. All the world have seen the changes that have taken place during these ten years. In the declaration announced by the Chinese Nationalist Party on April of 27th year (1938) in its extraordinary plenary session of all-China representatives, at Wu-chang-Hankow there was made a clear and accurate manifestation concerning this matter. In August of 28th year (1939), we revised that manifestation in the declaration issued at the Sixth all-China session in Shanghai.

Since the removal of the seat of the Nationalist Government to Nanking in March this year, we are adopting our policy along this line. Hence the present announcement of the joint declaration of Japan, Manchuria and China. We, the people of these three countries have been, and will be brethren. Each of us ought to endeavour to bring about the happiness of the people and ensure the eternal peace of East Asia, acting side by side in concert and co-operating with one another. In my opinion the idea of Greater Asia is what Dr. SUN, father of our nation, advocated. In recent years, it developed into the movement for an East Asiatic League, which advocates the formation of a bloc under the four fundamental principles, of political independence, military alliance, economic co-operation and cultural fusion, of every nation in East Asia, thereby contributing to the establishment of eternal peace in the world, as well as in East Asia. If we march on in cooperation, toward such a common goal
friendly relations between racial countries in East Asia can be
promoted all the more and their affection increased. I hope that
all the Chinese brethren will in sincere co-operation share and
complete this grave responsibility of our days.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, NAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Speech of Wang, Chief of the Nationalist Government" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 3 day of March 1947

NAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)
Signature of Official

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: NAYASHI, Kaoru

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William A. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William A. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 8th May 1947
ことである。戦後が経過し和平を妨害しなかったならば今次
の戦争は起こらず、国際社会の危機を解消するに至った。また、
国の和平を妨げたため、日本は国際社会との和平条約の締結を交渉しては
いた。戦争は再燃し、日本は国際社会の和平を妨害するため、
の戦争を妨げたため、日本は国際社会との和平条約の締結を交渉しては
までは、戦争を続ける日本がまだ存在する。この存在を
問題として、日本は日本が木を求めるために戦争を続ける。これは
戦後が経過し和平を妨害しなかったならば今次
の戦争は起こらず、国際社会の危機を解消するに至った。また、
国の和平を妨げたため、日本は国際社会との和平条約の締結を交渉しては
いた。戦争は再燃し、日本は国際社会の和平を妨害するため、
の戦争を妨げたため、日本は国際社会との和平条約の締結を交渉しては
までは、戦争を続ける日本がまだ存在する。この存在を
問題として、日本は日本が木を求めるために戦争を続ける。これは
戦後が経過し和平を妨害しなかったならば今次
発展して、東亜の領域の運動となり、東亜各民族国家の政治を確立、軍事ドイツの経済、文化交流の四面本原則の下に、綿密に、東亜の平和に貢献する。同時に、世界の永久的平和に貢献せんとするに至った。かかる共同目標を有し共同して前進せば、東亜各民族国家の関係はますます親密さを加へますます相互親愛を加へ得るものである。全員は同心桿力、この時代の重大責任を負担し、この時代の重大使命を完成せんことを誓む。
文書ノ出所ヲ成立ニ関スル証明書

自分ノ林ハ外務省文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル處ニ於テ添付セラレタ

日本語ニ依ツテ書カレ五頁ヲリ成ル注日民政府主席談ノ関係ニ係ル公文書ノ故ノ

昭和二十二年三月三日於東京

佐

武元郎
Opium and Narcotic Control in China

(Foreign Office Ordinance No. 8, 1, October 1928)

Article I

The cultivation of poppies for the production of opium, the production of raw opium, the importation to or exportation from China and the purchase or sale, receipt or donation, possession or the possession with a view to re-sale of raw opium or poppy seeds is prohibited.

Article II

It is prohibited to import to or export from China opium paste or apparatus for the smoking of opium paste.

Article III

It is forbidden to import into China morphine, cocaine, and their salts or syringes, needles, or other instruments necessary for the use of the above drugs; unless in accordance with the regulations of China concerning morphine or the prohibition and for control of the importation of cocaine recognised by the Japanese Minister to China and with the permission of the appropriate Japanese consul. This rule, however, will not apply in cases where China, as a result of agreement with other countries, has decided to adopt other measures.
Article IV

Except in cases provided for in this ordinance the manufacture, importation into China, the exportation from that country, the purchase or sale, the receipt or donation the possession or the possession with a view to sale of morphine, cocaine or their salts or syringes, needles or other instruments necessary for their use is prohibited.

Article V

Doctors, dentists, veterinarians, druggists, or pharmacists, who in accordance with Article III import morphine, cocaine or their salts or syringes, needles or other instruments for the use of those drugs will report the fact to the Japanese consul officially connected with their place of business within fifteen days after the arrival of the imported article.

Those who have transferred in the articles above stated from outside the jurisdiction of the Imperial Consul connected with their place of business or who have transferred them outside that jurisdiction also will observe the preceding article.

Article VI

Pharmacists and druggists are prohibited from or giving morphine, cocaine, or their salts or, syringes, needles, or
other instruments necessary for the use of the said medicines, to doctors, dentists, veterinarians, druggists, and apothecaries or to officially recognized foreigners of these occupations, without receiving certificates of purchase recognized by the appropriate Japanese consul. This rule, however, is not applicable in the case in which a druggist compounds, sells, or gives morphine, cocaine and or their salts to doctors, dentists, veterinarians or recognized foreigners of these occupations, according to their prescriptions.

It is required to write the name, quantity and the purpose of using the medicine together with the date, name, address and occupation of the purchaser on the above-mentioned certificate of purchase and also to stamp his seal on to it. When one obtains by transfer the articles of the first paragraph from a recognized foreign druggist or pharmacist the transferee is also to come under the jurisdiction of the paragraph I.

Article VII

The certificate or the prescription mentioned in the previous article must be kept for three years from the date of issue.
Article VII

Doctors, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists or druggists must distinguish morphia, cocaine and their salts from other drugs and keep them in a place under lock and key. Regardless of Clause 1 of Article VI, druggists are forbidden from selling or giving the above-mentioned articles, unless as they are in sealed legally vessels.

Article IX

Doctors, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists or druggists must prepare a book and record the consumption, purchase and sale or gift and receipt of morphia, cocaine and their salts, syringes, needles and other instruments necessary for the use of these drugs, and must keep this book for three years from the date of entry.

The appropriate Japanese Consul shall have the power to examine this record or the actual articles.

Article X

When morphia, cocaine, their salts, syringes, needles and other instruments necessary for the use of these drugs become useless on account of damage, deterioration or any other causes, doctors, dentists, veterinarians pharmacists
or druggists are required to record the name and quantity of the article, and to report same to the appropriate Imperial Consul with the actual articles.

As to the disposal of the articles in the preceding paragraph, they must be in accordance with the direction of the appropriate Imperial Consul.

Article XI

Doctors, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists and druggists are required to make a yearly list of receipts and disbursals of morphia, cocaine, their salts, syringes, needles and other instruments necessary for the use of the said drugs and to furnish the report to the competent Japanese Consul by the end of the following January.

Article XII

The competent Japanese consul may issue orders recognized to be necessary from the point of view of superintendence concerning the form of the book dealing with the consumption, buying, selling, giving and receiving of morphia, cocaine, their salts, syringes, needles and other instruments necessary for the use of the same drugs.

Article XIII

Those who act contrary to the ordinances of Article I

- 5 -
to Article IV inclusive, are to be given less than 3-month's jail sentence, or to be fined less than 100 yen.

An attempted crime under the preceding paragraph shall be punished.

Article XIV

Those who violate the ordinance of Article VI are also to come under the first paragraph of the preceding article.

Article XV

Even in the case of those who are not Japanese having acted contrary to the ordinance of Article I to Article IV inclusive, any Japanese who has aided or abetted him shall be punished as an abettor or accessory to the crime under Article XIII.

Article XVI

Articles connected with actions contrary to the ordinance of Article I to Article IV except when their seizure has been ordered by the court will be seized and disposed of as an administrative measure.

Article XVII

Those who act contrary to the ordinance of Article V or Article VII to Article XI inclusive, or who make false reports
or notifications, or refuse to produce examination the book or the actual articles shall be fined less than 100 yen or confined or punished with a fine.

Article XVIII

Those who act contrary to the orders issued according to the ordinance of Article XII shall be detained or punished with a fine.

Article XIX

In the case of a druggist who is a minor or of a person under interdict the penal laws of Article XIV, XVII or XVIII shall be applied to the statutory representative. This rule, however, is not applicable in the case of such minors having the same ability as an adult in connection with their trade.

Article XX

Doctors, dentists, veterinarians, pharmacists or apothecaries are not immune from punishment when their representatives, head of the family, families, co-residents, employees or other workers act contrary to this ordinance or to orders issued in accordance with this ordinance concerning their trade, even though they themselves may not have given them any direction.
Article XXI

In case of representatives, employees or the other workers of a corporation acting contrary to this ordinance or to orders concerning the trade of their corporation issued in accordance therewith, the penal laws are to be applicable to the representative.

Article XXII

Article III to Article XVIII inclusive of the ordinance will apply to the following drugs--

a. Medicinal Opium:

b. Di-acetyl morphine, ethyl morphine codeine, thebain or other derivatives of morphine as well as their salts.

c. Egonin and the derivative of Egonin (except cocaine) and their salts.

d. The above-mentioned Morphia, Cocaine, and drugs containing Opium. (the so-called anti-opium drugs included).

e. Indian hemp and its resin as well as drugs made from them.

f. Stvain and other drugs to be specified by the Japanese Consul.
Attached Rules:

This ordinance shall be enforced from the day of its promulgation.

This ordinance can be applied only to the district where the Japanese Consul can exercise jurisdiction with the exception of the South Manchurian Railway zone.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 9 pages and entitled "Opium and Narcotic Control Ordinance in China (Foreign Office Ordinance)" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 4th day of April, 1947.

/s/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: /s/ URIBE, Katsum (seal)
阿片製造スル目的ヲ以テ罷部ヲ栽培シ、生阿片ヲ製造スルノ為ハ罷部ヲ若ハ販賣ノ目的ヲ以テ所持スキルヲ得ズ。
第十一條
前項ノ物品ハ處分ニ付ハ所持帯同領事官ノ監察ヲ受ケルス耳

第十二條
前項ノ物品ハ處分ニ付ハ所持帯同領事官ノ監察ヲ受ケルス耳

第十三條
前項ノ物品ハ處分ニ付ハ所持帯同領事官ノ監察ヲ受ケルス耳
第六條ノ規定ニ違反シタル者ヲ亦前條ニ同ジ

第十四條

帝國臣民ニ非ザル者ノ一條乃至前第四條ノ規定ニ違反シタル者ハハ従ヲシテ處断ス

第十五条

第五條

第十六条

第十七条

第二条ハハ輔導ノ為ヲハ現品ノ復元ヲハミタルモノハ百国以下ノ補金ヲハ補

第十八条

第六条ノ規定ニ違反セル命令ニ違反シタル者ハ拘留又ハ料料ヲ處ス
Gist of the Conversation between Dr. Soong Ching-ling and Dr. J.

On June 11, 1939, from 8 to 10:30 A.M.

WANG. I found the word "anti-Comintern" in your letter addressed to me during my stay in H.K.O. some time ago. This was the most impressive thing that I have ever experienced. Then I was impressed with your opinion that CHIANG Kai-Shek should hold himself responsible for the outbreak of this Incident. As for the problem of responsibility, I am willing to assume responsibility for myself for the outbreak of this Incident, because I was also concerned with it. I lay the greatest stress on the anti-Comintern problem, which is a problem for the Orient as well as for China. Once CHIANG Kai-Shek maintained the anti-Comintern attitude and carried on the subjugation of the red bandits for several years. In 1935 I was ordered by him to bring China into closer relations with Germany. At the same time, CHIANG Kai-Shek despatched CHEH Li-fe to the Soviet Union to confer with LITVINOV with a view to establishing connection between China and the Soviet Union. CHIANG Kai-Shek had apparently planned to form a coalition with the Soviet Union from that time onward. Then, with the outbreak of the K.S.I.N. Incident, the coalition between the Soviet Union and China became decisive. At present, Britain, France and the United States, being jealous of the aggrandizement of Japan in the Orient, are assisting
China in her waging war against Japan. However, it is evident that the Soviet Union is taking the lead in aiding China. Thus, in spite of the fact that CHIANG Kai-Shek is waging war against Japan in concert with the Communist Party and the Soviet Union, the reason why the Chinese people at large are supporting CHIANG Kai-Shek is that they are afraid lest China fall into a position like that of India under the pressure of Japan. Such being the case, they are not in a position to start an anti-Communist movement. On the contrary, those who advocate peace with Japan are being turned out by the people. Only one-third of the members of the Kuomintang Army made approach to the Communist Party, while the other two-thirds are maintaining the Anti-Communist attitude in their hearts desiring peace. However, for the aforesaid reason, they are not in a position to start an anti-CHIANG Kai-Shek movement or an anti-Communist movement. Therefore, as soon as they ceased to have fear of Japan, they would turn unanimously against communism. As the result of the talks with men at AMO and CHUNGKING and some members of the Suffrage Council, who were other than those belonging to the Kuomintang, I found that they were unanimous against Communism. The reason why LUNG YUN, though he was most likely to rise in arms with me, was obliged to give up his intention was that he was also influenced by such a general tendency in China. I held office in the government at the time when China recognized communism, from 1924 to 1926, so that I am willing to assume responsibility for any conduct on my part during that period. Since then I have opposed the communist party all the time, especially I opposed the recent
Coalition between the CHUNGKING regime and the communist party.
But the attitude of the CHUNGKING government remained the same just
as I stated above. This was why I made up my mind to escape from
CHUNGKING in order to launch a campaign against the Comintern.

I received detailed information from Colonel Li Gao concerning the
conditions under which you were obliged to make escape from
CHUNGKING and your subsequent action. It is true that the Chinese
of to-day are swayed by anti-Japanese sentiment. This is, I believe,
due to the fact that they failed to understand Japan's true intention.
As a matter of fact, the Japanese government authorities as well as
the Japanese people at large have made concerted efforts to promote
friendship between Japan and China for the past sixty or seventy years.
I believe it was chiefly due to the misunderstanding on the part of the
Chinese that this object is not attained yet. If this is the case, those
who misunderstood as well as those who were misunderstood are naturally
responsible for the result. In this connection, I can say definitely
that Japan has not the slightest intention of reducing China to the
status of India. On the contrary, she is endeavoring to prevent the
infiltration of extraneous influence for the purpose of annihilating all
the races in the Orient, thereby expecting to secure the lasting Peace
of the Orient. As the first step toward this, Japan plans to form
coalition with China. She regards the present Incident as a holy war
and is determined to annihilate the communist party and the CHUNG
Kai-Shok army, which are acting in concert with each other. However, she
has not the slightest idea of making an enemy of the Chinese people. This
is evident from the fact that the Japanese army, while fighting
bravely with the enemy at the front, is treating the good Chinese masses not
with benevolence. As for the anti-communist problem it is concerned only
with the problem of the communist party in China, but also with the
problem of the threat of the Soviet Union to the northern border of
China as well as of MANCHUKUO. Japan is now preparing to rid the
northern border of Manchukuo as well as Japan of the menace of communism.
Thus, Japan is now making such grave determination and preparation to
eliminate communism.

Japan has called upon China to make a joint defense against
communism, but a large section of the Chinese people were apt to
misconstrue this as meaning that Japan intends to dominate China as
much as she pleases in the name of the joint defense against communism.
In connection with this, I usually explained that anti-communism is
Japan's true intention and that therefore Japan is desirous of realizing
the very unity and strengthening of China instead of dividing
and weakening her and that the object of joint defense against
communism will be actually attained only when China becomes strong.

As stated above, I have taken the stand against the admission of
communism since 1926, and will devote myself to the anti-communist
movement. As the first step toward this, I am determined to put the
Kuomintang, which is under the domination of the communist party,
above the latter in keeping to the principle and spirit of the
Kuomintang. It was the long-cherished desire of Sun Yat-Sen to form a
coalition with Japan in such relations as those of between older and
younger brothers. The Principle which Sun Yat-sen held was by no means communism. In the first place, I am going to make clear the Principles and policies of the Kuomintang headed by Sun Yat-sen. In the second place, I am going to advise the Kuomintang to accept Japan's proposal concerning anti-Communism and in this way to save our country. For the realization of this purpose, unity and strength of China are prerequisite. Though I am to proceed in cooperation with various parties other than the Kuomintang, I believe that the Kuomintang should continue to play the most active part. I should like to ask Japan to show us how to strengthen China's national defense from the standpoint of anti-Communism. As for the steps to be taken in the interior of China, I believe that we should first of all strive to drive the influence of the communist party out of China by establishing a powerful central government.

III. G.I.J: Of course, we are desirous of establishing a powerful central government, but attention must be paid to the fact that with the development of the war situation because of the present Incident, the new regimes have been established in North China, Mongolia, Central China and other districts where a great number of Japanese reside and that these Japanese have established various connections with the Chinese. We must pay due attention to this fact. Thus, the making of closer relations between the Japanese and the Chinese in various districts will not end in weakening a central government in the least. On the contrary, it will lead to the strengthening of the position of a central government.

I should like you to give careful consideration to this point.
to ask you about the question of San-Min-Chu-i. A certain section of
the Japanese people look askance at it. Especially, the phrase
"Principle of people's livelihood is the equivalent of communism" has
given rise to much misunderstanding. It is necessary for us to take
appropriate steps in the future to remove such misunderstanding.
Therefore, I should like you to make inquiries as to them.

The reason why Dr. Yat-Sen used such a phrase is his lecture on the principle of people's livelihood was that he tried to
assimilate all the currents of thoughts and ideas of the times into
the principle of the Kuomintang. Therefore, if you read it carefully,
you will find that he, while explaining the diametrical difference
between principle of people's livelihood and communism, advised the
adoption of the Principle of the Kuomintang in place of Marxism.
Of course, I am going to endeavor to make clear the meaning of San-
Min-Chu-i from now on. We shall talk about the movement of establish-
ing a central government at another time when we meet again.
I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 8th May, 1967
第一巻
ニ・明尼ソ・第二巻ニ・国民党公開ニ日本ノ希望スル反共産国
ノ要望ヲ受納セントス・ソレニハ支那ト統一トカ量トカ必要ナリ吾
人ハ固ヨリ国民党以外ノ各黨ヲ聯合シテ進ム国ナル中ノ共産勢力ト
シテハ依然国民主ニ當ルキモノナリト信ス尚防共ノタケ國防
内ニ於テ織ツキシテハ先ツ有力ナル統一政府ヲ作り共産勢力
内ニ於テ紛乱政府ヲ樹立スルトハ吾人ノ固ヨリ希望スルヲナリ唯
兹ニ決念ヘキハ今次謀叛ニ際シ軍事ヲ進展ニ伴ヒ北支、蒙强ニ中
弱化スル所以ニ非スデテ却ツテ日支ノ紛乱ヲ強化スルトハ決シテ中央政府ヲ
树立スルヲ依ル中央政府ノ立場ヲ

タヤハ三民主義ノ問題ニナリ此ノ點ハ充分考慮セラレタシテ尚次ノオ尊ネシ
Press Release Issued by the Department of State on September 14, 1937

Following a conference with the Secretary of State and the Chairman of the United States Maritime Commission, the President today issued the following statement:

"Merchant vessels owned by the Government of the United States will not hereafter, until further notice, be permitted to transport to China or Japan any of the arms, ammunition, or implements of war which were listed in the President's proclamation of May 1, 1937.

"Any other merchant vessels, flying the American flag, which attempt to transport any of the listed articles to China or Japan will, until further notice, do so at their own risk.

"The question of applying the Neutrality Act remains in status quo, the Government policy remaining on a 24-hour basis."
「米日特约国交条约

第1条

...
Reference is made to the note, No. 316, dated December 21, 1940, from the Japanese Embassy at Washington, in regard to restrictions recently placed on the exportation of iron and steel.

It is noted that the Embassy refers to its notes of August 3, 1940, and October 7, 1940, in regard to the restrictions placed on the exportation of aviation gasoline and iron and steel scrap. The Embassy's attention is invited to the replies which the Department addressed to those notes on August 9, 1940, and October 23, 1940. The statements therein made concerning the interests of the national defense of the United States apply fully to the considerations raised in the Embassy's note under acknowledgment in regard to the recent restrictions on the export of iron and steel.

Washington, January 7, 1941
The Chief of the Office of Arms and Munitions
Control, Department of State (Green), to 148
Persons and Companies Manufacturing Airplane
Parts

Washington, July 1, 1938

As some misunderstanding appears to have arisen as to the
purport of the statement made by the Secretary of State in his
press conference on June 11 in regard to bombing civilian popula­
tions from the air, I am addressing this letter in regard to the
matter to all persons and companies registered as manufacturers or
exporters of airplanes or aeronautical equipment.

In view of the fact that the Secretary's statement
definitely condemned bombing of civilian populations from the air,
it should be clear to all concerned that the Government of the
United States is strongly opposed to the sale of airplanes or
aeronautical equipment which would materially aid or encourage that
practice in any country in any part of the world. Therefore,
in view of this policy, the Department would with great regret
issue any licenses authorizing exportation, direct or indirect,
of any aircraft, aircraft armament, aircraft engines, aircraft
parts, aircraft accessories, aerial bombs or torpedoes to
countries the armed forces of which are making use of airplanes
for attack upon civilian populations.

Should any manufacturer or exporter have already entered
into contractual obligations, of which he finds it impossible to
divest himself, to sell or export airplanes or aeronautical
equipment, for which licenses have been issued or for which he has
heretofore intended to apply for licenses, to any country which is
engaged in bombing civilian populations from the air, it is sug­
gested that he may wish to inform the Department of the terms of
that contract before applying for licenses to export pursuant to
it or before exporting under licenses already issued.

Very truly yours,

Joseph C. Green

Pages 201, 202

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN,
1931-1941, Vol. LL
昭和四十七年三月一日

この件に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関しては、航空機に関する内容に関
等々を輸出する権利を附属する許可をとる所は便宜の都合により

前記条項に輸出者により輸出される許可上の義務を負ひ、ある一定に於ける輸出許可

前記は輸出許可により輸出を行ふ以前に関係省に照し輸出手续の

召具

ジョセフ・シー・グリーン

一九四一年按奏

二〇一頁～二〇二頁

一九三一年按奏

二〇一頁～二〇二頁

一九四一年按奏

二〇一頁～二〇二頁

一九三一年按奏

二〇一頁～二〇二頁

一九四一年按奏

二〇一頁～二〇二頁

一九三一年按奏

二〇一頁～二〇二頁
Executive Order No. 8631, Signed by President Roosevelt, January 10, 1941

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense," I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of:

1. Copper
2. Brass and Bronze
3. Zinc
4. Nickel
5. Potash

As used in my proclamation of January 10, 1941, issued pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, and in these regulations, the above articles and materials shall be construed to include:

A. Copper:
- Ore, concentrates, malleable, and unrefined copper including blister, black or coarse, converter, and anodes.
- Refined copper in bars, billets, cakes, ingots, slabs and other commercial shapes
- Old and scrap copper
- Pipes and tubes
- Plates and sheets
- Rods
- Wire:
  - Bare
  - Insulated wire and cable:
    - Rubber-covered wire
    - Weatherproof wire
    - Other insulated wire
- Other primary fabrications
- Fabrications for munitions purposes
- Alloys, other than brass and bronze

B. Brass and Bronze:
- Scrap and old
- Ingot and other commercial shapes
- Bars and rods
- Plates and sheets
- Pipes and tubes
- Wire (bare or insulated)
- Other primary fabrications
- Fabrications for munitions purposes

C. Zinc:
- Ore, concentrates, and dross
- Cast in slabs, plates, or blocks
- Rolled in sheets and strips
- Other forms including scrap
- Alloys
- Dust
- Manufactures containing 20% or more zinc
D. Nickel:
Ores, concentrates, and matte
Metal in any form including ingots, bars, rods, sheets, plates and scrap
Alloys containing 10% or more nickel including scrap
Nickel compounds (chemical) containing 10% or more nickel

E. Potash:
Potassium Salts and Compounds
Potassium hydroxide (KOH)
Potassium carbonate (K$_2$CO$_3$)
Potassium Chlorate (KClO$_3$)
Potassium perchlorate (KClO$_4$)
Potassium cyanide (KCN)
Potassium iodide (KI)
Potassium nitrate (KNO$_3$)
Potassium permanganate (K$_2$MnO$_7$)
Potassium acetate (KC$_2$H$_3$O$_2$)
Potassium bichromate (K$_2$Cr$_2$O$_7$)
Potassium bitartrate (KHC$_4$H$_4$O$_6$)

Potassic Fertilizer Materials
Potassium chloride (KCl)
Potassium sulphate (K$_2$SO$_4$)
All other potassic fertilizer materials containing 27% or more potassium oxide (K$_2$O) equivalent
All combinations and mixtures of any of the foregoing containing potash salts of 27% or more potassium oxide (K$_2$O) equivalent

3. Regulation 1 of the Regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to the Act of July 2, 1940, is modified only in so far as it applies to Copper, Brass and Bronze, Zinc, Nickel and Potash in accordance with the foregoing classification. Regulations 2 to 12 inclusive of the Regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to the Act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to exportation of Copper, Brass, and Bronze, Zinc, Nickel and Potash.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, January 10, 1941

Pages 239, 240

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11

Defense footnote: Commodity number omitted.
Memorandum by the Secretary of State

(Washington), January 6, 1940

The Japanese Ambassador called and handed me the attached notes, which are self-explanatory. I inquired whether he desired a written reply to the note in regard to moral sanctions, including an alleged contract between a Japanese company and American citizens concerning technical processes and manufacturing rights for the production of certain petroleum products. He said that the Japanese Government would like to have a written reply. I then remarked that he no doubt was aware of the fact that the so-called moral embargo on all phases of the airplane situation found its origin in and was based on the bombing of civilian populations from the air in China by the Japanese, and that I would probably list a great number of these bombings as reported to this Government and allow them to be published together with the balance of the contents of the note. The Ambassador appeared very startled at this idea, and repeated the request of his Government for a written reply.

With regard to technical processes for high-test gasoline, I stated that this Government, concerned as it is with the increase of war and the use or threat of force in so many parts of the world, feels constrained to conserve a number of the more vital interests it has in defense commodities or materials, and that this, together with our abhorrence of the bombings of civilian populations, is the basis for the conservation of the gasoline manufacturing processes to which the Ambassador referred.

The Ambassador brought up the question of the violation by this Government of the Treaty of Commerce of 1911. I said, without going into the merits of the matter, that I trusted his Government would not forget how many times American commercial rights and interests have suffered injury in China contrary to all treaties and all law, and that notwithstanding this fact, this Government and others perhaps were expected to be perfectly quiescent while being deprived of their right to participate in economic and other undertakings in China, although the Japanese Government would expect to enjoy the benefits of the rule of equality in its economic dealing with all the Western world. I then added that, as I had heretofore stated to the Ambassador, the subject of commercial treaties was under discussion between Mr. Grew and the Foreign Office at Tokyo, and that we were deferring the entire matter to that discussion for the time being. The Ambassador had nothing further to say.

C(ordell) H(ull)
ソリン事件、仏、米、国際法の立場から観て、日本は、通商条約に基づく利益を保つ必要がある。しかし、日本は、条約に基づく利益を保つために、通商条約を改めることを望まない。

大日本帝国は、条約に基づく利益を保つために、通商条約を改めることを望まない。これは、条約に基づく利益を保つために、通商条約を改めることを望まない。

日本は、条約に基づく利益を保つために、通商条約を改めることを望まない。これは、条約に基づく利益を保つために、通商条約を改めることを望まない。
Executive Order No. 8668, Signed by President Roosevelt, February 4, 1941

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of the articles and materials named in my proclamation of February 4, 1941:

1. The articles and materials named in my proclamation of February 4, 1941, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, shall be construed to include the following:

   (1) Well and refining machinery
       Petroleum and gas well equipment and parts
       including well drilling machinery and parts
       Petroleum refining machinery, equipment and parts
   (2) Radium
       Metal
       Salts and compounds
   (3) Uranium
       Metal
       Salts and compounds
       Minerals
   (4) Calf and kip skins
       Calf skins
       Kip skins

2. Regulations 2 to 12 inclusive of the Regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of the articles and materials listed in paragraph 1 (1) through (4) inclusive.

3. Executive Order No. 8640 is hereby amended to include within its provisions the articles and materials named in my proclamation of February 4, 1941.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, February 4, 1941

Pages 242, 243

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11
Entertaining the belief that steps taken by your Government, causing a situation not dissimilar in effect to that which might obtain under an export embargo discriminating against Japan, are in contravention to the provisions of Article V, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States and at variance with the spirit of the Treaty as a whole and fearing that the continuation of such measures may affect the present earnest efforts of Japan and the United States for the improvement of mutual friendly relations through the maintenance and promotion of commerce between the two countries, my Government greatly deplores the herein referred to actions of the authorities of the United States Government.

I avail myself (etc.)

Kensuke Horinouchi
The Japanese Ambassador (Horigouchi) to the Secretary of State

No. 2  Washington, January 6, 1940

Sir: I have the honor to state that, as the result of a communication through a circular letter of July 1, 1938, addressed by the Department of State to manufacturers and exporters of aircraft and aircraft parts, in which it was mentioned that "the Department of State would with great regret issue any licenses authorizing exportation, direct or indirect, of any aircraft, aircraft armament, aircraft engines, aircraft parts, aircraft accessories, aerial bombs or torpedoes to countries the armed forces of which are making use of airplanes for attack upon civilian populations," it has virtually become impossible for Japanese firms to import any airplanes and airplane parts of American make.

As repeatedly stated by my Government, military operations of the Japanese air forces in China have been directed solely against warlike organizations and establishments of the Chinese. No bombing or machine-gunning has been resorted to against civilian population, as such. The Japanese Government, therefore, cannot but take exception to any treatment of Japan as a country "the armed forces of which are making use of airplanes for attack upon civilian populations."

The above-mentioned measures employed by the Department of State, which, in view of the great influence that can be yielded by a central government upon private manufacturers and exporters, have the effect of a discriminatory export embargo. My Government considers that such measures applied to Japan are in derogation of the provision of Article V, paragraph 3, of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between Japan and the United States of February 21, 1911, and at variance with the general purposes of the Treaty as a whole.

While my Government was keenly alive to the unfortunate consequences of the said communication to American exporters, it did not relinquish the hope that the United States Government, in harmony with its fair and just trade policy, would before long retract it.

However, on December 16, 1939, another letter was addressed by the Department of State to manufacturers and exporters to the effect that the Department hoped that it would not receive any application for a license to authorize the exportation, direct or indirect, of articles enumerated in the letter of July 1, 1938, and, in addition thereto, of aeronautical equipment of all kinds and materials essential to airplane manufacture. In order to point out that molybdenum and aluminum should be included among such materials, a letter was addressed by the Department to all producers of these two materials.

Still further, it was announced on December 20, 1939, from the Department of State that the decision had been reached that there should be no further delivery to certain countries of plans, plants, manufacturing rights, or technical information required for the production of high quality aviation gasoline and that this decision had been communicated to the interested American oil companies. The announcement cited the decision as an extension of the United States Government's policy in regard to the sale of
airplane, aeronautical equipment, and materials essential to airplane manufacture to countries the armed forces of which were engaged in unprovoked bombing or machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air.

Of late there occurred a number of cases in which the purchase of certain articles and materials under negotiation between Japanese firms and interested American companies has been rendered impossible as the result of the Department of State's letters.

To cite one of the most outstanding cases, a memorandum of a contract was drawn and initialed August 19, 1938, by representatives of Japan Gasoline Company on the one part and Universal Oil Products Company on the other.

It was stipulated that Universal Oil Products Company, which since 1928 had maintained close business connection with Japan Gasoline Company, should grant a license in Japan covering their polymerization processes for the production of iso-octane and rights under all of their processes in the entire petroleum field, in return for which Japan Gasoline Company should pay $1,000,000 United States funds to Universal Oil Products Company.

It was understood that, during the progress of the negotiations in connection with the above agreement, the representatives of Universal Oil Products Company approached and laid the pertinent facts before the Department of State, which made no objection to the transaction.

Under the terms of the agreement Japan Gasoline Company paid to Universal Oil Products Company a sum of $300,000 on October 30, 1938, and $400,000 on July 8, 1939. It was agreed that further payment of $100,000 was to be made at the time of delivery of plans and specifications for a plant and a final payment of $200,000 upon completion and test of such a plant. In essence, Universal Oil Products Company was bound to guarantee, within the limit of the money it was to receive in payment, complete working of the plant in Japan under polymerization processes.

Recently Universal Oil Products Company proposed that a final agreement should be made along the lines of the provisional agreement, and accordingly the two parties continued their negotiations.

On December 19, 1939, however, Universal Oil Products Company informed the representatives of Japan Gasoline Company that they had received a letter from the Department of State which left no alternative for them but to withhold further fulfillment of the terms of the contract.

The consummation of this contract, under which the greater part of the payment involved had already been made and other obligations required have been completely fulfilled by one of the parties, has for all practical purposes been frustrated.

- 2 -
Executive Order No. 8669, Signed by President Roosevelt, February 4, 1941

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense," I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of:

Iron and Steel

1. As used in Proclamation No. 2449 of December 10, 1940, issued pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, and in these regulations, the terms "iron" and "steel" shall be construed to include the following forms, conversions, and derivatives:

Iron Ore:
Iron and Steel Semi-manufactures:

Iron and Steel Scrap:
- No. 1 Heavy melting steel scrap (Category 2)
- No. 2 Heavy melting steel scrap (Category 3)
- Hydraulically compressed and baked sheet scrap (Categories 7 & 8)
- Cast and forged iron scrap (Categories 1, 9, 10, 11, 12)
- Other (Categories 4, 5, 6, 13) (Includes heavy sheared steel, selected rail scrap, machine shop turnings, wire shorts, reeling rails, rejects, etc.)

Tin-plate scrap (Includes tin-plate clippings, cuttings, stampings, trimmings, skeleton sheets, and all other miscellaneous pieces or discarded tin plate, which result from the manufacture of tin plate, and of tin-bearing articles from tin plate) "Placed under export control. Executive Order, effective April 16, 1936"

Tin-plate circles, strips, cobbles, and scroll-shear butts
Tin-plate waste-waste, clippings, and scrap

Iron and Steel Products:

Steel ingots, blooms, billets, slabs, sheet bars, and ingot steel bars (Include ingot iron, and other iron made in steel-making furnaces):
- Not containing alloy
- Alloy steel, including stainless

Iron and Steel Bars and Rods (Include rounds, flats, squares, etc.)

Steel bars, cold finished
Iron bars
Concrete reinforcement bars (Include deformed and twisted)

Other steel bars, including drill rods, merchant bars, tool steel bars, and drill steel:
- Not containing alloy
- Stainless steel
- Alloy steel other than stainless
- Wire rods
Iron and Steel: Plates, Sheets, Skelp, and Strips  
(Include waste and waste-wasteplate, sheet and strip):  
Plates:  
Armor plate, other than that listed in the President's Proclamation of May 1, 1937  
Boiler plate  
Other plates, not fabricated (Include hot and cold rolled)  
Not containing alloy  
Stainless steel  
Alloy steel other than stainless  
Skelp iron and steel (Consists of long strips used in the manufacture of pipes and tubes)  
Iron and Steel, Galvanized:  
Iron Sheets  
Steel Sheets  
Steel Sheets, Black, Ungalvanized, (Include hot and cold rolled):  
Not containing alloy  
Stainless steel  
Alloy steel, other than stainless  
Iron Sheets, Black (Include material under 1/8" in thickness in 6033-6036)  
Strip, Hoop, Band, and Scroll Iron or Steel:  
Cold Rolled:  
Not containing alloy  
Stainless steel  
Alloy steel, other than stainless  
Hot Rolled:  
Not containing alloy  
Stainless steel  
Alloy steel, other than stainless  
Tin plate and Tagger's tin (Include waste tin and plate)  
Terneplate (Includes waste terneplate)  
Steel Mill Manufactures:  
Structural iron and steel:  
Water, oil, gas, and other storage tanks, complete, and knocked-down material for permanent or temporary installation  
Structural shapes, not fabricated (Include heavy light, and bar-sized structural shapes)  
Fabricated structural iron or steel  
Plates, fabricated, punched, or shaped  
Steel piling  
Railway-track materials:  
Rails:  
60 pounds and over per yard  
Less than 60 pounds per yard  
Relaying rails  
Rail joints, splice bars, fishplates, and tieplates  
Switches, frogs, crossings, and derail  
Railroad spikes (Include railroad screw spikes)  
Tubular products and fittings:  
Boiler Tubes:  
Seamless  
Welded  
Casing and oil-line pipe:  
Seamless  
Welded  
Seamless black pipe, other than casing and oil-line  
Cast-iron pressure pipe
Tubular Products and fittings (continued)

Cast-iron soil pipe
Welded black pipe:
  Steel
Wrought iron
Welded Galvanized pipe:
  Steel
  "Wrought iron"

Rigid electrical conduit of iron or steel
All other iron and steel pipe (Include riveted pipe and mechanical steel tubing)

Wire and manufactures:
Iron or steel wire, uncoated (Includes plain steel, stainless steel, and alloy steel other than stainless)
Galvanized wire
Barbed wire
Woven wire fencing
Wire rope and wire strand:
  Wire rope and cable, not insulated
Wire strand

Electric welding rods and wire of iron or steel
Welding rods and wire of iron or steel (other than electric)
Bale ties

Electrical and telephone transmission wires of iron or steel, coated with aluminum, copper, or other metals
Insulated wire and cable having an iron or steel core
Twisted wire
Other coated wire of iron or steel

Castings and forgings:
Gray-iron castings (Include semi-steel castings)
Malleable-iron castings

Ingot molds

Steel-castings:
  Not containing alloy
  Alloy steel, including stainless

Railway car wheels and axles (Exclude railway car ties, locomotive wheels, tires, and axles):
  Railway car wheels
  Railway car axles, without wheels
  Railway car axles, fitted with wheels

Iron and Steel forgings (Exclude steel grinding balls)
  Not containing alloy
  Alloy steel, including stainless

Advanced Manufactures:
Fence posts
Metal drums and containers, filled or unfilled, for oil, gas, and other liquids
Tool bits or tool bit blanks

Ferro Alloys:
Ferrochrome
Ferrocolumbium
Ferrormanganese and spiegeleisen
Ferrormolybdenum
Ferrophosphorus
Ferrosilicon
Ferrotitanium and ferro-carbontitanium
Ferrovanadium
3. Paragraphs d, h, l, t, and u, of regulation 1 of the regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to the act of July 2, 1940, so far as they apply to ferro-alloys, are modified in accordance with the foregoing list of forms, conversions, and derivatives. Regulations 2 to 12, inclusive, of the regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to the act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of iron and steel.

4. The regulations herein prescribed shall be effective February 15, 1941, and shall supersede those in Executive Order No. 8607 of December 10, 1940.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, February 4, 1941

Pages 243-248

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11

Defense Footnote: Commodity numbers omitted.
The Secretary of State to the Japanese Ambassador (Horinouchi)

Washington, January 27, 1940

The attitude and policy of the Government of the United States in connection with the unprovoked bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations are clearly indicated in the Department of State's press release of June 3, 1938; in the statement released by the President on December 2, 1939; and in the Department's press releases of December 15 and 20, 1939. Copies of the press releases under reference are enclosed for convenient reference. The American people and the American Government have directed the policy outlined in these press releases against a practice, not against specific countries; and its applicability to a particular country is determined not by any arbitrary finding of the American Government, but by the observable acts of the armed forces of such country or countries as may be engaged in military operations.

Reference is made to your statement to the effect that the Universal Oil Products Company, upon the receipt by it of a letter from the Department of State, was left no alternative but to withhold further fulfillment of a provisional agreement with the Japan Gasoline Company, and in particular to your statement that the pertinent facts in regard to the proposed transaction were communicated to the Department of State by the Universal Oil Products Company during the progress of negotiations and that the Department made no objection. It is observed that the Department of State's informal indication of non-objection to the installation in plants in foreign countries of certain processes for the production of iso-octane fuel was given before the continued widespread bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations in certain areas impelled the American people and this Government to extend the policy of condemnation of that practice to include the withholding of delivery of technical processes for the production of high quality aviation gasoline from countries the armed forces of which are engaged in unprovoked bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air. Furthermore, the Government of the United States, concerned as it is with the increase and spread of war and the use or threat of force in so many parts of the world, has recently felt constrained to conserve vital interests which this Government has in certain commodities and technical processes relating to the national defense.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the American Government is unable to agree that its action in inviting American exporters voluntarily to cooperate with the policy pursued by the American people and by this Government of condemning and
discouraging the bombing and machine-gunning of civilian populations from the air constituted an infringement of either the letter or the spirit of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1911 between the United States and Japan.

Accept (etc.)

Cordell Hull
Executive Order No. 8693, Signed by President
Roosevelt, February 25, 1941

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of the articles and materials designated in my proclamation of February 25, 1941:

1. The articles and materials designated in my proclamation of February 25, 1941, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, shall be construed to include the following:

   (1) Belladonna:
      Belladonna Leaves, U.S.P. (Belladonnae Folium):
         Belladonna plaster, U.S.P. (Emplastrum Belladonnae)
      Extract of Belladonna, U.S.P. (Extractum Belladonnae)
      Fluid Extract of Belladonna Leaf, N.F. (Fluid extractum Belladonnae Folii)
      Tincture of Belladonna, U.S.P. (Tinctura Belladonnae)
      Belladonna Ointment, U.S.P. (Unguentum Belladonnae)
      Belladonna Root, U.S.P. (Belladonnae Radix):
         Fluid Extract of Belladonna Root, U.S.P.
         (Fluid extractum Belladonnae Radicis)
      Belladonna Liniment, K.F. (Linamentum Belladonnae)

   (2) Atropine:
      Atropine, U.S.P. alkaloid (Atropine, atropis):
         Atropine Hydrobromide
         Atropine Hydrochloride
         Atropine Lethalbromide
         Atropine Methylnitrate
         Atropine Nitrate
         Atropine Sulfate, U.S.P. (Atropine Sulfate)
         Atropine Sulfuric Acid
         Atropine Valerate

   (3) Sole Leather
      Bends, backs, and sides

   (4) Belting Leather
      x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

3. Regulations 2 to 12 inclusive of the Regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of the articles and materials listed in paragraph 1 (1) through (4) inclusive.

4. Executive Order No. 8640 is hereby amended to include within its provisions the articles and materials designated in my proclamation of February 25, 1941.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, February 25, 1941
Memorandum by the Secretary of State

Washington, November 17, 1941

I accompanied Ambassador Nomura and Ambassador Saburo Kurusu to the White House in order that the latter might be received by the President.

The President remarked that some time ago he proclaimed a zone around this hemisphere, 300 miles out in the sea in some places and 1,100 miles in others. The President added that this was self-defense.
The Ambassador said that, while he did not wish to enter into a debate on the matter, he wished to point out that the Japanese people believe that economic measures are a much more effective weapon of war than military measures; that they believe they are being placed under severe pressure by the United States to yield to the American position; and that it is preferable to fight rather than to yield to pressure. The Ambassador added that this was a situation in which wise statesmanship was needed; that wars do not settle anything; and that under the circumstances some agreement, even though it is not satisfactory, is better than no agreement at all.
大抵は、本問題の処理を始めたことを欲しないと同時に、日本軍民
は、政権手段は単なる手段よりも変に有効な解決武器であると信じて居
は、彼等の米軍の居位に反対せると米軍から力の滅を加へられつつ
あり、且浙遠に屈伏するより更に多くの万が一にしてあると信じて居
で必要とする時局であり、政権に依って何ものも葬めされるいと
為定がなされるることは何等の決定かないより突き出して居るかと似言した。
Proclamation No. 2413, Signed by President Roosevelt,
July 2, 1940

WHEREAS Section 6 of the Act of Congress entitled "AN ACT TO expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides, as follows:

"Whenever the President determines that it is necessary in the interest of national defense to prohibit or curtail the exportation of any military equipment or munitions, or component parts thereof, or machinery, tools, or material or supplies necessary for the manufacture, servicing or operation thereof, he may by proclamation prohibit or curtail such exportation, except under such rules and regulations as he shall prescribe. Any such proclamation shall describe the articles, or materials included in the prohibition or curtailment contained therein. In case of the violation of any provision of any proclamation, or of any rule or regulation, issued hereunder, such violator or violators, upon conviction, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000, or by imprisonment for not more than two years or by both such fine and imprisonment. The authority granted in this Act shall terminate June 30, 1942, unless the Congress shall otherwise provide."

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the said Act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that the administration of the provisions of Section 6 of that Act is vested in the Administrator of Export Control, who shall administer such provisions under such rules and regulations as I shall from time to time prescribe in the interest of the national defense.

AND I do hereby further proclaim that upon the recommendation of the said Administrator, I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after July 5, 1940, the articles and materials hereinafter listed shall not be exported from this United States except when authorized in each case by a license hereinafter provided:

1. Arms, ammunition, and implements of war as defined in
   my Proclamation No. 2237, of May 1, 1937, as well as all other
   arms, ammunition, and implements of war manufactured in this
   country or in foreign countries in this country.

2. The following basic materials and products containing
   the same:

   a. Aluminum
   b. Antimony
   c. Asbestos
   d. Chromium
   e. Cotton fibers
   f. Copper
   g. Graphite
   h. Hides
   i. Industrial diamonds
   j. Lanthane
   k. Magnesium
   l. Manganese
   m. Manila fiber
   n. Mica
   o. Molybdenum
   p. Optical glass
   q. Platinum group metals
   r. Quartz crystals
Def. Doc. 1400-F-4

s. Quinine

t. Rubber

u. Silk

v. Tin

TOA in. b. Chemicals as follows:

w. Toluol

x. Tungsten

y. Vanadium

z. Wool

b. Ammonia and ammonium compounds

c. Chlorine

d. Dimethylenine

e. Diphenylamine

f. Nitric acid

g. Nitrocecellose, having a nitrogen content of less than 12 percent

h. Soda lime

i. Sodium acetate, anhydrous

j. Stannum chemicals

k. Sulphuric acid, fuming

I. Nitric ether

M. Sodium acetate, anhydrous

Metal working machinery for --

(a) Melting or casting

(b) Pressing into forms

(c) Cutting or grinding; power driven

(d) Welding; and all grades of sheet metal working machinery. And I do hereby empower the Secretary of State to issue licenses authorizing the exportation of any of the said articles and materials the exportation of which is not already subjected to the requirement that a license be obtained from the Secretary of State authorizing their exportation and I do hereby authorize and enjoin him to issue or refuse to issue licenses authorizing the exportation of any of the articles or materials listed above in accordance with the foregoing rules and regulations or such specific directives as may be, from time to time, communicated to him by the Administrator of Export Control.

AND I do hereby admonish all citizens of the United States and every person to abstain from every violation of the provisions of section 6 of the act above set forth, of the provisions of this proclamation, and of the provisions of such regulations as may be issued thereunder, and I do hereby warn them that all violations of such provisions will be rigorously prosecuted.

A. S. O. Roosevelt

[Signature]

Secretary of State
AND I do hereby enjoin upon all officers of the United States, charged with the execution of the laws thereof, the utmost diligence in preventing violations of the said act, of this my proclamation, and of any regulations which may be issued pursuant hereto, and in bringing to trial and punishment any offenders against the same.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 2nd day of July, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fourth, at 11 a.m., E.S.T.

(Seal) 

Franklin D. Roosevelt

By the President:
Cordell Hull
Secretary of State

Pages 211-213

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. LL
Executive Order No. 8694, Signed by President Roosevelt, February 25, 1941

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense," I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of the articles and materials designated in my proclamation of February 25, 1941:

1. The articles and materials designated in my proclamation of February 25, 1941, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, shall be construed to include the following:

   (1) Beryllium:
       Ores and concentrates (except gem varieties)
       Metal, alloys and scrap
       Beryllium salts and compounds

   (2) Graphite electrodes

   (3) Aircraft Pilot Trainers
       Trainers for ground instruction of pilots, student pilots, and combat crews for aircraft in instrument flying, navigation, bombing, or gunnery.

2. Regulations 2 to 12 inclusive of the Regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of the articles and materials listed in paragraph 1 (1) through (3) inclusive.

3. Executive Order No. 8640 is hereby amended to include within its provisions the articles and materials designated in my proclamation of February 25, 1941.

   Franklin D. Roosevelt
   The White House, February 25, 1941

Pages 251, 252
Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941 Vol. 11
The Ambassador said that the Japanese are alarmed over increasing naval and military preparations of the ABCD powers in the southwest Pacific area, and that an airplane of one of those countries had recently flown over Formosa. He said that our military men are very alert and enterprising and are known to believe in the principle that offense is the best defense. The Secretary asked whether the Ambassador's observations applied to defensive measures we are taking against Hitler. The Ambassador replied that he did not say that, but that it was because of Japan's apprehensions in regard to the situation that they had made their November 20 proposal.
大使は、日本人は東西太平洋地域に於ける AB D路の闘争、海軍軍備の増大により、日本がその十一月二十日の提議をしたのを局に聞いて日

- 七八二頁 -

"ソーセッパ・ダフリユ・ピーバーランタイ

RECEIVED

JUL 7 1947
Press Release Issued by the White House on
July 2, 1940

The President on July 2 signed H. R. 9850, providing legal authority for the control of exports from the United States of munitions, materials, and machinery essential to our national defense. A proclamation issued under this authority sets up the controls considered necessary at this time.

The items and materials listed in the proclamation include certain strategic materials as well as semi-finished products and machine tools of which there are actual or prospective shortages as a result of the national defense program.

The President also signed and issued the following military order:

"The administration of section 6 of the act of Congress entitled 'An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense', approved July 2, 1940, is essentially a military function, and by virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, I hereby designate Lieutenant Colonel Russell L. Maxwell, U.S. Army, Administrator of Export Control to administer the provisions of the said section under the direction and supervision of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

"Franklin D. Roosevelt
"Commander-in-Chief

"The White House
"July 2, 1940"
Executive Order No. 8702, Signed by President Roosevelt, March 4, 1941

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act To expedite the strengthening of the national defense", I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of the articles and materials named in my proclamation of March 4, 1941:

1. The articles and materials named in the said proclamation shall be construed to include the following:

   (1) Cadmium
       Ores and concentrates
       Metal
       Alloys
       Cadmium Salts and Compounds
       Cadmium chloride
       Cadmium oxide
       Cadmium sulfate
       Cadmium plating salts
       Cadmium sulfide
       Cadmium lithopong

   (2) Carbon Black:
       Carbon black, including gas black

   (3) Coconut Oil:
       Edible
       Inedible

   (4) Copra

   (5) Cresylic Acid and Cresols

   (6) Fatty Acids produced from vegetable oils under export control

   (7) Glycerin

   (8) Palm-Kernel Oil and Palm Kernels:
       Palm-Kernel Oil:
       Edible
       Inedible
       Palm Kernels

   (9) Pine Oil

   (10) Petroleum Coke

   (11) Shellac
       Lac, crude, seed, button, and stick
       Unbleached shellac
       Bleached shellac

   (12) Titanium
       Ores and concentrates:
       Ilmenite
       Rutile
       Metal
       Alloys
       Titanium Salts and Compounds:
       Titanium dioxide
       Titanium tetrachloride
3. Regulations 2 to 12 inclusive of the regulations issued July 2, 1940, pursuant to section 6 of the act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of the articles and materials listed in paragraph 1 (1)-(12).

4. Executive Order No. 8640 is hereby amended to include within its provisions the articles and materials named in my proclamation of March 4, 1941.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, March 4, 1941

Pages 255, 256, 257
Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11
Memorandum of a Conversation

(WASHINGTON,) July 2, 1941.

Mr. Ballantine and Mr. Schmidt, who were later joined by Mr. Hamilton, called at the apartment of Colonel Iwakuro and Mr. Wikawa by arrangement following an intimation that the Japanese would like to meet us for further discussion.

In a plea for mutual confidence, Mr. Wikawa stated that he had learned recently that the banking firm of Morgan and Company in New York, which had control of a Japanese sinking fund to purchase Japanese Government bonds at a price favorable to Japan, had learned from sources within the State Department that these conversations had been very politely but firmly and on technical grounds closed by the United States and that the freezing of Japanese funds in the United States could be expected in the near future. Morgan and Company had accordingly begun the purchase of Japanese Government bonds indiscriminately and had forced the price of those bonds to rise considerably to the detriment of the Japanese Government's sinking fund. Mr. Wikawa said they were embarrassed by an implication in the Secretary's oral statement of June 21 of division within the Japanese Government.

M(AX) W. S(CHMIDT)

51a Mr. Matsudaira was also present.
Regulations Governing the Exportation of Articles and Materials Designated in the President's Proclamation of July 2, 1940, Issued Pursuant to the Provisions of Section 6 of the Act of Congress Approved July 2, 1940

1. As used in my proclamation of July 26, 1940, issued pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, and in these regulations, the following terms shall be construed as defined herein:

A. Petroleum Products — (a) Aviation Motor Fuel, i.e. high octane gasolines, hydrocarbons, and hydrocarbon mixtures (including crude oils) boiling between 75° and 350° F. which with the addition of tetraethyl lead up to a total content of 3 c.c. per gallon will exceed 87 octane number by the A.S.T.M. Knock Test Method; or any material from which by commercial distillation there can be separated more than 3% of such gasoline, hydrocarbon or hydrocarbon mixture. (b) Aviation Lubricating Oil, i.e. any lubricating oil of 95 or more seconds Saybolt Universal Viscosity at 210° F. with a viscosity index of 85 or more.

B. Tetraethyl Lead — Pure tetraethyl lead, ethyl fluid, or any mixture containing more than 3 c.c. of tetraethyl lead per gallon.

C. Iron and Steel Scrap — Number 1 heavy melting scrap.

2. Regulations Nos. 2 to 12, inclusive, of the regulations issued on July 2, 1940, pursuant to the Act of July 2, 1940, are applicable to the exportation of aviation motor fuel, tetraethyl lead, and aviation lubricating oil.

Franklin D. Roosevelt

The White House, July 26, 1940

Pages 217, 218

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11
Proclamation No. 2423, Signed by President Roosevelt, September 12, 1940

WHEREAS Section 6 of the Act of Congress entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

(Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211).

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the above-mentioned act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after this date the following described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except upon authorization in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of Section 6 of the Act entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense" approved July 2, 1940," and in the regulations issued pursuant thereto:

1. Equipment (excluding minor component parts) which can be used, or adapted to use, for the production of aviation motor fuel from petroleum, petroleum products, hydrocarbons, or hydrocarbon mixtures, by processes involving chemical change; and any plans, specifications, or other documents containing descriptive or technical information of any kind (other than that appearing in any form available to the general public) useful in the design, construction, or operation of any such equipment, or in connection with any such processes. Aviation motor fuel shall mean such fuel as is defined in the regulations issued pursuant to Proclamation No. 2417 of July 26, 1940, as may from time to time be amended.

2. Equipment (excluding minor component parts) which can be used, or adapted to use, for the production of tetraethyl lead; and any plans, specifications, or other documents containing descriptive or technical information of any kind (other than that appearing in any form available to the general public) useful in the design, construction, or operation of any such equipment, or in connection with any such processes. Tetraethyl lead shall mean such tetraethyl lead as is defined in the regulations issued pursuant to Proclamation No. 2417 of July 26, 1940, as may from time to time be amended.

3. Plans, specifications, and other documents containing descriptive or technical information of any kind (other than that appearing in any form available to the general public) setting forth the design, or construction of aircraft or aircraft engines.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this twelfth day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

By the President: Franklin D. Roosevelt
Cordell Hull
Secretary of State

Pages 220,221

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11.
密談録文書（四）三
（ワシントン）一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月二日

バランタイン氏及びシュミット氏は陸軍大佐及び井川氏の部屋（松井氏も列席した）に訪問した。これ
は日本側から更に協議のため吾々に留したいとの意願を通報して来た。これ
打合せをしてみたのである。

互に秘密に附して置きたえと言って、井川氏の述べるに自分が最
近知った所では、日本政府の処償を日本に好都合な価格で購入するた
め日本の減債基金の管理をしてゐる総括の金融会社＝モルガン＝商会
が国務省内のある所の情報に依りこの会談が進められて関係者間の
して且つ又技術的理由により米国側から打ち切られたとは同様に然し確乎と
在る日本内で賀利が近き将来に於て顯期されると言ふことを知った。
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (Grew)

(TOKYO,) July 27, 1941.

* * * * *

At this point the Minister again reverted to the resentment which was felt in Japan by the freezing of Japanese assets. I told him that I had little knowledge of the intention of my Government in regard to the administration of the Executive Order freezing Japanese assets but that I believed, against speaking unofficially and personally, that there might be considerable flexibility in the administration of the Order. * * * * *

* * * * *

J(OSEPH) C. G(REW)

Pages 534 - 537, Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume II.
駐日大使（グル）の覚書

東京一昭和十六年七月二十七日

此処に於て大沢は彼々、日本貿易の凍結に対して日本に於て備損の念を起こしてある事実を述べた。先に彼に告げて、日本貿易凍結の決定は今後東京に於て行われる我政府の意図に於ては何も知り得ないということし非公式に且つ個人的に云へば、本命の実施に於て相当の伸縮性があるだろうと信ずるものであると云った。

一合衆国の對外関係 第二巻三四五一五三七頁より

デー（デヨセフ）・シーコチャー（グル）
The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State

The Japanese Government has taken note of the Proclamation, dated July 26, 1940, by the President of the United States of America, for the administration of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled, "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense," and the Regulations, dated July 26, 1940, governing the exportation of articles and materials designated in the President's Proclamation of July 2, 1940, and the announcement of July 31 recommended by Colonel R. L. Maxwell, Administrator of Export Control.

The announcement of July 31, the introduction to which stated that it was issued with the approval of the President, is as follows:

"In the interests of the National Defense the export of aviation gasoline is being limited to nations of the Western Hemisphere, except where such gasoline is required elsewhere for the operations of American owned companies."

It is the understanding of the Japanese Government that the announcement expresses the policy to be followed by the Government of the United States in applying the above mentioned Proclamations and Regulations to the export of aviation gasoline and that that policy, by limiting the export destinations, is tantamount to an embargo on aviation gasoline so far as countries outside the Western Hemisphere are concerned. As a country whose import of American aviation gasoline is of immense volume, Japan would bear the brunt of the virtual embargo. The resultant impression would be that Japan had been singled out for and subjected to discriminatory treatment.

While reserving all rights of further action, the Government of Japan wishes to protest against the policy of the Government of the United States set forth in the announcement under review.

(Washington) August 3, 1940

Pages 218, 219

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11
The Department of State to the Japanese Embassy.

The Government of the United States desires to state that the action under reference, as was mentioned in the proclamation issued by the President of the United States on July 26, 1940, referred to in the Japanese Embassy's note under acknowledgment, is necessary in the interest of the national defense and that, accordingly, this Government considers a protest by any foreign government against that action to be unwarranted.

Washington, August 9, 1940.

Pages 219, 220

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11
Press Release No. 48 Issued by the Federal Loan Agency on September 25, 1940

Jesse Jones, Federal Loan Administrator, announced today that as a part of the National Defense program the Metals Reserve Company has agreed to buy from the National Resources Commission of China tungsten to the value of $30,000,000. The tungsten will be delivered over a period of years at prices to be agreed upon from time to time, in accordance with market conditions, as the tungsten is delivered.

To assist China to meet her present foreign exchange needs the Export-Import Bank has agreed to lend China $25,000,000 that will be liquidated through the sale of the tungsten. The loan will be made to the Government of China with the guarantee of the Central Bank of China.

December 15, 1938, the Bank authorized $25,000,000 credits to the Universal Trading Corporation of New York, a Chinese-owned American corporation, which is being repaid through the importation from China of wood oil, used in the manufacture of paints and varnishes. $20,840,000 of this authorization has been drawn, and $4,193,444 repaid.

March 7, 1940, the Bank authorized additional loans to China of $20,000,000 which is to be repaid through the importation from China of tin. Some tin is already being shipped.

Of all loans heretofore authorized to China, both by the RFC and the Export-Import Bank, $43,824,528 has been disbursed and $13,160,253 repaid, with nothing past due.
Press Release Issued by the White House on September 26, 1940

The President has approved the early establishment of additional controls of the exportation of iron and steel scrap with a view to conserving the available supply to meet the rapidly expanding requirements of the defense program in this country.

Effective October 15, 1940, all outstanding balances of licenses which have been granted pursuant to the existing regulations of July 26, 1940 for the exportation of No. 1 heavy melting steel scrap will be revoked. On October 16, 1940 the exportation of all grades of iron and steel scrap will be placed under the licensing system.

Under the new regulations which will be made effective on October 16, 1940, licenses will be issued to permit shipments to the countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain only.

Pages 222, 223

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11
Memorandum by the Secretary of State

(Washington) August 28, 1941

The Ambassador of Japan called on the President at the latter's request. The Secretary of State was present. The Ambassador expressed his usual appreciation of certain courtesies and considerations shown him and his Government.

He then handed to the President a communication from the Prime Premier of Japan to the President of the United States (copy attached). The President read it with interest and complimented the tone and spirit of it.

The President then spoke somewhat as he did at the last meeting a week ago Sunday about the idea suggested by the Japanese Prime Minister of a personal meeting between the President and the Prime Minister at as early a date as possible for the purpose of having a frank discussion of all important affairs existing between the two countries. The President again spoke of the difficulty of going as far as Hawaii and elaborated on the reasons why it would be difficult to get away for twenty-one days. He then turned to Juneau, Alaska, as a meeting place, which would only require some fourteen or fifteen days, allowing for a three or four days conversation with the Japanese Prime Minister. The only point raised by the Ambassador in this connection was that the conversation be held as early as possible.

The Ambassador then handed to the President a communication from his Government in reply to the communication of the President to the Japanese Government, dated August 17, 1941 (copy attached). The President expressed his keen interest to get this reply and proceeded to read it. At two or three stages he stopped to comment briefly and, as he stated each time, study would later, of course, be given to the subject. For example, he remarked that there was nothing in the note to prevent the Japanese from reinforcing their Army and Navy in the Indochina area while the conversations were going on, even though there was no advance whatever by the Japanese forces. At another point he injected some oral comment to the effect that Japan is in no possible danger from Russia at the present time and he emphasized this very strongly. At still another point he referred critically to the Japanese oil complaints and their baseless nature. He then reminded the Ambassador that under the oil quota allowed Japan by this Government, Japan was in a position to have a number of tankers loaded with oil and transported to Japan if and when it so desired.

At the conclusion of the reading of the communication, the President said to the Ambassador that he could say to his Government that he considered this note a step forward and that he was very hopeful. He then added that he would be keenly interested in having three or four days with Prince Konoyo, and again he mentioned Juneau.
日本大使は大統領との面会を拝下さる看に、国務長官が同席した。大統領は彼並に当国政府に興えた友好と配慮について例の如く敬意を
表現した。

日本大使は大統領との大会を拝下され、国務長官が同席した。大統領は彼並に当国政府に興えた友好と配慮について例の如く敬意を
表現した。
提案に多少ふれたが、それは一週間前の日曜日に聞かれた前回の会談におけると同様であった。大統領は再びハワイまで出むくことの困難について述べた後で、会見の場所として日本の首相と三日乃至四日間会談す

きだといふことだけであった。

つまり大統領は会見の場所として日本の首相と三日乃至四日間会談す
The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State

No. 235

The Japanese Government has taken note of the regulations governing the exportation of iron and steel scrap, dated September 30, 1940, amending the construction and definition of the term "iron and steel scrap" included in the regulations of July 26, 1940, and the announcement of September 26, 1940, to the effect that, under the new regulations, licenses will be issued to permit shipments to the countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain only.

The above mentioned regulations refer to the Presidential authority derived from the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled, "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense", thereby suggesting that it was determined to be necessary in the interest of national defense to curtail the exportation of iron and steel scrap.

In view of the situation of iron and steel scrap markets, the supply and demand of these materials and the volume shipped to Japan, the Japanese Government finds it difficult to concede that this measure was motivated solely by the interest of national defense of the United States.

In the note of the Japanese Ambassador of August 3 the Japanese Government pointed out that the measure announced on July 26, 1940, in regard to the exportation of aviation gasoline, was tantamount to an export embargo as far as countries outside the Western Hemisphere were concerned. Compared to that announcement, the announcement under review may be said to have gone a step further toward discrimination by specifically excluding Great Britain from the virtual embargo.

In view of the fact that Japan has been for some years the principal buyer of American iron and steel scrap, the announcement of the administrative policy, as well as the regulations establishing license system in iron and steel scrap cannot fail to be regarded as directed against Japan, and, as such, to be an unfriendly act.

The Japanese Government hereby protests against the measures taken by the United States Government in connection with the exportation of iron and steel scrap.

(Washington) October 7, 1940
日本政府は一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二十六日（昭和十一年）前後、連合国の発動を加へたる一九四〇年（昭和十五年）の仮設の時及び邦国にに対する裁決のみを認める取扱を設けること、いふ趣旨の
一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二十六日（昭和十一年）前後、連合国の発動を加へたる一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二十六日（昭和十一年）前後、連合国の発動を加へたる一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二十六日（昭和十一年）前後、連合国の発動を加へたる一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二十六日（昭和十一年）前後、連合国の発動を加へたる一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二十六日（昭和十一年）前後、連合国の発動を加へたる一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二十六日（昭和十一年）前後、連合国の発動を加へたる一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二十六日（昭和十一年）前後、連合国の発動を加へたる一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二十六日（昭和十一年）前後、連合国の発動を加へたる一九四〇年（昭和十五年）七月二十六日（昭和十一年）前後、連合国の発動を加へたる一九四〇年（昭和十五年）
八月三日の日本大使の発表に於て、日本政府は航空機用ガソリンの輸出に於て一九五四一九五三年（昭和十五年一七月二十六日）に発表されたことも差別的措置に当たるものであるとは認めがたい。前の中発表と比較し、修正したとの発表は、特別に英語を字義上の禁止から除外する事によって更に一步進んで差別的措置に出たるもののと言ひ得るであろう。日本は三面的に農業アメリカの輸出を協定、同盟、普及協力の目標としたものと云へば、所々に差別的措置に当たるものと云はざるを得ない。日本政府はこのように特別に輸出に於て、アメリカ政府のとられた措置に答へ、米国、日本・・・等の対外関係より改革し一九五四一九五三年（昭和十五年一七月二十六日）に発表されたことも差別的措置に当たるものであるとは認めがたい。
I telephoned Mr. Iguchi of the Japanese Embassy and, referring to his call yesterday and the questions he then raised in regard to cargo aboard the Japanese ships, told him I wished, under instruction, to supplement information communicated by Mr. Welles, to the Ambassador this morning when the Ambassador raised the question of the treatment of cargo on board Japanese vessels. I referred to the fact that Mr. Welles had informed the Ambassador that no assurances could be given in regard to whether funds would be released or would not be released to cover any cargo landed from such ships and that applications for licenses would be given appropriate consideration if and as they were individually presented. I said that we understood that the Treasury Department was making arrangements whereby Japanese ships, if they did not wish to discharge their cargo, would be granted clearances and permitted to sail with cargo aboard. I told Mr. Iguchi that I understood that the Treasury Department was communicating information to the foregoing effect to the agents or owners of the Japanese steamship companies in this country.

Mr. Iguchi thanked me for communicating the foregoing information to him and said that he would bring it to the attention of the Ambassador.

Later, following conference with Mr. Acheson and conference by Mr. Acheson with Mr. Foley of the Treasury Department, I telephoned Mr. Iguchi and told him that I wished to give him further information on two points. I said that the first point was that the provision to the effect that Japanese ships could, if they desired, enter American ports and leave without discharging cargoes applies only to Japanese ships coming in before next Saturday (August 2), midnight. I explained that ships coming in before that date and desiring to leave without discharging cargoes would be given a reasonable time to leave. I said that the second point was that if a Japanese ship's manifest showed that cargo aboard the ship was destined to an American port and the ship did not wish to discharge that cargo upon arrival at an American port, the ship should correct the manifest at sea to show that no cargo was destined for discharge at an American port. I told Mr. Iguchi also that if the Japanese Embassy wished further particulars on and clarification of these matters, an officer of the Embassy might care to get in touch with the Commissioner of Customs at the Treasury Department.

I went over the foregoing twice with Mr. Iguchi and he said that he understood.

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11
井戸田氏は先に太平洋彼岸の送金行為に感謝し、大使にもその事について知らせた。井戸田氏は、アメリカとの関係を改善し、将来の関係を良好にするため、送金の意義を説明した。

この送金行為は、アメリカと日本の関係を改善し、将来の関係を良好にするため、井戸田氏は説明した。
This evening the Prime Minister invited me to dine at a
private house of a friend. Only Mr. Dooman and Mr. Ushiba, the
Prime Minister's private secretary, were also present. The con­
versation lasted for three hours and we presented with entire
frankness the fundamental views of our two countries. The Prime
Minister requested that his statements be transmitted personally
to the President in the belief that they might amplify and clarify
the approach through diplomatic channels which he had made in
Washington through Admiral "omura. The following is a brief
summary of the salient points as they emerged in the course of
our discussion.

1. Prince Konoye, and consequently the Government of Japan,
conclusively and wholeheartedly agree with the four principles
enunciated by the Secretary of State as a basis for the rehabi­
litation of relations between the United States and Japan.

2. Prince Konoye recognizes that the responsibility is his
for the present regrettable state of relations between our two
countries but, with appropriate modesty as to his personal capa­
bilities, he likewise recognizes that only he can cause the desire
rehabilitation to come about. In the event of failure on his
part no succeeding Prime Minister, at least during his own life­
time, could achieve the results desired. Prince Konoye is there­
fore determined to spare no effort, despite all elements and
factors opposing him, to crown his present endeavors with success.

3. The Prime Minister hopes that as a result of the commit­
ments which the Japanese Government is prepared to assume as
communicated to me by Admiral Toyoda, a rational basis has been
established for a meeting between the President and himself. The
Prime Minister, however, is cognizant of the fact that certain
points may need clarification and more precise formulation, and
he is confident that the divergencies in view can be reconciled
to our mutual satisfaction, particularly by reason of the favorabl
disposition on the part of Japanese naval and military leaders
who have not only subscribed to his proposals but who will also
be represented at the suggested meeting. The Prime Minister
stated that both the Ministers of War and of the Navy have given
their full agreement to his proposals to the United States.

4. The reports which the Prime Minister has received from
the Japanese Ambassador concerning the latter's conversations
with the President and the Secretary have led the Prime Minister
to think that the Administration in Washington entertains serious
doubts as to the strength of the present Cabinet and that the
Administration is not certain that in the event that the Cabinet
should adopt a peace program it could successfully resist the
attacks of opposing elements. Prince Konoye told me that from
the inception of the informal talks in Washington he had received
the strongest concurrence from the responsible chiefs of both
the Army and the Navy. Only today he had conferred with the
Minister of War who had promised to send a full General to ac­
company the Prime Minister to the meeting with the President;
the Minister of the Navy had agreed that a full Admiral should
accompany the Prime Minister. Prince Konoye added in confidence
that he expected that the representative of the Navy would probably be Admiral Yoshida, a former Minister of the Navy. In addition the Premier would be accompanied by the Vice Chiefs of Staff of the army and the Navy and other high ranking officers of the armed services who are in entire accord with his aims. He admitted that there are certain elements within the armed forces who do not approve his policies, but he voiced the conviction that since he had the full support of the responsible chiefs of the Army and Navy it would be possible for him to put down and control any opposition which might develop among these elements.

5. Prince Konoye repeatedly stressed the view that time is of the essence. It might take half a year to a year to work out all the details of the complete settlement and since resentment is daily mounting in Japan over the economic pressure being exerted by other countries, he could not guarantee to put into effect any such program of settlement six months or a year from now. He does, however, guarantee that at the present time he can carry with him the Japanese people to the goal which he has selected and that should difficulties be encountered in working out the details of the commitments which he may assume, these difficulties can be overcome satisfactorily because of the determined intention of his Government to see to it that its present efforts are fully successful.

6. In the course of our discussion I outlined in general terms the bitter lessons of the past to our Government as the result of the failure of the Japanese Government to honor the promises given to me by former Japanese Ministers for Foreign affairs apparently in all sincerity, as a result of which the Government of the United States had at long last concluded that it must place its reliance on actions and facts and not on Japanese promises or assurances. The Prime Minister did not attempt to refute this statement but stressed the fact that his Government now wished to bring about a thoroughgoing reconstruction of American-Japanese relations and he assured me that any commitments which he would undertake would bear no resemblance to the "irresponsible" assurances which we had received in the past and that such commitments if given would be observed. The Prime Minister concluded his presentation of this point by giving me to understand that given the will the way can be found.

7. Prince Konoye stated that should the President desire to communicate any kind of suggestion to him personally and confidentially he would be glad to arrange subsequent secret meetings with me, but he expressed the earnest hope that in view of the present internal situation in Japan the projected meeting with the President could be arranged with the least possible delay. Prince Konoye feels confident that all problems and questions at issue can be disposed of to our mutual satisfaction during the meeting with the President, and he ended our conversation with the statement that he is determined to bring to a successful conclusion the proposed reconstruction of relations with the United States regardless of cost or personal risk.
今夕総理大臣ハ友人ノ私宅ニ於ケル晩餐ニ私ヲ招待シタ。ドーマン氏ト
首相ノ被害ノ私邸ダケガ同様ニ出席シタ。我々ノ談話ハ三時間ニ亘り
日米両国ニ就イテノ根本的意見ニ於テ満足ヲ講じテ今ラシントンデニ於テ外交
手段ニ依リ行ふテ居ル交渉ヲ促シテ開明スルヲ特信スルカラニソレヲ親
手題ニ上げタル顕著ヲ観其概要ヲデアル。

四原則ニ絶対的且ツ全面的ニ資金ヲ発スル。
日本ノ駐米大使カラ首相へ送ラレタ大統領及ビ長官トノ会見ニ関スル
言質過去ニ於テ我々ノ受ケテ無資産ナテ保儀ト同ジモノデハナ

近衛公ハ若シ大統領ガ何カ個人的ニ内容ニ提覧スルコトガアレバ喜

デ今後モ私ト私ト秘密ノ会見ヲ行フト遅ベタガ、日本ノ国内状態ニ於

ケ大統領トノ意見ハ成ルベキ早ク行ヒタイトノ熱心ナ希望ヲ表明

シタ。近衛公ハ凡テノ問題ヲ協議ハテル大統領トノ意見ニ於テ相互ヲ示

足スル倶解決出来ルト急促スル事態ベタ。ソシテ最後ニ如何ナル様

性ヲテテテモ亦一身上ノ急迫ヲシテテモ、合衆關トノ関係閣復ヲ成

功ヲサル决心ヲテ待トテ參ベテ當蒙ヲ報告ヘタ。
The Japanese Embassy to the Department of State

Since iron and steel scrap classified as No. 1 heavy melting scrap was placed under export-licensing system on July 26, 1940, permission of the United States Government was obtained up to August 19 of the same year for 99 percent of applications for shipments to Japan.

In the light of this fact, the sudden enlargement of the iron and steel scrap licensing system to include all grades of these materials is hardly explicable from the standpoint of national defense, on which the regulation of September 30, 1940, is purported to be based.

The discriminatory feature of the announcement, that licenses will be issued to permit shipments to the countries of the Western Hemisphere and Great Britain only, has created a widespread impression in Japan that it was motivated by a desire to bring pressure upon her.

The fact that the majority of essential articles and materials that Japan desires to import from America is placed under licensing system is causing a feeling of tension among the people of Japan, who naturally presume that the system is intended to be a precursor of severance of economic relations between Japan and the United States.

In view of the high feeling in Japan it is apprehended that, in the event of continuation by the United States Government of the present attitude toward Japan in matters of trade restriction, especially if it leads to the imposition of further measures of curtailment, future relations between Japan and the United States will be unpredictable.

It is a matter of course that the Governments of both Japan and the United States should endeavor as best they can to preclude such an eventuality. To this endeavor the Japanese Government will devote itself and trusts that it may have the full cooperation of the United States Government.

Pages 224, 225

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11

This undated statement was handed to the Secretary of State by the Japanese Ambassador on October 8, 1940.
彼等はこの制度が当然日米の経済関係を推進させめるためたるべく企

日本に於ける苛立った感情の動きに際し、米国政府が貿易関係問題に

問題を日本に於ける現在の如き態度を導ずする場合、特に前章に二類の

製作を加えられならば将来の日米関係は安定しかたないものとなるで

ある。

日米両国政府が新しく如き不測の事情を防止する為特に之等の事に

敬意の努力をなすべきは當然である。日本政府はこの努力に向け努力を

するであろうとし之が米国政府の協力を要すものと信ずる。

合衆国財政外務系（日本）一九三一年（昭和六年）一一九四〇年

（昭和十六年）第二次文二四〇、二三五頁より抜粋

大使より職務長官に手交されたものである。

之の無日附スレートメントは一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十月八日日本
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State
(Acheson)

(Washington), August 1, 1941

Mr. Iguchi called at his request. He told me that the Tatuta Maru would require some cargo to ballast her for the return trip to Japan. I said that I had already been in touch with counsel for the N.Y.K. on this matter and that it would be promptly taken care of within the limits of the export restrictions. He expressed his appreciation.

(At a meeting of the Office of the Administrator of Export Control, Treasury, and State Department officials held in this office, Saturday afternoon licenses were granted for the cargo requested, with the exception that lubricating oil requested was restricted within the specifications announced by General Maxwell on Saturday. The cargo chiefly consisted of asphalt and a small quantity of cocoa beans and cotton).

Mr. Iguchi asked whether the time limit referred to by Mr. Hamilton within which ships might come in with cargo and leave with the same cargo implied that after midnight Saturday Japanese ships would be detained. I said that it did not. I explained that the time limit referred solely to the agreement that ships outside American ports with cargo might come in with the cargo and leave with it without hindrance from the Treasury. I pointed out that this assurance, as a practical matter, was no longer important because of the action of private parties in filing libel suits.

I stated to Mr. Iguchi, as I had been instructed to do by the Acting Secretary, that under present conditions this Government had no intention of interfering with Japanese ships; that such ships might come in, might discharge cargo consigned to American ports, would be granted sufficient supplies and fuel for the return voyage and would be given clearance and departure permits. I cautioned him again that on account of libels filed against cargoes it was not possible to give any assurance regarding the cargoes. I also pointed out that the assurance of freedom of departure was predicated on the continuance of existing conditions. He said that he earnestly hoped that there would be no change in these conditions for the worse.
新設関税局

(アケソン)

当該関税局

(昭和四一年)—九四一年(昭和十六年)—八月一日

先方よりの求めるにより井口氏来訪、関係者に白書の為めパラスドと

して着手の意を発表を仰ぐ旨書了した。于是本件に於ては既に日本関税局

局長宛の通知を一旦とした。井口氏は関係の意を表した。

以次日の午後、当所に於て開催した関係関係局高等所員、大阪省関

関係者等の皆誤に於て要求の如き調書を除き関係資料に対して許

可語が既可され、調書は去る土曜ロマックスウェル等に依り発表せ

られた事務局の範囲内に測定せられた。資料は主にアスファルトと少

量のコアの質と管花であった。
へた。予は時間制限のあるものには申しに貨物を搭載して出港し得る証を示されるとところ、又にその貨物を搭載して出港し得る証を示されたものを、それが予の保証の対象であると説明した。

予は又この保証の対象である貨物を搭載して出港し得る証を示されたものを、それが予の保証の対象であると説明した。
The President on October 10 approved an act which confers on him authority to requisition arms, ammunition, implements of war, machine tools, and other articles and materials which are needed for the national defense.

Under the Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939, and under the Export Control Act of July 2, 1940, certain articles and materials needed for the national defense have been subject to the export-licensing system. Since the passage of the last-named act, many applications for licenses have been refused as a result of decisions by the Administrator of Export Control that the proposed exportation would be contrary to the interests of the national defense. The articles or materials for which export licenses have been refused have in many cases already been sold and the title has passed to a foreign purchaser. It has been found that, in some of these cases, purchasers did not desire to sell the article or material in the United States or, because they were acting in a representative capacity, they were not legally in a position to do so. This situation has been particularly acute in the case of some exportations of machine tools. A great many of these tools for which export licenses have been refused are especially needed to meet national-defense requirements.

The President on October 15 issued an Executive order directing the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, acting jointly through the agency of the Army and Navy Munitions Board, to determine the necessity for the requisitioning of any equipment, munitions, or machinery tools, materials, or supplies necessary for the manufacture of munitions, or the servicing, or operation of facilities for the national defense, and to determine whether in any case it is in the public interest to sell, or otherwise dispose of, any of the articles and materials so requisitioned. The administration of the other provisions of the act has been vested in the Administrator of Export Control.

The President at the same time issued the necessary regulations for the carrying out of his Executive order.

As a result of his approval of this act and the issuance of this Executive order and these regulations, the President is assured the use of the critical articles and materials required in the national-defense program which might otherwise be unobtainable.
Reference is made to the note dated October 7, 1940, from the Japanese Embassy at Washington, in which objection is expressed by the Japanese Government to the regulations promulgated by the American Government on September 30, 1940, with regard to the exportation of iron and steel scrap, such objection being placed apparently on the ground that the restrictions to be effected by the regulations are discriminatory and are calculated to be injurious to Japan.

As was pointed out in the first paragraph of the Japanese Embassy's note, the regulations under reference derive from the provisions of section 6 of the Act of July 2, 1940 entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense". It having been found by the appropriate agencies and authorities of this Government that the restrictions on exportation to be effected by the regulations under reference are necessary in the interest of national defense, the Government of the United States perceives no warrantable basis for a raising of question by any other government, in the circumstances -- not of this Government's making -- which prevail today in international relations, with regard to the considerations which necessitate the adoption by this Government of these measures of conservation.

Washington, October 23, 1940
レチは
スペインノ
レナ

合衆国外務省 — 日本

一九三一年（昭和十六年）——一九四一年（昭和十五年）十月二十三日

平等二駄三九月ヨリ改整
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, September 29, 1941 - noon.

1529. The Ambassador reports for Secretary Hull and Secretary Welles as follows:

(1) In regard to the preliminary conversations taking place at Washington and Tokyo, the Ambassador points out that a review of telegraphic correspondence on this subject since last spring reveals the Japanese Government's efforts, increasing steadily and intensified lately, to arrange a meeting between Prince Konoye and President Roosevelt without further delay.

The Ambassador expresses his earnest hope therefore that so propitious a period be not permitted to slip by without a new foundation having been laid with enough stability to warrant a reasonable amount of confidence that the structure to be erected gradually and progressively thereon can and will endure.

(2) The Ambassador recalls his statements in the past that in Japan the pendulum always swings between moderate and extremist policies; that it was not then possible under the existing circumstances for any Japanese leader or group to reverse the program of expansion and expect to survive; that the permanent digging in by Japanese in China and the pushing of the Japanese advance to the south could be prevented only by insuperable obstacles. The Ambassador recalls likewise his views that the risks of taking positive measures to maintain United States security in the future were likely to be far smaller than the risks of not taking such measures; that only respect for potential power of the United States has deterred Japan from taking more liberties with American interests; and that Japan's program of forcible expansion could be brought to a halt only by a show of force and by a demonstration of American willingness to use this force if necessary. The Ambassador recalls also his statement that if Japan's leadership could be discredited eventually by such American action, there might take shape in Japan ultimately a regeneration of thought which would allow Japan to resume formal relations with the United States, leading to a readjustment of the entire problem of the Pacific.

(3) The Ambassador suggests that the United States has been following very wisely precisely this policy which, furthered by other developments in the world, has helped to discredit Japanese leadership, notably that of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka. The Ambassador cites as world developments arousing a positive reaction from the United States the conclusion by Japan of the Tripartite Alliance and Japan's recognition of the Wang Ching-wei regime at Nanking, which preceded Germany's attack on the Soviet Union. Germany's action upset the basis for the Tripartite Pact, Japan having joined the Italo-German Axis in order to obtain security against Russia and thereby to avoid the peril of being caught between the Soviet Union and the United States. At the present time Japan is attempting to correct this miscalculation by getting out of an extremely dangerous position. The Ambassador recalls his
reports to the Department to the effect that Japanese foreign policies are inevitably changed by the impact of events abroad and that liberal elements in Japan might come to the top in due course as a result of the trend of events. He considers that such a time has arrived. He sees a good chance of Japan's falling into line if a program can be followed of world reconstruction as forecast by the declaration of President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill. American policy—of perseverance, patient argumentation, efforts at persuasion, followed for many years, plus a manifest determination of the United States to take positive measures when called for—plus the impact of world developments upon Japan, has rendered Japan's political soil hospitable to the sowing of new seeds which, the Ambassador feels, if planted carefully and nourished, may bring about the anticipated regeneration of Japanese thought and a complete readjustment of relations between Japan and the United States.

(4) Certain quarters have advanced the thought—and no doubt it is prominently in the mind of the United States Government—that at this juncture an agreement between Japan and the United States will serve merely as a breathing spell to Japan. During such a breathing spell, Japan, having successfully untangled itself with American aid from the China conflict, will recover and strengthen its forces in order to assume at the next favorable opportunity its expansionist program. This thought cannot be gainsaid with certainty. The same school of thought also holds that Japan will be forced to abandon its expansionist program because of the deterioration of Japanese domestic economy and because of the threat of financial, economic, and social collapse due to a progressive intensification of economic measures by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands against Japan. The Ambassador adds that should this thesis be accepted as reasonably sound, the position will confront the United States of choosing one of two methods to approach its objective, namely, either the method of progressive economic strangulation or the method of constructive conciliation, not so-called appeasement. The Ambassador sees the second method as the definite choice of the United States Government following the beginning of the Washington preliminary conversations and President Roosevelt's acceptance in principle of the Japanese Prime Minister's proposed meeting. Indeed, the Ambassador remarks, the United States has never departed from its readiness to negotiate on any issues with Japan (see the American note dated December 30, 1938), despite the fact that Japan already had embarked at that time on its expansion by force program. He feels that, from the viewpoint of farseeing statesmanship, the wisdom of the American choice seems to be beyond cavil. Should failure greet the constructive, conciliatory method of approach now or later, there will always be available the other method, the application of progressive economic sanctions. In the opinion of the Ambassador, whether the trend of American relations with Japan is for better or for worse, the United States obviously will have to remain for a long time to come in a state of preparedness. The thought that eventual British victory in the world war will solve automatically many problems may, meanwhile, afford whatever degree of encouragement is justified.

(5) The Ambassador, while admitting that risks will inevitably be involved no matter what course is pursued toward Japan, offers his carefully studied belief that there would be substantial hope at the very least of preventing the Far Eastern situation from becoming worse and perhaps of ensuring definitely constructive results, if an agreement along the lines of the preliminary discussions were brought to a head by the proposed meeting of the heads of the two Governments. The Ambassador mentions his previous expressions of opinion that the principal point at issue between the United States and Japan is not whether the former must call a
halt to the expansionist program of the latter, but when. He raises the questions whether the United States is not now given the opportunity to halt Japan's program without war, or an immediate risk of war, or further whether, through failure to use the present opportunity, the United States will not face a greatly increased risk of war. The Ambassador states his firm belief in an affirmative answer to these two questions.

(6) Certain quarters hold the view that it is altogether improbable under existing circumstances that counteraction will be deliberately taken by Japan in response to any American action likely to be taken in the Pacific which would bring about war with the United States. The Ambassador states his inability to agree that war may not supervene following actions, whether irrational or deliberate, by elements either in Japan or in the United States tending to inflame public opinion in the other country concerned as to make war unavoidable. He recalls in this regard the cases of the Maine and the Panay.

(7) The Ambassador stresses the importance of understanding Japanese psychology, fundamentally unlike that of any Western nation. Japanese reactions to any particular set of circumstances cannot be measured, nor can Japanese actions be predicted by any Western measuring rod. This fact is hardly surprising in the case of a country so recently feudalistic. The Ambassador conceives his chief duty to be an attempt to interpret accurately Japanese psychology, and he states that he has aimed to do this in his numerous reports during the last several months and years to the Department. Keeping this thought constantly before him, the Ambassador warns of the risk of repetition to advance the considerations set forth below.

(8) Should the United States expect or await agreement by the Japanese Government, in the present preliminary conversations, to clear-cut commitments which will satisfy the United States Government both as to principles and as to concrete detail, almost certainly the conversations will drag along indefinitely and unproductively until the Konoye Cabinet and its supporting elements desiring rapprochement with the United States will come to the conclusion that the outlook for an agreement is hopeless and that the United States Government is only playing for time. If the abnormal sensitiveness of Japan and the abnormal effects of loss of face are considered, in such a situation Japanese reaction may and probably will be serious. This will result in the Konoye Government's being disgraced and in a revolution of anti-American feeling, and this may and probably will lead to unbridled acts. The eventual cost of these will not be reckoned, and their nature is likely to inflame Americans, while reprisal and counter-reprisal measures will bring about a situation in which it will be difficult to avoid war. The logical outcome of all this will be the downfall of the Konoye Cabinet and the formation of a military dictatorship which will lack either the disposition or the temperament to avoid colliding head-on with the United States. There is a question that such a situation may prove to be more serious even than the failure to produce an entirely satisfactory agreement through the proposed meeting between President Roosevelt and Prince Konoye, should it take place as planned. Worded otherwise, the question remains whether it will not prove to be a less serious case for the negotiations undertaken in good faith to fail of complete success than for the United States to demonstrate its unwillingness to enter any such negotiations.

(9) The Ambassador continues by stating that he has been emphatically that any negotiations and such declarations he considers must be accepted at their face value—that prior to the
proposed Roosevelt-Konoye meeting and formal negotiations it is im-
possible for the Japanese Government to define its future assurances
and commitments more specifically than hitherto stated. The Ambas-
sador explains that one reason for this Japanese position, as given
him very confidentially, is that former Foreign Minister Matsuoka,
after his retirement in July, recounted in complete detail to the
German Ambassador in Japan the course of the Washington conversa-
tions up to that time. Because many supporters of Matsuoka remain in
the Tokyo Foreign Office, the fear has been expressed that these men will
not scruple to reveal to both the Germans and the Japanese extremists
any information which would render the present Cabinet's position
untenable. Although certain basic principles have been accepted pro-
visionally by the Japanese Government, the definitions and formulae
of Japan's future objectives and policy, as advanced so far during
the preliminary conversations, and the statements supplementary to
those definitions, are so abstract or equivocal and are open to such
wide interpretation that they rather create confusion than clarify
commitments which the Japanese Government is ready to undertake.
The Ambassador states that at the same time he has been told that
Prince Konoye is in a position in direct negotiations with President
Roosevelt to offer him assurances which, because of their far reach-
ing character, will not fail to satisfy the United States. The truth
of this statement cannot be determined by the Ambassador, who,
however, points out that, in regard specifically to Japan's Axis
relations, the Japanese Government, though refusing consistently to
give an undertaking that it will overtly renounce its alliance mem-
bership, actually has shown a readiness to reduce Japan's alliance ad-
herence to a dead letter by its indication of willingness to enter
formally into negotiations with the United States. The Ambassador
therefore does not consider unlikely the possibility of Prince
Konoye's being in a position to give President Roosevelt directly a
more explicit and satisfactory engagement than has already been
vouchsafed in the course of the preliminary conversations.

In the opinion of the Ambassador, on the basis of the above
observations which he has every reason to regard as sound, American
objectives will not be reached by insisting or continuing to insist
during the preliminary conversations that Japan provide the sort of
clear-cut, specific commitments which appear in any final, formal
convention or treaty. Unless a reasonable amount of confidence is
placed by the United States in the professed sincerity of intention
among the Tokyo Papists and his supporters to mold Japan's
future policy upon the basic principles they are ready to accept and
then to adopt measures which gradually but loyally implement these
principles, with it understood that the United States will implement
its own commitments pari passu with the steps which Japan takes, the
Ambassador does not believe that a new orientation can be successfull
created in Japan to lead to a general improving of Japanese-American
relations and to the hope that ultimate war may be avoided in the
Pacific. The sole way to discredit the Japanese military machine
and army is through wholesale military defeat, and the Ambassador
sees no present prospect of this. The only alternative (and the only
wise one in the view of the Ambassador) is an attempt to produce a
regeneration of Japanese thought and outlook through constructive
conciliation, along the line of American efforts as a present. The
Ambassador inquires whether the better part of wisdom and of states-
manship is not to bring such efforts to a head before the force of
their initial impetus is lost, leaving it impossible to overcome an
opposition which the Ambassador thinks will mount inevitably and
steadily in Japan.

In submitting the foregoing discussion, the Ambassador does
so in all deference to the much broader field of view of President
Roosevelt and Secretary Hull and in full awareness that the Ambas-
sador's approach to the matter is limited to the viewpoint of the
American Embassy in Japan.
………………

………………

………………
従って今回はこのような好機を捉えて新しい歴史的邁進を踏み出すために、我々は総経済戦略及び日本の南東方進出を打診しようとしている。その進出は、我々が世界を統治し、我々の安全を確保するための重要な手段である。戦略を立てることにより、我々は世界を統治し、我々の安全を確保することを可能にする。
(三) 国際情勢の変化と従来に日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考え方がとっさに日本に Submitted to the

従来の行軍についての考える
よってこの観察を訂正しようと企図している。外観で嘘の特件の発生へ
ついてこの観察を訂正しようと企図している。外観で嘘の特件の発生へ
ついてこの観察を訂正しようと企図している。外観で嘘の特件の発生へ
ついてこの観察を訂正しようと企図している。外観で嘘の特件の発生へ
ついてこの観察を訂正しようと企図している。
政府等の人々の考えてあるとはもちろんであるが、この期に際して日本はアメリカの援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のような方法を採用し決定することを望む。

まず、アメリカ等が立つに過ぎない。このような消息がされればならないので、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。このような消息がされているのに、次のようにしてアメリカ等の援助を受けて、アメリカとの間に協定が講ぜられるとしてもそれは日本にとっては提案力に富むものである。
政策でない既設的な和解の手段であるのか何か一つである。ワシントン…the 協議会議の進展及日本の就実大臣の提議した会議に際して原則上の
大合衆議は必ず考えものと余は見てある。当時の日本は既に兵力による
ルーズベルト大統領が承認を與へたのに引続きいただいてこの手段をアメ
リカ合衆国は必ず考えをしたものと余は見てある。当時の日本は既に兵力による
政策でない既設的な和解の手段であるのか何か一つである。ワシントン
(五) 余は日本に対して如何なる方針を採つても議論が在在するのは不可避である。因も此の議論が在在するのを阻止し、恐らく明確な階段的な成果を収める誠分があるというふることを余の説明の断面に仮示する。余は
主な議論は前著者が後者の経験を阻止しなくてはならぬ点かと云ふ間題に存するのでなくして何時著しあへなければならぬかと云ふ間題に存する。余は
アメリカは日本の歴史計画を進退させる為さに在在せるか又は現在の在在を利用しないために
問題を余は提案する。これら二つの質問に対する余は是表的返答を具
(六) アメリカとの抗戦開始の意味を秘書側が考えたところでは、日本側の行動を決定し、戦争の進行については、対米行動が日本側に保持されるという処置を計画している。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国との戦争に関するものに対し、日本側が負担する責任の問題を含むものである。これにとらわれるならば、日本側は米国上の観点に立つべきである。
余は余の主な職務は正確に日本人の心理を理解しようとするものである。余は過去数年間に互いに密接に接して来た日本政府に対しは不思議である。余は報告の内容を念頭に置きながら以下に述べる事情を闡明するため、研究を進めるのである。

(八) 現在の事態、会議、紛争を含む日本政府とアメリカ政府との関係についての本篇は、昭和九年三月の会議に於て、原則及具体的な細目に関する紛争及び問題に関して、アメリカ政府と日本政府が関与するも、日本政府を支持してある分子は協定の見送しは絶望であるであろう。アメリカ政府はたずねる所を否ざるを得ないけれども、日本政府が病的に神経衰弱になり且体面を損せられたことを考えて、次の異常な結果を考驗される。
資源に富んだアメリカ人やソビエト人を激怒させようとする反乱は手段をとる結果数々の事件を招き出している。一方、関係のない近衛政府と近衛公との会談が既定の如く行われた場合、両国が効果的なく連帯を密かに仮定して立たなければならない。この場合、不利益が決定的でない場合よりも二度と述べた否定は假定を黙認されている。これにすれば、アメリカ人だけで関係に大きく関与することができる交渉が完全に攻め落とすこと、それが無事に部分的な即したところの会談を進上する意図が示掛けられている。関係に重大な関与を証明するためには、そこから生まれるかという問題が複雑であるのである。
ルースベルトと近衛との会談及び正式の交渉開始以前に於ては、日本政府は今日迄言明した以上にはつきりとその将来的の保護と約束及び譲歩の立場に据かれてゐる。このため日本政府は今日迄言明した以上にはつきりとその将来の保護に於ては、日本政府が今日迄言明した以上にはつきりとその将来の保護に於ては、日本政府が今日迄言明した以上にはつきりとその将来の保護に於ては、日本政府が今日迄言明した以上にはつきりとその将来の保護に於ては、日本政府が今日迄言明した以上にはつきりとその将来の保護に於ては、
大統領上の直接交渉に至つて、その焦迫感に至る理由のため必ずアメリカを満足させる保障を大統領に与へることが出来ることを申上げる。これの為、如何に余は先つべきかを定めても、何故に日本はその焦迫感に至る理由を示し、実際に何を希望すべきであるかを考慮せねばならぬか、ならば、余は先つすべきかを示し、実際に余は何を希望すべきであるかを考慮せねばならない。この為、余は先つすべきかを示し、実際に余は何を希望すべきであるかを考慮せねばならない。
承認すべき用意のある既存の原則に基づいて日本の将来の政策を確立し、両者の関係において日本の実効的支援に向けた方策を模索する。それにより、日本は米国の支援を受けることが必要である。しかし、日本は米国に依存することなく、自国の国際的な立場を維持することが求められる。このような観点から、日本は自国が持つ力と資源を最大限に活用することが求められる。
余は前記の趣を提出することに当り、ルースベルト大統領及びハル務務長官の慶い見解に敬意を表すものであり、且余の前述の尊項の究明は在日アメリカ大使館の立場だけからなしたことを十分承知してゐる。
D. D. 1400-T-2

"Foreign Relations of the US" Japan - Vol. II (pp. 17-)

Excerpt from Telegram

The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, May 18, 1939-7 PM
(Received May 18-10:03 AM)

***************Japan is bound to Germany and Italy by the tie of anti-communism and as we deem it necessary, further strengthening of this bond is being seriously considered. But if any one should regard Japan, because she had taken such a measure, as joining into the camp of totalitarian nations in opposition to the democratic nations, he would surely be misunderstanding the true intention of the Japanese Government. Japan is not a totalitarian, no more than a democratic, state. She has an original constitution of her own which is centered around the Imperial family, and is based on the spirit of levying (allowing) everything to have its own proper place, surpassing all ideas of antagonism. In joining hands with Germany and Italy we have no other purposes than to combat the destructive activities of Comintern. If the United States, not understanding the true intention of Japan on this point, should base her future policies on such misunderstanding, it would bring about a deplorable situation not only respecting the relations between the United States and Japan but also in respect of the peace of the world."

4. Arita said to me, and I believe his statement to be accurate, that there is now no substantial opposition in the Government to the proposed arrangement with Germany and Italy as now formulated. At the present moment the Cabinet appears to have weathered the recent storm and to be momentarily secure. I do not, however, believe that this present security can be regarded as permanent because (of) many divergent forces active within the country.

Grew
非式調文書第一四〇〇・ノ2号
（米の対外関係）日本之部第二巻第二頁及び三頁
テルンの政策的動向と戦略の推進が、特に注目されている。若しも米国の政策を顕著に示す日本の立場を了解せようとして、将来の関係の緊張を解消するためには、政府の態度に関する日本の政策を示すことが必要である。一方、政府は Admission の問題については、日本政府が示す方針によって、将来の関係の緊張を解消するためには、政府の態度に関する日本の政策を示すことが必要である。一方、政府は Admission の問題については、日本政府が示す方針によって、将来の関係の緊張を解消するためには、政府の態度に関する日本の政策を示すことが必要である。
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)

(Washington), November 19, 1941

The Japanese Charge came in to see me, at his request.

He raised the question of export licenses for machine tools, and submitted the attached very lengthy note. His principal points were:

(1) They were given to understand that machine tools would be allowed a license for export unless they were needed in the domestic market. Export licenses for certain machine tools were denied. Attempts were therefore made to sell them to the domestic market, but it developed that nobody wanted them. Therefore, the Charge thinks the denial of license must be a mistake.

(2) Certain other machine tools are manufactured in accordance with specifications which fit Japanese machines, measurements, etc., only. Nobody appears to want to recondition them for American business.

(3) Certain other machines, according to the Japanese construction of the export licensing order, need no licenses at all. The manufacturers nevertheless requested licenses for them, which were denied. The Embassy wishes licenses for the whole lot.

I confined myself to the comment that I would have the matter looked into.

A. A. B(erle), Jr.

Pages 229, 230

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11
Tokyo, March 24, 1940 4 PM
(Received March 25--1:55 PM)

200. 1. Replying to an interpellation in the Budget Committee of the Lower House yesterday afternoon with regard to the attitude of the United States towards Japan, the Prime Minister is reported to have stated inter alia as follows (our translation of press stenographic record):

"As for the problem of a general embargo this is a serious matter for the country imposing the embargo, (as well as) the country upon which it is imposed. If one false step is taken, danger lies ahead for both countries. I do not believe that the United States would risk applying a general embargo upon Japan. However, we must be prepared for any eventuality. The Government is giving every consideration to this point. However, the question of the danger to the two countries through the imposition of an embargo is more than important--it is pure supposition--and I must refrain from giving "yes" or "no" replies to questions based on supposition."

2. Significant portions of a reply by the Foreign Minister on the same occasion follow:

"As for relations between the Chungking Government and the United States the fact must be admitted that the United States, which recognizes the Chiang regime, aids that regime indirectly in various fields of trade. The loan of 25 million dollars and now the loan of 20 million may be placed in that category. The United States is supplying certain types of materials to the Chiang regime none of which are supplied to Japan. In other words, indirect aid to the Chiang regime has the effect of a moral embargo. The United States would deny this, but that is the way it appears to Japan.

Grew
（书信内容）

（书信内容）

（书信内容）

（书信内容）

（书信内容）

（书信内容）

（书信内容）

（书信内容）
同じ機会に於て外務大臣のなした回答の内重要な部分は次の通りである。

7 重慶政府と米国との関係に関しては、府政権を承認してある米国が色々の貿易面に於て間接的に政権を援助してある事実を認めれば、府政権に対する間接的援助は精神的通商停止の効果を持ってゐる。米国は府政権に対し政権の要材を供給してゐるが、その中の何一つ日本に供給されて居ない。換言すれば府政権に対し政権の要材を供給してゐるが、その中の何一つ日本に供給されて居ない。
の様にしか見えないのである。
Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle)
(Washington), November 30, 1940

The Japanese Chargé d'Affaires came in to see me at his request. He had on his mind the fact that his Government had raised the question of export licenses for certain machine tools, and had called to the attention of the Department the fact that certain kinds of machine tools, notably cutters and grinders, were not listed as requiring licenses. Nevertheless, shipments of these tools had been held up.

He now pointed out that in the recent circular to collectors of customs, they were directed not to permit export of tool and cutter grinders until further notice. In other words, though licenses were not required, the collectors of customs were nevertheless not permitted to allow these tools to go forward.

I said I would have the matter looked into, but I called the Counselor's attention to the fact that export of these articles was at all times dominated by our needs for national defense. If the Defense Commission felt such tools were needed, they would undoubtedly require them to be licensed; and, as had happened when the Act was first passed, the first step is to hold up shipment pending a more or less careful examination. I could not, therefore, assure him that arrangements would be made prior to December 10 permitting these tools to go forward. I did agree, however, that the Department would look into the matter.

Attached is the memorandum handed me by the Japanese Counselor.

A. A. Berle, Jr.
メテルコットヒ駅前会社内話ナセコノトコロナリ、而シテ制命令ガ初

ソレ故ハハノヲトモ工具類積出ヲ許可フ付十月一日以前ニ取扱メラルナリ

ノノクルヲナシ得ザリシモノナリ

然シテヲ余ハハノ件ニンシテ国務省ガ関交ヲナスタラ點ニ付同意サリ

日本寛陽大使手中交覚書ヲ添付ス

（昭和十六年）第二卷ニ三頁ヨリ抜テ

（昭和九年）二月ニ一月ヨリ抜テ

2
Memorandum by the Ambassador in Japan (3:ow)

Tokyo, 7 October 7, 1941

When I called upon the Foreign Minister at his request this morning he first informed me that the text of the memorandum handed to the Japanese Ambassador on October 2 by the Secretary of State had been received and was being carefully studied.

Thus, since an attribution of views to the Prime Minister had appeared in an official document of the United States Government, it had been deemed necessary, in view of the absence of previous comparison between the Foreign Minister and myself of notes relating to what might have been stated by Prince Konoye at the time of his meeting with me on September 6, to clarify the Japanese record of the Prime Minister's statement. (There is no doubt whatsoever that the observations of the Prime Minister, which were made in Japanese and translated by Dooman to me, were correctly and accurately set forth in my telegram No. 1113, September 6, 10 p.m., reporting my meeting with Prince Konoye. The Prime Minister doubtless is referring to his remark made subsequently that "he is convinced that divergences of view can be satisfactorily met" and that he "realizes that certain points may require elucidation and precision").
The Ambassador in Japan (Grew) to the Secretary of State

413. The following is a summary of the press reports of (address by?) Minister for Foreign Affairs at Pacific Soc. last night:

Tokyo, June 4, 1940--8 PM
(Received June-- 5:30 AM)

Fundamental policy of Japanese Empire based upon mission as stabilizing force East Asia. Obviously Japan concerned not only with China continent but also with South Seas areas. Economic relations between Japan and other countries East Asia very close. These countries' territories mutually dependent for prosperity. Japan has deep concern not only for political status quo Netherlands East Indies but also for economic resources, trade, industry, and development those islands. Can nations avoid conflict friction when there exist tariff walls, immigration restrictions, other barriers preventing smooth interchange of goods between nations which are complementary in economic sense? Construction new world order to come after present European war will require basic settlement of this issue.

Repeated by naval radio to Chungking and Peiping.

Grew
日本の外交関係

四月三日

以下は昨夜大阪で前記の件について総領事大佐の申し入れを受諾した新興の文書の案用宛の箋に

東京

一九四○年（昭和十五年）

六月四日

午後八時

（受讀）

午後五時三十分

日本の東亜関係がその進展の過程を相俟に支配の関係にあらう。日本は構想東亜

の環をめぐる関係はその進展の過程を相俟に支配の関係にあらう。日本は構想東亜

の環をめぐる関係はその進展の過程を相俟に支配の関係にあらう。日本は構想東亜

の環をめぐる関係はその進展の過程を相俟に支配の関係にあらう。日本は構想東亜

の環をめぐる関係はその進展の過程を相俟に支配の関係にあらう。
The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Charge d'Affaires ad interim of Japan and acknowledges the receipt of the Japanese Embassy's note of November 19, 1940, in regard to the issuance of export licenses for machine tools.

As the Embassy is aware, each application to export a machine tool is examined by the interested agencies of this Government with a view to determining whether or not the tool in question is needed in the United States defense program. In view of the constant and rapid expansion which this program is undergoing, it frequently becomes necessary to revoke a license already granted, since the tool which it seemed at the time of the issuance of the license could be dispensed with has thereafter been found to be essential to the program. Attention should also be invited to the fact that, even though a particular tool for the exportation of which application is made may not be needed in the defense program, the application may nevertheless be rejected if the manufacture of the tool in question would occupy production capacity needed for the manufacture of other tools which are essential to the program.

It should be pointed out, moreover, that other considerations are also weighed by those agencies of the Government responsible for the issuance of export licenses. On December 2, 1939, the President publicly stated the policy of this Government in regard to the export of materials essential to aircraft manufacture to countries the armed forces of which engage in the unprovoked bombing from the air of civilian populations. This policy is naturally taken into consideration by those officers responsible for the granting or rejection of export license applications.

The Embassy refers to the revocation of licenses for tools which collectors of customs had previously been informed could be exported without the requirement of a license. The attention of the Embassy is invited to the fact that collectors of customs were informed that no license would be required for the export of these types of tools "until further notice". In view of the fact that the expanding defense program of this Government makes the conservation of machine tool production capacity for its own needs constantly more necessary, collectors of customs were recently instructed that licenses will be henceforth required for the export of additional types of machine tools, including those types listed in the enclosure to the Embassy's note.

In regard to the specific case referred to in the second numbered paragraph of the first section of the Embassy's note, the Embassy is informed that this application was received by the Department of State on October 3, 1940, and transmitted to the interested agencies of this Government on the same date. It is understood that a decision in this case has now been reached and that it is being communicated to Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha. It is also understood that a decision has been reached in the case referred to in the concluding section of the Embassy's note and that this decision also is being transmitted to Mitsubishi Shoji Kaisha.

Washington, December 9, 1940
見つで輸出許可の請願を行う政府の関係機関は常にこの考慮を払うべきである。一つは当該機関の仕事に対する政府の関係機関の要求の対応を改善することである。一方で政府の関係機関の要求に対する対応は日本の統制にかかわる重要な問題である。政府の関係機関の要求に対する対応は日本の統制にかかわる重要な問題である。
Executive Order No. 8607, Signed by President Roosevelt, December 10, 1940

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by the provisions of section 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense," I hereby prescribe the following additional regulations governing the exportation of:

Iron and Steel

1. As used in my proclamation of December 10, 1940, issued pursuant to the provisions of sections 6 of the Act of Congress approved July 2, 1940, and in these regulations, the terms "iron" and "steel" shall be construed as defined herein:

Iron and Steel:

A. Iron ore
B. Pig iron
C. Ferro Alloys
   Ferromanganese
   Spiegeleisen
   Ferrosilicon
   Ferrochrome
   Forrotungsten
   Ferrovanadium
   Ferrocolumbium
   Ferrocobalt
   Ferrophosporus
   Ferromolybdenum
D. Semi-Finished Products
   Ingots
   Billets
   Blooms
   Slabs
   Sheet Bars
   Skelp
   Wire Rods
E. Finished Products
   Structural Shapes
   Steel Piling
   Plates
   Skelps
   Rails
   Splice Bars and Tie Plates
   Bars
      Merchant
      Concrete Reinforcing
      Cold Finished
      Alloy
      Tool Steel
      Hoops and Bailing Bands
      Pipe and Tube
      Drawn Wire
      Nails and Staples
      Barbed and Twisted Wire
The Secretary of State to the Japanese Chargé (Morishima)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d’Affaires ad interim of Japan and refers to the memoranda of November 30 and December 4, 1940, of the Japanese Embassy, in regard to the requirement that licenses be obtained for the export of certain machine tools which collectors of customs had been previously instructed might be exported without a license.

The Secretary of State, in reply, invites attention to the fourth paragraph of his note of December 9, 1940, in which he pointed out that this instruction to collectors of customs contained the stipulation that licenses would not be required for the export of these types of tools “until further notice”. On November 25, the Department advised collectors of customs that on and after December 10, 1940, all of these types of tools would be subjected to the licensing requirement. Prior to November 25, however, the Department, pursuant to the desires of the Administrator of Export Control with whom rests full authority in matters of this sort, had had occasion to inform both collectors of customs and manufacturers that licenses would be required in certain individual cases for the export of certain specific tools of the types previously exempted, which tools are pressingly needed in the defense program of the United States. These specific instructions, which amended the instructions of July 27, 1940, and, in contradistinction to the instructions of November 25, took effect immediately, account for the course pursued in the individual cases referred to in the Embassy’s memoranda of November 30 and December 4, 1940.

Washington, December 17, 1940
国務大臣より日比代駐大使（略）

国務長官は日本政府代理大使に答議を渡すとともに、特に長官が発表に
ては出る所が出来ると指示され、昭和十五年十一月二十四日付日比代
大使館発信を従事関係者に知らしめます。

右記照会に答して国務長官は昭和十五年十二月九日付同旨答書の第四条に
従って案を採用し、昭和十五年十一月十五日付同旨答書に十二月四日付日比
大使館発信を従事関係者に知らしめます。
Proclamation No. 2451, Signed by President Roosevelt, December 20, 1940

WHEREAS section 6 of the Act of Congress entitled "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, provides as follows:

(Here follows the text of the act as quoted in proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, printed on page 211.)

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid Act of Congress, do hereby proclaim that upon the recommendation of the Administrator of Export Control I have determined that it is necessary in the interest of the national defense that on and after January 6, 1941, the following described articles and materials shall not be exported from the United States except when authorized in each case by a license as provided for in Proclamation No. 2413 of July 2, 1940, entitled "Administration of section 6 of the Act entitled 'An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense' approved July 2, 1940."

1. Bromine
2. Ethylene
3. Ethylene dibromide
4. Methylamine
5. Strontium Metals and Ores
6. Cobalt
7. Abrasives and abrasive products containing emery, corundum, or garnet, as well as abrasive paper and cloth
8. Plastic molding machines and presses
9. Measuring Machines
10. Gauges
11. Testing Machines
12. Balancing Machines
13. Hydraulic Pumps
14. Tools incorporating industrial diamonds
15. Equipment and plants for the production of aviation lubricating oil

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this 20th day of December, in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and forty, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and sixty-fifth.

By the President:

Franklin D. Roosevelt

Cordell Hull
Secretary of State

Excerpt from FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, 1931-1941, Vol. 11
The Japanese Government has taken note of the Proclamation, dated December 10, 1940, by the President of the United States of America, governing the exportation of iron and steel under the provisions of Section 6 of the Act entitled, "An Act to expedite the strengthening of the national defense," approved July 2, 1940, and of the "White House announcement" of the same date, stating in part, that "licenses will be granted for exports to the British Empire and Western Hemisphere, and for the present, so far as the interests of the national defense permit, for exports to other destinations in quantities approximating usual or pre-war exports."

The enforcement of the measure ordered by the President in the Proclamation, especially when carried out in accordance with the policy as announced -- that is, the granting of licenses for exports exclusively to certain countries while subjecting exports to other countries to the considerations of "the interests of the national defense" and to arbitrary quantitative limitations -- constitutes an instance of discriminatory treatment of countries in the latter category, of which Japan, in consideration of the volume of her importation in recent years of the specified commodities, would be one of those most gravely affected.

The Japanese Government, which has had occasion to file protests against discriminations embodied in previous Presidential Proclamations, regulations, and announcements of administrative policy governing the exportation of aviation gasoline and iron and steel scrap, by the Japanese Ambassador's notes of August 3, 1940 and October 8 (7), 1940, respectively, is now constrained to protest, under similar circumstances and for similar reasons, against this fresh measure of discrimination reviewed in the above.

(Washington), December 21, 1940
日本政府は、一九四〇年十二月十日における大蔵省昭南支地方出資に関する布告、並に昭和二年四月十一日出資に関する布告に於いて、出資資産の出資者、出資内容、及び出資者の出資資産に関する資料を発表した。
Dof Dog No 1401 (ERRATA SHEET)

四〇～一～八
六行目

第四表

四〇～一～八

四〇～一～八

四〇～一～八

四〇～一～八

海軍関係

海軍関係
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>四行目</td>
<td>五行目</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>四行目</td>
<td>五行目</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>四行目</td>
<td>五行目</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>四行目</td>
<td>五行目</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Def Doe No 1401**

四行目

関内ニ於テ

駐兵ヲ於テ

予定ヲ付

関内ニ於テ

駐兵ヲ於テ

予定ヲ付

関内ニ於テ

駐兵ヲ於テ

予定ヲ付
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>부서</th>
<th>일</th>
<th>시간</th>
<th>인원</th>
<th>작업내용</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rex Doo No. 1402**
CERTIFICATE

I, Urabe Katsuma, Acting Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the following defense documents are true and correct copies of official documents under the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.

1401-A-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Konoye, 17 April 1941. No. 233
1401-B-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Konoye, 18 April 1941. No. 239
1401-C-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Matsuoka, 8 May 1941. No. 277
1401-D-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 24 July 1941. No. 566
1401-E-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 4 August 1941. No. 646
1401-F-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 5 August 1941. No. 447
1401-G-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 5 August 1941. No. 448
1401-H-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 6 August 1941. No. 659
1401-I-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 7 August 1941. No. 452
1401-J-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 18 August 1941. No. 709
1401-K-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 29 August 1941. No. 756
1401-L-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 3 September 1941. No. 778
1401-M-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 4 September 1941. No. 528
1401-N-1 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Toyoda, 8 September 1941. No. 791
1401-O-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 22 September 1941. No. 589
1401-P-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 23 September 1941. No. 591
1401-Q-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 27 September 1941. No. 604
1401-R-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 27 September 1941. No. 605
1401-S-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 3 October 1941. No. 894
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Document No.</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1401-V-1</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>3 October 1941</td>
<td>627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-V-1</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>17 October 1941</td>
<td>682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-X-1</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>21 October 1941</td>
<td>698</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-Z-1</td>
<td>Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō</td>
<td>24 October 1941</td>
<td>995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-A-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>4 November 1941</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-B-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>4 November 1941</td>
<td>726</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-C-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>4 November 1941</td>
<td>731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-D-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>5 November 1941</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-E-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>6 November 1941</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-F-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō</td>
<td>7 November 1941</td>
<td>1055</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-G-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>9 November 1941</td>
<td>751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-H-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō</td>
<td>10 November 1941</td>
<td>1066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-J-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>10 November 1941</td>
<td>734</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-K-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>10 November 1941</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-L-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō</td>
<td>13 November 1941</td>
<td>1087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-N-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō</td>
<td>14 November 1941</td>
<td>1090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-O-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>16 November 1941</td>
<td>702</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-P-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura</td>
<td>7 November 1941</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-C-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō</td>
<td>17 November 1941</td>
<td>1118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-R-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō</td>
<td>21 November 1941</td>
<td>1147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-S-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō</td>
<td>23 November 1941</td>
<td>1160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1401-T-2</td>
<td>Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō</td>
<td>23 November 1941</td>
<td>1161</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1401-U-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura, 23 November 1941. No. 816
1401-V-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō, 25 November 1941. No. 1179
1401-W-2 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura, 26 November 1941. No. 833
1401-X-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō, 27 November 1941. No. 1190
1401-Y-2 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō, 27 November 1941. No. 1204
1401-A-3 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō, 28 November 1941. No. 1214
1401-B-3 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō, 30 November 1941. No. 1222
1401-C-3 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura, 1 December 1941. No. 866
1401-D-3 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura, 3 December 1941. No. 878
1401-E-3 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō, 6 December 1941. No. 1275
1401-F-3 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura, 7 December 1941. No. 905
1401-G-3 Telegram from Minister Tōgō to Ambassador Nomura, 3 November 1941. No. 723
1401-H-3 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 28 August 1941. No. 509
1401-I-3 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō, 23 November 1941. No. 1189
1401-J-3 Telegram from Ambassador Nomura to Minister Tōgō, 16 November 1941. No. 1106
1401-I-1 Telegram from Minister Toyoda to Ambassador Nomura, 3 October 1941. No. 428

Certified at Tokyo
on this 12th day of August 1941

/s/ Urabe Katsuma (seal)

Witness: /s/ Sato Takegoro (seal)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>-</th>
<th>a</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>a</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
野村大使
東郷大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月二十五日
野村大使
東郷大臣宛電報
一九四一年十一月二十六日
東郷大臣
野村大使
一九四一年十一月二十七日
東郷大使
一九四一年十一月二十八日
東郷大使
野村大使
野村大使
東郷大臣宛電報
東郷大臣
野村大使
野村大使
東郷大臣宛電報
東郷大臣
野村大使
一九四一年十二月一日
第八六號
一九四一年
東郷大使
野村大使
野村大使
東郷大臣宛電報
東郷大臣
野村大使
野村大使
東郷大臣宛電報
東郷大臣
野村大使
野村大使
東郷大臣宛電報
東郷大臣
昭和二十二年八月十二日
於東京

一九四一年十月三日
第六二八號
The resignation of former Foreign Minister Matsuoka has brightened the prospect that Japan may give up its Axis policy in favor of a more moderate one.

The difficulties in the Japanese-American negotiations lie, it is observed, in that whereas Japan requires prompt settlement of the matter and cannot afford for the present to go beyond a general understanding, the United States is adopting a policy of procrastination and cautiously examining every word and phrase to be used in any agreement between the two countries. Such attitude of the United States comes from the lack of her understanding of the mind of the Japanese people as well as the tense internal situation in Japan which does not admit of further delay. It would be very regrettable if this most favorable chance for a solution of the Far Eastern problems which we have had since my assuming the present post were thus lost.

Prince Konoe has a sincere desire of saving Japan from the crisis which she would face because of her participation in the Triple Alliance and her relations with the Axis, for which he is responsible. But there is within this country rather strong feeling against his change of policy, so that it is feared that he may lose his supporters if there be no prospect of success in the Japanese-American negotiations. Moreover, the Konoe Cabinet will come to a crisis if the negotiations prove abortive or are unduly protracted.

It is an opinion common to the American Ambassador in Tokyo and myself that although there is much difficulty in the present negotiations, merely to cling to the present prudent attitude and to lose the present favorable chance is an extremely ill-advised policy. It goes without saying that the measures of economic reprisal should not be alleviated until we see convincing proof of a change in Japan's foreign policy—or in other words, sure signs of the realization of the Konoe principles.
三、日本軍破壊海軍日本側ニ於テハ軍艦ヲ破壊シ且現在ノ倉一概テ予想以

二、出雲先ヲシテ日本側ハ壊砕ヲ許サルモノト認メラレタルシ居ルカ即ラ国際ル法

近衛公ハ自ら責任ヲ有ヒルラルニ関スルルヲ儒ラ郎アラ然シラリ

内ノ反対ハ相当強し選ク然ノ日本側ハ壊砕ヲ許サルモノヲ見サレハ何交調査ニ歸シ

斯ル支持者ヲ失フニ至ルヘコ又高一等会談マ流連ヲ務ルカ又ハ不當ニ
I submit this telegram for your reference only.

With respect to the Japanese-American negotiations, I will believe in success, so all that I can until the last moment. Beyond that, my state of mind is to do my best and leave the rest to residence. However, I observe the present situation as follows:

1. As I have repeatedly made report to you, the Pacific policy of the United States is to stop further advance of Japan either to the north or to the south. This object of the United States to achieve through economic pressure, but preparations for war are steadily in progress.

2. In order to meet the southern or northern advance of Japan, operational and all other preparations are being made and the utmost cooperation is being carried on with the countries concerned. It is the determination of the United States rather to wage war than to concede anything from fundamental political principles she holds traditionally, to compromise, and it seems that she has no intention whatever of repeating what happened in Munich, which is now branded as a failure. This is more true by reason of encouragement at the observation that the peak of German power has now been passed, that the Soviet Union maintains its fighting spirit, and that the danger of a separate peace has decreased.

3. With respect to China, ties of alliance become stronger and stronger. The United States gives all possible assistance to China, and will accept nothing which will prejudice the sovereignty of China, even in favor of stabilisation of the Pacific. It is, therefore, possible that the China problem may become the "stumbling-block" of the stabilisation of the Pacific, thereby bringing the adjustment of Japanese-American relations to end in failure.

4. Our relations with the Axis are very flexible; they can be very close or otherwise depending on the policy of the Japanese Government. The United States, however, believes that Japan is in a position in which she can get at the United States in the back if the situation warrants. The press tends to report on the intimacy of Japan with the Axis, and some papers even go so far as to talk about their unity.

5. In case Japan dares to advance into the south for the sake of her life and self-existence, it is very likely that a war against Britain, the United States and the Netherlands will follow as a consequence, and that the Soviet Union, too, will join it. In such case, Central American countries, among the neutrals, are at the disposal of the United States, and the South American countries will, though reluctantly, maintain neutrality in favor of the United States, it being necessary economically for them to do so.

6. Such a war will necessarily be a long war, in which the winning or losing of local battles will not matter much. It is easy to see that the victor will be the one who holds out till the last.
7. The United States is getting entangled in the Atlantic step by step, but up to now she has not gone beyond the convoy operations, so she can concentrate her main forces in the Pacific at any time. Britain, too can, in view of the present state of the German and Italian navies, spare a considerable part of her forces for the Indian Ocean. It has been my expectation that the United States would in or less compromise in the Pacific when she got very busy in the Atlantic, but no such signs have yet been observed. On the contrary, it is necessary to bear in mind the possibility that the United States will first join the war in the Pacific, because public opinion still holds against war with Germany, while there is less opposition to a Pacific war.

8. Although I am not very familiar with the present domestic situation in Japan, I learn through your instructions that the situation is pressmg and that the endurance of the Japanese people is reaching its maximum. It may be presumptuous for me to suggest it in such circumstances, but I consider it advisable to be patient and wait for a month or two, if the domestic situation permits, until we get a clearer over-all prospect of the world war.

Please read my telegrams No. 824 and 901 of 3 and 4 October.
大不況下、国家経済の生存を、米国政策と連携して、利益を求める。相互の利益を求めることが、治安維持と経済の発展に結びつく。このため、経済の発展を図るためには、米国政策との連携が不可欠である。
From Nonmura to Tôgô
27 November 1941
No. 1201

Reference to your telegram No. 842.

The United States has been conferring with the Netherlands Government on account of her insistence and because of our request that she do so. It was disclosed on the 24th by the White House that the United States had carried out the protective occupation of Dutch Guiana after having reached an agreement with the Dutch Government in Britain. It was clearly stated in the announcement that the primary objective of the occupation was to secure aluminum, which is vital to American defence; that the American army is employed for the occupation because the Dutch Government is unable to dispatch its troops from the Netherlands East Indies in the circumstances prevailing in the Southwestern Pacific; and that Brazil takes part in the occupation by invitation of the Dutch Government. Moreover, after the Dutch Foreign Minister conferred with the American authorities on his way to the Netherlands East Indies, the supply of American munitions thereto was increased, and technicians are coming and going between the two. These circumstances, together with the past history of the Netherlands East Indies, indicate the possibility of an American and British occupation of the Indies, depending upon the situation following rupture of the Japanese-American negotiations, for the purpose of securing such vital materials as rubber and tin, in the same manner as the American and Brazilian occupation of Dutch Guiana. Such circumstances must be borne in mind, and the reference in my telegram No. 1180 is in the same vein.
Gist of Conversation between Premier HIRANUMA and Wang.

On June 10, the 14th year of Showa (1939)

From 8:00 A.M.

To 9:30 A.M.

WANG: I deem it a great honor to meet you, and to talk with you today.

HIRANUMA: I appreciate your efforts for the settlement of Sino-Japanese problems. We have been reigned over and governed by a line of Emperors unbroken for ages eternal. From time immemorial the ultimate object of the Emperors was to maintain peace among human beings with the Way of Benevolence. Our nation has valued highly the so-called military spirit, but it is only for realizing this ultimate object of the Emperors, and it is quite different from the military spirit which is prevailing among the people of the European powers. Foreigners have often misunderstood the meaning of this word, taking it for a means of aggression. This is only because they can not understand the great spirit of the Way of Benevolence. I believe that we must make efforts to realize that ultimate object, as we are in a post in which we are responsible in assisting the Emperor. Further, I believe that we must bring about perpetual peace in East Asia, especially in the relations...
between Japan and China, in order to maintain peace among all peoples of the world. For that end, the influential persons of both countries have to cooperate and make their best efforts to realize it. I offer my respects to you who have risen up at this incident for the cause of Japan and China, and I hope for your further efforts.

We have perfectly understood the spirit of the Japanese Emperors. Now I will tell you about the recent psychology of the Chinese for your information. As for the Communist party and the persons who have connections with that party, we have no way but to throw them down to the ground in order to establish peace between Japan and China, as they have set both China and East Asia at naught, and have acted as a tool of the Comintern. But most of the Chinese, except them, at heart are longing for peace and, have recognized Japan, which has achieved its position with the effort more than half a century, as their senior nation in East Asia, and believe that peace can not be secured in East Asia without the cooperation of Japan with China. But they can not speak so in public, because there are still many people who do not know the true intention of Japan as has been mentioned by you just now. I have advised peace to CHANG Fei-shak for several dozens of times, but he used to reply briefly, 'If we conclude peace with Japan, the independence and freedom of China will be lost throughout the territory. But as long as we continue resistance, China
will survive in a territory, which, even if it be small, is not under the occupation of Japan. This represents not only CHI’NG's conclusion, but also that of almost all the Chinese. Most of the Chinese believe still to-day that Japan will not give up her ambition to dominate China, since Japan has made sacrifices of such vast military power and money to the war.

It can not be denied that the declarations which have been made several times by the Japanese Government gave a somewhat bright perspective to the Chinese people. But they are entertaining misgivings regarding the actual realization of their hope. Such an atmosphere can be inferred even from letters from Chungking and other places. This fact that the true intention of Japan has not penetrated into the interior of China may be due to some defect in the way of advertisement. I believe the efforts of the intelligent public of both countries will be necessary for improving it. The Communists, however, taking advantage of this misgiving of the Chinese against Japan, are propagandizing that those who speak of peace are traitors, and they are oppressing these persons. On account of that, it is very difficult for a Chinese to speak of peace even in foreign countries as well as in homeland.

N: The European powers, in their international relations, have usually struggled for their own interests. The Peace Treaty of Versailles after the First World War, too, was unreasonably based upon the reckoning of interests of each power. And the League of Nations also was nothing but a machine
in which they insist upon their own interests and which already contained the germ of a Second World War. In our East Asia, we must not follow this bad example. We must establish mutual relations based on justice, and secure eternal peace between us in order to avoid the recurrence of such incidents. Japan will not cease her action until her ultimate object to establish perpetual peace in East Asia is achieved. I declare that Japan will continue her action until the whole Chinese people understand the true intention of Japan. Especially as regards the Communist party, they are the common enemy of human beings, as they are disturbing the peace of the whole world. We cannot allow their existence in the World. We must, at least, drive them away from East Asia. If they challenge us with thoughts, we will fight with thoughts. But in the present situation, they cannot be driven without arms. And Japan has the steady determination to drive them away, even if she has to resort to war for that end. I believe that CHIANG Kai-shek understands the true intention of Japan. But now that he has adopted the pro-Comintern policy, the Japanese cannot rely upon him. We cannot countenance him as long as he does not break off with the Communists.

Further, Japan and China need close mutual cooperation in order to promote their economy. Then with a view to pursuing
these common objects—that is, the Anti-Communist policy and cooperation in the field of economy, it is necessary for both countries to establish a powerful central government in China. I believe that you will exert yourself to the utmost for that end, and I hope for your success while we will give you full assistance for it. In short I hope you will make every effort to lead China to the cooperation with Japan in establishing a new East Asia, making China throw away its pro-communist policy. As regards the actual procedure concerning the establishment of the central government, I advise you to confer with the War and Navy Ministers and other Ministers concerned.

Wise Powerless as I am, I will make every effort to establish the central government. And I am very obliged that you have given me the opportunity to talk with the Ministers concerned regarding the progress of the actual procedure. Only I have a few things which I want to tell you now. I think that I understand your policy, as I sent the other day PAO Jeungwu in order to deliver my opinion to you, and to know your opinion as well as that of other authorities in the Japanese Government. Firstly, it was expected at that time, that if CHIANG Fai-shok would alter his policy, we might cooperate with him to bring about peace. But now this is quite impossible.
Secondly, it was once proposed that we should tide over the present situation, by, rallying all groups outside the Kuomintang, and I replied at that time that I was ready to make efforts, if need be. But now it seems very difficult for us to cope with the present situation as a result of the influence of other parties than the Kuomintang. Thirdly, I determined once that I might resign my office, if CHIANG would do so in order to settle the present situation, and I might go abroad, if CHIANG would do so. But CHIANG refused this, and resorted it. So I had no way but to go ahead on my own responsibility.

I think it is best to reorganize the National Government by uniting all other parties with the Kuomintang and thus to make it a government which, will give up its old Anti-Japanese-Communist policy. Because, if we retain the original form of the National Government, it will serve the purpose of preventing the Chinese nation from feeling that their country has surrendered to Japanese oppression and of rallying a large number of our comrades from Chungking circles. At the time K.C. Tsung-wu was despatched to Japan by us the Japanese Government opined that Three Principles of the People to which the Kuomintang adhered should be revived, getting rid of the relation with communism. I think such an opinion of the Japanese Government is really reasonable; SUN Yat-sen's Three Principles of the People is a thing to be clearly distinguishable.
from communism. We will hereafter exert ourselves to the
utmost as to make this doctrine develop along its true lines.

I approve of devising such a measure as changing the Anti-
Japanese-Pro-Communist policy by establishing a central
government through the resurrection of the Kuomintang combined
with every other party and group, following the new banner of
the revived Three Principles of the People, entirely broken
away from communism. The Chungking Government is no longer to
be called the central Government. But if it changes its present
attitude, Japan will be ready to tolerate it from her benevolent
viewpoint. Nevertheless, the Chungking Government can not be fi-
from responsibility as the author of the present Incident.
Then it is a matter of course that CHIANG K’ai-shek should retire
from his post. But even in case of CHIANG’s retirement I hope
you will hold all responsibility for converting the Chungking
circles to the revived Three Principles of the People. In a word
I earnestly hope that you will endeavor to complete this task
entirely on your own responsibility.

WANG. I cannot say how positively how many persons I
can call to my banner from Chungking and other quarters when I
raise myself for the sake of the country. But as far as the
Kuomintang is concerned, as I have shared my fate with the
Kuomintang those scores of years, I assert that I will take the
responsibility of making the Kuomintang change its past mistaken
policy and become a power which will contribute to the realization of peace in the Orient.

HIRANUMA, I hope you will make a strenuous effort for the accomplishment of this.

MR. I studied in Tokyo thirty-four years ago, and since I read a lecture on law you published when you were a judicial official I have had deep reverence and affection for you. It is with great pleasure that I was unexpectedly given the honour of seeing you.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 6 pages and entitled "Gist of Conversation between Premier HIRANUMA and Wang" is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

certified at Tokyo,

on this 12th day of March, 1947

HAYASHI Kaoru
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

Witness: URABE Katsuma
(seal)
TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William B. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William B. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan

Date 8th May 1947
Ordinance for the Control of Opium in China
(30 June, 1936, Foreign Office Ordinance No. 1)

The Ordinance for the Control of Opium in China was determined as follows:

Article 1. No person shall raise poppies for the purpose of manufacturing opium.

Article II. No person shall import to or export from China any opium paste or any instrument for opium-smoking.

Article III. No person shall import to or export from China, manufacture, sell or purchase, give or receive, possess or carry raw opium.

Article IV. Any person who acts in violation of the provisions of articles I to III shall be punished with imprisonment of not more than three months or a fine not exceeding one hundred yen. Any attempted infraction of the foregoing articles shall be punished.

Article V. Any person who instigates or helps any individual or individuals other than Japanese subjects and allows him or them to commit any act enumerated in Articles I to III shall be punished with an imprisonment of not more than three months or a fine not exceeding one hundred yen.

Article VI. Anything which has any bearing with an act committed in violation of the provisions of Articles I to III may be retained or confiscated by administrative measure excepting in cases where it has been confiscated by trial.

Article VII. When the representative of any corporation, its employee or
any other person working for it commits any act in violation of this
Ordinance in connection with the business of the said corporation
the penalty provisions in this Ordinance shall be applied to the
representative of the said corporation.

By-Laws

This Ordinance shall be enforced as of July 1, 1936.

The Ordinance for Opium and Narcotic Control in China, Foreign Office Ordinance No.8 (1928) will become voice as of the day of
enforcement of this Ordinance.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Chief of Archives Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the newspaper report hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Ordinance for Opium Control in China," is an exact excerpt from newspaper in the custody of our Office.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 4th day of Apr., 1947.

/S/ HAYASHI, Koory (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on the same date

Witness: /S/ URABE, Katsune (seal)
第六条

第一款 本条及前第三条第一款规定违反シタル行行為未関係物ハ後則

第七条

法入ノ代表者又ハ事業入人者ノ他ノ従業員法人ノ業務ニ関ス

附則

昭和三年内務省令第八条第二条ノ第二項ノ当該旨ヲニ於テ於ノ内務省令同条ノ第三項ノ当該旨ヲニ関す
文書の発行所等は、文書課長が、専用書類を提出した後、文書課長に署名し、文書課長に送付することを命令した。

発行日：昭和二十二年四月四日

立会人：

補　部

補　部
Narcotic Control in China was decided as follows:

**NARCOTIC CONTROL IN CHINA**

(Article 1) Materials referred to as narcotic in this control are indicated on the following number:

1. Morphine and di-acetyl morphine and other morphine esters and all of their salts.

2. Coarse manufactured "Morphine", "Coca" leaves, and coarse manufactured "Cocaine".

3. "Egonin" and "Cocaine" and other "Egonin esters" and all of their salts.

4. "Di-hydro-oxy-codeine", "Di-hydro-codeine" and "Di-hydro-morphine", "Di-hydro-morphine" and every other "ester" and all of their salts.

5. "Codeine", "Ethylmorphine", "Benzil-morphine" and other "Morphine ether" and all of their salts.


7. "Di-hydro-Codeine" and their salts of every description.

8. "Morphine", "Morphine ester" (except "diathesis morphine") or "Morphine ether" ("codeine" and "ethylmorphine") which can be detected two parts thousandth or "diathesis morphine".

9. "Di-hydro-oxyCodeine", "Di-hydro-Codeine", "Dihydro-Morphine", Acetyl-Di-hydro-Codeine and "Dihydro-Morphine" or every other "ester" or its derivatives, "Morphine" or which can be detected more than two parts thousandth as a derivative.

10. "Cocaine" and its derivatives which can be detected more than one part thousandth.

11. Indian Hemp grass and its resin and the articles containing of them.

12. Opium for medical use.

13. Articles appointed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

(Article 2) In this control, export means from the part of China and import to the part of China.

(Article 3) Narcotic is not permitted to manufacture or to export.

(Article 4) Narcotic is not permitted to use for themselves or any other person except the medical use.

(Article 5) It is prohibited to import, buy and sell, deliver, have with themselves narcotic or to have for the purpose to sell it except the regulated cases in this control.
Article 6. In the case of necessity of narcotic for scientific research or business of school and hospital or doctor, dentist, veterinary, pharmaceutist and druggist, it will be permitted to import narcotic after recognition of the Imperial consular officer concerned according to the concerning Chinese regulations which are acknowledged by the Imperial Government.

Article 7. He who will import narcotic according to the preceding article must receive a permission of the Imperial consular officer concerned reporting the matters of the every following number:

1. Name of article and quantity.
2. Purpose of import.
3. Name of consignor (title name, if it is a legal person) and the place of business.
4. Term of import.
5. Measures of consignment.
6. Place of import.

He who will change the matter of every number of the preceding clause after receiving permission of it, should receive permission of the matter concerned again.

When the first clause was permitted, it will be delivered a permission of import and a certificate of permission of import.

Article 8. He who received a permission of the preceding article and imported narcotic, must report to the Imperial consular officer concerned during ten days with an attested copy of a certificate of destination or a certificate of export attached to consignment and a permission of import.

When, he who received a permission of the preceding article did not import narcotic, must return to the Imperial consular officer a permission of import and a certificate of permission of import during ten days after the expiration of a term of the permission.

He who brought in narcotic from the outside of the jurisdiction or brought out to the outside of it of the Imperial consular officer concerned, must report to the Imperial consular officer concerned within ten days.

Article 9. Pharmaceutist and druggist are prohibited to sell or deliver narcotic unless they receive a certificate of purchase recognized by the Imperial consular officer concerned from doctor, dentist, veterinary, pharmaceutist and druggist or hospital and school or officially acknowledged foreign doctor, dentist, veterinary, pharmaceutist and druggist. However, it is not within the limits of the case of sale or delivery of narcotic according to the prescription issued by doctor, dentist, and veterinary or officially recognized foreign doctor, dentist and veterinary from the part of pharmaceutist.

Certificate of purchase of the preceding clause should be written: name of purchase, quantity, purpose of use, date, business place of the purchaser, profession and name and family, and sealed.

In case of transfer of narcotic from the officially recognized foreign pharmaceutist or druggist also will be applied the provisions of the first clause to the grantee.
Certificate of purchase or prescription should be kept for three years including the day of issue.

Article 10. When doctor, dentist, veterinary, pharmacist and druggist close their business or leave from China, and they have remains of narcotic, they must transfer them immediately to the Imperial national doctor, dentist, veterinary, pharmacist and druggist.

In case of the preceding clause, a grantor together with a grantee must give notice signed and sealed, and written: name of article, quantity, business place and date, to the Imperial consular officer concerned.

In case of impossibility of transfer according to the first clause of this article, they must accept the directions of the Imperial consular officer concerned.

Article 11. When doctor, dentist, veterinary, pharmacist and druggist found that narcotic had become unable to use by putrefaction and any other causes, they must give notice, write the name of the article and quantity together with the article concerned to the Imperial consular officer concerned.

He who found out that doctor, dentist, veterinary, pharmacist and druggist were dead or missing and remains of narcotic must immediately report this to the Imperial consular officer concerned.
It must be accepted the directions of the Imperial consular officer concerned how to deal with the narcotic concerning the preceding two clauses.

Article 12. Doctor, dentist, veterinary, pharmacist and druggist must discriminate between narcotic and other drugs and the former must be kept in a locked place.

Druggist is not permitted to sell or deliver narcotic in subdivision.

Article 13. Doctor, dentist, veterinary, pharmacist and druggist must prepare a regular account book on which must be written the consumption, sale and purchase, and delivery of narcotic and it must be kept three years from the every described date; moreover, they ought to make a list of delivery of narcotic and to report to the Imperial consular officer concerned until the end of January of the next year.

The Imperial consular officer concerned can examine the account book and narcotic about the preceding clause.

Article 14. The Imperial consular officer concerned can order the necessary matters recognized for control to the said licenses concerning the form of the account book and the others of the preceding article.

Article 15. One who violated the provisions from the Article 3 to the Article 5 and of the Article 7 would be sentenced to the penal service less than three months or to the penalty less than one hundred yen.

The criminal attempts of the preceding clause will be punished except the case of Article 4.

Article 16. One who instigated or aided and abetted the non-Imperial persons and let them manufacture, export, sell and buy, and deliver narcotics unlawfully would be sentenced to the penal service less than three months or to the penalty less than one hundred yen.

Article 17. Objects concerning the violated conduots against the provisions from the Article 3 to the Article 5 and of the Article 7 would be kept or confiscated by dint of the administrative measures except the confiscation of judgment.

Article 18. One who violated the provisions from Article 8 to Article 13 or reported falsely written or refused the examination of narcotic or the account book, would be sentenced to the penalty less than one hundred yen or detention or fine.

Article 19. One who violated an order issued by the provisions of Article 14 would be sentenced to detention or fine.

Article 20. In case of a druggist being a minor or an interdixt, the penal regulations of the preceding two Articles will be applied to a legal representative. However, it is not within the limits of a minor who has a similar capacity of a major concerning his business.

Article 21. Doctor, dentist, veterinary, pharmacist and druggist cannot be escaped from the punishment because of their representative, head of family, member of family, lodger, employee
and any other worker violated this control or the order issued by this control concerning their business even though not by their own directions.

Article 22. Representative or employee or any other worker of a legal person violated this control or the order issued by this control concerning the legal person's work, the penal regulations would be applied to the representative of it.

Additional Rules

This control shall come into force on the 1st of July, 1936.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 9 pages and entitled "Narcotic Control in China" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

certified at Tokyo
on this 4th day of April 1947

HAYASHI, Kaoru
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.
at the same place
on this same date

Witness: URABE, Katsuma
(seal)
第十九條
拘留者ハ科料ヲ處ス

第二十条
薬種商未成年者又ハ禁治産者ナルトキハ前二條ノ罰則ハ之ヲ

第二十一条
販売者＝付テハ此ノ限ヲ在ツス

第二十二条
法人ノ代表者又ハ其ノ居人其ノ他ノ従業者＝シテ其ノ業務ニ関シ本

又ハ本令ハ該蹙ルコトヲ得ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ代表者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用스

ノ販売者＝之ヲ適用ス
自分、林隆
日本語
外務省文書課長
署名

昭和二十二年四月四日
於東京

立会人
浦部勝

署名捺印

右署名捺印

同日
於同所

荒野
Law of Narcotic Control in China
(1941 Imperial Ordinance No. 815)
(Proclaimed 15 August 1941)

Article 1. The control of narcotics and raw opium in China for Japanese nationals and Japanese corporations shall be as stipulated here in this law. The types of narcotics in the foregoing clause shall be decided by the Foreign Minister.

Article 2. The manufacture of narcotics and opium shall be forbidden in China.
Poppy plantation for the purpose of manufacturing opium in China shall be forbidden in China.

Article 3. The exportation of narcotics and opium from China shall be forbidden.

Article 4. The importation of narcotics and opium into China shall be forbidden.

Article 5. The transportation of narcotics out of one consular jurisdictional district into another shall be forbidden in China.

Article 6. Narcotics and opium in China shall not be allowed to be conveyed, assigned, taken over, transferred, to be received.

Article 7. The parts concerning narcotics in the three foregoing articles shall not be applicable for

- 1 -
medical or pharmaceutical practitioners or others authorized by the Foreign Minister who might import, transport, convey, assign, take over, transfer or receive in accordance with the stipulations of the Foreign Minister.

Article 8. No one except a pharmaceutical practitioner shall be allowed to possess narcotics in China for the purpose of sale. Opium shall not be allowed to be possessed in China.

Article 9. No personal use of narcotics, whether for one's own use or for others shall be allowed in China except in cases which come under any one of the following clauses:

1. Cases where a medical practitioner uses it in the execution of his professional duties.

2. Cases where a patient or his nurse uses it in accordance with the professional instructions of a medical practitioner.

3. Besides the foregoing two clauses, cases where persons are authorized by the Foreign Minister to use it in accordance with the stipulations of the Foreign Minister.

Article 10. In this law, by medical practitioner it is meant a physician, dentist or veterinarian, authorized
by the Foreign Minister, and by pharmaceutical practitioner is meant a pharmacist, manufacturer of medicine and medicine dealer, authorized by the Foreign Minister.

Article 11. Violators of the Articles 2 to 6 and also 8 and 9 shall be condemned to imprisonment not to exceed one year or fined not more than ¥ 200. Attempted crimes of the foregoing clauses shall be punished.

Article 12. Those who, prepare apparatus and materials in China for the purpose of manufacturing narcotics in China shall be imprisoned not exceeding 6 months or fined not more than ¥ 100.

Article 13. Besides the stipulations in Articles 2 to 12, the Foreign Minister shall decide on items necessary in connection with the control of narcotics.

By Laws

This law shall become effective as of the 20th day of August, 1941.
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Narcotic Control in China" is an exact and authorized copy of an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 4th day of April, 1947

/S/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: /S/ URADE, Katsuma (seal)
The Communist Party, the Army and the Relation between the Kuomintang and the Communists

(Weekly Report No.197, published on July 24, 1936)

by the Cabinet Information Board.

The present setup of the party and its leaders.

The position of the Communist Party in China as a propelling power behind "militant China" has lately become more and more weighty. On the occasion of the Hsian Incident in December, 1936, the year before the outbreak of the China conflict, the party which had only a single poor soviet district and not more than 70 or 80 thousands troops altogether attained a lawful position in consequence of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident on July 7 of the following year and of the coalition with the Nationalist Party. In addition to this, the party was enabled to maintain and enlarge its military force at the expense of the National Government which had been an enemy but yesterday, through the reorganization of its army into the 8th Rouso Army of the National Revolution Army, and was able to set about the establishment of a firm stronghold under the name of the "Outlying District Government" which does not permit the Chungking Government to meddle with its affairs.

For the past three years, the party has grown stronger and stronger like a snow-ball, and the so-called "specific gravity" at the anti-Japanese front has become so great that it seems now as if an age to saw it last. Some people even regard the party as having more influential than the Chungking Nationalist Party. Whatever one may say, it is an undeniable fact that

- 1 -
the position of the party is gradually getting close in upon the Nationalist Party. Such an increase in the influence of the party inevitably causes the friction with the Nationalist Party on the anti-Japanese front. Sure enough, dissension between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party has been reported continually. However, under the present international situation in which British and French aid to Chiang has ceased, leaving the U.S.S.R. as the sole stay of "militant China", we can not imagine that the Chungking Nationalist Party will break its coalition with the Communist Party and bring the Soviet aid to naught. On the other hand, we have to think of the rising enthusiasm for peace which might make the Chungking Nationalist Party take a decisive step towards an anti-Communist coup d'etat.

Even in such an eventuality, we can't imagine that the party, its army and its outlying districts will be exterminated at one blow. They will remain an enemy to the new order of East Asia for a long period of time, occupying one corner of north-west China as hitherto. -- This is why we should not be lazy in scrutinizing the party, its outlying districts, its army and its relationship with the Nationalist Party.

The present organization of the Communist Party in China has the Political Bureau as its supreme organ with CH'ING KON-TIEN as its General Secretary. It has the following 16 committee members who are regarded as the highest leaders of the party:

MaO Tse-tung, CHU Ta, CHOU En-lai, CHEN Shao-yu, CHIN Pang-hsien, LIN Po-chu, FENG Te-huai, LIN Pao, LIAO Ching-yun, LI Fu-chun, CHAO Yung, HU Ko-chuan, YEH Chien-ying, WANG Chia-hsiang, YEH Ting, HU Liang.
It is said that according this party the country is divided into the following 4 districts, each district having a bureau and each bureau having its secretaries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Designation</th>
<th>The sphere of jurisdiction</th>
<th>Secretary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Nancho Bureau</td>
<td>Entire Manchoukuo</td>
<td>Yang Ching-yu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Northern Bureau</td>
<td>North of Huang-Ho, Shansi, Shantung, Hopei and Chekiang</td>
<td>TEN H-shih, YANG Shang-kun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Central Bureau</td>
<td>South of Yellow River, North of Yantze-kiang, east of Hanhui, and west of the Tientsin-Fukow Railway line</td>
<td>LIU Shao-ko</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Southern Bureau</td>
<td>The region along upper and lower reaches of the Yantze-kiang</td>
<td>TUNG H-wu, Canton, Kwanghai, and Fukien</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the Southern Bureau, there is the special South-eastern Branch Bureau with HSING Ying for the supervision of the lower Yantze-kiang zone as its secretary. There is the outlying District Committee (with KAO Kang as its Secretary) in the Shansi-Kansu-Ninghsia District, the headquarters of the party, and there are the "Perforated Line Committees" in the large cities in central and south China Occupied by Japanese forces. The organizations under the local bureaus seem to vary according to local conditions and to be not always uniform. Roughly speaking, there is a province committee in each province, and under it there are hsien (county) committees, district committees, chapter and borough sections. Besides the above, there is a municipal committee in a city and an administration department of the guerilla force in a guerrilla district. Under the Central Political Bureau, there are the Outlying
District Government (with LIN Po-chu as its President), the Secretariat, the Administrative Bureau, the Publicity Department, the Military Committee (with MAO Tse-tung as Chairman), the Young Men's Committee, the Women's Committee, the Artizans' Committee (with LIU Shao-ko as Secretary), etc. The National Suffrage Council established in 1939 is an elementary public organ on which the Communist Party exerted its utmost efforts, and MAO Tse-tung, CHEN Shao-yu, CHING Feng-hsien, LIN Po-chu, WU Kang-Chang, TING Pi-ju and TENG Ying-choo, seven in all are listed as councillors of this organ.

The actual condition of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Outlying District, which is the headquarters of the Communist Party in China as well as the rear stronghold of the Communist Army, is the revival of the two Soviet districts, viz., the Shensi-Kansu Outlying Soviet District and the North Shensi Soviet District which was established by LIU Tzu-tan, the chief of the Communist Party in Shensi and others in 1930. When the Communist Party in Kiangsi and its army arrived in this district in 1935, they established the North-Western Branch of the Soviet Central Government by amalgamating these two districts, but in December, 1936, after the Hsian Incident, this was reorganized into the Outlying District Government. Upon the outbreak of the China Incident in 1937, in consequence of the conference between the representatives of the party and CHANG-Kai-shek, the Outlying District Government was placed under the immediate jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan, and on and after September 6 of the same year, it won its formal recognition. The present district is said to cover, Yenan in the north, Shensi as its centre, 16 hsien in Shensi, 6 hsien including...
Chingyang in Kansu and Yanchih in Ninghsia, 23 hsien in all with a population of 2,500,000. Though the greater part of the district consists of loess and prairies, the land in 18 hsien including Yenan is arable and yields foodstuffs, beans, cotton, petroleum, salt, live stock and other products, and produces coal and iron enough to support the population. Thus LIN Po-chu of the Outlying District Government boasts of his district. Though the district is nominally placed under the jurisdiction of the Executive Yuan, it forms in substance a central soviet district which does not permit the Chungking Nationalist Party or the Chungking Government to meddle with its affairs. The Communist Party appointed LIN Po-chu, a veteran of the party as President of the Outlying District Government concurrently with the Chief of the Financial Board and the President of the District Bank, and afforded him an authority to execute administration at his will, entirely disregarding the administrative officials of the Chungking Government, to appoint and to dismiss heads of Hsien, to issue District Bank notes for circulation within the district and to impose taxes on the people. As to the taxation, more than 20 kinds such as the "anti-Japanese" tax, Patriotic dues, the wealth tax, the land tax, etc. are being levied. (tax revenue totals about 1,400,000 yuan).

What the party has been striving most at is the educational undertaking. The educational institutions operated by the party are such colleges and higher technical schools as the Anti-Japanese Military Administration University (with LIN Hao as its Chancellor and LC Jui-ching as senior professor) known as "Fighting University," the North Shensi Public Schol (its principal being CHENG Fang-wu who has been a literary critic and a member of the Creation Society formed by Kuo Po-jo and others), the LU Hsun Art Academy, the Marx...
School, the Lenin School, the Practical Science Laboratory, besides, 706 primary schools (with 16,000 school children) and 6,000 Literary Societies (organizations to teach the rudiments of reading and writing, with about 40,000 members). Through these organs, Bolshevik education is being pushed forward step by step.

Other operations are roughly as follows:

(a) Mobilization of the people.

Mobilizing 80,000 youths within the district, the party replenished the 8th Route Army. Young men and boys mobilized for the Youth Spearhead Column totalled 28,000. Both figures are from the latest two years' statistics.

(b) Organization of the self-defence army. The party proclaimed the Self-defence Army Ordinance for the purpose of arming all the people and assign to all of them, regardless of sex, the responsibility for the defence of the outlying districts. The army consisting of the forces 23,000 strong is commanded by the District Peace Preservation Headquarters.

(c) Operations at the rear.

In order to render assistance to the families of soldiers of the Communist Army, the party organized a farming aid corps and presented for the comfort of officers and men 60,000 pairs of socks and 100,000 vests made of wool. At the same time, organizing a company for the extermination of recalcitrants the party disbanded 41 bands of local bandits and captured 1,200 rifles.

(d) Relief of the poor.

Out of 100,000 yuan subsidized by the Chungking Government, the party appropriated 30,000 yuan for the poor relief fund for immediate use, and spent 70,000 yuan on handicraft enterprises for the purpose of relieving
the poor. In addition, the party established a children's relief society with a fund of 5,000 yuan endowed by SUNG Wei-ling.

(e) Popular Election held.

The party established the outlying district councillor system and carried out a secret ballot poll.

(f) Increase of farm lands.

The total area of farm lands in 1939 was 8,990,000 亩 (T.N. about 220,343 acres). The party increased this farm land by 560,000 亩 (about 13,725 acres) in three years.

(g) Public enterprises.

There are as follows:

1 spinning mill, 1 petroleum refinery, 3 coal mines, 3 printing shops,
1 machine repair shop, 3 chemical plants, 2 farm tool factories, and soap factories, celluloid factories, flour mills etc.

The true strength of the Communist army.

What is the source of the power of the Communist Party? Needless to say, it is the Communist Army. Through the diversion of the Communist Army a minor soviet district formed, and through the convergence of minor soviet districts, led to the formation of a major soviet district and then finally the Soviet Central Government came into being. The party also employed its army for the extension of the soviet district. Such has been the usual practice of the Chinese Communist party and is characteristic of the Chinese communist movement which is quite different from that of other countries. Accordingly, it is inconceivable to outsiders how highly the Chinese Communist Party values its Communist army.
The Communist army was in all its glory in 1933, and the military strength at that time was said to be about 300,000. After that, with the rising power of CHIANG Kai-shek in suppressing the Communist army, the influence of the army gradually declined, and at the time of Hsian Incident in 1936, its strength was only seventy or eighty thousand. At the time of the Hsian Incident the reason why the highest leaders of the party were in favor of sparing CHIANG's life, restraining the radical elements who demanded that CHIANG should be killed, was because, though it was an order of the Comintern, there was a deep-laid plot to preserve the potential of its army and to form an invincible Communist army with redoubled energies. Therefore, upon accomplishment of the second coalition between the Nationalist and the Communist parties, the party contrived to wax at the expense of CHIANG Kai-shek by reorganizing its army into the Eighth Route Army of the National Revolutionary Army (with CHU Teh as Commander-in-Chief and FENG Te-huai as his vice). In 1938, the following year, the party dissolve the guerilla corps which had been in the Kiangsi and Fukien district and reformed it into the New Fourth Army (with YE Ting as its Commander and HSIAO Ying as Vice-Commander). (The Eighth Route Army was later renamed the 18th Group Army.) Thus the party enlarged its army at the expense of CHIANG Kai-shek. At present, the Eighth Route Army consisting of about 300,000 is spreading its forces in the provinces of Shensi, Shansi, Shantung, Huan and Hopei, and the New Fourth Army consisting of 100,000 is manoeuvring in the districts of Anhwei and Kiangsu. In spite of the total strength of its army which number 400,000 and exceeds the number of troops in the golden age of 1933, the party, not being satisfied with this, is making a dash toward the goal of one million troops. Furthermore, the party is utilizing the military expenses given by CHIANG Kai-shek in order to extend its military strength without appropriating...
it exclusively for the maintenance of troops; and yet the party is incessantly requesting Chungking to increase the subsidies on the pretense that "the sum of 2 yu. 72 cents, the monthly allowance for each soldier of the Eighth Route Army, is worth only 67 cents as a result of the depreciation of legal tender." Therefore, in a way, the cunning of the party surpasses that of CHIEN K'ai-shek.

Friction between the Nationalist and the Communist parties.

A complaint arose in Nationalist army circles against the measures taken by the Communist army that had been strengthening itself by taking advantage of the anti-Japan attitude and yet was planning to preserve its power by refraining from Nationalist army and the Communist army have repeatedly taken place since last year. Thus friction between the Nationalist and the Communist parties has come to attract public attention. Such friction, however, is very natural, since this coalition of the two parties whose policies are essentially different, was based on mutual exploitation. This is the reason why the conflict between the heads of the two parties, the burning-down of the Communist press organ, etc. were so frequent within a few months after the coalition was effected three years ago. CHIEN K'ai-shek was, however, well aware of the coalition being an axis of the anti-Japanese front and whenever trouble arose, he preferred to concede to the Communist party and banned the activities on the part of the Nationalist party. Similarly, the leaders of the Communist party well understood the real intention of the Comintern and also attached major importance to the maintenance of the anti-Japanese front as their first principle. So that the friction between
the two parties has been regarded as peripheral strife. However, the attitude of Chungking has lately undergone a slight change. Even CHEN Cheng who has been supposed to be the greatest sympathizer with the Communist party among the generals of the Chiang Group went so far as to comment, "The Eighth army is idle at all times, and never fights. There is not a single soldier wounded in Yenan." Furthermore, the Hu Taung-nan Army which remained at the northwestern district in order to watch the Communist party and its army (the army is said to be the cream of all forces under Chiang's direct command and his treasured force, which has never engaged in the anti-Japanese campaign) has slashed the Shanxi New Army of the Communist party in one operation. In spite of the strong protest voiced by the Communist army against this, Chiang remained unperturbed. At this juncture, a document entitled "Outline of the Illegal Actions of the Chinese Communist Party and the Truth about its Warfare Sabotage under the name of the Political Section of the Military Committee Chairman's headquarters at Tientsiu (the Chief of the headquarters being CHENG Chien first and CHU Shao-liang later) was suddenly published last April. Though such documents as anti-Communist telegraphic communications sent by generals of the Nationalist party or other material of the same sort have frequently been published heretofore, there is no comparison between them, and this literature published by the Tientsiu Headquarters is of great importance. Presumably it may be regarded as the first open anti-Communist declaration by Chungking. The document consisting of 22 pages is divided into 9 sections viz., (a) Introduction, (b) the actual condition of the so-called Shanxi-Kansu-Ningsia Outlying District, (c) the facts about the destruction of the administration setup, (d) the action to liquidate the allied army, (e) the
actual phases of the guerilla operation, (f) the facts about the slaughter of and tyranny over innocent people, (g) the Shansi Province New Army's action to aid rebellion, (h) the facts about an unlawful increase of the army and the disturbance of finance, (i) Conclusion. In its contents, the Communist party and its army are thoroughly and bitterly reprehended.

In face of this open accusation, the Communist party did not keep silent and furiously refuted it through its mid-May number of the *Weekly Emancipation*. Taking up each section mentioned in the Tientsin Headquarters document, the party stated that there had been no such facts as those of which it had been accused, and revealed that the Nationalist party should be blamed instead of the Communist party. So the party disclosed the fact that after the war, more than 1,400 officers of the Eighth Army as well as several thousands of families of officers and soldiers of the New Fourth Army have been murdered at North China by obstinate anti-Communist elements. We may draw a conclusion that the friction between the two parties has been transferred from the periphery to the core as judged from the above exchange, but we may not be able to presage that the two parties will split. This is because the suspension of the British and French aid to CHANG increased the necessity for reliance for fighting upon the U.S.S.R. as we have mentioned at the beginning of this article.

Thus, as the increase of the Communist influence of China brings about an obstacle to the settlement of the China Incident and to the establishment of a new order in East Asia, we should feel grave concern on this point and at the same time must prepare for the future.
CERTIFICATE

Source and Authenticity.

I, K.A. S.HI, Kaoru, the occupy the post of Chief of the Archive and
Documents Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereof
attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "The
Communist party, the army and the struggle between the Kuomintang and the
Communists" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in
the custody of the Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 3rd day of March, 1947
/S/ K.A.S.HI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto
in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date
Witness : /S/ S.JO, Tokage (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify
that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the
best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible
to the meaning of the original document

/S/ William E. Clarke (seal)
Tokyo, Japan
Date 16th Nov, 1947
政治部がある。中央政治局の下には邊區政府（主席林伯渠）、書記陝

組織部、宣傳部、軍事委員会（主席毛澤東）、青年委員會、婦女委員會

工人委員會（書記劉少奇）等がある。昭和十四年成立の邊民參政會は、

共產黨側が取も力を入れた初步的民意機関であるがとの會の參政員とし

て毛澤東、顧祝之、秦邦憲、林伯渠、吳王章、崔必武、鄭簡超七人が数

へられてある。

陝甘寧邊區の実情

中華共產黨の本振であり、共產軍の後方根據地である陝甘寕邊區は一九

三〇年陝西共産黨の首領劉子丹等によって創建された陝甘邊ソヴェー

ト北ソヴェートのソヴェート区の後身である。一九三五年江西の共産

陝南京政府陝北辺区公署を設立したのが一九三六年十二月の西安事件後改め

て辺區政府を設立したのである。三七年夏部事變勃発するや、黨代表は蔣

介石と会見し次の結果辺區政府は行政院の直轄に歸することとなる同年

九月六日から正式にその存在が認められた。現在辺區の範囲は陝西北部

に広がっている。
共産黨の有する力の核の戦はどこにあるか？いえ、共産軍である。

共産軍の進撃によってソビエト中央政府が出る、これが寄り集まって大ソビエト軍区となり、ついでソビエト軍を覆う。これが中国共産軍の共産軍を大切にするとは局外者の想像以上である。他国の共産軍を用いたソビエト軍区とは、はるかに類を異にし、支那共産軍は大巨石である。また共産軍を用いてソビエト軍区となら、密にソビエト軍を摂取する。これが中国共産軍の共産軍を大切にするとは局外者の想像以上である。他国の共産軍を用いたソビエト軍区とは、はるかに類を異にし、支那共産軍は大巨石である。
ひで、メグネタと太る軍艦をした。一二九三年八月は、江西、福建地方に渡して置いた師団を解散して新四軍（旅長葉挺、副軍長項英）に改編したのである。一第八路軍は後第十八集団軍と改名し、九三三年の全盛時代の兵力を失散してあるのであるが、彼等はこれを以て足りりとせず、九三三年の全盛時代の兵力を新四軍の師団に配置した。敬愛月額二元十角二分は、法幣収著の結果六角七分にしか當たらないが、師団の編制は各師団の兵力を引き立たせるに適してゐる。合計四十一万で、九三三年の全盛時代の兵力を新四軍に配置した。
この公然たる非難に対して、共産党の主張は解決を図る努力を欠いている。
Address by Foreign Minister Hayashi

At the Opening of the Diet

I should like to continue further to state my views as Foreign Minister. The foreign policy of the Government is, what I have already stated, and in accomplishing this policy, I will pay special attention to solidifying the friendly and indivisible relations between Japan and Manchuria, and also to the readjustment of relations with China as well as the Soviet Union.

In the first place, as to relations with China, it is really regrettable that various questions have arisen between Japan and China because of China's not fully understanding the true intention of our Empire, though Japan has been trying to ensure the stability of East Asia in cooperation with China. At this time, I suppose it is necessary to brighten international relations through reconciliation sentiment between the two nations, and ensuring the realization of the stability of the East Asia by coalition. In order to do this, each country should try to understand the others situation. It is also necessary to increase contact not only between the two governments, but also between the peoples themselves. I am, therefore, determined to make the fruit of coalition between Japan and China bear, and at the same time, adjust diplomatic
relations between the two, by actively excluding those who want to obstruct it.

In the second place, I should like to speak a word about relations with the Soviet Union. For the peace of the Orient, it is needless to say that the Soviet Union should properly appreciate the situation of our Empire, and both countries should be reconciled with each other. So, it will meet the above-mentioned purpose to promote at this time a friendly solution to the various problems pending between the two countries. Accordingly I should like to request that the Soviet authorities take a wider point of view and cooperate with us to the above-mentioned end.

Recently the Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded between the Japanese and German Governments, and it is a timely and indispensable measure for Japan to have taken from the viewpoint of her responsibility for securing the peace of East Asia. and when we consider that the activities of Comintern have been conspicuous of late in the world, particularly in the East Asia. Our Government will do its best in order to produce satisfactory results, without making any wrong application of this Pact.

The policy of our Empire to stabilise friendly relations with England and the United States, the two great friendly nations of our Empire, is constant as ever. There are some problems still to be adjusted between Japan and England, but
none of them is of a character that will affect the basis of the friendly relations between the two. I firmly believe that they will be solved by the mutual understanding of the two countries.

As to the Naval Disarmament problem, our Empire has come to withdraw from the treaty, but it is needless to say that there is no change in our former attitude of adhering to the principles of non-intimidation and non-aggression.

In conclusion, it must be said that the expansion of our foreign trade is an indispensable task in the development of our Empire, and it is also very urgent especially from the view of Japan's present economic condition. So the Government wishes to make every effort to exclude any obstruction to the development of trade, and at the same time to take active measures appropriate to promote trade.

In carrying out the above-mentioned policy, it is impossible to obtain the expected results except with the united effort of all the people. Accordingly I earnestly desire your hearty cooperation.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, "HAYASHI Kacru", the Chief of the Archives Section of the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Address by Foreign Minister HAYASHI at Reopening of Diet", is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27 day of February, 1947

/s/ "HAYASHI Kacru" (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the "Itress.

At the same place, or this same date.
"Itress: /s/ SATO Takeforo (seal)

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 7 May 1947
文書No. 出所 1415

同日於同所

立會人

佐藤

武

五郎

昭和二十二年二月二十七日

於 東京

林

部長名捺印

同日於同所

右署名捺印

受文者

二月

弁理官

田辺

昭和二十二年二月二十七日

於 東京

林

関係公文書ノ抜差ノ正確ニシテ該書類ハ日本政府（外務省）ノ領管

文書No. 出所 1415

同日於同所

立會人

佐藤

武

五郎

昭和二十二年二月ニ於テ於テ

林

関係公文書ノ抜差ノ正確ニシテ該書類ハ日本政府（外務省）ノ領管

文書No. 出所 1415

同日於同所

立會人

佐藤

武

五郎

昭和二十二年二月ニ於テ於テ

林

関係公文書ノ抜差ノ正確ニシテ該書類ハ日本政府（外務省）ノ領管

文書No. 出所 1415

同日於同所

立會人

佐藤

武

五郎

昭和二十二年二月ニ於テ於テ

林

関係公文書ノ抜差ノ正確ニシテ該書類ハ日本政府（外務省）ノ領管
と同時に、苟も之を阻止せんとするものは巡じて排除するる覚悟を持

次にソヴィエト連邦との外交関係は正当に認定し、両國互に融和に

の再定の要ることを須ずて行い、此の際両国間に積たる難塊を

を要望するものであります。従つて私辺ソヴィエト連邦当局に於っても大局的見地に立脚し、右に協力する

の有効的解決を促進することは右目的に合致するものであります。従つ

に東亞に於けるソヴィエト連邦活動関係の活動顕著なるものがあらに観み、東

安定の責任を有する帝國として當然執らざるを得なくなった指針であり、

帝國の方針は不変であります。日英両国間には調整を要する際問題が
这一页的文本内容无法读取。
THE FIRST FORM BUSINESS REPORT

1. Report of Business Operations
   (1) Sunday affairs
   (2) Financial affairs
      (a) Capital and stocks
      (b) Investments and loans
      (c) Business revenue

2. Inventory

3. Balance sheet

4. Statement of profit and loss

5. Disposal of profit

The 1st term business report - North China Development Co. 1-6 Yurakacho, Kojimachiku, Tokyo.

(Upon settlement of accounts for the year 1939 (covering the period November 7 to December 31, 1933) the company hereby gives its report of business operations, inventory, balance sheet, statement of profit and loss and disposal of profit for publication to its stockholders, as follows:

.... Omission ... 

(2) Investments & Loans:
Total amount of loans as at the end of the current year ¥20,925,000.00

(3) Receipts & Disbursements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Receipts</th>
<th>Disbursements</th>
<th>Profit or Loss</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>¥ 430,247.46</td>
<td>¥ 404,044.61</td>
<td>¥ 26,202.85</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -
2. Inventory (as at December 31, 1938)

**Assets:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital unpaid</td>
<td>Govt-owned 2,388,230</td>
<td>¥ 2,388,230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private-owned 3,500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>North China Telegraph &amp; Telephone Co. Ltd. &amp; one other</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>government investment in kind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits</td>
<td>Japan Industrial Bank &amp; other banks</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>accounts receivable</td>
<td>In-cuts on loans, deposits &amp; others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, fixtures, etc.</td>
<td>Motor cars, safes &amp; other properties</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial expense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                              |                                     | 350,085,654.15 |

| Liabilities:                 |                                     |               |
|------------------------------|                                     |               |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Government-owned 3,500,000</td>
<td>¥ 3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private-owned 3,500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts payable</td>
<td>Initial expense, government advances &amp; others</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current year</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                              |                                     | 350,085,654.15 |
THE FIRST TERM BUSINESS REPORT

1. Report of Business Operations:
   (1) Sunday affairs
   (2) Financial affairs
      (A) Capital and stocks
      (B) Investments and loans
      (C) Business revenue

2. Inventory

3. Balance sheet

4. Statement of profit and loss

5. Disposal of profit

(Upon settlement of accounts for the year 1939 (covering the period November 7 to December 31, 1939) the company hereby gives its report of business operations, inventory, balance sheet, statement of profit and loss and disposal of profit for publication to its stockholders, as follows:

   .... Omission ....

(2) Investments & Loans:

   Total amount of loans as at the end of the current year ¥20,625,000.00

(3) Receipts & Disbursements:

   Receipts | Disbursements | Profit or Loss
   ¥ 430,247.46 | ¥ 404,044.61 | ¥ 26,202.85
2. Inventory (as at December 31, 1933)

**Assets:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital unpaid</td>
<td>Govt-owned 2,388,280</td>
<td>¥ 250,530,379.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private-owned 3,500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>North China Telegraph &amp; Telephone Co. Ltd. &amp; one other</td>
<td>20,925,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>30,553,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government investment in kind</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand</td>
<td>Japan Industrial Bank &amp; others</td>
<td>47,677,909.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts receivable</td>
<td>Interest on loans, deposits &amp; others</td>
<td>39,235.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,972.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Furniture, fixtures, etc.</td>
<td>Motor cars, safes &amp; other properties</td>
<td>194,123.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial expense</td>
<td></td>
<td>40,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>¥ 350,085,664.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Liabilities:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Government-owned 3,500,000</td>
<td>¥ 350,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private-owned 3,500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts payable</td>
<td>Initial expense, government advances &amp; others</td>
<td>59,451.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current year</td>
<td></td>
<td>26,202.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>¥ 350,035,654.15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above is approved  
March 1939  
Masashi Nakamura, Auditor  
Masuzo Nomura, auditor  
Masatsune Oguri, auditor

The Second-Term Business Report

1. Report of Business Operations
   (1) Sundry affairs
   (2) Business activities
   (3) Financial affairs
      (a) Capital and stocks
      (b) Investments and loans
      (c) Bonds
      (d) Business receipts and disbursements

2. Inventory

3. Balance Sheet

4. Statement of Profit and Loss

5. Disposal of Profit


Upon settlement of accounts for the year 1939 (covering the period January 1 to December 31, 1939) the company hereby give its report of business operations, inventory, balance sheet, statement of profit and loss and disposal of profit for publication to its stockholders, as follows:

.... Omission ....
(2) Investments & Loans:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Amount as at end of 1938</th>
<th>During 1939</th>
<th>Amount Redeemed</th>
<th>Outstanding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Invest-</td>
<td>¥104,718,187.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>¥104,718,187.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>loans</td>
<td>¥20,925,000.00</td>
<td>¥147,543,063.74</td>
<td>¥46,576,495.33</td>
<td>¥121,891,568.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>¥20,925,000.00</td>
<td>¥252,261,251.24</td>
<td>¥46,576,495.33</td>
<td>¥226,609,755.91</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Bonds:

During the current year the first issue of bonds amounting to ¥30,000,000.00 was made in August, the second issue of bonds in the amount of ¥40,000,000.00 in November and the third issue of bonds amounting to ¥40,000,000.00 in December, and the total of bond issue outstanding at the end of the current year amounts to ¥110,000,000.00, particulars of which follow:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Order</th>
<th>Amount Outstanding</th>
<th>Date of Issue</th>
<th>Annual Rate of Interest</th>
<th>Date of Redemption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>40,000,000.00</td>
<td>Nov. 1, 1939</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>Dec. 15, 1951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>40,000,000.00</td>
<td>Nov. 1, 1939</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>Dec. 15, 1951</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The capacity left for further issuance of bonds as at the end of the current year is the balance of the amount 5 times the paid-up capital - ¥570,148,304.00 - from which the amount already issued, namely, ¥110,000,000.00 is deducted, which is figured up at ¥570,148,304.00.
Def. Doc. # 1416

Of this amount, the amount already approved at the general
meeting of shareholders for issuance of bonds is
¥140,000,000.00.

(4) Receipts and Disbursements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross Profit</th>
<th>Gross Loss</th>
<th>Profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¥6,149,652.12</td>
<td>¥3,961,072.73</td>
<td>¥2,188,552.39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Inventory (As at December 31, 1939):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets Items</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital unpaid</td>
<td>Government-owned stocks 2,838,280 Private-owned stocks 3,500,000</td>
<td>¥213,970,339.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments</td>
<td>Shares in North China Communication Co., Ltd. &amp; other 13 companies &amp; Seikel Mining Administration (North China Communications Co. &amp; other companies</td>
<td>121,891,568.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>Government investment in Kind Railway equipments</td>
<td>96,038.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lands, buildings, furniture, etc.</td>
<td>Offices, lands for employees' housing, 1,933,439.8; buildings, furniture &amp; utensils</td>
<td>3,840,877.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts receivable</td>
<td>Interests on loans, bank deposits, etc.</td>
<td>3,840,877.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank deposits</td>
<td>Japan Industrial Bank &amp; 15 other banks</td>
<td>14,531,448.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,183.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances</td>
<td>Accounts on construction of offices &amp; employees' residences, etc.</td>
<td>100,443.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in bonds</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,924,597.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial expense</td>
<td></td>
<td>25,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities for debts</td>
<td></td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥483,538,126.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liabilities</td>
<td>Remarks</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Government-owned shares 3,500,000 Private-owned shares 3,500,000</td>
<td>¥350,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,621.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees' dismissal allowance fund</td>
<td></td>
<td>262.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds issued</td>
<td></td>
<td>110,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts payable</td>
<td>Interest on bonds, etc.</td>
<td>823,354.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional receipts</td>
<td></td>
<td>16.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities for debts</td>
<td></td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit brought forward from preceding term</td>
<td></td>
<td>23,319.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current year</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,188,552.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>¥463,539,126.31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. Balance Sheet (as at December 31, 1929)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unpaid capital</td>
<td>$213,976,333.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments</td>
<td>$104,768,187.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>$121,791,563.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government investments in kind</td>
<td>$96,935.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lands, buildings, furniture, etc.</td>
<td>$1,933,439.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts receivable</td>
<td>$3,855,877.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank deposits</td>
<td>$4,531,448.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand</td>
<td>$6,185.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances</td>
<td>$100,443.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences in bonds</td>
<td>$1,924,537.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial expense</td>
<td>$25,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities for debt</td>
<td>$500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$3463,538,126.31</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liability</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>¥350,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal reserve</td>
<td>2,621.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees' dismissal allowance fund</td>
<td>262.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds issued</td>
<td>110,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts payable</td>
<td>823,354.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances received</td>
<td>16.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security for debts</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit brought forward</td>
<td>23,319.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current year</td>
<td>2,138,552.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>¥463,538,126.31</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Remarks: Aggregate total of government subsidies ¥2,142,704.95)
## 4. Statement of Profit and Loss: (As from Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 1939)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business expenses</td>
<td>¥2,551,417.79</td>
<td>Revenue from loans</td>
<td>¥2,818,055.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests paid</td>
<td>1,345,594.82</td>
<td>Interests received</td>
<td>367,357.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various depreciations</td>
<td>64,060.12</td>
<td>Miscellaneous incomes</td>
<td>830,748.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current year</td>
<td>2,183,553.39</td>
<td>Government subsidies</td>
<td>2,133,463.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Total                       | ¥6,149,625.12 | Total                       | ¥6,149,625.12 |

## 5. Disposal of Profit:

| Profit for current year     | ¥2,188,552.39 |
| Profit brought forward      | 23,319.75     |

| Total                       | ¥2,211,872.14 |

Above profit disposed of as follows:

- Legal reserve: ¥218,856.00
- Employees' dismissal allowance fund: ¥21,806.00
- Dividend to stockholders other than Japanese government: ¥1,968,750.00
  - (At the rate of 4.5% per annum)
- Carried forward: ¥238,014

It is hereby declared that the above is a correct statement.

March 1940, North China Development Co., Ltd.

Okinori Koya, President
Tsunetaka Komachi, Vice-President
Tsumoo Yoranishi, Vice-President
Teiji Okubo, Director
Hiroshi Yoshida, Director
Katsujiro Mikumo, Director
Kiyonatsu Bokkuya, Director
Yetaro Ogawa, Director
Tho above is approved.
March 1940.
Mitsui Kakamura, Auditor
Viscount Masuno Nanuma, Auditor
Matsumura Ogura, Auditor

The Third Term Business Report

1. Report of Business Operations
   (1) Sundry affairs
   (2) Business activities
   (3) Financial affairs
      (A) Capital and stocks
      (B) Investments and loans
      (C) Bonds
      (D) Business receipts and disbursements

2. Inventory

3. Balance Sheet

4. Statement of profit and loss

5. Disposal of profit

The Third Term Business Report
North China Development Co. Ltd.
2-6-9 Hirakawacho, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo

Upon settlement of accounts for the year 1940 (covering the period January 1 to December 31, 1940) the company hereby gives its report of business operations, inventory, balance sheet, statement of profit and loss and disposal of profit for publication to its stockholders, as follows:

Change of Supervisor

February 1, 1940: Mr. Shimpei Takouchi, hitherto investigator of Koa-In is appointed supervisor of the company.

- 12 -
February 10, 1940: Mr. Shoji Suganori, secretary of Koa-In (China Affairs Board), being transferred to the post of chief of Steel Manufacturing Section, Steel Bureau, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, is automatically relieved of his post as supervisor of the company.

February 23, 1940: Mr. Yutaka Abe, secretary of Koa-In (China Affairs Board) is appointed supervisor of the company.

December 14, 1940: Mr. Shinpei Takeuchi, being transferred to the post of chief of Financial Bureau of Finance Ministry, is automatically relieved of his post as supervisor of the company.

(2) Investments and Loans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount as at end of 1939</th>
<th>Accounts Closed 1940</th>
<th>Outstanding end of 1940</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investments</td>
<td>¥104,718,187.50</td>
<td>137,249,875.00</td>
<td>239,349,875.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>¥121,891,568.42</td>
<td>211,351,308.26</td>
<td>313,213,372.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>¥226,609,755.91</td>
<td>348,601,183.26</td>
<td>552,563,247.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(3) Bonds

During the current year bonds were issued 6 times since March amounting to ¥215,000.00 and the amount of bonds issue outstanding as at the end of 1940 totals ¥325,000,000.00 particulars of which are as given herewith:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue Order</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Date of Issue</th>
<th>Rate of Interest</th>
<th>Date of Redemption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1st</td>
<td>¥30,000,000.00</td>
<td>Aug. 23, 1939</td>
<td>4.2% P.A.</td>
<td>Aug. 28, '51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2nd</td>
<td>¥40,000,000.00</td>
<td>Nov. 1, 1939</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 1, '51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3rd</td>
<td>¥40,000,000.00</td>
<td>Dec. 15, 1939</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 15, '51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4th</td>
<td>¥30,000,000.00</td>
<td>Mar. 11, 1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>Mar. 10, '52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5th</td>
<td>¥30,000,000.00</td>
<td>Aug. 12, 1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aug. 9, '52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6th</td>
<td>¥30,000,000.00</td>
<td>Sep. 25, 1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sep. 25, '52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7th</td>
<td>¥30,000,000.00</td>
<td>Oct. 23, 1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>Oct. 28, '52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8th</td>
<td>¥20,000,000.00</td>
<td>Nov. 23, 1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 28, '52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9th</td>
<td>¥25,000,000.00</td>
<td>Dec. 20, 1940</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 20, '52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>¥305,000,000.00</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The capacity left for further issuance of bonds as at the end of the current year is the balance of the amount 5 times of the paid-up capital - ¥1,092,305,860 - from which the amount already issued, namely, ¥325,000,000.00 is deducted, which is figured up at ¥767,305,960.00. Of this amount, the amount already approved at the general meeting of shareholders for issuance of bonds is ¥173,000,000.00.

(4) Reconciliation and Disbursements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross Profit</th>
<th>Gross Loss</th>
<th>Profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¥18,303,065.03</td>
<td>¥15,256,302.15</td>
<td>¥2,946,763.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Items</td>
<td>Equities</td>
<td>Amount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital unpaid</td>
<td>Government-owned 2,588,280 shares</td>
<td>¥131,538,828.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private-owned 2,550,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments</td>
<td>North China Communications Co.</td>
<td>339,349,875.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&amp; 17 other companies, &amp; shares in guilds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>North China Communications Co.</td>
<td>313,213,372.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&amp; 15 other companies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Invest. in kind</td>
<td>Railway equipments</td>
<td>27,550.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landa, buildings,</td>
<td>Offices, lands for employees' residences,</td>
<td>2,681,486.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>furniture etc.</td>
<td>buildings and furniture, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts receivable</td>
<td>Government security, interest on loans, etc.</td>
<td>8,871,383.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances</td>
<td>Resident Corporation, etc.</td>
<td>1,260,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank deposits</td>
<td>Japan Industrial Bank &amp; 15 other</td>
<td>6,993,639.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand</td>
<td></td>
<td>10,071.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional payments</td>
<td>Advance payments of interest on loans, etc.</td>
<td>1,727,937.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Difference in bonds</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,283,614.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security for dots</td>
<td></td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>¥711,657,758.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Liabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Government-owned shares 3,500,000</td>
<td>¥350,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private-owned = 3,500,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td>221,477.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees' dismissal</td>
<td>allowance fund</td>
<td>22,148.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds issued</td>
<td></td>
<td>325,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td></td>
<td>23,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overdrawn on current a/c</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,498,454.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts payable</td>
<td>Interest on bonds, etc.</td>
<td>4,283,957.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances received for investigation work</td>
<td></td>
<td>524,441.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security for debt</td>
<td>Security for overdrafts</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional receipts</td>
<td>Subsidiary co.'s deposits etc.</td>
<td>1,658,135.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit brought forward</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,330.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current year</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,546,763.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>¥711,657,758.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital unpaid</td>
<td>¥131,533,829.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments</td>
<td>239,349,875.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>312,213,372.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government investment in kind</td>
<td>27,550.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lands, buildings, furniture, etc.</td>
<td>2,831,486.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts receivable</td>
<td>6,871,383.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances</td>
<td>1,260,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank deposits</td>
<td>6,739,639.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand</td>
<td>15,617.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional payments</td>
<td>1,721,537.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences in bonds</td>
<td>5,263,614.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security for debts</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>¥711,577,758.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Liabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>¥250,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal reserve</td>
<td>222,147.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees’ dismissal allowance fund</td>
<td>22,143.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds issued</td>
<td>325,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>23,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank account</td>
<td>3,498,454.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts payable</td>
<td>4,283,957.33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Liabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Advances received for investigation work</td>
<td>¥524,441.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional receipts</td>
<td>1,658,135.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security for debt</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit brought forward</td>
<td>2,380.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current year</td>
<td>2,946,763.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>¥7,217,657,758.79</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Remarks: Government subsidies total ¥6,558,558.05)

## Statement of Profit and Loss:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Loss</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business expense</td>
<td>¥4,882,246.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest paid</td>
<td>9,218,502.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various depreciations</td>
<td>564,993.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation expense</td>
<td>690,558.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current year</td>
<td>2,946,763.88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>¥13,569,065.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profit</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue from investment:</td>
<td>¥980,250.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revenue from loans</td>
<td>143,474.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest received</td>
<td>159,688.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous incomes</td>
<td>130,525.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies for investigation work</td>
<td>690,558.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>¥12,995,065.03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Disposal of Profit:

| Profit for current year             | ¥2,948,763.88 |
| Profit brought forward              | 2,380.14    |
| **Total**                           | ¥2,949,144.02 |
Above profit disposed of as follows:

Legal reserve ¥ 294,676.33

Employees' dismissal allowance fund 29,457.64

Dividend (6% P.A.) to shareholders 2,625,000.00;
other than government

(It is hereby declared that the above is a correct statement.

March 1941. North China Development Co., Ltd.

Okinori Kaya, President
Tsunetaka Kosuchi, Vice-President
Tsuneo Yananishi, Vice-President
Matsuiro Mikumo, Director
Kiyoharu Ichikawa, Director
Yataro Ogawa, Director

The above is approved.

March 1941,

Masashi Nakamura, Auditor
Viscount Masuji Nakamura, Auditor
Masatsune Ogura, Auditor

(The Fourth Term Business Report - Contents)

North China Development Co., Ltd.
2-6-9 Hibiya-cho, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo

(1. Report of Business Operations)

(1) Sundry affairs

(2) Business activities

(3) Financial affairs

(A) Capital and stocks
(B) Bonds...
(C) Business receipts and disbursements

2. Inventory

3. Balance Sheet

4. Statements of profit and loss

5. Disposal of profit
Upon settlement of accounts for the fiscal year 1940-B covering the period January 1941 to 31st March 1941, the company hereby gives its report of business operation, inventory, balance sheet, statement of profit and loss and disposal of profit for publication to its stockholders, as follows:

Supervisor, Mr. Bunoi Takase, hitherto investigator of Koa-In (China Affairs Board) is appointed supervisor of the company January 14, 1941.

(2) Business Activities:

Investment

During the current fiscal year Santo Douka Kabushiki Kaisha (Shantung Electro-Chemical Co., Ltd.) capitalized at ¥800,000 was created on February 1, and the company acquired 4,000 shares of that firm, and further invested in total the sum of ¥4,990,000.00 in the subsidiary companies and guilds as specified hereunder, bringing the aggregate amount of investments as at the end of the current fiscal year to ¥24,339,875.00.

The enterprises in which these investments have been made are on the whole showing favorable returns. Of the 18 such companies and 8 such guilds, 14 companies have been operating for more than a fiscal year, of which 10 companies have paid their dividends.

Receipts and Disbursements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross Profit</th>
<th>Gross Loss</th>
<th>Profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¥1,217,756.71</td>
<td>¥6,480,397.15</td>
<td>¥737,359.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Inventory (As at March 31, 1941)

#### Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Account</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital unpaid</td>
<td>113,538,028.00</td>
<td>Government-owned shares 2,500,280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Private-owned shares 2,477,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments</td>
<td>214,339,075.00</td>
<td>North China Communications Co., Ltd.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>by other companies, &amp; 8 guilds shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>27,550.00</td>
<td>North China Co., Ltd &amp; 5 other companies 2,689,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>&amp; other securities, &amp; 8 guilds shares</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liquid, Buildings, Furniture et al.</td>
<td>2,951,507.35</td>
<td>Office, lands a buildings for employees'</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>residences, furniture etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts receivable</td>
<td>7,115,915.27</td>
<td>Government subsidies, interest on loans, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Advances to resident Corporation etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances</td>
<td>3,800,000.00</td>
<td>Loans to resident Corporation etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand</td>
<td>15,717.86</td>
<td>Provisional receipts to cover interest on loans, share dividends, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank deposits</td>
<td>4,864,271.16</td>
<td>Provisional payments to cover interest on loans, share dividends, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5,072,615.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences in heads</td>
<td>6,224,832.50</td>
<td>Total 377,487,131.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities for debt</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
<td>Total 377,487,131.45</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Liabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Account</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>350,000,000.00</td>
<td>Government-owned shares 3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Private-owned 3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal reserve</td>
<td>516,159.38</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees' dismissal</td>
<td>516,159.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taxes</td>
<td>516,159.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds issued</td>
<td>385,000,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>23,000,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank account</td>
<td>4,888,716.41</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts payable</td>
<td>8,581,726.62</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional receipts</td>
<td>1,581,922.77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities for debt</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current year</td>
<td>727,359.56</td>
<td>Total (21) 727,359.56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. Balance Sheet (As at March 31, 1941)

### Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital unpaid</td>
<td>¥131,533,828.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments</td>
<td>244,339,875.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>383,006,372.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government investment in kind</td>
<td>27,550.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lands, buildings, furniture etc.</td>
<td>2,951,507.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts receivable</td>
<td>7,115,915.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances</td>
<td>3,800,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank deposits</td>
<td>4,864,271.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand</td>
<td>15,717.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional payments</td>
<td>5,072,615.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences in bonds</td>
<td>6,224,832.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities for debts</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>¥774,457,484.48</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Liabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>¥350,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal reserve</td>
<td>516,153.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees’ dismissal allowance fund</td>
<td>51,615.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds issued</td>
<td>385,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>23,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank account</td>
<td>4,486,716.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts payable</td>
<td>8,581,726.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional receipts</td>
<td>1,581,912.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities for debts</td>
<td>500,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current fiscal year</td>
<td>737,359.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>¥774,457,484.48</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Remarks: Government subsidies aggregate ¥9,707,014.78)
(Subsidies for investigations ¥1,558,245.33)

- 22 -
4. Statement of Profit and Loss (Jan. 1 to March 31, 1941)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business expenses</td>
<td>¥1,348,966.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests paid</td>
<td>¥3,975,990.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various depreciations</td>
<td>¥270,470.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation expenses</td>
<td>¥667,891.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current term</td>
<td>¥737,959.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government subsidies</td>
<td>¥1,336,741.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subsidies for investigation</td>
<td>¥387,991.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>¥7,217,756.71</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. Disposal of Profit:

Profit for current term: ¥737,959.36

Above profit disposed of as follows:

- Legal reserve: ¥737,959.36
- Employees’ dismissal allowance fund: ¥7,373,30
- Dividend (6% P.A.) to stockholders other than government: ¥656,250.00

It is hereby declared that the above is a correct statement.

June 1941
North China Development Co., Ltd.

Shinori Kama, President
Tsunetaka Konno, Vice-President
Toruetsu Yamashita, Vice-President
Kazuo Hikawa, Director
Sudan Murayama, Director
Kazuo Okawa, Director
Suzuki Ikeda, Director
Yasuhiko Hama, Director

The above is approved.

Masahiro Nakamura, Auditor
Viscount Masako Nomura, Auditor
The Fifth Term Business Report - Contents

1. Report of Business Operations
   (1) Sundry affairs
   (2) Business activities
   (3) Financial affairs
      (A) Capital and stocks
      (B) Investments and loans
      (C) Liabilities
      (D) Business receipts and disbursements

2. Inventory
3. Balance Sheet
4. Statement of profit and loss
5. Disposal of profit

The Fifth Term Business Report - North China Development Co., Ltd.
2-6-9 Hiraikawacho, Kojimachi-ku, Tokyo

Upon settlement of accounts for the fiscal year 1941 (covering the period April 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942) the company hereby gives its report of business operations, inventory, balance sheet, statement of profit and loss and disposal of profit for publication to its stockholders, as follows:

..... Omission ..... 

Supervisor

November 24, 1941: Mr. Yutaka, Abe, secretary of Koa-In, (China Affairs Board) hitherto supervisor of the company, having been transferred to the post of secretary of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, is automatically relieved of his post of supervisor of the company.

Teruhiko

November 28, 1941: Mr. Hasegawa, secretary of Koa-In, (China Affairs Board) is appointed supervisor of the company.

..... Omission .....
Revision of Law

The North China Development Company Revised Law No. 76 passed on March 7, 1942 revised the North China Development Company, Law No. 81 passed on April 30, 1938, to read as follows:

The following clause is added to Article 14:

"In case warranted by special circumstances the North China Development Co., Ltd. can, with government approval, undertake the operation of any of the enterprises as specified in the items of the foregoing paragraph."

In Article 24 immediately following the words "investments and loans" the words "and independent enterprises" are added.

In the first paragraph of Article 29 "the revenue from investments and loans" is altered to "the revenue from investments, loans and independent enterprises", "the total amount of investments and loans" to "the total amount of investments, loans and operating funds of independent enterprises", and in the third paragraph of the same article "the revenue from investments and loans" is altered to "the revenue from investments, loans and independent enterprises" and "the total amount of investments and loans" to "the total amount of investments, loans and operating funds of independent enterprises".

The second paragraph in Article 34 and the third paragraph in Article 37 are deleted.

Revision of Cabinet Ordinance

By Cabinet Ordinance No. 5 of the year 1942 dated March 7, 1942 the following alterations were made in relation to the mode of calculation based on Paragraph 3 of Article 29 of the Cabinet Ordinance No. 1 dated February 20, 1939 - the North China Development Company Law:

In Article 1 "the investments and loans" is altered to "the investments, loans and independent enterprises", and immediately following the words "and other revenue" the words "and profits from independent enterprises" are added, and the following addition is made to the same article:

"Profits from independent enterprises shall be the amounts earned from independent enterprises from which the expenses incurred for deriving the revenue are deducted."
Def. Doc. #1416

In Articles 2 and 3 "investments and loans" is altered to "investments, loans and operating funds of independent enterprises".

......Omission......

Investment.

These to, which the investment was made total 23 companies and 8 unions at the end of the current year. The amount of increased investment to the third class company and unions of our company in the current year is ¥58,702,959.33 and the amount of investment at the end of the current year is ¥301,048,834.33.

Of the above companies and unions, those which have enough experiences of more than one business year are 20 companies and 8 unions, 15 companies of which have already been shared in the profits.

Loans:

The total amount of loans granted during the current fiscal year is ¥255,549,304.89 and the amount redeemed is ¥27,663,837.80, thus showing an increase of ¥227,881,466.99. This when added to the balance outstanding at the end of the preceding fiscal term (1940-B) of ¥368,006,372.00 brings the total of loans as at the end of the current fiscal year to ¥683,572,860.35.

The said new loans have been granted to the majority of the subsidiary companies and guilds as mentioned in the paragraph of Investments and to Ko-Ch Donki Kohor, Yugen-Koshi and Shantung Mining Co. Ltd.

......Omission......

- 26 -
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount at end of 1944-45</th>
<th>Investments</th>
<th>Loans</th>
<th>Amount Balancing Outstanding at end of 194</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment</td>
<td>¥244,339,875.60</td>
<td>61,549,450.00</td>
<td>4,840,490.67</td>
<td>301,048,634.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>368,006,372.00</td>
<td>255,519,304.79</td>
<td>27,833,637.80</td>
<td>595,692,088.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>612,346,247.60</td>
<td>317,068,734.79</td>
<td>32,674,123.47</td>
<td>896,740,823.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(4) Receipts and Disbursements:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gross Profit</th>
<th>Gross Loss</th>
<th>Profit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>¥39,011,562.06</td>
<td>¥38,062,123.84</td>
<td>¥2,949,438.22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2. Inventory (As at March 31, 1942)

### Assets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital unpaid</td>
<td>Government-owned shares 2,888,280</td>
<td>¥1,531,538,626.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private-owned</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments</td>
<td>Shares in North China Com. Co. &amp; 22</td>
<td>301,048,834.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>other companies &amp; 8 guilds</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>North China Com. Co. &amp; 22 other companies</td>
<td>595,692,038.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government investment in kind</td>
<td>Railway equipments</td>
<td>27,550.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lands, buildings, Offices,</td>
<td>Lands, buildings, Offices, lands &amp; buildings for employment etc.</td>
<td>3,930,402.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lands &amp; buildings for employ-</td>
<td>government subsidies, interests on bonds, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fure etc.</td>
<td>Accounts receivable</td>
<td>16,321,292.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valuable papers</td>
<td>Nippon Kyodo Shoken Kabuchiki Kaisha's shares, 2,000</td>
<td>75,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances</td>
<td>Loans to Resident Corporation etc.</td>
<td>24,125,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank deposits</td>
<td>Japan Industrial Bank, etc.</td>
<td>3,646,165.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand</td>
<td></td>
<td>14,145.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional payments</td>
<td>Deposit for interest on bonds etc.</td>
<td>4,081,124.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences in bonds</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents to cover</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees' valuable papers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities for debts</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>¥1,102,091,610.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Liabilities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Government-owned shares 3,500,000</td>
<td>¥350,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private-owned</td>
<td>3,500,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal reserve</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employes' dismissal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>allowance fund</td>
<td></td>
<td>68,989.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds issued</td>
<td></td>
<td>679,400,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>Advances for debentures, etc.</td>
<td>24,487,630.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits</td>
<td>North China Communications Co. &amp; others</td>
<td>12,442,927.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank account</td>
<td>Branch and Tokyo Bank</td>
<td>10,990,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts payable</td>
<td>Interest on bonds, dividend on shares, etc.</td>
<td>11,017,586.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional receipts</td>
<td>Employees' deposits, etc.</td>
<td>685,704.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War bonds, etc.</td>
<td></td>
<td>83,585.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities for debts</td>
<td>Securities for overdrafts by Tangku Transportation Co. etc.</td>
<td>10,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current year</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,949,438.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>¥1,102,091,610.88</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3. Balance Sheet (As at March 31, 1942)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital unpaid</td>
<td>¥131,538,828.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments</td>
<td>301,048,834.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>585,692,038.99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government investment in kind</td>
<td>27,550.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lands, buildings, furniture etc.</td>
<td>3,736,402.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts receivable</td>
<td>16,681,229.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valuable papers</td>
<td>75,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advances</td>
<td>21,125,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits</td>
<td>3,645,165.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash on hand</td>
<td>14,345.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional payments</td>
<td>4,988,824.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Differences in bonds</td>
<td>10,247,808.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents for employees' valuable papers</td>
<td>83,585.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities for debts</td>
<td>10,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>¥1,102,091,617.58</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Liabilities</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>350,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal reserve</td>
<td>588,889.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees' dismissal allowance fund</td>
<td>58,989.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bonds issued</td>
<td>679,400,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loans</td>
<td>24,487,630.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposits</td>
<td>12,442,927.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank account</td>
<td>10,999,860.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accounts payable</td>
<td>11,013,586.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provisional receipts</td>
<td>65,704.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employees' valuable papers</td>
<td>83,585.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Securities for debts</td>
<td>10,000,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current year</td>
<td>2,949,438.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>¥1,102,091,610.68</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Remarks: Government subsidies aggregate ¥16,790,292.57  
Investigation subsidies ¥5,137,853.56)
Dof. Dpc. #1416

(4. Statement of Profit and Loss (April 1, 1941 to March 31, 1942)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Business expenses</td>
<td>¥7,086,883.62</td>
<td>Revenue from investment</td>
<td>¥4,129,625.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest paid</td>
<td>¥28,673.62</td>
<td>Revenue from loans</td>
<td>¥23,613,048.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Various deprecia­tions</td>
<td>¥1,006,636.64</td>
<td>Interest received</td>
<td>¥509,783.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investigation expenses</td>
<td>¥8,090,380.89</td>
<td>Miscellaneous incomes</td>
<td>¥86,746.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Profit for current year</td>
<td>¥2,949,438.22</td>
<td>Incomes from investigation</td>
<td>¥5,058.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Government subsidies</td>
<td>¥1,083,277.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Investigation subsidies</td>
<td>¥3,583,422.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>¥39,011,562.00</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>¥39,011,562.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(5. Disposal of profit
(profit for current year ¥2,949,438.22)

The above profit disposed of as follows:
Legal reserve                             ¥2,949,438.22
Employees dismissal allowance             29,454.39
Dividend (at 6% p.a.) to stockholders     ¥2,625,000.00
Government

(It is hereby declared that the above is a correct statement, June 1942. North China Development Co., Ltd.
June 1942. North China Development Co., Ltd.
Juichi Tsushima, President
Tsuneo Yamauchi, Vice-President
Tsuneo Yamaichi, Vice-President
Kawajire Mikumo, Director
Niyomatsu Bokkaya, Director
Kesaku Sakakura, Director
Koichi Ikeda, Director
Kosaburo Kamatsu, Director

The report of Business Operations, the Inventory, the Balance Sheet, the Statement of Profit and Loss and the Proposition for Disposal of Profit have been duly audited and approved.
June 1942.
Saji Matsuyama, auditor
Viscount Katsuo Nomura, Auditor
Shuncsuke Furuta, Auditor)
第一同

第二同

第三同

第四同

第五同

第六同

第七同

第八同

第九同

第十同

第十一同

第十二同

第十三同

第十四同

第十五同

第十六同

第十七同

第十八同

第十九同

第二十同

第二十一同

第二十二同

第二十三同

第二十四同

第二十五同

第二十六同

第二十七同

第二十八同

第二十九同

第三十同

第三十一同

第三十二同

第三十三同

第三十四同

第三十五同

第三十六同

第三十七同

第三十八同

第三十九同

第四十同

第四十一同

第四十二同

第四十三同

第四十四同

第四十五同

第四十六同

第四十七同

第四十八同

第四十九同

第五十同

第五十一同

第五十二同

第五十三同

第五十四同

第五十五同

第五十六同

第五十七同

第五十八同

第五十九同

第六十同

第六十一同

第六十二同

第六十三同

第六十四同

第六十五同

第六十六同

第六十七同

第六十八同

第六十九同

第七十同

第七十一同

第七十二同

第七十三同

第七十四同

第七十五同

第七十六同

第七十七同

第七十八同

第七十九同

第八十同

第八十一同

第八十二同

第八十三同

第八十四同

第八十五同

第八十六同

第八十七同

第八十八同

第八十九同

第九十同

第九十一同

第九十二同

第九十三同

第九十四同

第九十五同

第九十六同

第九十七同

第九十八同

第九十九同

第一百同

第一百零同

第一百零一同
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>项目</th>
<th>日期</th>
<th>种类</th>
<th>符号</th>
<th>数量</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>序号</td>
<td>品名</td>
<td>单位</td>
<td>需求量</td>
<td>供应量</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>钢板</td>
<td>吨</td>
<td>100000</td>
<td>100000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>钢管</td>
<td>米</td>
<td>50000</td>
<td>50000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>铝板</td>
<td>吨</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>20000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>铝管</td>
<td>米</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>铜板</td>
<td>吨</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>15000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>铜管</td>
<td>米</td>
<td>8000</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>不锈钢板</td>
<td>吨</td>
<td>12000</td>
<td>12000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>不锈钢管</td>
<td>米</td>
<td>6000</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

合计需求量：300000 吨
合计供应量：300000 吨
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>列四</th>
<th>领</th>
<th>领油</th>
<th>列四</th>
<th>领</th>
<th>领油</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>燃料油</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>下列</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>下列</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>燃料油</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>下列</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>下列</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>精炼料</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>下列</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>下列</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>精炼料</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>下列</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>下列</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>精炼料</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>下列</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>下列</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>精炼料</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>下列</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>下列</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：上述数据仅供参考，具体以实际情况为准。
## 近代中国历史学

### 表

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>项目</th>
<th>年份</th>
<th>人物</th>
<th>国籍</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>政治变革</td>
<td>1911</td>
<td>孙中山</td>
<td>中华人民共和国</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>文化运动</td>
<td>1910</td>
<td>陈独秀</td>
<td>中国</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>经济发展</td>
<td>1912</td>
<td>胡适</td>
<td>美国</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 其他

- 本文是杜威于1916年发表的论文，题目为《近代中国历史学》。
6. Def. Doc. *1416

右
昭和十四年三月
也

北支那関於株式會社

小野寺會三森吉大山神大久
倉村村權口田保西

正経

現時...

恒三HeaderText

(Translation or transcription of the document content is not possible due to the complex and non-standard characters used.)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>項目</th>
<th>内容</th>
<th>項目</th>
<th>内容</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>第1回</td>
<td>000000000</td>
<td>第2回</td>
<td>11111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>第2回</td>
<td>000000000</td>
<td>第3回</td>
<td>11111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>第3回</td>
<td>000000000</td>
<td>その他</td>
<td>11111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>全合</td>
<td>111100000</td>
<td>その他</td>
<td>11111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

①

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>項目</th>
<th>内容</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>R1</td>
<td>R1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>その他</td>
<td>1111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>その他</td>
<td>1111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

②
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>序号</th>
<th>名称</th>
<th>数量</th>
<th>品种</th>
<th>单位</th>
<th>金额</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>产品一</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>米</td>
<td>1000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>产品二</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>千克</td>
<td>500.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>产品三</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>公斤</td>
<td>2000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>产品四</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>千克</td>
<td>1500.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：以上金额单位为人民币元。
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>序号</th>
<th>项目</th>
<th>数量</th>
<th>金额</th>
<th>序号</th>
<th>项目</th>
<th>数量</th>
<th>金额</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>甲</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>¥123</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>乙</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>¥123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>丙</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>¥123</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>丁</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>¥123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>戊</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>¥123</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>己</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>¥123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

（此表仅供参考，具体数据以实际为准）
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>序号</th>
<th>姓名</th>
<th>职务</th>
<th>年龄</th>
<th>性别</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>张三</td>
<td>主管</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>男</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>李四</td>
<td>经理</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>女</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>王五</td>
<td>副理</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>男</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：|
政府以外株式出資金
（年四分五厘）割
後期讓渡利益金
右之通知也
昭和十五年三月

北支那鐵道株式會社

松本

森本

義

清顯

次郎

松倉三郷郎嘉宣
昭和十八年三月

小野中

小川

正次

長三郎

15
需要分析和理解的内容，包括文字、公式、图表等。
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>部品番号</th>
<th>機械仕様</th>
<th>機械仕様</th>
<th>機械仕様</th>
<th>機械仕様</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>命令编号</td>
<td>命令类型</td>
<td>命令描述</td>
<td>命令参数</td>
<td>参数值</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>命令1</td>
<td>参数1</td>
<td>参数值1</td>
<td>值1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>命令2</td>
<td>参数2</td>
<td>参数值2</td>
<td>值2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>命令3</td>
<td>参数3</td>
<td>参数值3</td>
<td>值3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>命令4</td>
<td>参数4</td>
<td>参数值4</td>
<td>值4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

备注：...
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>序号</th>
<th>名称</th>
<th>数量</th>
<th>单位</th>
<th>备注</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>材料</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>吨</td>
<td>详细说明</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>设备</td>
<td>60台</td>
<td>台</td>
<td>配套使用</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>产品</td>
<td>5000件</td>
<td>件</td>
<td>包装运输</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>软件</td>
<td>200套</td>
<td>套</td>
<td>版权保护</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：以上数据仅供参考。
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>序号</th>
<th>项目</th>
<th>数量（个）</th>
<th>单价（元）</th>
<th>金额（元）</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>零件A</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>零件B</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>零件C</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>零件D</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>零件E</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6750</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

合计金额：22750元
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>列</th>
<th>项</th>
<th>项</th>
<th>项</th>
<th>项</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：

第 | 第 | 第 | 第 | 第 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

说明：

备注：

* 具体表格数据请根据实际情况填写。
* 注意事项包括但不限于数据的准确性和完整性。
* 其他相关说明和要求请参照相关文件。
<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
三 headings

四 headings
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>品名</th>
<th>单位</th>
<th>数量</th>
<th>单位价格</th>
<th>金额</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>000000</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>000000</td>
<td>0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>000000</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>000000</td>
<td>0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>000000</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>000000</td>
<td>0000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00</td>
<td>000000</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>000000</td>
<td>0000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

备注：

（来源：XXX公司）
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>预金</th>
<th>日本興立銀行其他</th>
<th>日分配予</th>
<th>注</th>
<th>金利</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：
- 預金：預備資金
- 日本興立銀行其他：日本興立銀行的其他資金
- 日分配予：日分配予資金
- 注：注解
- 金利：金利
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>部</th>
<th>内容</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 表格内容

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>序号</th>
<th>序次</th>
<th>名称</th>
<th>短号</th>
<th>备注</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>短号</td>
<td>001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>名称</td>
<td>123</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>序次</td>
<td>456</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>序号</td>
<td>789</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 备注
- 序号: 序列号
- 序次: 序列次序
- 名称: 对应名称
- 短号: 对应短号码
- 备注: 其他相关备注
右之通牒也
昭和十六年六月

全監

全全全全全全全全全全

北支部關政條例

滨中池中小戸三山神明宮

井村川谷望波殿

畳吉多爾清藤堂見

次次郎郎松郎郎幸宜

31
昭和十六年度（昭和十七年三月三十一日）に至り、

会計決算事業報告書、財務目録、貸借対照表、損益計算書、及び

監理官

昭和十七年十一月二十一日四日当社監理官

同月二十八日西成書記官

常磐監理官

昭和十七年三月七日法律第十六号北支郡開発株式会社法

中改正

前フランス公開に於て

・中略・
内容缺失
本年度末現在ニ於ケル投資先ハニ三會社八組合及び當社ノ等合社及

而シテ右會社等合組合ノ内一合資年度以上経過セルモノハニ二社八組合ニ

及比其ノ内既セ利経関商ナルモノノ十社ニ達ス

而シテ合資額ハ三万四千八百八十四金等合組合ニ

及比其ノ内既セ利経関商ナルモノノ十社ニ達ス

而シテ合資額ハ九千九百九拾九金等合組合ニ
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>科目</th>
<th>昭和十七年度末</th>
<th>昭和十六年度末</th>
<th>昭和十五年度末</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>銀行及融資</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>子金</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>番付引当金</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

レバ本年度末現在融資総額一五億三千五百六拾九万弐千参拾合八円九拾九

融資先ハ投資ノ項ニ記載シタル強華信用組合ノ大部分並ニ履渉電気股

份有限公司及川東銀座株式會社ヲリ。
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>科目</th>
<th>項目</th>
<th>金額</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>土地建物</td>
<td>事務所及社宅</td>
<td>金額</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>什器</td>
<td>金額</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>買入</td>
<td>金額</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>債券</td>
<td>金額</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>買入</td>
<td>金額</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>什器</td>
<td>金額</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>債券</td>
<td>金額</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>買入</td>
<td>金額</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>什器</td>
<td>金額</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>買入</td>
<td>金額</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>什器</td>
<td>金額</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

（昭和十七年三月三十一日現在）
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>部门</th>
<th>项目</th>
<th>完成情况</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>总部</td>
<td>项目A</td>
<td>完成</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>分部1</td>
<td>项目B</td>
<td>进行中</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>分部2</td>
<td>项目C</td>
<td>完成</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：日期：2023/1/10
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>合計</th>
<th>三九〇一七八九八〇元</th>
<th>合計</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>本年度利益金</td>
<td>三九〇一七八九八〇元</td>
<td>本年度利益金</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>成品利益金</td>
<td>三九〇一七八九八〇元</td>
<td>成品利益金</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>之処分</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 註

昭和一七年六月

北支郡長後藤

総務部長

石原

1416

- 社員退職金
- 破産以外株式常任金
- 政府以外株式配当金
- 一年六分之一
- 右之通算也
言葉が少ないですよね。

このページは Martial Arts Katakana サンプルソートと感じることがあります。
本院ニ就てセル日本生命ニチハ生命カントル五帳ヲリ成シノ北文部閣進延様式書

昭和二十二年四月二十九日
於東京内外省管経局

福野弘吉
立會人
THE NORTH CHINA INCIDENT SPECIAL TAX LAW
(Law No. 66, 12 August, 1937).
(An extract)

Article 1. The North China Incident special tax shall be composed of:
1. Income special tax.
2. Extraordinary profits special tax.
3. Dividends special tax.
4. Public and private bond interest special tax.
5. Commodities special tax.

Article 2. The income special tax shall be imposed on persons paying income tax.

Article 3. The income special tax of a person paying the first class income tax shall be levied on his income of each business year ending within one year from the day of enforcement of this law (excepting liquidation incomes); and its amount shall be 10% of the first class income tax levied on said income (including the additional levy under the Extraordinary Tax Increase Law).

Article 4. The income special tax of a person paying the second class income tax shall be levied on his second class income received within one year from the day of enforcement of this law (excepting interest on national bonds); and its amount
shall be 5% of the second class income tax levied on said income.

**Article 5.** The income special tax of a person paying the third class income tax shall be levied on his third class income belonging to the year 1937; and its amount shall be 7.5% of the third class income tax levied on said income (including the additional levy under the Extraordinary Tax Increase Law).

**Article 7.** The extraordinary profits special tax shall be imposed on persons paying extraordinary profits tax.

**Article 8.** The extraordinary profits special tax of a juridic person shall be levied on his profits of each business year ending within one year from the day of enforcement of this law; and its amount shall be 15% of the extraordinary profits tax levied on said profits (including the additional levy under the Extraordinary Tax Increase Law).

**Article 9.** The extraordinary profits special tax of an individual shall be levied on his profits belonging to the year 1937; and its amount shall be 15% of the extraordinary profits tax levied on said profits (including the additional levy under the Extraordinary Tax Increase Law).
Article 11. The dividends special tax shall be imposed on persons receiving dividends from juridical persons having head offices in the sphere where this law is enforced.

Persons exempted from the second class income tax, by the income tax law or any other laws shall be exempted from the dividends special tax.

Article 12. The dividends special tax shall be levied on the dividends received from the juridical persons as prescribed in the preceding Section, within one year from the enforcement of this law; and its amount shall be 10% of such portion of dividend amount as surpassing 7% p. a.

Article 14. The public and private bond interest special tax shall be imposed on persons receiving interest or public or private bonds, within the sphere where this law is enforced.

Persons exempted from the second class income tax, by the income tax law or any other laws shall be exempted from the public and private bond interest special tax.

Article 15. The public and private bond interest special tax shall be levied on the interest on public or private bonds received within one year from the day of enforcement of this law (excepting interest)
on such foreign currency bonds as prescribed in Paragraph 2, Section 1 of the Foreign Currency Bonds Special Tax Law; and its amount shall be 10% of such portion of the interest amount as surpassing 4% p. a. as to national bonds, and 4.5% p. a. as to other bonds.

Article 20. The commodities special tax shall be levied on the following goods, whose particulars shall be stipulated by ordinance.

Group 1:

1. Precious stones, semi-precious stones or articles in which precious stones or semi-precious stones are used.
2. Pearls or articles in which pearls are used.
3. Precious metals or articles made of precious metals.
4. Articles made of tortoise-shell.
5. Articles made of corals.

Group 2:

1. Cameras, Photograph enlarger, film projector and parts thereof.
2. Dry plate for cameras, film and sensitized paper.
3. Phonographs and parts thereof.
4. Phonograph records.
5. Musical instruments and parts thereof.
Supplementary Provisions

The present Law shall come into force on the day of promulgation.

The provisions relating to the commodities special tax shall be applied to goods of the first and second categories, liable to the commodities special tax, which are sold, forwarded from manufactories, or taken out of bonded zones, on or prior to 31 March, 1938.
CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DOCUMENT

I, MORINAGA, Sadaichiro, chief of Archives Section of the Finance Minister's Secretariat, hereby certify that the document attached hereto, written in Japanese in 4 pages entitled THE NORTH CHINA INCIDENT SPECIAL TAX LAW (pages 91-95) is an exact and authentic copy of the extract from the compendium of laws published in 1937 by the government printing bureau and in custody of the Archives Section of Finance Minister's Secretariat of Japanese Government.

15 April 1947
At Ministry of Finance, Tokyo,
MORINAGA, Sadaichiro
Chief of Archives Section of Finance Minister's Secretariat

Signed and sealed in my presence at same date and same place

Witness....AICHI, Kiichi
Chief of Finance Minister's Secretariat
TEIKOKU KOGYO KAIHATSU KABUSHIKI KAISHA (Imperial Mining Industry Development Company Limited) Law

Law No. 82 April 12, 1939

(Countersigned by: Prime Minister, Ministers of Home Affairs, Commerce & Industry and Finance)

Revised: No. 58 1940

CHAPTER I General

Article 1. Teikoku Kogyo Kaihatsu Kabushiki Kaisha (Imperial Mining Industry Development Co. Ltd.) shall be a joint stock company having for its object the undertaking of businesses necessary for the promotion of exploitation of important mineral resources (excluding gold ore and alluvial gold) and the increased production of such resources.

Article 4. The stocks of Teikoku Kogyo Kaihatsu Kabushiki Kaisha shall be inscribed shares, the holding of which shall be confined to the government, public corporations, Japanese subjects and Japanese juridical persons.
COAL DISTRIBUTION CONTROL LAW

Law No. 104, April 4, 1940

(Countersigned by: Prime Minister, Ministers of Finance and of Commerce & Industry)

Article 6. Nippon Sekitan Kabushiki Kaisha (Japan Coal Co. Ltd.) shall be a joint stock company, having for its object the undertaking of businesses necessary for the smooth supply and demand of coal and the fair regulation of its prices.

Article 8. The stocks of Nippon Sekitan Kabushiki Kaisha shall be inscribed shares, the holding of which shall be confined to the government, public corporations, Japanese subjects and Japanese juridical persons, more than half of whose employees, shareholders or executive officers, or more than half of whose voting power should not be, or be held by, foreign nationals or foreign juridical persons.

A juridical person or persons specified by an Imperial ordinance can, notwithstanding the aforesaid provisions, hold shares of Nippon Sekitan Kabushiki Kaisha when specially permitted by the competent minister.
TOYO TAKUSHOKU KABUSHIKI K. IISHI. (ORIENTAL COLONIZATION CO.LTD) LAW

Law No.63 August 27, 1908

(Countersigned by: Prime Minister, Ministers of Finance, Commerce & Agriculture, and Justice)

Revised: No.49 1910, No.23 1917, No.17 1928, No.28 1930, No.68 1939.

CHAPTER I General

Article 1. Toyo Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha (Oriental Colonization Co. Ltd.) shall be a joint stock company having for its object the supply of funds for colonization in territories other than the Homeland and the operation of various colonization enterprises. It shall keep its main office in Tokyo.

Article 3. The stocks of Toyo Takushoku Kabushiki Kaisha shall be inscribed shares, the holding of which shall be confined to the Japanese.
CERTIFICATE OF ORIGIN AND ESTABLISHMENT OF DOCUMENT

I, Uichi Noda, holding the post of Chief of Accountants' Bureau (Shukei Kyoku-Cho) of the Ministry of Finance, hereby certify that the document attached hereto, written in Japanese in 6 pages is an exact and authentic copy of the extract from the collection of laws and regulations relative to special companies, compiled by the Accountants' Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, kept in custody by the Accountants' Bureau of the Ministry of Finance of the Japanese government.

30 March 1947 At Accountants' Bureau, Ministry of Finance, Tokyo

UICHI NODA,
Chief, Accountants' Bureau, Ministry of Finance

Signed and sealed in my presence
At same date and same place

TAKEI TOJO
Chief, Budget Section, Accountants' Bureau, Ministry of Finance

The Progress of the Preliminary Conversations for a Japanese-Dutch Anti-Comintern Pact.

With an aim to conduce to the improvement of the friendly correlations between Japan and the Dutch East Indies, conversations were made in preparation for an anti-Comintern pact between Yamaguchi, Charge d'Affaires of the Japanese Legation at Hague, and the Dutch Foreign Minister. The outline of the progress of the conversations is reported as follows:

The Netherlands possess a vast territory near East Asia. Moreover, the population of the Dutch East Indies includes many Chinese. Such being the reason, the public opinions of the Netherlands and the Dutch East Indies have always been much sensitive to the situation of affairs in China, especially to Japan's attitudes towards China. Meanwhile, Japan has been obliged to pay much attention to the trend of the Dutch public opinions.

Charge d'Affaires Yamaguchi, in these connections, gave a full illustration of the present situation of the Sino-Japanese relations on October 12, and expressed Japan's hope that the Dutch Government should be very cautious in loading the public opinions rightly. The Dutch Foreign Minister expressed his appreciation of the Japanese request, and said that the Netherlands would make every possible effort to meet it.

Yamaguchi then turning to the question of the defence against the Comintern activities, pointed out that Japan's present demand towards China was nothing more than a natural result of the Communist menace suffered thoroughly by the Japanese Government, adding that he expected the Dutch Foreign Minister would fully understand it. The Dutch Foreign Minister answered that the existence of strong anti-Bolshevist feelings in the Netherlands was only a matter of common knowledge which needed no explanation, and revealed that the Dutch Government was still trying hard to suppress the Communist movement, though it was not, at present, so furious as it had been before.

Yamaguchi then mentioned his view that it was considered the wisest way for those nations having common interests in the defence against the Communist assault to act in unanimous co-operation; whereupon the Dutch Foreign Minister inquired of him to what extent the co-operation could be expected to be possible. Yamaguchi, in reply, pointed out the danger that such co-operation might naturally lead up to the support of a political system just opposite to the Communist, or might interest the participant nations in a political block; and revealed his view that the scope of the co-operation should properly be limited within the counter-propaganda against the Communist campaign and the exchange of informations concerning Communist activities.

The Dutch Foreign Minister seemed to take an active interest in the proposal, saying that it would be favourable if the Netherlands could exchange informations with Japan in connection with the Red movement in the Dutch East Indies at least.

(Yamaguchi 1)
On October 24, twelve days after the previous meeting, Yamaguchi visited the Dutch Foreign Minister to talk over the matter again. The Dutch Foreign Minister apparently had an intention to limit the scope of co-operation solely within the Dutch East Indian affairs. Yamaguchi took the position that the home country of the Netherlands also should be included, and in reply to the Dutch Foreign Minister’s inquiry about the ground of his claim, pointed out that there was a powerful propagandic machinery of the Comintern in Amsterdam, which had an important effect on the drift of argument condemning Japan appearing on the Dutch papers, requesting him to think over the matter again.

On the following day, October 25, the Chief of the Bureau of the East Asiatic Affairs of the Dutch East Indian Government who was just in Hague on furlough, visited Yamaguchi. He revealed to the Japanese Chargé d’Affaires the policy of the Dutch East Indian Government to oppress not only the Communist activities but also any other kind of political movement which was considered harmful to the public order in the Dutch colonies and her diplomatic relations with other nations, and suggested to expand the scope of the co-operation so as to include the prohibition of all other kinds of harmful political movement. But, after all, he lodged no objection to the necessity of the exchange of information and opinions regarding the suppression of the Bolshevik movement.

After the proclamation of the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact, however, the Netherlands appeared too much prudent to conclude the pact in question. It was likely that the rumour then abroad of a Japanese-German military alliance against the Soviet Union was partly the reason of her hesitation.

The Chief of the Bureau of the Political Affairs of the Dutch Foreign Office, then, declared to Yamaguchi that the Netherlands had no intention to conclude an anti-Comintern pact, which is prone to develop into some form of political coalition. Yet he expressed, at the same time, the desire on the part of the Netherlands to open the exchange of information as regards individual cases, both in Asia and in Europe, on the principle of reciprocity, between the competent offices of Japan and the Netherlands respectively, through free contact with each other, with the approval of the Dutch East Indian Government. He further emphasized the point that the scope of the co-operation should cover the suppression of those elements who act in defiance of the constitution.

The Japanese Government, with full appreciation of the Netherlands’ standpoint, is now watching developments calmly.

(Yamaguchi 2)
I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 5 pages and entitled "Preliminary Interview Concerning an Anti-Commintern Agreement between Japan and Holland, October 12, 1936" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 23rd day of January 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ Nagaharu Odo
ローマン語山口県来訪記念写真展

政権

平成24年10月22日

政府

本展は、山口県の歴史と文化を紹介し、県民の共感を深める目的で開催されました。

政府は、県民の皆様に、山口県の魅力を再訪する機会を提供し、県民との交流を深めることが重要と考えています。

政府は、県民の皆様に、山口県の魅力を再訪する機会を提供し、県民との交流を深めることが重要と考えています。
The relations between Japan and Britain have not been peaceful recently owing to the China question and the commercial and naval problems. It is, however, impolitic for Japan to contend with Britain, laying herself thus open to a possible attack of other Powers. There is indeed an urgent necessity of planning to cooperate with Britain, in consideration of Japan's relations with China and the Soviet Union. Japan should take precautions not to drive Britain, under all circumstances, to such a standpoint as would prove unfavourable to our own situation.

The Japanese Government holds the view that it is necessary to make some attempts at cultivating the friendly relations with Britain on the above-referred ground. Ambassador Yoshida, with such intention of the Japanese Government in mind, had made a persistent effort to achieve the purpose in all the fields of the British society after his arrival at his post in London in June, 1936.

The national feelings on the part of Britain towards Japan, as a result of Ambassador Yoshida's earnest effort, was just showing a favourable turn, when the Keelung incident broke out in October of the same year. In the following November, the Japanese-German Anti-Comintern Pact was concluded, and this produced a destructive effect on the British national feelings towards Japan.

The Japanese Government, according to the present situation of affairs, is determined to pursue the line of policy to bring the Keelung incident to a peaceful settlement at the earliest possible date, root out the misunderstanding on the part of Britain concerning the Japanese-German
Anti-Comintern Pact, and after removing all the obstacles in the way of the preliminary negotiations with Britain, positively promote the friendly relations with her through settling the Anglo-Japanese issue on China and commercial problems.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of two pages and entitled "Problem of Promoting Friendly Relations between Japan and England" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 23rd day of January 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo
Kyodo - UP

WASHINGTON - March 25 - The US State Department today made public the entire texts of the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam Agreements, including the Pact of February 11, 1945, whereby the Kuriles, Southern Sakhalin and concessions in Manchuria were promised in return for Russia's entry into the war against Japan.

Beyond the revelation that Russia agreed at Teheran to go to war against Bulgaria if that nation attacked Turkey, the texts contained little of major import that had not been previously announced informally or through communiqué.

It was disclosed that at Teheran on December 1, 1943, the Big Three were negotiating to bring Turkey into the war.

Agreement on Japan

Regarding Japan, the text of the Yalta agreement said: "The Three Great Powers -- the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain -- have agreed that in two of three months after Germany has surrendered and after war in Europe has been terminated, the Soviet Union will enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on the conditions that (1) the status quo of Outer Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved, (2) that the former rights of Russia violated by treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz: (A) The southern part of Sakhalin as well as all or the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union. (B) The Commercial Port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the prominent interest of the Soviet Union in this port being guarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the USSR restored. (C) The Chinese Eastern railroad and South Manchurian railroad which provide an outlet to Dairen shall be operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese company, it being understood that the prominent interest of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria."
Defense Document No. 1430

(3) that the Kurile islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

Chiang's Concurrence Needed

"It is understood that the agreement concerning Outer Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

"The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshall Stalin.

"The heads of the Three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

"For its part, the Soviet Union expresses readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke."

It was signed: "Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill."

Potsdam Agreement

The Potsdam Agreement by Marshall Stalin, Mr. Churchill, Mr. Clement Attlee and President Truman provided that the Montreux Convention Governing the Dardanelles should be revised as "failing to meet present day conditions." It said the next steps should be subject to direct conversation between each of the three governments and Turkey.

These "next steps" to date have brought a Soviet demand on Turkey that Russia be given a direct share in the defense of the Dardanelles, Great Britain and the U.S. are opposed to such an arrangement.

On the question of "the dismemberment" of Germany, the Big Three agreed at Yalta that the surrender terms should include a section calling for the "complete disarmament, demilitarizations and dismemberment of Germany as they deem a requisite for the future peace and security."
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Jintaro Wakamatsu, Publisher and Printer of the Nippon Times, hereby certify that the newspaper hereto attached in English consisting of 4 pages and entitled "Nippon Times #17250, Tokyo Wednesday, March 26, 1947" was published by the Nippon Times Ltd. on the same day as above.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 22d day of April 1947.

/s/ J. Wakamatsu

Witness: Y. Kazamo
' on 14 H

K ^

W

T
m

o
Ci

14 »1

öS

^

iS

's

*■ $

r

Jig ik

*

-s

£$

C fv< *s ‘S

® V

S * 0
HiKi$J3~S*?\kN:H

*■ w

r

S v- =* * /;'’ v>

jg ^ * K $ a % ' ^ V ^ ^ S ^ >1 m * £: 5 * •
* 3 & $ M $ 11r 111 * ^ 2S C I! r ÎS V H ■*• P
fe ^ N jjg ^ & N [*- U -J 4dä g « M M S E œ i l « ^
£

K

* ft *■

r « « H n
*
If

»! tftffiS 1

v.it V =* 0

( i^-la «<

S *

£ J)

\ ^ g < £ s & i > * Y

S =* £

& &

n -*-

1 fj c S
à

U4 n 14 \

* D ' H

$

I!

fn >

*\ tS.£2 ii? ^ É2 SS

\

^

'! $ *J!-i *
Y fr n -z-

<n\T ^

V & *K «S & fig «

*

iS

V H ■*- H !$ i$ *
5 Ü »n fS

I® «I J ^ 4» * 4fl L e a < ' >

' iS $
#

\ & $4 itt $ ^

^ V fr n
®

D & Q-K
Vy
V H *t l-ac* 'iu>
'I & ■*> ^ >s

* V •fr n •*-

* r

5> *K
/^\

; -K $

h

V H

<> >

£3 K *

SÊ»I m ®.iijfl Ü t* * '<

^ U

8ÇN 1$ iH 3

H &

'S in <& +N ^ M 3! n\ jg ^

IT\h«fii5öSC>^vH

■

£

U‘ ?«

& &

C;: ^ ?f ;■; f,

w- w

aj
Ù 1*Ä ^ ‘

fr

n

B\ '$ * '

jfi.

.

ij

*- r fr a # IS £3 ^

6 ^

N

V HA

inj 5s ÎS

K V

r > (& 'I i£ U

nx ^

V

H

Lai •
5 * L2i \ ^h» *

^ *N ^

K

¥ ^ * V :vn ^


Confidential No. 409

Date: October 15, 1937

From: Chief of Military Affairs Bureau, Navy Ministry. Director of the 1st Division, Naval General Staff.

To: Chief of Staff, Third Fleet.

Subject: (Communication of) Information concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War.

In view of the present international relations, when dealing with Chinese P.O.W.s who have come under our authority, special attention must be paid on your part, that we may invite no pretext for censure on grounds of unlawful and cruel treatment.

When dealing with those who are to be interned as P.O.W.s, it is very important that our attitude will signify (prove) fairness and justice in the light of International Law, both to the home front and abroad.

Therefore it is requested that P.O.W.s be dealt with in accordance to the following, whenever circumstances of the district concerned allows:

1. The names and the affiliate units of the P.O.W.s including those killed in action shall be notified to the Chinese authorities.

2. Necessary attention must be paid towards sick or wounded P.O.W.s so that they are not treated roughly. In case a P.O.W. dies, it shall be notified to the Chinese authorities.

3. The personal belongings of a deceased P.O.W. (valuables, letters, etc.) shall be delivered to the Chinese side.
4. Any other necessary information concerning P.O.W.s shall be notified to the Chinese, whenever possible.

5. The above mentioned communication with the Chinese authorities shall be carried out through our Consul-General.

(This matter has already been discussed with Army Central authorities.)
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, [Name], who occupy the post of the Chief of Archive Section at the 2nd Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Information concerning the Treatment of Prisoners of War" is an exact and true copy excerpt from the official document in the custody of the Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this ___ day of ____ , 1947

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: ___________________
一

二

三

四

五

六

七

八

九

十

十一

十二

十三

十四

十五

十六

十七

十八

十九

二十

2

2
文書出所

文書の出所は、立川ビルの近くにある

文書の内容は、某文書の出所についての情報です。

出所：文書

年：1934

日付：同日

宛先：同所

文書の内容は、文書の出所についての情報です。
Army-controlled Factories to be Returned
on the Anniversary
The North China Army's Resolute Step.

(Peking, July 6, sec. teleg.)

The factory working in North China has been threatened with
obstruction caused by various circumstances since the outbreak
of the Incident. In view of the serious influence upon the public
life in case of the Storage of operation, the North China Area Army
has kept under its control certain factories, as a temporary means,
to keep their activities. The purpose being protection of industry
in war-time and security of its productive power for the benefit
of public life, it is quite obvious that those factories and mills
should be returned naturally to due claimants with the progress of
construction of peace and order.

The authorities of the North China Army published a decree
concerning the retrocession of army-controlled factories in North
China on March 19 last year in response to a declaration of the
Japanese Expeditionary Forces to North China. Since then various
preparations have been made and, this time, all necessary investiga­
tion has been completed. The Area Army has decided to release
its control over 40 factories, as listed in another section, on
July 7 commemorating the fourth anniversary of the outbreak of
the Incident. As for other factories than those under-mentioned,
the retrocession is to be carried out in succession as the going
preparations will be accomplished.

From the point of view that the present Incident is a holy war
for the construction of the East on morality realizing economical cooperation, good-neighbourliness and friendship and an anti-comintern barrier without the least intention to invade the land of China, the retrocession of army-controlled factories, resolutely carried out by the Japanese authorities in North China surmounting every obstacle is an act which fulfills the Sino-Japanese pact concluded on November 30, 1940. The Chinese are expected to cooperate willingly with the Japanese in the promotion of economy in North China after this retrocession, and to play an important role in the industry for public life.

The announcement of the North China Area Army (Peking, July 6, ‘39, see, telex). The announcement concerning the first release of army-controlled factories published at noon on July 6, by the North China Area Army.

Since March 19 last year when the decree concerning the retrocession of army-controlled factories was issued, the Army has been studying in earnest as to the concrete management necessary to that purpose. Now as the business preparations have been completed, the Army has decided to release army control over, at present, 40 factories as the following. The two claimants are required to apply to the Army for retrocession according to the formalities of application for the retrocession of army-controlled factories shown by the North China Political Affairs Committee, and it is our eager desire that these claimants will revive natural activities of industry and take part in our efforts for future development of economy in North China.

- 2 -
List of Factories to be first released from army control

Electric Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factory</th>
<th>City</th>
<th>Industry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paoting Electricity Generation Factory, Paoting</td>
<td>Shimon</td>
<td>Shimon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaoyung</td>
<td>Kaoying</td>
<td>Kaoying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinhsion</td>
<td>Chinhsion</td>
<td>Chinhsion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anyang</td>
<td>Changtuk</td>
<td>Changtuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hsinhsiang</td>
<td>Hsinhsiang</td>
<td>Hsinhsiang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kaifong</td>
<td>Kaifong</td>
<td>Kaifong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruikwa</td>
<td>Siichow</td>
<td>Siichow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sintun</td>
<td>Sintun</td>
<td>Sintun</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liuyunchiang</td>
<td>Liuyunchiang</td>
<td>Liuyunchiang</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Spinning Industry

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factory</th>
<th>Company, City</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yu-an</td>
<td>Changtuk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangyu</td>
<td>Kwangyu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huasun</td>
<td>Chi-hsion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiisin</td>
<td>Wuchin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lufoi</td>
<td>Tsinan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jekfong</td>
<td>Tsinan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changtuk</td>
<td>Tsinan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Cotton-Manufacturing and Packing Industry

Tsoshien  Cotton-Manufactory, Tsoshien
Chengting  "  , Chengting
Fongjun  "  , Fongjun

Changtien Pressing and Packing Factory, Changtien
Tahan tsun Cotton-Manufactory, Changtien.

Changtien Pressing and Packing Company, Changtien

Flour Industry

Chufeng  Flour-Mill,  Shimen
Shunto  Electric Flour-Mill,  Shuntesh
Chihfong  Flour-Mill,  Hantian
Chinjun  "  ,  Changtien
Tung fong  "  ,  Sinshang
Tienfong  "  ,  Kaifeng
Yufeng  "  ,  Kaifeng
Tohfong  "  ,  Kaifeng
Michuchin  "  ,  Tahokuo
Paofong  "  ,  Tainan
Fongusion  "  ,  "
Chong fong  "  ,  "

- 4 -
Def. Doc. No. 1436

Chong chi Flour-Mill, Tainan

Taining

Paohsing  

Suchow

Cement Industry

Chihchu Cement Factory, Tainan
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Chief of the Investigation Section in the Tokyo Asahi Press, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages, and entitled "Army-Controlled Factories to be returned on the anniversary the North China Army's resolute step" is a copy of a report on our new paper issued on July 7, 1941.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9 day of February, 1947

HISHIJIMA, Yoshiji (seal)
Signature of Official

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place
on the same date.

Witness: IMAHARI Yasutaro (seal)
(北京総電六日報)

記念日・北支宣の英断

（昭和十六年七月七日）

昭和四六工場を返還（昭和十六年七月七日）

（北支宣電）

敬北に於ける電管軍工場は裁割勒令以来数々たる事件により工事の作業活動を阻害される様れが来つつので高一これに停止するに於て一般民衆生活に於ては大なる影響を及ぼす事多く之を速やかに防むため北支宣でははやむを禁ざるものである故に其の事実を訴せんとするものであるが昭和三十四年五月二日総管軍五管部工場返還に関する布告を発し防割の措置を進めて来たが今国際電管軍工場の管軍部を解除するに於て決した。
いつでも返還準備中で返実現をみるはずである。

次第には東亜再建の障害で中国の領土を寸増しも犯すものではない。

本意がある東北日本をいかに再実 kjを促進するものと期待されている。

（北京正日正午）

（北支軍政庁）

（北支军政庁）

（北支軍政庁）

（北支軍政庁）

（北支軍政庁）
Defense Documents Nos. 1437, 1438 & 1439

CERTIFICATE

I, Konichiro Matsuoka, being first duly sworn on oath, do hereby depose and say that I am the son of the late Yosuke Matsuoka, the former Foreign Minister of Japan, and that the foregoing documents entitled, "The Conversation with Hitler at Berlin 27 March 1941", "The American-Japanese Negotiations", and "How the Tripartite Pact was Made", were dictated to me by my father and I have reported the same to the best of my knowledge, ability and memory. That I had no opportunity to check or correct the document with my father as he died before the occasion presented itself, however it is a true and fair statement of his declaration at the time. It was recorded by me originally in English, which language I understand fairly well. The statement was made to me between 1 January and 22 January 1946.

[Signature]

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 9th day of June 1947.

[Signature]
THE CONVERSATION WITH HITLER AT BERLIN
27 March 1941

I believe it was 27th of March, the day after I arrived in Berlin, that I called on the Fuehrer. This was the first time that I met Hitler, and at this meeting Hitler broached the question of Singapore. I do not at this distant date recall the exact words used by me, but I said something to the effect, that inasmuch as Singapore is in the Greater East Asia, which Germany recognized to be the Japan's sphere where the new order was to be set up, this matter must be left to Japan alone to decide. Hitler dropped the question and never recalled to it. I fool I said at the outset by way of joke, that I'd like very much Japan did take Singapore before she allied with Germany. 'it shame she didn't and then I seriously called Hitler's attention as aforementioned. Thus the question was shelved for good, once for all.

Before arriving at Berlin, I thought out closely and well how to avoid or get away from the Singapore question, if it ever brought up by Germany. Then Hitler described at length for my benefit the war and general situation in Europe, chiefly Western Europe.

The possibility of war with America was never discussed.

Concerning the Nurnberg press report, that I discussed the possibility of war with America and that I made committal about Singapore, etc; it is true that one Dr. Schmid interpreted and I spoke in English. Von. Ribbentrop hardly spoke anything. The greater part of this report is, untrue. I had then no authority to commit Japan on anything, and a foreign minister does not commit his country without authority. However, suppose I did say these things in our conversation with Hitler and Von Ribbentrop, what do they amount to ? As I said nothing of the kind in my report when I got back to Japan, as even Konoye witnesses, (and a Japanese never lies to the Emperor).
ベルリンにおけるこのヒツトの幕末

一九四一年三月二十七日

私が彼を訪れたのはそれは私がベルリンに到着して後の三月二十七日にあたったことがと思います。これが私が彼に会った最初であることがわかります。

そしてこの幕末に関してはシングガボールの問題を持ち出した事は出来ませんでした。私はシングガボールは新秩序の設けられた日本の勢力圏でないという事実を理解しました。しかし、この問題に対する解決策を提案できるかどうかは私に難しいです。

ベルリンに到着する前に私はドイツ側からシングガボール問題が持ち出されました。
Several questions were put to German foreign minister von Ribbentrop. but it seems that why I put these questions was not well understood.

Some time afterwards Mr. Stahmer was sent to Tokyo by von Ribbentrop.

I do not know the exact date of Mr. Stahmer's calls on me.

It was the early part of September seen after he reached Tokyo. I received him in my private house, which General Ott, the German ambassador and Stahmer visited, and after the introduction of Stahmer by general Ott, I started immediately to put questions. My first question was: what Germany thought of America at the time. Stahmer replied Germany wanted to avoid America at the time. Stahmer replied Germany wanted to avoid America's ever joining the war. Here I took the liberty of asking Mr. Stahmer from when answers to my question were coming. I visited to know what authority Mr. Stahmer had in answering me.

Stahmer answered that I may consider his words as coming directly from von Ribbentrop, the German foreign minister. Thereupon I proceeded and put him further questions. I asked how Germany intends to deal with America after the European war? Mr. Stahmer replied that Germany intended to improve relations with America after the war and wished to be on friendly terms with her. Then I said, I'm anxious that Japan and America should never fight, and Japan must do everything humanly possible to avoid it. Japan's relations with America must be improved and readjusted. Japan wishes to see the most cordial relations with America in future.
I said further concerning Soviet Russia that Japan has been for years negotiating for a nonaggression or neutrality treaty at Moscow, but in vain.

Japan wishes to solve any outstanding and unpleasant matters between the two countries, and readjust relations. I asked Stahmer, was it possible that Germany could use good offices and help Japan in this score? Mr. Stahmer responded immediately that Germany would do so.

We talked generally about the war and the world situation. I remember it was about two hours or so and we parted. I reported roughly about this meeting to the premier, army and the navy ministers and they authorized me to proceed.

I met Mr. Stahmer and General Ott several times in my house and finally the German-Japanese pact (later including Italy it became Tripartite Pact as described elsewhere) draft was initiated, the German side seems to have referred the matter several times to Berlin.

To recapitulate, the foundation of the pact was the Hakko-Ichoa old Japanese ideal, but the immediate basis were 1) to avoid the participation of a powerful country like America in the European war, 2) prevention of, or not to do anything by either Germany & Japan leading to American-Japanese war, 3) Germany to use good offices with Soviet Russia and help Japan to conclude non-aggression or neutrality pact with Soviet Russia and to readjust relations otherwise. These points must have been understood will from publication and utterance at the time.

In short, it was an effort to stop enlarging the theater of war and to prevent a real world conflagration.
This is why I said at the time that the Tripartite Pact was a peace pact and not a war alliance as stated elsewhere.

I may add that aside from the agreement Germany and Japan reached, I had other considerations of my own for Japan to wit:

1) To come very close to Germany to prevent Berlin from directing the American citizens of German origin, to carry out propaganda against Japan with the aim of bringing about American-Japanese war. The American citizen of German blood and origin were said to number twenty millions or more, six millions of whom were born and later naturalized in America. Some of them were well connected with Germany, and have apparently harmless societies or associations such as amateur artists or theater clubs literally associations etc., which are highly organized and can be used as tools of Berlin. It was my opinion that if such mischievous propaganda is ever carried out, there would be no means of stopping it, and we would see an American-Japanese war in a half year. I trust anyone who study this point and followed it to its basis will agree with me.

2) To prevent the theater widening out to what we call Greater East Asia and to preserve peace in those regions.

3) To use German influence and good offices to induce China to directly approach and negotiate with Japan to end the Chinese incident. This was actually tried later on.

4) To put Japan and Soviet Russia on sound and good relations, so that we could approach them after America with strong and self-respectable attitude on one hand and sincerity and broad mind on the other. Thus I hoped, we could reach a peaceful understanding in the Pacific and on the Chinese question.
In approaching America, I made it a sine qua non that Japan should eventually but as soon as possible withdraw her forces from China.

When this could be done Japan, I thought in America's eyes, was in position to offer America Japan's cooperation in bringing about the end of the British-German war in Europe, although the fall of the second Konoye cabinet and my illness prevented me from any attempt at this latter part of my plan.

I considered the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China as the crux of the situation. If this not done America would not trust in Japan's sincerity. Yet this withdrawal of Japanese forces from China, was very difficult in Japan, and I was considering it, in the problem of approaching America, very carefully. A principle of my international dealing was that any promise given must be faithfully carried out, or else one should never promise.
Soon after coming back to Japan I had to visit Ise to worship, and then on account of taking cold and badly coughing (afterwards) I had to stop two weeks due to tuberculosis). I had to continue my work for new naval laws. I studied the American-Japanese understanding draft wired from my ambassador Admiral Nomura and at first, we believe that the negotiations were largely conducted on the knowledge of some source. Yet I still thought that my words through Mr. Steinhardt to the President and Mr. Hull had something to do with it, though what part they would play we had to divine. Anyhow, that a matter be greatly as this should be taken up between America and Japan without my knowledge and prepared with no some other source, the Foreign Minister should at once resign, but seeing the situation so grave, I made up my mind to conduct the negotiation to a successful ending if possible. Succeeding or failing, in the end I would take the whole responsibility and resign.

This was the course I mapped out for my conduct thereafter. Indeed I did my best in the negotiation to bring them to a success, preserving the national dignity of Japan and international good faith. But I studied carefully the draft wired by Admiral Nomura and proceeded to conduct the negotiations. I began to doubt success very much. The reasons may be roughly given as follows:

1. In the grave world situation the negotiations at Washington involved too many and intricate subjects. We must satisfy in some major way, the Japanese people as well as the Americans, and must also avoid giving any ground for misunderstanding or misgiving to Germany and Italy.

All of a sudden for Prince Konoye, our Premier, to meet the President in Honolulu or to dispatch our navy to exchange felicitations with the American Navy, would greatly astound Germany and Italy. In any case, these things must be communicated beforehand to Germany and Italy, preventing misunderstanding and misgiving.

Besides, Prince Konoye's conference with the President at Honolulu would be very delicate, and if it ended in rupture, it might have an element of danger to lead two countries to further estrangement even to the brink of war. Before they meet we must agree between America and Japan on main points which are to be limited to as few as possible. In any case, in a grave situation like ours, we must not try to reach an agreement on too many things and settle too many details at once.

2. I doubted if both the American and Japanese authorities who started the negotiations were entirely sincere. Of course I did not doubt Admiral Nomura's sincerity at all but the men who were manipulating from Tokyo or elsewhere behind him, I doubted very much their sincerity. On the other hand, America might be thinking of closing the door behind and making sure that Japan would not attack from the Pacific, and she would join the war in Europe or might even be, by negotiating with Japan, testing the attitude and determination of Japan; how strong or how weak. In those days the American attitude and action towards European war were becoming every day more positive.

3. In negotiating like this, the national dignity must be upheld and international good faith must be observed. The Japanese side was simply in begging, stooping down to the President and Mr. Hull, no dignity on our part, while the highest liaison conference seemed to have agreed, before I came back to
Tokyo, that as a matter of course the negotiations with America were to be conducted in secrecy to Germany and Italy.

When I took part in the conference the evening of the day I got back to Tokyo, I recall someone said in the conference that Japan is an independent country and is not certainly obliged to conform with Germany and Italy on every foreign affair or negotiation with any other country, whereas I replied that that depended on the matters or affairs Japan is taking up; concerning the pending negotiations which were of such importance, some communication to some extent must be made to Germany and Italy.

Japan was obliged to do so to preserve good faith and that did not encroach upon the independence of Japan nor permit Germany and Italy to interfere with the negotiations.

During negotiations like this, it is usual to "give in" on both sides as you proceed, but Mr. Hull showed a stiff attitude as we went on.

For instance, in later negotiations Mr. Hull wished his speech condemning Germany to be made an appendix to the present convention, or to make Japan accept the American views of the European war. Of course, Japan could not agree without seeming to show bad faith with Germany and Italy to such things.

Although the American-Japanese understanding could have been reached on the Pacific and China problem without reference to the European war, or without Japan committing such bad faith, why America brought in such unnecessary and extraneous matters I was at a loss to understand, unless America's move was to compel in the negotiations, Japan to practically cancel the Tripartite Pact which Japan could not very well do at the time.

The army and navy had been pressing me for some time to negotiate with France for permission to send Japanese forces to Rhineland for military exercises which request I put off as long as possible fearing such a move might lead to a clash with Great Britain. It seemed to me that the negotiations with America and the sending of Japanese forces to Southern Indo-China were irrefragable too, and would make America doubt our sincerity in the negotiations. But the navy and army authorities contended that Singapore was augmenting its forces and might at any time invade Indo-China and that they wished to forestall such a move and prevent a clash with Great Britain. They said the move was not at all aggressive and some young officers called on me from the army at my house to explain where they wanted to send in forces, and to show me that the Japanese military airplane did not enable them to fly and attack Singapore as they could not fly a long enough distance to do so. The names of those young officers I do not know: two or three officers called at my house.

I had in mind the upholding of the dignity of Japan and the observing of good international faith; tried my best to put the negotiations in a right track and to bring them to a successful ending. But the fall of the second Konoye Cabinet and my ill health prevented it, caused us to drop the negotiations quietly and to hope to take them up later when the opportune moment came and to then realize my fond dream of reaching a good understanding with America in the Pacific as well as with the China problem; eventually cooperating with America to end the war. I have been ever since, ill and convalescent to the present time.
HOW THE TRIPARTITE PACT WAS MADE

Several questions were put to German Foreign Minister Von Ribbentrop but it seemed that why I put these questions was not well understood.

Some time afterwards Mr. Stahmer was sent to Tokyo by Von Ribbentrop.

I do not know the exact dates of Mr. Stahmer's calls on me. It was though, the early part of September, soon after he reached Tokyo. I received him in my private house which General Ott, the German Ambassador and Stahmer visited, and after the introduction of Mr. Stahmer by General Ott, I immediately started to ask my questions. My first question was: what Germany thought of America at the time. Mr. Stahmer replied Germany wanted to avoid America's ever joining the war. Here I took the liberty of asking Mr. Stahmer who was answering my questions, what authority Mr. Stahmer had in answering me. Mr. Stahmer answered that I might consider his words as coming directly from Mr. Von Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Minister. The question I proceeded to put further questions before him. I asked how Germany intended to deal with America after the European war. Mr. Stahmer replied that Germany intended to improve relations with America after the war and wished to be on friendly terms with her. Then I said that I was anxious that Japan and America should never fight and that Japan must do everything humanly possible to avoid it. Japan's relations with America must be improved and readjusted. Japan wished to see the most cordial relations with America in the future. I said further, concerning Soviet Russia, that Japan has been for years negotiating for a non-aggression or neutrality treaty at Moscow, but in vain. Japan wished to solve many outstanding and unpleasant matters between the two countries and readjust relations. I asked Mr. Stahmer was it possible for Germany to use her good offices and help Japan in this score? Mr. Stahmer responded immediately that Germany would do so.

We talked generally about the war and the world situation. I remember it was late at night or so before we parted. I reported roughly about this meeting to the Premier, Army and Navy Ministers and they authorized us to proceed.

I met Mr. Stahmer and General Ott several times in my house and finally the German-Japanese pact (later including Italy it became the Tripartite Pact as described elsewhere) draft was initiated; the German side seems to have referred the matter several times to Berlin.

To recapitulate, the foundation of the pact was the Hakko-Ichiu old Japanese idea, but the immediate basis were: 1) to avoid the participation of a powerful country like America in the European war. 2) prevention of, or not to do anything by either Germany or Japan leading to American-Japanese war. 3) Germany to use good offices with Soviet Russia and help Japan to conclude non-aggression or neutrality pact with Soviet Russia and readjust relation otherwise. These points must have been underlined well from the beginning and attune the time.

In short, it was an effort to stop enlarging the theater of war and to prevent a new world conflictation.

This is why I said at the time that the Tripartite Pact was a peace pact and not a war alliance as stated elsewhere.
I may add that aside from the agreement Germany and Japan reached, I had other considerations of my own for Japan to wit:

1. To come very close to Germany to prevent Berlin to direct the American citizens of German origin, to carry out propaganda against Japan with the aim of bringing about American-Japanese war. The American citizens of German blood and origin were said to number twenty millions or more, six millions of whom were born and later naturalized in America. Some of them are well connected with Germany, and have apparently harmless societies or associations such as music, artists, or theater clubs, literary associations, etc., which are highly recognized and can be used as tools of Berlin. It was my opinion that if such mischievous propaganda is ever carried out, there would be no means of stopping it and we would see an American-Japanese war in a half year. I trust anyone who has studied this point and followed it to its basis will agree with me.

2. To prevent the theater widening out to what we call Greater East Asia and to preserve peace in these regions.

3. To use German influence and good offices to induce China to directly approach and negotiate with Japan to end the Chinese incident. This was actually tried later on.

4. To put Japan and Soviet Russia on sound and good relations, so that we could approach them after America with strong and self-respectable attitude on one hand and sincerity and broad mind on the other. Thus I hoped, we could reach a peaceful understanding in the Pacific and on the Chinese question. In approaching America, I made it a sine qua non that Japan should eventually but as soon as possible withdraw her forces from China.

When this could be done Japan, I thought in America's eyes, was in a position to offer America Japan's cooperation in bringing about the end of the British-German war in Europe, although the fall of the second Ruiiko cabinet and my illness prevented me from any attempt of this latter part of my plan.

I considered the withdrawal of Japanese forces from China as the crux of the situation. If this was not done America would not trust Japan's sincerity. Yet, this withdrawal of Japanese forces from China was very difficult for Japan but I was considering it in the problem of approaching America very carefully. A principle of my international dealing was that any promise given must be faithfully carried out, or else one should never promise.
您好！
其ノ例トシテ、後日ノ交渉ニ於テハル氏バ同氏ノ知進ヲ非難セル演説ヲ
同協議ニ追加スルニヲ希望シ或ハス約ヲ送スルニ過ぎスル米ノ側ノ見解リ日本
ニ承認セシメントシタ。勿論日本トシテハ石ノ如キヲ認メルコトハ勿論
＝オスル不信ヲ表明シテイ限り到能ク高いテナイ所デアル。
Def. Doc, # I-41.

An Affidavit by Osaka, Reizo

Page 1, line 14.
the date paper by Japan instead of the material from
From Japan.

Page 2, (3) 1st line.
by the Central Committee instead of Authorities.

Page 4, line 2.
Chung-chung instead of Chang-tu.

Page 6, line 9.
by Wang Chin (Chei Siao-yu), not Wang Chin-shi
and Siao-yu.

Page 8, 5th line from the bottom.
not spring.
take off at Chien-lung.
I M T F E

United States of America et al
- against -
ARAKI, Sadao etc.

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: OTSUWA, Reizo

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows.
I graduated from Keiji University in 1925 (Taisho 14) and entered the South Manchurian Railway Company in April of the same year. I was attached to the Research Section of the Company and was engaged in research on Chinese political and economic affairs with emphasis on study of the condition of the Chinese Communist Party. From that time until April, 1942 (Showa 17) I lived in China, residing in Peking, Shanghai, and Nanking.

Various research material concerning China was collected at the Research Section of the South Manchuria Railway and I had the opportunity of meeting important Chinese persons in numerous fields.

2. By order of the South Manchurian Railway Company I wrote a book entitled "Recent Development in the Chinese Communist Movement." This is an English translation by MATSUZAKI, Susumu, member of the archives section, General Affairs Department, of the manuscript presented by the Company as the 17th series of the material from Japan to the 6th Pacific Conference held at Yosemite Park in California, U.S.A. from August 15 to August 29, 1936.

3. I based the contents of the book on various publications of the Chinese Communist Party. I entered Chinese Communist Party districts on several occasions for the purpose of investigation.

4. I can read English and Chinese but I am not conversant in writing and speaking these languages.

5. The portion from Page 343 to page 375 of the book shown to me as Defence Document No. 1161 is an exact copy of what I wrote, in the book
6. I used to collect various statements, resolutions, declarations and other documents in Chinese made by the Chinese Communist Party, while I was serving in the research section of the South Manchurian Railway Company. The same research section published, in July 1939, a book entitled "The History of the Movement For Unification of The Anti-Japanese People's Front." All the documents of the Chinese Communist Party appearing in this book are, as I have already stated, reproductions of the documents collected by me. I certify Document No. 930 to be a copy of the said book.

7. After the outbreak of the 1st Shanghai Incident on January 29, 1932, The Provisional "Central Government of Soviet China declared war against Japan on April 26 of the same year, and on the same occasion criticized Kuomintang Army for making attacks on the Chinese Communist troops.

8. It also made public "An Appeal To The People By The Central Authorities of The Chinese Communist Party" on the same day and "The Declaration Of The Participation of The Chinese Soviet Government In Anti-Japanese Resistance" on April 15, 1933, in which it blamed the Chiang Kai-shek government for conducting negotiations with the Japanese government in an effort to readjust the Sino-Japanese relations by peaceful means and repeatedly reproached the Kuomintang Army for attacking the Chinese Communist troops, thus urging a united front in their resistance against Japan.

9. "The Preliminary Agreement Against Japan and Chiang Kai-shek" was
Collaboration" advocated by people such as Chiang Kai-shek, Wang Ching-wei, Huang Fu, Wang I-Tang and Chang-Tu who were making efforts for the readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations, praised the declaration of war against Japan or the Soviet Government of China and "the Fundamental Principles Of The Operations Against Japan By The Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Union" as proposed by the Red of the Fukien Provincial Government and demanded the suspension by the Kuomintang of preparations for a war against Japan and its army's offensives against the Soviet district and also the establishment of a national defense government including the Chinese Communist Army and the Red Army with the purpose of carrying out the resistance against Japan. It further demanded as a policy of the national defense government referred to above, the confiscation of all Japanese assets in China, the repletion of the military preparations against Japan and the arming of the whole Chinese people.

Inasmuch as this proclamation was chiefly addressed to groups such as industrial and agricultural organizations, students, young military men, journalists, anti-Japanese associations, patriotic societies and the like, itslogan which called for "Power From the Powerful And Money From the wealthy" appealed strongly to the Chinese masses in general, and, as a result, the efforts of the Chinese government for the readjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations were made still more difficult.

12. The central committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued "The Message Of Appeal To All People All Parties and Factions And All Armies of the country" on December 14, 1935, and "The Resolution Concerning The
concluded on November 26, 1933, among the Chinese Communist Army, the
Fukien Provincial Government and the 19th Route Army, in which it was
agreed that the 19th Route Army would protect the "soviet" district with
its military force, that an anti-Chiang Kai-shek proclamation would be
issued, that the preparations for military actions against Japan and
Chiang Kai-shek would be pushed ahead and that an agreement on the op-
erations for attaining these ends would be made.

10. The Red Army of the Chinese Workers and Farmers demanded that the
civil wars be converted into a war against an external enemy by issuing
"The Proclamation Of The Resistance Against Japan In The Northern
Territory." The proclamation assailed the Chinese government for having
recognized Manchukuo by concluding directly with the latter a postal and
transportation agreement and for having launched attacks against the
Soviet Government of China as well as the Red Army of The Workers and
Farmers (the Chinese Communist Army) and demanded the Chiang Kai-shek
Government to declare war against Japan.

11. While the Japanese and Chinese governments had been making great
efforts to readjust Sino-Japanese relations subsequent to the Mukden
Incident since the conclusion of the Tangku Agreement in May, 1933, the
central committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued, on August 1,
1935, a "Message Of Appeal To The Whole Nation For National Salvation
Through Resistance Against Japan" which is commonly known as the "August
I Proclamation." The Chinese Communist Party criticized, in this procla-
mation, the slogans of "Sino-Japanese Amity" and "Sino-Japanese
Collaboration* advocated by people such as Chiang Kai-shek, "ang Ching-wei, Huang Fu, "ang I-Tang and Chang-Tu who were making efforts for the readjustment of Sino-Japanese relations, praised the declaration of war against Japan or the Soviet Government of China and the Fundamental Principles Of The Operations Against Japan By The Chinese People's Anti-Japanese Union* as proposed by the Red of the Fukien Provincial Government and demanded the suspension by the Kuomintang of preparations for a war against Japan and its army's offensives against the Soviet district and also the establishment of a national defense government including the Chinese Communist Army and the Red Army with the purpose of carrying out the resistance against Japan. It further demanded as a policy of the national defense government referred to above, the confiscation of all Japanese assets in China, the repletion of the military preparations against Japan and the arming of the whole Chinese people.

Inasmuch as this proclamation was chiefly addressed to groups such as industrial and agricultural organizations, students, young military men, journalists, anti-Japanese associations, patriotic societies and the like, its slogan which called for "Power From the Powerful And Money From the Wealthy" appealed strongly to the Chinese masses in general, and, as a result, the efforts of the Chinese government for the readjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations were made still more difficult.

12. The central committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued "The Message Of Appeal To All People All Parties and Factions And All Armies of the country* on December 14, 1935, and "The Resolution Concerning The
Def. Doc. # 1441

Prevailing Political Situation and The Duties of The Communist Party" on 25th of the same month, while both of them contained aims similar to that of the August I Proclamation, the latter, in particular, urged the creation of a national defense government and the formation of an united army for resisting Japan and advocated the organization of those entertaining anti-Japanese ideologies, regardless of their economic doctrines and of their agreement or disagreement with the Soviet system and land revolution, in order to brand as traitors the leaders of the Nationalist government who were endeavouring to readjust the diplomatic relations with Japan and to carry out a struggle against them.

The same resolution therefore requested the Communist Party members to work upon the various groups, troops and local political regimes in order to organize them or amalgamate the existing organizations for the attainment of the above-stated ends. The resolution further announced that all the elements who are unfavourably treated under the Nationalist government would be treated well under the Soviet regime and that its policies towards the wealthy farmers and commercial and industrial capitalists would be modified in order that a larger number of people might become members of the Soviet Republic and might thus contribute to a vigorous prosecution of the struggle against Japan and the Kuomintang government. The series of such activities of the Chinese Communist Party in various regions resulted in the aggrandisement of the Soviet-dominated area, the increase of the Communist Party members and the reinforcement of the Communist army, while arousing tremendous repercussions among the members of the Kuomintang Party and junior officers and men of the Nationalist Army. These activities,
however, also rendered extremely difficult the efforts which were being
made by both the Chinese and Japanese governments towards a readjustment
of the relations between the two countries.

13. Great encouragement was given to the Chinese Communist Party when
the 7th general convention of the Comintern, held in Moscow between July
25 and August 29, 1935, adopted as its principal slogan, "War for the
sake of peace", as well as a resolution for the creation of a united
front opposing Germany, Japan and Poland. The Chinese Communist Party
was represented at this convention by Wang Min-Shi and Chen Shao-yu.

14. The "Northern Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist
Party issued the "Proclamation of National Salvation Through Resistance
Against Japan" on March 10, 1936 expounding similar extantions and urging
the troops, political parties, various organization and individual citizens
to come under the Soviet regime and participate in the formation of a national
defense government and a united army of resistance against Japan.

Against Japan" was adopted at the general meeting for the creation of
a united army for national salvation on June 1, 1936. Emphasis in this
platform was laid on the fact that unity had been realized on the principle
of "Resistance Against Japan - above All" without resorting to a
general anti-imperialistic or anti-British activities as a means of resist-
ing against external forces hampering the accomplishment of the National
Revolution and that unity had been realized on the principle that a war
against Japan was inevitable, as against the views that war should be
avoided, as a means of carrying on the struggle against Japan.

- 6 -
16. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party published a "Resolution concerning the immediate political condition and duty of the Party" on June 13th, 1936. It was said in this resolution, that since the national salvation movement was started by students in Peiping on December 9th, 1935, an anti-Japanese and national salvation movement sprang up widely throughout the country and that the participants included not only workers and farmers but also students, soldiers as well as those belonging to the intellectual class. It also said that the anti-Japanese and anti-Chiang Kai-shek united front had been completed; that the anti-Japanese sentiment ran so high among the officers of lower rank and soldiers of the 29th Army Corps stationed in the Peiping-Tientsin district at that time that they were inclined to disobey the orders of their superior officers; and that since the declaration of August 1st, the advocacy of the Chinese Communist Party evoked an ardent response from the practical faction of the Army throughout the country. It further asserted that it was impossible to make a distinction between an anti-Japanese war and an anti-Chiang war; that a Soviet People's Republic should be established by reorganizing the Chinese Communist Party; that a National Defense Government and anti-Japanese combined forces be created; and that in accordance with the opinion of Wang Ming, a member of the Party, to entice the malcontents in the Kuomintang and the National Army to join in the anti-Japanese united front in opposition to the intention of the National Government.

17. On September 17, 1936 the Central Political Bureau of the Chinese
Communist Party passed a "Resolution concerning the new situation of
the anti-Japanese and national salvation movement and the establishment
of a Democratic Republic"

18. The anti-Japanese movement which accompanied the above mentioned
propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party reached the high-water mark in
1936 and resulted in a number of cases of murder of Japanese at various
places, among which the well-known are as follows: the Chongtu Incident of August 24, 1936;
of September 3, 1936; the Hankow Incident of September 19, 1936; the
Nakayama Incident of November 9, 1935; the Hibino Yoko incident of
November 11, 1935; and the Kayabu incident of July, 1936.

19. The Sian coup took place on December 12, 1936.

With the plan of convening a meeting of the National Defense
Council at Sian, Chiang Kai-shek sent out telegraphic invitations to
leaders of various areas on December 7, 1936. On December 11, Chang
Hsu-hui-liang, Yu Hsu-hui-chung, Chu Hsiao-liang, Shuo Li-tzu, Chu Chia-hua,
Chon Chong, Chiang Tao-pin, Yang Hu-cheng, and Chen Tiao-yuan, etc.
assisted. On December 12, Chang Hsu-hui-liang in league with Yang Hu-cheng
carried out a coup, arrested and incarcerated Chiang Kai-shek and leaders
of the Central Government who had been staying then at Chinghuati hot
spring at Chien-lung.

Chang Hsu-hui-liang issued a circular telegram on the 13th, in which
he attacked the National Government for having been engaged from first
to last in diplomatic negotiations with Japan in spite of the fact that
the Government should have declared war against Japan and denied the
the National Government and insisted upon the reconstruction of the State.

Chiang Kai-shek, upon concluding a compromise with Ch'ung Hsueh-liang, returned to Nanking on December 26, 1936.

This compromise contained eight conditions, among which were the following: Chiang Kai-shek was to approve of carrying on resistance against Japan at an opportune moment; to stop subjugating communist bandits; from responsible posts of the Central Government to discharge important officials of the pro-Japanese faction in the Kuomintang; and to promise to commute and acquit Chen Chun-ju and six other members of the Communist Party who had been imprisoned in Shanghai.

Since the Sian coup, the anti-Japanese movement, especially that which was being carried out in North China, became positive and concrete.

Several cases of disturbances took place under the leadership of students in various places.

The Lukowhiao incident (The Marco Polo Bridge incident) broke out on July 7, 1937, and thus the Chinese Communist Party achieved the first goal of its movement. It was the very following day that the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party issued a circular telegram all over the country urging the necessity of collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in order to fight immediately a decisive war against Japan.
Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 1, 1947
Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 1, 1947
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

OTSUKA, Reizo (seal)
On this 29 day of April 1947

At

DEPONENT OTSUKA, Reizo (seal)

I, OHARA, Shinichi hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date

At

Witness: (Signed) OHARA, Shinichi (seal)
戦争末期の日本は、戦争に備えて大規模な戦略を計画していた。特に、海戦面での戦略は、電信機の発展により大幅な変化を遂げていた。

地図に示されたのは、日本の海戦における重要な戦略ポイントである。特に、太平洋戦争末期は、米軍の進撃に対し、日本の海軍が最後の抵抗を繰り広げていた。

電信機の発展により、情報の伝達が高速に行われ、戦略の変更が迅速に行われていた。これにより、日本の海軍は、米軍の攻撃を防ぐ努力を続けていた。

戦争末期の日本は、決して戦術を無くしていたわけではなく、戦略的な変更を繰り返していた。この変革により、日本海軍は最後の抵抗を繰り広げ、戦争末期の日本海戦面での戦略は、その後の海戦においても大きな影響を与えていた。
二二年一月二十五日中國共產黨中央委員會宣言

我共產黨人與全國人民一道，决然開始建設中國新民主主義的國家。我們的目標在於建設一個自由、民主、富強的新中國。我們的任務在於打倒日本侵略者，打倒美帝和國民党的反革命軍阀。我們的鬥爭是全國人民的鬥爭，我們的勝利是全民族的勝利。我們要建設一個自由、民主、富強的新中國。
派一切の軍に告げる書一を発し同月二十五日（現下の政治形勢と党の
任務に関する決議一を発した。何れも人一宣言と同様の趣旨を含ん
でものであるが特に後者は国防政府の樹立と抗日連合軍の結成を促し
経済思想及ソヴィエト制度及土地革命の賛否に拘らず反日思想を有
するものを組織し日本との国交調整に努力し居る国民政府の要
務実として之に対する闘争を主張して居ります。

これがため今決議は共産員が中囲の乱る地域、四体、軍隊、地方政
権に働きかけ又は之を組織し或は組織を合体し右の趣旨を貫徹するこ
とを要求して居ります。

之く一聯の中囲共産員の活動は各地に於けるソヴィエト共産
日本及国民政府との斗爭を強く行ふると主張した。
下級将兵に対しては非常な影響を与え、そしてこの当時続けられていった中日両国政府間の敵対調整の努力をも
非常に困難を興えた。

一九三五年七月二十五日から同年八月二十日迄ソビエトに開かれた
第七次コモンウェルス大會が中心スローガンを「平和のための戦争」に
反対する統一戦線の結成を決議するや
この決議は中圂共産党に非常な鼓舞となった。この決議は王明等
顧忠玉が出席した。

一九三六年三月十日中圂共産党中央委員会北方局は「抗日救国宣言」
を発し大略前述と同様の主張をなしたる外、軍隊、政黨、団体機関
個人等がソビエトに来り国防政府と抗日聯合軍の結成に参加せん
ことを求めた。

一九三六年六月一日救國軍合軍成立大會に於て「抗日救國の初步政
治綱領」が決議された。この決議は民族革命中の對外抗争として、普
遍的反帝又は反英などの手段をとらず先づ「反日第一」の原則の下に
統一されたこと及び反日の手段に関し戦争は避けるべきものとの意見を排し反日戦争は不可避との原則に統一させられたことを強調して居る。
十六、一九三六年六月十三日中共中央委员会公布《政治状况与党的任务》

生救亡运动起otherwise以来，屡次全国反日救国运动gong有ectcirsty了参加这件事。反日反将介石统一战线未完成之前，反日救国运动由反日救国委员会在\n
十八、一九三六年九月十七日中共中央政治局及<\n
十七、一九三六年九月十七日中共中央政治局及\n
民主共和国建立

一九三六年六月十三日中共中央委员会公布《政治状况与党的任务》。
十八、中共の右の宣伝・伴う抗日運動は一九三六年に至り高潮に達し各地における種々の日本人殺害事件が起つた。その中内で同年八月二十四日零
一九三六年十二月十二日西安事件が発生して
一九三六年十二月七日蔣介石仮西安で国防委員を解散する決定を各地将
軍及び中領要人を召集し零
十三日蔣介石仮国民政府が仮日宣撲を布告すべきに拘らす日本との外交
交渉に終始することを認めし、国民政府を否認し国家の改業をなすべき
蔣介石は陳誠良との妥協成立して十二月二十六日南京に臨つた。
此の妥協条件の内には蔣介石は時政を見て抗日を知るにかかわる共

略伐を中止し、戦時政府の親日派要人を中央委員より開発し、上海に

騒然せられ居る共産党員沈鈞塵以下六名の罪の懲戒と処分を経する一

項を含む八条でありました。

二〇、西安事変後抗日連絡を

て来ました。各地に指導者を

数多の順應者に北支に於ける抗日運作は積極的具体的なに

目的を達しました。そしてその翌日中国共産中央委員会は国共合作

が開時期に"
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

vs

RIKI Sadao, et al

S'ORH DEPOSITION

Deponent: HABA Shachi

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I shall omit my domicile, address etc., as well as personal history, as I have already stated them in my deposition. I add the following to my previous deposition:

1. The population of the five provinces in North China is considered to be about 35 million. It is difficult to learn accurately how many of these are chronic addicts of opium, but it is thought to be not less than 3 per cent of the whole population, or not less than 2 million and two hundred twenty-five thousand. Since the registration system is in force there, you may ask why I must decide on a number by conjecture. In North China however, many opium-smokers do not register for several reasons. That is, there is no difference between the price of official opium and secretly sold opium, and those who register must pay tax on
registration for opium lamp and opium pipe, while those who do not register can get opium ingredient without difficulty at the same price whenever they want. Consequently, many do not register, making thereby the registration extremely uncertain. In calculating the quantity of opium consumed in North China, therefore, it is supposed to be more accurate to form your basis on conjecture than by the registered number of opium addicts. Supposing that the quantity of opium consumed by a single addict is thirty Liang (one North China Liang = 31 gram), then the total quantity of opium consumed would reach the enormous amount of 67 million five hundred thousand Liang. But the opium under the control of the Government, that is the North China political Committee, is only about three million and fifty thousand Liang. So, it is only one-nineteenth of the entire quantity of opium consumed that the government is barely managing through the opium smokers.

As I have stated above there is no clear distinction between the opium under the control of the Government and those smuggled into North China. Consequently the drug-stores dealing with crude opium, and those handling opium ingredient are all selling the narcotics by secretly mixing the official with smuggled opium. For instance, I have come across in place the condition when they were able to continue their trades without suffering at all though the official ration from the anti-opium General Office had been cut off for several months.

It was this imperfect Opium Control that the North China Political Committee was fundamentally suffering from, in the
administration of anti-opium policies. The greatest reason why the government was not able to realize its planned opium monopoly law, was because of rampant secret cultivation and the predominance of smuggling which were in a state almost out of the sphere of control.

The Control has been difficult in the North China district, as this district adjoins Manchuria and Sinkiang, both of which are noted for opium production, and besides the fact that its northern boundary faces Toho, it has the district of Peking and Tientsin as its center which have on the nest holes of crude morphine manufacturers from long ago. As to anti-opium work especially in the line of control, only one nation or one district by itself cannot accomplish the purpose. Therefore, regarding control of smuggling done in the districts of Peking and Tientsin, North China and Manchuria, all having difficulty in common frequently held liaison conferences and made efforts in hopes of finding a flash of hope.

The main problems discussed at the Manchurian and Chinese Liaison conference on the control of opium held in 1944 if we are to present them here for reference purposes are:

A. Exchange of information concerning a control, as well as the establishment of a network of mutual information.

B. Simplification of procedure in enforcing control and promotion of closer liaison.

C. The matter concerning permanent stay in North China by the Manchurian control staff.

D. The matter concerning the strengthening of control on smuggling.
at the Shanhaiakuan Custom-House. (Supplement: Concerning the use of searching dogs).

E. Manchurian request of Chinese co-operation with activities of the frontier mounted police organized by the "Manchurian side, to guard against smuggling, etc.

What is meant by a searching dog of the 4th item is a dog of the shepherd species, which was especially trained to search out opium or narcotics.

The conference took up the subject of the use of this shepherd dog along the frontier of Shanhaikwan. Manchuria began to use these searching dogs along the frontier between Manchuria and Korea from 1943 on, and have been turning in quite a satisfactory record.

The mounted police force of the fifth item refers to the special mounted police in charge of controlling opium and narcotic smuggling. As it was necessary to organize the special voluntary mounted police in a military way in order to control smuggling at the frontier which was organized and manageable an understanding and liaison concerning its use were demanded at this conference. And further not only the mere control of opium and narcotic, but concerning the anti-opium problem in general, North China and Manchuria had been solidifying their mutual correspondence. Manchuria has come to anticipate completing this anti-opium project, as she has already succeeded in this work to some extent in 1943. Therefore she wanted to realize her long-cherished ideal, the ideal of contributing in the completion
of anti-opium work in China and East Asia, consequently throughout the world, with Manchuria as the leading body. (Refer to the annexed deposition).

So the relation between the two has been increasingly solidified, for the purpose of co-operating in the anti-opium work in China which was in its infancy.

I went to various places in China time after time, giving lectures on the liaison conference, investigation of anti-opium work in China and Manchuria's desire to become the leader in the development of an anti-opium movement in East Asia, of which I have already stated above. The details of Manchuria's desires are clearly recorded in the Rules of the Anti-opium Society established on January of the 11th year of Aungto (1943). I was sure that this evil habit of opium-smoking had been a historical humiliation of East Asia covering these three centuries, and its eradication must be a prerequisite to the realization of the establishment of the East Asia Prosperity Sphere. Manchuria's anti-opium policy was also based upon this.

Although the first means of accomplishing this ideal came to naught with Japan's defeat, it means only a collapse in a step to do it, not a change in the anti-opium idea.

Once the intellectual class living in various places in East Asia started a anti-opium movement petition in 1906, with Dr. Hamilton Light and Bishop Blant as their main advocates. This moved Roosevelt, the then President of the United States, and in 1909 the first International Opium Conference was held at Shanghai.
This is the kind of ardour which we too should succeed to. Thus North China and Manchuria through the accomplishment of the anti-opium movement had been getting closer and closer, and from the ninth year of Kangto (1942) on, Manchuria used the Zhihuan Medical Treatment and brought about epoch-making results in the legal and medical treatment of the opium-addicted patients. This method was used in the north China too, and similar results were attained there in the tenth year of Kangto (1943). I have explained the details of these facts in the annexed deposition. But frankly speaking, the anti-opium movement in North and Central China was just in its infancy — in the preparatory period in the enforcement of the anti-opium administration.

At that time every municipal as well as provincial government various places in China were suffering from financial difficulties at the beginning of the work so there was no denying that the income from opium was important from a financial point of view. But the first step in anti-opium administration is in the absolute control of opium and opium addicts, and an earnest prohibition policy can not be achieved without the premise of controlling them. Still it cannot be concluded that the Government made financial income with opium and narcotic, even though there was considerable profit from opium by monopolizing it or enforcing government control which was almost the same as monopoly. In short, from whether the government is enforcing the prohibition policy side by side or not, can it be decided whether opium and narcotic were managed only for the financial purposes or if opium control was done with the object for absolute grasp of the
patients, as the first step in anti-opium policy.

As I explained in the separate deposition, Japan refrained from taking an active part in China's opium administration because of Japan's policy not to interfere with the internal affairs of China. Japan confined herself to giving aid to China according to the idea of International Opium Treaty. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned imperfect opium prohibition policies in various parts of China were frequently made the materials for slandering Japan just because these policies had contributed greatly to the finance of the regions.

The following is the propaganda made by Chungking and the information sent to the United States and Britain:

"Japan encourages the poppy cultivation, secretly helps to spread opium smoking in various parts in China and tries to undermine the Chinese people."

"Japan is appropriating the gains from opium for her war cost."

"Japan is using Koreans to deal in and to distribute heroin in the occupied territory. Japan tries to massacre the people of China by means of injectors rather than by bayonets."

When one studies these phrases of propaganda every one of them will prove to be an unfounded utterance merely thought up for the purpose of propaganda. As I have stated before the Japanese Government did not interfere in any way with the Chinese Government, nor had she anything to do with the income from opium. Only in supplying opium, SATOMI Hajimo on his own used his good offices, in the name of Hungenchi-Shangtang. And also at the request of the Chinese Government, the legations and consulates in various
Dof. Joc. No. 1444

places used their good offices in asking the transportation organs to transport opium which was becoming more and more difficult. On the contrary, five or six Japanese had been appointed as liaison officers in the North China Opium Prohibition Office, and also in Central China, a few had been appointed in the same capacity on non-official basis. Everyone of these men were ardent advocates of opium prohibition and worked hard on the problem of how the administration of opium in its infancy in China can be led to the right path of complete prohibition. As for the sincere endeavour of the Japanese people and the result they brought about in regard to the anti-opium work in Manchuria, I believe it is not only Minister of Communication Ker Tsuhung but also any and all sincere and fair-minded educated people in Manchuria who praise the Japanese with the following words:

"The greatest work done by the Japanese in Manchuria is their sincere contribution towards the opium prohibition and the enforcement of discipline among officials.

I had long been in a position to load spiritually the officials connected with the anti-opium administration in the Manchuria Government. What I had always asked of them was to have the faith of a martyr with the cross. The anti-opium work, requires many sacrifices, and it is a difficult task without reward, and yet it is a noble undertaking. I cannot help feeling righteously indignant when I hear such slanders as mentioned before when the fact is that so many Japanese worked silently and devoted themselves to this work with the feeling that this was their mission.
Def. Doc. No. 1444

"Of course there are exceptions to this question too."

"I have had disputes at Nanking as well as at Singapore with those who maintained that opium should be utilized for war purposes."

"The Chinese are naturally thorough opiumans. Why shouldn't they have what they want?" Some people argued in this way.

Again in the CANTON Region the use of opium was permitted in exchange for such important war materials as tungsten, molybdenum etc. and in other regions it was used for the purpose of collecting informations about the enemy. I have more than once seen such abnormal use of opium, but in every case the amount is so small as to be negligible. I was also told by Japanese consular police of several regions that there were very many Korean opium smugglers, but even this fact affords no reason for the Japanese Government to be blamed. On the contrary, the alert control on the part of the Japanese authorities was bringing about good results.

I have engaged for many years in anti-opium administration in Manchurian and experienced difficulties in the work — in its strange and complex aspects. I think the more formulation or propagation of such policies as that of three years determined on by Nanking Government and the five years abstinence policy of the Chungking Government will not bring about the desired result. A slight degree of progress is to be made when a systematic control of a rigid nature, a detailed administrative management and relief establishment on a large scale are combined with the strong will to carry them out. As will be seen from the report
of the East Asia Opium States Investigation Committee presented to the 9th International Opium Conference held at general in 1930, many passages will be found left open in the structure of anti-opium administration however carefully the measures may be taken. No, the very measures this report points out as the conclusion, namely the method of registering addicts, the supervision of smoking establishments and the method of selling opium ingredients etc. are indeed minute in details. Further advanced measures than those are those adopted and enforced by Manchoukou. (and regret that we missed the opportunity to have the authori concerned in the Administrative Bureau of the League of Nations investigated the actual result attained in opium prohibition for three years prior to the dissolution of Manchoukou. Even under the measures we adopted, various irregularities were found to have arisen through the gaps and crevices in the laws or control, proving the fact that pure idealism will never bring about any desired effect. This fact is too eloquently told by the history of China covering a period of 200 years. Let me cite a few examples from it.

Shansi province was formerly regarded as a region flooded with opium narcotics. It was April in the year 1921 when the Banking Government promulgated the 3 year plan for prohibiting opium that I visited Taiyuan, the capital of the province. Aiming at the incorruptible policy of a new governor, and in accordance with the idealistic three-year plan promulgated by the Central government, the city had made it its policy immediately to enforce
Def. Doc. No. 1444

a thorough prohibition of opium Smoking and had already started work along these lines. Perhaps some irregularities might have been committed by the Taiyuan Anti-opium Branch Bureaux, but at any rate the bureau chief and other staff members had been arrested and consequently the entire functions of the anti-opium administration were in a state of suspension. Accordingly the sale of opium ingredients, too, was suspended for about a month.

Immediate prohibition of opium smoking in the province; thorough control of smuggling; prohibition of poppy cultivation; and thorough diffusion of anti-opium thought. I began to study the result of such drastic measures as the above with sympathy, though not without certain misgivings. Scanty was the material that I gained during my short sojourn there, and although I was in perfect accord with the governor’s incorruptible policy as well as his drastic measure of prohibiting cultivation and smoking, the actual result was, to my regret, proven to be not successful as far as the Anti-opium problem was concerned, because it was not accompanied by systematic measures.

The movement for the extermination of opium smoking establishments held on March 10 seemed to have ended in a more demonstration, for the smoking places were continuing their business in spite of the suspension of delivery and the black-marketing of crude heroine was continuing as actively as ever. If one walked a short distance out of Tai-yuan city, poppy seeds were to be seen under the ground waiting for the coming Spring (In Shansi province the poppy seeds are sown in Autumn and germinate after wintering).
Before the provincial and municipal authorities concerned, I laid some of my opinions based on what I had practically investigated, but those in charge did not assume a very enthusiastic attitude. In this connection, I was restrained by an assistant officer of the Japanese Information Liaison Office (former Social Service Agency) in Taiyuan. He said to me, "it is not a matter of what result will be achieved. It is no use meddling with the anti-opium policy established and proclaimed by the Chinese Government. You have only to pay your respects to the enthusiasm of the chief of the province." So far as the opium administration is concerned, a superficial idealism is rather dangerous, for it is liable to make opium or other narcotics as well as its addicts hide underground, and drive them into an uncontrollable situation.

The immediate prohibition policy would be, of course, success only if strong judicial measures were taken together with perfect administrative ones, so that the whole nation might strive in co-operation to carry out the prohibition of opium smoking. If this were so, it would be needless to adopt the long-term anti-opium. The actual administration, however, is not so simple.

In the same connection, the chief of the General Anti-opium Bureau of the Northern Chinese Political Committee and the chief of the corresponding bureau of the Nanking Government, assumed an extremely painful air at my question, avoiding any open statement. As to the relative merits of the two policies -- immediate prohibition or gradual lessening, no conclusion can be
drawn so far as serious and strong measures are taken together, as previously stated. The immediate and thorough-going anti-opium policy can be realized only with such firm resolution, regardless of sacrifice, as that of the Manchurian Foreign Minister Lu, who stated, "Those addicts who refuse to refrain from opium-smoking are the rogues violating the laws of the land. Even if they count to 200,000 or 300,000, we should resolutely condemn them to death." On the contrary, the anti-opium policy based on the line of gradual lessening, however loose it may appear, is the method which the Japanese Government enforced in Formosa, and finally achieved success.

The ten year anti-opium policy adopted by Manchukuo lies between those two policies. But as the term was so short, we had to meet with immense difficulty in curing 820,000 addicts. I state this in the accompanying affidavit, so I will not repeat it here.

As to the opium administration in Formosa, discussions have often been made before the International Opium Conference, and from what has been accomplished during the past 40 years, I can conclude that it has reached final success.

At the beginning of her administration of Formosa, the Japanese Government adopted toward the opium addicts exceeding 190,000 at that time, the line of gradual lessening based on the prohibition policy. Since then, with the permeation of administrative power, as well as the enlightenment arrived at by the anti-opium policy accompanying the spread of education, we prevented the new occurrence of addiction to opium and other narcotics. On the one
hand, and the secret sale and smoking of opium, on the other, through the perfect control of opium and its addicts. In 1942, there remained only 5,000 registered addicts all over the island.

The Government-general planned to dispatch physicians throughout the island, to examine the 5,000 addicts, to classify them into three categories, and to hospitalize them forcibly in designated government or public hospitals where they could undergo medical treatment. The hospitalization of the first category had been already carried out in 1943, when I visited and inspected the island, as the policy of eradicating all addicts of the island was expected to be brought to completion within two years, I was more than delighted.

It goes without saying that the monopoly of opium for smoking can be abolished with the eradication of its addicts. I think it was in autumn, 1943, that I congratulated Doctor tu tsung ming, Consultant to the Government-general of Formosa, on the completion of the anti-opium administration there.

On this 1st day of May, 1947
At Tokyo.

DEPONENT B.B. Shachi (seal)

I, B.B. Shachi, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) IKIHRIG asutaro (seal)
Def. Doc. No. 1444

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

[Signature: R.R. Shachi 'scal']
結案報告書

日本

對

荒木 貞夫

審查

審查

局

部

審查

第1次

契約 小田原 強

事務局

事務

部

審查

1144

如約書
山海緑線の使用マニュアルの初歩的なリッチップ。海岸に沿って星座十二年広

モデリーム

第五号本舗の利用者向けのシリアル設定のニシハラ神功のポリュームの

ナカノ

グッタァラタ

カナ・因鋳型はコノ設備を工夫した。
斯ケ、禁煙事業遂行ニ於テハ、華北ツ滿州トノ接近ハ、次次緊密ノ変
デナイハジノハ、ブデンノ相関を

政治家ノ観察を

リハゾルールノ事実

デナイハジノハ、ブデンノ相関を

政治家ノ観察を

リハゾルールノ事実

デナイハジノハ、ブデンノ相関を

政治家ノ観察を

リハゾルールノ事実

デナイハジノハ、ブデンノ相関を

政治家ノ観察を

リハゾルールノ事実

デナイハジノハ、ブデンノ相関を

政治家ノ観察を

リハゾルールノ事実
ガ見ラルルノメディアリテス。一九三〇年度ジュネーブノ国際間片會

【ノ美】提出サレテナル、[ノ東]同片状況調査国ノ報告ニモ見ラルルヲニ、

議議行政ノ議略資ハ、細心ノ注意ヲ傾倒シテ立谷シテモノ報告ニモ見ラルルヲニ、

ハ、スケアルベ（以下次頁）
山西省は従来河片断薬の分布地である太原市で騒動したのは、南京政府が河片断薬を収納することを、黄河に近い地域に物語をつけてあるので、山西省は新任省長の案内計画を発表すると聞く。即ち彼は昨日の中央政府から発令され、新任の省長に移された。従来河片断薬分局には多くの不正行為も伏

在してあったが、余に地域局長以下幹部が拘束されていて、
一切の臨時行政機関が停止の状態であるし、従って阿片戸籍の簿下げを
約一ヶ月間休止されているのであります。

省内外に於ける阿片吸飲の即時廃止。密販買の徹底取締。吸食戒備の募集
を伴う薬煙思想の普及徹底。

私はかなり思い切ったこの措置に就いて、多少の危険を覚えるながらも、
胸のすなわち感覚を抱きながら、その効果に関して研究を進めて見ました。

私の僅かな滞在期間で蒐集し得た材料は、ほんの些細な程度でしか
なかったが、そして省長の建議政治課題には万歳の賛意を表し、且
又、薬煙提案の即時行にも、敬意をおしえないものであったが、
残念ながら薬煙に関する限り、組織的な措置が伴はなかったので、成功
とは違へ難い現状であったのであります。

三月十日を期して行はれた薬煙所撲滅運動も、単なるデモンストレ
ションに過ぎたりしく、薬煙は大風一過、涼しい頃で官士の薬下停止
に関係なく、薬煙を続けてあるし、薬煙へロインの間取引は、意々活発
に行わせてあるし、太原市を一歩進むれば、相対らず薬煙の種子は、地
下に春を持つてる状態であったのです。
（山西省の駒羿は秋に飾かれた）
常な艱難を経験しなければならなかったのであります。是は別紙請進書に詳しく述べましたから、重複を避けます。

台湾の壊政に就いては、従来際難阿片黴疫の席上・歴々問題になっておりましたが、今日四十数年の発達を模倣して、成功の城に達したものと断定出来ます。

日本政府は台湾統治の難初、當時十八万を越えてゐた黴疫に対して、

断然主義に基づく謹慎方針を採用したのでありました。

一方行政力の演進と、改官の普及に伴ひ、薬効新法に依って、新しく発生する阿片麻薬習慣を抑へ。他方新薬による阿片並に既存黴疫の完全管理を行ひ、哺乳薬吸食を防遏して來たのでありましたが、昭和十七年頃には、全島の登録黴疫者が僅々五千人に過ぎなくなってしまいました。在阿督府は、全島に係長官を派して、五千名の黴疫者が検診・これを三階に分けて、それぞれ所定の官公立病院に強制収容を行ひ、啓発効果大を挙げました。私は昭和十八年同島に於て、全島の阿片薬薬窪を計画・既に第一期の収容を実施してゐました。
波政談は、有終の美を成すことが想像され、欣快に耐えなかったのであ
ります。勿論、著者の絶波と同時に、吸飲用の阿片专卖は拡りを去るものであ
ります。台湾総督府顧問杜聰明博士と台湾の祭壇行政の完成に応じて悦び
を談ったのは昭和十八年の秋であったと思います。
Excerpts From
MISSION TO MOSCOW
By JCS. E. davies,
United States Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1936 to 1938
(The Blakiston Company, Philadelphia)

Diary
Washington--January 4, 1938

Formal dinner given in our honor by Ambassador and Kuma Scito at the
Japanese Embassy. Scito is an old friend and golfing companion of "Burning
Tree." It was a very pleasant gesture on his part to host to entertain for us,
I was perplexed, however, for I was going to Moscow, and Japan and Moscov were
secretly on speaking terms. So I decided to be entirely undiplomatic and go to
Scito frankly with the problem. He saw the point at once and said, "That's
simple. We shall ask my colleague, the Soviet Ambassador, edt. Iissayedev Troyanovsky,
and my problem was solved with a most pleasant evening. Over the coffee in-ter-
national relations were furthered by a suggestion of organizing an international
A group of "Burning Tree" Golf Clubs similar to International Rotary. There was no
question but what Washington's "Burning Tree" would have to be number one. Party
almost broke up over whether number two was to be Tokyo or Moscow. It was refer to
the League of Nations!

************

Moscow, November 16, 1938

The Soviet Union has definitely determined, at least for the present, not
to become involved in active military participation, but it would aid China in the
expend that it could and still maintain a correct diplomatic position vis-a-vis
Japan.

************

AUSTRIAN EFFECT ON WAR PSYCHOLOGY
March 17, 1938
Excerpt from a Letter to Senator Millard Tydings

Along with the rest of Europe, this country is extremely war conscious. Enormous ship-ments are being sent to the Fert Erat. The shipments include war
materials and foodstuffs. There are many indications of shortage here in food
that did not obtain last winter, in spite of the huge crop last summer. There
are indications that this government is going more isolationist than ever before. War is terribly close.
LITVINOV FEARS A "FASCIST PEACE"

Litvinov said he foresaw a Fascist peace imposed by Germany and Italy and that history would be likely to be repeated in that the present finds Italy making friends with Germany because of fear, with the intention probably of deserting her when the situation seemingly becomes expedient, just as she did during the World War. Italy, he added, is by no means safely anchored to the Hitler axis.

(p. 255)

Regarding the Far Eastern situation, he said that Japan has approximately a million men in China, including 300,000 in Manchukuo, and that the Chinese were putting up a remarkable fight and causing Japan much trouble. He indicated he did not anticipate any aggressive action from Japan against the Soviet Union.

Diary

Commissar Litvinov and daughter came. He said that Stalin was arranging to see me before my departure. This surprised me very much. He sees no one, except it be some visiting head of government from without the country. It is said that he has never seen an ambassador formally. It would be interesting to meet him. I should like to size him up.

Moscow, March 29, 1938

There is little change in the border situation, with only one minor incident reported. This may be due in some measure to preoccupation of the Japanese militar, authorities with the war in China. In this connection, by far the most interesting development regarding the Far Eastern situation during the recent past has been the statement, made to me in the course of a conversation which took place on March 23, last, by M. Litvinov, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, in which he stated that any aggression against the Soviet Union on the part of Japan is now out of the question, on account of the trouble which China is causing Japan by its (China's) unexpected military success. This, he stated, was shown by the fact that Japan now has a million men under arms in China proper and another three hundred thousand in Manchuria.

Moscow, April 1, 1938

Japan

In the Far East, from what Commissar Litvinov tells me, this government believes that Japan is having a hard time of it in China and that the Chinese are now putting up substantial resistance. This government does not conceal its deep sympathy for China, but is meticulously careful to maintain peace with Japan, at least for the present.
One fourth of the national revenues were appropriated last year to war purposes. This amounts to approximately twenty-five billion rubles. At the current bootleg gold value of the ruble, this approximates two to two and one half billion dollars. Expenditures this year will probably be still greater. There are indications of an almost feverish preparation for war. Large stocks of foodstuffs and supplies, including military equipment, tanks, submarines, destroyers, airships, trucks, and so forth, are reported by travelers as being sent to the Far East in an unending stream. There is a shortage of fabric here in Moscow, which did not exist last year, and which is alleged to be due to war requirements.

Those industrial organizations which are directly connected with war requirements have been recently placed under direct army control and supervision. It is variously estimated that the Far Eastern Army consists of from 250,000 to 500,000 men. It is alleged to be completely self-contained with an adequate two-year supply of food and military requirements. Annually 1,200,000 youths are called to the colors for training. There are constant rumors of roads and fortifications being secretly and hurriedly built all along the western frontier. The current strength of the army is reputed to be 1,200,000 men.

THE CLOSING OF FOREIGN CONSULATES

The purposes of the Fascist governments of isolating the U.S.S.R. among the nations of the world and placing them in quarantine, so to speak, seems to have worked not only successfully from without this country but also seems to have been most effective here. The Soviet Union in retaliation, or for reasons of its own, appears to be perfectly willing to out-Hero'd Harold in this respect. And they have a faculty for hitting first and hard if they think they are in danger.

SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD JAPANESE PROTESTS

It is announced by the press that the Foreign Commissar received a protest from the Japanese Ambassador against the military assistance which he asserted the government was giving to China.

M. Litvinov is reported to have replied that their attitude in selling arms, etc., to China was in complete accordance with the principles of international law. He denied that they had sent any military detachments or individual military personnel to that country to participate in action.
PERSONALLY, I DO NOT THINK THAT THE WORLD IS IN ANY REAL DANGER FROM COMMUNISM FOR MANY YEARS TO COME. COMMUNISM WON'T WORK. IT HASN'T WORKED HERE.

The French Ambassador has said to me that the Comintern (the agency for the international revolution idea) is resorted to by Stalin, not because of desire, but purely as a military and strategic necessity.

MR. RALPH BLAND, VICE-CONSUL AT KOBE, JAPAN, PASSING THROUGH ON ROUTE FOR HOME, CAME IN FOR LUNCH. HE IS A KEEN, FINE-APPEARING YOUNG MAN—A CREDIT TO THE SERVICE. HE IS HIGHLY INTELLIGENT AND WELL-BALANCED AND CAREFUL IN HIS EXPRESSION OF OPINIONS OR FACTS.

He stated that in Japan there were indications of economic pressure, caused by the war, making their appearance, and that there was much discussion and fear of possible Russian air attacks on the "wood and paper" cities of Japan.

The following is my best judgment as to the situation here with reference to Japan:

1. Soviet-Japanese relations are very difficult; constant difficulties were being experienced in the Island of Sakhalin in connection with the operation of Japanese concessions; where, necessarily, reliance was placed in large part upon Soviet employees; these difficulties, it is claimed by some, arise primarily from the fact that such Soviet employees, fearing charges of being Trotskyites and Japanese spies and wreckers, refused to have anything whatever to do with the Japanese; that there were also other matters of serious difference.

I have the impression that the attitude of Russian diplomacy is definitely hardening toward Japan and more aggressive than last summer.

2. According to reliable information there are approximately 450,000 to 600,000 Soviet armed troops in the eastern area. It is stated, however, that the Japanese believe that for every Japanese soldier in Manchukuo the Soviets maintained, in Manchuria, three Soviet soldiers. The Japanese armed forces in Manchuria are estimated to be from 150,000 to 200,000 in number. This checks with other information current here.

Litvinov recently advised me that the Japanese were extensive buyers of Soviet rubles "outside"; that this accounted for the rise in the price of the "black" ruble, and that in his opinion Japan was procuring rubles for the purposes of bribery in the East.
...Excerpts From
MISSION TO MOSCOW
By JOSPEH E. DAVIES

(p. 352)

WILL ARE THE POLITICAL STRENGTHS OF THIS GOVERNMENT?

The Communist Party and the Government--The government in fact consists of a very small group of men, who control the Communist Party. The government is no more than the agent of the Communist Party, and takes orders from it. Realistically, the government is in fact one man--Stalin the "strong" man, who survived the contest, completely disposed of all competitors, and is completely dominant. He appears to be the type of "easy boss," quiet, self-effacing, but nevertheless the real power. The government is a dictatorship not "of the proletariat," as professed, but "over the proletariat." It is completely dominated by one man.

(p. 365-366)

SUMMARY

V.

The military strength of the U.S.S.R. is impressive. In both quality and numbers the man power is extraordinary. The standing army of approximately 1,500,000 men is divided into two self-contained units, one in the West and one in the Orient--about 70% in the West and 30% in the East. It is well equipped with arms and well disciplined and trained to fanatical devotion to Communism. Its mechanized units are very good. The air-force personnel is excellent--their equipment good in pursuit planes, poor in bombing equipment. Numerically the air force is probably the strongest of the great powers. In air equipment, generally speaking, they probably are two or three years behind the Western nations.

The government is supremely confident that it could successfully resist simultaneous attack by Japan and Germany.

VII.

The significance to the United States is quite clear. If Japan should go berserk by any chance, the fact that Russia is at her back door is of consequence to us.

The Soviet Union is more friendly to the United States than to any foreign power. That is quite clear.

If the U.S.S.R. should be excluded from the proposed Four-Power Pact and become isolated (as it now seems to be convinced it will be), there is reason to believe that it may continue to live unto itself and develop indefinitely. It may develop into a very potential threat to world economic and political stability. Communism holds no serious threat to the United States. Friendly relations in the future may be of great general value.

I have the honor to be, Sir, respectfully yours,

Joseph E. Davies
Within two weeks after the declaration of war by Britain and France on Germany, the Russians and Japnese have agreed, according to the press reports, for an armistice on the Eastern front. Thus not only has Hitler closed his eastern door in Europe, but he has solidified his position by composing the differences between Japan and Russia in the Far East.

The Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement was a diplomatic victory for Germany that was far-reaching in its effect.

**Excerpts From MISSION TO MOSCOW**

By Joseph E. Davies

---

**Journal**

Brussels—November 28, 1939

Three months have now elapsed since "the state of war" was declared by England. It has developed many surprises. They were:

* The Germans made good on their prediction of demolishing Poland in three weeks. That was surprising to some.

Apparantly the Moscow agreement envisaged a complete restoration of the geographical and political spheres of tsarist Russia to the Soviets, and more, to wit: the uprooting and abandoning of the Baltic German civilization and life, as well as the restoration of Polish White Russia and Polish Ukraine to the U.S.S.R. as a part of the deal with Germany. The Soviets are willing to risk alienating world opinion and that of many world Communists by attacking Finland to complete the naval outpost fortification of Leningrad against possible future attack by an enemy, who can only be conceived to be their present ally, Germany. Such an anachronism seemed impossible a few months ago.

Nor would the well informed have conceived it possible six months ago that Germany would pay so high a price to Russia in order to close her eastern door when attacking Poland.

The implied threat to England and France contained in Ribbentrop's Moscow statement that "consultations as to the necessary stops" to be taken jointly, unless the western nations stopped their war on Germany, had, apparently no real basis in any agreement with Molotov. The "necessary stops" were not taken, or proved abortive. Instead of embarking on such action, Molotov declared the policy of the U.S.S.R. to be one of neutrality. Thus Hitler closed his eastern door, but he paid a very high price.

---

**RUSSIA—FINLAND**

Undoubtedly the Finns have set the Russians back in a very heroic way. The probability of negotiated peace between Russia and Finland is, in my opinion, not now imminent. The Russian army is a god to the Communists. Amour-propre and perhaps even self-preservation itself would require the established authorities to throw all of their might and numbers into the fight to re-establish lost army prestige. Finland can't stand out against such a machine. After that, peace will come on Soviet terms.
この極めて楽しい共同問題は解決した。ゴルフクラブをのぞく国際ロータリークラブ部に似たパーキング・ツリーが、誰も、別に質問をしたことが例のワシントンのパーキングツリーが第一になるかと云ふことが間違っていた。晩餐会は東京がモスクワから問題で殆ど分裂してしまったので、これは後述する。しかし、赤い領結に委託された、一九三七年十一月十六日、於モスクワ、ソ軍は少くとも現在の所、積極的且つ効果的農業行動に開発させざるを明確に決定した。だからソ軍は日本に貢して正常な外交的効力は絶え出る機
マドーナテラスムスの平和を説くにあたって、現在の状況を念頭に置いて、次のような観点から議論したいと考える。

まず、国際社会の結束を図ることの大切さが強調されている。国際問題を解決するためには、国際的な協力が不可欠であることを再確認したい。この観点から、国際連合や国際通貨基金などの国際機関の役割が重要であると考える。

次に、日本が国際平和を護るために果たすべき役割について考える。日本は、これまでに国際社会に貢献してきたが、さらにその役割を伸ばすことが必要である。国際社会の構築に絶えず努力を払っていかねばならない。

また、国際社会の問題解決に寄与するため、経済的な支援も重要であると考える。経済的支援を通じて、国際社会の安定を図ることが必要である。

以上のような観点から、国際社会の平和を護るために必要な行動を講じることが求められている。今後、この観点を念頭に置いて、国際社会の平和を護るために果たすべき役割を果たしていくことが求められている。
この文では、日本が対支政策に心を奪われている状況である。最近日本が進めている近東関係の最も興味のある事柄は、ソ連外務人民委員リトヴィノフが昨五月二十三日の会見の際余により示した、対華政策は支那が同様に進める政策と同等である。即ちその結果を観て戦果は挙げ日本の立場を示せたことにより、問題外となり此の為、支那本土に日本が現在約百餘、満洲に三十萬
東京は二十五万至五十万であると我々に算出され二二年分の食糧
と軍糧を有し完全に自給自足と云われて居る．
毎年百二十万の青年が訓練の為軍旗の下に召集され
西部領土に沿って秘密且急速に後路整憶が建築されつつあると云ふ
のが絶えずある．

（五六八頁）

アシスト政府が戦略を世界の際同の中に孤立せしめ不況を遭遇せん
とする目的の外観よりみて成功せるとのみならず世界に於ても極めて有効
であった．

蔵糧は戦略として或は独自の理由を以て此の際には極めて弱常なる行為
に先手を打つ性質を持ってある．
はスカンデルンによって、戦望の為ではなく純粋な軍事及戦略的必要か
ら作られたと云う。

モスクー一九三八年四月十四日

日本の途にある在日支那戦利ラルフ・ブレイク氏来日要請。氏は
熱心にして自分の職務に命ある風来の立派な青年である。賢明にして常
常にとみ意見開闘に當っても毅然を進べられるにも僅重である。

氏は日本陸軍内では戦争の結果、蔵財的役迫が著しくなり旦、可能なる際
西亞の日支の一本と紙一の都市空襲が降じられ且又恐るべき居る事を
述べた。

露西亜と日本

新聞於モスクー一九三八年六月四日

此地に於ける日本にに関する状勢は余の故上の判断では大の如くである。

一、日陸関係は非常に難しい。蘇聯は絶えず樺太島に於て日本利権协
力に威懾して行われて居る。當島では當然大体ソ聯使用人が信頼を受け
て居る。故者の言にはそれがある。

日なみの伯い或は破壊者たる嫌疑を恐れて日本人に警戒する事を拒絶す
る事実に主として発するといふ。更に意大利葛藤が他にもある。

更に挑戦的になっている。

材料が行なわれる。そして日中では日本に兵を返しソ聯は三人宛滿洲
に保持せりと信じて居る。在満日は實際はその数十五万乃至二十万と

若近リツヴィノフは余に次の知り知らせた。郎ちソ聯貨幣ルーブルを日

人が手広く国外から買出してゐる。此の為にルーブルの間値格昇騰の

理由である。更に彼の意見で歴日は東洋に於ける貿易の為にルーブル

を獲得しつつあるのであらうとは。
当政府の政治力は（三五一頁）

共産党政府

共産党政府は共産党を支配する極少の人のグループ

から成る。政府は共産党の代行機関たるに過ぎず、党から指導を受ける。

彼は単に完全に凡ゆる競争者を片付け完全に支配権を握って居る。

この政府は彼等が公言する如く、プロレタリアートの上に立っていると見えるが、底力がある

支配されて居るのだ。

ソ聯兵力は強き印象を與える。質量共にその兵力は異常である。約百五十

（三五五頁・三六六頁）
リッペン・ロッブのモスコウ締盟に於ける英仏に対する暗黙の協議

も、西洋諸国が対独覇を停止させる限り協力の下に必要手段を執る協議

は明らかにソロトフの協定に何等根據を持たぬのである。

段一は行われなかったが、或は失敗に終ったのである。

明した。かくの如くヒトラーは東の門戸を閉じた代りに極めて高慢な代

償を支払ったのである。

ロシアのフィンランド（四一〇頁）

フィンランド人があへて英雄的態度でロシア人を阻止したときは疑が

いた。余の考へでは、ロシア軍は共産主義者の神である。自分心或は自己保存の念

だけによっても現局をとじその軍の失われたる威信再建の為兵力の全

部を操注さ、なければならないであろう。

The Government of the Great Japanese Empire and the Government of the Republic of China, with mutual respect for the independence of each other, desire by close co-operation with each other, to establish a Greater East Asia on an ethical foundation and to contribute thereby to the peace of the world in general.

Therefore, with firm and unshakable determination to eliminate all sources of evil that are detrimental to this purpose, they have agreed to the following points:

Article 1. In order to maintain permanent neighborliness and amicable relations the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China shall mutually respect sovereignty and territorial integrity and shall take mutually helpful and friendly measures in all spheres.

Article 2. The Empire of Japan and the Republic of China shall rate closely and afford to each other all possible assistance for the cause of establishing, consolidating, and stabilizing a Greater East Asia.

Article 3. The Empire of Japan and the Republic of China, in conformance with the principle of reciprocity, shall undertake to effect close economic co-operation with each other.

Article 4. Details which are necessary to the enforcement of this treaty shall be discussed and agreed upon the authorities concerned of the two countries.

Article 5. The Treaty concerning the basis relationship between the Empire of Japan and the Republic of China, which was signed
November 30, 1940 (Showa 15), that is, November 30 of the 29th year of the Republic of China, as well as all documents affixed thereto, shall lose validity on the day upon which this Treaty shall become effective.

Article 6. The present treaty shall come into effect on the date of its signature.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Treaty and have hereto affixed their Seals.

Done in duplicate, in the Japanese and the Chinese languages, at Nanking, on October 30, 1943 (Showa 18), which date corresponds to October 30 of the 32nd year of the Republic of China.

TANI Masayuki

Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan

WANG Chao-ming

President of the Executive Department of the National Government of the Republic of China.
Certificate of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Naoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Foreign Ministry Archives Section, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 (two) pages and entitled "Treaty of Alliance between Japan and China" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the Foreign Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this May 2, 1947.

Hayashi Naoru (sealed)
Signature of Official

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: Urabe Katsuma.

Translation Certificate

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan

Date May 7, 1947
Annexed Protocol

Upon signing the Treaty of Alliance between Japan and the Republic of China on this day, the Plenipotentiaries of the both countries have agreed upon the following:

Article 1. Japan provises to withdraw the Japanese troops dispatched into the territories of the Republic of China when general peace shall be restored between the both countries at the cessation of war.

Japan waives the right of stationing troops which was based by the Peking Protocol concerning the Boxers Riots and other related documents.

Article 2. This Protocol shall be put in force simultaneously with the conclusion of this Treaty. As witness, the Plenipotentiaries of the both countries have signed and sealed this Protocol. On October 30, the 18th year of Showa, or October 30, the 32nd year of the Republic of China, two copies each in Japanese and Chinese languages of this Protocol were made at Nanking.

TANI, Masayuki (sealed)
The Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Japanese Empire.

WANG, Tieshong (sealed)
The president of the Executive Yuan, the National Government of the Republic of China.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of source and authenticity

I, Hayashi, Seoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Annexed Protocol" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 23rd day of December, 1946.

K. Hayashi
signature of Official

Witness: Konishige Odo
大日本帝國駐華全權大使

中華民國外交部部長

正之

銘

（印）
To His Excellency Wang Tianning,
The President of the Executive Yuan,
National Government of the
Republic of China.

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated this day to the following effect.

"In signing the Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of China and Japan, to-day the following understandings were reached between Your Excellency and I.

Some of the matters existing at present in China rendering adjustment in consideration of the principles of this Treaty should be radically adjusted in accordance with the principles of this Treaty when general peace shall be restored between the two countries with the cessation of war.

Even during the period in which the state of war still continues necessary adjustment shall be gradually made in accordance with the principles of this Treaty through the conference of the two countries concerned so far as the situations permit.

I shall be glad to have your confirmation of the above-mentioned understandings.

I hereby have confirmed the above-mentioned understandings.

In replying to your Excellency, I beg you to accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

(Taxed) (sealed)

The Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Japanese Empire.
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled Exchanged Note (despatched), Oct. 30, 1942 is an exact and true copy of a document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 23rd day of December, 1946.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagahara 042.
汪兆銘

閣下

中華民國國民政府行政院院長
Exchanged Note

(Translation of the letter received)

Nankin, October 30, the 32nd Year of the Republic of China. (TN 1943)

To His Excellency Tani Masayuki,
The Extraordinary Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the Japanese Empire.

Excellency:

I have the honour to state to you that, in signing, on this day, the Treaty of Alliance between the Republic of China and Japan, the following understandings were reached between Your Excellency and I.

Some of the matters existing, at present, in China requiring adjustment in consideration of the principles of this Treaty shall be radically adjusted in accordance with the principles of this Treaty when a general peace shall be restored between the countries at the cessation of war.

Even during the period in which the state of war still continues, necessary adjustments shall be gradually made in accordance with the spirit of this Treaty through the conference of both countries so far as the situations permit.

I shall be glad to have your confirmation of the above understandings.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[Seal]

The president of the Executive Yuan, the National Government of the Republic of China.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Exchanged Note (received)" is an exact and true copy of an official translation of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 23rd day of December 1946.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: Nagaharu Odo
交換公文

（来信文）

伝は、本公文におきまして、以下に示すことにより、関係機関との間で、平和交済に関する協定を締結することを希望いたしますが、ご了承の程、幸いです。

官 部 5.4.4.5

議 部 5.4.4.5

平和交済に関する協定を締結することを希望いたします。
Def Doc No. 1449

EXCERPT FROM THE OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS AT NÜRNBERG, GERMANY, ON 28 AND 29, MARCH AND 1 APRIL 1946

Q. Will you say your full name?
A. Joachim von Ribbentrop.
Q. Will you repeat this oath after me:

I swear by God, the Almighty and Omniscient, that I will speak the pure truth and will withhold and add nothing.

(The witness repeated the oath).

THE PRESIDENT: You may sit down.

29 MARCH 1946

Q. When did you fly to Moscow, and what negotiations did you there carry on?
A. On the evening of the 14th of August I arrived in Moscow. The reception given me by Stalin and Molotov was very friendly. We had at first a two hour discussion. In this discussion the entire complex of Russo-German relations was discussed.

The result was, first, the mutual will of both nations to put their relations on a new basis. This should be expressed in a non-aggression pact. Secondly, the spheres of interest of the two countries were to be defined, which also came about through a secret additional agreement.

Q. For what reason was this secret protocol concluded? What was its content, and what were the political bases of it?
A. I should like to say, first of all, this secret protocol has been spoken about frequently here in this court. In the negotiations at that time with Stalin and Molotov, I spoke very openly, as also the Russian gentleman did with me. I described Hitler's desire that the two countries should reach a definitive agreement, and I also of course spoke of the critical situation in Europe.

I told the Russian gentleman that Germany would do everything to ameliorate the situation in Russia and to settle it peacefully, despite everything, but I left no doubt that the situation was very serious and that it was possible that war might break out. That was in the clear. It was here a question for both statesmen, Stalin as well as Hitler, of territories which both countries had lost after an unfortunate war. This problem could only be solved one way or another. It was, therefore, well to look at these things from some other point of view and just as Adolf Hitler was of the opinion that I stated in Moscow, that in some form or other this problem would have to be solved, and thus also on the Russian side...
Del' Ewe do. 1449

Then spoke about that should be done in the case of war. that should be done by the Germans and the Russians. A line of demarcation was agreed on, it is known about, that in the event of intolerable Polish provocation or if a war should break out, that this would be a boundary, so that Germany and Russia could not be accused of collusion as regards Poland. This well known line was founded along the line of the Rivers Wisla and Bug, and it was agreed that in the case of conflict the territories lying to the west of these rivers would be the German sphere of interest, and those to the east would be the Russian spheres of interest.

Then after the outbreak of the Russian war the occupation of these zones were undertaken on the one hand by Germany and on other hand by Russia. I may repeat that at that time I had the impression, both from Hitler and Stalin, that the territories, the Polish territories and other territories that have been delimited in these spheres of interest about which I shall speak shortly, that these were regions which both countries had lost after an unfortunate war, and both statesmen undoubtedly held the opinion that if the last chances for negotiations for the settlement of this problem had been exhausted, there was certainly a justification for Adolf Hitler to attempt to solve the problem connected with these territories in another way, and the incorporate these territories into Germany.

Over and above that, it is also known that the other spheres of interest were defined, Finland, the Baltic countries and Bessarabia. This was a great agreement which was reached in the interest of the great powers in the event of a peaceful settlement as well as in the case of war.

This 25th day of August was a very eventful day. In the morning a communication came from the Italian government, according to which Italy, in the case of a conflict regarding the question of Poland, would not stand at Germany's side.

What were the final reasons for the Russian conflict.

A. Repeat the question, please.

What were the causes for the conflict with Russia?

A. I have to say the following. In the winter of 1940-41, the following situation confronted the Fuehrer, and it seems to me very important that I clarify this situation.

England was not ready to make peace. Therefore, the question was of decisive importance to the Fuehrer to know what the attitude of the United States of America was and the reasons. On these two points he told me the following. I had a very lengthy discussion with him about this at that time and asked him to give me clearly defined diplomat principles and instructions.
He said, "The attitude of Japan is not completely certain for Germany. We have, of course, concluded the Three Power Pact, but there are strong elements at work in Japan which work in the opposite directions, and we do not know what position Japan will take. Italy through Greece and her campaign there, showed herself to be a rather weak ally for us. It might be that Germany would stand completely alone."

Then he mentioned the position of the U.S.A. and the attitude of the U.S.A. He said that he had always wanted good relations with U.S.A., but even though the attitude of the U.S.A. had become more and more hostile toward Germany, the conclusion of the Three Power Pact was to keep the U.S.A. out of the war.

Then in the summer of 1940 he tried to come to closer contact with Japan. Japan had made efforts along the same lines, and through the three working together the pact was put through.

The aim of the pact was, or rather I should say the contents of this pact was to be a pact of a political, military and economic nature. There was no doubt and we always considered it from the beginning, that this pact was to be a defensive one. By that I mean a pact which, above all, was to keep the U.S.A. out of the war, and I had to hope that through such a constellation the possibility would arise to bring about a peace with England.

It was asserted many times, but it is not true, that there were aggressive plans at the basis of this pact. The purpose of it was, as I have said, to bring about a constellation of power which would give Germany on one hand, the opportunity to order things in a new way in Europe, and to give Japan the possibility in East Asia — the China problem was there — and Japan was to have the possibility to solve this problem. That was the purpose of the pact.

The situation was not unfavorable that the U.S.A. would rely on this pact and England would be isolated, so that perhaps a compromise peace would be achieved, a compromise peace which we never lost sight of all during the course of the war, and which we wanted even at the end.

Q. Did Japan, before her attack on Pearl Harbor, notify Germany of her intention?

A. No, that was not the case. At that time I tried, as far as Japan was concerned, to move her to attack Singapore. A peace with England did not seem possible, and I did not know in a military way which measures would be possible to reach this cli.

The Fuhrer instructed me, at any rate, in a diplomatic way to do everything to reach or bring about a weakening of the position of England in order that the peace might be brought about.
We believed that this could be done best through an attack by Japan on the strong position of England in East Asia. Therefore, I tried to influence Japan to attack Singapore.

After the outbreak of the German-Russian war, I also tried to have Japan attack Russia, for in such a way I saw a quick ending of the war. Japan, however, did not do that. Rather I should say, she did neither the one thing we wanted nor the other, but she did a third thing — she attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor.

This attack was for us a complete surprise. We had considered the possibility that Japan might attack Singapore or perhaps Hong Kong or attack England, but we never considered that it should attack the United States or that was anything that we wanted; that is, the possibility of an attack in England but if that would happen, the United States would intervene. That was the question which we considered often at length but we hoped that this would not happen and that America would not intervene. The attack on Pearl Harbor was told in Berlin — or rather, I received knowledge of it through the press and then I received Reuter's message from the Japanese Ambassador Oshima. All other reports or proofs or anything else are completely untrue and I would like to testify to that under my oath. I would like to go further than that and concur and assert that even this attack was a surprise to the Japanese Ambassador — as he told me, it was a complete surprise to him also.

Q. What was the cooperation in the future between the Foreign Office and the allies of Germany?
A. The cooperation with Italy was a very close one. That is to say, in fact, in the further course of the war we were forced to take care of all military matters there ourselves, to direct them.

As far as Japan is concerned, the cooperation was a very difficult one, and that for the simple reason that we could only communicate with the Japanese Government by wireless. We had connections from time to time by U-Boats, but a coordinated war together with them was not possible.

I believe that on this point the expression of the American General Marshall is correct, that here a close strategic cooperation and planning of any kind did not take place. In fact, in reality, that was not the case.

Q. Now, something else: You stated last Friday that you wanted Russia to join in the Tripartite Pact. Why did that fail?
A. That failed because of Russian demands. The Russian demands — I should perhaps say first that I had agreed with Molotov in Berlin that we would negotiate further over diplomatic channels. I would exert my influence on the Fuehrer to see
to it that regarding the demands already made by Molotov in Berlin a compromise agreement of some sort could be reached.

Then Schulenburg sent us a report from Moscow and informed us of the Russian demands. In this report, first, the demand was renewed for Finland. The Fuehrer, as known, told Molotov that he did not wish that, after the winter's war of 1940-41 in the north there war should break out anew. The demand regarding Finland was brought up again, and we supposed that it would lead to an occupation of Finland. That was difficult, since it was a demand that the Fuehrer had already turned down.

A second demand concerned the Balkans, specifically, Bulgaria. Russia wanted bases there and close relations with Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government, with which we had close relations, did not wish this.

Moreover, it was for both the Fuehrer and Mussolini a difficult question to meet these Russian demands because of our economic interest in wheat, oil, and so on. Moreover, the will of the Bulgarian government was against it.

There was then thirdly, the demand of the Russian for bases of a military nature, and then also, the wish that Molotov had expressed to me in Berlin to have the outlet of the Baltic Sea. Molotov told me at that time that, of course, Russia was interested in Jutland and other such regions.

Q. I now come to another question. What intentions did Hitler have in regard to the military strength of Russia?

A. Adolf Hitler told me once and expressed himself so—this was during the time that he became worried about what was taking place in Russia in the way of preparations against Germany. He said, "We of course do not know what is concealed behind this door, and we may one day be obliged to break this door open."

This and other statements that the Fuehrer made at this time drove me to state to him that on the basis of what he knew about Russia already it should cause him great concern about attacking Russia.

Q. Witness, the prosecution put in, as evidence, a document concerning a discussion between you and the Japanese Ambassador Matsuoka. The document carries the number 1877-PS, and the number USA Exhibit 152. It is on page 1007 of the German court record.

The prosecution cited a part of this document and, among other things, the following passage concerning Raeder: "The Reich Foreign Minister returned once more to the question of Singapore. In view of the Japanese fears of submarine attacks from the Philippines and the interference of the English Mediterranean and home fleet, he spoke once more with General Admiral Raeder. Raeder said to him that the English fleets in this year were so busy in British home waters and in the Mediterranean that they could not spare a single boat for the Far East."
Witness, as Raeder clearly remembers, you, as Foreign Minister never broke with him about strategic matters regarding Japan, or about the value or uselessness of American submarines. I should be obliged to you if you could clarify this point, whether there is some error here as to the person involved in this discussion.

A. That is altogether possible. I do not now recall either that I ever spoke with Admiral Raeder about German-Japanese strategy. We had only very loose connections with Japan.

If I, at that time, said to Matsuoka what you have there quoted, I must have had from the Fuehrer, and he must have induced me to say that. I could not have said it on my own initiative, because I did not know about those things. However, I do know that the Fuehrer spoke to me several times about points relating to Japan, so it is possible that this originated with the Fuehrer. I do not know who has testified to this.

Q. This document carries the title, "Notes on conference between Foreign Minister and Matsuoka."

A. Oh, yes, I have seen that. Then it is possible that the Fuehrer said that, in fact, I consider that probable, and it can be that some mistake was made in the notes.
その結果は先づ第一に之际両国の関係を新たなる基礎の上に置かんと
する両国相互の要望でありました。第二には之等二国の経済的
ないし政治的根拠は何であつたか。その内容
問はどんなものであり又是その政治的根拠は何であつたか。私
の答は先づ最初に此の秘密約定書に基づいては本内容を
何であつたか。その内容
の時交渉により私は解けてなく大ひに語り上記の約定書
も同様つぶやきし私に語りました。スターリン及びモロトフとのそ
定に到着すべきであるというヒットラーの願望を際り又同時
洲の危機に就いて話しました。それは冷戦の紛争に対しドイツはポーランドの
状態を改善しそれに私
平和飛は論を落着せしめる為には如何なる障壁があるかつて何でょろかと
考へてゐることを私
に語りました。しかしこ私は状勢が重大であつあり戦争勃発
を恐れてゐる。
このことは明らかなる事実で、可能性ある事は明白に断じしました。この問題は何等かの方法で解決されない限り、これに起ることはありません。問題の政治家は、スターリンに取ってもヒトラーに取っても両国が不幸なる戦争をして以来失って来た領土の問題を一二に観察するのも良いことでありました。ありませんから之等の事を他の観点から述べた如くアドルフ・ヒトラーも同意見を持って居り、ロシヤ側にも同様に考えた私共も万一大戦争となった場合に何かをしたければならないか、この問題は何等かの方法で解決されなければならぬと思います。そしてモスクワに於て私共が一丸となった如く、選択の態度に出た場合若くは戦争が勃発せる場合に於てそれを以て境界線を以てドイツ並にロシヤが関し共謀の谷に問はれることがないやうにして居り、ロシヤ側に於ても同様の事実を明らかにたのでありました。
この八月二十五日は非常に多忙でありました、午前のイタリア政府から通牒がありそれに応じなければイタリーはポーランド問題に関することを期待するために再鎮撫する協定がありました。戦争を惹起するに至った場合にも何れにも利益になるように決定された訴えに反して（議論）
私が次の如く語りました。私はその時の問題に基づき、彼を非常に長時間に亘る前進を行って明確に定まった外交的原則及び指令を私に與べる必要は私に次の如く語りました。私はその時の問題に基づき、彼を非常に長時間に亘る前進を行って明確に定まった外交的原則及び指令を私に與べる必要は私に次の如く語りました。
当時の状態はアメリカが本協定に依存し、日本は孤立するようになるのであり、このついて協定を希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであり、望むというふることを希望するのに好都合な状態であったのであ
件を希望すると語りました。が、イスタンブールに関する要求が再び提出されまして、私たちが結局、フィンランドの占領にまで発展するなら、そうとは思わなかったのでありました。この問題は困難で、それはこの要求を拒否したのです。ロシアに圧力が及ぶと、フィンランドは緊密な関係を得たということを望んでおりました。

第二編目の要求は、バルカン諸国特にフィンランドと緊密な関係を得たからです。これはこの要求を断じませんでした。ドイツとは深い関係があります。フィンランド政府は、その要求を断じませんでした。
六八三九頁

答：かつてアドルフ・ヒトラーは自分自身で私に説明した数え入れられた最初の言葉を私は忘れていない。彼は、我々は何でないか、この数え入れの記録を破り開くことを余儀なくされたかもしれないと述べた。彼は、数え入れは私の日記の前の中に書かれたもので、彼は言った。以上の言葉はおそらく彼の発表した研究者の証言であるから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知しておくことから推し量を敬遠しようと考えた。彼が即ちヨーロッパに崩壊して承知お互い考えた。
一節がありません。ドイツ連邦共和国外務大臣はもう一度シングハレル問題を取上げました。フィリピンからする潜水艦攻撃及び英国有地近海及び地中海で非常に多忙であっても日本に迷惑をかけてあるため、レーダー提督はアメリカが日本の立場に関しては決して言及する必要がないと考えて居ります。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
-vs-
ARAFAI, Sadao, et al

(Translation)
SWORN DEPOSITION

DEponent: WAGMI, Takaji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
1. I was on duty in the Philippines during the time from March 1942 to February 1945. During this period from March 1942 to April 1944 I was Chief of Staff of the 14th Area Army. The army commanders at this time were three Lieutenant Generals, ROMMA, TAI-AKA and KURCDA.

Following this, I occupied the post of Vice-Chief of Staff of the Southern Army from May 1944 to October of the same year. Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Army of the time, Marshall TERAUCHI, was staying in Manila. Finally, during the months from November 1944 to February 1945, I was Chief of Staff of the 35th Army which was under General YAMASHITA, the Commander of the 14th Area Army and took part in the battles of Leyte under the Army Commander, Lieutenant General SUZUKI.

2. I shall give an account concerning our treatment of war prisoners on Bataan.

Our attacks against the Bataan Peninsula were carried on in the spring of 1942 and it was on April 9 when the American-Philippine Forces surrendered.

We had estimated beforehand that war prisoners of the American-Philippine Forces would amount to 40,000 at the most, but in reality there were 70,000 in all. This indeed caused much difficulty on our part in accommodating the prisoners.
rest back to the rear on ambulances. The distance of march we covered a day was within the limits permitted by treaties. I witnessed this march personally and so far as I observed, there was no atrocities committed. The prisoners were sent by train from San-Fernando to O'Donell where they were placed in an internment camp. Later, 20,000 out of 70,000 died from undernourishment and malaria. Provisions for the prisoners were, in addition to those prepared beforehand, obtained locally or sent from territories like Formosa etc. Thus we did our best in providing the prisoners with food. In the way of medicine, as there was very nearly a sufficient quantity, we gave out as much as was required.

3. Until July, 1942, treatment of prisoners of war and military administration was under the jurisdiction of the General Staff, and the Line of Communications Commander was taking care of the matter. In July, 1942 these affairs were transferred to the jurisdiction of the Minister of War, and Chief of Prisoner of War Internment Camps became appointive. From this time on, the Minister of War became the controlling officer and the Army Commander became the administrator. I know this fact from a standpoint of my duties which was assisting the Army Commander.

4. All the Philippines among the prisoners were released over a period dating from August to October 1942. Volunteers,
Judging from their bravery with which the Americans and Filipinos fought so intensely, we supposed that their physical conditions would be certainly fine. But we found most of the soldiers of the American-Philippine Forces were ill from undernourishment. As was also the case with the Japanese, there were a lot of sufferers of malaria, perhaps, because of the fact that this was a jungle zone. Although we intended and trucks which were captured by us from the enemy were out of commission and only a few were available. As for our side, vehicles were filled to capacity in transportation of arms and ammunition and other military supplies necessary for us to carry out the attack on Corregidor and subjugation campaigns in the various areas. As a result, all the Japanese soldiers, too, were obliged to march on foot. As we had many patients, especially malarial among us, fighting strength of the Japanese forces dropped for a time to nearly one third of normal. This made it inevitable to postpone the commencement of attacks on Corregidor, which had been scheduled for around April 20 of that year, until May 5. It was on account of these conditions that we were compelled to march on foot from Balanga (TN: phonetic) as far as San-Fernando. As to those prisoners of war who claimed to be sick, we allowed some to recuperate Bataan and sent the
among whom was Major-General Francisco, were appointed to posts in the constabulary etc. The rest were turned to their homes. The American prisoners numbering about 10,000 were removed to places Cabanatuan where richer resources were obtainable and to Mindanao Island where there were more farms than in "Donell. Some prisoners even went to Japan. Although we opened hospitals locally, the sick were sent to Manila for medical treatment as there were fully equipped hospitals there. Until September 1644, there were no air-raid attacks made against the Islands American aircraft, so the prisoners spent their days in peace as well as the inhabitants throughout the Philippines.

On this 23rd day of April, 1947
At Tokyo

DEFENDANT TACI, Takaji (seal)

KIYOSHI, Ichiro

I, TACI, Takaji hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At Tokyo

Witness: (signed) KIYOSHI, Ichiro (seal)
OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell
the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

WACHI, Takaji (seal)
自分僕我々
行ハルル
方式ニ
従イ先
別紙ノ
通リ
宣言ヲ
為シタル
に於ノ

如ク
供述
致シマス

宣言
供述
者

荒木
貞夫

其他

亞米利加合眾國

東京裁判所

尼/dir
私は一九四二年三月より一九四五年二月までフィリピンに勤務し
て居りました。その中一九四二年三月から一九四四年四月迄は第十四
方面軍参謀長で居りました。次に一九四四年の五月から同年の十月迄は
南方軍総司令官寺内元帥はマニラに在駐されて居つ
たのでありました。當時の軍司令官は本間、田中及び森田
の三中将でありました。

十四方面軍司令官山下の真下にある第十五軍の参謀長を務め軍司
令官鈴木中將の下でレイテの戦に従軍しました。

バターン半島の攻撃は一九四三年春でありますましたのが同年の四月九日に米
比軍は降伏しました。軍の降服の時、実際には七万人も居りましてその数は
非常に関難を感じました。又彼等は非常な勇敢に戦つたのであります
すから建康状態は良好のでありました。日本軍側もそうでありました
が、戦後その地帶

で出来ただけ給食するに努めたのであります。食べ物は略々充足する
量がありましたから必要量は足を興へました。

俘虜の取扱及び軍政の一九三二年七月迄は軍事本部の管理下にあり
り兵站司令官及び本部統制官で軍政最高の役を務め日中は一九三二年七月迄に
て陸軍大臣令下に立入り総監收容所長が任命せられました。此の時
以後陸軍大臣統制官及び総監収容所長が管理官であります。

私は軍司令官で従佐する職務よりしてこれを承知して居ります。

一九四二年の九月より十月迄の間に俘虜のうち比島人は全部解放
をした。而してフランシスコ連合軍日本中綬戦始め在島者は比島の警
察隊等ナツツマンや親戚の多いミンダナオ島に移しました。俘虜は米人

は米艦よりの空輸もなく比島全体も閉鎖であり俘虜も平穏を生活を
送ったのであります。
Def. Doc. No. 1164.

INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- vs -

ARAKI, Sadao, et al

APPELLANT

TAKEUCHI Ryōji

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1) I was Chief of the Third Section, Bureau of Political Affairs of the Foreign Ministry, from April 1944 to August 1945, having charge of matters in connection with diplomatic relations between Japan and the Soviet Union.

2) The Soviet Army opened attack against the Japanese troops in Manchukuo at 0:00 AM, Tokyo Time (6:00 PM, 8 August, Moscow time), 9 August 1945. It was in the morning of the 9th that the information was received that the Government of the Soviet Union had declared war on Japan as from 9 August. The first news thereof reached us through radio broadcast from the United States about 4:00 AM. At that time, the Japanese Government had asked the Soviet Government to use its good offices to end the Pacific War, and was urging its reply. As a telegram from Ambassador Satō in Moscow had reported that an interview with Molotov had been arranged at 5:00 PM, 8 August (Moscow time), we were expecting to receive the answer of the Soviet Government to our request on that occasion. Meanwhile, Soviet Ambassador Malik asked for an interview with Foreign Minister Togo a little after 9:00 AM, 9 August, but the Foreign Minister, being pressed with official business, could not receive him on that day. The Minister met Malik at 11:15 AM the following day, the 10th, on which occasion the Soviet Ambassador handed to the Foreign Minister a notification dated 8 August to the effect that the Soviet Union and Japan would be in a state of war from 9 August. I was later informed that Ambassador Satō received from Molotov at 5:00 PM (11:00 PM, Japan and Manchukuo time) on the 8th the notification of the start of war on the 9th, and that Molotov assured him that he might send cables to Tokyo making report of the matter to the Foreign Minister. The telegrams, however, did not reach the Foreign Ministry. At that time the Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Treaty was still in force and there was no important negotiation in progress between the two countries which would suggest the possibility of the outbreak of war between them.

On this 11th day of March, 1947, at Tokyo.

(Signed) Takeuchi Ryōji (Seal)

Sworn to and subscribed before me at the above date and place.

(Signed) Nishi Haruhiko (Seal)

Witness
Def. Doc. No. 1464

OATH

In accordance with my conscience, I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

(Signed) Takeuchi Ryūji (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

H. Nishi

Tokyo

5 May 1947
pite

(部分废弃生字)

(部分废弃生字)

(部分废弃生字)

(部分废弃生字)

(部分废弃生字)

(部分废弃生字)
Defense Documents Nos. 1165 to 1174 incl.

CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese, consisting of 24 pages, is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, consisting of telegrams interchanged between Foreign Minister Togo and Ambassador Satō at Moscow during the period from 12 July 1945 to 8 August 1945 (telegrams addressed to Ambassador Satō, Nos. 893, 898, 931 and 932; telegrams addressed to Foreign Minister Togo, Nos. 1385, 1417, 1449, 1450, 1484 and 1485).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 9th day of May, 1947

Hayashi Kaoru (Signed)

Witness: Satō Takegoro (Signed)
しん

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・马

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・マ

ラ・马
I. Hayashi Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the telegram of notification of the commencement of hostilities dispatched by Ambassador Satô at Moscow to the Foreign Minister in August 1945, when the U.S.S.R. declared war upon Japan, was not received by the Japanese Foreign Office.

Hayashi Kaoru

Tokyo
19 March 1947

Witness: Urabe Katsuma

Translation Certificate

I, Nishi Haruhiko, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

H. Nishi

Tokyo
3 May 1947
Report of the Russian notification of the commencement of hostilities against Japan.

1. It was announced in Soviet newspapers that both Chairman Stalin and Commissioner Molotov had returned to Moscow from the Potsdam Conference on August 5. With the view of demanding a prompt answer in relation to the termination of the war through the good offices of Soviet Russia, which I had previously offered to the Soviet Government, I asked beforehand for an immediate interview with Commissioner Molotov, when he had returned to Moscow. But, on August 5, when Commissioner Molotov returned, I asked once more for an interview with him. On August 7, he answered that he would meet me at eight p.m. on August 8. But, later on, he asked me to change the time of the interview to five p.m. to which, of course, I agreed.

2. On August 8, when I called on Commissioner Molotov, together with Secretary YUBAsI at five o'clock in the afternoon, he did not wait for me to breach my subject, but said immediately that he had something to give notice of, and read the following declaration written in Russian and handed it over to me.
After Hitler Germany has been defeated and has surrendered Japan has become the only big power continuing to wage war. She rejected the demand as of July 26 of this year by the three countries of the United States, Britain and China in regard to the unconditional surrender of the Japanese forces, consequently the proposal by the Japanese Government, for Russian mediation in regard to the Far Eastern War has become without basis. In view of Japan's refusal of surrender, the allied powers proposed to the Soviet Government that she should participate in the war against Japan's aggression, in order to hasten the termination of the war and lessen the number of its victims, thereby contributing to the speedy restoration of general peace. In obedience to her duties to the allied powers, the Soviet Government accepted the proposal and participated in the Allied Declaration as of July 26 of this year. The Soviet Government considers this policy as the only measure to promote the establishment of peace and to save every nation from further sacrifice and distress, as well as to enable the Japanese people to avoid such danger and destruction as Germany had to endure after she had rejected the demand for unconditional surrender. From such a point of view, the Soviet Government declares that she will be at war with Japan from tomorrow namely August 9. When he finished reading the declaration, Commissioner Molotov added that Ambassador Merick as well would communicate the declaration to the Japanese Government in Tokyo.

Accordingly I expressed my regret at the decision made by the Soviet Government, pointing out that it was incomprehensible to open hostilities
against Japan on the pretext of relieving the Japanese people of sacrifice and distress. Then I wanted to make a few questions, though I desired no repeated discussions, because it was necessary to clarify the purport of the declaration before it was communicated to the Japanese government. When I asked him if he meant by going to war with Japan on August 9, that Russia was at peace with us on August 8, but would be at war on August 9, Commissioner Molotov then wanted me to understand, not partially but fully, the declaration of the Soviet Government, and answered in the affirmative as to the time when she would go to war. Next, when I asked him how I could communicate the declaration to the Japanese Government, he answered that there was no objection to my sending telegrams to Tokyo or using code in order to communicate the above-mentioned declaration and the details of the interview. Thus the conversation came to an end, and when I took leave of him, I expressed my regret for the commencement of hostilities, and at the same time, my gratitude for the kind treatment received of the Russian Government during my term of office amounting to three years. Commissioner Molotov thanked me for my statement, adding that I should never be insulted, even though Russia on the commencement of hostilities took actions based on international law.

3. In accordance with the statement of Commissioner Molotov in the above-mentioned conversation, I handed the following telegrams to the Russian authorities at nine p.m. on August 8, requesting them (The staff of the embassy were forbidden to go out of the embassy, and so were unable to send telegrams themselves). The Soviet Government promised to send them
Def. Doc. # 1476

Immediately (on my return I found they had not arrived)
a) A telegram reporting the reception of the proclamation of war from
Commissioner Holotov, and requesting a prompt decision on a country to re-
represent Japanese interests.
b) The whole text of the proclamation.
c) A telegram from Secretary KAMURA to Chief of the Political
Section TAKUCHI, reporting that all the staff were in safety and had
already disposed of all Business affairs.
d) A telegram from Telegraphic Officer KAMURA to Chief of the Telegraphic
Section HINI, reporting that all the telegraphic affairs had been disposed
of.

I report the above.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese consisting of five pages and entitled "Official Note, Extra Number, from Ambassador Satō returned from Moscow to Foreign Minister Yoshida, dated 15 June 1946" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 7th day of May, 1947

Hayashi Kaoru

Witness! Urabe Katsuma

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William L. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William L. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 14th May 1947
昭和二十年八月五日、スターリン閣僚及びモロトフ委員ボッダム会議ヨリ際至セル旨ソ紙ニ愛

ソ聯邦ノ対日宣戦通告ノ総経報告ノ件

外務大臣

吉田

茂殿

外務大使

佐藤

尚武
Berlin, May 17, 1938.

Note

for the conversation with the Japanese Ambassador
Concerning economic questions.

Minister von Pauker presented on May 12 a note concerning "present state of the German-Japanese relations," which contains the important viewpoint for conducting the conversation. The following suggestions are made as the summation and the completion thereof:

1) Preference to the German performances for Japan:

Aside from the general political assistance especially the recognition of Manchukuo, recall of the military advisors from China and the embargo on the export of armaments to China.

2) As a result of this support of Japan, Germany suffered considerable economic loss in her relation with China:

a) refunding of foreign exchange and other loss resulting from the broken contracts of armament supplies (estimate RM 33 Mill.),

b) expected default of payment of armament supplies already made (about RM 47 Mill.),

c) probable Chinese boycott against German goods with the risk of bankruptcy of many German companies in China (invested capital about RM 300 Mill.); considerable diminution or loss of the German-Chinese trade which has heretofore been very favourable (yearly income of foreign exchange about RM 125 Mill., import of...
important raw material such as wolfram, antimony from China).

3) Lack of Japanese good will heretofore on the economic field:
   a) insufficient release of frozen claim (Yen FO, 44 will.),
   b) in issuing permits for foreign exchange more unfavourable
treatment than for instance the Americans receive
   c) granting of big governmental contracts in Manchukuo to
   Americans and Swiss against cash payment, not withstanding the
   German offer of supply on credit,
   d) prohibition of German business in North China by Japanese
   monopoly firms, for instance for wool,
   e) no favourable treatment of German war damage claims in
   Shanghai and Nanking; on the contrary, worse treatment than for
   instance America,

4) From the above there follows a general expectation of greater
Japanese good will in economic questions. The often promised
preferential position in the Japanese continental spheres
(Manchukuo, North-and Middle-China) must not only be stipulated
in binding form, but also come to the practical realization as
soon as possible. As a result of the big losses already sustained
in our China business we are no more in a position to carry out
supplementary compensation business on the basis of 1:1, in
exchange of goods which was proposed during the negotiations by
the Japanese and was accepted on principle by us; but we can take
for our goods only half as much as Japanese goods, and for the
other half we must demand payment in foreign exchange. Such a
proposal will be made to the Japanese leader of the negotiations
on the next occasion

signed: Wiehl.

- 2 -
I, Yale Maxon, Chief of the Document Division, IPS, hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GHQ, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody, and control of originals or copies of all documents obtained by the said section.

2. That frames 140341 - 140642 being 2 sheets of a photostatic copy of a memorandum signed by [name] dated 17 May 1930 and contained in IPS Document 4024 were received by the IPS from the Office of the Chief of Counsel of the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials.

/S/ Yale Maxon

-3-
手記

経済問題関於特大使ノ報告ノ文化ヲ補助シテハ五月ニ至ルニテデイヘノ日本関係ノ現状ノ

関レテ報告ヲ提出レタノコノ閣僚ヨリ会談ノ為メモ主要点ガ引出セルノ

(日本ヲ對ルロッテノ政策)ヘガ提案シルール

一般ノ政策ヲ於テテハルコトヲ特テソロノ武器ヲ輸出禁止

(日本ヲ斯ク支持スルロッテニ注意ヲ促ス)ヘガ提案シルール

(1) 既ノ引 élémentsレハ軍需品供給ヲストレクト支拠ヒガナザレルノ見合テ

(2) 既ノ引 élémentsレハ軍需品供給ヲストレクト支拠ヒガナザレルノ見合テ

約四千七百万马克

ハ三千三百万马克ト評価シルール
（a）北支獨立日本占領財源問題
（b）満洲國版於臺灣大規模政府契約現金貿易환ヒデーマリナー人
（c）日本特急供給品用意アールニ拘ハ、ラズ
（d）日本製品貿易
（e）消毒・医薬品貿易
March 4, 1939

A

Telephone conversation with Ribbentrop; he is still sure of Japanese support of the Tripartite Pact, but claims that it will take several weeks to reach an agreement.

April 27, 1939

B

Nothing new except conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, who says that the last word regarding Japan's official decisions on the Tripartite Pact has not yet been said. It is necessary, however, to know it before 6 May, and I speak to that effect.

April 28, 1939

C

I receive news from Japan: it seems now that they are deciding to sign the alliance. I tell Shiratori that in any case they must hasten and tell us Yes or No; within a few days I shall meet Ribbentrop and we must make our decision, especially as diplomatic activity among the democracies has become very intense during these last days and as the Anglo-Soviet alliance seems now a concrete and completed fact. The Luso returns to Rome.
しん多くを求めて余に彼が常に三部同盟条約よりも厚く好んでおったごこ
の二国協定の発表をさせるようにして誤録した。リッペンツロップは心
は之れに畏縮を唱へたのであらが後には遂にヒトラーの承認を得るごと
話されたのであるが彼は即刻に承認を興へ且公報の作成に自ら協力し
たのである。

日曜の朝右の意を余がドゥーチェに報告したとき彼は格別の述べの為
する最後の努力を試みたのである。余は右の意志の可能程や又有用性に
統は根拠に依頼的であっただけれども敗退之後に反対しなかったので
Many conversations, but none of particular interest except the one with the Japanese Ambassador. The final formula for the Tripartite Pact has been sent to Arita in Tokyo. Very weak. Ribbentrop too is dissatisfied with it. But the Ambassador warns me that now it is difficult to push matters further and that we are close to the breaking point.

---

The alliance, or rather the immediate announcement of the alliance, was decided Saturday evening right after dinner at the Continental, following a telephone call from the Duce. After the talk, I reported to Mussolini the results, satisfying from our point of view. He, as always when he has achieved something, demands more, and asked me to have the Bilateral Pact announced, which he has always preferred to the Triangular Alliance. Ribbentrop, who, at the bottom of his heart, has always aimed at the inclusion of Japan in the Pact, at first demurred but then ended by giving in with the reservation that he must obtain Hitler's approval and personally helped with the editing of the communique. When I informed the Duce on Sunday morning he displayed particular satisfaction.

---

Ribbentrop is making a last attempt to add a tripartite pact with Japan to the signature of the alliance. I do not object although I am fundamentally skeptical of the possibility and also of the usefulness of the thing.
Certificate

I. The Original Copy of "the Essentials for the Handling of the Nomonhan Frontier Incident," dated May 31, 1939.

II. The Original Copy of the order, dated August 30, 1939, of the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters issued under Imperial command, to the effect that "the engagement at Nomonhan should not be enlarged but be brought to the speediest possible conclusion and that the Commander of the Kwantung Army should strive, with the least possible force, to hold out at the said field."

III. The Original Copy of the order, dated September 3, 1939, of the Army Department of the Imperial Headquarters issued under Imperial Command, Communicating "the Imperial Headquarters' plan to bring the Nomonhan Frontier Incident to a voluntary Conclusion, and ordering the Commander of the Kwantung Army to stop offensives in the said field."

I, MIYAMA Yozo, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section, First Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the above three documents were originally in the custody of the Army General Staff but that at the time of the close of the
Def. Doc. # 1484

war they were burnt with the rest of similar documents, so that they no longer exist.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 7th day of May, 1947.

/S/ MIYAMA, Yōzō (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: /S/ BANNO, Junkichi (seal)
Def. Doc. # 1484

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, William E. Clarke, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ William E. Clarke

Tokyo, Japan
Date 9 May 1947
一九三九年 (四四年) 五月三十一日  ニノハモハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年四月十四年ニ ミナノハモハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモノハハ

一九三九年八月三十日 大本営陸軍部命令ニシテノモ
On November 11th I returned to Shanghai and learned from private telegrams that the emperor had left Tientsin for Manchuria.

The Chinese endeavored to make out that the emperor had been kidnapped by the Japanese and carried off against his will. This statement was widely circulated among Europeans, many of whom believed it; but it was wholly untrue. The extraordinary statements recently published to the effect that the emperor and empress had telegraphed to Chiang Kai-shek at Nanking and to Chang Hsueh-liang at Peking "asserting their loyalty and asking for sanctuary" are equally false. So is the allegation that the emperor had "sworn a pact with his wife to commit suicide before he would consent to be king of Manchuria." I need hardly say that the last persons in the world to whom the emperor would have appealed for sanctuary were Chiang Kai-shek and Chang Hsueh-liang; and that had he wished to escape from danger of being kidnapped and carried off to Manchuria, all he had to do was to walk on board a British steamer bound for Shanghai.

His loyal and devoted servant Ch'eng Hsiao-hsiu was most emphatically not his jailor. He left Tientsin and went to Manchuria of his own free will, and his faithful companions were Ch'eng Hsiao-hsiu (new his prime minister) and his son Ch'eng Chu-i.
十一月十三日夜，我在上海與日本大使閣下談話，得知他在天津的近衛舊居，為了避難而逃往東京。此舉可能是為了避免與日本大使館的直接接觸，因為當時日本的反應很冷淡，甚至敵視。我對他的行動表示理解，並請他轉達給天津的軍事長官，以求保護。

第二天，我收到了日本大使的回電，稱其已返回天津。我便寫信給他在東京的同事，表示了我的意見，建議他不要返回天津，因為那裡的形勢對他不利。我建議他應該留在東京，以避免不必要的風險。
Excerpt from Exhibit No. 9 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT No. 9

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Selected Letters between Admiral H. R. Stark and Admiral J. O. Richardson.

1. 18 January 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson.  
   (Defense Document 1500-A-1 - Page 923, Volume 14)*

2. 26 January 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark.  
   (Defense Document 1500-B-1 - Pages 924 - 926, Volume 14)*

3. 16 February 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark.  
   (Defense Document 1500-C-1 - Page 927, Volume 14)*

4. 8 March 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark.  

5. 11 March 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark.  

6. 15 March 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson.  
   (Defense Document 1500-D-1 - Pages 930 - 933, Volume 14)*

7. 8 April 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson  
   (Defense Document 1500-E-1 - Page 933, Volume 14)*

8. 7 May 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson.  
   (Defense Document 1500-E-2 - Pages 933 - 934, Volume 14)*

9. 13 May 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark.  
   (Defense Document 1500-F-1 - Pages 935 - 937, Volume 14)*

10. 22 May 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson  
    (Defense Document 1500-G-1 - Pages 938 - 939, Volume 14)*

11. 22 May 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark.  
    (Defense Document 1500-H-1 - Pages 940 - 942, Volume 14)*

12. 27 May 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson.  
    (Defense Document 1500-I-1 - Pages 943 - 945, Volume 14)*

13. 22 June 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson.  
    (Defense Document 1500-J-1 - Page 946, Volume 14)*

14. 22 June 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark with enclosures.  
    (Defense Documents 1500-K-1, 1500-K-2, 1500-L-, 1500-M-2 - Pages 947 - 951, Volume 14)*

15. 18 September 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark with enclosures.  
    (Defense Documents 1500-M-1, 1500-N-1, 1500-H-2 - Pages 952 - 960, Volume 14)*

16. 24 September 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson.  
    (Defense Document 1500-O-1 - Page 961, Volume 14)*

17. 1 October 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson.  
    Defense Document 1500-P-1 - Pages 961 - 962, Volume 14)*
Defense Document 1500-A (corrected copy)

18. 9 October 1940 memo from Admiral Richardson for Admiral Stark.
    (Defense Document 1500-D-2 - Page 962, Volume 14)*

19. 22 October 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark.
    (Defense Document 1500-E-2 - Pages 963 - 970, Volume 14)*

20. 12 November 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
    with enclosures.
    (Defense Documents 1500-S-1, 1500-S-2 - Pages 971 - 972, Volume 14)*

21. 22 November 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson.
    (Defense Document 1500-T-1 - Pages 973 - 974, Volume 14)*

22. 28 November 1940 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark.
    (Defense Document 1500-U-1 - Pages 975 - 979, Volume 14)*

23. 27 December 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson.
    (Defense Document 1500-W-1 - Page 980, Volume 14)*

24. 23 December 1940 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson
    with enclosures.

25. 30 December 1940 from Admiral Bloch via Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark.
    (Defense Document 1500-W-1 - Pages 985 - 989, Volume 14)*

26. 7 January 1941 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark.
    (Defense Document 1500-U-2 - Pages 990 - 992, Volume 14)*

27. 25 January 1941 from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark.
    (Defense Document 1500-X-1 - Pages 993 - 999, Volume 14)*

28. 10 February 1941 from Admiral Stark to Admiral Richardson.
    (Defense Document 1500-Y-1 - Page 1,000, Volume 14)*

(Pearl Harbor Attack)

* Added by Defense
1. 某计算机程序

2. 该程序适用于

3. 解决下述问题

4. 问题描述

5. 问题分析

6. 算法设计

7. 算法实现

8. 程序测试

9. 测试结果

10. 结论与展望

11. 参考文献
D. D. 1500-A-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
18 January 1940.

18 January 1940.

Dear Joe: As of possible interest to you I am enclosing the General Board's report on organization of the Navy Department. Will be glad to get your comments if and when you get time.

I will drop entirely the question of Captain Smith coming to the PENNSYLVANIA for the purpose of acquiring CinC background on war plans.

Before he starts Fast I will ask him to ask you for an appointment so that you may send back any general thoughts you may wish to of a confidential nature which would be useful to all of us. In this connection I have a letter from Tommy Hart, just received, in which he thinks the situation in the Far East is very serious and that this year may prove to be a crucial and critical one. As I have written Bloch, and as you undoubtedly know, I have continually asked him to bear in mind what is going on to the Westward which in this particular period in this old world's history may be far more important to us than the troubles in Europe, especially if something should break and break quickly and without warning. It is something, in my humble opinion, for which you should be mentally prepared. Anything in this wide world I can do to help, of course I will; that is my only reason or existing here. Incidentally by officer messenger or otherwise, I would be glad to know what your thoughts are in that connection so that I may be in harmony and may be able to transmit them to higher authority if they should be asked.

Hope the Army Maneuvers have been greatly beneficial. The President is intensely interested in our working closely with them in all ways, and the pull-together here in the Department is very close.

Best wishes to you all as ever

Sincerely,

/S/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania,"
昭和九年（一九三四）年一月十八日

デフォルメー・マスターサイダー

海軍大将よりジョー・オーサー・ドッソ
海軍大将宛

髙級官制一九〇一Ａ－１

「髙級官制案に対する異見ありと考えた」

要求者らの報告書を同封致します。同時か間々時に貴君の批評を聴かせ
てもうへたら幸いです。
Memorandum dated Oct. 16, 1940, from Admiral Richardson to Admiral Hart, concerning a proposed blockade of Japan in the event of aggressive action over the reopening of the Burma Road.

EXHIBIT NO. 11

CinC File No. U. S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship
A16/01687

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.
Subject: International situation - Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.

Enclosures: (A) Copy of assumptions.
(B) Copy of tentative operations.

1. During the recent visit of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, to Washington and on October 10, the Secretary told the Commander-in-Chief that the President was considering, in connection with possible retaliatory measures taken by Japan against Great Britain upon opening of the Burma Road, the following:

(a) Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet as a peace-time move.

(b) Declaring a complete embargo on shipments to and from Japan.

(c) Attempting to stop all trade between Japan and the Americas. To accomplish this latter measure, he (the President) proposed establishment of patrol lines of light forces from Honolulu westward to the Philippines and a second line roughly from Samoa to Singapore, "in support of" the first line. The impracticability of this and other suggestions was explained to the Secretary, and, after some further conversations dealing with eventualities and at the direction of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief, and his War Plans Officer in conjunction with the War Plans Division of the Chief of Naval Operation's office, submitted a memorandum (Enclosure A) of assumptions outlining the situation presented by the Secretary and a brief outline sketch of operations (Enclosure B) by the U. S. Fleet to meet the assumptions in a more practicable manner. This was submitted to the Chief of Naval Operations on October 11 for submission to the Secretary and the President as to what the Navy proposed to do if directed to proceed on the proposed assumptions and tentative decisions.
EXHIBIT NO. 11

CinC File No., UNITED STATES FLEET
A16/01687

Long Beach, California
October 16, 1940

Subject: International situation - Reenforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.

2. To date, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, has had no further word in regard to the memorandum referred to above, but received a despatch today from the Chief of Naval Operations directing that a copy be forwarded to you via the HOUSTON. It is believed that further study in the Department and in the Fleet will result in some modifications in the operations proposed for the Fleet, particularly as regards distribution of patrol planes and cruisers.

3. The further operations indicated in paragraph 9 of Enclosure (B) are measures for the reduction and occupation of the Marshall Islands, or a feint in the Mid-Pacific which will be initiated when a train is assembled and transports are ready. Due to the situation in the Atlantic, the Department did not feel that our main Fleet should get too far in the Pacific, as it might be necessary to call it back on short notice. It was felt, however, that active operations against ORANGE possessions might have a deterrent effect on ORANGE full scale operations in the South China Sea and Dutch East Indies.

4. It will be noted that the above operations parallel very closely the present ORANGE Plan, modified by the despatch of an Advance Force to the Asiatic and further modified by the restriction of main Fleet operations to the Mid-Pacific area.

5. I was further told, in the Department that no Army forces would be available and that the British had agreed to the United States' use of Singapore.

6. In the event that the assumptions are not realized prior to about January 1, 1941, or decision is not reached to despatch the Advance Detachment before that time, there was discussion of assembling a train and transporting it to West Coast ports and holding a full dress rehearsal of operations against an atoll, as a Fleet exercise utilizing Christmas Island as a site. Steps are being taken for the acquisition and conversion of the necessary transports, etc., to be ready around that time. If this is done, the reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet may take place coincidently with this exercise, the idea being that Japan will be impressed by this evidence of United States determination to protect its interests. I presume you will be further informed of this eventually as plans are more fully developed.

7. My secret serial A16/01683 of this date, covering the composition and proportion of the tentative detachment slated for reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet, in case such a move is ordered, was forwarded to
Subject: International situation - Reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet.

you by clipper locked box, a copy being sent on the HOUSTON with this letter.

8. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

J. O. RICHARDSON

Copy to: (via airmail)

Opnav (This copy canceled by OpNav despatch 192000 of Oct. 6)

Defense Note: Portion below signature in handwriting.
MEASURES AND OPERATIONS TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY THE U.S. FLEET

1. Mobilize U.S. Fleet, in accordance with Orange Plan.

2. Redispose forces now in the Atlantic as follows:
   a. Move 2 heavy cruisers and one division of 4 Old Destroyers to Southern Brazil - Uruguay, and Argentine ports, basing locally or on Falkland Islands in order to interdict ORANGE trade and protection of U.S. Shipping.
   b. Move 2 heavy cruisers, one aircraft carrier, and 4 destroyers (from Pacific) to cover west coast ports of South America, basing locally or at Panama.
   c. Move 18 Old Destroyers to Pacific for local defense and protection of U.S. Shipping as follows:
      - 9 to Puget Sound and Alaska
      - 5 to San Francisco
      - 4 to Hawaii
   d. Move one aircraft carrier, one light cruiser, two transports, one destroyer tender, all new destroyers, one Destroyer transport, plus 1st Marine Brigade (now at Guantanamo), and three new submarines, and three old submarines to West Coast.
   e. Move PatWing 5 (___planes) with tenders to San Diego for local coastal defense (relieve PatWings 1 and 4).

3. Take measures for defense of Alaska as follows:
   a. Dispatch two submarines and small tender to Dutch Harbor.
   b. Reenforce Marine garrison at Dutch Harbor by remainder of defense battalion, housing them in vessels chartered for the purpose.
c. Dispatch one squadron (6 planes) of Patrol Planes, plus tender, to Dutch Harbor, and one squadron (6 planes) and tender to Kodiak.

4. Prepare a detachment for possible dispatch to East Indies area, consisting of 4 CA, 1 CV, 9 DP, 4 AMD, (Deadiv 51), 1 AC, 1 AD. This force will reinforce U. S. Asiatic Fleet units which will have retired to this area, and will operate in conjunction with British and Dutch Naval Forces. Upon arrival Asiatic waters, this force will report to the Commander-in-Chief, ASIATIC FLEET. (NOTE: - If degaussing and other mobilization measures have not been completed prior to departure, this hazard will have to be accepted, and materials required will have to be forwarded at a later date. In addition, if sent prior to the completion of readiness measures for the operation of the main body in the Mid-Pacific, it must be realized that war may result with this valuable force exposed and unsupported. The same is true of the Asiatic Fleet.

5. Dispatch promptly from Hawaii a detachment consisting of carrier, cruisers, and destroyers to sweep North Pacific waters between Hawaii and Aluetians for Japanese commerce, or Japanese raiders. To be fitted in with mobilization requirements.

6. Assemble transports and train and embark 2nd Reenforced Marine Brigade in West Coast ports.

7. Take measures for defense of Pacific Islands as follows: -
   a. Reenforce MIDWAY with remainder of Defense Battalion, 2 Patrons, 4 OSS, 1 ASR.
   b. Operate 2 SS for defense of WAKE.
   c. Operate 2 SS and 1 Patron with tender from JOHNSTON ISLAND, provide small Marine listening post.
   d. Operate 6 VP, 1 AVP, and 2 SS for defense of CANTON ISLAND.
2. Dispatch 2 OSS for defense of SATHOA.

3. Dispatch 2 Patrons of Patwing ONE to HAWAII (24 Planes) after relief by Patwing FIVE.

8. Dispatch remainder of Subrons FOUR and SIX (Approximately 14 SS) to CAROLIN’S and MARSHALLS for preliminary reconnaissance operations.

9. Upon completion of mobilization preparations, assemble Fleet in HAWAII prepared to initiate further measures as the situation requires.

10. Assist in defense of U. S. Shipping by the detail of certain Fleet Forces to Coastal Frontier forces. In the Pacific this will be comprise:

   • 4 DM to HAWAII
   • 3 OCL to Pacific Coastal Frontier.
ASSUMPTIONS.

1. The Gravity of the situation existing today is intensified by the opening of the Burma Road by Great Britain.

2. The Japanese announce or indicate that the opening of the Burma Road is an act unfriendly to Japan.

3. The Japanese undertake retaliatory measures to enforce cooperation with Japan by Great Britain in the Far East.

4. Japan undertakes positive aggressive action to enforce full cooperation by the Dutch East Indies.

5. The United States proclaims complete embargo on shipments from the United States or United States possessions to Japan and non-intercourse with Japan.

6. The United States undertakes by diplomatic and naval action to prevent Japanese trade, in Japanese ships and in ships of other nations, with the Western Hemisphere.

7. The United States will support British forces in the Western Pacific, in Australia and Singapore, and Dutch forces in the Dutch East Indies in stopping Japanese trade south of China Sea - Celebes Sea area.

8. The United States is prepared to accept war if the measures taken cause Japan to declare war.

9. Great Britain will prevent any naval aggression in the Western Atlantic against the Western Hemisphere by the Axis Powers.

10. The situations and decisions by the United States assumed herein may arise 17 October, 1940.
ル事ミツイテ更ニ調議シテ来タ後、
海軍作戦部長ノ意見ニ従テ、司令
長官及び其参謀ハ海軍作戦部長官下ノ役ヲ指揮ヲ受クノコ
事ノシテ、海軍作戦部長ノ意見ニ従テ、司令
長官及其實参議ハ海軍作戦部長官下ノ
役ヲ指揮ヲ受クノコ事ノシテ、海軍作戦部
長官及其实参議ハ海軍作戦部長官下ノ
役ヲ指揮ヲ受クノコ事ノシテ、海軍作戦部
長官及其实参議ハ海軍作戦部長官下ノ
役ヲ指揮ヲ受クノコ事ノシテ、海軍作戦部
始ノルベキ中部太平洋ニ於ケル軍制運動デアルト太西洋ノ形勢ニ當役

省ハ戦ガ主力ヲハテ至念ニhipヒ良ス必要ガアルコトヲ考慮シテ太平洋ニ余

リスノア事スル藤川作戦ハ南支那及西南部戦攻ハナツヲ大豆ヲレナイトハレタ。

上記ノ候補ハ現オレンドー作戦ト非常ニ近似セタモノデアルリ後者ニハア

ジア前衛部隊ノ派遣又更ニ中部太平洋地区ノ主力当該艦戦限ヲ加ハテ

リスレハ合衆国ガーシンガポールハ独占スルノニ同国シタイフ事ヲ開

イタ。
I do not know what to do.
現在太平洋二隻及航空母艦四隻、ヨリナル及びナッコフ航空隊及びノース島基地を攻撃。
障害大陰ノ部野井
AASR
四ニケスニケ分限デミッドウェイ}

(a) ポリメール
(b) ポリア
(c) ポリトン
(d) ポリト

江戸中
中防衛ノ為ニケスコメト
二ニケスコメト作戦ニ

(1) ポリモア
(2) ポリト
(3) ポリト
(4) ポリト

(1) ポリモア
(2) ポリト
(3) ポリト
(4) ポリト

合衆国海軍防衛
若千ノ艦隊ヨーヨリナル
ミゾハ
(1) ポリモア
(2) ポリト
(3) ポリト
(4) ポリト

合衆国海軍防衛
為ニケスコメト
二ニケスコメト作戦ニ
合衆国当局に西郷太平洋及びオーストラリア及ビッカースボルダー

シナ支那海はセレス海以南日本に易子停止セル

合衆国ハ一萬以上ノ手数ノリ日本ガ照応スル場合ハニジル状態

出発テキル。
Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

(2) 11 July 1941, Subject: Strategic Estimate of the Situation.

July 11, 1941.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.
Subject: Strategic Estimate of the Situation.

1. At your informal request there are attached revised data on the foreign situation. These data supersede those furnished by 1st Indorsement, May 26, 1941, to your memorandum W.P.D. 4510, May 24, 1941.

SHERMAN MILLS,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2

(4) In the Far East (Singapore area), there are approximately 4½ divisions, 2 Indian, 1 Australian, and the remainder made up from local forces. At Hong Kong there is approximately a brigade of British troops and a few local units. The Royal Air Force has about 13 squadrons in this area. There are also minor naval forces.

(5) Lines of Action:
To continue on the strategic defensive in all theatres until such time as unforeseen events will permit the offensive, and to seek by every possible means to bring the United States into the war at the earliest possible moment.

(Page 1335 and Page 1339 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(42) 4 December 1941 to OPNAV, Action: ALUSNA TOKYO, BANKOK ASTALUSNA, PEIPING, SHANGHAI.

(42) Top Secret
4 December 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: ALUSNA Tokyo, ALUSNA Bankok, ASTALUSNA Peiping, ASTALUSNA Shanghai
Infe: CINCAF, ALUSNA Changking, Com 16

40330

Destroy this system at discretion and report by word Jabberwock. Destroy all registered publications except CSP 1085 and 6 and 1007 and 1008 and this system and report execution by sending in plain language "Boomerang".

(Page 1408, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
Secretary of State,
Washington.

234, May 18, 5 p.m.

At my conference today with the Minister for Foreign Affairs Arita handed me the following message which the Prime Minister requested me to deliver personally to the Secretary of State on my forthcoming visit to Washington in the hope that the message may also be brought to the attention of the President:

At present there is a serious antagonism among the nations of Europe and no one can assure that there will be no clash in the near future. If, by mischance, war is to break out, its consequences would be practically beyond our imagination and the indescribable sufferings of hundreds of millions of people as well as the complete
D. D. 1500-B-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
26 January 1940.

COMMANDEER-IN-CHIEF
UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA
FLAGSHIP

26 Jan. 1940

Dear Betty:

The remarks in your letter of 18 Jan. about the situation in the Far East, the possibility of something breaking without warning and my need to be mentally prepared are somewhat disquieting.

When the China incident started and on every opportunity until after I left the job as Asst. C.N.O. I used to say to Bill Leahy, Be sure to impress on the boss that we do not want to drawn into this unless we have allies so bound to us that they can not leave us in the lurch.

There is a possibility that the constant repetition had something to do with the trip of Ingersoll.

When this understanding was reached it had some value but under present conditions it has little value as it affords us the use of a base in exchange for an obligation to protect about 2½ continents.

I strongly feel that you should repeatedly impress on the boss that an Orange war would probably last some years and cost much money, my guess is 5 to 10 years 35 to 70 Billion dollars.

I have always thought that our Orange Plan was chiefly useful as an exercise in War Planning, to train officers in War Planning and to serve as a basis for asking for appropriations and as a guide for developing our Navy and its shore facilities. As to actually executing the O-1 plan I hope we will never be called on to do that unless the Administration fully realizes the probable cost and duration of such a war and unless our people are prepared to support an expensive war of long duration.

Even if we could take Truk what would we have. A secure anchorage, nothing else, several thousand miles from our nearest drydock and adequate repair facilities and still hundreds of miles from the enemy country. Of course it could not be taken without some underwater damage. To actually put on real pressure we would have to have a real base. That would take many years and much money. We ought not to go into a thing like this unless we expected to see it through.

I hesitate to write you because the written word is so easily misunderstood, also I do not know what your ideas are, what you are telling the boss, what is the meaning of our diplomatic moves, or our Senators talks, or our neutrality patrol. But you are the principal and only Naval Advisor to the boss and he should know that our Fleet can not just sail away lick Orange and be back at home in a year or so. Also the probable cost of any war should be compared the probable value of winning the war.

When we commissioned the San Diego DDs we used the facilities of San Diego Base, Active DD Tenders, or working parties from active DD, and then
D. D. 1500-B-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
26 January 1940.

tenders and Mare Island Yard. I think that an excellent job was done but if it had been a real Mobilization, all of these activities would have been fully occupied. How long would it have taken San Diego Base to have done this and its other mobilization work without any outside assistance? A war plan if it is to be executed should be based on realities.

All of this letter may be needless but I know that if you do not tell the boss what you really know and feel about the probable cost and duration in Orange War NOBODY will.

I would hate to see our leaders make a move from which they could not gracefully withdraw, and which would eventually force us into a war, half heartedly supported by our country. In other words before this Nation takes a step I hope we will carefully examine the direction we are heading, where we will eventually go and be prepared to resolutely pursue the course whatever the cost.

I will finish this letter after I see Adm. Sharp and send it to you by him.

/s/ JOR

1 Feb.

I have seen SHARP and he has told me about his work on this trip.

The Minor Joint Exercise and Critique have been completed. There was no evidence of any friction or discord. The exercise certainly led the Army to believe that the Navy is highly efficient.

There is danger that many erroneous conclusions will be drawn from this exercise. Of course in actual war we could not have done anything like using all boats from BBs, CLs & CAs for landing. The boats would not have been on board and ships could not have come in shore and stopped for 25 men while lowering boats. There was no sea, no surf and nothing but Ideal weather.

If we ever do anything like this again I hope we have adequate warning, plenty of time, and proper preparation.

I am sending this by Comdr. Curtis.

Hastily

/s/ J O Richardson

Defense Note: In handwriting.
D. D. 1500-B-1

23 Feb

OFFICE OF CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

C.N.O.

I have not answered this -

Nimitz had a letter from Andrews and wrote him the
substance of my letter to Taffinder -

Then later sent him a copy of my letter to Taffinder -

In my opinion further reply is not necessary unless
to say that Nimitz has written to Andrews -

R.L.E.

Defense Note: In handwriting.
防弹波1900乙
ディスト肉

若シ再びスカル・モト

専差

カーテイス

印ジェイオーリチャードソン

匆々
Defense Doc. 1500-B-3

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

(3) 17 July 1941, Subject: Japanese Movement into French Indo-China.
(Excerpt)

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Japanese Movement Into French Indo-China.

JULY 17, 1941

2. It is the considered opinion of this division that this Japanese movement as planned, while opportunistic in conception, was also strategically defensive in character and designed primarily to prevent British and American influence from shutting off supplies of rubber, tin and rice from Thailand and Indo China which are badly needed by Japan.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff

(Page 1342 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
三角文書第一五号

マンハッタン作戦に於ける九月間一時

ワシントンD.C. (州) 安部（記載）

ラジオと電信を用じて

三九四年七月十七日

件名：電報三封日本NO.

参謀本部長宛

件名：電報三封日本NO.

日本兵見落

マンハッタン作戦及び

電信作戦ノ

ラジオと電信を用じて

三九四年七月十七日

件名：電報三封日本NO.

日本兵見落

マンハッタン作戦及び

ラジオと電信を用じて

三九四年七月十七日

件名：電報三封日本NO.

日本兵見落
Defense Doc. 1500-B-4

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(43) 4 December 1941 to OPNAV, Action: CO MARDET PEIPING CO MARDET TIENTSIN.

(43) Top Secret
4 December 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: CO MARDET Peiping, CO MARDET Tientsin
Info: CINCAF, Com 16
O40343

Destroy this system at discretion and send word Jabberwock when this has been done. All registered publications except this system must be destroyed immediately by Mardets Peiping and Tientsin and reported by word "Boomerang" in plain language. Use discretion on all other confidential papers.
アメリカ合衆国第七十九軍会議期に於ける真珠湾攻撃共同調査委員

会の資料文書第三十七号からの提出

基礎的資料・電報類

昭和十六年十二月四日

作戦関係

海軍作戦部

作戦関係

北京及天津海兵分遣隊司令官

第十六管理司令部

情報関係

合意に本システムを破棄し、破棄し終ったとはジャパニーオックと書
いて説明された。北京及天津の漢兵分遣隊は本システム以外のすべての
発動した公表文書をすみやかに破棄し、明瞭に「プーマラング」を書か

tて報告されたし、
他のすべての秘密報酬に就いても適宜の処置を講じられたし。

「姑獲鳥攻撃」第十四巻、第一四〇八頁。
The operating of Chinese guerilla forces armed, equipped, and directed by the associated Powers. Steps have already been taken by the British Government to organize such operations. It is recommended that the United States Government organize similar guerilla forces.

Senator Ferguson: Did we ever organize those, to put this plan into effect?

General Marshall: So far as I know, prior to December 7, 1941, we did not, as far as I can recollect.

The one action, aside from sending supplies into China, that I do have a very definite recollection of is equipping the air force, the Flying Tigers.

Senator Ferguson: The Volunteer Air Corps?

General Marshall: Yes; because I took the action to get (3237) them the planes personally.

Senator Ferguson: The Volunteer Air Corps was a force of airmen, combat planes, P-401s, I believe, furnished by the United States, and operated by volunteer officers from the United States, I think, of the Army and Navy, and there may have been even civilians in it. I am not quite certain.

Some of them were reserve officers, and they were relieved from active duty, and released so that they might go into the employ of the Chinese Government.
Saturday, November 24, 1945

Congress of the United States
Joint Committee on the Investigation
of the Pearl Harbor Attack
Washington, D.C.

If the committee will recall, in exhibit 18, introduced yesterday, we placed in evidence President Roosevelt's message to Mr. Churchill concerning the modus vivendi which was sent on the basis of a draft prepared by Mr. Hull to which Mr. Roosevelt added the remarks concerning being prepared for real trouble soon, and this message, which I would like to introduce, and have designated as Exhibit 29, is the reply of Mr. Churchill to President Roosevelt forwarded through State Department channels.

The Vice Chairman. Read it into the record.

Mr. Gesell. The message reads as follows:

Your message about Japan received tonight. Also full accounts from Lord Halifax of discussions and your counter project to Japan on which Foreign Secretary has sent some comments. Of course, it is for you to handle this business and we certainly do not want an additional war. There is only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not having a very thin diet? Our anxiety is about China. If they collapse our joint dangers would enormously increase. We are sure that regard of the United States for the Chinese cause will govern your action. We feel that the Japanese are most unsure of themselves.

As I indicated, this was in reply to the President's message concerning the modus vivendi to Prime Minister Churchill and, of course, relates to that subject.
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
16 February 1940.

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

AIRMAIL PERSONAL
CLASSIFIED

San Pedro, California
16 February 1940

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

Dear Betty:

Today I received a despatch from Andrews, a copy of which is enclosed, urging that the information in regard to the change of home ports of vessels of the Hawaiian Detachment be released for publication. This is requested in order that the maximum number of unoccupied houses and apartments at Honolulu may be overhauled and made available for occupancy. I felt constrained to reply negative.

The delicacy with which you must handle this matter is fully appreciated; and the reasons for your negative reply to my previous despatch requesting that the security classification of the despatch changing the home ports of these ships (Opnav 031811 of February 1940) be lowered are fully understood.

It seems to me, however, that the provision of acceptable living accommodations will be highly conducive to contentment and morale. Therefore, I request that the restriction on publicity be eliminated as early as you deem it advisable, and that Andrews and I be informed by despatch.

It may be of interest to you to know that the fact that the home ports of these vessels have been changed appeared in the Los Angeles Times of 4 February under a Honolulu date line, and was subsequently copied in Long Beach and San Diego papers as shown by the enclosure.

It appears that this matter is widely known now, but in view of the restrictions on publicity Andrews probably feels that he can not officially urge private interests in Honolulu to prepare houses for the occupancy of Naval personnel.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

/s/ J. O. Richardson

J. O. RICHARDSON
一九四〇年二月十六日附ジェームズ・フォートラチャードソン海軍大将宛書簡

合衆国海軍大将 エッチ・アール・スターグ

米国海軍部長 ペンシルベニア

在米調査関係者へ

ハワイ派遣艦隊の醜態に思う。

これはハワイに於て出来得る限りの不適当なことを促すものである。

貴君がこの問題を慎重に取扱われたものでこそ私に犯と答へざるを得ません。

一九四〇年二月海軍作戦第〇ハービー号に貴君が始められた理由も十分明らかです。

私には、立派な住宅施設を設けることは請願と志気の上に大いに

しかし大いに
SECRET

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT

Serial 0130012
Washington, November 5, 1941

Memorandum for the President:
Subject: Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Kagaruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident". If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rocky country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided those troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing all naval vessels from the Atlantic except 1

1Preceded by handwritten insertion "practically".

- 1 -
D. D. 1500-C-2

(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation", dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

The only existing plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by means which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increasing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

Two preceding words struck out, and handwritten word "current" substituted.
(a) Memorandum "Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation" dated Nov. 5, 1941, for the President, by General Marshall and Admiral Stark.

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or South of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i.e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

Chief of Staff.  
Chief of Naval Operations.
防護司令

第一〇〇一号

防護書類

防護書類

第十六号(ア)マーシャル陸軍大将及びミスター海軍大将が大統領に宛てたる「敵軍情勢に関する調査」と題する昭和四一年十一月五日、大統領宛書簡

注文

在大使、マガヌルダ使節団及び合衆国海軍部官より最近入手せる諸情
日本の空襲が確定の攻撃を行う場合、北朝鮮を基地としてその兵力を
集中して10か月以上を要する。故に攻撃作戦の準備はこれ以前に
行ければやや容易で、略300哩に亘る距離及び道路の不充分等
により困難を極めるものとなる。補給線維持も容易でなければ
ないであろう。故に中国は防禦に有利なる地勢を利用し、地上部隊のみ
によりこの攻撃を挫くしめる好機会を有することとなる。但しこれは
これら部隊が量共に充分なるものとしてのことである。

海の作戦部隊及び陸の参謀部隊が考慮に入れた問題は、合衆国部隊が敵
本のビルマ公路進撃を阻止するため日本に対し攻撃的立場に立たれた時
合衆国がその大犠牲を明かにし得るか否かといふ点である。両部隊は
かくの如き行動は如何に有益をとらしても戦局戦争になるであろうと考
へた。

目下の所太平洋に於て無制限の戦略的作戦を行うことが出来ている。大
西洋より引揚げて海軍を強化する必要がある。太平洋艦隊の
総兵力はその時までには印象的な大ささにまで達するであろう。所米アソリ関係路が開通されるが日本参謀本部は、対日戦争を急起する恐れきたが手段もって由石に援助の手を差し延べることが出来るのは、米英参謀本部会議において一致を見た基本の戦略政策及び戦略は依然として妥当である。

(1) 米英参謀本部会議において一致を見た基本的戦略政策及び戦略は依然として妥当である。戦略的戦略を日本に通して敵を敵に於ける共同努力を弱化せしめる所大であるからである。

(2) その安全が米国にとり被らめて重要なる地域を日本が攻撃若しくは直接に

Ref. Doc. # 1500-C-2
1) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
2) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
3) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
4) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
5) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
6) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
7) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
8) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
9) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
10) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
11) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
12) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
13) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
14) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
15) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
16) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
17) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
18) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
19) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
20) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
21) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
22) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
23) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
24) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
25) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
26) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
27) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
28) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
29) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
30) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
31) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
32) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
33) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
34) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
35) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
36) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
37) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
38) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
39) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
40) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
41) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
42) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
43) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
44) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
45) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
46) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
47) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
48) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
49) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
50) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
51) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
52) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
53) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
54) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
55) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
56) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
57) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
58) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
59) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
60) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
61) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
62) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
63) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
64) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
65) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
66) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
67) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
68) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
69) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
70) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
71) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
72) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
73) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
74) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
75) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
76) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
77) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
78) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
79) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
80) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
81) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
82) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
83) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
84) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
85) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
86) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
87) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
88) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
89) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
90) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
91) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
92) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
93) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
94) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
95) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
96) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
97) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
98) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
99) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動
100) 日本の実質的直接的戦争行動

海軍作戦部長及び陸上参謀総長並びに海軍作戦部長及び陸上参謀総長は、進展に核を充分发挥せしむる為に、対日抗戦設備は進むともにそれを確実に保つに努め、時期に応じた増強すること。

海軍作戦部長

指揮命令

昔日攻防演習を発したとし、海軍作戦部長
EXHIBIT No. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

(4) 17 July 1941, Subject: Mobilization of Additional Japanese Manpower.

(Excerpt)

JULY 17, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF:
Subject: Mobilization of Additional Japanese Manpower.

3. In view of the fact that the major part of the Japanese Army is pinned down in China without a large mobile reserve and the further fact that the Siberian Army is about twice the size of the Kwantung Army (20-30 Divisions to 12), the strengthening of the Japanese force in Manchoukuo appears to be a logical precautionary procedure.

SHERMAN MILES
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Copy to War Plans Division.

(Pages 1342 - 1343 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
EXHIBIT NO. 37
BASIC EXHIBIT OF DISPATCHES

(44) 4 December 1941 to OPNAV, Action: NAVSTA GUAM

(44) Top Secret
4 December 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: NAVSTA Guam
Info: CINCAF CINCPAC Com 14 Com 16

Guam destroy all secret and confidential publications and other classified matter except that essential for current purposes and special intelligence retaining minimum cryptographic channels necessary for essential communications with CINCAF CINCPAC Com 14 Com 16 and OPNAV X. Be prepared to destroy instantly in event of emergency all classified matter you retain X Report crypto channels retained.

(Page 1408, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
グアム、聯合軍総司令官、太平洋艦隊司令長官、第十四管区司令
部、第十六管区司令部、及び海軍作戦部との主要連絡に必要なる最
少の暗號路を保つ。現下の諸目的並びに特殊情報に必要なるもの
を除き、一切の保有秘密物件を非正式の際に即時破壊出来得るよう準備せよ。

保有暗號路は報告せよ。

尾崎大攻撃

第一十四回訂○八頁
ACTION OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FAR EAST IN SUPPORT OF CHINA

At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday, morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Tunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was announced that the British should send some planes to Thailand, and that Japan should be warned again against movement into Siberia.

Following Captain Schuirmann's presentation, Admiral Stark read a Navy Department estimate of the recent dispatches received from Chungking. Admiral Ingersoll gave his personal review of the situation. A summary of this review was that:

a. The decision on the Far Eastern situation, made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the U.S.-British Staff Conversations Report ABC-1.

b. A major war effort in the Pacific would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas.


d. The requirements in tankers alone for support of a Pacific war would create a serious oil shortage in this country, and the United States fleet cannot be supported in the Pacific without auxiliary shipping and adequate supplies.

e. The shortest line of communication is flanked by Mandated Islands, and is vulnerable to Japanese attack. Two other routes are available for communications to the Far Eastern Theater: one via Australia; the other via Suez of Good Hope.

f. Assuming that the fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilities are available at either Manila or Singapore, while there are docks, nevertheless the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present.
Manila is not as yet a secure base for the Fleet due to the lack of adequate anti-aircraft protection for the anchorage.

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of launching an attack in five directions: viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand, and against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five operations, United States' action should be in case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack; in case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East until the augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and army forces, becomes available.

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the Fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get back. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schuermann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Burney's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be Naval and that, under this assumption, the consideration should be given to the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 15. He then read General Czerw's analysis of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December, the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations.
弁護側文書

合衆国議会

証據書類等第十六号附部一号及一号文

米国の極東に於ける中国援助行動

海軍大佐は将門に於ける極東情勢を計議した国務省会議に於て、米国は米国の軍事行動上之声明を行った。シユア

海軍大佐は蔵介石を.clearRect大将と、未及び未

結果の会議で米国は大英帝国に日本に対し敵意を示すことを約束した。米国は大英帝国に対し、日本に対する敵意を示すことを約束した。
6艦隊が極東に移動する。しかし、補充はまだコストを考慮せねばならぬ。

米国は現在、英米の封鎖を解除することなく、艦隊を編成中である。現在の問題点は、艦隊の修繕と整備のための基地の確保である。米国は、現在、この問題を解決するために、八八艦隊をSolverに派遣している。この行動により、米国は、現在の海軍力の増大を達成している。

米国は、現在、東アジアの情勢を観察しており、特に、米国以前の日本に対する抗議を示している。米国は、現在、この問題を解決するために、八八艦隊をSolverに派遣している。この行動により、米国は、現在の海軍力の増大を達成している。

米国は、現在、東アジアの情勢を観察しており、特に、米国以前の日本に対する抗議を示している。米国は、現在、この問題を解決するために、八八艦隊をSolverに派遣している。この行動により、米国は、現在の海軍力の増大を達成している。

米国は、現在、東アジアの情勢を観察しており、特に、米国以前の日本に対する抗議を示している。米国は、現在、この問題を解決するために、八八艦隊をSolverに派遣している。この行動により、米国は、現在の海軍力の増大を達成している。

米国は、現在、東アジアの情勢を観察しており、特に、米国以前の日本に対する抗議を示している。米国は、現在、この問題を解決するために、八八艦隊をSolverに派遣している。この行動により、米国は、現在の海軍力の増大を達成している。
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
15 March 1940.

Confidential

Dear J. O.:

I am somewhat at a loss as to just how to answer your questions (a), (b) and (c) in your letter of 8 March.

I do not know whether Bloch left his personal file of correspondence between him and me, for you to read over or whether he talked it over with you. The background for sending the Hawaiian Detachment was for the most part contained in this personal correspondence.

One of the first questions which was brought to me after I took over this job was the possible reinforcement of the Asiatic Fleet which had been requested by Admiral Hart. This reinforcement was to be preferably, according to Hart's request, a division of heavy cruisers. His second choice was a division of light cruisers. The situation in Shanghai Settlement in regard to control of that area was tense. The situation in Tientsin, especially in regard to British Japanese relations, was critical. The war in Europe was breaking. We wanted to do what we could for Hart, strengthen the State Department's hands, and at the same time not weaken our own position.

I looked into the question of our War Plans, especially as to the Commander-in-Chief's Operating Plan for an Orange campaign. This seemed to meet a strategic situation in the Pacific in a manner by which Hart would be supported by naval deployment, and the Commander-in-Chief would still have close control over all units of the Fleet.

The result was that on 8 September I wrote to Bloch and made the suggestion of sending a detachment to Hawaii, but only after I had talked it over with the President and the (he) okayed it one hundred percent; as did the State Department.

There were several despatches back and forth (Opnav 0022-1815, 0024-1225, CinCUS 0023-1255, all of September), and also one or two telephone calls. Bloch recommended that Andrews be in command; he also recommended that my first suggestion of moving the submarines to Hawaii be held up; I concurred in both recommendations. Admiral Bloch was opposed to sending any more cruisers to the Asiatic. They were not sent.

We did reinforce the Asiatic by one tender, one squadron of patrol planes and six new submarines. The Hawaiian Detachment fits in with the Commander-in-Chief's Operating Plan Orange.

When the time came for the Hawaiian Detachment to go, a proposed press release as drawn up showing the reason to be "For the purpose of facilitating training operations." The President finally said: "Do not release it to the press."

Hardly had the Detachment arrived in Hawaii when the question of rotation came up. After a good deal of correspondence back and forth we took the bull by the horns and sent out our directive in regard to this question (CNO Serial 938 or 4 January 1940). Of course the question of home ports and transportation of dependents was a big item in arriving at the final decision.

My original ideas in regard to the Hawaiian Detachment were that possibly, in fact probably, the Commander of this Detachment would be able to carry out the regular schedule of gunnery
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
15 March 1940.

Firings and for training would be able to visit the various island possessions in the Mid-Pacific area to familiarize himself with these possessions and their potential uses in time of war.

I still think that the decision to send the Detachment to Hawaii under present world conditions is sound. No one can measure how much effect its presence there may have on the Orange foreign policy. The State Department is strong for the present setup and considers it beneficial; they were in on all discussions, press releases, etc.

I find that in the above I have more or less covered your paragraphs (a) and (b). I cannot help but feel that a Vice Admiral should be in command of the Hawaiian Detachment. He would probably command the above force prescribed in War Plans. Administration may be difficult but it will be more difficult in war and means should be developed to offset this difficulty.

In regard to your question (c), of course I don't know whether the President will go to the Coast before his term of office expires or not, but I think the chances are that he very probably will; in fact he intended to go last October and couldn't. At that time he told the people in San Francisco that he would try and come at a later date. My guess is that if world conditions will permit his leaving Washington you will see him sometime before Winter on the West Coast with the desire for a fishing trip, or more possibly a desire to go to Alaska which he has so often expressed. A cruiser force flagship or its equal will be required, because the President will doubtless want to take someone with him. When he went to the Canal Zone in the TUSCALOOSA he was comfortable but he had cut down his entourage to the minimum.

In regard to the relief of the AUGUSTA, I have received your official letter and we are now making a careful study of it from all angles and hope to find a solution which will be satisfactory in the main to both ends.

The decision to retain one division of CAs in the Atlantic was made after considerable discussion with the President. Some would have two divisions. I held one division is enough, supplemented as it is by a couple of CLs. With the general requirement of two cruisers in the Caribbean and two on the North Atlantic Coast, we cannot well do with less. For the time being at least we will have to retain one division of CAs on this side.

I will be glad to get your reply to my letter on the CL Force Flagship. Personally I do not see it - but I am prepared to do what you want.

Fvery good wish as always and best of luck.

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet,
USS "Pennsylvania,"
San Pedro, California.

P.S.—Mr. Edison expects to leave Washington on 26 March and join the Fleet 1 April; leave Hawaii in NASVILLE 15 April; arrive San Francisco 20 April; inspect San Diego about 24
D. D. 1500-D-1

Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
15 March 1940.

April and return to Washington about 28 April. I do hope you can acquaint him with the Navy on this trip. Deyo will take up the details on his arrival in the West, etc., and you will be acquainted with them later.
布袋今造隊が主発動時期に、大型作戦演習に用いる。<br>
今造隊の指揮下において、布袋今造隊が作戦演習用として、訓練を実施しており、中華民国などの<br>
進歩に伴う戦時状況に、明治の作戦計画を基に、露骨な軍事的な態度が示されている。<br>

この作戦計画は、布袋今造隊の指揮下において、進歩に伴う状況を対応するために策定されたものである。<br>
布袋今造隊の指揮下において、訓練を実施していることから、明治の作戦計画を基に、進歩に伴う戦時状況を対応することを目的としている。
Memorandum from Admiral J. O. Richardson for Admiral H. R. Stark - 9 October 1940.

1. Go ahead with assembly of Train.
2. Have we fuel oil in Samoa adequate to fill four (4) old light cruisers?
3. Give me a chart showing British and French Bases or possible bases for surface ships, submarines or airplanes in Islands in the Pacific, east of the International Date Line.
4. The British Ambassador stated that Ghormley was busy transmitting to the Department information regarding technical materials, and the British Admiralty felt that they should have officers prepared for staff conferences.
5. The British believe the Germans will attempt to occupy Dakar from Spain over land through Africa.
6. I (F.D.R.) can be convinced of the desirability of retaining the battleships on the West Coast if I can be given a good statement which will convince the American people, and the Japanese Government, that in bringing the battleships to the West Coast we are not stepping backward.
7. The President indicated that he might approve sending a Division of old Light Cruisers to visit Mindanao as a gesture. He did not appear favorably disposed toward sending a stronger force.

/s/ J. O. RICHARDSON
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.C.

EXHIBIT NO. 33

18 July 1941, Subject: New Japanese Cabinet.

I. B. 99

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: New Japanese Cabinet.

1. A United Press dispatch from Tokyo dated July 18, 1941, states that Prince Konoye has selected the key men for a new and highly militaristic Cabinet. Vital posts are reported as follows:

- Premier: Prince Konoye
- War Minister: General Tojo
- Navy Minister: Admiral Oikawa
- Home Minister: Baron Heranuma
- Foreign Minister: Admiral Toyoda

2. The first four named above are hold-overs from the former Cabinet. Admiral Toyoda replaces former Foreign Minister Matsuoka.

3. Admiral Toyoda was a protege of the former Admiral Baron Saito (assassinated in 1936 while Premier) and is regarded as a moderate. He is known as a clever, able officer, a specialist in Ordnance, and as having had considerable experience in diplomacy, particularly with the British.

4. The new Cabinet may be regarded as strongly nationalist, and while probably more moderate and conservative than would have been the case if an Army Officer had been given the portfolio as Foreign Minister, it may be that added impulse will be given to Japan's Southward Advance. In this connection, it must be remembered also that Admiral Toyoda has just completed a tour as Minister of Commerce and Industry, and is fully aware of the deplorable condition of Japan's foreign trade and internal economy. He may be expected, therefore, to take steps, as Foreign Minister, which will improve foreign trade conditions since such trade is the life blood of industrial Japan.

SHERMAN MILLS,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

(Page 1343 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
一、一九四一年（昭和十六年）七月十八日，日本的政府在新内閣の政務会議において、日本の新内閣が政府の政策を決定することを発表した。これに続いて、政府は日本国が帝国の政策を決定し、この決定を発表することを求める声明を発表した。
なる標子は次の如く数えられることである。

三、前之に交代したのである。

二、言の内初めの四名は前内閣よりの留任者である。豊田健督は松岡内閣を

臣就任した場合にsteenせられたやうなものとし考へられ得るが、軍人が外務大

の意思を有す人物に廃するに至って知られ居る。

臣就任した場合にsteenせられたやうなものとし考へられ得るが、軍人が外務大

の意思を有す人物に廃するに至って知られ居る。
(45) Top Secret
6 December 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: CINCPAC
Info: CINCPAC
061743

In view of the international situation and the exposed position of our outlying Pacific islands you may authorize the destruction by them of secret and confidential documents now or under later conditions of greater emergency X Means of communication to support our current operations and special intelligence should of course be maintained until the last moment.
は周りを最後の瞬間迄維持すべし。
（原珠沼攻城一第十四卷一四〇八頁）
There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message to the British Prime Minister containing a description of a proposal for a modus vivendi made by the Japanese Government to this Government and of a suggested alternate modus vivendi which this Government proposes to offer to the Japanese Government.

If you approve of the draft telegram, I shall arrange to have it forwarded.

Signed: OK

Enclosures
Draft telegram

Signed: OK  S.E.W. ADDITION FOR

* * * * * * * * * * *

Telegram Sent

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington  November 24, 1941

11 p.m.

American Embassy
London (England)

SECRET FROM THE PRESIDENT TO THE FORMER NAVAL PERSON

On November 20 the Japanese Ambassador communicated to us proposals for a modus vivendi. He has represented that the conclusion of such a modus vivendi might give the Japanese Government opportunity to develop public sentiment in Japan in support of a liberal and comprehensive course of peace covering the Pacific area and that the domestic political situation in Japan was as acute as to render urgent some relief such as was envisaged in the proposal. The proposal calls for a commitment on the part of Japan to transfer to northern Indochina all the Japanese forces now stationed in southern Indochina pending the restoration of peace between Japan and China or the establishment of general peace in the Pacific area; when Japan would withdraw all its troops from Indochina, commitments on the part of the United States to supply Japan a required quantity of petroleum products and to refrain from measures prejudicial to Japan's efforts to restore peace with China and mutual commitments to make no armed advance.
ment in the southeastern Asiatic and southern Pacific areas (the formula offered would apparently not exclude advancement into China from Indo-China), to cooperate toward obtaining goods required by either in the Netherlands East Indies and to restore commercial relations to those prevailing prior to the adoption of freezing measures.

This Government proposes to inform the Japanese Government that in the opinion of this Government the Japanese proposals contain features not in harmony with the fundamental principles which underlie the proposed general settlement and to which each Government has declared that it is committed. It is also proposed to offer to the Japanese Government an alternative proposal for a modus vivendi which will contain mutual guarantees of peaceful intent, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancements into areas which would include northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indochina, not to replace those forces, to limit those in north Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which must not be subject to replacement and shall not in any case exceed 25,000 and not to send additional forces to Indochina. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunks and ship supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifications, raw cotton up to $600,000 monthly, petroleum on a monthly basis for civilian needs, the proportionate amount to be exported from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports in general provided that raw silk constitute at least two-thirds in value of such imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase of the designated exports from the United States and for the payment of interest and principle of Japanese obligations within the United States. This Government would undertake to approach the British, Dutch and Australian Governments on the question of their taking similar economic measures. Provision is made that the modus vivendi shall remain in force for three months with the understanding that at the instance of either party the two parties shall confer to determine whether the prospects of reaching a peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area warrant extension of the modus vivendi.

(Written in ink) The British Ambassador has been informed and is informing your Foreign Minister.

Add (A)

Signed: Roosevelt

Signed: Hull

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

(A)

Add at close

This seems to be a fair proposition for the Japanese but its acceptance or rejection is really a matter of internal Japanese politics. I am not very hopeful and we must all be prepared for real trouble, possibly severe.

Signed: Roosevelt
ロンドン（支）。

ワシントン—一九四一年十一月二十四日

午後十一時

ロンドン（支）。
決定

ストラット云フ條件ヲ一ケ月内ヲ改ハル旨ノ規定ヲ附ケル

署名
ルーズダニルト

署名
ルーズダニルト

署名
ルーズダニルト
THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AMERICAN EMBASSY
Tokyo, June 7, 1939.

No. 3936

SUBJECT: JAPAN'S FOREIGN POLICY IN RELATION TO THE SITUATION IN EUROPE.

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL; FOR THE SECRETARY AND UNDER SECRETARY

The Honorable
The Secretary of State,
Washington.

Sir:

I had the honor in my telegram no. 245, May 26, 8 p.m., to present an analysis of certain trends in Japanese thought with regard to foreign policy in relation to the situation now developing in Europe. I observed that there
were elements in Japan - not to be confused with certain congenial, but withal ineffectual, persons educated abroad who have been telling us that reaction to Japan's China policy was "just around the corner" - who realized that, in the event of a war in Europe, the maintenance by Japan of neutrality between the democratic and totalitarian camps would afford Japan little security, and that national security could be assured in the long run only by liquidating the conflict with China. I was not unaware of the need for resting an observation of this nature on a reasonably firm basis, and it is my purpose in this despatch to lay before the Department the circumstances, some of personal knowledge and the others which derive by deduction, on which my view was based. As there is no discussion in the press or in any other public forum of the question whether or not Japan should align itself with Germany and Italy - indeed, any reference by the press to this question is officially interdicted - information with regard to thought trends has come to me largely by word of mouth.

The first conversation which needs to be recorded took place on May 16, at a luncheon which was given in honor of the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew by a Japanese who, while holding no official position, is a close friend and confident of high officials of the Court and of Prince Konoye, Minister
without Portfolio, and Marquis Kido, Minister of the Interior. He is in a position to exercise through various contacts considerable influence on the Government. As we left the table, our host drew the Ambassador and me into another room and talked substantially along the following lines:

Although the Japanese Government has decided not to conclude a military alliance with Germany and Italy, there was being exerted on the Government, not only by Germany and Italy but by reactionary groups in Japan, strong pressure toward entering into some arrangement with the latter countries which would reaffirm the solidarity among the nations whose policies were opposed by the democratic nations. The groups to which he belonged had succeeded in defeating the proposal to conclude the alliance and are now doing their best to defeat the "strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact", or at least to prevent it from becoming a political link with Germany and Italy; but it was difficult to meet the argument of those who had advocated the alliance and are now favoring close association with Germany and Italy, that Japan cannot afford to be isolated. Germany and Italy are urging Japan "to come over to their side", while the democratic nations are turning to Japan a very cold shoulder. If, therefore, the democratic nations,
especially the United States, could indicate to Japan that restoration of good relations with Japan is desired and that the way is open for Japan to align herself with the democratic nations, but not against the totalitarian states, those Japanese who are working for precisely those objectives would have their hand greatly strengthened.

The Ambassador said that he was very much interested in the views just expressed, but that it must be obvious that the restoration of peace and good relations between Japan and China must be a condition precedent to the restoration of good relations between Japan and the United States and other democratic nations. He could not, therefore, recommend that his Government give any gesture of welcome to Japan unless he were first satisfied that the terms of peace with China which Japan had in view could be reconciled with China's peace terms and would meet with the approval of the American Government.

Our host then talked very vaguely about the readiness of Japan to withdraw from central and South China, but when asked to give specifications he replied that a full statement on Japanese peace terms might better come from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He undertook to report the conversation to Mr. Arita, and to suggest to Mr. Arita that he give the Ambassador a precise explanation of
Japanese objectives in China during the conversation which the Ambassador had arranged to have with Mr. Arita on May 18th.

Mr. and Mrs. Arita were entertaining the Ambassador and Mrs. Grew at luncheon on May 17, and Mr. Grew prearranged with me that I should endeavor during the luncheon party to ascertain from Mr. Arita whether our host of the previous day had consulted him. I accordingly took advantage of a favorable opportunity to engage Mr. Arita in conversation. I found that he was quite familiar with the discussion of the previous day. He said that there had been a suggestion that he give Mr. Grew an assurance that Japan would withhold any action to "strengthen the Anti-Comintern Pact" until Mr. Grew returned to Washington and had an opportunity to discuss with his Government the possibility of making to Japan some "gesture of welcome". Mr. Arita said that there was no important opinion in the country unfavorable to the measure which had been proposed to combat communist activities, and that, if the time became ripe for the conclusion of the agreement under discussion with Germany and Italy, the Japanese Government intended to proceed with it. He could, however, assure Mr. Grew that the agreement would contain no military, political or economic clauses; but with this proviso - if it were found that these activities were being instigated by the Soviet Government, the counter-measures
proposed would have to be directed against that Government.

Mr. Arita then passed on to the negotiations between the Soviet and British Governments concerning the "common front against aggression". He said that Japan is very anxious to avoid involvement in the affairs of Europe, but that Japan could not ignore the fact that Russia straddled Europe and Asia, and that, whether Japan liked it or not, its policies and actions form a bridge by which events in the Far East and in Europe act and react on each other.

The British Ambassador had, he said, given him definite assurances that the arrangement under discussion by the British and Soviet Governments would specifically be made inapplicable, but he (Mr. Arita) replied that any arrangement which formed the basis for the close collaboration contemplated by Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union in respect of their common interests in Europe would be bound to bring about similar collaboration among them in the conduct of their policies in the Far East. He delivered himself at some length and with considerable show of heat over Sir Robert Craigie's insistence that the assurances given Mr. Arita should dissolve any Japanese anxiety with regard to the effective scope of the proposed arrangement. Mr. Arita concluded the conversation with me with the observation that decision over Japan's attitude vis-a-vis the situation developing in Europe would have to
be withheld until results of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations were known.

A full account of the Ambassador's conversation on May 18 will be found in his telegram No. 235, May 18, 7 p.m.

The impressions which the Ambassador and I had formed of Mr. Arita's views as expressed in the conversations of May 17 and 18 agreed in every respect. It seemed to us that Mr. Arita, far from indicating any eagerness to find a way to approach the democratic nations, was preoccupied with the effects on the Far East of the establishment of the "front against aggression" and was not in a conciliatory mood. The Ambassador came, therefore, to the conclusion, as I did, that there was no justification for believing that desire to bring Japan into line with the democratic nations as against the totalitarian nations animated the Japanese Government as such.

Whether by accident or by design, I was approached on the same day, May 18, by a Japanese hitherto unknown to me but who had made the acquaintance of the Ambassador as a fellow passenger during a voyage across the Pacific, with the suggestion that I have a "chat", as he put it, with the Prime Minister. I asked the gentleman to call again, as I wished to consider the matter. I informed the Ambassador of the call and of the suggestion that I have a talk with the Prime Minister. Mr. Grew said that he had
formed a favorable impression of Mr. Fujii, the person who had called on me, and that he saw no reason why I should not return a favorable reply. When Mr. Fujii called again, I said that I would be glad to have an opportunity to make the acquaintance of the Prime Minister, but that I had heard rumors of the possibility of a change of government and wondered, therefore, whether a call at that time would be opportune. Returning on the following day, Mr. Fujii brought an invitation from Baron Hiranuma to dinner on May 23, when he intended to explain his purpose in sending through Mr. Grew his message to the Secretary, and word to the effect that no change in the government was impending. I accepted the invitation. Mr. Fujii then emphasized the importance of keeping a profound secret the forthcoming talk. He said that Baron Hiranuma's political position was reasonably secure, but that the alignment of factions within the Government over European policy was so delicate as to require that the Prime Minister act very cautiously.

Mr. Fujii called for me on the evening of May 23. As we went in my car, which bears an Embassy license tag, Mr. Fujii proposed that we alight some distance from the Prime Minister's private residence and go the rest of the way on foot; we did. At the gate of the residence there stood a number of policemen, who, although obviously
surprised by seeing a foreigner, made no attempt to stop me. The servants were prepared for my visit, but I have reason to believe that they, as well as two female relations of the Prime Minister's who served us later at dinner, and no knowledge whatever of my identity. It might be added that the residence, which is situated in the suburbs, is small and quite unpretentious and would barely grace a small tradesman. These details, while inconsequential, may perhaps reflect my impressions at the moment.

Baron Hiranuma received me very courteously. He said that he unfortunately had few opportunities to meet foreigners and thus to receive at first hand the impressions of foreigners with regard to conditions in various parts of the world. The situation in Europe was, in his view, a delicate one, and he felt confident that he could obtain from an American a more objective appraisal of that situation than he would be likely to procure from an European.

I expressed regret that I was not in a position to give him any information other than that which was public knowledge. There then ensued a colloquy on the situation in Europe, during which Baron Hiranuma displayed knowledge not only of a factual nature but of political trends in
Europe which surprised me. One of the points brought out which, in his view, made for danger in Europe was that Chancellor Hitler - with the objectives which he has in mind for Germany to achieve - provides an issue around which all elements in Great Britain can rally; the imperialists, who do not propose to tolerate a Germany which can pretend to equality with Great Britain; the industrialists, who fear German commercial competition; and, finally, the Jews, radicals and even the Germanophiles, who vie with each other in their hatred of Hitler.

Baron Hiranuma then said that the possibility of a war arising in Europe was one which he contemplated with horror. It would inevitably result in the total destruction of civilisation, as no nation, however remote from the seat of war, would hope to escape the eventual consequences even though it might be fortunate to avoid direct involvement. He had publicly stated on several occasions that Japan could never be a democracy or a totalitarian state, and that Japan could make its greatest contribution by bringing together in harmonious and peaceful relations the two groups of nations. There were, he continued, elements in Japan which considered that Japan could not afford to maintain a condition of isolation and that her security demanded that she enter into "special relations" with Germany and Italy. He was insisting, however, that Japan follow what he termed "moral diplomacy". A nation's
existence was not to be measured by decades, and it was essential, therefore, that statesmen charged with the destinies of national fix their attention on long term objective rather than on gaining favorable tactical positions, which were after all, ephemeral. The most important of these objectives was a stabilized peace to replace interludes of preparation for the next war. Japan, like the United States, was not directly involved in the troubles of Europe; and it was his thought that these two nations, which were the only Great Powers situated outside of Europe, were in a position to exercise a moderating influence on Europe. To exercise that influence was a duty which they owed their own peoples, for the downfall of Europe would inevitably bring with it the downfall of the rest of the world. In his opinion, the first step which had to be taken was to check the tendency toward the division of Europe into two politically hostile camps. He wondered whether the views of the American Government were responsive to those which he had expressed in his message to the Secretary.

I said that the American Government had taken a lead, in respect of both time and emphasis. In making known discord fact that nations are today interdependent and that discord between any nations is a matter of concern to all others. His message to the Secretary did not, I said, contain any definitive suggestion as to how the United States and Japan
might proceed toward averting war in Europe. The principal difficulty, in my opinion, in the way of the collaboration which he had suggested in talking to me was Japan's policies and actions in China. I felt certain that the American Government would, in other more happy circumstances, have welcomed Japanese cooperation toward alleviating the threat to peace in Europe which, the great majority of Americans believed, arises from the policies and actions of Germany and Italy; and I doubted whether the American people would favor collaboration with a nation which it believed to be following in the Far East precisely those policies and actions that are considered to be the root of the trouble in Europe. I also said that the American people have laid before them nearly every day reports of bombings of American property and of other instances of violations of American rights and interests in China. The Foreign Office was trying to exculpate the Japanese military authorities by pleading military necessity or inadvertence, but enough had happened to justify belief that the Japanese authorities, in China at least, were systematically and deliberately trying to expel American and other foreign interests from China. The views of the American people in these respects were, I said, very definitely formed. I could not but feel, therefore, that the adjustment of the conflict in China on terms satisfactory to all concerned would have to be a condition precedent to that degree of
collaboration between the United States and Japan which could reasonably be expected to bring about the desired results in Europe.

The Prime Minister observed that he was well aware of the state of feeling which prevailed in the United States against Japan. The American people had assumed that Japan had deliberately provoked the conflict in China with a view to seizing the more populated and productive parts of that country, but he felt confident that the American Government realized that it had not been the original intention or desire of Japan to do anything more than to protect its rights in North China. It was also supposed by Americans that Japan intended to close the Open Door in China; and to his regret the actions of the Japanese authorities in China were not entirely reconcilable with the desire of the Japanese Government to respect foreign rights and interests in China. But he wondered whether the American Government realized that the Japanese people labored under a very real feeling of grievance against the Occidental Powers, especially Great Britain. When the Great War broke out, Japan was an ally of Great Britain. There were no legal obligations on Japan to support her ally, but she conceived that she had a moral obligation to do so. She accordingly declared war against Germany, her navy undertook operations against the German
fleet in the Pacific, her merchant marine cooperated in various ways, and finally her military forces eliminated Germany from Shantung. "The only thanks we got from Great Britain", continued Baron Hiranuma, "was the abrogation of that very alliance which inspired Japan to support Great Britain." Again, the rights which Japan had acquired in Manchuria as a result of her war with Russia and later by agreement with China were essential to Japan; nevertheless, the efforts of China to prejudice those rights were regarded by Great Britain and the United States with complacence, if not with benevolence; China took courage to persist, with the result that Japan had to resort to force in 1931 to protect those rights. Finally, the Japanese people came to the conclusion that the Nine Power Treaty and the Naval Treaties operated, not to stabilize peace in the Far East, but to bind Japan against safeguarding her interests in China. So long as the Japanese people felt that it had just cause for grievance, it was politically impossible for his government or any government which would succeed him to bring about complete equality of opportunity in China for all nations.

The Japanese people, Baron Hiranuma continued, have considerable sympathy for Germany and Italy, as they conceive these countries to be in many important respects in the same position as Japan. It was not to be expected
that Germany would have permitted herself to remain under the restrictions of the Versailles Treaty, nor that Italy would have been content to be dependent on other nations for supplied of raw materials. At the same time, the consequences of efforts on their part to redress their grievances by force, or of the stubborn refusal of the democratic nations to offer to correct these grievances could not possible to confined to the protagonists in the European quarrel but would have to be shared by other nations. He referred to my observation that the settlement of the China conflict would probably have to be a condition precedent to joint American-Japanese efforts to moderate the situation in Europe. If that were to be the view of the American Government, any hope of proceeding along the course which he had in mind would have to be abandoned. The objectives which Japan has had in China are essential for her security in a world of sanctions, embargoes, closing of markets to foreign competition, and lack of free access to raw materials, and so long as such conditions exist any moderation or her objectives in China and, therefore, of her peace terms, could not be considered. Nevertheless if conditions could be brought about which would assure to all nations markets for the world's goods on the basis of quality and price and supplies of the materials which they needed, the importance to Japan of
securing a market and sources of raw materials in China would greatly diminish; and by the same token there would not be the urge that there now is on Germany and Italy to expand at the expense of weaker and smaller nations.

Baron Hiranuma stated that the conditions which brought about the situations in the Far East and Europe are not local but universal in character, and that neither situation could be settled in a manner calculated to bring about a stabilized peace unless the conditions which brought them about were corrected.

Baron Hiranuma said that the belief was widely held abroad that Japan was considering a military alliance with Germany and Italy. He had endeavored to explain frankly the basis of Japanese sympathy for Germany and Italy, and he could say quite definitely that the basis of what appeared to be a concerting of Japanese policy with that of Germany and Italy lay in the fact that all three countries are in the same economic strategic position. He personally was of the opinion that Japan, whose government would for all time to come rest on the sanctity of the Imperial Family, could not tie itself by special relations to any foreign government whose stability depended on the continued existence and political prestige of one individual. There were both in Germany and Italy political currents
flowing beneath the surface which, in his view, would
gravely prejudice confidence in any political arrange-
ment, such as an alliance, which Japan might make with
whose countries. Hidden dissident elements would be
certain to make themselves felt in time of war and thus
are to be reckoned as a threat to the success of German
and Italian arms.

At this point we were interrupted by notice that
dinner was served. The conversation during dinner was
not in any way pertinent to the subject of this despatch,
being confined to discussions of points in Chinese
philosophy, personal reminiscences, and so on, the Prime
Minister discoursing in a most interesting manner.

Returning to his study, the Prime Minister said that he
wished to draw together the various threads of our
conversations, as follows:

The United States and Japan were the only powers
which could help to prevent the crystallization of the
trend toward the division of Europe into armed camps.
There can, however, be no confident hope that a permanent
peace can be established until the world-wide economic
and political conditions which bring about unrest in Europe
and in the Far East can be corrected; and if an interna-
tional conference can be called to solve the problems
which create unrest, Japan would be prepared to agree to
the inclusion of the Far Eastern situation among the problems to be discussed. Before any call for such a conference could be issued, Great Britain and France, and Germany and Italy, would have to be sounded out. If the President were prepared to make a confidential approach to the European democracies; he would be glad to approach Germany and Italy; and, if there were returned favorable replied by these nations, he would be glad to have the President call the conference under such conditions as might be agreed upon after discussion through normal diplomatic channels.

I wish to make it clear, before setting forth certain conclusion which I draw from these conversations, that I do not put forward the views of those Japanese - even though they be persons of great importance and influence - who harbor hopes of restoring good relations with the democratic nations, as being necessarily the views of the Japanese Government. These are, however, the views of a powerful element in the Government; they may prevail or they may not, but they cannot be ignored.

Any observer who is in any way sensitive to things not seen would, if be were in Tokyo today, become aware of the groping for security against the gathering storm in Europe. I should perhaps add parenthetically that the
European situation today has assumed primary proportions, and that it would be visionary to suppose that the present confusion concerning the course which Japan should follow is due to despondence over the apparently ineffectual hostilities in China. The Army and other elements which have thus far controlled China policy have assumed that the Far Eastern conflict could be permanently and completely insulated against repercussions from situations elsewhere, as they did not look to American and other occidental armed intervention in that conflict. Although reference has been made in the Embassy's telegrams to the effects of the President's message to Chancellor Hitler, I do not believe that I could, by further reference to that message, exaggerate the impulse which it had toward persuading the Japanese Government to realize that there may be grave danger of involvement with the United States "not directly across the Pacific but by way of Europe", as one Japanese put it to me. I should, however, place that observation in proper perspective. A threat by the United States to eject Japan from China would, I am confident, be resisted. But if war were to break out in Europe with the United States participating on the side of Great Britain and France, the outcome in the view of those Japanese who think along rational lines would admit of no doubt. With Germany and Italy crushed, the prospect of confronting the
victors would not be a palatable one to Japan.

There are, therefore, ‘in the situation which seems to be developing but two courses for Japan to follow - either to go over unreservedly to the totalitarian side, or to restore good relations with those nations which, in the opinion of one element of the Japanese Government, would be the victors. True, in rejecting the proposal to join Germany and Italy in an alliance, Japan provisionally chose a third course - neutrality. I am inclined, however, to doubt whether there are many Japanese who confidently believe that neutrality would afford security. The arguments of those who believe in the superior power of Germany and Italy are obvious and simple: Japan has only to associate herself with those countries and wait for the European war to pick China like a ripe plum. But, for those Japanese who have other views concerning the power of Germany and Italy, there is but one way by which Japan's security can be safeguarded, and that is to bring the conflict with China to an end on some reasonable terms. Here again I wish to make it clear that the desire for a settlement of the conflict does not derive from moral regeneration but from realization of stark facts.

In concluding this despatch, which is already unconscionably long, I wish briefly to allude to the
discrepancy between the attitude of the Prime Minister as indicated in his conversation with me and that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose preoccupation over the Anglo-Soviet negotiations has already been mentioned. It is obvious that the desire of the Prime Minister for American collaboration to bring about peace in Europe (and in the Far East) cannot be reconciled with the readiness, which is almost an eagerness, on the part of the Foreign Minister to meet a fancied threat from Great Britain. These two points of view reflect conflicting policies, and which of these policies will prevail may perhaps be decided by events of the next few days.

Respectfully yours,

/S/ Eugene H. Dooman
Charge d'Affaires ad interim.
8 April 1940.

DEAR JO: I have just been glancing over your letter of 8 February to Admiral Nimitz to check my memory on one of your questions as follows: I did it because of some information which came in this morning.

(a) Is "CinCus facing trouble in the Western Pacific" so surely as to warrant giving that consideration greater weight in the preparation of the flag slate than the usual peacetime considerations of training flag officers for higher command? If so, the best should be kept at, or ordered to sea.

I believe Nimitz answered your letter but was not able to answer the above question. I want now to answer that question with an emphatic affirmative. I believe the situation in the Far East is continually deteriorating so far as our relations with Japan are concerned. I may be unduly pessimistic but I do want to communicate my thoughts for what they are worth and I might add they are backed by some pretty concrete evidence. I think you should continually keep uppermost in your mind the possibility of trouble in the Orient, and the means to meet it.

The President has been troubled with a bad cold and we are about two weeks overdue in an appointment with him; however, we are hoping we will have it within the next few days and after he has agreed to the topside slate we will send you his desires for your further recommendations lower down.

I am also in hearty accord with the last paragraph of your letter and to save you the trouble of checking I am quoting it:

"If the eminence of trouble does not outweigh other considerations, I think that the most promising material for high command should be given adequate sea experience at the expense of the less promising, and that a long range plan should be prepared with a view to having the best possible available with recent Fleet experience and with adequate time to serve when those now in high position in the Fleet step out of the picture."

Here's hoping the Maneuvers are highly beneficial from every standpoint.

Every good wish as always,

/s/ BETTY.
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson 7 May 1940.

(Copy of Mr. Edison's letter of 5/7 enclosed)

Confidential Mail 5/8/40 to catch clipper of 5/14 7 MAY 1940.

Dear J. O.: Just hung up the telephone after talking with the President and by the time this reaches you you will have received word to remain in Hawaiian Waters for a couple of weeks.

When the Fleet returns to the Coast (and I trust the delay will not be over two weeks, but I cannot tell) the President has asked that the Fleet schedule be so arranged that on extremely short notice the Fleet be able to return concentrated to Hawaiian Waters. This will present somewhat of a problem in lugging around more oil with you perhaps than usual and keeping more provisions on board because if action is wanted it will be wanted quickly. As far as I can see, your proposed schedule meets this requirement and unless you hear to the contrary you may assume it okay.

I am glad you want to run East to have a talk in the Department. Had you not suggested it, I would have myself. We have been making some close examinations into the War Plans recently and I remarked at the time I wished you could have been present. I trust your arrival here will not be delayed over about two weeks, beyond what it normally would have been.

Of course you know the thought behind the above and that is that the Italian situation is extremely delicate, the two weeks ahead regarded as critical; then - - - ?? ---- nobody can answer the riddle just now.

I am still hopeful that our Expansion Bill will go through. The Appropriation Bill has also to be acted on. Other than these two items nothing of particular interest that I can think of for the moment from the Fleet standpoint.

I hope to get money for elevation of the NEW YORK, TEXAS and ARKANSAS guns. My feeling is that these ships are of little use as is, and that even if they have to be out of the Fleet under overhaul at a critical time, we should go ahead with them. Do you concur?

Am also looking into the question of one or two more flag officers in Atron which I believe you desire.

Am delighted you are able to give War Plans your personal attention. Personally I think it is one of our most important jobs.

I don't know how you feel about it, but I have always felt that CincUS was loaded up with too much in the way of material matters and administration; and that in general material matters should not go beyond type commanders, at least as far as routine items are concerned. For example if Condes-batch wants to find out something about his destroyers, he can ask for Com-des-batch tell him, or better still, has Com-des-batch write him or see him frequently enough to keep him in general touch. It seems to me force commanders should not have to sign or even think about the thousand and one material details which must detract from their more important duties; let the type commanders do this.*

* This is just thinking out loud - but I would like to talk this over with you when you are here.
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson 7 May 1940.

I know you have a tough job in submitting the names of six rear admirals from among whom three may be earmarked for furlough. I have got to do the same myself. If you and Peck agree it will automatically make it easier. I just mentioned to the President the advisability of appointing the three of us to constitute a board to actually meet and make this recommendation. This would take away any political repercussions so far as the President is concerned. However, he didn't take to this idea and said all he wanted was to be told verbally the names.

With best wishes as always

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

【秘】
昭和十五年五月七日附
ジェー・オー・リチャードソン
海軍大将宛

【密】
昭和十四日のクリッパー機に間に合ふ様

拜啓、
大統領と話をして電話を切ったところです。此の手紙が届く頃には貴君はもう二週間向か水路に留まる様にとの知らせを受取つてゐるでしょう。

大統領は艦隊が本局に薦められたらゝ巡れても二週間は越えまいと思ふが、それは分らぬ。最短の敝案で以て向か水路に留まる様にと要求されてゐます。これは敝案を普通以上に持ち巡るといふ点と、行動が必要となる場合には迅速を要するので艦隊に一層多くの食糧を保有して置いて置かなければならぬといふ点で貴君には申し負かうと存じます。が小生の見る限りでは貴君の行動致案案は右の題となるところと思ふ。
要求に対し合意して居り反対の命令に接させる限り貰君の依拠表はオーケ

と承知されてよいであろう。

海軍省で打合せをする為母東行したいとの部希望は結局です。若し貰君
から申出でなければ貰君が提案するととろでした。其の際小生は貰君に加って貰ひた
整に於て詳細な検討を加へました。貰君の当地着が順番に延びる難定を越へて約
二週間以上遅れるとはないと思ひます。

勿論貰君には上司の言葉の恐れの意味がつつもてるでしょう。郎も伊太利の
情勢が急めて微旋であつて二週間後が危険と認められる、それから先は

小生は冷ね、我々が彼張張案の為に望を捨てません。艦隊の立場から
は目下のところこの二項を除いては

特に闘心を持つ事は思いあたりません。

小生はニューヨーク籍、テキサス籍、アルカンサス籍の艦砲の仰角を高
くする為母金が欲しい。小生の考へては之等諸艦は現在のまゝでは無り

役に立たないのでたへ危険の除にこの三艦を點検修理のため艦隊から
除外しなければならないとしていても、所信を断行すべきであると思うので

支出を取り除くべきか否か、

ないと存じます。売見に御見給なりや否や？

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることが出来るのは喜ば

何にしても売君が破格料額に親しむ考覧を加えることがあると小生自身は考
小生は貴君が海軍の少将六人を指名し、そのうち三人に賜賜の数定をして報告しなければならぬ事は仰々無礼な事事だと存じます。賜下とベックとの御同票なら更に自然容易に速ぶと思ひます。小生は大統領に我々三人を委員に任命し貰従に會合して右の推摩を掌る委員会を構成する方が宜しかろうかと申しました。折くすれば大統領に遺る意見を取上げず自分の望む所は名前を口頭で速べて欲しいのですと申しました。
EXHIBIT NO. 37
BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(46) 6 December 1941 to COM 14, Action: OPNAV

Top Secret.
December 6, 1941
From: COM FOURTEEN
Action: OPNAV
Info: 060114

Believe local Consul has destroyed all but one system although presumably not included your eighteen double five of third.

(Page 1409, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
国防総合調査会

事務局

事務機関

会議日時

米国第七十九回国第一会期

第十四国第一会期

作戦関係

海軍作戦部

連絡

昭和二十六年十二月六日

貴方第三号の十八五号は含まれざるが如し。

（兵庫総合調査会）第十四卷一四〇九頁一
Defense Document No. 1500 E-5

Zhongking, November 25, 1941

Leuchlin Currie

After discussing with the Generalissimo the Chinese Ambassador's conference with the Secretary of State, I feel you should urgently advise the President of the Generalissimo's very strong reaction. I have never seen him really agitated before. Loosening of economic pressure or unfreezing would dangerously increase Japan's military advantage in China. A relaxation of American pressure while Japan has its forces in China would dismay the Chinese. Any "Modus Vivendi" now arrived at with China would be disastrous to Chinese belief in America and analogous to the closing of the Burma Road, which permanently destroyed British prestige. Japan and Chinese defeatists would instantly exploit the resulting disillusionment and urge oriental solidarity against occidental treachery. It is doubtful whether either past assistance or increasing aid could compensate for the feeling of being deserted at this hour. The Generalissimo has deep confidence in the President's fidelity to his consistent policy, but I must warn you that even the Generalissimo questions his ability to hold the situation together if the Chinese national trust in America is undermined by reports of Japan's escaping military defeat by diplomatic victory.

Lattimore

****************

Copy of Message Transmitted to Secretary Stimson by
Mr. T. V. Soong, Under Cover of a Letter Dated November 25,

"TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL CHIANG KAI SHEK TO DR. T. V.
TING, Zhongking, November 25, 1941

"I presume Ambassador Hu Shih has given you a copy of my telegram yesterday. Please convey contents of the message to Secretaries Knox and Stimson immediately.

"Please explain to them the gravity of the situation. If America should relax the economic blockade and freezing of Japanese assets, or even if reports that the United States is considering this should gain currency, the morale of our troops will be sorely shaken. During the past two months the Japanese propaganda have spread the belief that in November an agreement will be successfully reached with the United States. They have even come to a silent but not the least definite understanding with the doubtful elements in our country. If, therefore, there is any relaxation of the embargo or freezing regulations, or if a belief of that gains ground, then the Chinese people would consider that China has been completely sacrificed by the United States. The morale of the entire nation will collapse and every Asiatic nation will lose faith, and indeed suffer such a shock in their faith in democracy that a most tragic epoch in the world will be opened. The Chinese army will collapse, and the Japanese will be enabled to carry through their plans, so that even if in the future America would come to our rescue the situation would be already hopeless. Such a loss would not be to China alone.

"We could therefore only request the United States Government to be uncompromising, and announce that if the withdrawal of Japanese armies from China is not settled, the question of relaxing the embargo or freezing could not be considered. If, on the other hand, the American attitude remains..."
nibulous Japanese propaganda will daily perform its full purpose so that at no cost to them this propaganda will effect the breakdown of our resistance. Our more than four years of struggle with the loss of countless lives and sacrifices and devastation unparalleled in history would have been in vain. The sudden collapse of our resistance will be an unparalleled catastrophe to the world, and I do not indeed know how history in future will record this episode.”
それでも我々は唯合衆国政府が妥協を排して日本軍の中謀撤退が解決しないならで出発止や処理を緩和する問題を考慮されない旨を説明する一方アリカの態度が依然として曖昧である限り日本軍の宣伝は今日日にその恐怖すべき目的を達成し日本人には少しの損失も興えずにこの宣伝がいいへ抵抗の挫折は必ずや世界にとつては未だ信じられない戦況となります。この確実な我々の将来的の歴史がこの神話をどのように記録するか裁判私には全く分かりません。
Dear Betty:

When Hill went to Washington last January he took with him to Washington some ideas, largely Bloch's, as to what might be acceptable to the Commander-in-Chief, under the assumptions then made, to serve as a start from which Op-12 would develop basic assumptions to be officially transmitted within a few weeks, to the Commander-in-Chief for the existing plan.

During a recent conference in the Whidbey Naval District it was agreed out that we were badly short of .5"-38 caliber ammunition at Mare Island.

I am unable to grasp the meaning of Cnpav dispatch 112130 sent at 1940 last Saturday, but we are guessing that the Department has tentatively approved, with minor exceptions, the contents of the memorandum prepared for me by Hill, and that the Department will correct the ammunition situation at Mare Island.

The assumptions under which the Hill memorandum was drawn up and under which all other operations in the Western Pacific have previously been considered, are today all different. Previous assumptions and estimates of the situation no longer hold.

It seems that, under present world conditions, the paramount thing for us is the security of the Western Hemisphere. This, in my opinion, transcends everything -- anything certainly in the Far East, our own or other interests.

South America is the greatest prize yet remaining to be grabbed. Until the outcome in Europe can be more clearly seen, security in the Western Hemisphere seems to be the most important consideration for us.

I feel that any move west means hostilities. I feel that at this time it would be a grave mistake to become involved in the West where our interests, although important, are not vital, and thereby reduce our ability to maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere which is vital.

If the Fleet is to go west it can only start, properly prepared, from the West Coast where it can be docked, manned, stocked and stripped, and a suitable train assembled.

Rest assured that although I am entirely without information I realize your position, and I expect you to know that if the situation be such as much higher authority decides we should go West, all of us are ready to give all we have.

These are some of the things I wanted to talk to you about, and since I can not see you, I feel that I am duty bound to write you.
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
13 May 1940.

With kindest regards and best wishes,

Very sincerely yours,

/s/ J. O. Richardson

Please acknowledge receipt by iespacht.

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.

P. S. On 9 April I sent Andrews with a detachment in to simulate a raiding force against Pearl Harbor, to serve as an object for attack by our patrol planes and Army bombers, Andrews reported sighting Navy patrol planes, but he did not see any Army bombers.

Today we were picked up by our patrol planes about 0630, but we did not see any Army bombers. However, our submarine made several successful attacks from fairly short ranges. We had a heavy swell with white caps so that it was difficult to see the submarines.

While the Secretary was on board, one of the SARA-TOGA's fighting planes had a forced landing close aboard. The plane sank, but the Reserve Ensign was recovered without his even getting his feet wet.

Today one of the LEXINGTON bombing planes (SBU) had a forced landing. The plane sank, but the pilot and passenger were recovered with slight injuries.

The PENNSYLVANIA should anchor in Lahaina about 1700.

/s/ J. O. R.
一九四〇年五月十三日
海軍大將
ジェイ・オー・リチャードソン

布哇
一九四〇年五月十三日

派遣文書一五〇〇号

海軍大将
イツ・アール・スタンター

布哇
一九四〇年五月十三日

派遣文書一五〇〇号

海軍大将
ジェイ・オー・リチャードソン
第十二海軍区で開かれた最近の会議においてメール島において五インチ
三八ロケットの弾薬が著しく不足していることが明言されました。

小菅は大日の十時三十分に送不当された海軍司令部の内容は一部を除
いた文で省の方で認められたこと、と案して居りますメール島の弾薬
況も改善することにしたでありますと、我々は推察して来ます。

ヒル表書が速かに敵太平洋においての他の作戦が考察された以
前、の想定は今日では全く違っている。以前の想定及び事況判断はもはや適

と言えます。

現世界状勢下に於ては我々にとつて先づ考へねばならぬことは西半球
の安全であると思います。この小菅の考えでは極東に於ける何物よりも
我々の利益又他の利益何よりも先づ考へるべきだと思ひます。

南アメリカは今も今手中に入れられるものをその中ので巨大の機密、研究、積
活ロッパの蹄踏が一層見迫しのつう運は、西半球の安全は我々に

す。
小官は西への動きは何事なるを問はず戦国を意味するものであると思はれます。現在に於ては、吾々の制軍が重要ではあるが生命に係る西半球の安全を維持する实力を殲じるとは、重大なる過誤であると感じられます。若し英隊が完全に準備の下に西に動くとすれば敵隊の陪夜、乗組、...]
手紙が到着しましたので文にしてお送りします。

コロムビア地区ワシントン市海軍省、海軍作戦部長米国海軍大将エイチ・アールスターク

四月九日に小官は真珠湾攻撃隊の模擬隊として号令が海軍偵察機及び陸軍

爆撃機による攻撃の目標とするためにアンドレウス以下分遣隊を派遣しました。アンドレウスは海軍偵察機を認めたことは報告しましたが、陸軍

爆撃機は認めませんでした。今日我々は六時三〇分頃海軍偵察機に発見されましたのが陸軍爆撃機は認めませんでした。うなずくが大きくて白波が立つものので潜水艦を認めることを困難でした。

大臣が乗艦中にサラトガの攻撃隊の一が幾十近く不時着しました。飛行隊は沈みましたのが当の副隊長少尉は足不器とさすれば敵はこれました。飛行隊は沈

今日はワシントンの爆撃機（S.B.）が不時着しました。機雷は沈

Def. Doc. 1500 E-1
みました。が操縦士と乗員は大した傷も受けずに救われました。
ベンジルペンタニアは十七時頃ラハイナに投錨する旨です。
ジェイ・オーバル署名
Rear Admiral Bloch visited me yesterday stating that he had just been informed by General Herron, in secret, that he (Herron) had just received orders from the War Department placing Army in this area on the "Alert". This was done with special emphasis on possible carrier and plane attacks. He asked Bloch for a distant air patrol and inner air patrol.

I explained to Bloch your present patrol plan and informed him that I would establish immediately an inner patrol which I did at 1300 yesterday and am continuing same. General Herron desires that a VP patrol be established covering western semi-circle with Oahu as center instead of present VP patrol from Lahaina which as you know covers from 220 to 335 distance 180 miles.

I agree with Herron and I have VP to establish such a patrol which must begin at dawn each day.

I have discussed this matter with Fitch who is ready to start when you give the order.

I have also informed Rear Admiral Calhoun in secret.

If you desire this patrol established in lieu of present patrol I suggest that you send Combasefor a message "Affirm patrol" and this new patrol will be started tomorrow. Such a patrol is pictured as below:

\[ \text{Sector to be searched daily - Western semi-circle. The Army will cover night patrol, leaving us day patrol only.} \]

Calhoun and I are awaiting instructions.

Respectfully,

/s/ Adolphus Andres

I sent "Affirm Patrol" to Andrews on receipt of this.

JOR

(Defense Note: Above sentence in "handwriting.")
アメリカ合衆国、海軍イオニア、ハワイ州

一九四〇年六月二十二日付
海軍大将
スタンフォード

海軍大将

アメリカ合衆国海軍司令長官

一九四〇年（昭和十五年）六月十八日

アメリカ合衆国海軍司令長官

def. doc. no. 1500—p2

私はブロックに海軍敵意、及び航空機と敵に空母及び航空機一批が敵の行動か否かを知る旨

ブロックに空母及航空機と敵内空母及航空機を知り、要請しました。
私はこの問題を警官の命令あり次第開始しようと待っていた。私はヘロンと同感であり、毎日警備に始める警備を行うべきだとも

私はまたカルハウン海軍大将にも通知しました。

警備は明日から開始されます。

この警備は左図の通りです。
毎日探察すべき扇状区域

2. 西半円。

踏査が夜間探察をやり吾々は只昼間探察だけをやることになってみます。

カルハウンと私は指命を待つのです。

アンドルフス・アンドレス（署名印）

（総括四詳・右一文は肉筆）
5. There are clear indications that, in spite of the decisions outlined in Paragraphs 1 and 2 above, the Japanese Government is willing to take extraordinary diplomatic measures to keep the United States out of the war, at least temporarily. There are indications that Japan is unwilling to commit herself to the extent that Germany would like to see her committed. There are indications that Japan realizes that she must make some concessions to the strong political stand now taken by the United States, even though those concessions consist largely in further conversations and negotiations.

6. Considering all of the above, this Division believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part, offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific area and of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "paper diplomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Defense Doc. 1500-F-3

Distribution:
The President
Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Chief of Staff

War Plans Division
Office of Naval Intelligence
General Embick.

(Pages 1346 - 1347, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
の支配を受け得た、泰國に於ける軍事の経済の要求力は推進し、且重要

的支配を受け得た、泰國に於ける軍事の経済の要求力は推進し、且重要

万ソ連軍は対抗シテ、在、通國東進を以てソ連軍ハ台万ニ

四十万ソ連軍は対抗シテ、在、通國東進を以てソ連軍ハ台万ニ

加ヘ、日本ノ侵略政策ノ造成ニハ不利ナル以下ヲ現況ヲ現状ヲ新タニ

ウガラ、日本ノ侵略政策ノ造成ニハ不利ナル以下ヲ現況ヲ現状ヲ新タニ

ハハッチョル。
Drafting Section:
Administrative
Drafting Officer
T.J.B.
G-2 File Number:

PARAPHRASE OF AN OUTGOING SECRET RADIOGRAM

No. 40, Sent Dec. 3, 1941
Date: December 3, 1941

To: Military Attaché; American Embassy, Tokyo, Japan

Memorize emergency key word #2 for use of SIGNUD without repeat without indicators, destroy document stop SIGNQ, SIGRAP and SIGNDT should be retained and used for all communications except as last resort when these documents should be destroyed and memorized SIGNUD used stop destroy all other War Department ciphers and codes at once and notify by code word BINAB stop early. Rupture of diplomatic relations with Japan has been indicated. State Department informed you may advise Ambassador. MILES
てこれら書簡が差し入れ、前記したる、現在
が用ひらるべき場合を漸
きを保用しなきDealが活用
の様にての書簡に用ぶべし。信
は既ちに存じし、暗黙文字
に於り調査せよ。便宜欠
は皆下の大いに上信方
告し來れり。
CONFIDENTIAL FOR THE AMBASSADOR

In the light of the attitude of Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kaifu when they were heard on November 23 for consideration the document described in a separate telegram and of such indications as we have cumulatively had of the general attitude of the Japanese Government, it appears that the discussions up to the present time have not resulted in any decision which gives much promise of a satisfactory outcome give sentiment. It is of course too early to adopt any definite conclusion whether the discussions will continue or will lapse, but the probability that they may lapse should not preclude any thought of the possibility of a settlement.

The existence of such probability makes it appear advisable that we give some advance consideration to various problems which may arise in connection with our diplomatic and consular representation in Japanese territory. As long as the conversations might result in withdrawal of our diplomatic and consular representation from Japan, it would seem to us that, without any intention of being alarmist or of too hastily envisaging serious consequences, this question should be brought to your attention so that you may have it well in mind in case it should become necessary for the Department to consult you in regard to the making of arrangements for the packing of official and personal effects and the conditions under which other matters which we may be involved in the closing of our Embassy and Consulates. It is, of course, desirable that all phases of the matter be considered confidential and that discussion of it be kept to a minimum.

HULL
DEAR JOE: When we sent our dispatch it looked as if Italy were coming in almost immedately and that a serious situation might develop in the East Indies, and that there was a possibility of our being involved. However, the recent "blitzkrieg" events in Europe have certainly altered the picture for the time being. Personally I think it has made more remote (for the moment at least) the question of a westward movement of the fleet. I agree with the tenor of your letter and you will be glad to know I had already so expressed myself. I also realize events may change this picture and possibly over night.

With regard to the specific questions raised in your letter of 13 May, the Joint Plan for Rainbow Two is about complete, and a copy of it, including the studies upon which it is based, will go to you shortly by officer messenger. This joint Plan embraces in general all the basic assumptions listed in the memorandum Hill brought East. The joint tasks of this plan will require the operation of the fleet in general with the fleet tasks set up in Hill's memorandum.

I think these assumptions are about the best upon which a basic plan of this nature can be promised, although in any preliminary operating plan which you may prepare at present, I think you should assume the present strength and disposition of the fleet, in order to develop the problem from a practical basis.

As you get time in these strenuous days, I believe it would be desirable for you to go ahead with the preparation of a tentative Fleet Operating Plan for Rainbow Two, as we are most anxious to have the benefit of your detailed study of the difficulties involved, and the logistic and other requirements.

I wish you would keep constantly in mind the possibility of a complete collapse of the Allies, including the loss of their fleets. A very probable development of such a catastrophe is visualized in the Rainbow One Plan. Should the Allied fleets pass into the hands of the Germans, however, an entirely different, and far more serious situation would exist. I would appreciate your views regarding the best disposition of fleet forces in such an event.

Regarding the 5 inch 38 caliber ammunition we have realized the deficiency, and, as you probably know, Ordnance has now arranged for shipment of 20,000 rounds on the PYRO. We understand that this will complete the first increment of the mobilization supply on board and will give some room for target practice ammunition. It is my understanding that there will still be enough on shore on the West Coast and in Hawaii to meet mobilization requirements. I would be glad if you would confirm this.

I find that the 6 inch 47 caliber reserve supply on the West Coast is now what it should be. There are 6,000 shells out there and I have requested the Bureau of Ordnance to send a like quantity of powder by rail.

We are taking up the question of another Flag Officer in ATRON which you suggested. We hope to put this in effect in the near future; the idea being to assign this officer as Commander Destroyers Atlantic Squadron. Present plan is to rig up something on the DENEBOLA for him to use as an Administrative Flag Ship and then assign ad interim one of the new
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson 22 May 1940.

1500 ton destroyers as a Tactical Flag Ship with the idea of recalling from the Fleet the SAMPSON (which seems most logical choice) or another 1850 destroyer to take the place of this new 1500 tonner tentatively assigned. On account of the antiaircraft armament on the 1500 tonners I feel that the 1500 tonner would be more valuable to you than the SAMPSON, and at the same time the SAMPSON would give a little more room for Flag Quarters and Operating Staff accommodations. I do not want to tie up another cruiser as a separate Flag Ship. I sometimes feel there has been too much of this already. This seems to be the best solution for the problem, unless you can suggest a better one.

In regard to the disposition of cruisers I feel that the ST. LOUIS and HELENA should join the Fleet as soon as they are out of the Yard. They should get Fleet Training. They are valuable units to you. If we take them out of the Atlantic and send them to the Pacific I must replace them. Under the present situation the reduction in cruiser strength as it is, should, if anything, be augmented. There are two possible solutions: one, to assign Rowcliff and Cruiser Division FIVE to the Atlantic. This would give two heavy cruiser Divisions in the Hawaiian Detachment and two in the Atlantic. The other is to send Fletcher's Division, Cruiser Division THREE, to the Atlantic which would give one heavy Cruiser Division and one light Cruiser Division in the Atlantic, but would reduce your Light Cruiser strength by one Division and would give you a total of three heavy cruiser divisions in the Pacific. Of course as soon as the TRENTON comes home from Europe we will have her overhauled and she will be available for duty where most needed in the Atlantic or Pacific in case either Cruiser Division THREE or FIVE is sent to the Atlantic. Please let me have your perfectly frank reaction to the above by dispatch (supplemented by air mail if you so desire).

You may draw back at the thought of reducing your cruiser strength at this time in the Pacific. This I can believe might well be your inclination, as it would be mine. But, as I indicated above, the changing situation may push the decision one way or the other. In fact the picture may change by the time you get this letter to the extent that it may be necessary to send a real component of the Fleet to the Atlantic much as we would hate to do so and thus divide our forces.

The ST. LOUIS is due to be completed in Norfolk 15 July. The HELENA in New York, 9 July.

The situation in some of the South American countries gives real cause for concern - and I say this advisedly. If Germany should win - then what???

Wish I could see you - and if the pressure here - day and night ever lets up - I hope to fly out.

Keep cheerful.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USN "Pennsylvania," Pearl Harbor, T. H.

P. S. Please acknowledge by dispatch.

Have literally lived on the Hill - State Dept. - & White House
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
22 May 1940.

for last several days. Thank God yesterday I finally swung support for 170,000 men and 34,000 marines. Lots still in the mill - but I hope coming.

I hope to commission the remaining 35 DDs, 3 AOs and 36 SS - another personnel nightmare for the fleet - but I simply couldn't do it before.

Here's hopin.                               BETTY.
私は、西海岸及びハワイには未だ十分に動員に際し得る物資が在るも
のと解して居りますが、貴下の黙示を仰られば仕合せであります。

西海岸地に於ける大々四時砲弾の予備総数等は目下調査であると
思ひます。首尾には大々〇〇〇発の砲弾が用意されてゐる。且つこれ
次に貴下が指示された大西洋分艦隊の或る司令官の問題に移りた
ます。私共は近い将来に於て實行に移し度合いを望みてゐるものをで
あります。現在の計画では直接に導きに連絡を統へて彼が所謂艦
隊として使用し得るものにし、即して新しい一〇〇〇砲隊陣の
中の一を仮

いかに便利であつたが同時にサブソンは該司令部並に作戦部に必要な替差役をする
に至って便利であるましたが同時にサブソンは該司令部並に作戦部に必要な替差役をする
あるであろうと思うのであります。私には新にいう一つ別の巡洋艦をあらしめるようなとは思んで居ります。今までそう思い続けて居られている巡洋艦配備においてのセント・トーマス及びレペライを完成次第配備に備え、間もなくには新しいものとしてあるべきであると思います。そうして巡洋艦の新設をしなければならないことは、私に解り難きもあるにしても、今までにはあるべきであることを解り難きものであります。この二旗は資格に於て大いに有用であると解り難きものであります。これが一巡洋艦を大西洋から太平洋に移すことにあつては、現在巡洋艦の力を弱ましその能力を二つに分けてから云へば補助強化したけれども、これが元へ戻る。その方法はフリゲート及び第五巡洋艦設くことによります。即ち、その一はパリタリ及び第三巡洋艦、二つを大西洋に二つを太平洋に置くことにして、巡洋艦を大西洋に設くことによります。
セントルイスは七月十五日イタリアの完成し、ペレナは七月九日
にニューヨークで完成することになることを考えております。
南米海軍の成績に於ける数々は多く心躍の録であります。で私は之を
戦後の結果申上げるものであります。遂に一つ、ドイツが戦利を
たならば、そうしたからどうなるでしょうか？？
御指名でありますやうに、
ハワイ島、米国、ペンシルヴァニア號
米国巡洋司令長官
イタリアチャーダン查詢大尉
ペテリ
義友
米国巡洋司令長官
イタリアチャーダン查詢大尉
ハワイ島、米国、ペンシルヴァニア號
ペテリ
Deer Richardson:

This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 20 June, received by plane this morning; I note the contents thereof and will carry out your wishes expressed therein.

General Herron received a dispatch from the War Department the other day which stated in substance: "Alert your forces against hostile oversea raid. This must be done in such a way as to prevent newspaper publicity or notice of foreign intelligence agents. Department suggests that you do this on a maneuver basis in order to accomplish the above." General Herron brought this dispatch down to me and told me he was taking the necessary action and hoped that the Navy could see its way clear to have an off-shore patrol each day and do anything else in its power. I consulted Andrews and an off-shore and inshore patrol around Pearl Harbor has been arranged concerning which you have been advised by Calhoun. I have no idea of how long this situation will exist, nor as to the gravity thereof; for two days I had out the Fleet Marine Force and their anti-aircraft guns with ammunition. I called them in yesterday inasmuch as it was necessary to keep their ammunition under tarpaulins in the vicinity of the guns and this did not look like a very safe practice inasmuch as they were deployed in the heart of the navy yard. My idea is, if something more definite is not heard by Monday, I will probably put them out again on Monday and on a distant station somewhere near the Army guns.

I have many things of relative importance and unimportance to discuss with you. Everything goes along smoothly and busily. I took the liberty of telling Eddy that I thought he should go back with Rucker in the plane today without giving him any reasons.

With my warmest regards,

Sincerely,

/s/ C. C. BLOCH.

Admiral J. O. Richardson, U.S.N.,
Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet,
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship.

CCB;kt
六月二十一日甲申朝前（明治十五年六月二十日）

先にハロルド大將は陸軍省より大論断の既に専報を受けていた。即ち、

一箇下の御詳聞は之が實現を致す所存です。

下の御詳聞は之が實現を致す所存です。

ハロルド大將は陸軍省より大論断の既に専報を受けていた。即ち、

一箇下の御詳聞は之が實現を致す所存です。

ハロルド大將は陸軍省より大論断の既に専報を受けていた。即ち、

一箇下の御詳聞は之が實現を致す所存です。

ハロルド大將は陸軍省より大論断の既に専報を受けていた。即ち、

一箇下の御詳聞は之が實現を致す所存です。

ハロルド大將は陸軍省より大論断の既に専報を受けていた。即ち、

一箇下の御詳聞は之が實現を致す所存です。
4. General Chu's visit undoubtedly indicates what we have had from other sources - that the Chinese here, and presumably also in Chungking, fear that they are being left out of the big picture, that we may not be firm in our present stand vis-a-vis Japan, and that aid to China may become more difficult in the future.

5. This Division believes that considerable morale aid might be given to China in the form of public statements emanating from high officials of the Government on our deep interest in Chinese resistance and our policy of aiding it. An official announcement of the forthcoming dispatch of a military mission to China is suggested. It is realized however that such morale aid would have to be considered in the light of its effect on the critical relations now existing between Japan and the United States.

/s/ Sherman Miles
SHERMAN MILES
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Copies to:
Secretary of War
Assistant Secretary of War
Chief of Staff
War Plans Division

ONI
Mr. Currie
General MacArthur

(= Pages 1347 - 1348, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
一九四一年八月二〇日

ワシントン陸軍省作成、陸軍情報部判断

議案類第三三号抜粋

防衛局長への覚書

主題：中国の抗戦

一九四一年八月二〇日

私は、現在の中国の抗戦、及び、多分貴国、その中国人も、自分達がこの大きな舞台から遠れ、かつ、ありはしないかさいふこ、我々が日本と相対立してある現在の立場から動かないのであらゆるか、知れぬか、ふこ、そして支援が将来一層困難となるかしないか、ということが危惧してある。これは
戰時計劃部（？）

（點點點攻擊第一十四卷第二三十四十二三十四八頁）
Exhibit No. 39 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-ninth Congress, First Session. (Excerpt)

EXHIBIT NO. 39

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for Record:

On Sunday, December 7, 1941, about 11:30 A.M., E.S.T., General Marshall called me to his office. General Miles and Colonel Bratton were present. General Marshall referred to the fact that the Japanese Ambassador had been directed to deliver a note to the State Department at 1 P.M., December 7, 1941. He felt that the Japanese Government instructions to deliver the note at an exact hour and time might have great significance. The pencilled draft of an alert message to be sent at once to CG, U.S. Army Forces in Far East; CG Caribbean Defense Command; CG Hawaiian Department; and CG Fourth Army was read aloud by General Marshall and concurred in by all present. Colonel Bratton was directed to take the pencilled draft of the message to the Message Center and have it sent immediately by the most expeditious means. Colonel Bratton returned in a few minutes and informed General Marshall that the message had been turned over to the Message Center and would reach destinations in about thirty minutes. The pencilled draft was typed later during the day and formally made of record.

(Signed) L. T. Gerow

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

(Page 1409, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

DATE: November 29, 1941

Subject:

Participants: Sir Ronald Campbell, Minister of the British Embassy
Dr. Stanley K. Hornbeck.

Sir Ronald Campbell called on me at his request.

In the course of the conversation he stated that the British armed authorities have received a message from our armed authorities stating that inasmuch as the United States-Japanese negotiations have "broken down", it now becomes necessary to issue certain instructions to the armed forces; and that the British Government wishes to inquire of us whether the negotiations have "broken down". I said in reply that so far as I am aware neither the American Government nor the Japanese Government has declared or indicated that the negotiations are terminated, but that I was not in a position to confirm or deny statements attributed to any American official agency that the negotiations have "broken down". I called attention to statements attributed in the press to Mr. Kurusu and I mentioned a story brought me by one of the correspondents to the effect that in the course of the conversation when Admiral Nomura and Mr. Kurusu called on the President yesterday, the President had remarked that he hoped to see his callers again after his return from Warm Springs. (This story, I understand, is alleged to have emanated from the Japanese Embassy.)
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 May 1940.

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CONFIDENTIAL Lahaina Roads, T. H.
22 May 1940

Dear Betty:

As you no doubt well appreciate, I now must plan the Fleet schedule and employment for the next few months. To do this intelligently, however, it is necessary to know more than I know now (now) about why we are here and how long we will probably stay. I realize that the answer to the second question is largely dependent upon the first, and probably also upon further developments, but nonetheless I should have something to go on. For instance, carrying out even a curtailed gunnery schedule will require wholesale movements of targets, tugs, utility planes, etc., from the Coast. The following are pertinent questions:

(a) Are we here primarily to influence the actions of other nations by our presence, and if so, what effect would the carrying out of normal training (insofar as we can under the limitations on anchorages, air fields, facilities and services) have on this purpose? The effect of the emergency docking program and the consequent absence of task forces during the training period must also be considered.

(b) Are we here as a stepping off place for belligerent activity? If so, we should devote all of our time and energies to preparing for war. This could more effectively and expeditiously be accomplished by an immediate return to the West Coast, with "freezing" of personnel, filling up complements, docking and all the rest of it. We could return here upon completion.

As it is now, to try and do both (a) and (b) from here and at the same time is a diversification of effort and purpose that can only result in the accomplishment of neither.

If we are here to develop this area as a peacetime operating base, consideration should be given to the certain decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale that may ensue, due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, services, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet. If only peacetime training is involved should the Bureau of Navigation and I not be advised so we may remove restrictions on officer details?

The answer to your proposal to retain the ENTERPRISE 1st and 2nd is dependent upon the answer to the above questions.

I am returning to Pearl Harbor with the Fleet on 24 June until 10 June for upkeep. During the first week of this period, on the assumption that we are here for
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 May 1940.

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CONFIDENTIAL

normal peacetime training, I will complete a survey of what is available and what are the minimum additional requirements in the way of:

- Auxiliary air fields
- Targets
- Tugs
- Utility planes
- Airplane services
- Athletic fields and facilities
- Provisions
- Fuel

Upon completion of this survey I may recommend a reduction in the number of carriers to be maintained in this area and I will probably request the allocation of funds for immediate work on auxiliary air fields and athletic fields and facilities.

Based on this survey and additional information from you, I may modify my orders regarding the shifting of tugs, tenders, targets, and utility planes from San Diego to Pearl Harbor.

At present the following are under orders to proceed to Pearl Harbor leaving the West Coast in June (except UTAH, BOGGS, and LAMBERTON, which are to come upon completion of overhaul in July or August):

(a) Entire utility wing, including drone squadron, less Atron units and less minimum base units for continued overhaul, and for acceptance of new units (chiefly new drones). This amounts to approximately 40 planes and 300 personnel. The sufficiency of present facilities for repair and operation of these is questionable. However, without practically all the utility wing present in this area it is certain that the gunnery schedule of the Fleet will be seriously curtailed.

(b) Three battle towing targets and four series 60 high speed sleds, and a number of series 40 high speed sleds, are to be towed or carried to the Hawaiian area by Base Force tugs and other Base Force vessels noted in (c) and (d).

(c) MEDUSA, MELVILLE, WHITNEY, DORSEY, ELLIOT, and UTAH, BOGGS, and LAMBERTON, on completion of overhaul.

(d) One oil barge and one garbage lighter, and five tugs.

If the Fleet is to remain here and carry out normal peacetime training it will be conducive to efficiency of administration, to the carrying out of employment schedules and to the most effective use of services and operating areas if the ships and services of the Hawaiian Detachment are incorporated under their normal type commanders. Unless advised
D. D. 1500-E-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 May 1940.

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

CONFIDENTIAL

to the contrary by you before 30 May, this will be done.

In any event and whatever the future holds, we seriously need additional enlisted personnel. We should no longer be content to operate with any vacancies in peacetime allowance materially below our needs and our complement. With so many ships building and other ships to be recommissioned, we must have many additional trained men. It will take a long time to train them. I urge that all training stations be operated to full capacity. Trained men are fully as important as additional material and equipment.

If we are in the preliminary stage of preparation for belligerent action our ships should be fully manned by the most competent available officer personnel. Peacetime shifting of officer personnel should cease. With my lack of knowledge of the Department's purposes and intentions, I feel that we may work at cross purposes, and the whole matter of officer personnel changes may become most confused.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ J. O. Richardson

J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.
軍事文書

敬啓

友方の連絡により、次の件についてお知らせする。

ハワイ領領海部長

昭和20年5月22日付

出先領海部長

ハワイ領領海部長

昭和20年5月22日付

敬具

軍部長

昭和20年5月22日付

出先領海部長

ハワイ領領海部長

昭和20年5月22日付

敬具

出先領海部長

ハワイ領領海部長

昭和20年5月22日付

敬具
一例を挙げますと小規模の砲撃訓練計画を実施するにしても練習飛行機、飛行場、航空機等の準備が著しく費用高いことにより、部隊の訓練および実戦に必要とされる訓練計画の実施が困難となる場合があります。特に訓練計画の実施が費用を要するも昭和12年度の訓練計画の実施が困難である場合でもこれを考慮に入れて計画を立てることが必要と考えます。

次に、二点が著しく問題となると見なされる点を挙げます。

1. 練習飛行機が不足している点
2. 航空機の訓練に対する費用の問題

この問題は、部隊の訓練と実戦に必要な訓練計画の実施が困難な場合を含むもので、特に昭和12年度の訓練計画を実施するにあたり問題となる点を挙げてみます。
状態が目下の如何と端合に於ては、と、在地に於て同時に行なったり実施
したりするときは努力と目的との関係を決してはならない。努力を
来たさせて参ゆ

若し我之等の在当地に於ける行動を一に発展させる為
に於て考究を要し、若千の要にしては適當でない現地の
整備及び地方公務者の関与を求るべき事は、従事

にせらるして然る可きではないかと

3
中※详情请见下文。该产品根据中华人民共和国相关法律法规，由有一定资质的ไทย公司制造。

产品名称：

产品描述：

生产日期：

保质期：

注意事项：

如需进一步了解，请联系销售客服。

泰国公司地址：

邮编：

联系方式：

www.example.com
差し迫った準備の子宮門に在るものとすれども、我無数の能事には経合し給

は停止すべきであり、小職は海軍本省の目的と貫通を知らねで

我々の仕事が目的と営業も、士官昇動

金額差で混雑を招くから知へ

最

省

海軍省

海軍作戦部長

スタート海軍大将殿下

コロンビア地区ワシントン市

ジョー・バードソン

7
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

Important items to be discussed in the Department.

1. Mediterranean Study. Joint Board, (Admiral Stark)

2. Defenses and developments for new bases. Atlantic. Underwater storage, auxiliary landing fields, etc. Will defense be entire responsibility of Navy or will Army be involved? (Admiral Stark.)

3. Personnel increase. (President, after discussion with Admiral Stark, Admiral Nimitz.)

4. Fleet Training. Present training too elementary and cautious. What steps to make more advanced? (Admiral Stark)

5. Greater target practice, ammunition allowance and more drone practice. Ships with war ammunition allowance cannot carry sufficient target practice ammunition. Additional ammunition ships urgently and constantly needed. (Admiral Stark)

6. Great weakness in fast auxiliaries. What steps for early procurement of fast and adequate numbers of auxiliaries to cover all probable Fleet employment? (Admiral Stark - Admiral Robinson)

7. Mine laying by airplanes. What is contemplated? (Admiral Towers - Admiral Stark)
凡ゆる編成を減たすに足る数の高速度補助艦を遠かにて待するに

七

航空機による機置架設の件。之に即する企図如何。（タニソン海軍大将）

六、

高速度補助艦に於ける大なる依存

（スターケ海軍大将）
EXHIBIT NO. 39

DECEMBER 15, 1941.

Memorandum for Record:

The attached message was taken personally by direction of the Chief of Staff to the War Department Message Center by Colonel Bratton, G-2, who gave it in person to the Message Center Chief, Colonel French, at 11:50 a.m., December 7. It was typed in Colonel Bratton’s presence and delivered to the Code Clerk. Time of recording on the Message Center records is 12 noon, December 7.

Colonel Bratton asked Colonel French at this time how long it would take before the message was on the way. Colonel French replied that it would be on the way in ten minutes and that it would be in the hands of addressees within 30 minutes at the latest.

Colonel Bratton reported these facts to the Chief of Staff.

The following is the log of the message:

 Honolulu

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Filed War Department Message Center</th>
<th>E.S.T.</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12:00 noon</td>
<td>6:30 AM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sent Western Union</th>
<th>12:17 PM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Received RCA, Honolulu</th>
<th>7:33 AM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivered to Signal Officer, Honolulu</th>
<th>11:45 AM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Delivered to AGO, Hawaiian Department</th>
<th>2:58 PM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

The Message Center reports that a check from Honolulu indicates that on receipt this message was handed to an oriental messenger (statement Colonel French to Colonel Smith, Secretary, General Staff) for delivery by hand to Army Headquarters.

(Signed) W.B. Smith,
W.B. SMITH,
Colonel, General Staff,
Secretary, General Staff.

(Pages 1409 - 1410, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
（续）

（续）
On November 20 the Japanese presented a five-point proposal for a temporary agreement in exchange on "Japan."

One. The United States to refrain from actions prejudicial to Japan's efforts to restore peace with China.

Two. Both countries to remove freezing restrictions and to restore commercial relations. The United States to furnish Japan a required amount of petroleum.

Three. Both countries to cooperate in obtaining necessary commodities from the Dutch East Indies.

Four. Both countries not to repeat to make any armed advancement into areas of southeastern Asia and the southern Pacific except Japanese-occupied French Indochina.

Five. Japan to withdraw its troops from Indochina following either peaceful settlement between Japan and China or establishment of equitable peace in the Pacific area. In the interim Japan to remove its troops from southern Indochina to northern Indochina upon conclusion of this arrangement which would later be made part of a final agreement.

The Department gave consideration of a number of alternate proposals and countersuggestions or combinations thereof which suggested themselves to the Department for possible presentation to the Japanese Government. At one time the Department considered the question of presenting to the Japanese Government, simultaneously with the proposal which was actually given to them on November 20, an alternate plan for a temporary modus vivendi. The draft under consideration at that time called for a temporary modus vivendi to be in effect for a period of three months during which time conversations would continue toward the working out of a comprehensive peaceful settlement covering the entire Pacific area. At the end of the period of the term of the modus vivendi, both Governments would at the request of either confer to determine whether the extension of the modus vivendi was justified by the prospects of reaching a settlement of the sort sought.

The draft modus vivendi which we were considering contained mutual pledges of peaceful intent, a reciprocal undertaking not to make armed advancement in northeastern Asia and the northern Pacific area, southeast Asia and the southern Pacific area, an undertaking by Japan to withdraw its forces from southern French Indochina, to limit those in northern Indochina to the number there on July 26, 1941, which number should not be subject to replacement and Japan should not in any case send additional naval, military or air forces to Indochina. This Government would undertake to modify its freezing orders to the extent to permit exports from the United States to Japan of bunker and shin supplies, food products and pharmaceuticals with certain qualifications, raw cotton up to $600,000 monthly, a small
amount of petroleum within categories now permitted general export on a
monthly basis for civilian needs, the unclassified amount to be exported
from this country to be determined after consultation with the British and
Dutch Governments. The United States would permit imports in cotton
provided that raw silk constitutes at least two thirds in value of such
imports. The proceeds of such imports would be available for the purchase
of the designated cotton from the United States and for the payment of
interest and principal of Japanese obligations within the United States.
This Government would undertake to consult the British, Dutch and
Australian Governments on the question of their taking similar economic
measures.

At a certain point in our consideration of the draft modus vivendi
the representatives in Washington of the British, Dutch, Australian and
Chinese Governments were consulted.

On November 25 the Chinese Ambassador at his request called on the
Secretary and sought to make profuse preliminary explanations of the
attitude which Chiang Kai-shek had expressed in several telegrams through
several channels to several addresses in regard to the draft modus
vivendi which we were considering. The Ambassador handed the Secretary
a copy of a telegram from the Chinese Foreign Minister stating that the
Generalissimo felt the American Government had put aside the Chinese
question and was still inclined to approve Japan's interest. In that telegram the Foreign Minister said he had told the
Generalissimo that the Secretary of State had always evidenced the greatest
respect for fundamental principles, that the Secretary's inquiry regarding
the possibility of a modus vivendi indicated that nothing had been given to the Japanese, and the Chinese Foreign Minister went on to
reassert China's firm opposition to any step increasing its difficulties
or strengthening Japan's aggressive power.

The Secretary told the Chinese Ambassador that some progress was
being made in conversations with the Japanese looking to broad-gauge peace­
ful settlement covering the entire Pacific, and that the Japanese were
urging that such conversations for that purpose be continued.

The Secretary pointed out that Hu-sem Chiang Kai-shek and the
Generalissimo had only recently sent many vigorous long cables to Washington emphasizing the extreme danger to the Burma Road and appealing for aid.
The Secretary said that one of the prime objects of the draft modus vivendi
which the President had under consideration was to protect the
Burma Road from the imminent danger pointed out by Chiang Kai-shek. The
Secretary said Chiang Kai-shek apparently failed to note that the draft
modus vivendi would inter alia relieve the Japanese menace from Indochina
to the whole Pacific area including China and trade routes there. The
Secretary pointed out that competent military opinion in this country
was to the effect that the limited amount of petroleum products Japan
might obtain during the ninety-day period of the draft modus vivendi under
consideration would not meet nor appreciably augment Japan's military
preparations.

After careful consideration of all factors in the situation within
the United States and in the general world situation, including the reaction
and replies of the Governments mentioned above, it was decided that we should
drop the draft modus vivendi which we had under consideration.

The Department has informed you in separate telegrams of the documents
handed the Japanese Ambassador on November 26 and of the conversation which
took place on that date.
二決定シタノナデアル。

當國務省ハ、十一月ニ十六日ニ日本大使ハ、手交セル文書並＝仮日行ハレ

タール会談ノ内容ヲ別段ノ祝賀ノ通讯報ニヨリテ資方ニ通報シタール。

ハル
TESTIMONY OF CAPT. ALWIN DALTON KRAMER, UNITED STATES NAVY

Mr. Richardson. Captain, will you give your name in full to the reporter?

Captain Kramer. Captain Alwin Dalton Kramer, United States Navy.

In June of 1938 I was ordered to the Navy Department, Washington, and assigned to the Far East Section of the Division of Intelligence. For the next approximate year and a half I had the Japanese desk in the Far East Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence. Part of that time I was assigned to the Communications Security Group under then Commander Safford.

In June of 1940 I was assigned to that section of Commander Safford's office on a full-time basis and remained on that duty until June of 1943.

I was in charge of a section of the Division of Naval Communications which was a subsection under then Commander Safford, known as OP-30-GZ, OP-30 being the designation of the then Commander Safford, known as the Communications Security Group.

GZ was the subsection concerned with the translation of decrypted ciphers and the recovery of Japanese codes. My permanent assignment was to the Far East Section of the Division of Naval Intelligence. My status was a loan status to OP-30-GZ.

Vol. IX

Senator Ferguson. I will ask you this: you made up a file down in your office, you had the fourteenth part, the 13 parts and the other parts at 8:15.

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you kept them on your desk until the time came for you to leave and go over to the White House?

Captain Kramer. That is my present recollection, yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. When you got to the White House, it was about what time?

Captain Kramer. I should say about a quarter of 10 sir, because my recollection is I was at the State Department after leaving the White House at 10 minutes to 10.

-1-
Senator Ferguson. Did you see Mr. Hull at all that morning?

Captain Kramer. I think I saw him, but whether it was in his office or passing through his outer office going in, I am not at present certain. In the case of Mr. Knox I can be specific, because I arrived there before he did and pointed out the 14th part in the folder which I handed him.

Senator Ferguson. So you showed Mr. Knox personally the 14th part?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you showed Mr. Knox personally the 14th part?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Is that correct?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And the two so-called "thank you" messages?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. What time did you have that folder completed?

Captain Kramer. I believe the total time I was in my office was not over 10 minutes. It was probably less than that.

Senator Ferguson. That let you go out at what time?

Captain Kramer. About 10:30, sir.

Senator Ferguson. About 10:30. And you then went to see McCollum?

Captain Kramer. I went first to Admiral Stark's office, Senator.

Senator Ferguson. Yes.

Captain Kramer. And McCollum came to the door of Admiral Stark's office, at which time I pointed out the new material I had in the folder, specifically the 1 o'clock delivery message, and explained very briefly and hurriedly its possible and probable tie-up with the movement of the Japanese convoy and contemplated Japanese action against the British and Thailand. My distinct recollection is that McCollum grasped that point almost instantaneously, and I then departed from the State Department, after not more than probably one-half minute's conversation.

Senator Ferguson. When you came back to the office did you feel certain they were going to attack Britain that morning?
Page 4051 (continued)

Captain Kramer. I felt reasonably certain in my own mind; yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Before 1 o'clock our time, that Britain would be attacked?

Captain Kramer. Probably about 1 o'clock; yes, sir.

Page 4052-53

Senator Ferguson. Then you went over to Secretary Knox's office?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. And you met Colonel Bratton?

Captain Kramer. Either he or one of his senior assistants.

Senator Ferguson. And some aides to Secretary Knox?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir.

Senator Ferguson. Was it--

Captain Kramer. Secretary Hull.

Senator Ferguson. Secretary Hull? Was the meeting over then?

Captain Kramer. No, sir. My purpose in hurrying so rapidly from Admiral Stark's office was to get to the State Department before that meeting broke up.

Senator Ferguson. What time did you get there?

Captain Kramer. I am less specific on the time I arrived there, but I should say it would be about a quarter of 11.

Senator Ferguson. Did you walk?

Captain Kramer. I walked again as I had on the earlier trip.

Senator Ferguson. So you got there about a quarter to 11, you think?

Captain Kramer. Yes, sir. It may have been nearer 11 o'clock.

It was part of my remarks when I was explaining to Mr. Hull's secretary the significance, the likely significance of this 1 o'clock time in Washington and its tie-up with the movement of the sun. In other words, time of day in the South China Sea. My recollection is that I mentioned something about the time of day at Pearl Harbor and that point in the conversation.

Page 3907

Captain Kramer. The previous evening when I was in Secretary Knox's apartment, after he had read the folder of traffic, he directed me to be at the State Department at 10 o'clock the following morning where there would be a meeting between he, Mr. Hull, and, I gathered, Mr. Stimson.
人員指名サレマシタ。

楠ノ一年半ノ間私八海軍情報部極東局日支談ノ席ヲ占メテ居リシタノノ

関一時サフォード長官ノ下於交通通信保全班附指名サレタコトガアリマス。

一九四〇年六月サフォード長官ノ班附ヲ専任指名ゼラレ一九四三年六月

オード氏ニ属シタ交通通信保全班ハ длトスノ当時ノ長ニサフ

パレルトニ属ニ居テハイテリマシタ。ニンニハ時ノ傍聞及ノ日本暗号守ノ復原ヲ図ル分顧デアリマシタ。私ハ

恒久的ノ配屬ハ海軍情報部極東局デアリマシタ。ハニ派遣ヲデアリマシタ。

Ref. Loc. No. 1550 16
[Japanese text]

- 締め切り前

篤川久美子

「次の一回にはもっと頑張ってみよう」と思うと、
「はい、はい」と応じる。

「そうですか、よくわかるわ。」

「うるさいっ」

「そうか、それはそうですね。」

「くっ、くっ」
掛る屋台「花にかすりお茶を」

「花にかすりお茶を」
ソレハへノ通告ガ、飛行機搭乗員通告ガ、最後ノ暗号解読器、焼きガ通
告デリマシタガ

ソレハ→サガ

ソレハ→サガ

ソレハ→サガ

ソレハ→サガ
DEAR JO:

Yours of the 22nd just received. I shall endeavor to answer it paragraph by paragraph. First, however, I would like to say that I know exactly what you are up against, and to tell you, that here in the Department we are up against the same thing.

Why are you in the Hawaiian Area?

Answer: You are there because of the deterrent effect which it is thought your presence may have on the Japs going into the East Indies. In previous letters I have hooked this up with the Italians going into the war. The connection is that with Italy in, it is thought the Japs might feel just that much freer to take independent action. We believe both the Germans and Italians have told the Japs that so far as they are concerned she, Japan, has a free hand in the Dutch East Indies.

Your natural question may follow - well, how about Italy and the war? I can state that we have had Italy going into the war on 24 hours notice on several different occasions during the last two weeks from sources of information which looked authentic. Others have stated that it would occur within the next ten days. I have stated personally that cold logic would dictate her not going in for some time. It is anybody's guess. It may be decided by the time this reaches you. Events are moving fast in Northern France.

The above in itself shows you how indefinite the situation is.

Along the same line as the first question presented you would naturally ask - suppose the Japs do go into the East Indies? What are we going to do about it? My answer is that is, I don't know and I think there is nobody on God's green earth who can tell you. I do know my own arguments with regard to this, both in the White House and in the State Department, are in line with the thoughts contained in your recent letter.

I would point out one thing and that is that even if the decision here were for the U. S. to take no decisive action if the Japs should decide to go into the Dutch East Indies, we must not breathe it to a soul, as by so doing we would completely nullify the reason for your presence in the Hawaiian area. Just remember that the Japs don't know what we are going to do and so long as they don't know they may hesitate, or be deterred. These thoughts I have kept very secret here.

(2) The above I think will answer the question "why you are there". It does not answer the question as to how long you will probably stay. Rest assured that the minute I get this information I will communicate it to you. Nobody can answer it just now. Like you, I have asked the question, and also - like you - I have been unable to get the answer.

I realize what you are up against in even a curtailed gunnery schedule. I may say that so far as the Department is concerned you are at liberty to play with the gunnery schedule
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
27 May 1940.

in any way you see fit, eliminating some practices for the
time being and substituting others which you may consider
important and which you have the means at hand to accomplish.
Specifically if you want to cut short range battle practice
and proceed with long range practices or division practices
or experimental or anything else, including anti-air, etc.,
etc., which you think will be to the advantage of the Fleet
in its present uncertain status - go ahead. Just keep us
informed.

We have told you what we are doing about ammunition; we
will attempt to meet any changes you may desire.

We have given you a free hand in recommending ships to come
back to the Coast for docking, etc.

You ask whether you are there as a stepping off place for
belligerent activity? Answer: obviously it might become so
under certain conditions but a definite answer cannot be
given as you have already gathered from the foregoing.

I realize what you say about the advantages of returning
to the West Coast for the purpose of preparation at this
time is out of the question. If you did return it might
nullify the principle reasons for your being in Hawaii.
This very question has been brought up here. As a compromise,
however, you have authority for returning ships to the Coast
for docking, taking ammunition, stores, etc., and this should
help in any case.

As to the freezing of personnel: - Nimitz has put the per­
sonnel problem before you. I will touch on it only to the
extent that I have been moving Heaven and Earth to get our
figure boosted to 170,000 enlisted men (or even possibly
17,500) and 34,000 marines. If we get these authorized I
believe you will be comfortable as regards numbers of men
for this coming year. I know the convulsion the Fleet had
to go through to commission the 64 destroyers and some other
ships recently. I am thankful that convulsion is over. I
hope the succeeding one may be as light as possible and you
may rest assured that Navigation will do everything it can
to lessen this unavoidable burden on the Forces Afloat.

I had hoped your time in the Hawaiian area would have
some indirect or incidental results regardless of anything
else, such as -

(a) Solving the logistic problems involved, including
not only supplies from the U. S. but their handling and
storage at Pearl Harbor.
(b) Training, such as you might do under war conditions.
(c) Familiarity of Task Forces with the Midway,
Aleutian, Palmyra, Johnston, Samoa general area, in so
far as may be practicable.
(d) Closer liaison with the Army and the common de­
fense of the Hawaiian area than has ever previously
existed between Army and Navy.
(e) Solving of communication problems involved by
joint action between Army and Navy and particularly
stressing the air communications.
(f) Security of the Fleet at anchor.
(g) Accentuating the realization that the Hawaiian
group consists of considerably more than just Oahu.
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
27 May 1940.

You were not detained in Hawaii to develop the area as a peacetime operating base but this will naturally flow to a considerable extent from what you are up against.

As to the decrease in the efficiency of the Fleet and the lowering of morale due to inadequate anchorages, air fields, facilities, service, recreation conditions, for so large a Fleet:*

I wish I could help you. I spent some of my first years out of the Naval Academy in the West Indies, - I remember the last port I was in after a 22 month stay and where we didn't move for 6 months; and there was not even one white person in the place. The great antidote I know is WORK and homemade recreation such as sailing, fishing, athletics, smokers, etc. You can also move Task Forces around a good deal for seagoing and diversion; just so you be ready for concentrations should such become necessary. We will solve the oil situation for you for all the cruising you feel necessary.

In my letter of May 22nd I mentioned the possibility of moving some units of the Fleet to the Atlantic. This might be a small movement, or it might grow to a modified Rainbow No. 1, - modified as to assumptions and as to the distribution of the forces. In other words, a situation that we might be confronted with would be one in which the Italian and German Fleets would not be free to act, but might be free to send a cruiser or so to the South Atlantic. In such a case there would be no need to send very extensive forces to the Atlantic, and the continuance of the Fleet in the Pacific would maintain its stabilizing influence.

Units that might be called to the Atlantic, under such a modified Rainbow situation, to provide for conditions that now appear possible, would be a division of cruisers, a carrier, a squadron of destroyers, possibly a light mine layer division possibly Patrol Wing One, and possibly, but more unlikely, a division of submarines with a tender.

If you desire to have task groups visit the Aleutians, and the islands in the mid-Pacific and south Pacific somewhat distant (4) from Hawaii, the possibility of such a call being made, - for the detachment of such a force to the Atlantic - should be borne in mind.

Also, it should be borne in mind, in connection with any movements of Navy units to the southward that a situation might arise which would call for visits to French or British possessions in these areas. We will strive to keep you informed on these points as the situation changes or develops.

I believe we have taken care of your auxiliary air fields by granting authority for leases and I may add that we are asking for authority to do something permanent in this connection in bills which we now have pending before the Congress and which should be acted upon within the next two weeks.

Fleet Training has recently sent you a letter with regard to targets and target practice facilities in general. We will do everything we can to assist you in this situation and I trust that something permanent will come out of it so
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
27 May 1940.

that in future situations of this kind the 14th District will be much better off.

Regarding the carrier situation, we are prepared to go along with you on whatever you decide is best after you complete your survey.

Regarding splitting the Hawaiian Detachment back into its normal type commands, - We will naturally leave this matter entirely in your hands. If a part of the Fleet is brought to the Atlantic Coast, or if the main part of the Fleet is recalled to the West Coast, it may well, in any case, be necessary to formulate a task force for retention in Hawaii different from the composition of the present Hawaiian Detachment.

This letter is rather rambling and practically thinking out loud as I have read yours. Incidentally it should be read in connection with my letter to you of 22 May wherein was outlined the possibilities of having to send some ships to the Atlantic; and which you had not received when you wrote.

I would be glad if you would show Admiral Bloch this and also my last letter - as I want to keep him informed.

Rest assured that just as soon as I can give you anything more specific I will. Meanwhile keep cheerful and with every good wish as ever

Sincerely,
/S/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USF "PELELIU" Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

P. S. The European situation is extremely critical. Italy may act by 5 June which seems to be another deadline drawn on information which once again looks authentic. However, it still is a guess.
No. 1

Defm. Dec. 1500 - I-1
N. 4

Reference: Dec. 1500 - I - I

経験者の知識を基に、長崎の状況について以下に記述します。

1. 我々が長崎を離れ、海に出て、彼女たちがどのような海を越え、何の風を避けるか。

2. 場所によっては、我々が長崎を離れる時、我々がなぜそれを選んだか。

3. 夢見通りの風は、我々が長崎を離れる時にどのような風を吹かせたか。

4. 各種の条件が、我々が長崎を離れる時にどのような影響を及ぼしたか。

5. 各種の条件が、我々が長崎を離れる時にどのような影響を及ぼしたか。

6. 各種の条件が、我々が長崎を離れる時にどのような影響を及ぼしたか。

7. 各種の条件が、我々が長崎を離れる時にどのような影響を及ぼしたか。

8. 各種の条件が、我々が長崎を離れる時にどのような影響を及ぼしたか。

9. 各種の条件が、我々が長崎を離れる時にどのような影響を及ぼしたか。

10. 各種の条件が、我々が長崎を離れる時にどのような影響を及ぼしたか。

～この問題は触れずに置くか。我々がなぜこれを選んだか。
(1) This figure illustrates the relationship between...
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
7 January 1941.

UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

Serial 022.

Pearl Harbor, T.H.,
January 7, 1941.

CONFIDENTIAL

FIRST ENDORSEMENT to
Com 14 Conf. Ltr.
C-A16-1/A7-2/ND14
(629) of 30 Dec. 1940.

From: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet
and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

1. Forwarded. The Commander-in-Chief has conferred with
the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District and the Commanding
General of the Hawaiian Department. As a result of the con­
ference with the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and
an inspection in company with him, information was furnished
the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District who prepared the
basic letter. The Commander-in-Chief concurs with the Comman­
dant Fourteenth Naval District in the opinion that the present
Army Pursuit Squadrons and antiaircraft batteries are inadequate
to protect the Fleet and Pearl Harbor against air attack. When
established the proposed pursuit strength will be adequate.
The proposed total of 68 mobile three-inch guns for this area
is not considered adequate. With the almost continuous high
ceiling prevailing in this area a materially greater number
of larger and longer range antiaircraft guns are necessary to
counter high altitude bombing attacks on Pearl Harbor.

2. As neither the increased antiaircraft batteries nor
the augmented pursuit squadrons will be available for an ex­
tended period the defense of Fleet units within Pearl Harbor
will have to be augmented by that portion of the Fleet which
may be in Pearl Harbor in event of attack by hostile aircraft.
Plans for co-operation with the local defense forces are be­
ing made. At present the continuous readiness of carrier
fighter squadrons or antiaircraft batteries is not contemplated.
The improbability of such an attack under present conditions
does not, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, warrant
interrupting entirely the training required by Fleet Air Units
which would have to be largely curtailed if constant readiness
of a fighter squadron were required.

3. There does not appear to be any practicable way
of placing torpedo baffles or nets within the harbor to pro­
tect the ships moored therein against torpedo plane attack
without greatly limiting the activities within the harbor,
particularly the movements of large ships and the landing
and take-off of patrol squadrons. Inasmuch as Pearl Harbor
is the only operating base available to the Fleet in this area
D. D. 1500-I-2

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
7 January 1941.

UNITED STATES FLEET
A16/
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship
Serial 022.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

Any passive defense measures that will further restrict the use of the base as such should be avoided. Considering this and the improbability of such an attack under present conditions and the unlikelihood of an enemy being able to advance carriers sufficiently near in wartime in the face of active Fleet operations, it is not considered necessary to lay such nets.

4. The defense against submarines and mines are considered adequate under present peace time conditions, but early installation of underwater sound-submarine detection system should be made. Also the delivery of the required ships to the Fourteenth Naval District Defense Forces should be expedited, particularly ships for sweeping magnetic and anchored mines.

5. In this connection, it is urgently recommended that Local Defense Forces, adequate for the protection of naval installations at Pearl Harbor and the Fleet units based thereon, be provided the Commandant Fourteenth Naval District. In order to provide freedom of action for the United States Fleet, and further, to avoid the necessity for detailing important Fleet units (because no other ships are available) to tasks requiring only part of their full capabilities, it is considered that the forces provided should be sufficient for full protection and should be independent of the presence or absence of ships of the U.S. Fleet. It is further considered that the provision of adequate Local Defense Forces for the Fourteenth Naval District should be given higher priority than continental Naval Districts, where both the possibilities of, and objectives for, attack are much less.

J. O. RICHARDSON

Copy to:
Com FOURTEEN
題目

ハ 防弾掩蔽所

ハ 装甲部

ハ 防空部

ハ 対空部

ハ 侵攻部

ハ 防衛部

ハ 防護部

ハ 防火部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部

ハ 防寒部
カール攻撃ハナイデアラウト云フコトハ艦隊航空隊ニ必要ヲ訓練ヲ全ク
中止シナクテヨイト云フコトデアル。ソレ等艦隊航空隊ハ常ニ戦闘
機ヲ待機準備ヲ必要トサレルナルパ大中ニ割発サレルノデアル。ノ
即ハノオケル行動ヲ殆ニ大型船舶ノ行動及び隠蔽ヲ着着ヲ大ニ
水雷ヲ防護装置ヲ替ヲ仕掛ケル実用のノ方法ハナイヤニモヲヲレル。
真珠港ハ艦隊ニトッテノ地域ヲオケル唯一ノ作戦基地デアルヲ
ヨウナ歴地使用ヲヨリ以上割発スルヨウナ受動的防衛手段ハ避ケル
ベキデアル。コノ点ヲ考慮シテ、現在ノ状態ニ於テハスノ如キ来襲ノ
先ヲアリベカザルコト、且ツ敵ヲ戦時発殖ヲ逆襲ヲ作戦ヲ犯シテ充
分近距離マダ空母ヲ進メルダケノ実力ヲ有シテキルトハ思ハレヌコ
トニナルカノ如キ対策ヲ改えスルコトハ必要トハ思ハ
レヌ。
Excerpt from Exhibit No. 33 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT No. 33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES PREPARED BY G-2, WAR DEPARTMENT.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

(12) 5 September 1941, Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation.
(Excerpt)

I. B. 122

SEPTEMBER 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Brief Periodic Estimate of the World Situation.

...........

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U.S. Army.
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G

...........

5. Japan - Economic

Because of the ever-increasing stringency of the embargo placed on Japan by the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, the economic situation in Japan is slowly but surely becoming worse. The Japanese have always lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange and sufficient foreign trade; the embargo has served to increase the deficiencies in these categories. These deficiencies are serious but are not likely to become dangerous before December 1, 1941. The fact that Japan is also encumbered with financial problems connected with the "incident" in China prevents any curative steps being taken.

The technical assistance which the Germans have been giving to Japan over a period of six months is no longer as welcome as it was before Germany's attack on Russia. That attack has precluded the possibilities of Japan's receiving machinery and implements of war from Germany. As a matter of fact, the Japanese are beginning to question whether the Tripartite Agreement has not brought far greater economic disadvantages than advantage to Japan in carrying out her plans for a "Co-Prosperity Sphere" in Asia. The Pro-Axis leaders are finding great difficulty in justifying the alliance with Germany.

The "Co-Prosperity Sphere" is anything but prosperous. Because of the difficulties of labor shortage, lack of sufficient transportation facilities and lack of cooperation among the people who have been brought into the "sphere" by force or persuasion, the "sphere" is about to fall apart.

The action of the Netherlands East Indies in joining with the United States and Great Britain in embargoing goods to Japan was undoubtedly a severe blow, both economically and in prestige. The economic competition going on behind the scenes in Thailand, between Japan on the one hand, and Great Britain and China on the
other, will be increasingly significant. Recent information, however, indicates that Japanese banking interests are seeking for a new loan of 25,000,000 Bahts from Thailand bankers, (complementing a loan of $3,750,000 actually made to Japan early in August in order to pay for commodities purchased in Japan in Thailand). The influence of the Chinese, the traditional financiers of Siam, cannot be overlooked here.

The processes of economic warfare are so slow that, even if the status quo ante were to be established in China by way of settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict, Japanese economic predominance in the East Asiatic area would still be so firmly established that several months would have to pass before the effects of the economic embargo would in itself influence Japanese action in the Far East.

The effects of the embargo will compel Japan to strive to obtain more assistance in East Asia as well as to try to persuade Great Britain, the United States and the Netherlands East Indies through threats and promises to soften the impact their embargo has caused. Japan obviously does not want to go to war with the United States to achieve her economic objectives, but at the same time she feels that the achievement of these objectives is an essential part of her foreign policy.

The fact remains that Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either her manufacturing industries or a major war effort. To procure them she must have foreign exchange; in order to obtain foreign exchange, she must have foreign trade, which, at present, is seriously curtailed. The stoppage of trade is reducing Japan's raw materials drastically - raw materials which are vital to the organic well-being of Japan and to her ability to wage war successfully. No other country even approaches the United States in importance to Japan's economic welfare, both as a source of raw materials and as a market for the exports of Japan. Thus through the advantage the United States has gained through the embargo, Japan finds herself in a very poor bargaining position.

(Pages 1349 and 1353, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
世界戦勢と戦略
定期情報

1944年9月5日

デイストリクト・オブ・コロニピア

照会

曹洞第3号

陸軍省第28作戦ガール

陸軍情報部情報委員会

昭和四十四年九月五日
Senator BREWSTER. Under the plans existing prior to December 7, so far as your own knowledge goes, what was it contemplated should be the mission of the Navy during the earlier period of any hostilities with a Western Pacific power?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, the plans then in existence were called the "Orange" plan or the "O-l" plan and it was, in my opinion, a fairly sound plan theoretically, but the time element bore no relation to reality and some time in October I wrote a comprehensive letter to the Chief of Naval Operations presenting my conception of the then existing "Orange" plan, which is in the hands of the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. That was in 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. 1940.

Senator BREWSTER. And did that contemplate some manner of offensive action by the fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It did, early action to reconnoiter and attack some of the mandated islands and a progressive step-by-step movement westward with the taking, eventually, of Truk in a time stated that absolutely could not be realized.

...........

Defense Doc. 1500-I-4


Excerpt from testimony of Admiral J. O. Richardson - Tuesday, November 20, 1945.

................

(762) Senator BREWSTER. Under the plans existing prior to December 7, so far as your own knowledge goes, what was it contemplated should be the mission of the Navy during the earlier period of any hostilities with a Western Pacific power?

Admiral RICHARDSON. Well, the plans then in existence were called the "Orange" plan or the "O-l" plan and it was, in my opinion, a fairly sound plan theoretically, but the time element bore no relation to reality and some time in October I wrote a comprehensive letter to the Chief of Naval Operations presenting my conception of the then existing "Orange" plan, which is in the hands of the committee.

Senator BREWSTER. That was in 1940?

Admiral RICHARDSON. 1940.

Senator BREWSTER. And did that contemplate some manner of offensive action by the fleet?

Admiral RICHARDSON. It did, early action to reconnoiter and attack some of the mandated islands and a progressive step-by-step movement westward with the taking, eventually, of Truk in a time stated that absolutely could not be realized.

...........

Pages 293 - 294, Part 1 - "Pearl Harbor Attack"
十のいつであったか余は海軍作戦部長府に手紙を出して、今、皆貫前

会の手許にある当時のオレンジ計画に関する余の提案を廣範囲に互

ルスダ上院議員。それは昭和十五年一のことば

リチャードソン提督

ブルスダ上院議員。それは昭和十五年一のことば

の計画では建業を便って攻勢の行動に出

リチャードソン提督

企図されてあた。が委任統治島の統治島々

を構築してこれを攻略しようという当初の

行動といへ雖一歩一歩へ向へ而へと移動し

遂にトランク島を取るといへば案かかれ

であた。時間内には絶対に変更されえ

ことであた。
The British ambassador called at his request and I need disapprove that he had no special business except to check on the progress of the conversations between the President and myself and the Japs, with special reference to the question of the President's acting on them. This caused me to remark in a slightly way that the question of the conveying of 'plausible relations between the two states relating assassination nations are so complicated that it is nearly impossible to carry on such relations in a manner at all systematic and safe and sound. I referred to the fact that Chiang Kai-shek, for example, had sent numerous hysterical cable messages to different cabinet officials and high officials in the Government other than the State Department, and continues even ignoring the President, to a deliberate and serious situation with no real idea of what the facts are. I added that Chiang Kai-shek had his brother-in-law, located here in Washington, disseminate damaging reports at times to the press and others, apparently with no particular purpose in mind, that we have correspondents from London who interview different officials here, which is entirely their privilege to do, expect that at times we all move too fast without fully understanding each other's views, at our, at other. I stated that this is well illustrated in the case of the recent outburst by Chiang Kai-shek, in referring to this. I remarked that it would have been better if, when Chiang Kai-shek's loud protest about our negotiations here with Japan, instead of placing the protest on us without objection on his part, thereby qualifying and virtually killing what we knew were the individual views of the British Government toward these negotiations, he had sent a strong cable back to Chiang Kai-shek telling him to base up and fight with the same zeal as the Japanese and the Germans are displaying instead of weakening and telling the Chinese people that all of the friendly countries were now striving primarily to protect themselves and to force an agreement between China and Japan, every Chinese should understand from such a procedure that the best possible course was being pursued and that this calls for resolute fighting until the undertaking is consummated by peace negotiations which Japan in due course would be entitled to enter into with China.

I expressed the view that the diplomatic part of our relations with Japan is virtually over and that the nature will now go to the officials of the Army and the Navy with whom I have talked on to whom I have given my views for whatever they are worth. Speaking in great confidence, I said that it would be a serious mistake for our country and other countries interested in the Pacific situation to make plans of resistance without including the possibility that Japan may move suddenly and with every possible element of surprise and spread out over considerable areas and capture certain positions and posts before the peaceful countries interested in the Pacific would have time to confer and formulate plans to meet these new conditions; that this would be on the theory that the Japanese recognize that their course of unlimited conquest now renewed all along the line probably is a desperate gamble and requires the utmost boldness and risk.
I also said to the Ambassador that a calm deliberate Japanese Government would more than ever desire to wait another thirty days to see whether the German Army is driven out of Russia by winter. I added that the extremist fire-eating elements in Japan, who have preached a general forward movement supported by the army and navy, have influenced a vast portion of the Japanese public to believe that such a movement would probably take no serious notice of the Russian-German situation, but would go forward in this desperate undertaking which they have advocated for some time; that at least it would be a mistake not to consider this possibility as entirely real, rather than to assume that they would virtually halt and cease in some movement toward Thailand and into the Burma Road while waiting the results on the Russian front. The Ambassador, I think, had his reservations on this latter point. He did not disagree with what I said about the badly confused mechanics for the conduct of diplomatic relations between several of our countries in these critical times.
調査専任者

写真と

添削者

調査長官ハル及び

英領大使ハリハッタス卿

著者

昭和五年

昭和五六年十一月廿九日

このため

彼は何時何所別の用向きであろうのは、がん特一、特に考査中みは定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考慮中の、定的の問題

研一

私は彫刻した各をすることができなく特、特に考
2

に親

に親

に親

に親

に親

に親

に親

に親
解を強制しようと努めていることを舌げたりしなかった方が得策である。

私は外交的手段により中国は冷静な手段が遂行されつつあること、
それに及びそれに依り事件が解決されならばならばなることが

かつある方針により中国人は Slugを手に移させるべきことを述べた。陸
海軍当局の手に移されるべきことを述べた。陸海軍当局に私は既に詰を
し独裁があるかという見解に角目分の意見を述べておいた。
私は自信を持ち

地縄国が近代的にその線に沿って更新された戦略を進勧するため

の行動は恐らく向う見ずの虚耗でありそれによって最大の大脅さと
脅威とを要

日本国民の今や全面的にその線に沿って更新された戦略を進勧するため

の行動は恐らく向う見ずの虚耗でありそれによって最大の大脅さと
脅威とを要

するといふ理論に基づくものなること。
私はまた大使に幾度もたびたび述べたように、日本政府は以前にも増して進む軍が
各関係者を怨まずに追い出されるか否かを見極めるために更に三十日間待つことを欲
することを想するだろうと言った。私は次のように述べた。

大使はこの後者の点に関しては保留的態度を取った。私は方数ヶ時間の外交関係指導上
の非常性を指摘し、ビルマ路へ

state 200年 1月 5日

せられる機会について私のはざめたことに相手大使は不答成ではありません。
第十四款

1.1.0
1.1.2
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
22 June 1940.

Secret

JUNE 22, 1940.

Dear Jo:

Your trip to Washington was held in abeyance because of uncertainty as to the movements of the fleet in the immediate future. Tentatively decision has been made for the fleet to remain for the present where it is. This decision may be changed at any time. It rests partly upon the question as to what happens to the French fleet. On this last there is no definite and final information as yet.

So all I can say is that the fleet must stay in a condition of complete readiness. By now you will have received my last letter, in which in reply to your question I stated I thought it would be best for you to concentrate your planning energies on a distribution of task forces to provide for the problems of Rainbow 1 modified by those set up in Rainbow 4. This picture is as yet unchanged.

The floating dry dock from New Orleans has recently completed the transit of the Panama Canal, and is being reassembled for towing on to Pearl Harbor as originally planned. A few days ago the question was brought up as to whether or not this plan would be carried out. After giving it some reconsideration we decided to go ahead and take the dock on to Honolulu as it would be needed there to care for the forces that must be maintained in the Honolulu area in any case.

Guantanamo is receiving considerable development. In addition to air fields on both sides of the Bay we are increasing the gun defenses by four 6" guns and four 3" antiaircraft guns. In the near future we will send about 105 additional Marines, and somewhat later, when its training has been completed, we will send down a Marine Defense Battalion of about 750 men.

I am also endeavoring to get two transports ready for the use of the Marines in the immediate future, one for the Atlantic (probably Caribbean) and one for the Pacific. We plan to load them transports with combat units of the Fleet Marine Force so that they will be strategically ready for immediate use, - such a transport full of Marines and equipment can be dispatched to a needed task in the same manner as we now dispatch a cruiser.

We recently, as you read in the papers, introduced a bill expanding the Navy sufficiently to provide for major tasks simultaneously in both oceans, and of a strength that will permit us at all times to have strong forces in each ocean. It is not our intention to have a permanent Atlantic fleet somewhat disassociated from the permanent Pacific fleet. However, there will necessarily be some decentralization in fleet command. We can talk this over when you come East.

Another subject to take up with you is the question of basing the fleet units that might be brought to the Atlantic - using Caribbean bases, primarily - Cristobal, Guantanamo and others.

This is the first of an attempt to write you a weekly letter. Hope they may prove to be of some use to you.

All good wishes,

Sincerely,

Admiral J. O. Richardson, U.S.N.
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
San Francisco, California
観音

敬者

右のワシントン行は、私の今後行動が不詳の為未決定のままに経って居る。按分の問題は現在も居るやう一時的決定が為されて居るが、此の決定は何時でも再々の事が出ることになる。故に此の問題に関しては、偣面言葉がどうなるか等問題にかかって居る。従って私は仮は準備完了の状態として私の案を呈申し上げた。故に如何であるか等問題に応じて居る。故の正証の中で私は未の受音に対すその問題に於て私等の作戦を集中するのが最も近い道であると私は考えるというふりだ。此の考へは未だに変化して居るので、

R. H. DURKIN

1947年6月20日

Def. Doc. 7500-J1
此の手紙は前回書に手紙を書くという様写的最初のものである。此等の手
高橋浩の会に立たんとせよ。

門田邦を訪る。

カリフォルニア州サンフランシスコ

米国選手右翼J・Oリチャードソン

足下

ラッケイ

4
SECRET WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON
FEB. 7, 1941

Subject: Air Defense of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii.

To: The Secretary of the Navy.

1. In replying to your letter of January 24, regarding the possibility of surprise attacks upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor, I wish to express complete concurrence as to the importance of this matter and the urgency of our making every possible preparation to meet such a hostile effort. The Hawaiian Department is the best equipped of all our overseas departments, and continues to hold a high priority for the completion of its projected defenses because of the importance of giving full protection to the Fleet.

2. The Hawaiian Project provides for one hundred and forty-eight pursuit planes. There are now in Hawaii thirty-six pursuit planes: nineteen of these are P-36's and seventeen are of somewhat less efficiency. I have arranged to have thirty-one P-36 pursuit planes assembled at San Diego for shipment to Hawaii within the next ten days, as agreed to with the Navy Department. This will bring the Army pursuit group in Hawaii up to fifty of the P-36 type and seventeen of a somewhat less efficient type. In addition, fifty of the new P-40-B pursuit planes, with their guns, leakproof tanks and modern armor will be assembled at San Diego about March 15 for shipment by carrier to Hawaii.

3. There are at present in the Hawaiian Islands eighty-two 3-inch AA guns, twenty 37 mm AA guns (en route), and one hundred and nine caliber .50 AA machine guns. The total project calls for ninety-eight 3-inch AA guns, one hundred and twenty 37 mm AA guns, and three hundred and eight caliber .50 AA machine guns.

4. With reference to the Aircraft Warning Service, the equipment thereof has been ordered and will be delivered in Hawaii in June. All arrangements for installation will have been made by the time the equipment is delivered. Inquiry develops the information that delivery of the necessary equipment cannot be made at an earlier date.

5. The Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, is being directed to give immediate consideration to the question of the employment of balloon barrages and the use of smoke in protecting the Fleet and base facilities. Barrage balloons are not available at the present time for installation and cannot be made available prior to the summer of 1941. At present there are three on hand and eighty-four being manufactured forty for delivery by June 30, 1941, and the remainder by September. The Budget now has under consideration funds for two thousand nine hundred and fifty balloons. The value of smoke for screening vital areas on Oahu is a controversial subject. Qualified opinion is that atmospheric and geographic conditions in Oahu render the employment of smoke impracticable for large scale screening operations. However, the Commanding General will look into this matter again.
6. With reference to your other proposals for joint defense, I am forwarding a copy of your letter and this reply to the Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, and am directing him to cooperate with the local naval authorities in making these measures effective.

/s/ Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of War.
一九三九年（昭和十六年）二月七日
在ワシントン
在

ハワイ戦時態勢の防空について

主 題

ハワイ戦時態勢の防空について

密 附 元

海軍省

秘 密

二月二十四日頃の防潮は、予は本件の重要性を考え、ハワイ地区司令部は我が海軍省の命令を全面的に保証することを必要とする。前日ハワイ計画書は攻撃を相当期に遅く、その結果、攻撃を防ぐための措置を実施する。ハワイ地区司令部は我が海軍省はこの攻撃を防ぐために必要な措置を取ることが必要である。
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Japanese-American Relations.

5. This Division is of the belief that the present Cabinet in Tokyo does not yet feel strong enough to enforce any order for withdrawal of Japanese troops from China, even though under pressure from the United States, it might be inclined to do so. And, as a matter of fact, at this stage in the execution of our national strategic plan, a cessation of hostilities in China followed by the withdrawal of twenty-one Japanese divisions, 20 independent brigades, and 1,000 aircraft therefrom would be highly detrimental to our interests. Such a force if returned to Japan would be potentially of such an explosive nature that only a military oligarchy could control it. These militarists would submerge or destroy the moderate element in Japan replacing it with a restless Chauvinistic element possessing neither the ability nor the inclination to continue diplomatic relations with any of the Democratic Powers.

6. From the foregoing it seems imperative, for the present at least, to keep as much of the Japanese Army as possible pinned down in China. In other words we must cease at once our attempts to bring about the withdrawal of Japanese armed forces from China and must give to China whatever aid is possible on our part in sustaining the Chinese power and will to continue to contain and occupy the bulk of the Japanese Army.

11. Since it is highly improbable that this condition can be met by the Japanese Government at the present time our course lies straight before us. This Division still believes that forceful diplomacy vis-a-vis Japan, including the application of ever increasing military and economic pressure on our part offers the best chance of gaining time, the best possibility of preventing the spread of hostilities in the Pacific Area, and the best hope of the eventual disruption of the Tripartite Pact. The exercise of increasingly strong "power diplomacy" by the United States is clearly indicated.

HAYES A. KRONER,
Colonel, General Staff,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff,

Distribution:
The President  
Chief of Staff
Secretary of State  
Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.
Under Secretary of War  
Director of Naval Intelligence
Assistant Secretary of War  
Major General Embick

(Pages 1357 - 1359 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
止に続く日本側二十一箇条国際独立協定、及び二十箇条の撤退は米国の為には極めて不利である。かかる軍事財政の展開は非収束的、環状的性格を帯びたものとならない。連合国によって策定される民主主義国政のもと外交関係維持能力を無く、反共を好まざる外に何なる民主主義国政のもと外交関係維持を必要とするであろう。政府はこれを特に篤力しておるが、我々は直ちに日本軍の支那撤退を実現せしめるが如き計画に基づいて之を進めるべきであつて、更に又支那に対しても支那が日本の大軍を相手にし之を制御することを急務に計ることを必要とする。我々の謀れべく私の在日日本内閣が対応する事は先づあり得ないので我々の進むべき路は我々の直前に横はつて居る。
靠近水源的

以上文摘自学术文献，内容关于水源的重要性。
（「鉄道案内図」1941年1月号）
Mr. GESELL. You participated in the drafting and preparation of the joint memorandum signed by yourself and General Marshall to the President of November 27, did you not?

Admiral STARK. Well, General Marshall and I were responsible for it.

(5835) Mr. GESELL. Right.

Admiral STARK. That was formed up by the two war plans divisions.

Mr. GESELL. Can you tell us under what circumstances that was written? It is still a little vague on the record why that particular memorandum was written.

Admiral STARK. Primarily we wanted to gain time. I was extremely anxious to gain time and Marshall was, too. We stood together on that. We had going out in December — and again the Army could give you perhaps more accurate information — but as I recall twenty-odd thousand troops and that meant a lot in the Philippines. The air program as I recall involved about 600 planes, Army. It meant a good deal to us to get them out there. Also the Philippine Scouts were being trained.

I might mention a point which I think has not been brought out before, that I directed Admiral Hart to lay his mines in the Philippines for protecting Manila Bay, it was either June or July. At that time I considered the situation such that we had better get that job done and not be suddenly confronted with it. But the primary reason for that was to gain time and that is what the memorandum sought to stress.

Mr. GESELL. In other words, what you were doing was stressing how much you could tolerate in the way of activity (5836) by Japan before you felt some action had to be taken by this country?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

......

(Page 2192, Part 5 - "Pearl Harbor Attack"
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 June 1940. (With enclosures)

Dear Betty:

The enclosures are self-explanatory, and caused me to send confidential despatch 220603.

To clarify the situation, I flew to Pearl yesterday and held a conference with Andrews, Bloch, and General Herron, commanding the Hawaiian Department. Briefly, on 17 June, due to the "Alert" from the War Department, the Army issued live ammunition to all posts including A.A. batteries, etc., and established a patrol and guard over all critical areas, which are considered by them to be, all landing beaches, land areas (bridges, roads, etc.) and Pearl Harbor (Marines). Their directive included a proviso that all despatches were to be sent in code via cable to the Chief of Staff and that the public in Honolulu were not to be excited, hence no Army was stationed at waterworks, electric light plant, gas or telephone companies, but extra precautions were taken by these latter.

The navy increased their distant plane patrol from 180 miles to 300 miles and enlarged the sector being covered to include from 180° to 360°, as well as establishing a 30 mile inner patrol.

Two days later, the Army received word to "ease up on the Alert", but to maintain guard on all critical areas on a semi-permanent basis. We did not know about this, until General Herron mentioned it at the conference in reply to my query as to how long the Alert would continue. General Herron stated that he might, on the 24th, further modify his present interpretation of the "modified alert".

As a matter of interest, Herron said he had been asked if he could store crude rubber and tin to the extent of 600,000 cubic feet (his figures) and further that no such storage space was available.

The Army "Alert" and action taken caused me some concern though I felt positive that any Army intelligence bearing on the above would be available to and evaluated by the Navy, with information to me. Of course, anything of this character tends to aggravate the tenseness of the situation and to interrupt training, as the Fleet is operating from Lahaina and Pearl by single ships and groups and without the full screening and scouting which a more serious situation would necessitate.

As a similar situation may again arise, I believe a remedy would be to insure that where possible, when joint action is involved, even in drills, that the Commanders of the Army and Navy be jointly informed,
D. D. 1500-K-1
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 June 1940. (With enclosures)

with definite information to me as to whether the alarm is real or simulated for purposes of training.

With best regards,

/s/ J. O. Richardson

J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U.S.N.
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.
情報 役者 か は 説明 の 必要 は あり ません。 私 は それを みて 順 楽 公 務 第 二
ノ 大 O 三 頭 を 種 すること に した。

同 情 役者 か は 説明 の 必要 は あり ません。 私 は それを みて 順 楽 公 務 第 二

合 楽 図 番 番 司 令 長 官
ハワイ 羅 ハイ ナ ローテ 日

ハワイ ロ ハイ ナ ローテ 日

合 楽 図 番 番 司 令 長 官
ハワイ 羅 ハイ ナ ローテ 日

合 楽 図 番 番 司 令 長 官
ハワイ 羅 ハイ ナ ローテ 日

合 楽 図 番 番 司 令 長 官
ハワイ 羅 ハイ ナ ローテ 日
NOVEMBER 2, 1941.

Memorandum for the Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.:

Subject: G-2 Estimate, Far Eastern Situation. (For situation and communications maps see Tabs B, C, and D.)

In compliance with verbal request, Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D., this date, the following is submitted as a G-2 Estimate of the Far Eastern Situation:

1. After four years of war in China, Japan is militarily overextended on the mainland of Asia, economically weak, and psychologically aware of the fact that her economic structure is crumbling.

2. For obvious reasons both Germany and China would like to embroil the United States in a large scale war with Japan. While Japan is reluctant to go to war with us, her political and economic situations demand action.

Omitted

SHERMAN MILES,
Brigadier General, U. S. Army,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
Mr. MITCHELL. . . .

I think it advisable at this time to mark as exhibit 44 this document which is entitled "Copies of Defense Plans" and contains extracts from various basic Army and Navy plans dealing directly with the question of defense against air attack.

The CHAIRMAN. Let it be filed as exhibit 44.

(The document referred to as marked "Exhibit No. 44.")

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you a copy of this document before you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you produced here the various plans on which this document, Exhibit 44, is based, as listed in (2633) in index in 13 items, that is, the War Department part of it?

General GEROW. I do not understand the question, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Have you checked these basic plans that have been produced here against the index?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Of Exhibit 44?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. There are 13 items in the list of contents.

Have you checked those documents against that index?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Are all the documents that are listed in this index present here? You have checked them, haven't you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will ask you to look at them and just state generally as you go over each item, what they are. The first is extracts from joint Army and Navy basic war plan - orange (1938); is that right?

General GEROW. This is the joint Army and Navy basic war plan - orange, 1938, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That does that mean?

General GEROW. That means it is a war plan that pertains specifically to operations against Japan. Japan was known as "orange."

Mr. MITCHELL. And item 2, extracts from joint Army and Navy basic war plan - Rainbow, No. 1, what is that?

General GEROW. This document is the joint Army and Navy basic war plan, Rainbow No. 1.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is Rainbow No. 1? Can you tell us what the relation of it is to the other plans, or something of what kind?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. If I might refer to the document, I can give the scope of the plan, rather than from memory.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I want you to do.

Mr. KEPP. Why not do the same thing with respect to the "orange plan?"

Mr. MITCHELL. Start with orange, and tell the committee, in a general way, so we can orient these various plans and understand what they were and what their relations were to each other.

General GEROW. This joint Army and Navy basic war plan, orange, 1938, constituted the basis upon which all Army plans, orange, and all Navy plans, orange, and all joint plans, orange, and all our operating instructions for an orange war shall be formulated and developed.
Orange, as I stated, was the code name for Japan.

The document contains assumptions with regard to such a war, the concept of the war, the means assigned jointly to the Army and Navy and means assigned to each of the Army and Navy forces; joint decisions that were made by the Joint Board approving this plan; categories of defense.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, that plan covered any sort of operations in that area in a war with Japan?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; limited to the Pacific area.

Mr. MITCHELL. Limited to the Pacific?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. And that, of course, included Hawaii?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. As part of the area?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Now, give us the same information about Rainbow No. 1, which is the second item. What is the date of Rainbow No. 1?

General GEROW. Rainbow No. 1, sir, was approved on August 14, by the Acting Secretary of the Navy.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. August 14, what year?

General GEROW. 1939, and August 14, 1939, by the Acting Secretary of War. This document was prepared prior to my assignment to duty in the War Plans Division.

Mr. MITCHELL. I understand that.

I am asking you, as a War Plans man, to tell the committee in a very general way, what that plan dealt with, and what its relation was to orange, 1938.

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

The general situation on which this plan was based, was that at the time this directive was issued, the European war was in progress, which may involve other actions, and expand the field of military action.

There is an ever present possibility of the United States being drawn into this war.

There is also the possibility that peace in Europe may be followed by a situation in which the United States will be forced to defend without allies the integrity of the Monroe Doctrine and our interest in the Pacific.

Mr. MITCHELL. Does that plan cover operations in the Atlantic and Pacific?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Does it assume a possible engagement with Japan?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. I should like to read the reference to special situation on which it was based, sir.

(2643) Mr. MITCHELL. All right.

General GEROW. Special situation for Rainbow No. 1 (reading):

The termination of the war in Europe is followed by a violation of the letter or spirit of the Monroe Doctrine in South America by Germany and Italy. This is coupled with armed aggression by Japan against United States interest in the Far East. Other nations are neutral.

The purpose of the plan was "to provide for the most effective use of naval and military forces to defeat enemy objectives, particularly those in the territory and waters of the Western Hemisphere north of the approximate latitude 13 degrees south. This plan will restrict initially the projection of U. S. armed forces to the American
Continents and their outlying islands, north of 13 degrees south latitude, and to the United States possessions in the Pacific westward to include Unalaska and Midway. This plan will visualize the subsequent extension of United States control into the western Pacific as rapidly as possible, consistent with the accomplishment of United States objectives in the Western Hemisphere, but no plan for such extension of operations will be prepared at this time."

"Mr. MITCHELL. Go to the third item in the joint Army and Navy basic war plan, Rainbow No. 5; please look at that (2644) and give us the date of that and briefly just what the scope of that plan is, or was?"

General GEROW. This plan was approved on November 19, 1941, by the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. I think I can best describe this plan by reading from the plan the general assumptions on which it was based, and that is:

That the associated powers, comprising initially the United States, the British Commonwealth (less Eire), China, and the "Free French" are at war against the Axis powers, comprising either:

a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, or

b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Indochina, and Thailand.

That the associated powers will conduct the war in accord with ABC-1 and ABC-22.

That even if Japan, Indochina and Thailand are not initially in the war, the possibility of their intervention must be taken into account.

That United States forces which might base in the Far East Area will be able to fill logistic requirements other than personnel, ammunition, and technical materials, from sources in that general region.

That Latin American republics will take measures to (2645) control subversive elements, but will remain in a nonbelligerent status unless subjected to direct attack; in general the territorial waters and land bases of these republics will be available for use by United States forces for purposes of Hemisphere defense.

Those were the assumptions on which this plan was based.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, turn to the next item, extracts from War Department Operation Plan - Rainbow No. 5. What is that?

General GEROW. After the joint Army and Navy basic war plans were prepared, the Army and Navy then separately prepared their own plans, based on that joint plan. This War Department Operations Plan, Rainbow No. 5 of 1941, is the Army plan that was prepared, based on the joint Army and Navy basic plan - Rainbow No. It contains many of the statements that are contained in the basic plan. It contains the concept of the war, the assumptions under which the war will be fought, the means of allotment of forces, the directions to subordinate commanders to prepare subordinate plans, the coordination that must be had with other departments of the Government.
Mr. MITCHELL. It includes in its scope the area of the Hawaiian Islands, does it?

General GEROW. It does; yes, sir.

(2646) Mr. MITCHELL. Did you give the date of that?

General GEROW. This document does not contain on it the date of approval, but I am sure it was in August 1941, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Exhibit 44 has a note on it "Approved by the Chief of Staff, August 1941."

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I think I have that somewhere in my documents.

Mr. MITCHELL. Never mind. That is near enough.

General GEROW. I know it was sent out to Hawaii in August 1941, and the receipt was received back from the War Department on September 3, 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. The next item here is extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940. Will you look at that and tell us the scope and nature of that document, and the date?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. This document was prepared initially in Hawaii. It is a local plan based on the War Department plan which I have just discussed.

Mr. MITCHELL. A plan worked out by the local commanders in 1940?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. By the commanding officer of the Hawaiian Department?

(2647) General GEROW. By the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. And the Commander of the Fourteenth Naval District?

General GEROW. No, sir; this is not a joint plan. This is a firm plan. It is a little different from a plan, sir. It is what we call a defense project.

Mr. MITCHELL. I see.

General GEROW. It contains the objective to be accomplished, but primarily directed toward setting up the means that are required to carry out that war mission in considerable detail.

The CHAIRMAN. May I ask of the General: You say this was in 1940, and based on that previous item which you have just discussed which seems to have been approved in August 1941. Is not there some divergence as to dates?

General GEROW. This defense project is prepared annually and revised annually. This is the 1940 edition. The 1941 edition had not been completed at that time, but the orange plan of 1938 and the rainbow plan No. 1, contained the war missions for Hawaii, and those plans were taken together with the other data with which to revise the defense project which was in existence at that time, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The next item is joint coastal frontier (2648) defense plan, Hawaii. What is that?

General GEROW. This is a joint plan that is prepared by the local commanders in Hawaii, Army and Navy, based on the joint plans, Army and Navy plans furnished by the War Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is the date of it?

General GEROW. This document was approved at the Headquarters of the Hawaiian Department, the 11th of April 1941, and Headquarters of the Fourteenth Naval District, 11th of April 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. I will state that that document is in Exhibit 4, set forth in full, not a mere extract of it. The whole thing is in this exhibit 44.

The next item is No. 7, annex No. VII, to joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaii. What is the date of that, and what is it?

General GEROW. Will you repeat that question, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. The next item is annex No. VII to joint coastal frontier defense plan, Hawaii. What is that document, the nature of it, and the date of it?

General GEROW. Annex No. VII, sir; to that document is a local annex prepared by the Fourteenth Naval District and the Headquarters, Hawaiian Department. It is dated the 28th of March 1941, and covers joint security measures, protection of the fleet and Pearl Harbor base.
Mr. MITCHELL. The next item in the same volume, No. 8, is the Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement). What exhibit is that?

Mr. GESELL. Forty-four.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you ever see the report dated August 20, 1941, titled "A Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii"?

Mr. KEEFE. What is the date of that, please?

Mr. MITCHELL. August 20, 1941.

It is entitled "Study of the Air Situation in Hawaii," addressed to the Commanding General of the Army Air Forces, Washington, D.C., through Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, Fort Shafter, H., which has heretofore been marked Exhibit 13. Did you ever see that report?

General GEROW. I cannot recall at this time as having ever seen that report, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is the report which considered the vulnerability of Hawaii to an air attack at a time that it would likely come, in the morning, from carriers, and things of that kind, and then went on to estimate the ways of defeating it, and the number of planes that would be required to run a 360° long-range reconnaissance to detect the Jap carriers the evening before.

General GEROW. I have read the document since, just prior to this investigation.

Mr. MITCHELL. You didn't see it at the time?

General GEROW. At the time I don't recall having seen it, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. No. 9, the next item in the index, "5 November 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department."

Will you look at that and tell us what it is?

General GEROW. That document, sir, is contained in the operation orders of the Hawaiian Department dated 1941, sir. It is, as stated, a standing operating procedure.

Mr. MITCHELL. Promulgated by whom?

General GEROW. By the commanding general, Hawaiian Department.

Mr. MITCHELL. On his own, not a direction from Washington?

General GEROW. No, sir; on his own.

Mr. MITCHELL. Is that the document in which General Short directed his air alerts 1, 2, 3, or am I wrong about that?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; they are included in this document.

Mr. MITCHELL. Alert 1, sabotage without threat from without,

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Did you see that document before December 7, 1941?

General GEROW. I don't recall ever having seen it before December 7. I think the records of the War Department show it came in later in 1942.

Mr. MITCHELL. The 10th item is "Field Order No. 1," and from Navy Basic War Plan; 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41."

Those are Navy documents and Admiral Turner can describe them more fully, but just to complete the story here will you look at them and tell us in a general way what the nature of them is?

General GEROW. That is number 10, sir?

Mr. MITCHELL. 10, 11 and 12. Ten is the first, "Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department." Give the date of it and if you can from inspection, the general nature of it.

General GEROW. No. 10, sir, "Field Order No. 1 (Naval Security)," an Army document.

Mr. MITCHELL. It is?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. And it is the operations order as given out by the commanding general of the Hawaiian Department. It has no date. It is intended as an order to be put into effect on the emergency arrives.

Mr. MITCHELL. What is No. 11? 11, 12, and 13, they are Navy documents.
General GEROW. No. 11 is a Navy document, sir, based, as this paper indicates, on Rainbow No. 5.

Mr. MITCHELL. It would be a corresponding document to the army operations plan on Rainbow 5, similar?

General GEROW. Yes, sir. It was prepared in compliance with the directive contained in the joint Army-Navy basic plan, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. The next item is 12, "Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 2 CL-41 (revised) - Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas."

What is the date of that?

General GEROW. That is dated, sir, October 14, 1941.

Mr. MITCHELL. By whom is that issued or authorized?

General GEROW. The heading shows that it is issued by the Commander of the Pacific Fleet.

Mr. MITCHELL. The 13th item is "Operations Plan No. 1-41. Headquarters Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District."

What is the date of that and by whom issued or authorized?

General GEROW. That is dated 27 February 1941 and is issued by the Headquarters of the Naval Base Defense Force, 14th Naval District, Pearl Harbor.
2
隠二流
スコレラマ
私ノ申上げマシタ
顧り日本ヲ指ス
暗興デリマス。
サイレントボウ第二駆逐ノ日時ト予定テイマスカ

「ベル」大将
レーンボウ第一駆逐ハ八月十四日海進長官代理ヨリ承認セラ

シノモノデ。「No.4」
中立デアル。

本案ノ目的ハ敵ノ目的特ニ西半球ノ凡ソ南緯十三度以北ノ領土及水域上

ハ敵ノ目的ハ敵ノ目的特ニ西半球ノ凡ソ南緯十三度以北ノ領土及水域上

ハ敵ノ目的ハ敵ノ目的特ニ西半球ノ凡ソ南緯十三度以北ノ領土及水域上
ミッチェル氏
「米艦仮島地域八戦ノ中ニ Harbor のセカ」

（二六四三）

ミッチェル氏
「米艦仮島地域八戦ノ中ニ Harbor のセカ」

ソレハ陸軍ニ言四ー九年（昭和十六年）八月ニデアガト思ィマス

ミッチェル氏
「米艦仮島地域四ー四年（昭和十六年）八月ニデアガト思ィマス

アルト思ィマス

ケテソレハ陸軍ニ言ハニ九四ー九年（昭和十六年）八月ニポスニ司

ソテキ米ノ受領ハ九四ー九年（昭和十

Def Doč1500 K 4
ミッチャエル氏（一九四〇年（昭和十五年）改正）ハアリマヌス

唯一今へガ甲上フマシタ所ノ陸軍省暹ノ警察ヲタテデタモ

ミッチャエル氏（一九四〇年（昭和十五年）改正）ハアリマヌス

ミッチャエル氏（一九四〇年（昭和十五年）改正）ハアリマヌス
ハノー当時佐藤セル防衛部隊改正スベキノ着名ト所ニ採用サ

ハヌノハノをご個々の防衛部隊改正スベキノ着名ト所ニ採用サ
デ・イロ・中尉
現役告発者見解？命令
中尾、ス・ラも見
スレラッソム

ソレ及びビペロン中尉
力に最大努力

デ・イロ・中尉
現役告発者見解？命令

Mr. GESELL. On the other hand, the estimates in exhibit 33 were prepared not for distribution to the theaters, but for the information of the General Staff?

General MILES. Chief of Staff and his General Staff; yes, sir.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, what were your particular functions and duties in this organization, General Miles?

General MILES. I was the head of the whole organization, Military Intelligence Division, responsible for its administration, its expansion and for its output.

In other words, I spoke for the Military Intelligence of the General Staff. A paper would normally be prepared, we will say, of the Far East estimate by the far eastern section. That would then go for revision or comment to the immediate chief of the far eastern section, the head of the intelligence branch, and from that branch to me. But I am responsible for and was responsible for the output of the division.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, as head of the organization, of course, you had to give special emphasis to certain aspects of its activities, and I wondered whether there was any particular phase of the work of the Military Intelligence Division which (2074) you gave particular attention to.

General MILES. Normally I would say that my particular attention was devoted to our output in the way of analyzed and estimated, evaluated information which we called "Intelligence," but I also had a good many other irons in the fire.

Mr. GESELL. Now how were you organized within your division in respect to the handling of the far eastern information?

General MILES. The Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch was at that time under Colonel Bratton. He received all information that we obtained on the Far East from our military attaches, our observers, from the State Department, from the Navy Department, other departments of the Government, and although it was drying up considerably, information from civilian companies or press in the Far East, together, of course, with the secret information that we were getting from the intercepts—magic.

Mr. GESELL. Now to whom was he responsible?

General MILES. He was directly responsible to the Chief of the Intelligence Branch, at that time Col. Hayes Kroner. There was, however, also within that branch a situation section under Lieutenant Colonel Betts, now brigadier general. That was in charge of information bearing on the situation in all parts of the world. I described it at that time as the heart (2075) of the Intelligence Branch. It maintained situation maps both for G-2 and for the Secretary of War. All special studies, and so forth, emanate from this particular section.

Mr. GESELL. And that section would work in close coordination, I gather from your statement, with the Far Eastern Section of the Intelligence Branch in the formulation of estimates and studies, is that correct?

General MILES. That is correct.

Mr. GESELL. Well, now, during that time you have indicated you had several sources of information. You mentioned attaches, you mentioned, I believe, the Japanese intercepts, which you referred to as "magic." What other sources were there?
General MILES. We had some observers in the field. We had a mission under General Magruder in China. We had, of course, the Intelligence Division in the staff of the Hawaiian and Philippine Departments that were getting us information. We had started a nucleus of what might be called a secret service under Colonel Clear in Singapore. We had little money to give him, but at least he did make progress in tying in with the British Secret Service in the Far East. We exchange information, of course, with the Department of State and Navy Department particularly, and several other agencies, independent agencies of the Government in Washington, and with the military attaches and missions, particularly (20%) British, at that time in Washington.

Mr. GESELL. And I gather that all of these sources were sources of information which contributed data concerning the Far East?

General MILES. They did, sir.
デフィンショナルドキュメントNo.1600-K-5

ゲル氏

マイルス少将

ゲル氏

マイルス少将

福東次官は、情報局を担当していたが、情報科長に対しては特に重要視していた。

情報科の担当者は、情報科長によって作業が進められました。

情報科長は、情報科の活動を指揮し、情報科長の指示に従って作業が進められました。

情報科長は、情報科の活動を指揮し、情報科長の指示に従って作業が進められました。

情報科長は、情報科の活動を指揮し、情報科長の指示に従って作業が進められました。

情報科長は、情報科の活動を指揮し、情報科長の指示に従って作業が進められました。

情報科長は、情報科の活動を指揮し、情報科長の指示に従って作業が進められました。
ゲル氏

マイルス少将

彼が直接責任を有して居ましたか。

彼は誰に対して責任を有して居ましたか。

彼はハイス。クローネ大佐が課長でありました。然し該課はわが陸軍及び陸軍長官の両者のために専門的調査を有して居ました。次に言及すべきは、该課は世界各地方の心情に関する情報の調査を有しておりました。
判斷及び研究作戦のため緊密な連携の下に活動して居ります

特に、観察は大をし、特に於いて若干の情報源を有しておら

たた

マルス少将

所で、貴下はその期間に於いて若干の情報源を有しておら

れたことをお話しになりました。

貴下は大使館付武官を挙げられました。又、儒者と言へ

在地に若干の間接者があつました。支部にはマルス少将

郷本指揮下の使節団がかつてを通じて情報源を提供しておら

た。又勿論ハワイ、フィリピン部隊の情報部には情報源

があつて情報源を提供しておらました。シンガポールではクリ

が大佐以下の情報源にも呼び出されるものを既に作り

てありました。彼に興へるべき資金は殆んどありませんでした

たが、彼は少くとも統制に於ける英独指揮下との連携を促

せます。
せと

セル氏

（二〇七六年）と情報交渉を致しました。而して此事情報報を処理に関する資料を提供した情報源である
その通りであります。
Mr. Gesell. You were present, were you not, during the meeting in the Atlantic between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill?

Mr. Welles. I was.

Mr. Gesell. Did you receive any information at that meeting as to any agreement or arrangement or understanding that had been arrived at, if there was any, between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill concerning joint action of the United States and Great Britain in the Pacific?

Mr. Welles. When I left the President, since he was due to return to Washington before myself, told me that he had had a conversation, or several conversations, with Mr. Churchill with regard to the Japanese situation and the increasing dangers in the Far East; that Mr. Churchill had suggested to him that the two governments, as a means which might be of some effect, should take parallel action in issuing a warning to the government of Japan.

As I recall it, the President stated that what Mr. Churchill had suggested was that the Government of the United States should tell to the Government of Japan that if Japan persisted in her policy of conquest and aggression the United States, in the protection of its legitimate interests and in order to provide for its own security, would have to take such acts as were necessary in its own judgment.

The President also asked me to tell Secretary Hull that he wished to see the Japanese Ambassador immediately upon his return and that warning which had been suggested as a parallel action by Mr. Churchill was communicated to the Japanese Ambassador by the President on August 17th of that year.

Mr. Murphy. There have been rumors throughout the country, in several of the papers, to the effect that at the Atlantic Conference, there was a promise by the President of the United States to the Prime Minister of England, Mr. Churchill, that we would stall the Japanese for a period—that is a free translation—stall the Japanese for a period of about 4 months.

Mr. Gearhart. Baby them.

Mr. Murphy. I am using the word "stall." My colleague suggests "baby them" along. At any rate, was there any promise, so far as you know, on the part of the President of the United States, or any commitment by him, to the Prime Minister of England, that we would stall, baby them along, or anything of that nature, for a period of 4 months?

Mr. Welles. The only promise made by the President, Mr. Congressman,
to the best of my knowledge and belief, is that I have already stated, namely that the United States would take parallel action with the British Government in warning the Japanese Government that we could not regard with indifference their continued expansion.

Mr. Murray. And nothing else?

Mr. Welles. It was also the President's agreement, if it can be called that, an understanding was reached that the United States would again undertake the negotiations which, you remember, had been broken off when the Japanese moved into Indo-China, would again undertake negotiations with the Japanese Government in an effort to avoid war.
四五月  \[551 \text{ft}\]

下は出席して居られました。

ゲゼル氏、ルーズベルト大統領とチャーチル首相との太平洋会談中

1

協定に付

若しありとすれば一同会談で何等かの情報をうけられ

たか。

ゲゼル氏、大統領は私よりも先にワシントンに渡ることにつ

て居りましたので私が大統領と別れた時大統領は日本の

状態並びに従前来だ

てチャーチル氏と会談をした事。チャ

ール氏は大統領に英米両国は何等かの

情報を探す手段として日本政
府に警告を発することについて並行的措置をとるべきであると示唆され
た。私の記憶によれば大統領はチャーチル氏が示唆した事は米国政府
は日本の徴服と侵略の政策も固執するならば米
国はその合法的利益を保全するためにその必
要と判断するが如き措置をとらなければならないと言ふことを明
るくであるという事であった。
大統領は又語ったる早速日本大使と会見を希望する事はハル長官に
告げるやに前に希望致しました。
又チャーチル氏の示唆した並行的措置である警告は同年八月十七日ま

続領により日本大使に承認させられました。
マーフィー氏
太平洋会談の際に米国大統領が、英国首相チャーチル氏に対し
米国は日本を残す間四ヶ月はあり丸め込むうと一之をくだけた云ひ方
ですが、約束をしたとの噂が四月中に信ばり数つかの新聞にも載せらる
きました。マーフィー氏
赤軍の様にやや、と云ふ言葉を言つてあります。向かもかく、物下の御
存知の限りでは米国大統領は、英国首相に、米国は四ヶ月間日本を丸め
むとか、赤軍のやうにやることを云ふこともありませぬか。

ウエルズ氏
大統領のした約束は私る知り又信ずる所では私は既に述べた
ことだけであります。即ち米国は日本が防屈を縮小する場合、無関心では
あり得ないと云ふことを日本政府に警告する事につき英測政府と並行し
て、
D. D. 1500-L-1

AT 2230 (LOCAL TIME) ON 18 JUNE, 1940, SENT THE FOLLOWING TO COMMANDANT, 14TH NAVAL DISTRICT:

SECRET

"WOULDN'T LIKE TO KNOW WHETHER REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT FOR ADDITIONAL AIR PATROL IS A PART OF ARMY EXERCISE OR IS IT BASED UPON INFORMATION FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT".

AT 0945 (LOCAL TIME) ON 19 JUNE, 1940, THE FOLLOWING REPLY WAS RECEIVED:

CONFIDENTIAL

"REQUEST OF COMMANDING GENERAL "AS BASED UPON A Directive FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT X HE HAS NO INFORMATION AS TO WHETHER OR NOT IT IS AN EXERCISE".

JUL 7 1947
一九四四年（昭和十九年）六月十八日二十二時（地方時間）左の如く

ハワイ方面司令部の空襲警報を報せよとの要求は軍練習の一部であるか否か米軍司令部よりの警告に巡くものであるか知りたしめ

該司令部の警報に至る司令部からの命令に巡く

それが警報であるか否かに関する議論経験をもたない
EXHIBIT NO. 32
MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII
FROM JULY 8 TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(3) 16 October 1941 from CNO to Kimmel et al. Subject: Japanese Cabinet Range.

(3) Drafter: Op-12.
From: CNO.
Released by: Ingersol.
Date: October 16, 1941.
Addressees: Priority
CINCLANT
CINCPAC
CINCAF
(Acknowledge)

162203 CR 0534

The resignation of the Japanese cabinet has created a grave situation. If a new cabinet is formed it will probably be strongly nationalistic and anti-American. If the Konoye cabinet remains the effect will be that it will operate under a new mandate which will not include rapprochement with the US. In either case hostilities between Japan and Russia are a strong possibility. Since the US and Britain are held responsible by Japan for her present desperate situation there is also a possibility that Japan may attack these two powers. In view of these possibilities you will take due precautions including such preparatory deployments as will not disclose strategic intention nor constitute provocative actions against Japan. Second and third addees inform appropriate army and naval district authorities. Acknowledge XX

Secret

(Page 1327 of Volume 14 "Pearl Harbor Attack" Series)
CINCLANT
CINCAF

CIN CLANT
CIN CAF

日時：一九四一年十月十六日。

（受領報告）

RECEIVED
JUL 8 1947
日本内閣の処置は事態を重大化した。若し近衛内閣が留任するとしても結果に於ては同内閣は、米国と、妥協を含まず、従来の意思が間欠の下に行動するであろう。何れにせよ、蘇間に於ての可能性は極めて多い。

若し日本はこの時期の戦争を放棄する可能性がある、かといえるべき前線の行進が考えられる。
NOVEMBER 26, 1941

Subject: Japanese Naval Task Force.

The following information was received from the Commandant 14th Naval District through the Office of Naval Intelligence at 12:45 a.m. this date:

1. The Japanese have been organizing a naval task force for the past month comprising:
   b. Third Fleet which formerly was the China Coast Command Force including its first and second base forces, constituted by miscellaneous small vessels.
   c. Combined Air Force consisting of all large carrier forces.
   d. Also destroyer squadron 3, air squadron 7, submarine squadron 5, and possibly 1 battleship division from First Fleet consisting of 3 battleships.

Summary of Above: 14 Heavy Cruisers, 4 Light Cruisers, 10 Carriers, 3 Light Cruisers, 2 Destroyer Squadrons (24 destroyers), 2 Submarine Squadrons (18 submarines), and possibly 3 battleships.

2. The combined air force has assembled in Takao, Formosa, with some units believed in Hainan Island. The Third Fleet is believed moving in direction of Takao and Bako, Pescadores off West Coast of Formosa, from home waters in Japan. Units from the Second Fleet are at present possibly enroute to South China as advance scouts. Strong concentration of submarines and air groups in the Marshalls. Present location other units of this task force are not known.

3. The evaluation put upon the above information by the Commandant, 14th Naval District is that a strong force may be preparing to operate in Southeastern Asia, while component parts thereof may be expected to operate from Palau and the Marshall Islands.

SHERMAN MILES,

Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy

Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

Distribution:
Secretary of War
Assistant Chief of Staff, W.P.D.
I.B. File
Far East Section
Record Section

(Page 1366, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
中華民國第二十九年四月二十六日

秘書長

一九四一年十一月二十六日

日立本海軍司令部

以下ノ情報ハハ本日午前十二時四十五分ニ於テレ報物ヲ略次ノ如シ

日本海軍司令部

条約成文表次ノ如シ

戦略輸送ヲ主導ノヨリ

大佐我が偵察ヲ相営スル
上記報告ニ基ク第十四海戦区司令官ノ判定ハ、南東アジア方面ニ於
ハ不名デアル。
Item
1. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Orange (1938)
2. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 1
3. Extracts from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5
4. Extracts from War Department Operations Plan - Rainbow No. 5
5. Extracts from Hawaiian Defense Project, Revision 1940
6. Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii
7. Annex No. VII to Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Plan, Hawaii
8. Joint Air Estimate, Hawaii (Martin-Bellinger Agreement)
9. 5 November 1941 Standing Operating Procedure, Hawaiian Department
10. Field Order No. 1 NS (Naval Security), Hawaiian Department
11. Extracts from Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 5
12. Pacific Fleet Confidential Letter 20L-41 (Revised) - Security of Fleet at Base and in Operating Areas

(1) EXTRACTS FROM JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - ORANGE (1938)

SECTION I - DIRECTIVE

This JOINT ARMY AND NAVY BASIC WAR PLAN - ORANGE - shall constitute the basis upon which all Army Plans - ORANGE, all Navy Plans - ORANGE, all Joint Plans - ORANGE, and all supporting allocations for an ORANGE war shall be formulated and developed.

SECTION II - ASSUMPTIONS

This Plan is applicable to any probable situation between UNITED STATES and ORANGE which requires action by the armed forces. The character of the particular situation that may arise cannot be predicted, but in general it may be assumed that -

1. There will be a period of strained relations preceding the outbreak of war with ORANGE, during which period preparatory measures prior to mobilization can be taken.

2. Active hostilities against the UNITED STATES by ORANGE will be precipitated without a formal declaration of war.

3. The superiority of the UNITED STATES naval strength over that of ORANGE will be adequate to permit operations by the UNITED STATES Fleet to the westward of OAHU; and any assistance which may be given to ORANGE or to the UNITED STATES by other powers will not materially reduce this superiority.

(Page 1423, Part 15 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
防

防

防

防

防

防

防

防
这页文档包含中文文本，但没有提供足够的上下文信息来准确地翻译或解释内容。
Admiral STARK, I should say we were both making overt acts against each other. I was asked with regard to that by - I have forgotten which congressional committee, I was appearing before a number of them regularly - and I stated and it will undoubtedly be in the record somewhere, that in my opinion it did not make much difference what we did; that Hitler had every reason, if he wanted to exercise it so far as international law was concerned, to go to war with us at any time but that he would choose his own time and it would be a cold-blooded decision with him as to when that time would be most effective.

Mr. GEARHART. Now, an overt act against Germany in 1941 constituted an overt act against Japan in law, did it not?

Admiral STARK. No, sir; not in my opinion. We were not at war with Japan. Japan was not at war with anybody except the Chinese. We were endeavoring - that is, the President and Mr. Hull were, in my opinion, and I was close to them - not to precipitate a war in the Pacific.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes; but didn't it ever enter into your discussion as a member of the war council consisting of the President, the three Secretaries and the two Chiefs of Staff, didn't it ever enter into your discussions as to whether or not an overt act of a military nature against Germany might constitute or also constituted an overt act against the Japanese?

Admiral STARK. I do not recall it. I had never thought of it until you just asked the question.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, let me direct your attention to page 84 in Peace and War. I will read you a paragraph:

On September 27, 1940 Germany, Italy and Japan signed a far reaching treaty of alliance. In that treaty it was provided that Japan recognized and respected the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe; that Germany and Italy recognized and respected the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater Asia; and that the three countries would assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the powers was attacked by a power not then involved in the European war or in the Chinese-Japanese conflict.

Now, it would appear from that, would it not, that Japan became obligated to attack the United States under its agreement with Germany and Italy of September 27, 1940, upon the United States attacking Germany?

Admiral STARK. Yes; I think that is correct, although I believe that the State Department might testify to the fact that Japan in the last analysis would make her own decision as to carrying out that provision and she would or would not, according to whether or not it would be useful to her.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, do you agree with this conclusion which is drawn by the writer of this book, evidently with the approval of the Secretary of State of that day:

The last of these provisions obviously was aimed directly at the United States.
Admiral STARK. Yes; I think that may be correct, sir. I think that they had us in mind.

Mr. GEARHART. Then it was the belief of the State Department, and possibly of the War Council, that Germany, Italy, and Japan had in mind belligerent action on the part of the United States at the time they entered into that agreement?

Admiral STARK. I think so, at least a possibility of it. I might add that for a long period our diplomatic effort was to pry Japan loose from that Axis set-up or Tri-Partite agreement.

Mr. GEARHART. Well, you were familiar with the intercepts, in one of which the Japanese in Washington, or rather, in Tokyo informed Berlin of their steadfast adherence to the Tri-Partite agreements?

Admiral STARK. Yes, sir.

Mr. GEARHART. So far as anything that has ever been acquired along the line through any of the intercepts or through any of the discussions with the Japanese Ambassadors, no progress was made towards separating the Japanese from their Axis (6161) obligations.

Admiral STARK. No, sir; we didn't get to first base on that.

Mr. GEARHART. Yes, sir. And the intercepts told you, all of the time that we were negotiating with them, that the Japanese were adhering strictly to their Axis obligations?

Admiral STARK. I believed there was one intercept showing Germany's dissatisfaction with the fact that Japan was not doing more, at least one.
辩论例文 第五〇〇〇・一五号

一九四六年一月四日

○ スターグ提督

我々は双方ともお互を対象として公然たる行為をや
って私たまたと言つてよいでしょう。（一九五八）私はどの委員会だったか
忘れましたか。私のことは若干の委員会に几帳面に出席して居ましたか
のある委員会でそのことについて尋ねられましたか。その時私は次の如く
述べました。これをどこかの記録に載せてるところは疑ひたいと思う
ますぐ即ち私の考へでは、我々が如何なる事をするかは大した問題で
ないといふ事。又、ヒットラーは「国際法の関する限り、彼が戦争を
しやうとするならば、何時でも我國と戦争を始める見ゆる理由をつっ
て居た事。然し彼は自らその進行の時期を選ぶであろう。まだ。其の最
も結果的なる時期は何時であるかに付いては彼は冷靜に之を決定するであ
らしといふ事を述べました。
その中の一つはワシントン駐在の否認を東京の日本外務局が彼等の三国協定に対して確定支持する事を持ち上げた事である。そこでガーランド氏は、日本外務省の関係者を通じて我々が得た専権に関する限り、日本国民を権利的側に持つ事を問題化しているが。

①スターク氏

向には何等情報して居らなかったのです。我々はその事に関しては一匹にも違してなかったのです。

②スターク氏

日本が条約に支持していないうちに、彼等が彼等と交渉して来た時に通じて、彼等及び日本国民による特に創発側に持つ事として我々に対しては、その要事を守つ

一つは、イツ側の不満を示してゐる彼等の不満を示してゐる彼等に支持してゐないという事実に対するド
Mr. Hull's statement. . . . On November 7, I attended the regular Cabinet meeting. It was the President's custom either to start off the discussion himself or to ask some member of the Cabinet a question. At this meeting he turned to me and asked whether I had anything in mind. I thereupon pointed out for about 15 minutes the dangers in the international situation. I went over fully developments in the conversations with Japan and emphasized that in my opinion relations were extremely critical and that we should be on the lookout for a military attack anywhere by Japan at any time. When I finished, the President went around the Cabinet. All concurred in my estimate of the dangers. It became the consensus of the Cabinet that the critical situation might well be emphasized, in speeches in order that the country "would, if possible, be better prepared for such a development.

While the modus vivendi proposal was still under consideration, I emphasized the critical nature of this country's relations with Japan at the meeting of the War Council on November 25. The War Council, which consisted of the President, the Secretaries of State, War and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations, was a sort of a clearing house for all the information and views which we were currently discussing with our respective contacts and in our respective circles. The highlights in the developments at a particular juncture were invariably reviewed at those meetings. At that meeting I also gave the estimate which I then had that the Japanese military were already poised for attack. The Japanese leaders were determined and desperate. They were likely to break out anywhere, at any time, at any place, and I emphasized the probable element of surprise in their plans. I felt that virtually the last stage had been reached and that the safeguarding of our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy.

On November 28, at a meeting of the War Council, I reviewed the November 26 proposal which we had made to the Japanese, and pointed out that there was practically no possibility of an agreement being achieved with Japan. I emphasized that in my opinion the Japanese were likely to break out at any time with new acts of conquest and that the matter of safeguarding our national security was in the hands of the Army and the Navy. With due deference I expressed my judgment that any plans for our military defense should include an assumption that the Japanese might make the element of surprise a central point in their strategy and also might attack at various points simultaneously with a view to demoralizing efforts of defense and of coordination.

On November 29 I expressed substantially the same views to the British Ambassador.

I said the same things all during those days to many of my contacts.
REPLIES TO INTERROGATORIES PROPOUNDED BY THE HONORABLE
HOMER FERGUSON, MEMBER OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE
INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK

15. Answer: On November 9, 1941, the Australian Minister called
on me and brought up the question of his conferring with
the Japanese representative, Mr. Kurusu, and suggesting to
Kurusu that Australia would be glad to act as a mediator.
I offered no objection to his taking such a step, but merely
stated my opinion to the Minister that the diplomatic stage
was over and that nothing would come of such a move.

43. Question: What did you do to obtain the time as asked for by
        Marshall and Stark in their memorandums of November 5 and 2

44. Question: Did you discuss this question with the President and
        what was said by the President and you in that discussion?

Answer: Generally speaking, our entire 8 months of conversa-
tions involved gaining time. There was no conflict between
this objective and our intensive efforts to persuade the
Japanese to pursue policies of peace. After the Imperial
Conference at Tokyo on July 2, 1941, the Japanese in pur-
suance of the decision to move south, proceeded rapidly
with the necessary preparations for a military movement on
a large scale.

        It was obvious that the time of such attack at Japan
would make would be of Japan's own choosing, and would depend
upon Japan's own estimate of her readiness and of favoring
circumstances. It was not within the power of this Govern-
ment otherwise than by abject submission to Japan's terms,
to halt Japan in her course. However, I endeavored at all
times to treat with the Japanese in a spirit of open-minded-
ness, patience and goodwill. I sought from the outset of
the conversations to explore thoroughly every possibility of
bringing about a peaceful, fair and stabilizing settlement
of the situation in the Pacific, and I spared no effort to
keep always open a door to the continuation of the conversa-
tions. At the same time I had to be on guard against any
manifestation of weakness which might have encouraged the
Japanese to be more precipitate than they were in their
action. In this way, I believe that we gained months of
valuable time. It became clear, however, in October, as I
saw it, that the Japanese had decided to strike in their
own time, unless this Government should be willing to yield
abjectly to Japan's terms. I constantly discussed with the
President the question of gaining as much time as possible
and we had the subject very much in mind throughout the
conversations with the Japanese.

49. Question: Did the Secretary of State's office prepare a final
draft, one ready for delivery to the Japanese, of a modus
vivendi?

Answer: A draft of the modus vivendi dated November 25 which
was labeled "final draft," meaning that that was the last
draft that was made of that document, had been furnished
the committee. It cannot be accurately said that that
draft was "ready for delivery to the Japanese," as it is
impossible to tell what further revision might have been made if a decision had been made to offer the Japanese a modus vivendi.

49. Question: Did you show such a draft to the Ambassadors of Britain, China, and the Netherlands?

Answer: The latest draft of the modus vivendi shown to the British, Chinese and Netherlands diplomatic representatives was the draft of November 24. There were only minor differences between the November 24 and the November 25 drafts.

53. Question: Was it before or after you learned of the pilot message, being message 901, exhibit 1, page 338?

54. Question: Was it before or after you learned that Japan was replying to your November 26 message?

55. Question: Was it before or after you knew the contents of any part of the 14-part message, a reply to your November 26 message?

56. Question: Had you learned of the receipt of any of the 13 parts of the 14-part message, being message 902, page 239, exhibit before it was decided by the President, or by you, to send a message to the Emperor?

84. Question: When did you first learn that the Japanese were replying to your note of November 36?

85. Question: When did you first see any of the parts of the 14-part message 903, exhibit 1, page 339?

86. Question: When did you first learn that the message was to be delivered in accordance with a time later to be determined?

87. Question: When did you first see the message No. 844, page 195, exhibit 1, which contained the language: "therefore, with a report of the views of the Imperial Government on this American proposal which I will send you in 2 or 3 days, the negotiations will be de facto ruptured. This is inevitable. However, I do not wish to give the impression that the negotiations are broken off."

Answer: I cannot recall definitely the exact time when any of the messages referred to were seen by me.

... Even had the intercepted messages clearly indicated...
immediate war, they could only have referred to attack by
the gathering Japanese forces whose movements we had been
watching for days.

From the time the Japanese presented their drastic
ultimatum on November 20, no intimations were given us that
the Japanese would make the slightest concessions in their
demands, but, on the contrary, they drove steadily forward
to the attack with their armed forces, while, at the same time
misrepresenting the attitude of this Government. The
Japanese reply of December 7 was a false and fraudulent state­
ment in the worst of bad faith of Japan's case and a mon­
strous misrepresentation of our position in what turned out
to be a brazen attempt to shift from themselves to us
responsibility for their attack upon us.

Questions 57 to 60 are grouped in a single answer.

57. Did you discuss with the President the modus vivendi message?

58. Question: If so, what was said about it by the President and
what did you say to the President?

59. Question: 'Did you ever discuss with the President the fact
that you were not going to send the modus vivendi but were
going to send the note of the 26th?

60. Question. If you had such a conversation or discussion with
the President about that date on the modus vivendi will you
give us the conversations;

Answer: I was in constant touch with the President and con­
sulted him fully at all stages of our consideration of the
modus vivendi proposal. It is impossible to recall the
details of the discussion, but the trend of our thought was
indicated in my statement before the committee on November 18
1945. The President at no time expressed any dissent from
views expressed by me. On November 26 I recommended to the
President—and he approved— my calling in the Japanese
representatives and handing them the broad basic proposals
while withholding the modus vivendi plan.

Questions 79 and 80 are grouped in a single answer.

79. Question: Did you the diplomatic relations between Japan and
America grow worse after November 27?

80. Question. If they did grow worse how do you account for no
other message being given to the commanders in the field?

Answer: Diplomatic relations between Japan and the United
States could scarcely grow worse after November 27, except
in the sense that the crisis foreseen by us and planned by
the Japanese approached closer at hand. There was nothing
fundamentally new in the diplomatic situation. That situati­
as we viewed it, especially from November 31 until the attacl
on Pearl Harbor, was that Japan might strike at any time
and that the diplomatic establishment could not be expected
to preserve national security.

Question: Did not that message 844, exhibit 1, page 195, indi­
cate to you that your note of the 36th was not acceptable and
therefore that war was imminent?
Answer: I was already satisfied that the Japanese would not agree to anything short of complete yielding by the United States to Japan's demands. The intercepted Japanese message to which you refer did no more than confirm what we already knew. As I have pointed out repeatedly Japan was bent on attacking us unless we made abject surrender to her demands as an aggressor. We had no serious thought that Japan would accept our proposal of November 26.
四二九頁

前殿議官・ commune・ ハルの碑文

ハル氏の碑文

十一月七日、定例閣議が出席しました。大統領の習慣として自ら
で説明の口を切るか、または閣員の皆か、質問を発するのを常としました
この会議では大統領は私に向かって、何の意見があるか、どうか、を聞き、さ
らに私がの会談の全事件を述べ、私には意見は関係は極度に危険に面して
り、日本により何時、何処、にに対して何されるから、それに答えるため
に、大統領に懇請をせねば、と重ねました。私の語り終えた時、大統

对し懇請をせねばべきであると強調しました。
十四〇頁
十一月二十八日、軍事会議に於て私は、我々が日本に対して為した十
一月二十六日の提案を検討し、日本と協定に到達する可能性の実際的
に全く無いことを指摘しました。私は私見に依れば日本はなんら新
しい侵略行為を以て襲ひかければもしれないこと、そして国際安全
の保障は、陸海軍の手に委ねられてゐるのを強調しました。

日本は奇襲の要因を弱めんとして種々なる地點を同時的攻撃するからも
連絡の為の努力を弱めんとして種々なる地點を同時的攻撃するからも
されないといふ私の判断を申し述べました。
十一月二十九日私は大体に於て同意見を英国大使に語りました。
同じことをその當時を通じ多くの接続者に語りました。
問、貴下は何を語りましたか。
答、一般的に云ふと我々の会談の全八ヶ月は時をかせぐことにありましたが、我々の熱心な努力と日本の平和政策の遂行による何等の戦いはありませんでした。一九四一年七月二日の東京における」との相談のため必要な準備を迅速に進ませました。大規模の軍事行動のため必要な準備を迅速に進ませました。日本の準備及び好都合な状勢を日本が如何に判断するかを抑える日本の強さにより定まり日本の条件に従ふのが決まります。日本の強さによる越えはありませぬので、様々に努力致しました。私は交渉の最初から太平洋に於ける事態の平和的公平且安定させる解決を招き出すための全ての手段を用な
探求せんとしたのであります。私は交渉の継続のため常に門戸を開放して置くため凡ゆる努力をしました。同時に私は弱身を見せて日本においては貴重な数ヶ月を稼ぎ得たと信じます。所が私の観察した所によれば、十月には日本は米国政府が日本内に於ける難をしない限りその欲する時に出撃する決心をした譲歩にありました。私の発言に大統領と出来ぬだけ時を稼ぐことにつき、討議したのであります。
問、それは貴下がバリロット電報即ち第九〇一号の電報（警察第一号）を知った前ですか、後ですか。
問、それは十一月二十六日附書信に対する返事の十四部分の電報の何れかの部分を知った前ですか、後ですか。

問、大統領又は貴下により天皇に報を送ることに決定されれた前に電報第十九〇二号（二三九頁電報第一号）の十四部分の十三部分中の何れかを受けて取った事を知ってありますか。
十一月二十五日の質下のノートに対し、日本が同答しようとしている故

答

問七

問八

問五

電報電九〇二號（書簡第一號、二三九頁）の十四部の何れかの部分を始

て見たのは何時ですか

問六

通報は後に決定せらるべき時間に交付せらるる答であるるを仮に来

三日中

に右米案に対する帝國政府の見解申入れを以て、交涉決烈の印象を與ふるこを欲せし

りする他非情勢ナルが、交涉決烈の印象を與ふるこを欲せし

この言葉を含む電報を始めて見たのは何時ですか

問四

昭和四四年四月（一九五頁・書簡第一號）即ち電報すべき一依て四三日前

昭和四四年四月（一九五頁・書簡第一號）即ち電報すべき一依て四三日前
之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。非常に関心的な行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれて居りました。之等の報告は十一月廿六日の米国側報告に於ける作戦的行動の事実に私の注意を引かれた。
私なりに、大統領に申し立てる内閣の段階に於て充分大統領と相談致しました。内閣の詳細を思い出し、大統領は私の表明した見解に不同意を示された事はありませぬ。十一月廿六日は大統領に日本代表を招き、我等の提案を立上仮託的提案を手交することを大統領に報告し相当の承認を

質問日付九月乃至八月は一間答に之を経過する

日米間の外交関係は十一月二十日に以降悪化しましたか。
答

日本外交関係は十一月廿七日以後、一層悪くなったと云ふこととは出来ます

せん、我々の予想を又日本側で計上してゐた危機が一層手逆に迫った

のであります、我々の見る所によれば事情は常に十一月廿一日より真珠

島攻撃に至る間に於ては日本は何時攻撃するかを知れず外交手段により

国家の安全を保持することを期待したものであります

電報八四七號（電報第一號一九五頁）は昨年の廿五日ノハノノ件は受諾を

らせず、従つて感情は激違してゐることを當下に示したく danskでしたか

同八

八八

同九

同九二頁
答

私は既に米国が日本の要求を完全に容れたい限り如何なる事にも日本は
之に同意しないと云ふ事も認めても居りませんが、貴下の云はさる僅受日本
電報は私に既に知っておった事を確かめただに過ぎません。既に私が轟進し
る限り我々を攻撃しようと決心してゐたのであります。日本が十一月七
六日の米国案を受諾しようとすることはとても考えられないことでした。
Dear Betty:

While the Secretary was on board the ENTERPRISE he said to me, "Admiral, will you come to Washington in early October while you are on the Pacific Coast?" I replied, "I can not come to Washington except under orders, but if Stark wants to see me I suppose I will be ordered."

Just before leaving Pearl Harbor the Secretary said, "Admiral, I will talk to Stark and it is possible that we may want you to come to Washington for a conference." I replied, "I will be glad to come any time I am wanted."

I do not know of any benefit to the Navy that would accrue from my coming to Washington as I fully and frankly expressed my views to the Secretary on all points where I felt that such expression might help the Navy or the Nation. I also gave him a memorandum which covered the more important points discussed with him. Nevertheless, if you or the Secretary want me to come I will be pleased to do so.

During the past six months the Fleet has been visited by two Secretaries. During the last visit the Secretary made a most favorable impression upon the officers and men of the Fleet and I have frequently heard officers say, "I hope that Colonel Knox remains as Secretary regardless of the outcome of the election."

In the Fleet we did all we could to show both Secretaries what we are, what we are doing, and what we are thinking. Regardless of whether we made a good impression on the Secretary I believe that it would have boosted our spirits a bit if, upon his departure, he had sent a dispatch to the Fleet in these waters or to CinCus expressing some appreciation of our efforts to show our wares or approbation of our endeavors to maintain an efficient Fleet. Personally I feel that the Fleet made a good impression, and that a dispatch would have been sent had the Secretary been accompanied by a competent aide.

Please tell Nimitz that his letter of 30 August regarding six-year enlistments was delivered to me by the Secretary's Aide on Monday afternoon a few minutes before the Secretary left the ENTERPRISE and after I had completed my serious talks with the Secretary.

With kindest regards and best wishes.

Sincerely,

/J. O. Richardson

J. O. RICHARDSON

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy,
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department,
Washington, D. C.

P. S. As far as I know I have nothing to take up with the
D. D. 1500-M-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark (with enclosures) - 18 September 1940.

Department that can not be handled by correspondence but if I am wanted in Washington I am ready to come on arrival at San Pedro.

/s/ JOR

Defense Note: PS above in "handwriting."
も忘れませんと云ったので私は一時用なら何時でも喜んでおります

答へました。

近の訪問中には長官は相識の敬意に常に親しい印象を常に強くしましたが

而して彼を尊敬する一と云ふのを誓々断えた事があらっ

長官かが私に来てほしいなら喜んで來

過去六ヶ月間に組合は二人の長官の訪問を受けました

而して組合は一組合の敬意に常に親しい印象を常に強くしましたが

答へてあるかを長官に示す為に金を贈ってきました。我々が長官に
追伸　私の知ってある限りでは調書案の案で手数箇国案出来ない容は何
ありませんがワシントン出席せよとの案ならサンフード里案案の
間に生かせられます

署名（JO R）
Sealed Secret
 Drafter: Op-12
 From: Chief of Naval Operations.
 Released by: Ingersoll.
 Date: November 24, 1941.

Chances of favorable outcome of negotiations with Japan very doubtful. This situation coupled with statements of Japanese government and movements of their naval and military forces indicate in our opinion that a surprise aggressive movement in any direction including attack on Philippines or Guam is a possibility. Chief of Staff has seen this dispatch and requests action to inform senior army officers of this area. Utmost secrecy necessary in order not to complicate an already tense situation or precipitate Japanese action. Guam will be informed separately.

Copy to WPD, War Dept., and to Op-12 but no other distribution.

(Pages 1327 - 1328 of Volume 14 "Pearl Harbor Attack" Series)
The people and government of the Netherlands East Indies have continued, affirmatively and constructively, to function practically as a sovereign state, loyal to the mother country. As evidence of Dutch spirit, they (a) have reorganized their army, (b) are actively at work manufacturing needed army equipment, (c) are actively training reserves, (d) have expanded their system of air fields throughout the islands, (e) have cooperated with the British and United States governments in preparation of extensive plans for defense, (f) have refused to renew their commercial treaty with Japan, (g) have delivered to Japan only 10,000 tons of oil since January 1, 1941 - said delivery having been on an old contract still in force.

In the Far East the United States is concerned as a possible belligerent and also as a prime source of war materials for China, the British Commonwealth and for the Netherlands East Indies. We are in process of sending a few military airplanes to Thailand. But this theater will be a secondary one from the point of view of supply. Under all circumstances we will continue to be able to supply Australasia, the Dutch East Indies, and probably also China, though somewhat precariously, through the Burma Road. Siberia will become completely cut off if Japan attacks Russia.

Our influence in the Far Eastern Theater lies in the threat of our Naval power and the effort of our economic blockade. Both are primary deterrents against Japanese all-out entry in the war as an Axis partner. If we become involved in war with Japan we could launch a serious offensive against her by Naval and Air forces. But such an attack would fall short of a major strategic offensive because it could not be decisive within a reasonable time, and still more, because it would be a diversion of forces away from rather than toward our objective, the defeat of the Nazis.

SHERMAN MILLS
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.
段的に実際的の役目を引き行い果して居た。和田魂の遺稿として彼等は…
利は日本が西アジアを攻撃せば全然遮断する。事から
東方面に於ける我々の海軍力と我々の陸海軍の努力を
と顧問する。此等は何よりも日本が極めての相進として全面的策を進むと
を阻止してある最も有力な要因である。若し我々が日本との対争に
目的のものとなるを得ないし後々に努力を分散してナチの攻破と云ふ我々
がある。
分配

大統領

飛行部長

情報部長

航空兵部長

（原點）

公文

（第二十八卷）
UNITED STATES - BRITISH STAFF CONVERSATIONS

REPORT

GENERAL

1. Staff Conversations were held in Washington from January 29, 1941 to March 27, 1941, between a United States Staff Committee representing the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army, and a United Kingdom Delegation representing the Chiefs of Staff. Representatives of the Chiefs of Staff of the Dominions of Canada, Australia, and New Zealand were associated with the United Kingdom Delegation throughout the course of these conversations, but were not present at joint meetings.

2. The personnel of the United States Staff Committee and of the United Kingdom Delegation comprise the following:

(Page 1487, Part 15 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
DEAR FRANK: * * *

In a nutshell that is about the way I regard the present and future situation. No doubt you have seen some of my telegrams which have tried to paint the picture as clearly as has been possible at this post where we have to fumble and grope for accurate information, simply because among the Japanese themselves the right hand often doesn't know what the left hand is doing. Their so-called "new structure" is an awful mess and the bickering and controversy that go on within the Government itself are past belief. Every new totalitarian step is clothed in some righteous-sounding slogan. This, indeed, is not the Japan that we have known and loved.

* * *

(Pages 630 - 632, Part 2 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
昭和四五年十一月二十七日火曜日格言会議事録

合衆国第七九議会第一期

真珠港攻撃共同調査委員会議事録

議長一唯今十二時であります。休憩に入るように先立ち議長は委員会が同意せられるならば十二月十四日附大統領宛グルーヴ氏書簡及び一月二十一日附大統領復信は既にその若干を朗読せられたのでありますから、兹に附

書簡の全文を印刷し記録の寓しのうちに採録せられることを望みます。

フランク君

簡潔に聞知って、私は現在及び将来の情に試いて大体そんな風に見てゐる。貴下は私がどの位地にあって正確を情報を漏むに奔走しと云ふのは今日本人自身左手がしてゐる。右手は知る有様なんのだがいつも一つなり一

やるだけは明確に事情を描き出させるとした私の説明の傍らかを見て時
（此处应为文档正文）

Def.Doc.:A.15000-M-5
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY:

1. The following notes are submitted on the points which we discussed in my effort to meet your wishes to know officers, learn about ships and find out how you could assist the Fleet's preparation for war.

2. PERSONNEL

(A) Officers.

(c) Promotion by selection is the best method yet devised.

(b) Members should be allowed to serve on two successive boards if circumstances render it advisable (requires change by Congress).

(c) Sea duty assignments should be based on ability; the most promising officers should be given preference. This would tend to create a division of officers into two classes, the most promising and the least promising, or an A and B list.

(d) The abuses of retirement for physical disability and the retention on active duty and delayed retirement of the physically unfit should be corrected.

(B) Enlisted Personnel.

(a) While the enlisted strength increased 11,349 between 23 May and 15 August, the Fleet in the Pacific made a net gain of only about 600. Our enormous expenditures for material may prove futile unless there is a prompt and commensurate personnel expansion.

(b) The bottleneck of the training stations, limiting the rate of acceptance of new men, should be eliminated at once and emergency expansion should begin now without awaiting deficiency appropriations. We have not waited for specific appropriations in providing material expansion, and it is difficult to understand or explain to the Fleet why we are unable or unwilling to meet even more vital problems of personnel (involving the imperative necessity of making ready what we already have as well as training men for new construction) with equally direct and effective action. I estimate the time necessary to make a modern man-of-war's-man at 4 years. You can see the necessity of getting started on this training right away.

(C) Separate Air Corps.

(a) Unquestionably a higher degree of cooperation will exist between our Naval air arm and other Naval arms if all of them continue to be intimately bound together in one Navy.
With a separate air corps there is bound to develop a loyalty to the Corps rather than to the Navy, a jealousy between the Corps and the rest of the Navy, many perplexing problems of supply, personnel, administration, and above all a serious loss in effectiveness.

I know of no advantage to the Navy or the Nation that would accrue from the creation of a Naval Air Corps.

3. HAWAII

(A) SURFACE SHIPS.

(a) I believe new construction is being expedited as much as possible. Minelayers are needed for Atlantic Coast.

(B) AIRCRAFT.

(a) A tremendous expansion in this field complicated by foreign orders as well as by our demands. Airplanes, either for sale or for training, should not be obtained at the expense of the active Fleet. Fleet planes must be replaced as rapidly as possible, with new planes, but old planes cannot be taken off until new ones are on hand.

(C) AMMUNITION.

(a) Build up the maximum reserve possible of antiaircraft ammunition.

4. OPERATIONS

(A) RETENTION OF THE FLEET IN THE HAWAIIAN AREA.

(a) From a purely Naval point of view there are many disadvantages attached to basing the fleet in this area, some of which are:

(1) Difficulty, delay and cost of transporting men, munitions, and supplies.

(2) Inadequacy of Lahaina as operating anchorage due to lack of security.

(3) Inadequacy of Pearl Harbor as operating anchorage due to difficulties of entry, berthing and departure of large ships.

(4) Congested and restricted operating areas, in the air and on the surface.

(5) Inadequate facilities for fleet services, training, recreation and housing.

(6) Prolonged absences from mainland of officers and men in time of peace adversely affects morale.

(7) In case of war, necessary for Fleet to return to mobilization ports on West Coast or accept partial and unorganized mobilization measures resulting in confusion and a net loss of time.
(b) If the disposition of the Fleet were determined solely by naval considerations the major portion of the Fleet should return to its normal Pacific Coast bases because such basing would facilitate its training and its preparation for war.

(c) If factors other than purely naval ones are to influence the decision as to where the Fleet should be based at this time, the naval factors should be fully presented and carefully considered, as well as the probable effect of the decision on the readiness of the Fleet. In other words, is it more important to lend strength to diplomatic representations in the Pacific by basing the Fleet in the Hawaiian Area, than to facilitate its preparation for active service in any area by basing the major part of it on normal Pacific Coast bases?

(d) In case our relations with another Pacific Nation deteriorate, what is the State Department's conception of our next move? Does it believe that the Fleet is now mobilized and that it could embark on a campaign directly from Hawaii or safely conduct necessary training from the insecure anchorage at Lahaina which is 2000 miles nearer enemy submarine bases than our normal Pacific Coast bases?

5. SHORE ESTABLISHMENT

(a) I hope you will be constantly on guard not to have the position and purpose of the Shore Establishment over-emphasized. It has only one purpose — the support, maintenance and augmentation of the fighting Fleet. It cannot, of itself, damage an enemy. It is only human that some of those in Washington and long removed from the active Fleet, (predominantly staff corps) frequently fail to visualize the correct priority of objectives.

6. NAVY PUBLICITY

Practically all Navy Publicity, hearings before committees, speeches in Congress and handouts from the Navy Department have stressed one or more of the following ideas:

(a) The Navy is built for defense.
(b) A so-called adequate Navy will keep us out of war.
(c) With an adequate Navy we can impose our will upon the Nations of the earth with little danger of becoming involved in war.
(d) In the unhappy event of war the Fleet is a kind of mobile Maginot Line behind which the people can reside in peace with no obligation to their Country except to promise that their descendants will some day pay for the Navy.
(e) The Fleet is fully manned, fully trained and ready to fight at the drop of a hat.

(f) The comparative strength of navies is measured solely by material things.

(g) Aviation is a cheap means of defense and that large numbers of planes and pilots will render the nation secure.

(h) Outlying Naval bases and air fields, in themselves are weapons of defense.

The type of publicity mentioned above is wrong in that it tends to build the public into a false sense of security. It tends to weaken their moral fibre and to create an unhealthily cautionary mood in a country which may be drawn into war on very short notice. For a people, who may actually be involved in war in a comparatively short time, to be told that they can risk war without danger or wage war without risk, may be fatally detrimental to the determined prosecution of the very war towards which such conception implicitly lead. At the beginning of the present war, the French and British had just these ideas, with the present result.

7. COOPERATION BETWEEN EXECUTIVE, STATE, WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT.

(a) Whether justified or not, I can not escape the feeling that the coordination and mutual understanding between the above departments of the government is not as close as is necessary for effective action.

(b) Before reaching a decision as to the disposition and movements of the Fleet, or units thereof, is the Navy Department consulted, are its views frankly and forcibly presented, and are its representations thoroughly understood and considered?

(c) Present policy appears to be headed towards forcing our will upon another Pacific Nation by diplomatic representations supported by economic measures, a large material Navy in process of construction, and the disposition of an inadequately manned Fleet in being. Can this be done and are we prepared to face war or the inevitable loss of prestige if it cannot? Have the objectives of such a war been formulated, and its costs considered and compared with the value of victory? Can such a war be won by defensive measures or by a people trained to believe that the Navy is for defensive purposes only, and that their whole obligation to their country can be met by the payment of taxes?

(d) The Commander-in-Chief has no responsibility for the formulation of National policy, but he has a definite responsibility for the efficiency of one arm upon which the government relies to enforce National policy, when its aims can not be secured by diplomatic means. He must be concerned over the question as to whether the strength and efficiency of the Fleet are commensurate with the aggressive policy of the administration in the Pacific. Especially so if there is a possibility that this policy will require implementation.
(e) Are objectives being formulated and plans made for our active participation in the European war? We cannot long remain half in and half out of such a war. We should decide now on definite objectives and plans and should not assume that we will fight this one like we did the last, i.e., by sending aviation and light forces for active participation and utilizing our heavy ships, in secure home bases, largely as training ships. Such a course would immobilize our heavy ships, which are most certainly going to be needed either in the Atlantic or the Pacific, depending on the progress of the war.

/s/ J. O. Richardson
(1) 冬至日的活动安排

(2) 天气预报

3 月 1 日

(3) 菜单
作戦

（1）防空戦

（2）電戦

（3）兵器

（4）特殊戦

（5）戦闘

（6）潜水艦

＊安全度：不適当

＊性能：優れた

＊影響力：影響がある

＊戦闘力：高い

＊戦闘力：低い

＊戦闘力：不適当

＊性能：不適当

＊影響力：影響がない

＊戦闘力：中級

＊性能：不適当

＊影響力：影響がある
The Tripartite Pact which Japan signed with Germany and Italy in September, 1940, by implication requires Japan to attack the United States, or any other power, except Russia, not involved in the European war at that time, should it attack either of the Axis partners. The strong Russian resistance to Nazi attack has, however, been a damper to Japanese enthusiasm for her Axis obligations. Although Foreign Minister Togo, who succeeded Toyoda, has announced that there is no change in the foreign policy of Japan, and that Japan will adhere to the Axis alliance, there is evidence that in order to secure a better position for herself, she might disregard her obligations, and even withdraw from the Axis. Japan has boundless ambitions in East Asia, but in view of the increasing American and British strength in the Far East, and the continued stalemate in China, she finds herself in a more and more unfavorable strategic position to realize these ambitions. Japanese government leaders are aware of the perils of further military adventures; they went to avoid a general war in the Pacific. They wish by every means possible to inveigle the United States into an agreement "looking toward a peaceful settlement of all outstanding issues between the two countries." This simply means recognition of Japan's territorial and economic gains in Eastern Asia. The result of these conflicting desires is a state of almost desperate indecision. The fact that Japanese newspapers have come out with their most bombastic bluster during the beginning of Mr. Kurusu's conference seeking a peaceful settlement with this country is the best indication of the lack of coordination, the indecision, and the confused general political situation in Japan. There can be no doubt that the army hotheads, the Black Dragon Society, and other intransigents will oppose most strenuously any major concessions by their present government leaders. Thus the chief obstacle to successful negotiations by Mr. Kurusu or any other envoy, has been the fact that although Premier Togo is an army man, he cannot be said to control the army, the navy, or the ultra-nationalistic secret societies. Until such control is assured, no agreements through negotiations can be successfully carried out. The Kurusu conference can now be said definitely to have ended in failure because of the extreme position taken by the Japanese Government, as regard to concessions which they felt could be made in the Far Eastern Area.

Without their previous enthusiasm and behind uncertain leadership, the Japanese are continuing in the path to what they believe is their "divinely appointed destiny" without being too sure as to where that destiny will take them. As a matter of fact, there
is evidence that the people of Japan are becoming more and more alarmed and apprehensive; they fear that the present course is taking them into a major war with not just one power, but with a combination of powers. In her present situation, if Japan goes to war, her people will enter it desperately rather than confidently.

c. Economic. Because of the ever increasing stringency of the embargo placed on Japan by the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies, the economic situation in Japan is slowly but surely becoming worse. The Japanese have always lacked war materials, adequate foreign exchange, and sufficient foreign trade; the embargo has served to increase sharply the deficiencies in these categories.

Germany's attack on Russia has cut off the supply of military and industrial equipment and machinery from Germany to Japan. The Japanese are finding that economically, as well as politically, the Tripartite Pact has serious disadvantages to them. The pro-Axis leaders are having more and more difficulty in justifying the alliance with Germany.

Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere is anything but prosperous. Labor shortages, lack of adequate and sufficient transportation facilities, guerrilla warfare and, most of all, lack of cooperation on the part of the people who have been brought into the "sphere" by force or the threat of force, have prevented Japan from realizing the economic benefits which she has so often and so loudly proclaimed would result from her scheme.

The firm united front of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands East Indies in enforcing the embargo has put Japan "on the spot" economically. Even little Thailand has been encouraged to resist Japanese pressure for economic, as well as political, concessions. The effects of the embargo will compel Japan to strive to obtain more assistance from the regions under her control in East Asia, and to continue her efforts to persuade the ABD powers through threats and promises to relax the embargo. If she goes to war to achieve her economic objectives, Japan faces ruin; but at the same time she feels that achievement of these objectives are vital to her existence.

Japan lacks essential raw materials to support either her manufacturing industries or a major war effort, even continued effort against China. The stoppage of trade and freezing of credits has drastically reduced Japan's supply of raw materials, and has caused her to begin using her reserves. Many of her industries are suffering from shortages, rationing has been extended and intensified; in short, economically Japan is in perilous plight. The situation calls for strenuous measures; yet, if she goes to war, she may use up her reserves, especially of oil and steel, before she can force a decision favorable to herself. Thus her economic situation contributes largely to the indecision of her leaders. This is a problem which she must solve within the next few months.
世界和平与安全的实现

需要各国共同努力。各国应当以和平和合作的原则，加强国际间的交流与合作，共同应对全球性问题。

世界各国应加强在文化、经济、政治及安全等领域的合作，通过对话和协商解决争端，共同维护世界和平与安全。
Mr. MITCHELL. Well, can you identify for us VPL-46?

Admiral TURNER. VPL-46 was the Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, derived from Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, which in turn was derived from /2C-1 and 2, the American-British conversations.

Mr. MITCHELL. Well, is VPL-46 involved in any one of these 13 items on Exhibit 44, which lists various war plans?

Mr. KEEFE. Is it the same as Rainbow No. 5?

Mr. MITCHELL. That is what I am trying to find out.

Mr. KEEFE. That is what I would like to get cleared up.

Admiral TURNER. Yes, I said that VPL-46 is Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. 5, shown in No. 11, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is another name for Rainbow No. 5, is it?

Admiral TURNER. Yes, sir. VPL-46 is a war-plans number.
五七観看

（五七年十二月二十日・木戸日レリエンプ・クレ・マーナー）

（五八年又米英会談・いょう・及し手飼ヲキ）

ノギス。
24 SEPTEMBER 1940.

DEAR JO: I am working on a letter for you but will send you a copy of my letter to Peck; it is self-explanatory.

I meant simply to mention Faulkner but got into something a little more serious.

Frankly, I do not like the look of things any too well. Spent over three hours in the State Department yesterday — something over two in the morning with Mr. Hull, Welles and Hornbeck, and then again in the afternoon over an hour with Mr. Welles. I believe had you been present you would have been in agreement with what I did and I pushed my thoughts home just as hard as I could. I may say that the same general picture so far as our attitude is concerned still holds, although I would not be surprised, confidentially between you and me, to see an embargo on scrap but this too would be along the lines State has been working on.

I strongly opposed, and I believe carried my point, an embargo on fuel oil for reasons which are obvious to you and with which I may say I think the State Department is in concurrence. I believe Mr. Hull brought it up to get a thorough discussion of the subject and Mr. Welles said he was in complete agreement with me.

Hope to get a letter off in the next day or two with a coverage of some of the thoughts that I have been playing with and, as you know, my mind is completely open to you, almost to simply thinking out loud.

With every good wish as always

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico," Long Beach, California.

P.S. Just received yours with regard to your coming East and will take it up with the Secretary. Unless there is something you feel you want to talk about or that crops up after your arrival on the Coast, I will tell the Secretary I see no need of your coming East, at least for the moment.

I am sorry the message was not sent to the Fleet. I have felt that was an Aide's job. When with the Secretary I always sent them; in the last case when I visited Hawaii I sent them for the Secretary not only to the Navy and to the Army but to the Governor as well. I will tell Mort Deyo to be on guard against these slips hereafter.

Perhaps a letter from the Secretary now would be helpful. I will talk to him about it.

25 SEPTEMBER 1940.

After my note to you of yesterday I spoke to Mort Deyo about telegrams back to the Fleet or other activities after the Secretary's visits.

Mort told me that the Secretary was preparing letters himself as a result of his visit out there so you may expect to hear from him.
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
24 September 1940.

My feeling is that a letter sometime after a visit can never take the place of an appreciative despatch and I have so told Mort. Of course in the last analysis the Secretary is the Boss but I have given Mort the thought - here's hopin'.

Until you wrote I had not seen the sheet which placed officer and enlisted personnel under the Assistant Secretary or at least that particular item escaped my attention. It was not in the original suggestions I made to the Secretary. I immediately took it up with the Secretary and it has been changed; personnel now coming directly under the Secretary which is the same as it has been. Of course you know that BuNav and OpNav usually settle these things pretty much themselves.

/s/ BETTY.
帝書

一九四〇年九月二十四日付

海軍大将イエイ・アール・スタークより
海軍大将ジェー・オール・リチャード

ソノ宛の書

ヨウ

私は貴方に手紙を書かないとおっしゃいます。それを見た時は自然わかります。手紙の内容を書くことにしました。手紙はデクオクナーの手に一度言つて見ようと考えました。

私は前のにんぶし、同じ年の事実を前日好みさせん。私は昨日関係省で三時間会り遇りました。

午前中にハールス・ウェルズ氏、ポーニベンク氏と三時半余り、又午後に一時間余り会り遇りましたのです。若し貴方が出席して居られば居らなかったなり、私の前日に同意されたであろうと確信し私が思ふ所を出来居る際り前後に対話

Def Doc No 1500-0-1

RECEIVED

JUL 7 1947
Excerpt from the testimony of General George C. Marshall given before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, - Seventy-Ninth Congress, Second Session, December 13, 1945

... Senator FERGUSON. General, you mentioned the other day in relation to some material being furnished to Borneo, Port Moresby, and some others. Did we build airports there prior to December 7?

General MARSHALL. We endeavored to have the existing strips sufficiently improved to make them possible to land and take off with a B-17.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that upon your order, or where did that order come from?

General MARSHALL. That was upon my order to General MacArthur.

Senator FERGUSON. Had you conferred with anyone in relation to that prior thereto?

(4022) General MARSHALL. I certainly must have because while that was my desire, to have it done, I would have felt, I am quite certain that I should get the o.k. of the higher government officials because I was involving contacts with other governments.

Senator FERGUSON. And who would those higher government officials be?

General MARSHALL. Oh, it would be the Secretary of State - first the Secretary of War, the Secretary of State, and the President. Whether one or all, I don't know. I should imagine the most normal thing would have been the Secretary of State.

Senator FERGUSON. And prior to sending any material, that is, I am talking about bombs and ammunition -

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. You would confer with the Secretary of State or the President, or Secretary of War?

General MARSHALL. My assumption would certainly be that I would not have given those instructions to General MacArthur unless I had gotten a clearance at least from the Secretary of War, but more probably from the Secretary of State, and I may have gotten a direction from the President, I don't recall.

Senator FERGUSON. General, do you recall of any report (4026) submitted to the War Department which came to your attention in December of 1940, and revised in April of 1941? To refresh your memory, I hand you some papers. You needn't read them aloud. I just want you to go through them enough to be able to say whether or not you ever saw such a report. It involves the oil in the Netherlands Islands.

(4027) Senator LUCAS. Will the Senator yield?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

Senator LUCAS. Is that an exhibit?

Senator FERGUSON. No.

Senator LUCAS. What report is it in?

Senator FERGUSON. I am asking the General about it. Do you want to see it, Senator, first?

Senator LUCAS. No. I was just interested in knowing whether it was an exhibit. Who makes the report?

Senator FERGUSON. The report is not signed.

General MARSHALL. Also has no heading on the paper where it came from.

Senator LUCAS. It seems to me a little unusual to refresh someone's recollection upon an anonymous report.

Senator FERGUSON. If the Senator will look at it, it purports to be a copy of a report filed with restricted offices, and the Army is one of the offices.

General MARSHALL. What was the question, Senator?

Senator FERGUSON. After looking that over, had that ever been called to your attention?
General MARSHALL. I don't recall specifically that it had. I know that we were very much interested in what the Japanese, what the resources were for Japan in that region, and to what degree they would be destroyed.

(4028) Senator FERGUSON. Do I understand that one of the things, at least, that we considered Japan wanted to go into the Netherlands Islands for, was to get oil for war purposes, there had been questions up before you and the various officials about oil, whether an embargo on oil would defeat them?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, was there anything brought to your attention that there was one way to keep them from moving into these islands to get oil and that was to prepare so that those oil wells should be destroyed either prior to them going down or at the time they were coming, full preparation being made, and they being advised on that point, did you ever hear of that before?

General MARSHALL. Will you please read the first part of the question?

(First part of the question read.)

General MARSHALL. That is sufficient.

It was brought to my attention a number of times the factor of oil as it affected the Japanese in their capacity to make war, as it might affect the Japanese by our stricures on the supply of oil for the United States, and as it would affect the Japanese in making war if they had available Borneo and other Indonesian fields, and as it would affect them if we were able to destroy those fields so that the oil would not be usable for a considerable period of time. All those facts were discussed, were brought to my attention, and I think I asked a number of questions regarding them.

.......

Part 3 "Pearl Harbor Attack" - Pages 1519 - 1521.
合衆国第七十九議会第二会期、
開催建設機関に関する調査委員会
（一九四三年）

辻進

進行行われたジョージ・シアー・マーシャル元帥の書簡よりの抜粋。

その他の供給された弾薬物資に関して、先日述べられました。

マーラー・シアー元帥、现存突出路を充分改善して空港とし、B-29を着陸離陸せ

しめらうように努力しました。

ジョージ・シアー元帥。それはマッカーサー元帥に対する私の命令に基づいたのです。

これに関して先だって、それに関して難かと相談し

た事がありますでしたか。
四〇二五——マーシャル元帥。頑かに相談した事があっただのに違ひありま
せん。それをさせる事を私は希望してゐましたが、さうするには他の
官庁と連絡する必要が生じますから、政府上層官吏の承認を得なければ
ならばと感じた筍だと思います。
マーシャル元帥。それは国務長官でせう。第一に陸軍長官、国務長官
それから大統領でせう。そのうちの一人であつたか全部であつたか是
りません。最も順当なのは国務長官であつただらうと思ひます。
ファーガソン上院議員。そして物質を送るに先立ち、といふのは、爆弾
及び弾薬に就て云つてゐるのですから
マーシャル元帥。私のお聴聞では勿論、少なくとも陸軍長官から要は又恐
ろく国務長官から認可を得なければマッカーサー元帥とそれらの指揮を
與へなかつたでせう。それから私は大統領から指令を受けたかも知れな
いが思い出せません。ファーガソン上院議員。元帥、一九四〇年十二月に貴方の目を向けて、それが一九四一年四月に修正された事実書へ追記の報告（四〇ニ七）がありますか。貴方の記憶を新たにする為に、観る音楽を、貴方に許しますか。それは計算機の発明に相違しませんか。それは計算機書ですか。この部分が、貴方は私に質問されて後れませんか。ファーガソン上院議員。それは別のこと書にあらるのですか。貴方は元帥
ファーガリン上院議員。それに目を通されると伺います。それは
方の目に映った夢がありましたが。
マーシャル元帥。それを見たときは心に思い起こしました。日
本郷が... ...その地域に日本軍に攻らせてどんなな被害があるかなお
の際、それにそれらが破壊されるであろうかご無念な思いがあ
で、私はその夢を記憶していま
それを持ってきた夢は記憶して居ります。
（四〇〇八）

マーサル元帥

質問の最初の部分が読まれる（

質問の最初の部分が読まれる下さらないました。）
マーシャル元帥、それから充分です。石油の問題は何度も私の注意に上った事がありました。石油は日本軍の戦争能力に影響を及ぼす重要な資源の一つです。

事の真相は、我々が他国に影響を及ぼす事がない、若し彼等がポルネオにおける他のインダネシアの油田を無理に利用出来れば彼等の戦争遂行に影響を及ぼすであろうと私は考えています。それゆえ、我々は将来出発すれば彼等に影響を及ぼす事に考慮を払うべきです。

「真珠港攻撃」第三章、一五一九一五一頁
DEAR J.O.: I hated to send you the despatch last night that the house would be full when you got here. Kit had not intended to return until two weeks from next Sunday when Harold Gillespie from Honolulu expected to be with us. However he has been again delayed, will not be here when planned, and as the only reason for Kit remaining at the Lake was for his coming, and his coming now being indefinite, they decided to come down this week by they I mean Kit and Kewpie (our daughter) and her two children and nurse girl which will fill the house to about 100 per cent complement.

The Secretary wants very much to see you. I told him of your letter. However, one of the things he wanted to talk to you about is the possibility of sending a detachment to the Far East; it is being urged here by some. I have opposed it and so has Ingersoll. Your thoughts are likely to be determinative.

The question of where to hold the Fleet Problem will be on the agenda.

In addition the Secretary says he would just like to talk to you anyway; so there you are.

I more or less took the bull by the horns with regard to getting more men aboard ship quickly and while we had written you about it the Secretary took it up with the President before we had time to get your reply, that is, with regard to cutting the training period to three weeks. I felt I was on fairly sound ground in bringing this up as my feeling is that it is in accord with your wishes. I would prefer to get twice the number of men in a given period and get them quickly rather than have them spend an additional five weeks or so at the Training Station.

Frankly I do not like the trend of things and I would not be surprised at anything happening any day. Your statement that we can not stay half in this war and half out sizes up the thing pretty well and I have long felt that it is only a matter of time until we get in.

I am writing the District Commanders a letter pointing out the gravity of the situation as I see it and will send you a copy. In this letter I made no attempt to go into much detail - my objective being that they get the spirit of the situation as I see it which would leave no stone unturned towards our immediate readiness. God knows I hope I am wrong because I realize what a little additional time would mean to us but sometimes things get out of hand either from the other fellow's action or our own.

Personally, I am looking forward as always to seeing you. I will keep the decks clear and will arrange our evenings according to your desires. The feminine part of my family are good soldiers on retiring upstairs and turning over the downstairs to stag get-togethers.
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
1 October 1940.

which I find are so beneficial these days.

For next Tuesday, 8 October, I am tentatively slating the following for dinner: The Secretary, Comdr. Murphy, Admirals Seaton, Robinson, Nimitz, Ingersoll, Towers, Furlong, Morelli and General Holcomb.

I am sorry that you will not be putting up with us as our quiet, late evening talks helped me so much when you were last here.

With every good wish as always.

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral J. O. RICHARDSON, USN,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet,
USS "New Mexico," San Pedro, California.

P.S. I see no reason in the world for any secrecy with regard to your coming to Washington.
昭和十五年十月一日

長官は非常に貢付の趣を長官

Dof.Dos.51500-F-1

昭和十五年十月一日

長官は非常に貢付の趣を長官

昭和十五年十月一日

長官は非常に貢付の趣を長官
話しました。然し長官が貴下と話したく思うて居る事の一つは、為東に分遣艦隊を派遣するとの可能性についてです。それは貴下に於て既に分遣艦隊を派遣するとの可能性については、小生は反対致します。その上長官は貴也角貴下とお話しすること、と申して居ります。小生も、もっと小生の兵を早く軍艦に営せるという点に就ては興味然々。小生はこれは貴需に副もものであると信じ本問題を提起すること、に就ては大分詐たる根拠あるものと信じて居りました。小生は一定期間内に二倍の兵を得ること、これを更に五週間前後訓練所で過させるよりも寧ろ直ちに云へば、小生は今日の卒業を好みませんし、又何時如何なる事が
The following despatch is for all United States merchant ships in the Pacific:

There is a possibility of hostile action by Japan against U.S. shipping. United States merchant ships at sea in the Pacific proceed now as follows: In Chinese waters, China Sea or Dutch Indies waters, proceed immediately to Manila, Singapore, or a North Australian Port. In North Pacific westbound, except those bound to Vladivostok, proceed to Honolulu unless close to the Philippines, in the latter case proceed there. Ships bound for Vladivostok, proceed on voyage. If Honolulu bound continue voyage. If in North Pacific eastbound, continue voyage. If in South Pacific, continue voyage. Vessels operating coastwise off of South America or between the United States and the west coast of South America, continue voyage. All coastwise shipping eastern Pacific, continue voyage. Usual trade routes should be avoided.

(Page 1402, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
152.6R如常列表

保持

+481

154.6R

144.6R

154.6R

150.8

150.8

144.6R

150.8
Senator FERGUSON. Now, you have given, at the end of your memorandum - it is on page 5 of Exhibit 16 - you specifically make certain recommendations there.

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. "That the dispatch of United States Armed Forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved."

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Of course, that does not concern the volunteer air corps.

General MARSHALL. No, sir, because that was under China's pay, and control.

Senator FERGUSON. That was under the Chinese and not our movement, as you interpreted the other day.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain and our own forces.

That was your recommendation, was it not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know whether we were furnishing (329) and supplies to Borneo or any of the other islands? Did not your first report indicate that we were?

General MARSHALL. In that report I gave a specific example of furnishing ammunition to the Chinese Government which had been reserved for Iceland, I think it involved 7,000 rounds, and we gave them 5,000, or maybe it was 3,100, one of the other. That was to be sent by General MacArthur from Manila, and we would replace them by shipment at the same time from San Francisco.

Senator FERGUSON. Was that under Lend-Lease?

General MARSHALL. I assume it was, sir. I was getting it out, and the details were being taken care of by someone else.

Senator FERGUSON. You do not know what it was under?

General MARSHALL. I think it was under Lend-Lease, but my action was to get them started.

Senator FERGUSON. Your report of 1941, your first report indicates bombs were also furnished.

General MARSHALL. I do not believe that is quite what it was, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain it?

General MARSHALL. It was necessary, we felt, to have the ability to land, and gas, and arm the B-17's to the south of the Philippines for two reasons: One was in case (3292) we had to fly them in from Hawaii by that front, and the other one was that when you are operating strategic bombing planes of that type, their capacity is greatly increased for carrying bombs, and in range if they have a place they can shuttle to, and shuttle back from.

Therefore, we directed General MacArthur to take up with the governments concerned the proposition of preparing strips that would accommodate the B-17's and that he, General MacArthur, stock those strips with gasoline and bombs.

Senator FERGUSON. That was just anticipating, wasn't it, that if we got into any war we would be using these other bases, and we would be using the ABCD plan, the Singapore plan?

General MARSHALL. To that extent, yes, sir. The same thing is really covered in the ABC-1 and 2 plans.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. The point here was that the B-17's would be greatly restricted in what they did from the Philippines if they had no landing points other than in the Philippine Islands, and therefore it was essential, in my opinion - and I think I personally direct
this myself - that is my recollection - that these arrangements be made at Rabaul, Port Moresby, Port Darwin, Balikpapan (3293) Borneo and Singapore.

Senator FEUDUCN. Do you know when that material was furnished to those places?

General MARSHALL. The records show, and I know this, the deliveries were made and efforts to develop the strips were under way at Rabaul, at Port Moresby and Port Darwin before the outbreak of the war. My recollection is, and the records will undoubtedly show, that the ship with the gasoline and bombs for Balikpapan, for Borneo and for Singapore, was just about to sail at the outbreak of the war.

...
一九五四年前二月二日
第七十九國交第二期
馬歇爾大將

上総督長

サテ・アタハアタハノ覚悟ノ終リデイ卷設第十六號ノ
行ヘル盟議コリ指挙

ノ事ハハナナノ覚悟ノ終リデイ卷設第十六號ノ

ハナノソウデス。
1) オブミチ

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。

ソレハ武器製造ニヨツテ行ハレタノデスカ。
マーシャル

要點

ガフィリツビン諸島以外の着陸地點ヲ持タン

トスレラ各ガスフィリツビンカルカリスツル行ハ大キナ

デハ右ノ横ヲ記備ヲなスルコトガガラバルクポールトヲモレ

ノデヒノカケテヲラウトイツコトガス。ソノ故私ノ考へ

オスビヨポート・ガロパニタ"ヲ合テヲデアルト思ヒマス。ニ

ヨレバソレヲ合トハモノ場所ニ供給サレタ御存知デス

ソノ材料ガ保時コン等ノ場所ニ供給サレタ御存知デス

ノトモノハノヨハハノ記憶ヲ御存知デス。ガガスガニ

デハラバリツデハ戦争ヲ発時にハハリツ

ノデイヲアルトスガノ記憶ヲモロニナウ

マンタ。私ノ記憶ヲスルトコロデハノ度ヲ過激ヲ発時ニハバリツ

ソバガールトスガノ記憶ヲモロニナウ

マンタノ告発ヲ好ツカンノガソリント

鏡掲ヲ策ツタソガスヲ掲ヲ高温スルノガソリント
D. D. 150C-3-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 October 1940.

CinC File No. 
A16/01705

United States Fleet

SECRET

From: 
The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet
To: 
The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: 
War Plans - Status and readiness of in view of the current international situation.

1. Since the return of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, from his recent conference in Washington, and in view of the conversations that took place there, additional thought and study have been given to the status and readiness of the U. S. Fleet for war operations. As a result of this study, the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, feels it to be his solemn duty to present, for the consideration of the Chief of Naval Operations, certain facts and conclusions in order that there may be no doubt in the minds of higher authority as to his convictions in regard to the present situation, especially in the Pacific.

2. In order to bring out more clearly all the aspects of this situation, it is necessary to review certain factors affecting it and to discuss them in the light of present events.

3. On the occasion of his first visit to Washington, in July, and in personal letters to the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commander-in-Chief stressed his firm conviction that neither the Navy nor the country was prepared for war with Japan. He pointed out that such an eventuality could only result in a long drawn out, costly war, with doubtful prospects of ultimate success. He left Washington with three distinct impressions:

First. That the Fleet was retained in the Hawaiian area solely to support diplomatic representations and as a deterrent to Japanese aggressive action;

Second. That there was no intention of embarking on actual hostilities against Japan.

Third. That the immediate mission of the Fleet was concentrated training and absorption of new personnel and the attainment of a maximum condition of material and personnel readiness consistent with its retention in the Hawaiian area.

4. On the occasion of his second visit to Washington, in October, 1940, an entirely different impression was obtained. It is true that the international situation, between the two visits, had materially changed, principally in that the danger of invasion of the British Isles was considerably less imminent, with consequent reduced chances of the loss or compromise of the British Fleet; in that the United States had more closely identified itself with Great Britain; in that Japanese aggression had progressed to the domination of Indo-China and gave signs of further progress toward the Dutch East Indies; and, in the open alliance between Germany, in the United States.
Letter from Admiral J. D. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 October 1940.

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

---

5. As a result of these changes, it now appears that more active, open steps aimed at Japan are in serious contemplation and that these steps, if taken now, may lead to active mobilization. It is in connection with this eventuality that the Commander-in-Chief is constrained to present his present views.

6. The present O-1 Plan (ORANGE), WPUSF 44 and WPUSF 45, in the light of the present international situation is believed beyond the present strength of the U. S. Fleet and beyond the present resources of the U. S. Navy. This is believed true for the following reasons:

(a) The present strength of the U. S. Fleet is not sufficient to establish, at the earliest practicable date, the United States Joint Asiatic Force in the Marshall-Caroline Islands area in strength superior to that of ORANGE and ready for further advance to the Western Pacific in condition to operate offensively in that area.

While recognizing the qualifying phrase "at the earliest practicable date," it is firmly believed that we cannot, at this time, even with Great Britain assuming responsibility for our Atlantic interests, deploy our Atlantic forces to protect our coastal trade and to safeguard our more vital interests in South America. Nor can we neglect the protection of our own and the interdiction of Japanese trade in the Southeastern Pacific. With those commitments adequately cared for, our remaining force is barely superior to ORANGE at the beginning of our westward campaign. It will undoubtedly be subject to attrition losses en route.

(b) The Army is not now prepared and will not, in the immediate future, be prepared to support our western advance. The Fleet Marine Force is not sufficient to support the necessary operations alone.

(c) The capture of BASE ONE is a major military operation requiring detailed knowledge of the area, detailed planning based on such knowledge, and the taking over, conversion, manning, training, and organization of a large number of merchant ships. The establishment of the BASE, after its occupation, requires: (a) the transport of large quantities of material; (b) the organization, transport and maintenance of construction units capable of accomplishing the
D. D. 1900-2-1  
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
22 October 1940.

CinC File No.  
A16/01705  
UNITED STATES FLEET  
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship  
October 22, 1940  

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view of the current international situation.

necessary development; and (c), the defense and supply of the base during the construction period. The Plan requires the completion of this base forty-five days after the arrival of the first material at the site.

We do not, at present, have the detailed knowledge of the area requisite for proper planning of these manifold activities. It is true that some knowledge, possibly sufficient for initiation of operations and general planning for the attack, may be obtained by reconnaissance after hostilities have commenced, and the Plan provides for such operations. However, it is not now known, nor can it be determined, until after actual occupation, whether or not the hydrography of the area permits the establishment of a fleet anchorage, what construction is possible on the land areas under consideration and whether or not adequate defensive installations, particularly air fields for land-based aircraft, can be established. Granting that the base seized offers possibilities for the establishment of these facilities, it appears certain that the assembly of material and the organization for construction must await the actual occupation. To the knowledge of the Commander-in-Chief, no material has as yet been assembled for this purpose, nor have any but the vaguest ideas for the ultimate accomplishment of this objective been advanced.

Present Fleet plans, due chiefly to lack of sufficient knowledge as a basis, and partly to the preoccupation of staffs of forces afloat with routine matters of administration and training, have been most general in nature and have extended chiefly to the assignment of tasks and forces. Only tentative ideas, (based largely on unsupported assumptions) for the actual accomplishment of the objectives, have been advanced.

- 3 -
D. D. 1500-2-1
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 October 1940.

Cinc File No. A16/01705
UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship
U. S. Naval Yard, Bremerton, Wash.
October 22, 1940

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness in view of the current international situation.

---------------------------------------------------------------------

(d) The time element, in the present Plan, is believed greatly out of proportion to the tasks to be accomplished. While a definite time limit does not actually appear (except for the forty-five day limit mentioned above), it is strongly implied in the tasks in Appendix II of War I. In acknowledging the ORANGE Plan itself, that the operations visualized up to the establishment of BASE ONE can be accomplished in a period of some sixty to ninety days after mobilization.

It is the firm belief of the Commander-In-Chief, U. S. Fleet, that even if energetic, single-purpose steps toward the first objective (BASE ONE) of the Plan were initiated promptly, a period of some six weeks to one year would be required for its accomplishment. With the knowledge now available, the time required for subsequent operations can not even be guessed at. It is believed to be of the order of years rather than months.

(e) I know of no flag officer who wholeheartedly endorses the present ORANGE Plan. It is the general conception that the Plan had its inception primarily in the desirability of having a guiding directive for the development of the Naval Establishment to meet any international situation that might be thrust upon it. It is my belief that the impracticabilities of the ORANGE Plan, in the absence of a better one, have been periodically overlooked in order that the Department might have for budget purposes and presentation to Congress the maximum justification for the necessary enlargement of the Navy. In my opinion, the development of the Naval Establishment has not yet proceeded to the point essential to the successful prosecution of the Plan.

In addition to the ORANGE Plan, the Commander-in-Chief has available to him an approved Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. I, and a tentative draft, not as yet approved, of a Joint Army and Navy Basic War Plan, Rainbow No. II. The assumptions of neither of these Plans are applicable to the present situation, nor, to the knowledge
D. D. 1500-2-1
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 October 1940.

Cinc File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
Octbr 22, 1940

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

Of the Commander-in-Chief, is the assistance from allies visualized in the tentative draft of Rainbow No. II a likely possibility.

8. The foregoing considerations are set forth in some length in order to focus attention upon the fact that the Commander-in-Chief finds himself, in what he is led to believe may suddenly become a critical situation, without an applicable directive. He cannot, in the absence of a clear picture of national policy, national commitments and national objectives, formulate his own plans other than for obvious measures of security and defense and for accelerated preparation for further eventualities. He is of the firm belief that successful operations in war can rest only on sound plans, careful specific preparation and vigorous prosecution based upon confidence in the success of the course being pursued.

9. There is no intention or desire on the part of the Commander-in-Chief to evade his legitimate responsibilities nor is it desired that anything in this letter be so construed. It is fully realized that no plan can foresee or provide for every possible situation, and that adjustments and re-estimates must be made to fit the actual situation presented. At the same time, it is most strongly believed that the Commander-in-Chief must be better informed than he is now as to the Department's plans and intentions if he is to perform his full duty.

10. The foregoing is briefly summarized as follows:

(a) Unsuitability of ORANGE Plan in present situation and present development of Naval Establishment;

(b) Inapplicability of other Plans available to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet (Rainbow Nos. I and II);

(c) Vital necessity for (1) new directive (possibly Rainbow No. III) based on present realities, national objectives and commitments as far as these are known or can be predicted at the present time; (2) coordination of plans developed with National Policy and steps to be taken to implement that policy;

(d) In the light of information now available to him, the Commander-in-Chief is of the conviction that the elements of a realistic plan should embody:

(1) Security and defense measures of the Western Hemisphere;
D. D. 1500-2-1

Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
22 October 1940.

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET

UNITED STATES FLEET -
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

October 22, 1940

Subject: War Plans - Status and readiness of in view
of the current international situation.

1. Long-range interdiction of enemy commerce;

2. Threats and raids against the enemy;

3. Extension of operations as the relative strength of the Naval Establishment (may be influenced by allied strength and freedom of action) is built up to support them.

11. Please acknowledge receipt of this letter by despatch.

12. It is hereby certified that the originator considers it to be impracticable to phrase this document in such a manner as will permit a classification other than secret.

13. The exigency of delivery of this document is such that it will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer courier. The originator, therefore, authorizes the transmission of this document by registered mail within the continental limits of the United States.

J. O. RICHARDSON
伝信
米国合衆国艦隊司令長官

前例
米国合衆国艦隊司令長官が、最近ワシントン州セメーションに在住する

米国合衆国艦隊司令長官

前例
米国合衆国艦隊司令長官が、最近ワシントン州セメーションに在住する

ご要約
前例
米国合衆国艦隊司令長官が、最近ワシントン州セメーションに在住する
第三、艦戦ノ NODES 発射シテルミニ関係最大ノ機関ヲ発進シテノ、新兵ヲ増強及びピーハワイ、

戦場ヲ開ク寸前ノ増加テカタ。第二、日本ニ封シテ現戦

五、新ル変化ノ結果トシテ、現在ハ日本ヲ目指ス肉打 الدفاعデ明ラサ

原 文 二 頁

等 デアル

伊同盟ハ傳へラレルコロデハ合衆國ヲ目指スルモノデアタコト。及公式ノ日獨
建設士の標高地質図は等高線を実線で、可能の位置を点線で示し、材料を矢印で示す。此ノ目的ノタメニ従来何等ノ材料トノ方法サレテ居ラズ、又此ノ目的ヲ

第五条 トヨハノ期日ハ、別トシテ第一ノ期日ト云フモノガ現ハサレテキナイノニ上通ノ四十

7
スルコトハ出来ナイ。彼ハ戦争ニ於ル作戦ノ成功疑ナント確信スル方針ニ基キ勇敢ニ実行シテ行
到ナル特定ノ準備ヲ成功ニ至ル信ヲテハ。

合衆国艦隊司令長官ハ自己ノ正箇ノ責任ヲ兼顧シテ、命令ヲ適宜ヲ指示スルモノデアル。ハ
若シ自己ノ全任務ヲ實行スルノデアルハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハ
ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラス
ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラス
ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラス
ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラス
ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラス
ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラス
ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラス
ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラス
ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラス

（ｂ）合衆国艦隊司令長官ノ利用シ得ベキ他ノ家ハ、ハハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハ
スルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバ
ナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテ
ハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバ
ナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハ
スルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバ
ナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハ
スルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバ
ナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハ
スルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバ
ナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハ
スルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバ
ナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハ
スルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバ
ナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハスルモノデアル。ハ、ハナケレバナルラスティイフコトハ、充分認識ヲテハ

（a）海軍施設ノ現状並ニ現在ノ進展度ニ於テハオレンジヲ示セス。
Mr. MITCHELL. General Gerow, do you remember that during the time you were in the War Plans Division there were certain conversations with the British with respect to a joint war plan in case the two nations were drawn into the war?

General GEROW. I do, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is called the ABC, which means American-British Conversations, does it?

General GEROW. That is correct, sir; ABC-1.

Mr. MITCHELL. ABC-1?

General GEROW. And there was also an ABC-2.

Mr. MITCHELL. That was also a British staff plan, was it, a joint plan with Britain?

General GEROW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MITCHELL. Do you remember whether during that time there were conversations between military officers of the United States and Canada with respect to a joint operation with Canada in case we were drawn into the war?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; there were such conversations conducted.

Mr. MITCHELL. And do you remember also that there was a similar conference held at Singapore or some place in the Far East between officers of the Army and Navy of the United States and with the British and Dutch, which resulted in a plan or recommendations made by that conference out there?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; there was such a conference conducted.

Mr. MITCHELL. I show you a document here which is entitled, "American-Dutch-British conversations, Singapore, April 1941." You have seen that document, have you?

General GEROW. Yes, sir; I have seen this document. It is a report of the conversations at Singapore, sir, between the Americans, Dutch, and British.
海防局第6号

ニフシス攻撃调查共同委员会の観察写合衆国第七十九議会

昭和四五年十二月五日 共同作戦計画について 言に至る所

ジェロール将軍

ミッチェル氏

ジェロール将軍、前官は、戦争計画部に在勤当時、英米両国が

会談があったか否か否か、

それぞれ所谓A・B・Oであって、英米合戦といふ意味ですか？

ミッチェル氏

ジェロール将軍

それが如何に英米両国の計画で英国との共同計画案でしたか？

ミッチェル氏

ジェロール将軍

それでA・B・O真の二のつよいのがありました。

ジェロール将軍

それらも英米両国審議の計画で英国との共同計画案でしたか？

ミッチェル氏
ミシェル氏

軍官は幕の当時、我々が緊張に引き込まれた際には、合衆国

ジェロール将軍

そこで、軍官は、合衆国の港、海軍将校と英団及びオランダ

ミシェル氏

ダの後との間に、シンガポールか又は東亜の港の地勢に於て、

同様な状態が再現され、真の軍事的結果として、或る計画又は

推論（論旨）が作られたというふることも覚えて居りましょう。

ミシェル氏

－（アメリカ、オランダ、イギリス会議。）一九四一年四月、シン

ガボールに於けるアメリカ、オランダ及び英軍間の会議の報

告書であります。－

－真珠灣攻撃（第三部第九九一頁）－
Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:
Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

... 

g. Most effective aid to China, as well as to the defense in Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, is now being built up by the reinforcement of the Philippines. The safety of Luzon as an air and submarine base should soon be reasonably assured by the arrival of air and ground reinforcements. Strong diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from the military viewpoint at the earliest about the middle of December, 1941, when the Philippine Air Force will have become a positive threat to Japanese operations. It would be advantageous, if practicable, to delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure until February or March, 1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached its projected strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation.

h. Material aid to China should be accelerated consonant with the studied needs of Russia and Great Britain.

i. Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China should be continued and accelerated as far as practicable.

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

...
シンテール及び陸軍の防衛と共に中国に着する最も効果的な援助は

三月まで延ばす事が有効である。
その十一月三月頃はフィリピンの空軍力が追い込まれた後、築いていく更にサミアの安全航線が築かれるのであろう。中華に於ける資材購入はロッサ及び米国の必要性調査と相俟って進められなければならぬ。
DEAR J. O.: You may think I have been unusually silent for the last couple of weeks, and so I have. Truth of the matter is that a great part of this time was spent in making up an estimate of the international situation, together with a number of officers in Naval Operations and two from the General Board. As a start on this I sat down one early morning and drew up a twelve page rough estimate, working on up till two o'clock the next morning, this in the effort to clear my own mind, as I sometimes do by drawing up a paper. After I finished the rough notes, I then got together Ingersoll, Turner, Savvy, Charlie Wellborn, Forrest Sherman, Hill, Sexton, Moore and Oscar Badger and we went to it, day and night, Saturdays and Sundays, for about ten consecutive days. The product which no one claims is perfect is now in the hands of the President. I am hoping he will give some definite pronouncement on it in order that I may send you something more authoritative than I otherwise could do.

You know that we have no definite commitments. Perhaps none can be made. The direction which things finally take may be forced upon us.

For example, as you stated in a recent letter: - Upon your first visit here you found us of the opinion that in the event of war, we should not become involved in the Pacific and that any major effort, we might make would be in what we considered the most vital theater, namely, in the Atlantic. I have never changed my viewpoint on that and I may say that so far as I know, neither has the State Department. I believe the Secretary of the Navy also holds this view. But no appeasement.

Nevertheless, we can not afford to neglect the possibility of hostilities in the Pacific and that is why in so many of my letters I always mention keeping r weather eye to the Westward.

I think the study which was made when you were here, has been highly beneficial; studies of this sort always are, whether or not they are implemented.

I had hoped before this to get you the Navy end of RAINBOW III as a more thoroughly considered directive to meet the possibilities of the present situation in the Pacific. This RAINBOW III plan is nearing completion now and I expect to send it to you in a few days. I trust that you will find the tasks assigned to you are (2) within your power. We will await your comment.

We are pushing District preparation and degaussing work with all the speed we can command and if by any chance I could have until 1 April on this I would give a good deal. One January should see degaussing well along; one April much essential work accomplished in the Districts. Please do not construe that statement to mean that we might get into the war tomorrow, as I have nothing but my own thoughts on this. Nevertheless, you know I have felt right along that it is only a matter of time before we do get in (though I can not say this out loud). The chief question that concerns us is where we get in, and whom we will fight - and
"tomorrow" or perhaps "today" is what I am working towards.

You have received the despatch directing the sending of submarines to Manila. There are no plans at present to send anything more in that direction. But present conditions are far from static, the Japanese appear to be making preparation for a definite move of some kind, and the answer we will give, if any, to the steps they may take in the future can not be predicted at this time.

Your letter regarding the retention of a part of the Fleet on the Coast beyond the date of its intended departure, and also holding another part in Hawaii, arrived at a time when the election prevented my presenting this question promptly to the President. Since the scheduled departure of the units from Hawaii was the day following my receipt of your letter, there was nothing for me to do other than to radio you to carry out the approved schedule. As you know, the matter of withdrawing the Fleet from Hawaii is delicate, and could hardly be accomplished without a certain amount of preparation in Washington. It does not now appear that we can withdraw it without some good pretext.

Regarding this Winter's exercises there is no question as to the desirability of training both the Fleet and the troops in expeditionary operations which will simulate war as closely as possible. Therefore, I believe we should go ahead with the essential features of such a plan. As I understand the plan, you propose to assemble in Pearl Harbor an Expeditionary Force comprising most of the Fleet, plus transports in which are combat-loaded the west contingent of the Fleet Marine Force, plus tankers and supply ships. This expeditionary Force will then set out from Hawaii and will simulate the actual capture of an island, using Christmas Island or some other, perhaps San Clements for example - I have not received a copy of exactly what you plan to do and therefore this conception may be at fault.

We have all been greatly pleased over Churchills statement of recent British action against the Italian Fleet. Also we are more than pleased over the success of the Greeks, - even though it may prove in the end to be temporary. We have nothing more official to date than newspaper reports.

Am expecting King to relieve Ellis shortly after the middle of December.

Hope the enclosed to Tommy Hart and Ghormley will be of some interest to you.

Best wishes as always.

Sincerely,

Admiral J. O. Richardson, U.S.N.
Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Postmaster, Long Beach, California.
一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十一月十二日附英オペラ・スターク海軍大将よりジェン・オッピチャードソン海軍大将宛書（封人物名）

（一秘密）

大将よりジェン・オッピチャードソン海軍大将宛書（封人物名）

（一秘密）

（一秘密）

（一秘密）
結局物の反応が我々の上に強ひらかれるのだ。例へば最近の便りで君が述べておらるように君が始めて当地を訪れ
た時の我々の意見は、戦争の際我々としては太平洋の問題に握き込まれてはならない。我々がすでにあらう主たる勢力は我々が最も重要な活動
の舞台を考へるところに太平洋に於てゐるかろうとといふにあつた。之に
ついて私の見解は少しも変わらないし、又私の知る限りに於て国務省も又
然りであつたといへよう。海軍長官も此の見解を持ちゐゐにゐた。之に

西方に気を配れと私は何時も云つてゐるのだ。君が當地にゐられた頃厳重
にされられた頃峨峨動されたことは大変役に立つと考える。此の様
の強い見解を私が反対されると否とにかつてなか卫浴に有益なものだ。

太平洋の現状のゐる可能性に於て示すため一層著広して考へられた

指令として君にレインボー第三次計画も今や完成に近く一二日中に君の

許に届かれるつもりだ。君に託されることの任務は十分君のやしめるもの
我々は今全速力で管区準備と非軍化作業を推進しているが、九つについ
ては四月一日迄にもし機会があれば余しく書いて知らせよう。一月に
の宣伝を我々が明日にも戦争を始めるかのようにならぬに取らないでい
たい、之については私一側の考にすぎないに立ち
我々が戦争を始めるのは、之は大きな役ではいえないが一単に時間の問
題にすぎないといふことについては私が常にして二
の目指す所ののだ。我々は潜水艦をマニュアル派遣せよとの頼を受
取ったといふが、今のこと
その方面にどのよう东亚をもにしろ増派するといふ要求は全くない。し
かし現状は決して静止してゐるでないと
日本軍は或る種の明確の行
動のための準備を行つてゐるらしい。彼等は将来敵らんとする位置に對
し我々が興ぶてゐる回答は現在之を証言することは出来ない。
防相の一部を出航豫定日を超えて太平洋沿岸に留め又他の一部をハワイ
に置くといふ君の手紙が到着した時は丁度豫定のため此の問題を直に大
手紙を受取った翌日に告げたので君に承認されなかったのだ。艦隊のハワイ
出航豫定は君の

於て

から撤收するより外に仕方がないかったのだから。君も知る如く艦隊をハワイ
から撤收するといふことはテリケートの問題でワシントンに於ける取締
度の準備なしには遂行され難い。今のところ何とかよい口実がなければ撤
收は出来ないやうに思われる。

今冬の訓練に於ては艦隊及び陸上部隊を出来るだけ演習に近い特別演習
で訓練するのが望ましいことが勿論である。だから私はかいる計量の本
質的特徴を更に押しちめなければならないうと信ずる。私がその計量を

遠征部隊はそれからハワイを出発し、クリスマス島その他の行

ふだろう。今

未だ正確な君の計量の実は受け取つてゐないから、この

在を用いて実地に島嶼占領演習を

利用せずに実地に島嶼占領演習を

在を用いて実地に島嶼占領演習を

利用せずに実地に島嶼占領演習を
イタリア艦隊に対する英領最近の態勢についてのチャーチルの演説は、我々は皆非常に満足してある。ギリシャの成功についても、たとへ
結局に一時的なものとなるにしても、我々は十二分に満足してある。

国際は十二月十九日歴史にエリスの役を解かれるものと思ふ。

同封のトミー・ハート及びゴーリー宛の手紙は君にも若干興味がある。
Excerpt from Exhibit No. 32 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 32
MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII FROM JULY 8 TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(10) 27 November 1941 from G-2 to G-2 Hawaii, Subject: G-2 Warning.

(10) Secret
P 2 War WD Prty

Washington, D.C., November 27, 1941.

G-2 HAWAIIAN DEPARTMENT,

473-27TH

Japanese negotiations have come to practical stalemate stop Hostilities may ensue Stop Subversive activities may be expected Stop Inform commanding general and Chief of Staff only.

144PM

MILES

(Page 1329 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
(23) 23 October 1941 to OPNAV, Action: COM12, 14, 16 CINCPAC, CINCAF.

From: OPNAV
Action: COM 12 COM 14 CINCPAC CINCAF COM 16.
Info: COM 11 COM 13 COM 15 NAVSTA GUAM.
222250

Paraphrase

Until further orders all army and navy transpacific troop transports, ammunition ships and such others with sufficiently important military cargo will be escorted both ways between Honolulu and Manila. Authorized route slow vessels in above categories which would unduly prolong voyage via Torres Straits without escort. To insure minimum demands for escort from Pacific fleet schedules must be arranged so that these ships proceed in company. CINCAF should take over escort when and where practicable as arranged between CINCPAC and CINCAF. General escorting other transpacific American flag shipping not considered warranted at this time in view of routing prescribed in my 162258. Where cargo in merchant bottoms for Guam is involved normal routing is authorized.

Cargo for Guam should be so assembled and loaded that a minimum number of ships be required to make that port. Reference COM 12 despatches to CINCPAC Nos. 212352 and 212358 and CINCAF confidential serial 81633.

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37
BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

Defense Doc. 1500-R-3

(Page 1403, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
鈍テ指定スル造船募集ノ太平洋線除シ航線ヲソラス＝ハポートノ倉庫量ヲ増進スル必要ヲ認マラルヘレ。わノ航線ヲ遥テニ航行ヲ許可スルノ為ニ制限ヲ設ケルモノヲ除クノ事ヲ求ニタ。太平洋航線ヲ除クノヲ許可スルためノ行儀ヲ通知スルノ為ノカノ船ヲ除クノ事ヲ許可スルノヲ除クノ事ヲ求ニタ。太平洋航線ヲ除クノヲ許可スルためノ行儀ヲ通知スルノ為ニ制限ヲ設ケルモノヲ除クノ事ヲ求ニタ。

Excerpt from testimony of Admiral Richmond Kelly Turner - Thursday, December 20, 1945.

Admiral TURNER. I think, in answer to that question, the committee might be interested in a brief resume of all of the conferences that were held between the American authorities and the British and the Dutch.

The first contact with the British in Singapore was made by our naval attaché, Commander Thomas, who was going to Thailand in October, about the 23d.

The VICE CHAIRMAN. What year?

Admiral TURNER. October of 1940. That was merely exploratory. On November 11, in response to a dispatch from the Chief of Naval Operations, Captain Purnell, the chief of staff of Admiral Hart, went to Singapore and had exploratory conversations with them, with instructions that no commitments were to be made. There were no written documents issued from those two preliminary conferences. The next conference that was held—and it was in compliance with the letter that has just been read—was from January 14 to January 16, 1941, at Batavia, between the Commander in Chief of the Dutch Forces and Captain Purnell. We have in this paper a dispatch summary of the result of those conversations, and I have in my possession the minutes of that meeting, which I believe the counsel has not seen, which I just very recently got. It adds nothing particularly.

Then we received word that finally the British and Dutch were going to get together in Singapore in the latter part of February of 1941. Captain Purnell attended this British-Dutch conference and was authorized to agree to tentative methods of command, tentative methods and areas of operations, either jointly or separately, and to exchange of communication facilities and intelligence, but of course under the instructions that there would be no political or definite military commitments.

Nothing very definite came out of that conference. The next conference—and on which there is another letter directing that this conference be held, and a letter or a dispatch from the British Chiefs of Staff concerning the conference—was held in Singapore about the 19th of April, 1941. Out of that conference was evolved the ADB paper which is here, and which the counsel has just produced.

Mr. MITCHELL. That is exhibit 50.

Admiral TURNER. That paper contained a lot of objectionable features, and the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff in the Army, on July 3, 1941, in a letter to the British Joint Staff Mission here, rejected that paper in toto and requested that additional instructions be issued, so that we could get another agreement.

In brief, the objections were two: First, there were some political implications in the paper which were not acceptable to us, and secondly this deadline down in the South China Sea and Gulf of Siam. The other objection (5119) was that the plan was not very realistic and did not seem to advance in many respects the possible cooperative effort between the different countries.

Mr. MITCHELL. Excuse me for interrupting you, but that document that the Admiral just referred to, dated July 3, 1941, from the Chief of Naval Operations and Chief of Staff of the British rejecting this Singapore proposal has already been introduced in evidence as exhibit 65.

Go ahead, Admiral.
Admiral TURNER. As a result of that rejection, and after considerable conversations between our representatives and the British representatives here in Washington, the British Chiefs of Staff produced a paper which was a proposal for a draft of an agreement, and which had the title "ADB-2." The date of that is August, 1941. That paper was not entirely acceptable but was closer to our ideas.

Negotiations on the basis of that draft agreement were proceeding rather slowly, until the arrival of Admiral Phillips, the new British Far Eastern Commander in Singapore, in November. Admiral Phillips and some staff officers went to Manila and had conferences there with our authorities, chiefly Admiral Hart, and Admiral Hart on the 6th of December, his date, which would have been the 5th here, sent a dispatch to us concerning arrangements which he had made with Admiral (51.2.) Phillips as to command, and so on, in the war which then was coming, within a day or two.

That agreement, with some slight modifications and remarks, was approved by the Chief of Naval Operations, it being only a naval agreement, on the 7th of December, and the dispatch went out on the 8th.

(5122) In none of these papers was there ever a political commitment, or a definite military commitment. This was a plan of action, or these were plans of action based on assumptions that should the United States enter the war, then those papers would be effective, provided they were approved by the proper authorities.

None of ADB papers were ever presented to either the Secretary of the Navy, or the Secretary of War, or to the President, although all of those officers as well as the Secretary of State were aware that these conversations were being held from time to time.

(Pages 1931 - 1933, Part 4 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
SEPTEMBER 12, 1941.

Memorandum for Admiral Stark

DEAR BETTY: You asked me about what we are doing for the Philippines:

August 26: There sailed from San Francisco part of a regiment of antiaircraft troops and some reserve supplies.

September 8: There sailed from San Francisco the remainder of the antiaircraft regiment, a tank battalion of 50 tanks, 50 of the latest pursuit planes, and the personnel to man them, which brings the modern pursuit planes in the Philippines up to 86.

September 18: 50 self-propelled mounts for 75 cannon to be shipped from San Francisco, and 50 more tanks.

Today: The squadron of nine Flying Fortresses landed in Manila after successfully flying the route Midway, Wake, New Britain, Dutch East Indies.

September 30: Two squadrons (26 planes) of Flying Fortresses will leave San Francisco for Hawaii enroute to the Philippines.

October: A reserve of pursuit planes will have been in process of shipment, about 12 in October, rising to a total of 130 by December.

November: Probably a reserve of six to nine of the super Flying Fortresses, 3-24 type planes will be transferred to Manila. These planes will have an operating radius of 1500 miles, with a load of 14,000 bombs, which means that they can reach Osaka with a full load and Tokyo with a partial load. They have pressure cabins and can operate continuously 35,000 feet for bombing.

December: Another group of Flying Fortresses, some 35 planes, goes to Manila. A group of dive bombers, some 54 planes, also goes. A group of pursuit, some 130 planes, along with two additional squadrons to build up the previous pursuit group, will be dispatched. A 50% reserve is being established for all these planes.

G.C.M.,
Chief of Staff.

I gave original to Mr. Stimson.

(Hand written:) (You may have had word of this already!)
沒有既成の言語があると、それは何らかの理由で存在していません。それは、私たちが利用する言語が何であるかによって決まるのです。
DEAR TOULY: We are pushing ahead as rapidly as possible on the preparation of material and personnel for any eventualities. While there is much still to be done (a condition that will continue to exist for years) I can not say that matters are unsatisfactory, so far as concerns things under my control. But we do not yet know the direction which affairs may take.

For the past three weeks I have been spending many hours together with a group of officers particularly concerned, in developing a broad estimate of the material situation as it affects possible naval war operations. This estimate, or study, is now in the hands of the President. I do not expect any immediate decision, but do hope that it will serve to clarify matters so that, at least, those in authority will be fully aware of the implications of any particular policy that may be adopted with respect to the war.

Ghormley tells me the British expected us to be in the war within a few days after the resolution of the President - which is merely another evidence of their slack ways of thought, and of their non-realistic views of international political conditions, and of our own political system. They have been talking, in a large way, about the defense of the Malay Barrier, with an alliance between themselves, us, and the Dutch, without much thought as to what the effect would be in Europe. But we have no idea as to whether they would at once begin to fight were the Dutch alone, or were we alone, to be attacked by the Japanese. Then again, the copy of the British Far Eastern War Plan which Thomas obtained at Singapore, shows much evidence of their usual wishful thinking. Furthermore, though I believe the Dutch colonial authorities will resist an attempt to capture their islands, I question whether they would fight if only the Philippines, or only Singapore, were attacked.

The Navy can, of course, make no political commitments. Therefore, we can make no specific military plans for an allied war. However, as I told you in my despatch, you can perform a useful service by laying, with the British and possibly the Dutch, a framework for a future plan of cooperation, should we be forced into the war. I rather doubt, however, that the Dutch will talk freely with you. If they do my idea would be that you would explore (2) the fields of:

- Command arrangements,
- General objectives,
- General plan of cooperative action, including the approximate naval and military deployment.

You are, of course, committed to assist the Army in the defense of Luzon. But with allied bases to fall back on, your direct support of the Army might well fall short, in degree, of the support you would afford were we alone to fight Japan.

I do not believe Japan will attack us if she can avoid doing so. In fact, I believe she will go far to avoid hostilities with the United States. It is even doubtful if she wishes, at this time to fight the British or the Dutch. It seems more likely that she would prefer, while maintaining a position in readiness, to consolidate Indo-China with her positions further north, and to begin a more or less gradual economic penetration of the Netherlands East Indies and Siam. Should we refrain from imposing additional economic sanctions, present conditions, including the recent 1,800,000 ton oil contract, might be stabilized over a considerable period of the future. Our State Department, as you may know, had a hand in the execution of that contract.
But we never can tell. Should a war develop between Japan and an alliance of British, Dutch and Americans, I believe that Japan will plan to:

(a) Occupy Guam, and reinforce the Mandates with troops, submarines, and some air;
(b) Establish naval control of Philippine waters by destroying our naval and air forces, sending her main fleet in the Philippines and a strong, fast detachment in Halmahera;
(c) Capture bases with troops now based in Formosa and Hainan;
(d) Capture Formosa, to be followed by a campaign against the Dutch directed from East to West.

I believe that the allied objective should be to reduce Japan's offensive power through economic starvation; the success of the blockade would surely depend upon allied ability to hold the major portion of the Malay Barrier. Your own action would, of course, be based upon your view as to the most effective method of contributing to the attainment of the ultimate objective.

One thing (and this is for your ears alone) you can depend upon is that we would support you, probably by sending a naval reinforcement to you at Soerabaja or Singapore, and by other means. I would be glad to get your views as to the size and composition of such a reinforcement; but in making your recommendation I trust you will keep in mind that our Navy must hold in the Mid-Pacific, that we may also be in the war against the other two Axis Powers, and that the collapse of Britain would force us to a major re-orientation toward the Atlantic.

You may will appreciate that I do not welcome such a war (British Collapse).

The naval part of the War Plan, Rainbow III, for this possible war is about completed, and will be on its way to you within a short time. We are hoping to send naval attache's to Singapore, Batavia, Soerabaja, Balikpapan, and Ceylon; possibly one of these officers may bring this plan to you via air transportation.

We are all delighted to be able to put over the dependent thing for you. The State Department strongly supported us. I can appreciate the coals that must have been heaped upon you when it was learned that, while we were forcing our dependents home, the Army was sending dependents out.

You know how glad I always am for any opportunity to assist any or all of the Little Harts, as well as the Big Hart, in any way in which I can.

Keep cheerful,

Sincerely,

/s/ BETTY.

Admiral T. C. HART, U. S. Navy,
Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic Fleet.

P.S. An sixty today. Here's hoping! The first three score are the hardest.

18 NOVEMBER 1940.

PS. Admiral Brownson's name is being submitted to the President on the list going over to him for consideration in connection with the new destroyer. Here's hoping.
親愛なるトミ

我々は万一の事態に備えて物的、人的情報を出来る支え速かに進めてい
ます。未だ為すべき仕事は澤山ありますが一か月を経るが
せぬ。併し事態はどういう方向に向かうか未だ我々には分かりません。

過ぐる三週間。私は特別に関係のある一覧の将校達と将来なりすべき
海軍の戦争作戦に影響を与える物的状況の大体の見積を下すのに多く
の時間を費して来ました。この見積を紛らわしい決定を迫った時、我々
は急速の決定を迫られて多多々と皆局者の方々が戦争に関じて探るべ
き特別政策の真意を充分に承知されば幸に希望します。

英国人は大統領再選後数日にして我々が戦争に参加すると思うたとこ
ルイは私に告げていますが、これは英領人のいと加賀の住民方、国際的政治情勢並びに我が米国の政治制度に対する彼等の非現実的見解を示すもう一つの証拠にすぎません。彼等は欧州に於ける影響を大して考慮していない、英領と米領と和領との間の同盟によってマレー陣営を防備することについて大切な話し合って来ました。併し若し和領だけが、もし私々だけが日本人によつて攻撃された場合英国は直ちに戦斗を開始するかどうかは疑問です。それから又トマスがシンガポールで手に入れた英領東南戦争計画の篠は彼等の例の希望的考えを示す大きな証拠です。更に和領領民地當局はその植民地を掩護せんとする企てには反抗するものと私は信じています。若しフィリピンがシンガポールだけが攻撃された場合彼等が戦うかどうか私には疑問です。海軍は勿論政治的要素を無視することとは出来ません。故に我々は軍合戦争に対する特別の軍事計画を行ることに出来ません。万一我々が戦争を強いられた場合、英
(二) 大凡の陸海軍の展開を含めて共同活動の規準を結んでおくこと
は貴方の役に立つでしょう。若し彼等が話すとすれば私の方では貴方は
を研討されることと存じます。

貴方は勿論ルソンを防備するのに陸軍を護助する命令を興へられていま
す。併し陸海軍の展開を含めて共同活動の規準を結んでおくことは貴
方の役に立つでしょう。若し彼等が話すとすれば私の方では貴方は
を研討されることと存じます。

貴方は勿論ルソンを防備するのに陸軍を護助する命令を興へられていま
す。併し陸海軍の展開を含めて共同活動の規準を結んでおくことは貴
方の役に立つでしょう。若し彼等が話すとすれば私の方では貴方は
を研討されることと存じます。

貴方は勿論ルソンを防備するのに陸軍を護助する命令を興へられていま
す。併し陸海軍の展開を含めて共同活動の規準を結んでおくことは貴
方の役に立つでしょう。若し彼等が話すとすれば私の方では貴方は
を研討されることと存じます。

貴方は勿論ルソンを防備するのに陸軍を護助する命令を興へられていま
す。併し陸海軍の展開を含めて共同活動の規準を結んでおくことは貴
方の役に立つでしょう。若し彼等が話すとすれば私の方では貴方は
を研討されることと存じます。
経済的制裁をこれ以上加えるのを控えれば、最近の百八十万噸の石油
契約を含めての現在の状態は可成長い将来に亘って安定するかも知れ
ません。貴方の御承知かと思いますが我が国務省はその契約の履行に
攸はったのであります。

併じどうなるか分かりません。日本は次の計画を企てるでせり。
始まったから、私の考えでは日本は次の計画を企てるでせり。

【ア】グアムを占領すること。
【ブ】日本軍隊主力の根拠地をベリルアドレスにき、強力にして速度の早
【ラ】分遣隊をハルマヘラにおいて、我が海空軍を撃破してフィリピン

近海の探検を獲得すること。

連合国を示す目的は経済的制裁によって日本の攻勢力を低下させるある
私は信じます。この封鎖の成否は一つに連合国がマレー陣線の重要部分を維持することが出来ると考えられています。勿論、貴方御自身の行動は第一の目的達成に役立つ最も効果的な方法に過ぎる貴方の行動に基いてなされるでしょう。

貴方が信頼出来る一つのことは一これは貴方のお耳にだけ入れますか一貴方の御支持を求めるということと他の方針で我方多分スラバヤかシンガポールに海軍の援助を送ることと他の方針で我方が貴方の御希望をお聞きしたいと思います。私はかかる援助の大ささを感謝するに際して我々は他の二つの被占領国との戦争に参加することが何故か知られることと我々は再び大西洋に大に注意を向けなければならぬことと英国の崩壊に於ってかかわる戦争（英国の崩壊）を望んでいないことを貴方分って頂けると思います。
合衆国陸軍大将

親愛なるベテル（署名）
今日で六十歳です。といいに希望があります。

海軍大将 ハート

新しい巡洋艦に聞いて大統領の御手許に届ける名簿に海軍大将ブラウン

とみに希望があります。

一九四〇年十一月十八日
EXHIBIT NO. 32
MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII
FROM JULY 8 TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1941


From: Manila, P.I.
To: General George C. Marshall
No. 1004, November Twenty-eighth.

Pursuant to instructions contained in your radio six two four air reconnaissance has been extended and intensified in conjunction with the Navy stop Ground security measures have been taken stop Within the limitations imposed by present state of development of this theatre of operations everything is in readiness for the conduct of a successful defense stop Intimate liaison and cooperation and cordial relations exist between Army and Navy.

MACARTHUR

Secret

(Page 1329 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
誰もが存在している。
マッカーサー
（原）
第十四巻
九頁

2
Excerpt from Exhibit No. 5 of the Proceedings of the Clarke Investigation introduced in Hearings before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

(Exact copy - action copy - radiogram)

AG 38O.3 (6-25-41) MC
21 WTJ
AE
620P

Received at the War Department, June 26, 1941, 8:00 AM.
From: Manila
To: TAG
No. 1225, June 25th.

Following is paraphrase of cable from Brink. For G-2. On 19th and 20th of June British Commander in Chief Far East and the Director of Operations of Chinese Air Force (General Mow) discussed plans for cooperation in the event of Japanese operations against the British. British plan to use following Chinese airfields as bases from which to attack Japanese sea communications, land troops, and Japanese bases on Hainan Island and in French Indo China in the event of Japanese attack against Malaya or Hongkong: Nanning 23 degrees zero minutes north 108 degrees 30 minutes east; Liuchow 24 degrees 20 minutes north 109 degrees 20 minutes east; Kweilin 25 degrees 20 minutes north 110 degrees 10 minutes east; Chikkiang 27 degrees 30 minutes north 109 degrees 40 minutes east; Hemagyang 27 degrees zero minutes north 112 degrees 30 minutes east. Chinese agree to stock these airfields now with gasoline and bombs. Chinese suggest that the British use airfields in the following area from which to make direct raids on Formosa and the Japanese mainland: Wenchow-Chuchowfu-Kienowhu.

British intend to encourage Guerrilla warfare against the Japanese in the following general areas: Ichang-Kingchow-Hanhu; Siagtanhs-Changsha-Yowchow; Nanchang-Hoehchow-Klukiang; Soochow-Changshow-Taiping; Canton-Kongmoon-China Sea-Shamchung. Agreements for mutual cooperation will be arranged the 1st week in July at a meeting between British and Chinese staffs in Burma. Signed Orear.

GRUNERT.

(Pages 166, Part 34 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
(无法显示图像内容)
南緯二十三度東経百八度二十分

柳州

北緯二十四度二十分東経百九十度二十分

桂林

北緯二十五度十分東経百十度十分

衡陽

北緯二十七度東經百九度四十分

支那

支那

上海

英吉利

下記地域＝於テ日本海ニ對シシグルラ鐵ヲ促進スル意図ナル

宜昌、荊州、漢陽、湘潭、長沙、岳州、南昌、廬州、九江、蘇州、常州

約ハハルヲ於テ七月第一週英支幹部會合＝於テ取扱メラルル等

「僕珠露攻撃」（第三四部一六四頁）

「僕珠露攻撃」（第三四部一六六頁）

「僕珠露攻撃」（第三四部一六八頁）
DEAR JO: While you were here in early October we sent a despatch to Comfourteen to ascertain from Admiral Bloch whether or not the protection being afforded to the vital elements of the Naval Establishment in Hawaii was satisfactory, this in order that, if required, we could make representations to the War Department to direct more thorough protection on the part of its Hawaiian Department.

Admiral Bloch's answers to this despatch and to a second despatch on the same subject were not very definite, and did not provide basis for further action by the Department.

Since the Taranto incident my concern for the safety of the Fleet in Pearl Harbor, already great, has become even greater. This concern has to do both with possible activities on the part of Japanese residents of Hawaii and with the possibilities of attack coming from overseas. By far the most profitable object of sudden attack in Hawaiian waters would be the Fleet units based in that area. Without question the safety of these units is paramount and imposes on the Commander-in-Chief and the forces afloat a responsibility in which he must receive the complete support of Commandant Fourteen, and of the Army. I realize most fully that you are giving this problem comprehensive thought. My object in writing you is to find out what steps the Navy Department and the War Department should be taking to provide additional equipment and additional protective measures.

For instance, it is desirable to place torpedo nets within the harbor itself? I will appreciate your comments and those of Comfourteen on this question.

Antiaircraft protection can be provided first by units of the Fleet actually in Pearl Harbor with guns ready at all times; by stationing about the Navy Yard of Army A.A. defense measures including mobile batteries; and possibly by utilization of Marine Defense Battalion Antiaircraft Units now available in the Pearl Harbor areas, or that could be made available. Also by keeping carrier fighters squadrons alerted and ready to go.

Another aspect of local security which prompted the Department's original despatch was the security of the oil tanks against attack from the road passing near by.

I would like to have you take up the whole question upon your return to Hawaii with Comfourteen and with the Army, and let me know of any deficiencies which will require remedial action here in Washington.

Much is being done by the Army, and by the Navy in support of the Army, to maintain a security of the Panama Canal. Of at least equal importance is the security of our Fleet against sudden destructive attack. And the Fleet is, as usually must be the case, in a more exposed situation.

I have been in somewhat of a quandry whether to write this letter to you or to write one on similar lines to Admiral Bloch to take up with you and Army. It really is inmaterial so long as we get the answer - but after all the Fleet - your command -

- 1 -
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson 22 November 1940.

is the subject. I am sending Admiral Bloch a copy.

My best to you both and to "all your works" -

Sincerely,

H.R.S.

Op-12-VED
Serial 050312 (SC) A16/FF1
昭和三〇年十一月二十二日

○○○○

ハワイの海軍軍事施設の最重要部分に対する警備が満足すべきものであるかどうかを確認する必要がある。ハワイ管区司令官に申し上げて、これを行う。

我々が警備室に就けない。警備を兼ねするものはありません。（警備）

軍艦島内の艦隊の安全性に対する今まではとても大きな懸念を持った。
われたが、タラン事件以来は更に大きな懸念を抱くに至った。核攻撃はハワイの在住日本人側の恐れの可能性が増し、海軍により之等の型のみを考慮の対象とすべきであることを更に強く示しております。各艦隊は核の安全性は常に次のものであり、且つ司令長官及び水上部を煩わしい限りの大変に思われることでしょう。水力及び機械の完全な支えを受けるためには、今更とも知らずに、貴重な戦略上の要請に於いては、大変に幸いです。本問題に対する貴重な資料並に十三管区司令部の御批判を承ることを出

例へば港の内部へ水雷防礦網を設けるのがよいのではないか？
移動陣営をはじめ警備防空隊の警備手段を配置することに依り、今現在の地方の安全確保の問題は、その為に陸軍省の抑々の警備が出されているのであります。常備の安全の確保のためには、常備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全の確保のためには、警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確認してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してあります。警備の安全を確保してある
ので

余は、本便を寄下に出すべきか、或はブロック長者に出して、寄下

や隠微と共に問題を取上げる説同類な書信を出すべきかに付測々途

つてあります我々が返事を得られるべきならば、實際上それへは重要なこ

提督にも本便の書を送ります。

貴下方煩者並びに『寄下のすべての仕事』の成功を祈りながら

敬具

HAZEN COMET. STAR.
482 28th critical situation demands that all precautions be taken immediately against subversive activities within field of investigative responsibility of War Department paren see paragraph three mid SC thirty dash forty five end paren stop Also desired that you initiate forthwith all additional measures necessary to provide for protection of your establishments comma property comma and equipment against sabotage comma protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda end protection of all activities against espionage stop This does not repeat not meaning that any illegal measures are authorized stop Protective measures should be confined to those essential to security comma avoiding unnecessary publicity and alarm stop To insure speed of transmission identical telegrams are being sent to all air stations but this does not repeat not affect your responsibility under existing instructions ADAMS.
27 November 1941 to OPNAV 38S, Action: COM ALNAL COAST
FROM COM 14, 16, CINPAC, CINCAF

Top Secret

27 November 1941
From: OPNAV 38S
Action: Commandants all Naval Coastal Frontiers, Com 14, 16
CINCPAC, CINCAF.
Info: CINCLANT
271519

On account of fact that existing and subsequent merchant ship
codes may be compromised the use of secret positions in assignmen-
t of routes for merchant ships will be initiated as rapidly as
possible and instructions for their use given to masters as
this will enable directions for diversions to be given without
disclosing to axis nations the location of our ships.

(Page 1406, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
Notet: The attached document is the corrected document and should be substituted for the corresponding document which should be destroyed.
Excerpt from Exhibit No. 50 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 50.

MOST SECRET

Classified SECRET
Auth: WGG
Date: 5 Dec 45
Initials: __________

AMERICAN - DUTCH - BRITISH
CONVERSATIONS

SINGAPORE, APRIL, 1941

(Short Title - "A.D.B.")

RECEIVED

REPORT

Office of the Commander-in-Chief,

SOUTH EAST, 21st April 1941.

(Page 1551, Part 15 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")

- 1 -
IV - ACTION OPEN TO THE ASSOCIATED POWERS.

28. To ensure that we are not diverted from the major object of the defeat of Germany and Italy, our main strategy in the Far East at the present time must be defensive. There, however, certain measures open to us which will assist greatly in the defence of our interests in the Far East, but which are themselves offensive.

29. It is important to organise air operations against Japanese occupied territory and against Japan herself. It is probable that her collapse will occur as a result of economic blockade, naval pressure and air bombardment. This latter form of pressure is the most direct and one which Japan particularly fears.

In addition to the defensive value of operation submarine and air forces from Luzon, referred to in pars. 21 above there is even greater value from the offensive point of view in holding this island. It is therefore recommended that the defences of Luzon should be strengthened and that every effort should be made to maintain a bombing force in the island in addition to building up a similar force in China.

30. Other positive activities which may be undertaken are as follows:

(a) Support to the Chinese Regular Forces by financial aid and provision of equipment.

(b) Operation of Guerillas in China.

(c) Organisation of subversive activities in Japan.

31. So far as economic pressure is concerned, the entry of the United States of America, the British Empire, and the Netherlands East Indies into a war against Japan would automatically restrict Japanese trade to that with the coast of Asia. Since China will be in the war against her, and our submarine and air forces should be able to interfere considerably with trade from Thailand and Indo-China, a very large measure of economic blockade would thus be forced upon Japan from the outset.

(Page 1565, Part 15 "Pearl Harbor Attack")
VII - PLAN FOR EMPLOYMENT OF LAND AND AIR FORCES (contd.)

OTHER OPERATIONS.

78. (a) Support to Chinese Regular Forces by financial aid, provision of equipment and establishment of military and air missions. A British nucleus Mission is already established, and a United States Mission possible combined with the British Mission would be of considerable value, and it is recommended that preparations to establish it should now be made.

(b) The operating of Chinese Guerrilla Forces armed, equipped and directed by the Associated Powers. Steps have already been taken by the British Government to organise such operations. It is recommended that the United States Government organise similar guerrilla forces.

(c) The organisation of subversive activities, sabotage and corruption in Japan and Japanese occupied territories. Activities of this kind are already being organised by the British Government. It is recommended that the United States Government should also undertake such activities and co-ordinate them closely with those of the British.

Mr. KEFFE. And on the 10th of January 1941 the lease-lend bill was introduced in the Congress; on March 11, 1941, that became law and we immediately began to give supplies under that to England and our other later allies; did we not?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEFFE. And if you remember?

General MARSHALL. I do not recall the exact figures.

Mr. KEFFE. In particular our maneuvering to get the planes for the Air Force out there operated under General Chennault.

General MARSHALL. Yes. He had resigned, I believe.

Mr. KEFFE. Resigned, and went over and became Chief to Chiang Kai-shek.

General MARSHALL. In the service of the Chinese Government.

Mr. KEFFE. He recruited a good many Americans to go over to fly planes under his command?

General MARSHALL. Yes, sir.

Mr. KEFFE. And planes were furnished to him by the United States Government?

General MARSHALL. I do not remember the arrangements as to financing, but I know that I personally initiated the procedure, a proposed details which were followed out.

Mr. KEFFE. We perhaps loaned money to China and they then bought our planes. Is that what it was?

General MARSHALL. I would prefer not to answer that.

(3632) Mr. KEFFE. I see.

(Pages 1383 - 1384, Part 3 "Pearl Harbor Attack")
null
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
28 November 1940.

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET  
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship  
Long Beach, California  
November 28, 1940

Dear Betty:

Your last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received.

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a great deal of concern and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and ships, at present, are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance.

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me greater concern, because to provide a reasonable degree of security calls for employment of a great number of Fleet units for security alone, which will consume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed toward training and indoctrination. I feel that the Fleet must operate on either of two assumptions, i.e., (a) that we are at peace and no security measures are required; or (b) that war time measures of security must be carried out. Herefore, we have carried out limited security measures largely as a basis for training and on the assumption that no foreign power would choose to bring on a war by an attack on the Fleet, but that some misdirected or fanatical nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible attack on Fleet units. Now, however, in the light of your concern over these matters and in view of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose a tentative draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor. It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes, and some degree of extra discomfort, but under the assumption, this will have to be accepted.

In regard to the operations with the Second Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, we had originally planned on a tentative date of January 20. This was based on the readiness of the transports by January 1 and the Department's desire, as I understood it (see Cooke's memorandum to you of October 10) to fit these exercises into the international and diplomatic picture. I do not, of course, know to what extent the picture has been altered or how these exercises now fit in. As you will see later, this makes a great difference in their conception.

According to our information, the last of the "CITY" transports will not be completed, at the yard, until January 23, with a fitting-out period of seven days at a navy yard

- 1 -
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
28 November 1940.

on top of that. This, with the other four "CITY" class and
the EXOCHORDA, will give us six transports by February 1, if
the dates now set are met. Allowing for an indoctrination and
shakedown period, it does not appear possible to embark the
Marines prior to about March 1, with the exercise actually
starting in the Hawaiian area around March 10. By that time,
the Marines inform me, they will have about 12,000 men, which
would, if we took the whole Force, require at least six more
transports. This brings up the question of the objectives of
the exercise. As I originally understood them, they were to
be a full dress rehearsal of an island attack, with the possi­
bility that they might turn into the "real thing." Under this
conception, we would, of course, want to carry the entire Force
and all their equipment, including organic transportation and
ground unit support for their aircraft.

If, however, they are to be largely training exercises,
with definitely limited objectives, we can accomplish much
needed training for marines, transports and supporting forces
by limiting the numbers of men and the quantity of equipment
to the facilities provided by the six transports, organizing
the units into more or less complete combat teams -- one on
each transport. We could, under this assumption, start the
exercises much earlier (that is, earlier than waiting for
six more transports) and perhaps follow the first ones with a
second series applying the lessons learned the first time but
utilizing the remaining troops.

Until a decision is reached on the foregoing, I can do
little except study the problem and general planning.

Preliminary discussion along this line brings out the
following:

(a) The Marines will have only two squadrons of planes.
These can be embarked on carriers, but, depending
on the scope of the operations, a separate ship or
ships (probably a cargo vessel) may be needed to
accommodate the ground troops and equipment.

(b) If the scope of the exercises includes readiness
for further eventualities, at least one and probably
two, extra cargo ships will be required to carry
organic transportation, 90 days' ammunition, and
supplies.

(c) In any concept, something will have to be done about
landing boats. I assume that all transports will
carry the boats listed in your conversion letter.
These will provide, roughly, about 500 boat spaces
per ship, whereas 1100 are required per combat
team. The remaining 600 boat spaces per transport
must either be provided from the supporting ships
(manifestly undesirable) or be carried into the
transport area by special cargo vessels or boat
 carriers. I believe we should convert a special
boat carrier for this purpose, similar to ones used
at Shanghai by the Japanese.
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. H. Stark
28 November 1940.

CinC Pilo No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

(d) Transport crews should be ample to provide boat crews for boats carried, boat officers, and organized bench parties. A boat carrier, if provided, should carry the necessary boat crews as part of its complement.

(e) Transport equipment should include either special tanks for fresh water capable of being carried ashore in boats or sufficient drums to carry water for troops transported.

(f) If further eventualities are to be provided for, I would want the AMERICAN SEAMAN (Maritime Commission training ship especially equipped as distilling ship) taken over and made available.

(g) The Marines' ammunition situation is critical. I feel sure this is known at Marine Corps headquarters, but it cannot be over-emphasized. They also need pack howitzers, to replace their present heavy and unwieldy guns.

(h) An able, energetic Transport Group Commander must be assigned as soon as possible. This is a man-sized job, requiring ability to work with the Marines. There are many details which can be worked out only by close cooperation. It is my present intention to operate the transports, as soon as each is ready, in the San Diego area, training in loading, embarking, debarking and landing exercises.

(i) To be ready for real service we will have to have bombardment ammunition, preferably at Oahu, where it can be interchanged with service ammunition if found necessary. The only such ammunition now on the West Coast, to my knowledge, is 14"/50, 6"/53 and 5"/51, which would limit the gunfire support to BB's and CL's (7500), whereas CA's, CL's (10,000) and DD's are indicated for this type work.

I have told the Marines, as a basis for their present planning, that we will take only so much of the Brigade as can be combat loaded on the six transports, and that those should go prepared with what can be carried, ready for any operations that might be possible East of the 160° East Longitude.

We have no reply, as yet, to our letter of October 31, relative to diplomatic arrangements for reconnaissance of CHRISTMAS and MAKIN Islands. Of course, decision as to the suitability of CHRISTMAS must await reconnaissance, and special diplomatic arrangements will have to be made if the landing is to be held there. General Upshur rather favors an exercise on Oahu or similar large island, where opportunity will be afforded for maneuvers after landing. This question, however, cannot be settled now.
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark  
28 November 1940.

United States Fleet  
U.S.S. New Mexico, Flagship

As I see it, the possibilities as to locale include:

Christmas Island -- if found suitable
Palmyra Island -- probably will limit force

that can be employed to less
than that available in six
transports.

One of Hawaiian Islands

Please let me know as soon as possible your decision as to the concept and scope of the exercises. I would also appreciate being informed as to the progress made in the conversion of the transports, the provision of landing boats, boat carriers, etc.

With best regards,

/s/ J. O. Richardson

Sincerely,

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy

The Chief of Naval Operations

Navy Department

Washington, D. C.
Dear Betty:

Your last two letters, touching on the security of the Fleet while operating in the Hawaiian area and the prospective operations of the Second Brigade of the Fleet Marine Force with the Fleet during the third quarter have been received.

With regard to the first of these matters, I will take this up with Bloch on my arrival back in Hawaii. This feature of the problem does not give me a great deal of concern and, I think, can be easily provided for. I think torpedo nets within the harbor are neither necessary nor practicable. The area is too restricted and ships, at present, are not moored within torpedo range of the entrance.

The security of the units while carrying out routine operations gives me greater concern, because to provide a reasonable degree of security calls for employment of a great number of Fleet units for security alone, which will consume both time and effort that could, otherwise, be well directed toward training and indoctrination. I feel that the Fleet must operate on either of two assumptions, i.e., (a) that we are at peace and no security measures are required; or (b) that war time measures of security must be carried out. Here-tofore, we have carried out limited security measures largely as a basis for training and on the assumption that no foreign power would choose to bring on a war by an attack on the Fleet, but that some misdirected or fanatical nationals might undertake individual and irresponsible attack on Fleet units. Now, however, in the light of your concern over these matters and in view of your better information and position to evaluate the possibilities, I have come to the conclusion that I must operate on the basis of (b) above. I enclose a tentative draft of a directive which I plan to issue upon arrival at Pearl Harbor. It is bound to result in the curtailment of badly needed basic training of new personnel, particularly in destroyers and planes, and some degree of extra discomfort, but under the assumption, this will have to be accepted.

In regard to the operations with the Second Brigade, Fleet Marine Force, we had originally planned on a tentative date of January 20. This was based on the readiness of the transports by January 1 and the Department's desire, as I understood it (See Cooke's memorandum to you of October 10) to fit these exercises into the international and diplomatic picture. I do not, of course, know to what extent the picture has been altered or how these exercises now fit in. As you will see later, this makes a great difference in their conception.

According to our information, the last of the "CITY" transports will not be completed, at the yard, until January 23, with a fitting-out period of seven days at a navy yard
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
28 November 1940.

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

on top of that. This, with the other four "CITY" class and
the EXOCHORDA, will give us six transports by February 1, if
the data and set are met. Allowing for an indoctrination and
shakedown period, it does not appear possible to embark the
Marines prior to about March 1, with the exercise actually
starting in the Hawaiian area around March 10. By that time,
the Marines inform me, they will have about 12,000 men, which
would, if we took the whole Force, require at least six more
transports. This brings up the question of the objectives of
the exercise. As I originally understood them, they were to
be a full dress rehearsal of an island attack, with the possi-
bility that they might turn into the "real thing." Under this
conception, we would, of course, want to carry the entire Force
and all their equipment, including organic transportation and
ground unit support for their aircraft.

If, however, they are to be largely training exercises,
with definitely limited objectives, we can accomplish much
needed training for marines, transports and supporting forces
by limiting the numbers of men and the quantity of equipment
to the facilities provided by the six transports, organizing
the units into more or less complete combat teams -- one on
each transport. We could, under this assumption, start the
exercises much earlier (that is, earlier than waiting for
six more transports) and perhaps follow the first ones with a
second series applying the lessons learned the first time but
utilizing the remaining troops.

Until a decision is reached on the foregoing, I can do
little except study the problem and general planning.

Preliminary discussion along this line brings out the
following:

(a) The Marines will have only two squadrons of planes.
These can be embarked on carriers, but, depending
on the scope of the operations, a separate ship or
ships (probably a cargo vessel) may be needed to
accommodate the ground troops and equipment.

(b) If the scope of the exercises includes readiness
for further eventualities, at least one and probably
two, extra cargo ships will be required to carry
organic transportation, 90 days' ammunition, and
supplies.

(c) In any concept, something will have to be done about
landing boats. I assume that all transports will
carry the boats listed in your conversion letter.
These will provide, roughly, about 500 boat spaces
per ship, whereas 1100 are required per combat
team. The remaining 600 boat spaces per transport
must either be provided from the supporting ships
(manifestly undesirable) or be carried into the
transport area by special cargo vessels or boat
carriers. I believe we should convert a special
boat carrier for this purpose, similar to ones used
at Shanghai by the Japanese.

- 2 -
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
28 November 1940.

Cinc Filo No. UNITED STATES FLEET
U.S.S. NEW MEXICO, Flagship

(d) Transport crews should be ample to provide boat crews for boats carried, boat officers, and organized beach parties. A boat carrier, if provided, should carry the necessary boat crews as part of its complement.

(e) Transport equipment should include either special tanks for fresh water capable of being carried ashore in boats or sufficient drums to carry water for troops transported.

(f) If further eventualities are to be provided for, I would want the AMERICAN SEAMAN (Maritime Commission training ship especially equipped as distilling ship) taken over and made available.

(g) The Marines' ammunition situation is critical. I feel sure this is known at Marine Corps headquarters, but it cannot be over-emphasized. They also need pack howitzers, to replace their present heavy and unwieldy guns.

(h) An able, energetic Transport Group Commander must be assigned as soon as possible. This is a man-sized job, requiring ability to work with the Marines. There are many details which can be worked out only by close cooperation. It is my present intention to operate the transports, as soon as each is ready, in the San Diego area, training in loading, embarking, debarking and landing exercises.

(i) To be ready for real service we will have to have bombardment ammunition, preferably at Oahu, where it can be interchanged with service ammunition if found necessary. The only such ammunition now on the West Coast, to my knowledge, is 14"/50, 6"/53 and 5"/31, which would limit the gunfire support to BB's and CL's (7500), whereas CA's, CL's (10,000) and DD's are indicated for this type work.

I have told the Marines, as a basis for their present planning, that we will take only so much of the Brigade as can be combat loaded on the six transports, and that these should go prepared with what can be carried, ready for any operations that might be possible East of the 160° East Longitude.

We have no reply, as yet, to our letter of October 31, relative to diplomatic arrangements for reconnaissance of CHRISTMAS and MAKIN Islands. Of course, decision as to the suitability of CHRISTMAS must await reconnaissance, and special diplomatic arrangements will have to be made if the landing is to be held there. General Upshur rather favors an exercise on Oahu or similar large island, where opportunity will be afforded for maneuvers after landing. This question, however, cannot be settled now.
As I see it, the possibilities as to locale include:

Christmas Island — if found suitable
Palmwra Island — probably will limit force that can be employed to less than that available in six transports.

One of Hawaiian Islands

Please let me know as soon as possible your decision as to the concept and scope of the exercises. I would also appreciate being informed as to the progress made in the conversion of the transports, the provision of landing boats, boat carriers, etc.

With best regards,

/s/ J. O. Richardson
Sincerely,

Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. Navy
The Chief of Naval Operations
Navy Department
Washington, D. C.
Defense Doc. 1500-U-2

Excerpt from Exhibit No. 32 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 32
MESSAGES BETWEEN WAR DEPARTMENT AND HAWAII
FROM JULY 8 TO SEPTEMBER 7, 1941

(14) 28 November 1941 from Arnold to Hawaiian Air Force.
Subject: Sabotage

(14) secret
Priority

Attention Commanding General Hawaiian Air Force period That instructions substantially as follows be issued to all establishments and units under your control and command is desired colon against those subversive activities within the field of investigative responsibility of the War Department paren see paragraph three mid SR three zero dash four five paren the present critical situation demands that all precautions be taken at once period It is desired also that all additional measures necessary be initiated by you immediately to provide the following colon protection of your personnel against subversive propaganda comma protection of all activities against espionage comma and protection against sabotage of your equipment comma property and establishments period This does not repeat not authorize any illegal measures period Avoiding unnecessary alarm and publicity protective measures should be confined to those essential to security period Para it is also desired that or on before December five this year reports be submitted to the Chief Army Air Forces of all steps initiated by you to comply with these instructions period signed Arnold.

A.F. No. 461
Secret

(Page 1330 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(36) 27 November 1941 to CNO, Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC.

(36) Top Secret

November 7, 1941.

From: Chief of Naval Operations
Action: CINCAF, CINCPAC
Info: CINCLANT, SPENAVO
272337

This despatch is to be considered a war warning X Negotiations with Japan looking toward stabilization of conditions in the Pacific have ceased and an aggressive move by Japan is expected within the next few days X The number and equipment of Japanese troops and the organization of naval task forces indicates an amphibious expedition against either the Philippines, Thai or Kra peninsula or possibly Borneo X Execute an appropriate defensive deployment preparatory to carrying out the tasks assigned in WPL46 X Inform district and army authorities X A similar warning is being sent by War Department X SPENAVO inform British X Continental districts Guam Samoa directed take appropriate measures against sabotage.

Copy to WPD, War Dept.
太平洋戦線におけるアメリカ軍の動向を、一部の情報源から得たものである。前述の情報は、アメリカ軍の動向を反映している。

【情報源】
- アメリカ軍情報
- サモア情報
- デンマーク情報
- スウェーデン情報

【注】
- 本情報は、米軍を中心とする情報が主である。
General MARSHALL. This plan was to meet a probable, as we understood it, Japanese operation to the south of the China Sea.

Senator FERGUSON. Well, were you familiar with the fact that Mr. Churchill made the statement sometime before the war started, as far as America was concerned December 7, that in case Japan attacked America they would be in with us in 1 or 2 hours, or whatever the time was?

General MARSHALL. I have a recollection of some such statement. Could that have been in reply to this plan then?

Senator FERGUSON. Were they to come in if Hawaii alone were to be attacked?

General MARSHALL. I could not answer that, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. Or was it a one-sided plan?

General MARSHALL. I do not think it was one-sided.

Senator FERGUSON. I just want to know what your opinion is on it.

General MARSHALL. It says "A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the associated powers." That is a very general statement, and can cover Hawaii also. "It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute 'a direct act of war.' It is possible for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be resolved by diplomatic action, It is recognized that the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned."

Senator FERGUSON. I am trying to find out whether this plan went into effect prior to December 7.

General MARSHALL. I am quite certain it did not go into effect because it never was implemented, sir.

Senator FERGUSON. On page 25, it says, at the bottom of the page - will you read that (b), the last paragraph?

General MARSHALL (reading):

The operating of Chinese guerrilla forces armed, equipped, and directed by the associated Powers. Steps have already been taken by the British Government to organize such operations. It is recommended that the United States Government organize similar guerrilla forces.

Senator FERGUSON. Did we ever organize those, to put this plan into effect?

General MARSHALL. So far as I know, prior to December 7, 1941, we did not, as far as I can recollect.

The one action, aside from sending supplies into China, that I do have a very definite recollection of is equipping the air force the Flying Tigers.

Senator FERGUSON. The Volunteer Air Corps?

General MARSHALL. Yes; because I took the action to get (3237) them the planes personally.

Senator FERGUSON. What was the Volunteer Air Corps?

General MARSHALL. The Volunteer Air Corps was a force of airmen, combat planes, P-40's, I believe, furnished by the United States, and operated by volunteer officers from the United States, I think, of the Army and Navy, and there may have been even civilians in it. I am not quite certain.

Some of them were reserve officers, and they were relieved from active duty, and released so that they might go into the employ of the Chinese Government.
The planes were obtained - is there any interest in that?

Senator FERGUSON. Yes, sir.

General MARSHALL. The planes were obtained on the basis of an English contract for planes. I think, with the Curtiss Co., and when that contract had been fulfilled, it was possible for the plant to turn out a certain number of planes during the next few months, if they immediately started, within 10 days, using the parts that were then available; otherwise their assembly lines would change.

Under the contract arrangement we had, which controlled the Curtiss Co.'s operations with the British, our Government, meaning the War Department in general, and Air Corps people in particular, could control the question (3237) of whether or not those planes should be manufactured beyond the contract terms.

The problem was to obtain planes immediately for the Chinese.

The planes which would have been fabricated out of this available extra material of course would not have been completed for 3 or 4 months:

We could kill that, so far as the British getting the benefit of those additional planes, or, as I used it, we could, on a trade basis, require them to make immediate delivery of completed planes that were going to them, to the Chinese, and we later would allow them to take those additional planes that were manufactured from the accumulated material.

(3239) I saw Mr. Sumner Welles and he took up the adjustment with the British, and they submitted to that condition, and we got 50 in January or February, and 50 more in February or March. They were all for the Flying Tigers; they were sent out to the Far East. The men that were recruited by the Chinese and we released where they happened to be reserve officers, also, proceeded to the Far East.

My next recollection of the matter is while we had obtained the planes on that basis by a twist of the British contract, we now found ourselves in the predicament of having to provide the guns and ammunition, which we did not have available, and we had a hard time arming the planes.

That was the one definite force that I recall, prior to December 7, 1941, we organized to the extent that I have just described.

Senator FERGUSON. Now, General, was that an activating of this Exhibit 50 plan?

General MARSHALL. I do not think it was that. It came actually out of a visit here of T. V. Soong with the head of the Chinese Air I took them out to my house for lunch and they made an impressive picture of the circumstances and the great good such action would do and I immediately undertook the obtaining of that material. That was without regard to this plan, and what I was referring to here is the (3240) continuation of that.
第二期のラジオ組織成員

アーキテクton

私ノノ認定ノ

セカンド・プラットフォーム

義勇飛行隊デスカ

義勇飛行隊デスカ

ソウルス

私ノノ認識ノ

ラジオ組織成員

マーシャル大将

マーシャル大将

ラジオ組織成員

ラジオ組織成員

ラジオ組織成員

マーシャル大将
情報技術者による製造業における情報化の実現

当社では、情報技術者の立場から、製造業における情報化の実現について考察を行います。情報化は、生産管理、品質管理、生産計画、生産管理など、製造業における様々な面で重要な要素となっています。情報化の実現は、生産作業の効率化、生産管理の透明化、品質管理の向上、生産計画の迅速化などに寄与することが期待される。

情報技術者は、この情報化の実現において、重要な役割を果たすことが期待されます。情報システムの構築、システムの運営、システムの保守、システムの改良など、さまざまな業務において活躍する必要があります。情報技術者は、製造業における情報化の実現を支援し、製造業の成長を支える存在として位置づけられるべきです。

情報技術者自身も、情報化の実現において自身の能力を伸ばすことを求められます。情報技術者自身が、情報化の実現において必要な知識、技術を身に付けることが求められる。情報技術者は、情報化の実現において、自身の能力を伸ばすためにも、その専門分野において常に学び続けることが求められます。

情報技術者による製造業における情報化の実現の重要性は、情報化の実現が製造業の成長を支えるだけではなく、情報技術者の自己成長を支えるにもかかわる。情報技術者自身が、情報化の実現において自身の能力を伸ばすための機会を提供するべきです。
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
17 December 1940.

NAVY DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
Washington, Dec. 17 1940

Secret
From: The Chief of Naval Operations
To: The Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject: War Plans - Status and Readiness of in View of
Current International Situation.
Reference: (a) CinC's Secret Letter A16/01705 of October 22, 1940

1. In reply to your recommendation in the above letter that
   a new war plan be issued, you are informed that Navy Basic War
   Plan - Rainbow No. 3 (W.P.L. 44) has recently been completed.
   Four advance copies have been forwarded to you by officer
   messenger. The finished copies of this plan, plus such revis­
   sions of WPL-42, Navy Basic War Plan - Rainbow No. 1, as have
   been found desirable for making parts of that plan usable with
   Rainbow No. 3, will be distributed as soon as practicable through
   the Registered Publication Section.

2. War Plan Rainbow No. 3 is designed to provide against the
   most imminent and difficult war situation which may confront
   the United States in the near future. It is, therefore requested
   that the Commander in Chief prepare as soon as practicable the
   operating plans for a war envisaged by Rainbow No. 3.

3. The Chief of Naval Operations has, in the past, kept the
   Commander in Chief advised as to all matters within his own
   knowledge which related to current national policy and pending
   national decisions. This past practice will be continued in
   the future. However, the Commander in Chief is doubtless aware
   that the changing world military situation will continue to
   affect policy, and thus will influence plans for the war opera­
   tion of the naval forces. It is, of course, impracticable to
   draw up and to issue now Navy Basic War Plans when merely minor
   changes in policy occur. The Chief of Naval Operations considers
   that Rainbow No. 3 is, in its major aspects, suitable for all
   probable situations which may arise in the near future where
   the principal portion of the national effort is directed west­
   ward. Under study now by the naval and army officials are plans
   based on assumptions requiring the exertion of the principal
   portion of the national effort to the eastward (Rainbow No. 5),
   and also a plan, somewhat similar to Rainbow No. 1, involving
   the defense of the entire Western Hemisphere against attack
   from both the east and the west (Rainbow No. 4). So far as now
   can be foreseen, these three basic plans should be adequate to
   guide mobilization, initial deployment, and initial operations
   under all contingencies which are foreseeable at present.

4. In view of the above, it is believed unnecessary to comment
   on the present applicability of the Orange War Plan, rs that
   Plan was drawn up to guide the prosecution of a war under cir­
   cumstances which do not now exist.

5. The urgency of this document is such that it will not
   reach the addressees in time by the next available officer courier.
   The originator therefore authorizes the transmission of this
document by registered mail within the continental limits of
the United States.

/s/ H. R. STARK
海軍作戦部長

米国艦隊司令長官宛

題目一戦争計画

関係省省一九四〇年（昭和十五年）十一月三十一日付

司令長官秘密書簡一六一〇一七〇五号

前記の書簡に於て貴下が新戦争計画を発せられるべき旨勧告させられました

実に文書送達将校により御手許に発送させられました。今計画案四通は既に

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送させられました。本計画案四通は既に

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て

文書送達将校に於て御手許に発送せられたものを既に文書送達将校に於て
修正案を、同計額の一部を「レインボウ第三號」と共に使用し得る

もしするのに斯くの如き修正をした方が好ましいといふ事が解つ
たのであるか、此等の書類は出来るだけ速かに登録出版局を通じて領
布されます。

戦争計画「レインボウ第三號」は米国が近き将来に於て直面すべき最

戦争に對於する作戦計画を出来るだけ速かに準備する様願ひます。

海軍作戦部長は過去に於て現在行はれてゐる国策及び政策の国家的決
定に基して自分の知つて居る事項は全部司令長官に知らせられてゐる

戦争計画「レインボウ第三號」はその主要なる面に於て近き将来に起り得べる且つ国

上の述べた作戦計画の変更が起つたに過ぎない場合に新規の海軍基本戦争計画を

上記の如き過去の習慣は将来も続くる様りであります。併しごから司令

長官が御存知の通り世界軍事情勢の変更により国策及び政策の国家的決

定から於て海軍の作戦計画の影響を受ける事は勿論であります。たな国策

立策し発する事は勿論実際的ではありますまん。
家の努力の大半を要ると云ぶ想定に於て計盤レインボウ第一号一に該分類似し東西両方よりの攻撃に対する西半球全体の防衛を包含する計盤レインボウ第四号一は只今臨海軍当局によって検討されて居ります。現在誤見得る限りに於て此等三基本計盤は現在誤見得る凡ゆる不敵の場合に際して動員、初期展開及び初期作戦を指導するに適してゐる答であります。前記したる事実に鑑みレインボウ第四号一を現在適用し得るや否やに付き述べる事は不必要と思ひます。何となれば同計盤は現在存在しないと考えずに於ける戦争の遂行を指導する為に立てられたものだからであります。本文書は緊急を要するものでありますかして此の次の文書送達時仮に受信人に送達されるのでは間に合ひません。故に發信者は米国の大腦地域内は書留郵便で本文書を送達し得る認可を與へます。
Subject: Reply to Marshall warning.

Secret

Received: November 28, 1941.
11:18 PM

From: HQ WDC Presidio of San Francisco, Calif.,
To: General George C. Marshall
November 28th:

Report following measures taken as per your radio Nov twenty seven: Your radio paraphrased to Commanding Generals 2DC, Second Air Force, Fourth Air Force, Ninth CAD, Pacific Coastal Frontier Sectors, Ninth Corps Area and Commandants Eleventh Twelfth and Fifteenth Naval Districts. All harbor entrance control posts continuously manned. One gun battery each harbor defense continuously alerted. Protection against sabotage and other subversive activities intensified. Six infy battalions and necessary motor transportation alerted so as to be instantly available to CG NCA to carry out his missions under Rainbow Five. Constant contact being maintained with corps area and naval district commanders and full cooperation assured. PCF, sector and subsector plans Rainbow Five practically completed and necessary reconnaissance being made to carry out defense of critical areas. Two rifle companies furnished CG SF P of E for guard duty and one company furnished to CG NCA for internment aliens at Angel Island. Paren in connection this report see my radio to CG GHQ Nov twenty fifth which recommended that WPL five two be extended to include Pacific Coast and Japanese vessels and which outlined steps taken by me in preparation therefor. As Air Forces as well as other Army forces will be involved in the execution of WLP five two or the preparatory stage of Rainbow Five it is strongly urged that I be authorized to direct operations of Air Forces in defense (15A) of the PCF or that instructions be issued specifying air action and that I be furnished a copy of such directive. Should hostilities occur this command now ready to carry out tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan except for woeful shortage of ammunition and pursuit and bombardment planes which should be made available without delay.

DeWITT, Commanding.

(Pages 1330 - 1331 Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
發電文書：

【發電文書】

今（九四一年）昭和十六年十一月廿八日（星期六）下午十八時

發電文書

自駐華大使

進駐華大使

總領事

尊敬的陸軍參謀總長

此電

自從

敬祈

敬希

十一月廿八日
十一月二十七日ノ像官無兔ニヨリ採打タル以下ノ報告

太平洋沿岸部

各指揮官部

■

■

浜

Formateado que refiere a la situación militar.

日本防備警備部ペリコトスメソソレニ付

小官ノ採リタル部分ノ帰報ヲ待テ

November 27th, reports on the state of the military.

Military department of the Pacific coast.

Each commander.

Display format information about the military situation.
Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF D'SPATCHES

(37) 27 November 1941 to OPNAV, Action: COMl-13, 15, NAVY YARD WASHINGTON, GOV GUAM & SOMOA.

(37) Top Secret

27 November 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: Coms 1-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-15 Navyyard Washn Governor Guam & Samoa
Info:
272338

(Paraphrase)

Commandants will take appropriate measures for security against subversive activity and sabotage due to critical status of orange negotiations and imminent probability extension orange operations X Publicity to be avoided.

(Page 1406, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
DEFENCE DOCUMENT NO. 1500-V-4

EXCERPTS FROM EXHIBIT NO. 47.

This document contains information from the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack.

(Telegram received)

TOKI. This telegram must be closely preserved before being communicated to anyone (80).

From Chongqing via N.R.
Date: November 3, 1941
Read 8:46 P.M.

SECRETARY OF STATE

Washington

455, November 3, 5 p.m. (Section One).

Reference to Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 3, 43 p.m.

In our conversation yesterday with the President which was telegraphed to him (off the record) it was indicated that it was his intention to make the telegraph message yesterday to Dr. Chih to whom no doubt will be made available to the Department.

The message is to be sent at 8:46 p.m. unless instructed otherwise.

It is the understanding that Japan will undertake the difficult invasion of Tonkin from Indochina but I believe it is certain that in any case Japanese air forces will be detached from the main body of Japanese forces within China as against the American or any other voluntary forces and when they enter China it is probable that at least 60,000 men will be available.

It is true of course that a major defeat of a Japanese attack upon Yunnan would have very advantageous effects in restraining Japanese expansion if it were possible. If it should be impossible to send sufficient forces to Yunnan from the existing units it may be necessary to bolster these forces with Yunnan's own contributions.

August 8th, 1943.

(Telegram received)

(Telegram received)

(Telegram received)
The successful invasion of Yenan by the Japanese would probably seriously affect Chinese policy and deprive China of many of the factors for continued organized resistance. I do not believe however, that it would result in any early solution of Japan’s problem in China. Japan would still find herself obliged to maintain large forces in this country for an indefinite period.

(End of Message)

The successful invasion of Yenan by the Japanese would probably seriously affect Chinese policy and deprive China of many of the factors for continued organized resistance. I do not believe however, that it would result in any early solution of Japan’s problem in China. Japan would still find herself obliged to maintain large forces in this country for an indefinite period.

(End of Message)

(Signed from Chungking November 2, 1941)

Confidential,
Message to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek to President Roosevelt

In view of a steadily evolving danger which threatens to change the whole military situation in China, I have communicated the following message to Mr. Winston Churchill:

"Intelligence which I have received confirms that the Japanese are determined upon an attack against Yenan from Indo-China in order to take Kunming, and cut China’s lines of communication with India, Britain, and the United States. Preparations are already under way. The attack may be expected shortly. This is in my view the first step in plans for the early or immediate capture of Indo-China, whether by force of arms or by further extension of operations southward and eastward. Under these circumstances I should bring to your notice certain facts and aspects of the situation. Indeed I feel I now have the right to impress upon you, for the first time, the full gravity of the situation. Indeed I feel I now have the right to impress upon you, for the first time, the full gravity of the situation. Indeed I feel I now have the right to impress upon you, for the first time, the full gravity of the situation.

Once Kunming is taken, the Japanese would be rid of all fear of attack in the rear. You will, I feel sure, be the first to see that this means that Japan’s true objective is not China but a first-rate attack on India or Indo-China to cut our lines of communication as well as to take the city of Yenan and make it the springboard for an attack on India. You will appreciate how vitally the coming battle will bear upon the safety of all countries on the Pacific, upon yourselves and ourselves alike.

You know you may count upon me to do my utmost to defend Kunming, and believe me when I tell you that my friends can do it. But you know as I do that I have no air force, and without an air force what can you do? You may do against another threat is strong in the air. A glance at the map will show that if the city falls, China will be cut off from communications outside, and her armies will be encircled and deprived of all contact with those of her other friends. Moreover the morale of the Chinese army and Chinese people will be shaken to its foundations. Their morale has stood for more than four years on the eastern front. No Japanese triumph on the one front where as all Japan’s armed forces are within a few miles in the air. For the first time in this long war a real collapse of resistance would be possible.

For more than four years now China has been fighting with all her might and all her strength to defend her frontiers. The Japanese armies extend to the very gates of Yenan and beyond. The Japanese are in the position of a conqueror to conquer. The Japanese are in the position of a conqueror to conquer.

The coming battle is therefore not merely a question of victory or defeat of China but the peace and security of the Pacific hang upon it. Indeed it is not too much to say that the outcome of
Defense Doc. No. 1500-V-4

the European (?) war may hang upon it.

"If China had the air force she needs, I should be making no appeal to you, but I should feel confident of our ability to defeat the invaders. But we have nothing that can be called an air force to meet against what the Japanese would bring to bear upon us, for we may be sure that they will use their finest and their strongest. If, however, in the battle the Japanese air force can be checked or even smashed, her power to enter upon what I have called fresh enterprise will be much diminished. It is true that her navy will remain to her, but with that she can do little without the strength in the air without which there would be no end to her schemes of expansion. From then on, her submission could be brought about by political and economic pressure. Do not let us therefore make mistakes as they have done elsewhere in this (4) war, and let the Japanese attack us, as they seem to do, one by one, I am not asking you to declare war upon Japan, I merely wish to leave you in no doubt about the situation in which I find myself, so make it clear that I am no match of the enemy in the air, to tell you what this means and to suggest a remedy. The American volunteer air force now under training is good but very small. Our only hope is that the British air force in Malaya, with American cooperation, may come into action and support the American volunteers and the existing Chinese air force. The British air force could cooperate as part of the Chinese air force or assume the role of an international volunteer force. The result would be to save China and to save the Pacific.

"You might feel at first glance that this would involve you in war with Japan while you are fighting with such courage in Europe and the Middle East. I see things otherwise. I do not believe that Japan feels that she has the strength to attack so long as the resistance of China persists. But once she is rid of this, she will attack you as she did when it suits her and whether or not she is — by such action on your part as I have now suggested. It would be impossible to minimize the importance of British air action in Yunnan, for upon this the fate of democratic cause will (5) turn. China has reached the most critical phase of her war of resistance. Her ability to defend landward approaches to Singapore and Burma now depends primarily on British, and Americans will have to cooperate in the defense of Yunnan. If the Japanese can break our front here we shall be cut off from you, and the whole structure of your own air and naval coordination with America and the Netherlands East Indies will be seriously threatened in new ways and from a new direction. I should like to express, with all the strength at my command, the conviction that wisdom and foresight demand that China be given the help that I have indicated. Nothing else can ensure alike the defeat of Japan and the success of the countries now resisting aggression.

"I have also discussed the strategic subject matter of the foregoing letter with Brigadier-General Macruder and have asked him to convey to you what I consider to be the decisive importance of the campaign in Yunnan. In addition I should like to urge on you my conviction that British determination in dealing with Japan waits at present upon the influence of America; if the United States would move on its air arm in the Philippines to provide either an active unit or a reserve force in the combined operation, I am convinced that unless Japan is checked sharply and at once, she is on the verge of winning a position from which she can deal with each of us separately and in her own time. The opportunity to check her is a fleeting one. You (6) are, Mr. President, recognized as the leader of the front of democratic nations fighting against aggression. I feel sure that you will move with the readiness that the urgency of the moment demands. It is now
Defense Document No. 1500-V-4

themselves, sit back, and wait until the aid arrives. For this reason it might be well not to promise them too much. One other point should be mentioned. What Major McCullough recommends is war-like action by the United States and Britain against Japan — in short, de facto war with Japan. If we are going to fight Japan, rather than transporting our men and equipment to far-off West Yunnan province, thus placing ourselves under all the hardships of difficult transportation, it would seem more sensible to attack the Japanese supply lines and home bases from our already established bases, thus diverting their attention from the Burma Road.

(Signed) R. A. BOONE
For A. H. McCollum

Distribution: Original and 1 copy to DFI — Copy No. 1 and 2
Op-16-2-Copy No. 3
Op-10/11-Copy No. 4
Op-12-Copy No. 5
File-Copy No. 6

October 28, 1941

NFM 5342
Filed 0140

Priority
From: CHUNGKING
To: FOR AMMEOA
Number 28. October 28th

Part 1. Special attention Secretary of War and Chief of Staff.
The Generalissimo, who has been absent since our arrival, received me today, accompanied by Mackeyland. After exchange of messages and amenities he expressed deep appreciation for the sending of the mission.

In order to get his reaction to the objectives of the mission, I outlined my conception of the methods to be employed in making available the assistance afforded by lend lease material and services. I suggested five different military problems to which lend lease material was applicable and regarding which our personnel could collaborate on the solution. These were: 1, the communications problem; 2, the aviation project; 3, the supply of equipment to reorganized army forces; 4, the supply of raw materials; 5, the projects for training in and maintenance of new material.

Part 2. He made a note of these five points and expressed satisfaction with this method of approach, then quickly singled out aviation as the most pressing problem. He stated bluntly that he would like the mission to take over the control and development of his aviation service, disregarding apparently the Chinese air force and referring to Champlin's volunteer force as the only aviation that counted.

He requested, with emphasis, that a high ranking aviation officer be sent to take over his air force.

(2) I had no opportunity to comment on these points.

Becoming intensely earnest he said there was another emergency about which he wished to ask immediate assistance. More follows.
Part 3. The Japanese, he knew, were preparing to attack Kunming from Indo-China and cut the Burma Road. He expected the attack by the end of November. By a concentration of his land forces he could resist this attack, he said, but only if he had air support. Then, queried later, he insisted that he had the resources to defeat the Japanese if air assistance were forthcoming. The generalissimo insisted, and rightly, that Chinese resistance would end if Kunming were lost. In his analysis he argued that Kunming was the key to the Pacific, if it fell, China would fall, and the attack on Malaya Asia would inevitably follow. War in the Pacific then, was a certainty. If China could hold, peace in the Pacific might be saved, but China must have air support, he repeated. The British should reinforce the American volunteer unit. They must be convinced of the necessity of this course of action. Although not expressed, it was to be inferred that no other assistance would be forthcoming in time. Not once did he mention American reinforcements of any kind, clearly the critical situation he repeatedly said that only British air support could save China and peace in the Pacific.

Part four. The generalissimo then asked directly that I inform Washington of the threatening situation at once, and urge that the President intervene with London to make available the Singapore Air Forces to support his defense. Also he requested me personally to appeal to the British commander-in-chief in Singapore to the same effect. Para. Quoting some announcement of the administration to the effect that a movement southward by Japan would be considered inimical to American interests, he argued that our own could properly interpret an attack on Kunming in that light. Even worse, since it would be the first item in a more effective movement south if Chinese resistance were eliminated he added that with the Burma Road cut, America's right to trade with China would be infringed.

Part 5. He then asked that the President be urged to bring diplomatic pressure on Japan and to appeal as well to Britain jointly to warn Japan that an attack upon Kunming would be considered inimical to our interests. This course, he believed, would cause Japan to desist.

In the circumstances, I had no opportunity to turn the interview into channels in which I was authorized to act. I seized one opportunity to point to the critical deficiency of operations on the Burma Road that the success of the defense depended upon improving the traffic there whether or not the British gave all support. I further reminded him that an argument the British might offer for refusing support would be their inability to supply their air units with the road in its present condition. With respect to the road I made clear that the mission was prepared to offer technical assistance in improving the conditions but that the political complications would have to be cleared by the Chinese themselves.

Part 6. The generalissimo informed me that he had taken up the question of aviation support with the British Ambassador on several occasions. Madame Chiang interjected that the Chinese had given assurances of support of large land forces if Singapore were attacked, but that Britain refused to give assurances of air support if Kunming were attacked, unless British territory were invaded.

I told the generalissimo that I could transmit this request to the Secretary of War.
(4) Previous to the interview I had drafted a radio on the subject of the probability of an attack on Kunming. Present indications point strongly that way. If successful, there is little doubt that China's resistance would end. Also it is doubtless true that without effective air support the Japanese might succeed in this decisive effort.

Part seven. It may not be an exaggeration to say that Kunming momentarily has become the key to the Pacific. There is no combat value in the Chinese air force. The American volunteers alone at present strength and as presently equipped are ineffective and will not be ready for combat for several months. Increments of lend lease aviation material contemplated will be too little and too late. Only British forces at Singapore, or perhaps organized units from the Philippines would be available in time to afford effective support to China.

I have discussed the interview with our Ambassador and he has read this radio.

Magruder

These excerpts are from part 15 - joint committee exhibits nos. 44 through 87 - hearings before the joint committee on the investigation of the Pearl Harbor attack, congress of the united states - pages 1476, 1477, 1478, 1479, 1480 and 1481.
胡適に昨夜送信された。総帥より大統領宛の聲明の写し外交部長から只今送られて来た。胡適は勿論変を外交部に供するであろう。若し無理で

来だ日本が印度支那から雲南に貢し困難な侵入を開始するようなことがない限り私は航空機により本文写しを送達する

はならない。

支那関は形式異なるが内容は最初に書簡長が要約して私に後のたる事を聴り

のもとしなければならぬ。
受電

DE

本電文は他への送信に先立ち厳密に解読されるようご注意ください。
既に四ヶ年以上日中は約五百の大兵力を門領に留め、断くして日本の人力を一定の場所に固著させしてしまった。二

之は自故であるかといふ若下は明昨は御分りであります。これは骨下

並に其余の我友邦諸国中々に認められた事であると思ひます。若し、それが開

落したならば日本は總てる警戒を拾去り全勢力を他の地點に向けた事が出

るでありませ。故に之づくある門下は単に中国一個の敗北の問題ではた

く太平の不和と保全の成否にあかはる問題であります。故に、欧州（ター

甲の成敗如何も篤く此処に在するといつても遠慮ではなひつつありませ

うに打降つ力長のあるなれを確信して居りますから、骨下に付して感嘆するに

はしないでせう。然し我々は中日に於する日本側の屈圧にを目すべき空港

呼びざるを得は何等やるでないのであります。日本側は彼等の長足に立派を強
もし日本軍の兵力を用いてくると、それは生死の問題となります。もし戦争が続ければ私たちは必死に努力を続けることでしょう。軍の力を使うことが必要であるとされているのです。もし日本軍が用いるなら、それは私たちは必死に努力を続けることでしょう。軍の力を使うことが必要であるとされているのです。

しかし、日本の軍の力は、我々が考えていたよりも遠いもので、我々はそのことを認識しなければなりません。もし日本軍が用いるなら、それは私たちは必死に努力を続けることでしょう。軍の力を使うことが必要であるとされているのです。

我々は、日本の軍の力を使うことが必要であるとされているのです。しかし、我々はそのことを認識しなければなりません。もし日本軍が用いるなら、それは私たちは必死に努力を続けることでしょう。軍の力を使うことが必要であるとされているのです。
小さいのでありきである。彼らの唯一の魅力は、彼らに在るイギリス空軍がアメリカの協力を得て行動を起こし、アメリカの足元で、日本空軍の一部として協力するかどうか。その場合、それは日本の物的で尖った大空洞を救うための役割を果たすであろうとの考え方は出来得るであろう。けれども、その場合、中日は中日空軍の一部として協力する必要がある。
陸路よりシラガスベル及びビルマに接近する我が軍が防ぎ得るか否かは、
今やかくつつも、南戦解に両するイギリス、並にアメリカの軍力如何に依存
してあるのもからす。我々は現に我々が対敵を破壊する為
に、我々の間の是経算の遠利の全経算に新しく方針に与える、如何に
東南洋の我々の為になり紡紡を望むか否かを望む人々に
及ぼす、我々の全心を懸して改訳
模真に」とき決定的貢献性を為さんるものと考へてあるべくあると主張するであると
Info し戴いのであります。し、我々は、我々は、我々は、我々
模真に」とき決定的貢献性を為さんるものと考へてあるべくあると主張するであると
模真に」とき決定的貢献性を為さんるものと考へてあるべくあると主張するであると
模真に」とき決定的貢献性を為さんるものと考へてあるべくあると主張するであると
模真に」とき決定的貢献性を為さんるものと考へてあるべくあると主張するであると
模真に」とき決定的貢献性を為さんるものと考へてあるべくあると主張するであると
模真に」とき決定的貢献性を為さんるものと考へてあるべくあると主張するであると
模真に」とき決定的貢献性を為さんるものと考へてあるべくあると主張するであると
模真に」とき決定的貢献性を為さんのも
現実の部は、会議を設て、アピールし、アメリカに在る白人（アメリカ人の部）は会議を設て、表立って支持しないが、日本は我々に負担させる別に見ず、日本に有利な事態を成立させれば、我々はこれを支持するという態度をとっているのであります。何よりも、我々の立場を Southwest に譲って来るならば、我々は、多分、何れに余り合同、協力の名の下、台湾に存在を認めさせんとするか、他の事態に発展させ、湯突に日本が遠縁的かつ個人別に設けて、日本に有利な事態を生じさせるものであります。}

[署名]
張介石
（署名）
参加することにあらためて居ります

馬下元長がロンドンに発をされられてゐる而米国大使が出でゐるもの

昭和18年10月17日

日米の進む止める事が出るでありますかと思うれも居ります。
昭和元年十月二十八日

第一号

宛

先ず陸軍長官及び陸軍長官の部下の皆様,

一九四一年十月二十八日 午後二時四十二分

伴い我々の話を欠いたため前日になられた大変劇に、今日再度申しました。香信並に

友談交換の後後は、陸軍長官の部下の皆様を訪問するにあたり、私は武器の各法による物資

並に兵力の役割を有効にしむべき方法に関する自己の分の各法の役割を話し

示唆し我々陸軍長官からのように協力し得ることを述べました。それには武器装備の各法を

陸軍長官の部下の皆様及び陸軍長官の

防給団所装備に関する調査及び維持等を

10
攻撃されたならば、敵の兵力をまじえて英を攻撃する保険をとっただけに、一発の攻撃をした保険は出たものと考える。英間かいが、おおまかに、

空の役割をする保険は出たものと考える。

私は、この分間の先立って Chengの長官に真偽を知らしめたが、彼はこの時から、一発の攻撃をした保険は出たものと考える。
Letter from Admiral C. C. Bloch via Admiral Richardson to Admiral Stark - 30 December 1940.

OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U.S.A.

30 Dec. 1940

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Via: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet...

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

References: (a) Opnav dispatch 092135 of October 1940.
(b) Opnav dispatch 182128 of October 1940.
(c) Chief of Naval Operations' personal letter addressed to CINCUS dated 22 November 1940 (copy sent to Com 14).
(d) Com 14 dispatch 150055 of October 1940.
(e) Com 14 dispatch 220230 of October 1940.

1. In view of the inquiries contained in references (a), (b) and (c), I consider it desirable to write this letter to set forth the present ability of the Fourteenth Naval District to meet surprise hostile attacks of an enemy with the equipment and forces at hand.

2. AIRCRAFT RAIDS.

Aircraft attacking the base at Pearl Harbor will undoubtedly be brought by carriers. Therefore, there are two ways of repelling attack. First, by locating and destroying the carrier prior to launching planes. Second, by driving off attacking bombers with anti-aircraft guns and fighters. The Navy component of the local defense forces has no planes for distant reconnaissance with which to locate enemy carriers and the only planes belonging to the local defense forces to attack carriers when located would be the Army bombers. The Army has in the Hawaiian area fifty-nine B-18 bombers. All of these are classified as being obsolete. The model is six years old and the planes themselves are five years old. Therefore, it is my opinion that neither numbers nor types are satisfactory for the purpose intended. New bombing planes are expected sometime in the future. However, not before July 1941. For distant reconnaissance, requisition would have to be made on the forces afloat for such as could be spared by the Fleet.

To drive off bombing planes after they have been launched will require both fighting planes and anti-aircraft guns. The Army has in the Hawaiian area thirty-six pursuit planes, all of which are classified as obsolete. Some of them are six years old and some of them are four years old. In numbers and models, there is a serious deficiency existing. New fighters are expected when the P-40...
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U.S.A.

CONFIDENTIAL 30 Dec. 1940

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

is in production to the extent that the 185 projected for Hawaii can be delivered. This does not appear to be probable before the end of 1941; this number does not appear adequate.

The Army is charged with the protection of the Pearl Harbor base by anti-aircraft guns. There are in Hawaii twenty-six fixed 3-inch guns and forty-four mobile 3-inch guns. There are projected twenty-four more, to be delivered in 1941. There are no 37-millimeter and only 109 .50 caliber out of the projected 120 37-millimeter and 306 .50 caliber machine guns. The Army plans to place the greater part of the 3-inch guns around Pearl Harbor and only a few near other military objectives. In my opinion, it will be necessary to increase the numbers of guns around Pearl Harbor greatly to have any semblance of anti-aircraft defense. Furthermore, I express my doubt as to the efficiency of a 3-inch gun with a 21-second fuse for driving off high altitude bombers. The Army has made no plans for the anti-aircraft defense of Lualualei or Kaneohe; furthermore, it will be necessary to have a considerable concentration of anti-aircraft guns to defend the shipping terminals and harbor of Honolulu in order that lines of communication may be kept open. With a limited knowledge of the density of anti-aircraft barrages abroad, I am of the opinion that at least 500 guns of adequate size and range will be required for the efficient defense of the Hawaiian area. This number is in addition to 37-millimeter and .50 caliber machine guns.

In addition to the above, the Army has planned an aircraft warning service which will consist of eight Radar stations. Three of these stations are fixed and five are mobile. When completed at an indefinite time in the future, this warning net should be adequate.

3. DEFENSE AGAINST SUBMARINES.

The ideal defense against submarines would be conducted by patrol vessels and aircraft working in conjunction. The district has no aircraft for this purpose. Recently, there have arrived here three vessels of Destroyer Division EIGHTY which is assigned to the local defense forces. These vessels have listening gear and, when repaired and ready for service, will be a valuable contribution for anti-submarine and escort work. A large number of patrol vessels will be required for anti-submarine work in the vicinity of Oahu and the other islands. At present, the district has none and request would have to be made on the Fleet for such vessels and planes as could be spared for this most important work. No anti-submarine nets are planned, nor are any considered desirable. Anti-torpedo nets are projected for the
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDEANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT
AND
Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U.S.A.

CONFIDENTIAL 30 Dec. 1940

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

entrances of Honolulu and Pearl Harbor. They will probably be delivered about 1 March 1941. The net depot will be completed somewhat later.

4. DEFENSE AGAINST MINES.

The district has recently built and equipped one sweep barge and three tugs are being equipped for towing and energizing the coil. This barge can probably look out for Honolulu and Pearl Harbor until such time as it is seriously injured. The district has no vessels available for use as sweeps for anchored mines. A number of mine sweepers are being built or purchased, but their delivery dates here are uncertain. A large number of sweepers will be required in order to keep the harbors of Pearl Harbor, Honolulu and Kamehameha clear and, in addition, Hilo on Hawai‘i, Kahului and Lahaina on Maui, and Port Allen and Nawiliwili on Kaua‘i. With the delivery of sweepers now being built or purchased, the general situation will be improved measurably.

5. DEFENSE AGAINST BOMBARDMENT.

The coast defenses of the Army are considered adequate except that Kane‘ohe receives very little protection from the batteries.

6. SABOTAGE.

There are two tank farms, the upper and the lower. The lower is entirely contained in the government reservation and, by the use of roving patrols, is considered reasonably secure. The upper farm is adjacent to a public highway. The farm is surrounded by an unclimable fence and each tank with an earth barn. Its chief exposure is along the highway. To counteract this, three elevated sentry stations have been erected, each equipped with searchlights. This enables sentries to keep a continuous lookout over the entire fence line day and night; the upper farm is considered fairly secure.

7. WATER AND ELECTRICITY SUPPLY.

Recently, a guard house has been erected and an arrangement has been made, the Marines alternating with the Army, for constant guard on the water supply.

A constant guard is kept on the electric supply lines through which outside power is received.
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDANT
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT

Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, U.S.A.

CONFIDENTIAL

Subject: Situation Concerning the Security of the Fleet and the Present Ability of the Local Defense Forces to Meet Surprise Attacks.

8. An elaborate system of photographic passes, search and examination is in effect. There are over 5,000 Civil Service employees who come into the yard each day. In addition, there are about 5,000 employees of civilian contractors and several thousand enlisted men. In addition to the above, there is a constant stream of trucks and vehicles of all descriptions carrying supplies, stores, etc. It is impossible to maintain absolute security without disruption of the work of the yard. However, surprise searches and periodic stops, etc., are in effect in order that the alert may be emphasized. The main gate has been strengthened to prevent running; there have been two drills for the purpose of giving surprise training to the yard garrison in the event of a surprise riot in the yard. In addition to the above, a survey has been made not only of the yard but of all of the Belleville stations, and every effort is being made to close holes and stop gaps. While the Commandant is not satisfied, he feels that the precautions taken are reasonably effective but that they are susceptible to improvement, which will be made as occasion warrants.

9. It should be borne in mind that until comparatively recently none of us in this country had very much conception of what measures were necessary and what provisions were desirable in order to effect any measure of protection against aircraft, against submarines, against mines and against subversive elements. The officers and men of this command have been alert, zealous and vigilant in executing all measures under their control in order to properly prepare the district for any exigencies.

10. It should be assumed that the War Department is fully aware of the situation here and that they are proceeding vigorously with a view to overcoming deficiencies. It may be that they have failed to recognize the necessity for large numbers of anti-aircraft guns and pursuit planes. I suggest that the Chief of Naval Operations make inquiry from the War Department as to what their plans are and on what dates they predict that they will be accomplished and then, if the numbers and dates are not satisfactory, these features may be discussed at length.

11. It is considered highly undesirable from my point of view that the War Department should in any way come to believe that there is lack of agreement between the Army authorities and Navy authorities here, or that the officials of the Fourteenth Naval District are pressing the Navy Department to do something in regard to Army matters.

C. C. BLOCH
昭和十五年十月初日

研究

当捕獲に努力を以て敵の真性を示す

前を進めて答えることは不妙とする

に依って是べるとは皆官と思つさせる

では非ければ

はし来れる爆撃の原因を示す方法で

べき八勢肝内之箇を示す方法で

地方防府内之箇は彼方の爆撃の

ならば

いまはハワイ地域に於ても

はハワイは五八戦を有するもこれれば

の為に

前は元前のものであり

もののは五年前のものである。彼

の為に
小官は予期目的の為に改修を於て昭和十六年七月以降に於ても多見せるもののため、昭和十六年七月以降は改修を於て昭和十六年七月以降に於ても多見せるものにあらずと思考せられる。従来於ては昭和十六年七月以降に於て多見せるもののため、昭和十六年七月以降は改修を於て昭和十六年七月以降に於ても多見せるものにあらずと思考せられる。
の三七軽機関砲、二〇〇門半インチ砲、三〇〇門の大砲の中三七軽機関砲は最も無効、半インチ砲は僅かに一〇九門である。砲兵は於て数大部の三
インチ砲を毎時約四万発を毎分に、少々を他の占領目的の警備に配慮する
ように計画して居るが、小官の意見としては荷しりくも防築を想する
に於て適当な周辺の砲の配置は非常に重要である。砲兵の部隊は
今後の進展に伴い対空、対地上の防築を想定するためにより多数
インチ砲の効果である。砲兵はアルフレイアタンポニーの防空
ノル、及び荷地に於ける増設を防衛する高射砲を現在に於て充
分に行っている。砲兵は急務の防空、対地上の配置を想定する必要あり
小官としてはハワイ地区に於ける充分な防築を計画する必要あり
の観念なる口述、射程距離の長さを必要とするより充分に荷しりく
の目的を見ると、現に荷しりくに於て三
七軽機関砲等の半インチ砲の配置を行なきることを求めるものである。
上記の外我兵に於ては電撃見掛を、八館所に配置せる防空警備
及び八館所の中三七砲は完全なる防空警備を求めるものである。
四、

地区に於ては最近捜海用曳鉄一隻と之にコイルを索引装置させ
れに三隻の曳鉄を装えがこの捜海船は甚しき捜海を為すホノ
ルル及深珠蔵の捜海の任に堪えるであろう。此地に於て

捜海を行うには多隻の捜海船を必要とする。現在ハワイ業及

他ハワイ島のアレン湾及ニウイリウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハワイ島のヒロ・マウイ島の

カフルイ・ラハイナ・カウエイ島のアフレット及

他ハバイ
六、汚染行動防止

上方及び下方にタンクを設置した所と二箇所あるが下方の箇所は全く

政府の指定保留地に入って居り、事態発生に際しては自らの

責任を負うものと考える。

上方のタンクを設置した箇所は主に装備所に入れてあるが、このタンクには土塀の小屋が設けてある。この箇所は主に装備所に入れてあるが、この箇所には土塀の小屋が設けてある。この箇所は主に装備所に入れてあるが、この箇所には土塀の小屋が設けてある。この箇所は主に装備所に入れてあるが、この箇所には土塀の小屋が設けてある。この箇所は主に装備所に入れてあるが、この箇所には土塀の小屋が設けてある。この箇所は主に装備所に入れてあるが、この箇所には土塀の小屋が設けてある。この箇所は主に装備所に入れてあるが、この箇所には土塀の小屋が設けてある。この箇所は主に装備所に入れてあるが、この箇所には土塀の小屋が設けてある。この箇所は主に装備所に入れてあるが、この箇所には土塀の小屋が設けてある。この箇所は主に装備所に入れてあるが、この箇所には土塀の小屋が設けてある。この箇所は主に装備所に入れてあるが、この箇所には土塀の小屋が設けてある。この箇所は主に装備所に入れてあるが、この箇所には土塀の小屋が設けてある。
八、前記を踏まえた通行状を使用し、各出入口及び所定の順を守るか。
ヘロヘロ #1500 W - 1
(21) 7 December 1941 from Marshall to Short. Subject: Japanese ultimatum.

Secret

1549WS Washington DC 74/73 RCA USG ETAT 7 1218P.

C G

Hawn Dept Ft. Shafter, T.H.

529 7th Japanese are presenting at one pm eastern standard time today what amounts to an ultimatum also they are under orders to destroy their code machine immediately stop just what significance the hour set may have we do not know but be on alert accordingly stop inform naval authorities of this communication

MARSHALL.

(Page 1334 - Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Ret Chinese Aircraft Program

In connection with your consideration of the tentative aircraft program for China which I submitted yesterday, you may find the attached documents of some interest. The one without a title was prepared by the Chinese Mission here and the other was written by Dr. Hornbeck.

/1/ LAUCHLIN CURRIE

/2/ Lauchlin Currie

Singapore is the key to the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean. Its position determines the control of eastern Asia regardless of the fact of the Philippines. All steps taken so far by Japan indicate their intention to prepare for a move against Singapore.

One may assume that although Singapore is well fortified, small British land, sea, and air forces there are likely to find it difficult to sustain for long the full impact of the Japanese fleet, air, and land forces unless outside assistance be given.

The recent Soviet-Japanese pact has enabled Japan to release at least ten crack divisions and some five hundred first line planes now in Manchuria for operation in other theaters of war.

Singapore could be saved by active intervention of the entire United States fleet with its attendant dangers and complications.

There is, however, a powerful means to check Japanese attack on Singapore and the South Seas or to assist in the effective defense of the beleaguered key fortress, without the intervention of the United States fleet, and that is the creation of a small but efficient air force in China.

This force would constitute a threat to the flank of a Japanese advance southward. Every Japanese move, concentrations on Formosa or Hainan, convey of transports into China, Siam, or further west, transport of troops across Indo-China, and above all, Japanese air concentrations in Tonkin and Cochin China would be watched systematically, but more important, exposed to constant attack and diversion.

The configuration of southeastern Asia exposes Japan to such action on the part of an efficient hostile air force. Such a force located between the Burma frontier and the province of Kweichow, mostly on high plateaus, has only to cover some 350 miles to reach the Japanese air concentrations at Hanoi, where hundreds of planes are crowding the few
Defence Document No. 1500-W-4

Airports which the topography of the country permits to utilize. Further it would interfere with Japanese military transports and troop concentration on Formosa, Hainan, Paracels Island, which are all within easy range. The force could as easily attack concentrations of Japanese planes, troops, and shipping in southern Indo-China and Siam.

The Japanese are sprawled all over China and the existence of this air force would enable the main body of the Chinese regular armies to undertake counter-offensive operations with good assurance of success, which they cannot do at present until supplied with the requisite air arm. The Japanese armies in central China depend exclusively for their supplies on the long and winding Irrawaddy, which provides an ideal target for an air force operating on interior lines. With the initial strength of the new air force the Chinese troops could launch counter-attacks, the main purpose of which would be not only to hold existing Japanese forces in China but to cause the continuous dispatch of strong reinforcements.

Finally, the main industrial areas within Japan, the triangle Kobe, Kyoto, Osaka, as well as Yokohama and Tokyo, could be attacked by bombers operating from existing air fields in China.

(2) All the above objectives can be achieved efficiently and successfully by a force of 500 planes composed of 350 pursuit and 150 bombers. The existing lines of communication from ports of entry from the west permit to supply and maintain in the field such a force, and would be doubly assured if urgently supplemented by some 35 transport planes of the DC-3 type. The American-operated China National Airways Corporation estimate that this would give an additional capacity of 4,000 tons monthly from the rail head in Burma and over the most difficult section of the Burma highway.

The full strength of 500 planes could be reached by three stages.

The first stage, when the 100 P-40fs now on the water reach China and the pilots and ground crews now volunteering for service are already in the field, in July the force of pursuits could begin protecting the ways of access to China and particularly the Burma highway.

Second stage, a force ready to operate in September and composed of 200 pursuits and 100 bombers could be constituted if immediate decision were taken and intensive preparations were made to supply an additional 100 pursuits and 100 bombers to be shipped during the month of May.

Third stage, by the first of November a full force of 500 craft would be ready to operate by shipment in June and July of 150 pursuits and 50 bombers. In addition, replacements at the rate of 15 percent would have to be provided.

The gradual development of the operations would by then permit the full force to attack all the objectives at the end of the rainy season. From the first of November there is six months of clear weather over Burma and Yunnan, permitting extensive operations. Thus preparatory work would be accomplished under the cover of bad weather and the force would be ready to operate at the best season, provided immediate decision and requisite practical steps are taken, which would imply certain diversions of planes, equipment, and personnel, and concentrated preparation (including the question of shipping.)

Permission has already been obtained to recruit pilots and ground crews for the P-40fs already on the way. If permission is given to
Defense Document No. 1500-W-4

recruit an additional 150 pilots and 300 technical men for ground crews, the personnel of the force could be in the field by the end of July. There are 1,200 Chinese pilots and a large number of ground crews available in China; one third experienced, one-third with fighting experience, and the remainder requiring more training, and the existence of this renders it possible to limit the number of the foreign members of the force.

With this personnel and aircraft in operation this autumn, not only the determined Japanese move toward the south could be prevented or rendered difficult, but should this move materialize, vitally effective assistance would be afforded to the defenders of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies by constant attacks in the rear of the enemy forces.

To sum up:

Effective air operations in China should follow a carefully planned program which includes the procurement, shipment, assembly, and operation of specified types of airplanes in order to attain prescribed tactical and strategic objectives.

(3) The general outline of such a program follows.

First Phase

Airplanes Required

1. 100 bombardment, modified Lockheed Hudson type.
2. 100 pursuit, P-40 type.
3. 100 pursuit, P-43 type.

Note: Of the above listed airplanes, 100 P-40's have been procured and are on route to China.

Volunteer Personnel

1. 100 pilots.
2. 160 technical and clerical.

Note: These men are now being employed.

Tactical Objectives

1. Defense of our bases, Burma highway, supplies in transit and in storage in Yunnan province and industrial establishments in vicinity of Kunming, Yunnan, by:
   a. Local operation of pursuit airplanes.
   b. Counter-offensive operations of bombardment airplanes.

Strategic Objectives

To force the Japanese to divert a portion of their air force now available for conditionary use to the defense of his bases in Indo-China and counter-offensive operations in Yunnan province.

Time Schedule

1. The 100 pursuit airplanes, P-40 type, may begin initial operations early in July, 1941.
Defense Document No. 1500-W-4

2. The 100 bombardment airplanes, Lockheed Hudson type, and 100 pursuit airplanes, P-43 type, may begin operations early in September if the airplanes of both classes are made available without delay.

Second Phase

Airplanes Required:

1. Maintenance of initial strength of:
   a. 100 pursuit, P-40 type;
   b. 100 pursuit, P-43 type;
   c. 100 bombardment, Lockheed Hudson type, by regular monthly replacement of losses.

2. Provision of additional airplanes of following classes, types, and numbers:
   a. 100 pursuit, P-40 or P-47;
   b. 50 pursuit, P-39;
   c. 50 bombardment, Lockheed Hudson, B-26 or B-29.

(4) Volunteer Personnel:

1. Increase volunteer personnel as follows:
   a. Pilots, 150 additional;
   b. Technical, clerical, 250 additional.

Tactical Objectives:

1. Defense of all establishments in Yunnan province.
3. Attack Japanese supply dumps in Indo-China and Hainan Island.
4. Attack Japanese supply vessels, transports, tankers, and small naval vessels in harbors of Indo-China and Hainan Island and at sea between those places.
5. Occasional raids on Japanese industrial establishments in Japan.
7. Support of offensive operations of Chinese armies.

Strategical Objectives:

1. Force diversion of considerable portion of available Japanese air force to defense of Japanese establishments on South China coast and in Japan and to counter-offensive operations in interior of China.
2. Enable Chinese armies to assume operations which will make necessary heavy reinforcement of Japanese troops in China.
3. Destruction of Japanese supplies and supply ships in order to handicap operations of an expeditionary force to the south of Indo-China.
4. Destruction of Japanese factories in order to cripple production of munitions and essential articles for maintenance of economic structure in Japan.

Time Schedule:

1. The increase of the air force from 300 to 500 airplanes (150 pursuit and 150 bombardment) should be completed by October 31, 1941.

When the railway between the Burma Road and Siang Yun is completed, and
this could be effected by June, 1942, sufficient carrying capacity would be amply provided for the maintenance in the field of 1,000 combat planes, or indeed any strength it is desired to build up to.

Table of approximate distances in statute miles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City</th>
<th>Chuchow</th>
<th>Hangchow</th>
<th>Kanchow</th>
<th>Kian</th>
<th>Manila</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nagasaki</td>
<td>730</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>1,460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobe</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>1,485</td>
<td>1,410</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Osaka</td>
<td>1,085</td>
<td>1,510</td>
<td>1,435</td>
<td>1,385</td>
<td>1,780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td>1,355</td>
<td>1,780</td>
<td>1,690</td>
<td>1,645</td>
<td>2,010</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

December 4, 1940
Revised April 23, 1941

The importance of Singapore to the defense of the British Isles and the British Empire and to the interests of the United States.

4. Singapore is, furthermore, important from point of view of more obviously direct interests of the United States. Were Singapore to fall, the blockade of China (except for the inadequate and unreliable northwest route from Russia) could be made complete and the defeat of China by Japan would be facilitated. The control over the natural resources of the South Seas area which Japan would acquire if it took Singapore has already been indicated. Our own position in the Philippines—a far more valuable possession both economically and strategically than is usually recognized—would, of course, be strategically prejudiced.

It is in its effect upon China's resistance, however, that the fall of Singapore to Japan would most conclusively affect (adversely) the direct interests of the United States (other than and in addition to our interest in survival of the British Empire). Were China to succumb we would be less able than now to protect our interests in the Far East. Our historic Far Eastern policy and our whole position in the Far East would be seriously compromised. Not the least of the disastrous results of China's defeat would be a serious drop, as a result of such a blow to our prestige, in popular morale in this country and in the hearts of the peoples of South America. The only remaining counterweights to the power and influence in the Far East of Japan would be those of Russia. With the collapse of China, Japan would be master in East Asia and in the South Seas, and Japan would be able to draw freely upon China's natural resources and manpower. The security of Australia and New Zealand—to both of which we are bound by increasingly strong ties—would be endangered. In addition, Japan's access to the great economic resources of India would be definitely facilitated and Japanese political influence in India would increase.

The increase in Japan's strength vis-a-vis the United States which would result from these various developments would be notable, and Japan's ability to challenge our economic (and before long our political) position in Central and South America would be vastly increased. At the same time, our general commercial and strategic position would be considerably weakened—by our loss of much of the Japanese market for our goods, as Japan would become more and more self-sufficient—as well as by inevitable restrictions upon our access to the rubber, tin, quinine, jute, tungsten, tung oil and other vital materials of the Asian and Oceanic regions.
5. It has been suggested that Japan would be only too glad to sell to the British and to us the products of the region, and that in fact, therefore, our (and the British) economic situation would not be adversely affected. The fate of British and American trade in Manchuria and in North China is persuasive evidence that our (and British) export trade would certainly suffer. Whether Japan's ability to dictate the terms upon which we could acquire rubber, tin, and other products would also prove harmful to us in times of peace need not concern us. The present and the immediate future are times of war, and in the war that is coming not only is Japan an open if non-belligerent partner of Germany and its allies, but the United States is openly aiding Great Britain and China. (7) Japan must — while and so long as she is an ally of Germany — aid Germany in the latter's attempt to destroy the British Empire, and toward that end Japan must give support to Germany's attempts to hamstring the British in their operations — both general and particular — of resistance. Consequently, were Japan to acquire control of Singapore (i.e., control of the key ways to the vast natural resources of Asia and the South Seas) it could not with any warrant be expected that she would freely sell to the British or to us — we being Britain's greatest armorer and supplier — what we severally and jointly need (with our expanding requirements) of the strategic materials of the Orient.

6. There is little or any warrant for the view, rather lightly advanced in various quarters (and made without consideration of the above-enumerated reasons why successful Japanese aggression southward would make Germany's defeat less likely), that, if and when Germany shall have been defeated, it would be an easy matter for Great Britain and/or the United States to put Japan out of any advanced positions which she may or might have taken while British and American attention and efforts were concentrated upon problems in the Atlantic and in Europe. Were the Japanese during the present war to occupy Singapore, without having had to pay a huge (8) price, the Japanese Empire would be at the end of the war a very different entity from that which it is today, an entity much more powerful in a military sense than it is now. If there any warrant for an assumption that at that point the British would be so powerful that they would and could move with success against such a Japan as would then exist? It may well be doubted, also, whether the people of the United States would at that point be willing to embark upon far-flung overseas operations for the mere purpose of driving the Japanese out of points in which they had established themselves on the western side of the Pacific.

TELEGRAM TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES FROM GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK, CHUNOKING, JULY 31, 1941.

My dear Mr. President: I am most grateful to you for having acceded to my request to place all Chinese assets under freezing control. This is additional evidence of your desire to assist China in every possible way, and is appreciated by the Chinese people in that spirit.
I am sure that the action of your Government in freezing all Japanese assets will prove an important body blow to the aggressor.

The Chinese Government is sincerely grateful to you and your Government for having brought about concerted action, on both these measures, by practically all the friendly powers who are fighting aggression.

I am confident that my other requests which I have made to you in the interest of strengthening China's fighting power and meeting the emergency situation of the Far East, will receive your kind attention at the convenient time.

/S/ CHIANG KAI-SHEK

THESE EXCERPTS ARE FROM PART 19 - JOINT COMMITTEE EXHIBITS NOS. 157 THROUGH 172 - HEARINGS BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES - PAGES 3489, 3490, 3491, 3492, 3493, 3494 and 3501.
日本の飛行機、特にアンテループ東南アジアの航空基地への配置は、重要な役割を果たす。また、日本の航空基地は東南アジアの航空基地への航空機の配置に影響を及ぼす。

この配置は、日本の航空基地は東南アジアの航空基地への航空機の配置に影響を及ぼす。また、日本の航空基地は東南アジアの航空基地への航空機の配置に影響を及ぼす。
は二道に保護される事となる。アメリカ経営の支那華民航空会社は次
の様な対策を行ってある。〜右の状況によってピルマールトの
裏にビルマールトの数も困難な地域の上空を〜六月限〜〇〇前の
緊急の必要に応じて〜〇近の飛行
と同様の通路を確保する為に周密な準備が進められて〜六月上旬に
〜六月に〜毎の飛行
が開始される。〜六月下旬に〜丸
 Ricky No. 1500 4-4

五〇〇様の全勢力を集中するには左の三段違いによって達する事が
可課である。

第三期
六月～七月にかけて〜五〇〇様の通路を〜五〇〇前の緊急の必要に応じて〜〇近の飛行
が開始される。〜六月下旬に〜丸
 Ricky No. 1500 4-4
ベトナム戦役

１．ベトナム戦役

一九四四年四月二十三日放送

東大戦長

１．一六四八

２．一五三四

３．一三八五

四．一三六四

五．一三三八

六．一三一八

七．一二九八

八．一二八八

九．一二七八

十．一二六八

十一．一二五八

十二．一二四八

十三．一二三八

十四．一二二八

十五．一二一八

十六．一二〇八

十七．一一双八

十八．一三三八

十九．一三五八

二十．一三七八

一九四〇年十二月四日
非対称的アサルンの力として残るものは唯ロシアのみとならざるをえん。非対称的アサルンの力として残るものは唯ロシアのみとならざるをえん。非対称的アサルンの力として残るものは唯ロシアのみとならざるをえん。非対称的アサルンの力として残るものは唯ロシアのみとならざるをえん。非対称的アサルンの力として残るものは唯ロシアのみとならざるをえん。非対称的アサルンの力として残るものは唯ロシアのみとならざるをえん。非対称的アサルンの力として残るものは唯ロシアのみとならざるをえん。非対称的アサルンの力として残るものは唯ロシアのみとならざるをえん。非対称的アサルンの力として残るものは唯ロシアのみとならざるをえん。非対称的アサルンの力として残るものは唯ロシアのみとならざるをえん。非対称的アサルンの力として残るものは唯ロシアのみとならざるを
力こを自由に利用することが出来るでうる。合衆国はオーストラリアを
ニーニャランドと念々強く結ばれてあるが両国が安全性の問題に際しての
力こを自由に利用することが出来るでうる。合衆国はオーストラリアを
ニーニャランドと念々強く結ばれてあるが両国が安全性の問題に際しての

これらは戦後日本が東アジアに近づくことや有利になると見られ
これらの多発地に復帰するアメリカの動向が増加すると考える

でなく合衆国がアジア並に大衆の地に於ける日本への影響力は

グスタン・国際他の紛争物を促進することができるだけ

である

1 1 1 丸

1 1 1
日本の経済的及ぶ国際的立場として、日本はドイツの同盟国であるために、戦時において重要な資源を供給する必要がある。このため、日本は戦時において資源の確保に努める必要がある。その結果として、日本は資源の確保に努めることが求められる。とくに、資源の確保に努めるためには、資源の供給源を確保することが求められる。これにより、日本の経済的及び国際的立場が維持される。
本文は日本語で、具体的な文脈や内容が不明瞭なため、詳細な解釈は困難です。文書の内容は戦時中の日本政府の決断や戦略に関するものであるが、その詳細は把握できません。
総領庁の電報
（昭和六年一月三十一日開局）

震災に於て米国人民の耐力を見たものはあります。そして米国の
事情に於て中華人民の耐力を見たものはあります。
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
25 January 1941.

From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations.
Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

References: (a) Opnav secret despatch 212155 of January, 1941.
(b) Opnav memorandum for Secnav Op-12-CTB of November 12, 1940.

1. Reference (a) was received by the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Fleet, one day prior to the arrival of Commander McCrea at Pearl Harbor en route to the Navy Department. It is considered desirable to take advantage of his return to inform the Chief of Naval Operations of the views of the Commander-in-Chief as to the new situation.

2. In view of reference (a) and some degree of urgency implied therein, it is considered that study of the new situation and the preparation of plans therefor should take priority over the preparation of plans for Rainbow No. 3. Unless advice to the contrary is received, this will be done.

3. The new situation, as visualized by the Commander-in-Chief, alters the assumptions and concepts of Rainbow No. 3, principally in that the major offensive effort of the United States is to be exerted in the Atlantic, rather than in the Pacific, and in that a "waiting attitude" will be taken in the Pacific, pending a determination of Japan's intentions. If Japan enters the war or commits an overt act against United States' interests or territory, our attitude in the Pacific will be primarily defensive, but opportunities will be seized to damage Japan as situations present themselves or can be created.

4. Under the foregoing general conception, it is deemed desirable to outline as briefly as possible, certain tentative assumptions, upon which the actions of the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will be predicated. These are:

(a) The United States is at war with Germany and Italy.

(b) War with Japan is imminent.

(c) Units of the Pacific Fleet may be detached to the Atlantic on short notice. The numbers and types of these units are at present unknown.

(d) At least three German raiders are in the Pacific.
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
25 January 1941.

CinC File No. UNITED STATES FLEET SECRET
A16/0129 U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship

Pearl Harbor, T. H.
January 25, 1941

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

(e) Japan may attack without warning, and these attacks may take any form — even to attacks by Japanese ships flying German or Italian flags or by submarines, under a doubtful presumption that they may be considered German or Italian.

(f) Japanese attacks may be expected against shipping, outlying possessions or naval units. Surprise raids on Pearl Harbor, or attempts to block the channel, are possible.

(g) Local sabotage is possible.

5. Under the foregoing assumptions, the U. S. Fleet in the Pacific will assume the tasks listed below. Where deemed appropriate, measures to be taken under the tasks will be included.

Waiting Attitude

(1) Take full security measures for the protection of Fleet units, at sea and in port.

In the performance of this task, the Fleet is severely handicapped by the existence of certain marked deficiencies in the existing local defense forces and equipment both Army and Navy. These deficiencies will be set forth in detail later, but are mentioned here in order that certain measures listed below may be more clearly understood.

At present, the following measures, among others, will be required to accomplish the above task:

(a) Expand patrol plane search to the maximum, reinforcing Patrol Wing Two with units from Patrol Wing One.

(b) Establish inner air patrol over Pearl and Honolulu Harbor entrances and approaches, augmenting Army planes with naval and marine planes as necessary.

(c) Arrange for alertness of a striking force of Army bombers and pursuit planes; supplemented by available Navy or Marine planes.

(d) Augment Army A.A. defenses with A.A. batteries of Fleet units in Pearl Harbor.
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
25 January 1941.

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG

(2) Keep vessels of all types in constant readiness for distant service.

(3) Assist in local defense of the Fourteenth Naval District.

   This task will require augmentation of District forces by the assignment of Fleet units until suitable vessels, including those of the Coast Guard, become available to the Commandant.

(4) Protect United States' shipping. This will require the following:

   (a) Provide escort for important ships.

   (b) Route allied and United States' shipping in the Fleet Control Zone.

   (c) Base cruisers on Samoa to cover shipping in the South Seas.

   (d) Dispatch the Southeastern Pacific Force.

   (e) Establish escort and patrol group between Hawaii and the West Coast.

   (f) Maintain striking group to operate against raiders (search for raiders might afford opportunity to reconnoiter the Marshall Islands without provoking Japan).

(5) Protection of outlying islands. This will require the following:

   (a) Establish defense battalions at Midway and Samoa and smaller units at Johnston, Wake, Palmyra and Canton.

   (b) Maintain submarine patrols at all the above-mentioned islands, except Samoa.

   (c) Dispatch two submarines, plus the ORTOLAN, for the defense of Unalaska.

(6) Adjust U. S. Fleet training to war conditions.

   Additional Measures if Japan Enters War

(7) Make initial sweep for Japanese merchantmen and raiders in the Northern Pacific.

(8) Establish submarine patrols in the Marshall Islands, withdrawing them from own outlying islands as necessary.
Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

(9) Make early reconnaissance in force of the Marshall Islands. Thereafter conduct a general surveillance of that area and make raids on forces, material installations, and communications therein.

(10) Make periodic sweeps toward the Marianas and Bonins.

6. It will, of course, be realized that the effectiveness with which the tasks set forth above can be prosecuted is dependent upon the forces available, especially after the withdrawal of the Atlantic reinforcement. If a carrier is to be included in the Atlantic reinforcement, one of the LEXINGTON class should be selected due to difficulties of handling in Pearl Harbor. There is, however, definite need for all four carriers under the tasks assigned this fleet.

7. In connection with the execution of the foregoing tasks, and with particular reference to the early initiation of offensive operations, it must be pointed out that the existing deficiencies in the defenses of Oahu and in the Local Defense Forces of the Fourteenth Naval District impose a heavy burden on the Fleet for purely defensive purposes. Ideally, a Fleet Base should afford refuge and rest for personnel as well as opportunity for maintenance and upkeep of material installations. When Fleet planes, Fleet guns and Fleet personnel are required to be constantly ready for defense of its own Base, the wear and tear on both men and material can not but result in impaired readiness for active operations at sea. The most outstanding deficiencies affecting this readiness of the Fleet are:

(a) The critical inadequacy of A.A. guns available for the defense of Pearl Harbor, necessitating constant manning of ships' A.A. guns while in port.

(b) The small number and obsolescent condition of land-based aircraft, necessitating constant readiness of striking groups of Fleet planes and use of Fleet planes for local patrols.

(c) Lack of suitable local defense vessels for the Fourteenth Naval District, necessitating detail of Fleet units to this duty. The detail of Fleet units to this duty not only results in loss, to the Fleet, of the availability of important vessels, but also results in the forced employment of ships whose more valuable characteristics will be largely wasted due to the nature of their tasks. This is particularly true where destroyers must be diverted to local A/S patrol, off-shore patrol and local escort. These duties could better be performed by submarine chasers, converted gunboats and converted escort vessels.
Letter from Admiral J. O. Richardson to Admiral H. R. Stark
25 January 1941.

CinC File No.  A16/0129

Subject: Chief of Naval Operations' Plan DOG.

(d) Lack of aircraft detection devices ashore.

8. It is considered imperative that immediate measures be undertaken to correct the critical deficiencies enumerated above. It is further believed that these measures should take priority over the needs of continental districts, the training program, and material aid to Great Britain.

9. It is recommended that the Alaskan and Hawaiian reinforcements referred to in paragraph 2103(a)(5) of W.P.L. 44 (advance copy) be despatched as soon as possible in order that necessity for heavy escort may not embarrass the U. S. Pacific Fleet in its later operations.

10. This letter has been prepared in collaboration with the prospective Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel, U. S. N. It represents his, as well as my own, views.

J. O. RICHARDSON

Copy to: Rear Admiral H. E. Kimmel
原文一頁

合衆国艦隊司令長官

ハワイ、パールハーバー
一九四一年、一月二十五日

参照資料
(a) 海軍作戦部長官御摺　九四〇年十一月十二日付
(b) 一九四〇年十一月十七日付

パーミスター日前、合衆国艦隊司令長官ニヨリ接受サラマンカ、役ノ請託

司令長官

スル見返り

作戦部長ニ依ベールコトガ望
(a) 合衆国ハ伊ト交戦状態ニアルコト。
(b) 頭目数ヲ急迫シ居ルコト。
(c) 太平洋艦隊所属ノ諸部隊ハ指示ヲ受けノ既ハ未ヲ知ヲ在ヲトコト不明。 HANDLE COPEC
(d) 仲間ノ伊ト奇襲ヲ西洋ニ派遣シ得レル

原文二頁

(a) 日本ハ無警デ攻撃スルヲ知レズ、且其攻撃ハ凡ユウ形態ヲ採ルモノ

イフ東ナイ進所ヲ下ニ従事或ハ伊ト南国著ヲ得ルルコト。

(b) 日本ノ攻撃ハ現ノ間ハ未ヲ指示ヲ与トル南部ハ海洋軍部隊ニ對シテナサレ

ルコトモ摩ヘラレバルハバークハ、或ハ水路封鎖ノ企図ヲ可能ナ

(c)局地的ヲ破壊シタル広キ、合衆国太平洋艦隊ハ下ヲ於キ任務ヲ執ラントスル

配
(a) 陸軍爆撃機及び陸上対空飛行弾丸二等対空砲部隊ノ実施ヲ禁止シ、利用可能ノ

(b) 海軍機及び海兵隊及びニヨリ補充スルコト。

① 撮報ノ対空防備チョルハープラニュケルハコトノ於ケル無防部隊ノ対空砲砲設チ以
原田四賢
一九四一年一月二十五日

副官長

昭和十六年一月二十五日

布職員

作陸部長


c

硝子

三・二

ナス外、同地域内ノ兵力ハ、搬載ヲ依フテ、対シテ定期ナル建設及通信施設等ヲ急務スルコト。
原注同图，图中显示内容为符号或标记，具体描述不可直接翻译。
兵力を派遣する必要があるとコスト。この任務は、次の任意兵力を派遣する部署

この影響のナレーション、余計な部署、統合スルコト、ナルノデアリマス。是レハ

派遣が適切、計画水道、海岸哨戒及び地方の設備ニ用サレバナ

ラス場合ニ待ニ事資アリマス。此故任者ハ簡易遠、假想遠及假想設

衛者＝彼ツクムニ遠行シル等アリマス。
第五頁

J. O.

スティーヴンソン

提督

H. M. S.

里海

一九四一年一月十五日

布隆

十六○一二九

合衆国艦隊提督合衆国軍艦ペンシルベニア號

主富

海軍作戰部長

D. G. 賓

秘

上記ノ航路ヲ不足ヲ修正スルタモノ

レルモデリマス。レルモデリノ後ノ要際ハ

対敵ノ援助ヲヨリノ優先ノニトレルペデリタ

トモリタノデリマス。

スカノルニ

四西

及ビハノ

ノ導雷艦ハ大規模護衛ヲ必要ガ其

将來ノ作戦ニ於テイ合衆国太平洋艦隊ヲ

支ヲタ及ボササルノヲ可及び遠方
Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37
BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(39) 2 December 1941 to OPNAV, Action: CINCAF.

(39) Top Secret

2 December 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: CINCAF
Info: 012356

(Paraphrase)

President directs that the following be done as soon as possible and within two days if possible after receipt this despatch. Charter 3 small vessels to form a "defensive information patrol". Minimum requirements to establish identity as U.S. men-of-war are command by a naval officer and to mount a small gun and 1 machine gun would suffice. Filipino crews may be employed with minimum number naval ratings to accomplish purpose which is to observe and report by radio Japanese movements in west China Sea and Gulf of Siam. One vessel to be stationed between Hainan and Hue one vessel off the Indo-China Coast between Camranh Bay and Crpe St. Jacques and one vessel off Pointe de Camau. Use of Isabel authorized by president as one of the three but not other naval vessels. Report measures taken to carry out presidents views. At same time inform me as to what reconnaissance measures are being regularly performed at sea by both army and navy whether by air surface vessels or submarines and your opinion as to the effectiveness of these latter measures.

(Page 1407, Volume 14 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
面して右手段の効果に関する意見を併せて内部ゆり Bhar

[Page: 3]
General MARSHALL. I do not believe that is quite what it was, Senator.

Senator FERGUSON. Will you explain it?

General MARSHALL. It was necessary, we felt, to have the ability to land, and gas, and arm the B-17's to the south of the Philippines for two reasons: One was in case we had to fly them in from Hawaii by that front, and the other one was that when you are operating strategical bombing planes of that type, their capacity is greatly increased for carrying bombs, and in range if they have some place they can shuttle to, and shuttle back from.

Therefore, we directed General MacArthur to take up with the governments concerned the proposition of preparing strips that would accommodate the B-17's and that he, General MacArthur, stock those strips with gasoline and bombs.

Senator FERGUSON. That was just anticipating, wasn't it, that if we got into any war we would be using these other bases, and we would be using the ABCD plan, the Singapore plan?

General MARSHALL. To that extent, yes, sir. The same thing is really covered in the ABC-1 and 2 plans.

Senator FERGUSON. Yes.

General MARSHALL. The point here was that the B-17's would be greatly restricted in what they did from the Philippines if they had no landing points other than in the Philippine Islands, and therefore, it was essential, in my opinion - and I think I personally directed this myself - that is my recollection - that those arrangements be made at Rabaul, Port Moresby, Port Darwin, Balikpapa (3293) Borneo and Singapore.

Senator FERGUSON. Do you know when that material was furnished to those places?

General MARSHALL. The records show, and I know this, the deliveries were made and efforts to develop the strips were under way at Rabaul, at Port Moresby and Port Darwin before the outbreak of the war. My recollection is, and the records will undoubtedly show, that the ship with the gasoline and bombs for Balikpapa, for Borneo and for Singapore, was just about to sail at the outbreak of the war.

.......

(Page 1251, Part 3 - "Pearl Harbor Attack")
Letter from Admiral H. R. Stark to Admiral J. O. Richardson
10 February 1941.

Op-12-CTB(SC)A16(R-3) Serial 014412

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, 10 February 1941.

Secret
From: The Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Chief of Naval Operations Plan D.
References: (r) Cinc, U. S. Pacific Fleet, secret ltr. A16/0129
of January 25, 1941.
(b) SecNav secret ltr. to SecWar, Serial 09112
of January 24, 1941.

1. Receipt is acknowledged of reference (r).
2. Since the plans to be prepared under the directives of WPL-44
will be applicable to a large extent to the situation presented
by Plan D, the Chief of Naval Operations desires that planning
under WPL-44 continue to have the highest priority.
3. The general concept, the assumptions, and the tasks under
Plan D situation, outlined in paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of reference
(r), are in accord with the views of the Chief of Naval Operations.
4. In connection with the initial sweep for Japanese raiders
in the Northern Pacific, mentioned in paragraph 5 (7), a suggestion
may here be in order. The Chief of Naval Operations believes it
possible that Japan for some time maintained a vessel about 500
miles north of Oahu. Indications are that some similar vessel
is now stationed about 1,000 miles southwest of Oahu. In connection
with reports of unidentified submarines near Oahu, Panama, the
Mexican coast, and in the open sea, it may be surmised that the
vessel mentioned above is a submarine tender, and that Japan may
plan during war to base submarines on tenders in the open sea.
It is considered most inadvisable that we indicate too much
curiosity in this respect for the time being. It would be well,
however, to keep track of such vessels, and to take immediate
steps to sink them on the outbreak of war.
5. With reference to paragraph 7 of reference (r), the Chief
of Naval Operations is cognizant of the condition of the de­
fenses of Oahu, and, in view of the inadequacy of the Army defenses,
the responsibility which must rest upon the fleet for its own
protection while in Pearl Harbor. In this connection, your
attention is invited to reference (b), a copy of which was fur­
nished to the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. The War
Department is taking steps to remedy the situation, but the
Commander-in-Chief should constantly press the Commanding General
of the Hawaiian Department to make all the improvements that lie
within his own power.
6. It is noted that no provision is made in the Naval local De­
fense Force plans of the Fourteenth Naval District for the employ­
ment of vessels as a part of an aircraft warning net in the waters
to the northward and southward of Oahu. It is suggested that in
coordinating the plans of the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific
Fleet, and the Commandant, Fourteenth Naval District, this matter
be given consideration. It is possible the large ships equipped
with radio might prove useful for this purpose during war.
7. The urgency of delivery of this document is such that it
will not reach the addressee in time by the next available officer
courier. The originator therefore authorizes the transmission
of this document be registered mail.

/s/ H. R. Stark.
H. R. STARK.
Def pac No. 1500 Y-1

秘

参照Aは受領しました。

A. 一九四一年二月〇日附 海軍大将 エッチ・アール・スターコ
宛

B. 一九四一年二月二五日附 海军作 航部長

合衆国太平洋艦隊司令長官

海軍作 航部長 計量 D

合衆国太平洋艦隊司令長官

 Hutchinson

一九四一年一月二十四日附 海軍長官より陸軍長官宛

秘密•瞭報通 嘱 令 〇九二二

RECEIVED
JUL 10 1947
二月四日の指示の下に準備させるべき計識は、計識に表示されて

ある状況に、大部分通用し得るにつき、海軍作戦部長は、普

く計識に、優先性を持続することを目指します。

海軍、陸軍、任務は海軍作戦部長の見解に一致して居ります。

四、第四節（一）に言及された北太平洋を駆逐する日本艦隊を最初に押し

することにより、誤解しては致命に提意見をすることが適切と認めます。

海軍作戦部長は日本がオアフの北約五〇〇哩に約船を或る朝配置して

たらしめと信じます。

現在オアフの東西約一〇〇哩に同様の艦船が配置されて居るものがあ

ります。オアフ、バリマ附近、メキシコ沿岸及び公海上の都度不明の

潜水艇に関する諸報告に端しては、前記の一艦船若と潜水母舰であり、日

本が数時分には潜水艦の操縦を公海上の母艦に置くか計識するかも知れぬ

と推測出ます。否

當分の間、我々がこの点に動し繰りにする多くの関心を示すことは最も不

得
防と考へられます。許し乍ら左様な戦船の進路を途絶へ、戦争の勃発と同時に行う。要するに防備の不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充分なる上に着し防備が不充
Highly reliable information has been received that categoric and urgent instructions were sent yesterday to Japanese diplomatic and consular posts at Hongkong X Singapore X Batavia X Manila X Washington and London to destroy most of their codes and ciphers at once and to burn all other important confidential and secret documents X
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

November 10, 1941.

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

/s/ Hull

Enclosure: Draft message.
To Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt:

I have for some days had before me your message of November 2 which was delivered to me through your Ambassador here on November 4; also, your earlier message which was delivered to me through Dr. T. V. Soong on October 30.

We have had for some time very much in mind the situation created by the menace of a Japanese attack against Kunming from Indochina to which you call special attention. When I received the first of your messages under reference, officers of this Government, including high officers of the Department of State, the Army and the Navy, entered immediately into consultations in order to give renewed and urgent consideration to all aspects of the problems underlying that situation. It soon became our conclusion that, while it would be a grave error to underestimate the gravity of that situation, it did not appear that preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kunming had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack. Given the difficult character of the terrain and the formidable resistance which your land forces would offer in Yunnan, an invasion of that province from Indochina by land forces calls for substantial preparation and extensive operations. At the same time we fully realize that it is important that your forces be adequately prepared equipped and disposed in all branches. Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in its political, military and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition, our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in
large amounts and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do
my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of
material for your use. Meanwhile we are exchanging views with
the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the
tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective
coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible.

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such
as the foregoing, together with such as the British doubtless are
considering, adopted and implemented simultaneously with your in­
tensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Yunnan Province are
sound steps toward safeguarding against such threat of an attack
upon Yunnan as may be developing. Indirectly influencing that
situation: American military and naval defensive forces in the
Philippine Islands, which are being steadily increased, and the
United States Fleet at Hawaii, lying as they do along the flank of
any Japanese military movement into China from Indochina, are ever
present and significant factors in the whole situation, as are the
increasing British and Dutch defensive preparations in their
territories to the south.

This Government has on numerous occasions pointed out to the
Government of Japan various consequences inherent in pursuit of
courses of aggression and conquest. We shall continue to impress
this point of view upon Japan on every appropriate occasion.

In the present state of world affairs, I feel - and I am
confident that you will agree with me - that there rests on the
United States, in connection with every move which it considers
and every decision which it makes, extraordinary obligation to
give intensive thought to widespread political stresses and
strains, to both long-swing and short-swing potentialities, and
to the weight of various possible and probable advantages in
comparison with the weight of other possible or probable disad­
vantages. The world conflict is now being waged in many theaters
and with a great variety of weapons, both physical and moral.
Resistance to the forces of conquest takes many forms. In all
probability, the efforts of all of us who are engaged in that re-
sistance, efforts of China and of the United States and of many
other countries, will have to be continued and be sustained over
a long period of time before our countries, one and all, will again
be made secure and our people again be enabled to turn their whole
thought and effort to peaceful and constructive pursuits.

I assure you that the situation and the problems which are the
subject of this correspondence will continue to have my own and
my country's constant attention.
辻腹側文書第一五〇〇号 二一四

密

華夏攻撃御査共同委員会提出御断第十六よりの抜萃

當國第七十九議會第一會期

外交部

ワシントン

十一月四日中華大使より送達された十一月二日附の蔣介石総統発貴下宛信書に対する貴下の返書草稿を同封致したるに付御意慮を煩はし度

下さい。なお本返労に御異論なくば、貴下に於かれては当地在の中華大使を招き、同使に本返労手交の上蔣介石総統へこれを傳達方を要請する

以て然る可きと存じ候。

寄名

ハル

一九四一年十一月十日

Def pce No. 1500 Y-4
十一月四日當地駐在の貴覇大使を通じて余に傳達させられた曰キ、共にこゝ数日間余の手許に所持し居れり
印第支那よりする日本軍の進軍攻撃の態態は著下か擔に吾等の注意を喚起き
余に催促させられた貴覇は、共にこゝ数日間余の手許に所持し居れり

於て貴軍陸上部隊が迄しく得る強固不揺の抵抗があらは、陸上部隊を以てす

所なり。さきに挙げたる最初の貴覇余が受領するや、貴覇の根底に横たわる諸問題の全

局面に對し、急務模想を新たにするため、直ちに函箋を開きたり。この

際、事態の重大性を過少評価するへ如きは重大なる誤謬なるも、日本の

面に對し、急務模想を新たにするため、直ちに函箋を開きたり。この
日本支那よりの同省進攻には、充分なる準備と広汎なる作戦が必要です。同時に軍事的経済的観点より世界の情勢を考慮に入れ、現実の実情を適切に行ふる重要なる事は我々の確認する所なり。目下の情勢では、各兵士、各部隊の総員と同様、利益を最大にすむための事態を考慮して、必要なる準備を講じてゆく必要がある。特に、海上軍事的関係が必要である。現下の軍事状況においては、全国の協力が不可欠である。
上述の如き措置は、英国が目下最急でなく考慮しつつある措置と共にある雲南省防衛強化を目標に貴国の際会の懸念なる努力と時を同じくして採択履行されたものにして現在近づきつつあるやも知れざる局明攻撃の威懾に余ると同感なるものをと信ずる。かかる事態に間接に影響を及ぼすものにして、今下に於かれて

ハワイの合衆国艦隊は、印度支那よりする日本の如何なる軍事的

未だ両国の防衛準備の南方諸領土に於ける立場もこれと同じである。そこで

中華倭国にもその側面に位置し居るが故に、全局面に於て厳然として意

義重大なる要素となってゐる。更に目下増大しつつあるイギリス、オラン

ダ政策の結果の生じるごとを指摘して来た。今後も適當なる役目ある每に、この見解を日本政府に好意附けることを

継続するであらう。
們將來的建設計劃上將更進一步地考慮到在日後的發展中所遇到的各種困難與挑戰。為此，有必要對現有的建設計劃進行調整，以適應日後發展的需要。這要求我們在考慮現有建設計劃的同時，也要考慮到日後發展的可能。唯有如此，我們才能確保現有建設計劃的穩定性與日後發展的創新性，從而確保我們在日後的發展中不會因現有建設計劃的不合時宜而造成損失。
Exhibit No. 10 of the Joint Committee On The Investigation Of The Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

Letter dated Jan. 24, 1941, from Secretary of Navy to Secretary of War regarding defenses of Pearl Harbor, and reply by Secretary of War, dated Feb. 7, 1941, letter from Adjutant General to Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, dated Feb. 7, 1941, transmitting the above letters with instructions and receipt therefor.

EXHIBIT NO. 10

Op-12B-9-McC (SC)47-2(2)/FF1
Serial 09112
Secret  

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: The security of the U. S. Pacific Fleet while in Pearl Harbor, and of the Pearl Harbor Naval Base itself, has been under renewed study by the Navy Department and forces afloat for the past several weeks. This reexamination has been, in part, prompted by the increased gravity of the situation with respect to Japan, and by reports from abroad of successful bombing and torpedo plane attacks on ships while in bases. If war eventuates with Japan, it is believed easily possible that hostilities would be initiated by a surprise attack upon the Fleet or the Naval Base at Pearl Harbor.

In my opinion, the inherent possibilities of a major disaster to the fleet or naval base warrant taking every step, as rapidly as can be done, that will increase the joint readiness of the Army and Navy to withstand a raid of the character mentioned above.

The dangers envisaged in their order of importance and probability are considered to be:

1. Air bombing attack.
2. Air torpedo plane attack.
3. Sabotage.
4. Submarine attack.
5. Mining.
6. Bombardment by gun fire.

Defense against all but the first two of these dangers appears to have been provided for satisfactorily. The following paragraphs are devoted principally to a discussion of the problems encompassed in (1) and (2) above, the solution of which I consider to be of primary importance.

Both types of air attack are possible. They may be carried out successively, simultaneously, or in combination with any of the other operations enumerated. The maximum probable enemy effort may be put at twelve aircraft squadrons, and the minimum at two. Attacks would be launched from a striking force of carriers and their supporting vessels.

(2) The counter measures to be considered are:

(a) Location and engagement of enemy carriers and supporting vessels before air attack can be launched;
(b) Location and engagement of enemy aircraft before they reach their objectives;
(c) Repulse of enemy aircraft by anti-aircraft fire;
(d) Concealment of vital installations by artificial smoke;
(e) Protection of vital installations by balloon barrages.

The operations set forth in (a) are largely functions of the Fleet but, quite possibly, might not be carried out in case of an air attack initiated without warning prior to a declaration of war.

Pursuit aircraft in large numbers and an effective warning net are required for the operations in (b). It is understood
that only thirty-six Army pursuit aircraft are at present in Oahu, and that, while the organization and equipping of an anti-air Information Service supported by modern fire control equipment is in progress, the present system relies wholly on visual observation and sound locators which are only effective up to four miles.

Available Army anti-aircraft batteries appear inadequate if judged by the standards of the war in Europe. There are now in Oahu 26-3" fixed anti-aircraft guns, of which something over half are grouped about Pearl Harbor, 56 mobile 3" guns, and 109 .50 caliber machine guns. The anti-aircraft batteries are manned in part by personnel which is also required to man parts of the sea coast artillery. Should an attack on Oahu combine air attack with a gun bombardment, one or the other countering fires would suffer from lack of men. If the prevailing high ceiling is taken into account the caliber of the anti-aircraft guns might be inadequate against high altitude bombing attack.

By late summer the defenses will be considerably strengthened by additions in guns, planes, and radio locators. It is understood, sixteen additional 3" Mobile, twenty-four 90 mm., and one hundred twenty 37 mm. guns will be on hand; the pursuit aircraft strength is to be expanded to a total of 149; the new radio locators will have an effective range of 100 miles. Although the caliber of the guns will still be small for effective action against high altitude bombers, this augmentation will markedly improve the security of the Fleet. It does not, of course, affect the critical period immediately before us.

(3) The supplementary measures noted in (d) and (e) might be of the greatest value in the defense of Pearl Harbor. Balloon barrages have demonstrated some usefulness in Europe. Smoke from fixed installations on the ground might prove most advantageous.

To meet the needs of the situation, I offer the following proposals:

1. That the Army assign the highest priority to the increase of pursuit aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery, and the establishment of an air warning net in Hawaii.
2. That the Army give consideration to the questions of balloon barrages, the employment of smoke, and other special devices for improving the defenses of Pearl Harbor.
3. That local joint plans be drawn for the effective coordination of naval and military aircraft operations, and ship and shore anti-aircraft gun fire, against surprise aircraft raids.
4. That the Army and Navy forces in Oahu agree on appropriate degrees of joint readiness for immediate action in defense against surprise aircraft raids against Pearl Harbor.
5. That joint exercises, designed to prepare Army and Navy forces in Oahu for defense against surprise aircraft raids, be held at least once weekly so long as the present uncertainty continues to exist.

Your concurrence in these proposals and the rapid implementation of the measures to be taken by the Army, which are of the highest importance to the security of the Fleet, will be met with the closest cooperation on the part of the Army Department.

Sincerely yours,

Secretary of the Navy

The Honorable The SECRETARY OF WAR.
Copies to: CINC, U.S. Pacific Fleet.
Con 14
Op-22
Op-30
合衆国第79国会における議案

関係者の防備に関する、海軍省より海軍省にわたる、昭和16年1月4日付命令及び部上記の関係者を、関係者及びその関係者を減へ、司令官により

海軍省平行地自体の安全性に就き過去数週間に亘り再検討中であります。
この再検討は、一戦、対日情勢が急激な変大性を加えるに觀み、又根拠地
に碇泊中の艦隊に対する雷撃機及び雷電機攻撃の有効性に就き報せらるる
海外よりの情報に依り促進せられたるものである。此の再検討は、面、
破壊攻撃
(雷電機の空襲)
(雷電機の空襲)
(潜水艇攻撃)

正當な理由とあり得ると考へることであります。
各種の危険を其の重要性と可能性の順位に依り考察すれば左の如くで
あります。

2
内閣裁定

最初の二つの題料以外の危段に対する防備は不備に於てあるやうに思は
れます。次ノ数節は主として上記ノと同ノに包含される問題の討議に傾
けられ居るもので、余は之等問題ノ解決を以て先決要件と考えるもので
あります。

（表）反攻手段として考慮されるものは
(1) 攻撃手段開始前に敵母艦及び敵戦艦等の所望を調査発見しと交戦すること。
(2) 戦艦の防空兵力が其等の目標に到達する前にその所在を調査発見しと交戦すること。

Dof, Doe 1580–2–1
(4) 高射砲火に依り敵機を撃退すること。
(5) 重要施設を人工破壊を以て陥滅すること。
(6) 気球幕を張りて重要施設を掩護すること。
前記(4)に掲げたる作戦は主に艦隊の機能に属するもの他は空襲が宣戦の
布告前後当然に行われる場合に當然出来なければならない。

(4) 作戦には多数の追聴機と有効なる聴診網が必要である。目下オラ
ワフ島に於ける陸軍の追聴機の数は僅かに三十六機と知られてある。目下この
方式戦火発射装置を以てする防空報導の組織と施設が目下進措中なるも、
現在の方策としては全く效果ある能力報導と聴音器に依存して
現在の

現在の

現在の

現在の
軍を受けるとすれば、その何れかの対抗軍事は人員欠乏の重圧に陥るで
もる。著し父が一役に責任される程度上昇を考慮に入れることならば、
防備は著しく強化されるであろう。即ち防空機及無線方向探知器の増加に
り二十四門、三十七ミリ百門が増設され、新無線方向探知器百部の有効距離
長さ二十五をもって観察される程度上昇を著しく強化されるであろう。之は勿論
今我等が直面する危機に役立つものではない。

地上固定発射の割合に於て見ても有利性を示し、
今国軍は追撃機及防空機の増加及有線に於ける無線潜線網の増設に

Daf, Dec 1500-2-1

5
高の優先順位を附記すること。

国防軍は現実の防備を改善する高気候課、遠隔外必要な特殊手

段の使用問題を考慮すること。

同航空機は地頭を対し、陸海軍航空砲攻撃船錨及び海岸の高射砲火の有效

数、現効合同動作を取る模様普通の対ってきたこと。

島オホーツク島に於ける陸海軍部隊をして、不意打的空襲に対する防衛

協力の為の歳草と於ける各種手段の策要なる緊要であら


共通の目標を以て、現時の不意状態の敵に取る模様普通の対してきたこと。

密なる協力を以て迎えられるでありませう。敬具

6
Excerpt from Exhibit No. 37 of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack - Congress of the United States, Seventy-Ninth Congress, First Session.

EXHIBIT NO. 37

BASIC EXHIBIT OF DESPATCHES

(41) 3 December 1941 to OPNAV, Action: CINCAF, COM16

(41) Top Secret
3 December 1941
From: OPNAV
Action: CINCAF, Com Sixteen
Info: CINPAC, Com Fourteen
Ø31855

Circular twenty four forty four from Tokyo one December ordered London X Hongkong X Singapore and Manila to destroy Purple machine XX Batavia machine already sent to Tokyo XX December second Washington also directed destroy Purple X All but one copy of other systems X And all secret documents XX British Admiralty London today reports embassy London has complied
Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China - At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President’s return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can’t back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Following Captain Schuirmann’s presentation, Admiral Stark read a Navy Department estimate of the recent dispatches received from Chungking. Admiral Ingersoll, gave his personal review of the situation. A summary of this review was that:

a. The decision on the Far Eastern situation, made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the U.S.-British Staff Conversations Report ABC-1.

b. A major war effort in the Pacific would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas.


d. The requirements in tankers alone for support of a Pacific war would create a serious oil shortage in this country, and the United States fleet cannot be supported in the Pacific without auxiliary shipping and adequate supplies.

e. The shortest line of communication is flanked by mandated islands, and is vulnerable to Japanese attack. Two other routes are available for communications to the Far Eastern Theater: one via Australia; the other via Cape of Good Hope.

f. Assuming that the fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilities are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present.

g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the Fleet due to the lack of adequate antiaircraft protection for the anchorage.

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of launching an attack in five directions; viz., against Russia, the Philippines,
into Yunnan, Thailand and against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five operations, United States' action should be: In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East until the augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and army forces, becomes available.

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further the State Department conference, Captain Schuirmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be Naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5. He then read General Gorow's analysis of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December, the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations.

W. P. SCOOBEY,
Colonel, G.S.C.,
Secretary

(At the call of the Senior Member, the weekly meeting scheduled for November 5, 1941, was held today in Room 2003, Munitions Building. The meeting was called to order at 3:40 p.m.

対する反対を援助せしめる機会を占めるものである。

同大佐は、大統領がチャーチルとの協議に鰐牛して懸るや、八月十七日、若し日本が向も侵略を事とする場合に、行合衆国はこれに対し處置を採る事が必要なるであろう。一との際、面接を日本に示し、京都及び能見等を象徴する地を、侵略の場合に対し準備を採る事が必要なるであろう。更に同大佐は、ハル氏が日本に此の上警告を興へてそれを我々が直付けする力がないから、これ以上の国務省による警告を支持する用意が当部省にあるか否かを知りたいと有告した。第二回会談は十日二月四日、国務省で開かれ、その成績では、我が国はタイ国に飛行機を海上使用すべきであるという事及び日本のシベリア派を対し警告を発すべきであるという事が提案された。
^

二

学東へ遠征移動が可能であると判断して、マニラ、シンガポー

ルに於て何の修理施設も利用出来ない。揚陸所はあるとしても、修

レ不能を戒、施設は現存してゐない。)

マニラに於ては焼焼地に設営防砲施設と十分でないから、今のと

る困難に対する、日々が往々の方向にしロシーナ、フィリピンに

し、雲南省、泰、に、興にマレーに対し政權を保持してある。日本

が以上五方の一つ或ひはそれ以上の作戦を開始し得るに到らば合戦の

行動は次の如くあるべきである。日本が攻めがシベリヤ、泰段ひは雲南省

間領土へ向けてられた場合に於て、合衆国は日本の攻めに抵抗すべきを如

た場合に於て、合衆国は宜させすべきを為す。斯くして政權を保持してゐる

が増強されて、時に潜水艦や陸上部隊の増加されて、守備役立つ役に

なる迄は行東に於ける政權を延々すべきだと之をふることである。
インガーンル海軍大将は、特筆を除いて、現在の艦隊兵力に従って
項目の海軍機関が想定工数に見られることが非常に不適当な状況に
とられた。更にシュアマン海軍大佐は、関東府が、たとえ対馬が
感ぜられることを指摘した。そして現在は無気を振すべき時とはいえ
ないというふうに報告することは、何と読むべきか、答べるべく

イグザルル海軍大将は、関東府が在日行動を取るべき事が必要であると
にあたり得ると考えなるように思った。マーシャル大将は、関東府に
及ぼす影響を考慮を掛けるべきである。これは主

情報に基づいて日本当局は現状下に於て未だ行動を取るべきだという

彼の受け取った情報は、日本当局が十一月五日迄には国際の決定を見

5

Def. Doc. # 1500-2-4
防府に至るかかも知れぬとのことを示してある。次に同大統領ジークル將

に問かれた。

先任委員の要求により、一九四一年十一月三日に予定されてあった護

止する必要を有するかもしれないにあらず、その事件が又日本側発動を阻

W・P・スコベイ
東京帝国大学文学部

国文科

（昭和20年4月1日）

教授

黒沢敬一

（「東京帝国大学文学部国文科」昭和20年1月1日 - 10月31日）
THE PROTOCOL OF BORDER-LINES

This document is annex I of the protocol on the Border East of Hunchun, concluded between China and Russia in 1886, and is taken from the "Collection of Border Treaties between Fenchouwu and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," compiled in July, 1943, by the Bureau of Treaties of the Foreign Office, Tokyo, pp. 78-80.

PROTOCOL BETWEEN CHINA AND RUSSIA ON THE BORDER EAST OF HUNCHUN

Signed at Hunchun, Russia, on June 3, the 12th Year of Kanghui (1886).

APP. XII. THE PROTOCOL OF BORDER-LINES

The protocol of Border-lines of the First Section.

The envoy for border receration of both countries have defined the border of the First Section to be the stretch from the River Tumen to the astronomical point at Changling, according to the map drawn up after the survey by Russian commissioners in 1884 (the 10 Year of Kanghui). This mountain is situated between the Russian outpost at Hunchun and that of the Chinese side at Narkao, and is on the road between Hunchun and the River Hunchun. The distance between the place where the border-mark T has newly been established and the astronomical point is sixty-five and half Russian li, or approximately one hundred and thirty-one Chinese li, and the red line on the map marks the border all along the watershed, and the side on which water flows westwards and pours into the river belongs to China, and the side on which it flows eastwards and pours into the sea to Russia. The distance southwards from the border-mark T along the stream to the estuary of the River Tumen is fifteen Russian li, or approximately thirty Chinese li, and the distance to the end of the sandbar measured in a straight line by land is thirteen li four hundred and fifty-five sajins, or approximately over twenty-seven Chinese li. The established monolith border-mark T is one sajen, or approximately six Chinese feet-thick, ten Russian inches, or approximately fifteen Chinese inches wide, and four Russian inches, or approximately six Chinese inches thick. On one side it has the Russian letter T inscribed, and on the other three Chinese characters "T Letter Monument" with the date on the side. The depth of the border-mark in the ground is one Russian foot, or approximately two Chinese feet and three inches. The foundation ground it is constructed with hard stone, and surrounded by a deep ditch filled with crushed gravel and hardened by pouring mortar so as to make the border-mark durable. Proceeding over the hill northwest-
V-rays from the border-mark T up to the north of a sand hill via the west of Iik. Easrey, the border-mark No. 1 is established, the total distance being eight li and six hundred saijens. Proceeding thence northwards one li and sixty-five saijens, and turning three northwest for four li one hundred and thirty-five saijens along sand hills, Tienetz is reached, where the border-mark No. 2 is established. Turning further southeast, and proceeding around a swamp, and turning north, Mount Kh'unou is reached. From the north of this mountain, again turning east Point Vrabesh is reached, and thence again proceeding north-west, a road between Khan and the river Yinnan is reached, and thence the border-mark No. 3 is established, the total distance being thirteen li four hundred and sixty-five saijens. Thence for two li and four hundred saijens north-westwards along a flat hill, and the border-mark No. 4 is established. Thence again north-westwards for two li one hundred and fifty saijens after crossing several hills, and Mount Lach'unin is reached, where the border-mark No. 5 is established on a flat slope at the foot of the mountain. Again six li two hundred and eighty-five saijens north-eastwards, ascending a mild hill and crossing small ravines at several points, Katingtzu is reached. The border-mark No. 6 is established at the roadside leading to the River Yinchu. Again proceeding north-east, Wushan or Nienkitingtzu is reached. Turning thence south-west, Yushan or Tihchingtzu is reached, from where turning north-west and crossing a large mountain by a narrow and steep path, Mount Xledo is reached. Proceeding thence around the source of the River Chulin, and turning east and again north, the border-mark No. 7 is established on the top of the mountain, which, though not high, has very rugged paths, and is situated twenty li four hundred and seventy-five saijens from the border-mark No. 6. Thence turning north at a point three li two hundred and sixty-five saijens north-eastwards, and proceeding one li and sixty-five saijens, and again turning east for three hundred and thirty saijens, the astronomical point, dated in 1632, is reached. This is the border-mark No. 8. The distance mentioned above are all in Russian li, one Russian li corresponding to two Chinese li, and one Russian sajen to seven Chinese feet. The astronomical point is a tall brick building with a hard stone foundation. All other border-marks are round mountains of earth, around which a ditch is dug and filled with gravel. On each mound is erected a small monolith with the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., inscribed. This Protocol is drawn up in duplicate, in Pekoharian, Chinese and Russian languages. Two maps are drawn up according to the border lines defined above. The envoy for border demarcation of both countries sign both of them and affix their seals thereto, each holding one copy of the Protocol and the maps as evidence.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, ŌYASHI, Kooru, Chief of the Archives Section of the Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in the Japanese language, consisting of 4 pages and entitled:

The Protocol of Border-Lines

is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 27th day of March, 1947.

/s/ K. Hayashi

Witness:

/s/ X. Urabe

CERTIFICATE

I, MIURA, Kazuichi, hereby declare that I can read, write and speak the Japanese and the English Languages, and have done the English translation of

The Protocol of Border-Lines

accurately and faithfully.

/s/ K. Miura

Tokyo, January 10th, 1947
西国国境划定大臣表段，境界千八百八年元绪。国境划分，测量作元经图依国界记起，长间国道河哨所间守在。国境划分，测量作经元图依国界记起，长间国道河哨所间守。
无法识别文档内容。
No.1．

昭

入

又

入

又

入

入
Excerpts from "THE GREAT CONSPIRACY AGAINST RUSSIA" by Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn

Book One: Revolution and Counter-revolution

In the Midsummer of the fateful year of 1917, as the Russian revolutionary volcano seethed and rumbled, an American named Major Raymond Robins arrived in Petrograd on a secret mission of the utmost importance. Officially, he traveled as Assistant Chief of the American Red Cross Division. Unofficially, he was in the service of the Intelligence Division of the United States Army. His secret mission was to help keep Russia in the war against Germany.

When Major Raymond Robins reached Petrograd, hungry, desperate masses of people were spread like a great dark tide over the land. The capital swarmed with soldier delegations, straight from the muddy frontline trenches demanding an end to the war. Bread riots were occurring almost daily. Lenin's Bolshevik Party -- the organization of the Russian Communists which had been declared illegal and driven underground by Kerensky -- was rapidly growing in power and prestige.

By the summer of 1918, although the United States was at war with Germany and not with Russia, the New York Times was already describing the Bolsheviks as "our most malignant enemies," and as "ravenous beasts of prey." The Soviet leaders were being universally denounced in the American press as "paid agents" of the Germans. "Butchers," "assassins and madmen," "blood-intoxicated criminals," and "human scum" were some of the typical terms by which American newspapers referred to Lenin and his associates. In Congress, they were called "those damnable beasts."
Early in 1918, Capt. Reilly was transferred to Russia as Director of British Secret Intelligence operations in that country. His personal friends, wide business connections and intimate knowledge of the inner circles of the Russian counterrevolution made him an ideal man for the job. But the Russian assignment also had a deep personal significance for Reilly. He was consumed by a bitter hatred for the Bolsheviks and, indeed, for the entire Russian Revolution. He frankly stated his counterrevolutionary aims:

"The Germans are human beings. We can afford to be even beaten by them. Here in Moscow there is growing to maturity the arch-enemy of the human race. If civilization does not move first and crush the monster, while yet there is time, the monster will finally overwhelm civilization."

In his reports to the British Secret Service headquarters in London, Reilly repeatedly advocated an immediate peace with Germany and an alliance with the Kaiser against the Bolshevik menace.

"At any price," he declared, "this foul obscenity which has been born in Russia must be crushed out of existence. Peace with Germany: Yes, peace with Germany, peace with anybody! There is only one enemy. Mankind must unite in a holy alliance against this midnight terror."

On his arrival in Russia, Reilly immediately plunged into anti-Soviet conspiracy.

His avowed aim was to overthrow the Soviet Government.

The Social Revolutionaries were receiving financial aid from the French Intelligence Service. With funds personally handed to him by the French Ambassador, Boris Savinkov had re-established the old Social Revolutionary terrorist center in Moscow under the title of League for the Regeneration of Russia, its aim was to plan the assassination of Lenin and other Soviet leaders. On Sidney Reilly's recommendation
the British Secret Service also began supplying Savinkov with money for the training and arming of his terrorists.

(Page 17)

From north, south, east and west, the enemies of the new Russia were preparing to converge on Moscow.

(Page 14)

Back in London, Captain Reilly reported to his superiors in the British Secret Service. He was full of regrets for lost opportunities. "If Rene Marchand had not been a traitor... if Berzin had not shorn the white feather... if the Expeditionary Force had advanced quickly on the Vologda... if I could have combined with Savinkov..."

But of one thing Reilly was sure. The fact that England was still at war with Germany was a mistake. There must be an immediate cessation of hostilities on the Western Front and a coalition against Bolshevism. Cried Captain Sidney George Reilly:

"Peace, peace on any terms - and then a united front against the true enemies of mankind!"

(Page 17)

Early in January, 1919, the Big Four - Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George, Georges Clemenceau and Vittorio Orlando - sat down in a conference room at the Quai D'Orsay in Paris to talk about world peace.

But one-sixth of the earth was not represented at the Peace Conference.

Even as the peacemakers talked, tens of thousands of Allied soldiers were waging a bloody, undeclared war against Soviet Russia. Side by side with the counterrevolutionary White Armies led by Kolchak and Denikin, the Allied troops were fighting the young Red Army on an immense battlefront that stretched from the bleak arctic regions to the Black Sea, and from the Ukrainian wheatfields to the mountains and steppes of Siberia.

A violent and fantastic campaign of anti-Soviet propaganda was sweeping Europe and America in the spring of 1919. The London Daily Telegraph reported a "reign of terror" in Odessa accompanied by a "free-love week." The New York Sun headlined: "U.S. Founded Mutilated by Reds with Axes." The New York Times reported: "Russia Under Reds a Gigantic
Def. Doc. # 1526

Bedlam . . . Escaped Victims say maniacs Stalk Raving through the streets of Moscow . . . Fight Dogs for Carrion." The entire world press, Allied and German alike, published fraudulent "authentic documents" shoring that in Russia "young women and girls of the bourgeois classes" were being "commandeered and delivered to the barracks . . . for the needs of artillery regiments!"

Scarcely two months after the Armistice, the Allied leaders seemed already to have forgotten the purpose for which the great conflict was fought. The "menace of Bolshevism" swept aside every other consideration. It dominated the Paris Conference.

Marshal Foch, the French Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies, appeared before a secret session of the Peace Conference to demand a quick settlement with Germany, so that the Allies could hurl their combined resources against Soviet Russia. The French Marshal pleaded the case of France's mortal enemy, Germany.

"The present difficult situation of the German Government is well known," said Foch, "At Mannheim, Crêteil, Baden and Dusseldorf, the Soviet movement is rapidly extending. At the present moment Germany will therefore accept any terms the Allies might demand, The German Government only asks peace. That is the only thing that will satisfy the people and enable the Government to master the situation.

To put down the German revolution, the German High Command was to be permitted to retain an army of 100,000 officers and men, as well as the so-called "Black Reichsöhr" composed of the most highly trained and indoctrinated soldiers in Germany. In addition, the German High Command was allowed to subsidize underground nationalist leagues and terrorist societies to kill, torture and intimidate the insurgent German democrats. All of this was done in the name of "saving Germany from Bolshevism"...

* The reason for the failure of the Allied Armies to march to Berlin in 1918 and permanently drive German Bolshevism was Allied fear of Bolshevism, skilfully exploited by German intrigues. The Allied Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Foch, reported in his post-war memoirs that from the outset of the peace negotiations the German emissaries repeatedly invoked "the threatened Bolshevist invasion of Germany" as a means of securing favorable peace terms for Germany. General William, of the British General Staff recorded in his War Diary on November 9, 1918, two days before the Armistice was signed: "Cabinet
meeting tonight from 6:30-8, Lloyd George read two telegrams from the Tiger (Clemenceau) in which he described Foch's interviews with the Germans: the Tiger is afraid that Germany may collapse and that Bolshevism may gain control. Lloyd George asked me if I wanted that to happen or if I did not prefer an armistice. Without hesitation I replied: "Armistico." The whole cabinet agreed with me. For us the real danger is no longer the Germans but Bolshevism. In a moment of clarity, Clemenceau himself warned the Paris Peace Conference that "anti-Bolshevism" was a device being utilized by the German General Staff to confuse the Allies and to save German militarism. "The Germans are using Bolshevism," said Clemenceau in 1919, "as a bogey with which to frighten the Allies." Nevertheless, without the influence of Foch, Pétain, Foygand and others, the Tiger fought his own war and succumbed to the anti-Bolshevik hysteria which soon paralyzed all clear thought and democratic action by the Allied peacemakers.

General Max Hoffmann, former commander of the German Armies on the Eastern Front and the "hero" of Brest-Litovsk, approached his recent enemy, Marshal Foch, with a plan whereby the German Army was to march on Moscow and annihilate Bolshevism "at its source". Foch approved the Plan, but proposed that the French Army, instead of the German, should spearhead the attack. Foch wanted to mobilize the whole of eastern Europe against Soviet Russia.

"In Russia at the present moment Bolshevism and complete anarchy reign," Foch told the Paris Peace Conference. "My plan would be to settle all the important outstanding questions on the Western side in order to enable the Allies to use the resources thus made available for the solution of the Eastern question... Polish troops would be quite able to face the Russians, provided the former are strengthened by the supply of modern nouliances and engines of war. Great numbers are required, which could be obtained by mobilizing the Finns, Poles, Czechs, Rumanians and Greeks, as well as the Russian pro-Ally elements still available... If this is done, 1919 will see the end of Bolshevism!"

But Woodrow Wilson was surrounded by men determined at all costs to preserve the status-quo. Bound by their secret imperialist treaties and commercial pacts, these men schemed to out-it, sabotage and frustrate Wilson at every stop. There were tense moments when Wilson rebelled and threatened to take his cause over the heads of the politicians and militarists to the people.

In Rome, Wilson had planned to make a sensational speech from the balcony of the Palazzo Venezia overlooking the great square where, only two years later,
Benito Mussolini was to harangue his Blackshirts. The Italian monarchists, fearing the effects of Wilson's words on the people of Rome, prevented the crowd from gathering in the square and broke up the demonstration on the grounds that it was inspired by "Bolshevism."

The same thing happened in Paris, where Wilson looked at his hotel window all morning to make a promised speech to the Paris workers. He did not know that French police and soldiers had been called out to stop the workers from reaching his hotel ...

Wherever Wilson went in Europe he was surrounded by secret agents and propagandists; behind his back, endless intrigue went on.

Each of the Allied powers had organized its own espionage apparatus for use at the Peace Conference. At Place de la Concorde in Paris the U.S. Military Intelligence established a special Code Room, where highly trained officers and carefully selected clerks worked day and night interrupting and deciphering the secret messages of the other powers. This Code Room was under the charge of Major Herbert O. Yardley, who later revealed, in his book The American Black Chamber, how eye-witness reports of American agents in Europe describing the true state of affairs were deliberately withheld from President Wilson, into whose ears lurid and fantastic anti-Bolshevik propaganda was ceaselessly dinned.

Frequently, Major Yardley intercepted and decoded secret messages concerning plots to sabotage Wilson's policies. On one occasion he decoded a message of an even more startling and sinister character. Major Yardley disclosed:

... the reader may well appreciate the shock I received as I deciphered a telegram which reported an Entente plot to assassinate President Wilson either by administering a slow poison or by giving him the influenza in ice. Our informant, in whom we had the greatest confidence, begged the authorities for God's sake to warn the President. I have no way of knowing whether this plot had any truth in fact, and if it had, whether it succeeded.

Def. Doc. 1526
But there are these undeniable facts: President Wilson's first 
sign of illness occurred while he was in Paris, and he was soon 
to die a lingering death.

At the early sessions of the Paris Peace Conference, President 
Wilson found an unexpected ally in his attempt to win fair play for Russia. 
The Prime Minister of Great Britain, David Lloyd George, came to Wilson's 
support with a series of stinging attacks on the anti-Soviet plans of Foch 
and the French Premier Clemenceau.

The French "Tiger", Georges Clemenceau, spokesman for the French 
holders of Czarist bonds and the General Staff, rose to reply on behalf 
of the advocates of intervention. Clemenceau knew that Lloyd George's subtle 
policy would be supported in British ruling circles, where the militarists 
and the Intelligence Service were already committed to an anti-Soviet war. 
At the same time, Clemenceau felt it was necessary, for Wilson's benefit, 
to break down Lloyd George's arguments by a strong statement of the menace 
of Bolshevism.

"In principle," began Clemenceau, "I do not favor conversations 
with the Bolsheviks, not because they are criminals, but because we 
would be raising them to our level by saying that they are worthy of 
entering into conversation with us." The British Prime Minister and 
the President of the United States, if the French Premier might be 
permitted to say so, were adopting too academic and doctrinaire an 
attitude to the question of Bolshevism. "The Bolshevik danger is 
very great at the present moment," Clemenceau declared. "Bolshevism 
is spreading. It has invaded the Baltic Provinces and Poland, and this 
very morning we have received very bad news regarding its spread to 
Budapest and Vienna. Italy, also is in danger. The danger is probably 
greater there than in France. If Bolshevism, after spreading in Germany, 
were to traverse Austria and Hungary and to reach Italy, Europe would 
be faced with very great danger. Therefore, something must be done 
against Bolshevism!"

Clemenceau did not rely on his own eloquence alone. He asked 
permission to introduce "expert witnesses" on the subject of Bolshevism. 
The first of them was Ambassador Noulens, the one-time friend of
Ambassador Francis at Petrograd and the ringleader of the anti-Soviet intriguers in the diplomatic corps. Noulens was introduced to Wilson and Lloyd George.

"I will confine myself to statements of facts," said Ambassador Noulens, and immediately plunged into an amazing recital of "Bolshevik atrocities."

Not only men, but women have been shot," said Noulens. "There have been atrocities, drownings, the cutting off of noses and tongues, mutilations, burials alive, mock shootings, rape and pillage everywhere."

The atmosphere at the peace Conference changed. Lloyd George, realizing he was getting nowhere, abruptly returned to London. In his place, Winston Churchill, the youthful British Secretary of War and Aviation, hurried to Paris to state the case for the anti-Bolshevik extremists."

At that time, and for many years to come, Winston Churchill was the leading spokesman for British Tory anti-Sovietism. Churchill feared the spread of Russian revolutionary ideas through the eastern regions of the British Empire.

Rene Kraus, in his biography Winston Churchill writes: "The Big Five in Paris had decided to support the White Russian Counter-revolution. Churchill was entrusted with the execution of an action he was not responsible for. But there is no denying that once the decision was made he was all on fire to carry it out... In association with the Chief of Staff, Sir Henry Wilson, he worked out a program to equip and arm the various White Armies from surplus war stores, and to help them with export officers and instructors."

After Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany, Churchill recognised that Nazism constituted the real menace to British interests in Europe and throughout the world. Without hesitation, Churchill reversed his stand on Soviet Russia and began calling for an alliance between Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union to halt the march of Nazi aggression. In 1941, when Nazi Germany invaded Soviet Russia, Churchill's voice was
The "Official Representative of the White Russian Armies" at the British War Office was Lieutenant General Golovin. He had arrived early that spring carrying a personal note of introduction to Winston Churchill. Shortly after Golovin reached London, he conferred with Sir Samuel Hoare. Among the subject they discussed was the question of the Caucasus and, in particular, its great oil deposits at Grozny and Baku.

On May 5, accompanied by Hoare, Golovin paid his first visit to the British War Office. On Hoare's advice, the Russian officer wore his full-dress uniform. He was received with great cordiality by the British officers, who listened absorbedly as he outlined the progress of the various White Russian campaigns.

That same day, at half-past five in the afternoon, Golovin saw Churchill. The Secretary of War spoke angrily of the opposition of the British liberals and workingmen to military aid to the White anti-Soviet armies. Churchill expressed the hope that, in spite of this obstacle, he would be able to send an additional 10,000 "volunteers" for the Northern campaign. Reinforcements, he knew, were badly needed in this area because of the serious demoralization that had set in among the British and American troops.

Churchill also stressed his eagerness to assist General Denikin as much as possible. At any event, Denikin could expect 2500 "volunteers" for service as military instructors and technical experts. As for immediate material help, Churchill told Golovin that 24,000,000 pounds (approximately $100,000,000) would be allocated to the various anti-Soviet fronts, and there would be adequate equipment and arms to outfit 100,000 Yudenitch troops for the march on Petrograd. (Page 26-27) Arrangements would be made for 500 Church officers who were prisoners of war in Germany to be transferred to Archangel at British expense...

"The result of the interview exceeded all my expectations," Golovin stated in the report he submitted to his superiors when he returned to Russia. "Churchill is not only a sympathizer but an energetic and active friend. The greatest possible aid is assured us. Now we have to show the English that we are ready to turn words into deeds."
the first to address the world with the declaration that Russia's fight was the fight of all free peoples and would receive Britain's support. At the conclusion of the Second World War Churchill again raised the cry of the "menace of Bolshevism." (Page 25)

**WHITE'S MISSION**

With Churchill as the acknowledged but unofficial Commander-in-Chief of the Allied anti-Soviet armies, the scene shifted to London where, during the spring and summer, special White Russian emissaries streamed into the British Government offices at Whitehall. They came as representatives of Admiral Kolchak, General Denikin, and other White Russian leaders, to make the final arrangements for an all-out drive against the Soviets. Their highly secretive negotiations were conducted for the most part with Winston Churchill and Sir Samuel Hoare.

Churchill, as Secretary of War, undertook to equip the White Russian armies with material from Great Britain's accumulation of surplus war supplies. Hoare supervised the complex diplomatic intrigues.

Among the White Russian representatives were such "democratic Russians" as the famous Social-Revolutionary terrorist, Boris Savinkov; the Czarist Prince Lvov; and Sergei Sazonov, the former Czarist Minister of Foreign Affairs, who had been acting as both Denikin's and Kolchak's representative in Paris. On May 27, 1919, the London Times reported:

M. Sazonov met a number of members of Parliament at the House of Commons last night. Sir Samuel Hoare presided...

M. Sazonov took a favorable view of the prospects of an early overthrow of the Bolshevik regime and said that recognition of Admiral Kolchak's Government would do much to hasten this event. He expressed the deep gratitude of Russians not only for the material support which had been afforded them by Great Britain, but for the services of the British Navy in saving a large number of refugees.
Def. Doc. # 1526

This report, subsequently captured by the Red Army in the secret archives of the Murmansk White Government, was published in the Daily Herald in London a short time after, causing considerable embarrassment to anti-Soviet circles in England. (Page 27)

**WHITE RUSSIAN PHASE**


Chapter VI - The War of Intervention

I. Prelude

By the summer of 1919, without declaration of war, the armed forces of fourteen states had invaded the territory of Soviet Russia. The countries involved were:

- Great Britain
- France
- Japan
- Germany
- Italy
- United States
- Czechoslovakia
- Serbia
- China
- Finland
- Greece
- Poland
- Rumania
- Turkey

Fighting side by side with the anti-Soviet invaders were the counterrevolutionary White Armies led by former Czarist generals striving to restore the feudal aristocracy which the Russian people had overthrown.

The strategy of the attackers was ambitious. The armies of the White generals, moving in conjunction with the interventionist troops, were to converge on Moscow from the north, south, east and west.

In the north and northwest, at Archangel, Murmansk and in the Baltic States, the forces of the British stood poised alongside the White Russia troops of General Nicholas Yudenitch.

In the south, at bases in the Caucasus and along the Black Sea, were the White armies of General Anton Denikin, amply supplied and reinforced by the French.

In the east, Admiral Alexander Kolchak's forces, operating under British military advisors, were encamped along the Ural Mountains.

In the west, under the leadership of French officers, were General Pilsudski's newly organized Polish armies.

Allied statesmen advanced various reasons for the presence of their
Def. Doc. # 1526

troops in Russia. When their soldiers first landed in Murmansk and Archangel in the spring and summer of 1918, the Allied Governments, declared the troops had come to prevent supplies from falling into the hands of the Germans. Later they explained their troops were in Siberia to help the Czechoslovakian forces withdraw from Russia. Another reason given for the presence of Allied detachments was that they were helping the Russians to "restore order" in their troubled land.

Repeatedly, Allied statesmen denied any intention of armed intervention against the Soviets, or of interfering with Russia's internal affairs. "We do not propose to interfere with the internal arrangements of Russia", declared Arthur Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, in August, 1918. "She must manage her own affairs."

The ironic and invariably blunt Winston Churchill, who himself supervised the Allied campaign against Soviet Russia, later wrote in his book, "The World Crisis: the Aftermath:

"Were they (the Allies) at war with Russia?
Certainly not; but they shot Soviet Russians at sight. They stood as invaders on Russian Soil. They armed the enemies of the Soviet Government. They blockaded the ports and sunk its battleships. They earnestly desired and schemed its downfall. But war - shocking! Interference-shame! It was, they repeated, a matter of indifference to them how Russians settled their own affairs. They were impartial - bang!

The "Whites" so-called because of their opposition to the revolutionaries whose symbol was the Red Flag, included, according to George Stewart's authoritative account of their struggle in The "Whites" Armies of Russia, all those for whom "Czarism represented the assurance of their status in society, their livelihood, honors, Holy Russia, a social order built upon privilege and force, pleasant in its rewards to the fortunate, comfortable to parasitic groups which found their life in serving it, an ancient system which had its sanction in long centuries when Russia was building." The term "White Russians" is used in this book to describe those who fought to retain or restore this
ancient order in Russia. It must not be confused with the name given to inhabitants of the Soviet Republic of Byelorussia, who are also called White Russians because of their original native costume: white smock, black shoes with white leggings and white homespun coat.

One of the proclamations from British General Headquarters in northern Russia, which was read to British and American troops, opened with these words:

There seems to be among the troops a very indistinct idea of what we are fighting for here in Northern Russia. This can be explained in a few words. We are up against Bolshevism, which means anarchy pure and simple. Look at Russia at the present moment. The power is in the hands of for non, mostly Jews ...
Def. Doc. # 1526

joining his army or else being shot. When the troops of Denikin and Wrangel stormed into the captured city of Stavropol, one of their first acts was to break into a hospital and massacre seventy wounded Red Army soldiers. Pillage was an official practice in Denikin's army. Wrangel himself issued orders to his troops that loot from their campaign should be "equally divided" among them.

Driving north the forces of Denikin and Wrangel occupied Tsaritsyn (now Stalingrad) in June, 1919, and by October were approaching Tula, 120 miles from Moscow.

"The entire Bolshevik structure in Russia appears to be collapsing," reported the New York Times. "The destruction of Moscow, the head center of bolshevism, has begun." The Times described Denikin as "sweeping all before him" and the Red Army as retreating in "wild panic."

But, using a plan of attack drawn up by Stalin as a member of the Revolutionary Military Committee, the Red Army initiated a sudden counteroffensive.

Denikin's forces were taken completely by surprise. Within a few weeks the Southern White Russian Army was in headlong retreat toward the Black Sea. Morale broke down, and Denikin's troops fled in panic and disorder. Sick and dying clogged the roads. Hospital trains were frequently without medical supplies, doctors or nurses. The army disintegrated into bands of robbers, streaming toward the south.

On December 9, 1919 General Wrangel sent a panic-stricken dispatch to General Denikin, declaring:

- This is the bitter truth. The army has ceased to exist as a fighting force.

During the spring and early summer of 1919, newspapers in Paris, London and New York carried frequent detailed reports of devastating Red Army defeats at the hands of Admiral Kolchak. These were some of the headlines which appeared in the New York Times:

- March 26 Kolchak Wins Battle near Novik, April 20
- Reds Overwhelm in the East, April 22 Red Race Tatters
- as Kolchak Wins, May 15 Kolchak Plans Move on Moscow
But on August 11 the Times carried a dispatch from Washington stating:

The time has come, a high official of the government stated tonight, to prepare the people of the anti-Bolshevik world for a possible disaster to the Kolchak regime in western Siberia.

Kolchak reached Irkutsk in a train flying the Union Jack, the Stars and Stripes, the French and Italian tricolors, and the Rising Sun of Japan.

Excerpts from "THE GREAT CONSPIRACY AGAINST RUSSIA" by Michael Sayors and Albert E. Kahn
一九八八年長には、合衆国は強大と敗北とは破っていたが、
「ガッガッした肉食獣」と呼んでいた。ソ連指導者たちは通常にアメリカの
新聞雑誌で描写の「給与を受ける手先」と呼ばれていった。「大脳殺害」
新聞がリー・エンョーンの一派の者を呼ぶためのもであった。（十一頁）

一九八八年中にリーニー大尉は、核の実行を禁止するという国民の
要求が起った。彼をこの社会に対する理性的な指導者を選任しめた。彼は
核の反革命の内容に関係する種々の知識を彼をこの社会に対する反革命
目的を次のように述べた。

「戦わぬ人をも人間だ。戦われた者にとって大敵が生い立ちつつある。もし
文明が先ず出動して」
倫敦の英仏秘密局本部へのもめの報告に於て、レイリは再三詰問と即時和解を要請し、敵を殺して日下に何を復讐をも厭はずとの露骨に説明する事は主張した。彼はこれを

国際連合の平和を、敵は唯一つだ。人類はこの瓦娘中の警戒に対して警戒

の下にモスクワに旧社会革命労働団を再建した。その目的は、レーニンが

の訓練と武装

を行はしめた。

(十三頁)
ロンドンに語って、レイリ大尉は英領秘密班の彼の上役に報告した。彼は機會を失したことが懸念でたまらなかった。

仮しレイリは次の一章について無言していた。彼は英領が今までもない各式軍事を中止し、過激主義に対する共同を必要とする。ンディー・ジョージ・レイド・ジョー・ジル・クレマンソ・ヴィアトリーオ・オーラン

東西両北より新ロシアの敵はモスクワに於て合同すべく準備した(十四)
### 関西地方の近代史について

対面反逆者という名の無政府主義者は、派遣本部による、権力側を提進したため、東部に線の元軍司令官であり又プレスト・リトウス克の勇将であるマックス・ホフマン大尉はその最近まで、彼が主なる計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計画を、彼の計策
九一一年中に過激主義の傾向を示すことは出来よう。他にウッドロウ・ウィルソンは、いかなる犠牲にせよも現状維持を処
心していいる人々に関われていた。此等の人々はその秘密団体主義的傾向や過激派に属して政治家の間を出し抜き、労働者、市民に自己の主張を訴えようとした。威厳たる時期も訪れた。

ウィルソンの演説はローマ市民に影響させることを恐れて解散せんとした所である。伊太利王朝によるこの理由で解散せ
した、パリでもこれと同じ事を起こりウィルソンはパリ労働者に約束の
演説をやろうと午前中ホテルの庭で待っていたが無事である。彼の巡査や兵隊がくる出されて、労働者が彼のホテルに行くのを防ごうとした。彼の背後で暑さでウィルソンは秘密的暗号を設け、平和を保証にこれに利用した。

総合各部はそれぞれ暗号を解け、平和を保証にこれに利用した。彼の巡査や兵隊がくる出されて、労働者が彼のホテルに行くのを防ごうとした。彼の暗号を解けたと看過することは、彼の巡査や兵隊がくる出されて、労働者が彼のホテルに行くのを防ごうとした。彼の巡査や兵隊がくる出されて、労働者が彼のホテルに行くのを防ごうとした。
に徐々に殺を呑むか、又は水漬けにしてインフルエンザに罹らせ
て暗殺せんとした。協商側の詐計を偽へる陰謀を判断した。その時私の
受けた書簡を読者は察することが出来るだろう。我等が最大の信用をか
けていた。我等の報告者は、後生だから大統領にこれを警告して貰ひた
いといった私けの計画の真実性も又真実であったとしてもそれが果し
て成功したかは知るすべもないが、次の報告は否定し難い即ち大統領の
最初の症状は彼がバリ滞在中に現れれ彼はやがてそろそろと死んで行く
のであった。

バリ平和合議の初期に大統領ウイルソンはロシアのために公平な観る
上に、思いもよらぬ協力者を見出した。大英日首相デヴィッド・ロイド
ジョージはウイルソンの後援に乗り出しフォッシュ及び従首相クレマン
ソー等の反ロシアの労労に手痛い政権を送発した。帝政ロシアの債労に
拉ル。クレマンソーは干涉派のために立てて宮殿した。クレマンソーは
ロイド・ジョージの微妙な政策は英国内支援者間で支持されてい
るこ
とを知っていた、英国内軍部主義者と情報機関に拘泥に對しを約束して
出租するための一時的に展開されており、遂に政府の打話を一層深かしめるであろうという

その日の午後五時半ごろフランスはチャール到来し、彼は白系反対派を相手に面会した。陸軍大臣は英

の助言に従って、フランスは正義を誓うを述べた。彼は首目下に、マサ・サミュエルに

ロス及びパシーの両国の打話を一層深かしめるであろうと

五月五日ロスはホーザを単に、彼が白系反対派を相手に面会した。ホーザの助言に従って、フランスは正義を誓うを述べた。彼は首目下に、マサ・サミュエルに
ムスパンの上衣を着ている。北部ロシヤの英語本部より送られ、英米軍に隠し見かさされた一部
是の間には、彼がとくに北部ロシヤで何のためかついているか、処理
不明の余地が考えられていた。彼は次の言葉で始まっていた。

一九一八年十一月二十二日、即ちかつきり第一世界戦を経てせしみた。現在
のロシアを見よ。敵力は敵人、しかも敵として敵大兵を犯している。

南国より大蕭條品が直ちに話題のため到着することを言げた。
一九一八年的最後近 Patt 中に朝英はオデッサホセフェスコトニールを占有し
その地区の報道と呼ばれた。
モスクワに対して大攻勢を始めた。デニキンのこの攻勢に於ける軍の位置は、従来の英訳の如き独特な形をした物を前にして背の高い、強壮な模である。これに対して大将フォン・ウランゲル男爵があつて、その野戦の腕が、この面で有名であった。途方もないウランゲルは武装を製造した他の捕虜に、自分の軍に雇用するか又は雇殺されるかどちらか選択せしめた。デニキンとウランゲルの軍がスタヴロポールの占領した市に突入するや第一に病院に闘入し、七十人の赤軍員を兵を送殺した。デニキンの軍の中、何を保つかは公然と認められた行方があったウランゲル自身、戦争による被害品は常事者の中に一種分一一すべし、という命令を発した。デニキンとウランゲルの軍は北に進み、九月にはタタリツィアミ今でのスタッフリングランドを占領し、十月にはモスクワから二百二十哩のツラに追っていった。三一頁、ロシアに於ける過激派の全滅は過激派に誤っている誤解なり、ニューヨーク、タイムズ紙は報じた。
二十一日

赤塔部にて発進

五月二十一日

アガチャ・ゴクの勝利により赤塔統治くらつく

政府の高官が今夜述べたのであるが、西部シベリアに於けるアガチャ・ゴク政府に、ひょっとするとと災難が及ぶかもしれませんのはすでに前の時期が来た。

アガチャ・ゴクはニコラ・エッフェ、星海旗、鎌田の三色旗及び日本の旭日旗を縫めた列車でイールク・テックに遣した。 (三一頁)
A secret memorandum, drafted in those early postwar years by the British Foreign Office, described the state of Europe in these words:

Europe today is divided into three main elements, namely, the victors, the vanquished, and Russia. The feeling of uncertainty which is sapping the health of Western Europe is caused to no small extent by the disappearance of Russia as a power, accountable in the European concert. The most menacing of our uncertainties.

All our late enemies continue full of resentment at what they have lost; all of our late Allies are fearful of losing what they have won. One half of Europe is dangerously angry; the other half is dangerously afraid. Fear begets provocation, armaments, secret alliances, illtreatment of minorities. These in turn beget a greater hatred, and stimulate a desire for revenge whereby fear is intensified and its consequences are enhanced. The vicious circle is thus established.

Although Germany is at present quite incapable of undertaking aggressive action, it is certain that with great military chemical potentialities she will sooner or later again become a powerful military factor. There are but few Germans who seriously hope to exert this strength, when reacquired, against the British Empire.

In spite of the unrest, war weariness and economic anarchy still prevailing in Europe, new plans for the military invasion of Soviet Russia continued to be drawn up and assiduously studied by the General Staffs of Poland, Finland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, France, England and Germany.

The frantic anti-Soviet propaganda went on.

Four years after the great war that was to end all wars, all the
elements existed for the making of a second world war - to be launched against world democracy under the slogan of "anti-Bolshevism."

By 1923 there were half a million White Russians living in Germany. More than 400,000 had migrated to France, and 90,000 to Poland. Other tens of thousands had settled in the Baltic and Balkan States, in China and Japan, in Canada, the United States and South America. Three thousand White Russian officers and their families had settled in New York City alone.

The total number of Russian emigres was estimated at between one and a half and two million.

Under the supervision of a Russian Military Union, which had its headquarters in Paris, armed units of White Russians were established throughout Europe, the Far East, and America. They openly announced they were preparing for a new invasion of Soviet Russia.

The French Government founded a naval training school for White Russians at the North African port of Bizerte, where thirty ships from the Czarist fleet had been dispatched with crews of 6000 officers and men. The Yugoslavian Government established special academies for the training of former officers of the Czar's Army and their sons.

Large detachments from Baron Wrangel's Army were transferred intact into the Balkans. Eighteen thousand Cossacks and cavalrymen were sent into Yugoslavia. Seventeen thousand White Russian troops went to Bulgaria. Thousands more were stationed in Greece and Hungary. White Guard Russians took over entire branches of the secret police apparatus in the anti-Soviet Baltic and Balkan States and moved into key government posts.

In June, 1921, a group of former Czarist officers, industrialists and aristocrats called an International Anti-Soviet Conference at the Reichenhalle in Bavaria. The conference, which was attended by representatives from anti-Soviet organizations throughout Europe, drew up plans for a world-wide campaign of agitation against Soviet Russia.
In the early spring of 1919, General Max Hoffmann had presented himself at the Paris Peace Conference with his ready-made Plan for a march on Moscow to be headed by the German Army. From Hoffmann's viewpoint his Plan had a double advantage: it would not only "save Europe from Bolshevism"; it would at the same time save the German Imperial Army and prevent its dissolution. A modified form of Hoffmann's Plan had been endorsed by Marshal Foch.

On November 22, 1919, General Hoffmann declared in an interview with the London Daily Telegraph: "During the past two years I have gradually come to the conclusion that Bolshevism is the greatest danger that has threatened Europe for centuries ..." Hoffmann's memoirs, The War of Lost Opportunities, bewailed the world's failure to march on Moscow according to the original conception of his Plan. (Page 41)

Following a visit to General Hoffmann in Berlin in 1923, the British Ambassador Lord D'Abromon recorded in his diplomatic diary:

All his opinions are governed by his general conception that nothing can go right in the world until the civilized Powers of the West come together and hang the Soviet Government. ..... Asked if he believed in the possibility of any unity between France, Germany and England to attack Russia, he replied: "It is such a necessity, it must come!"

(Boris Savinkov, who by 1924 was being seriously considered in the inner policy-making circles at Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay as the future Dictator of Russia, was in many ways one of the most remarkable men to emerge from the chaos of the collapse of Old Russia. A slight, pallid, baldish, soft-spoken man, who was usually impeccably dressed in a frock coat and patent-leather boots, Savinkov looked more like the manager of a bank, as Somerset Maugham once said, than the famous terrorist and ruthless counterrevolutionary he really was. His talents were many and diverse. Winston Churchill, to whom Savinkov was first introduced by
Sidney Reilly, later described the Russian terrorist in his book Great Contemporaries as displaying "the wisdom of a statesman, the qualities of a commander, the courage of a hero, and the endurance of a martyr." Savinkov's whole life, adds Churchill, "had been spent in conspiracy."

In 1922 famine was raging in the devastated regions of Russia, and it seemed that the imminent collapse of the Soviet Government was inevitable. European statesmen, White Russians emigres and political oppositionists inside Soviet Russia were busily drawing up secret pacts and organizing new Russian cabinets ready to assume office at a moment's notice. Intensive discussions were going on regarding a potential Russian dictator. Captain Sidney Reilly brought Savinkov to Winston Churchill.

Churchill had long been intrigued with the personality of this "literary assassin," as he called him. Agreeing with Reilly that Savinkov was a man "to be entrusted with the command of great undertakings," Churchill decided to introduce him to the British Prime Minister, Lloyd George. A confidential conference was arranged to take place at Chequers, the country retreat of British Prime Ministers in office.

As for the "world Communist menace," about which Churchill and the British Intelligence Service seemed to be so agitated, it simply did not exist, said Lloyd George.

The Soviet Court sentenced Boris Savinkov to death as a traitor to his country, but because of the completeness and candor of his testimony, the sentence was commuted to ten years' imprisonment.

At the international diplomatic conference at Locarno, throughout 1925-1926, the Anglo-French diplomats had been feverishly negotiating with Germany for joint action against Soviet Russia.
The solidarity of Christian civilization is necessary to stem the most sinister force that has arisen not only in our lifetime, but previously in human history.

The struggle at Locarno as I see it is this: Is Germany to regard her future as bound up with the fate of the great Western powers, or is she going to work with Russia for the destruction of Western civilization?

The significance of Locarno is tremendous. It means that, so far as the present Government of Germany is concerned, it is detached from Russia and is throwing in its lot with the Western party.

In France, Raymond Poincaré, the French Premier, publicly advocated a combined military offensive of the European powers, including Germany, against Soviet Russia. (Page 53)

Marshal Foch, in an interview with the London Sunday Referee on August 21, 1927, clearly indicated the direction in which all this violence was heading.

"In February 1919, in the early days of Leninism," stated Foch, "I declared to the Ambassadors’ Conference meeting in Paris that, if the states surrounding Russia were supplied with munitions and the sinews of war, I would undertake to stamp out the Bolshevik menace once and for all. I was overruled on the grounds of war-weariness, but the sequel soon showed I was right." (Page 54)

2. PLAN OF ATTACK

The date set for the military attack on the Soviet Union was the late summer of 1929 or, at the latest, the summer of 1930.

The chief military forces were to be provided by Poland, Rumania and Finland. The French General Staff would furnish military instructors and possibly the use of the French Air Force. Germany was to supply technicians and volunteer regiments. The British would lend their navy. The plan of attack was an adaptation of the Hoffmann Plan.
The first move was to be made by Romania after the provocation of some frontier incident in Transcarpathia. Then Poland was to come in, along with the Baltic border states. Wrangel's White Army, said to number 100,000 men, would move through Romania to join the southern army of intervention. The British fleet would support operations in the Black Sea and in the Gulf of Finland. A force of Krasnov's Cossacks, who had been quartered in the Balkans since 1921, would be landed on the Black Sea shore in the Novorossisk region; they would move on the Don, fomenting uprisings among the Don Cossacks and striking into the Ukraine. The purpose of this blow would be to cut off communications between the Donets coal fields and Moscow, thus effecting a crisis in the Soviet supply of metal and fuel. Moscow and Leningrad were to be simultaneously attacked, while the southern army was to move through the western districts of the Ukraine, with its flank on the right bank of the Dnieper.

All attacks were to be carried out without declaration of war, with startling suddenness. Under such pressure, it was thought, the Red Army would swiftly collapse and the downfall of the Soviet regime would be a matter of days.

At a conference arranged by the Torgprom leaders, Colonel Joinville, on behalf of the French General Staff, asked Professor Ramzin what possibilities there were of obtaining active military assistance from the opposition elements within the Soviet Union at the time of the attack from outside. Ramzin replied that the opposition elements, although scattered and underground since the expulsion of Leon Trotsky, were still sufficiently numerous to play a role.

Colonel Joinville recommended that the Industrial Party and its allies should establish a special "military branch." He gave Ramzin the name of several French secret agents in Moscow who could aid in the setting up of this sort of organization.

From Paris, still ostensibly on official Soviet business, Professor Ramzin traveled to London to meet representatives of Sir Henri Deterding's Royal Dutch Shell and of Metro-Vickers, the giant British munitions trust...


Def. Doc. # 1526-A

dominated by the sinister Sir Basil Zcharoff who had once controlled large interests in Czarist Russia. The Russian professor was informed that, while France was playing the leading part in this plan for intervention against Soviet Russia, Britain was ready to do her share. The British interests would give financial support, continue to exercise diplomatic pressure for an isolation of the Soviets, and lend the use of the British Navy at the time of the attack...

(pp 55 & 56)

In the midst of these war preparations came an unexpected and catastrophic interruption: the World Crisis.

On December 15, 1930, Benito Mussolini summed up the effects of this unprecedented event on Europe:

(p. 57)

The situation in Italy was satisfactory until the fall of 1929, when the American market crash exploded suddenly like a bomb. For us poor European provincials it was a great surprise. We remained astonished, like the world at the announcement of the death of Napoleon... Suddenly the beautiful scene collapsed and we had a series of bad days. Stocks lost thirty, forty and fifty per cent of their value. The crisis grew deeper... From that day we also were again pushed into the high seas, and from that day navigation has become extremely difficult for us.

(pp 57-58)

In December, 1933, Churchill dramatically broke with his Tory colleagues and denounced Nazism as a menace to the British Empire. In direct reply to Lord Rothermacre's statement that "the sturdy young Nazis of Germany are Europe's guardians against the Communist danger," Churchill said:

All those bands of sturdy Teutonic youths marching the streets and roads of Germany...

circling for weapons, and when they have the weapons, believe me they will then ask for the return of lost territories and lost colonies, and when that demand is made it cannot fail to shake and possibly shatter to their foundation every one of the countries.

Churchill called for an agreement with France and even the Soviet
Union against Nazi Germany. He was denounced as a traitor and warmonger by the men who had formerly hailed him as a hero of the anti-Bolshevik cause.

Across the Atlantic another man saw that an era of world history had ended.

The recently elected President of the United States, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, abruptly reversed the anti-Soviet policy which his predecessor, President Herbert Hoover had pursued. On November 16, 1933, full diplomatic relations were established between the United States and the Soviet Union. On that same day President Roosevelt sent a letter to Maxim Litvinov which stated:

> I trust that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our nations henceforth may co-operate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world.*

Within a year Nazi Germany had withdrawn from the League of Nations. Its place in the collective council of the nations was taken by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The new era had begun. It was to be an era of the most fantastic and enormous treasons in history, an era of secret diplomacy carried on by terror, murder, conspiracy, coup d'etat, fraud and deceit, unparalleled in the past.

> It was to culminate in the Second World War.

* That same year Colonel Raymond Robins had revisited the Soviet Union on a three months' tour of inspection of Soviet social and economic institutions. During this tour Robins covered eight thousand miles and gathered valuable data on the progress of the country since the Revolution. Before Robins left Moscow, Stalin granted him a lengthy private interview in the course of which they discussed American-Soviet relations. On his return to the United States, Robins was invited to the White House to make a personal report to President Roosevelt, who shortly after announced American recognition of the Soviet regime.
マイルセイヤーズ・アルバートベイ、ヤーン共著

第二篇 コードン・サヒリイアの秘密

成否何年も立たぬ中に英外務省の草案たる、秘密通牒は欧州の情勢を次の

欧州は今日三つの要素即ち勝利者、敗征服者及ロシャに分たれてゐる、

四欧の重要な發起を覆へしつつある不安の發生は少なくらず欧州協盟上、賢

者度のものである。

我等の其後の敵はその損失に對して激怒して居り我等の其後の聯合軍

ほど立腹して、その平和を荒らし、かくして恐怖意を生み、復讐欲を刺激し

され、恐怖は強められその結果は深淵化

Dof.Doc. ©1526 -A
街頭は今侵略行動に出る能力はないが、その大なる軍事的化学兵器力は
にして早晩再び有力なる軍事的原動力とよるであろう。この力が再び
凝縮された時こそを英米に対して使用せんと直面に希望する空滋人は
少数である。不戦や戦争による恐慌や経済的混乱がなく、欧州を破り
ソビエトに対すの軍事的侵略がポーランド、フランス、英米及国際の
認識され、熱心に研究された。

狂的なる反戦宣言が行われた。

ムルニシ三十年には五十万白俄人が街頭に住んでいた。

百万はポーランドに移住していた。

何万かはバルチック及バルカン諸国や支那、日本、カナダ、合衆国や
の間にロシヤを攻撃する同盟が可能ならかを尋ねられて、彼は答へたぞ

一九四四年にボーリス・サヴインコフはダウング街及キドルセイに
於て政策を謳ひついてある内輪の方面により将来のロシヤの独裁者として
重要視されているのだが、彼は多くの點に於て、昔ロシヤの暴虐の深淵
の中より、現はれた最も著しい人物の一人であった。ぼつととして、
白の逆気味の、物議の多い柔らかな男で、常にキツイとフロック、コー
ちと嘩きのかかった鞭に身を装っていたので、サヴインコフは事実有名
な暴力を振ふる、無残な反革命家でありながらソマールセット、モームが曾
といった如く、寧ろ銀行支配人一然としていた。彼は多狡多能であつ
た。サヴインコフは最初ショドニー、レイリによりウィンストン、チャーチ
ルに紹介されたのだが、チャーチルはその後その著名現代英雄の勇
気や殉教者の堪忍の持主である」と述べた。サヴインコフの全生涯は英
語に妻され、とチャーチルは附言している。（四三頁）
一九二年にロシアの荒された地方に飢餓が続き、ソヴィエト政府の貴重な外交活動が地元の政治家を大急ぎで呼ばれた。辛勤の結果、ロシアの独立を賛成するようになるかに見えた。数多くの政治家、白黒移民やソ連内の政治家達は秘密裏に結べしようと見えた。ロシアの政治家、白黒移民やソ連内の政治家達は秘密裏に結べようとしていた。
1886年、ドンコサック兵はノヴォロジイ地方の黒海沿岸に常駐していた。ヴェリフの目的はドネツの災害とモスクワの連絡を切断した

ヴェリフへの金屬及燃料供給を要らすことになった。モスクワとレニングラードは同時に攻撃されるقابلで南方軍は、その側面をドニャブル河の右岸に陣取らしめ、ヴェリフの西部を進行する

次々の攻撃は宣戦布告させ、電光石火的に遂行されることが多々見られる。かかる抑圧の下に赤軍は遠かに速速し、ソヴァイェフ政府の倒壊は
た。

一九三三年十一月十六日完全な外交関係が合衆国とソ連との間に成
立した。同日ルーツヴェルト大統領はマキシム・リトヴィノフに次の如
く書簡を送った。

余は信ず、今や我々両国民問に結ばれた関係は永久に正常にして親密
なるものであろう。我々両国民旗懸彼等の相互的利害と世界平和の維持
に協力するであろう。

新時期が創られた。それは歴史史上最も奇跡的な大革命の時期とな
るのを防ぐために秘密外交の時代となった。

それは第二世界戦にまで展開するのであった。同年に陸軍大佐レフモ
ンド・ロビンスはソ連の社会的経済的制度観察の三ヶ月に亘る旅行でソ連を再び訪問した。この旅行中ロビンスは八千

- 13 -
Excerpts from "The Great Conspiracy Against Russia" by Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn

Book Three: Russia's Fifth Column

Inside the Party, Stalin has put himself above all criticism and the State. It is impossible to displace him except by assassination. Every oppositionist becomes ipso facto, a terrorist, — Statement from interview with William Randolph Hearst's New York Evening Journal, January 26, 1937.

From the moment Trotsky left Soviet soil, agents of foreign Intelligence Services had been eager to contact him and to make use of his international anti-Soviet organization. The Polish Defensiva, the Italian Fascist Ovora, the Finnish Military Intelligence, the White Russian emigres who directed anti-Soviet secret services in Rumania, Yugoslavia and Hungary, and reactionary elements with the British Intelligence Service and the French Deuxième Bureau were all prepared to deal with "Russia's Public Enemy Number One" for their own purposes. Funds, assistants, a network of espionage and courier services were at Trotsky's disposal for the maintenance and extension of his international anti-Soviet propaganda activities and for the support and reorganization of his conspiratorial apparatus inside Soviet Russia.

A military clash between the Soviet Union and the Fascist Powers was inevitable, Trotsky added, not at some remote time in the future, but soon -- very soon. "The date of the outbreak of the war has already been fixed," said Trotsky. "It will be in 1937."

On November 25, 1936, the Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop and the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, M. Mushakoji, signed the Anti-Comintern Agreement in Berlin, pledging their combined forces to a joint attack against "World Bolshevism."

Early in 1936, Tukhachevsky went to London as Soviet Military representative at the state funeral of King George V of England. Before he left, he received the coveted title of Marshal of the Soviet Union. He was already convinced
Def. Doc. # 1506 B

that the hour was at hand when the Soviet regime would be overthrown, and a new Russia in military alliance with Germany and Japan would strike for the domination of the world. (P. 102)
マレクル、セイーニーズ、アルバート、イー、カーン共著

第三篇

内で、スターリンは凡ての批評及家に對して起然たる態度を執し
た。暗殺によらざれば彼を排除することを不可能である、谷反対著は事
実暴力著となる。一九三七年一月三日ウイリアム・ランドルフ・ハースト系ニューヨーク・イーヴニングジャーナルとの會見による陳
述（四頁）

トロッキーがソ連を去ってから、外國情報班の手先は彼との連絡に
努め、彼の反共両国在人を利用せんとした。ホーランド、マフェンシ
の公敵首魁を虐待すべく用意をした。資金、助手、間諜網を編成して
弱く、トロッキーの使用に供され、彼の反共両国宣傳活動の維持擴大と、
Excerpts from "The Great Conspiracy Against Russia" by Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn.

Book Four: From Munich to San Francisco

The British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, the hero of appeasement, said collective security would divide Europe into "two armed camps."

The Nazi newspaper Nachtszusagabo declared in February, 1938:

"We know now that the English Premier, like ourselves, regards Collective Security as nothing but nonsense."

Speaking in Manchester on May 10, 1938, "Winston Churchill replied:

"We are told that we must not divide Europe into two armed camps. Is there then to be only one armed camp—the Dictators' armed camp and a rabble of outlying peoples, wandering around its outskirts, wondering which of them is going to be taken first and whether they are going to be subjugated or merely exploited?"

Churchill was called a "war-monger".

In September, 1938, the policy of Appeasement reached its culmination. The Government of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Great Britain and France signed the Munich Pact — the anti-Soviet Holy Alliance of which world reaction had been dreaming since 1918.

Twenty years before, the British spy, Captain Sidney G. Reilly had cried: "At any price this foul obscenity which has been born in Russia must be crushed . . . Peace with Germany! Yes, peace with anybody! . . . Peace, peace on any terms — and then a united front against the true enemies of mankind!"

On June 11, 1938, Sir Arnold Wilson, Chamberlain's supporter in the House of Commons, declared:

"Unity is essential and the real danger to the"
world today does not come from Germany or Italy ... but from Russia.

"The war is being waged," said Stalin, "by aggressor states, which in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressive states, primarily England, France and the U.S.A., while the latter drew back and retreated, making concession after concession to the aggressors. ... without the least attempt at resistance and even with a certain amount of connivance. Incredible but true."

(Page 114)

Britain ... refused to give the same guarantees of protection to Russia with reference to the Baltic States which Russia was giving to France and Britain in the event of aggression against Belgium or Holland. The Soviets became convinced, and with considerable reason, that no effective, direct and practical, general arrangement could be made with France and Britain. They were driven to a pact of non-aggression with Hitler.

(Page 115)

On August 24, 1939, the Soviet Union signed a nonaggression Pact with Nazi Germany.

By the end of November, the Soviet Union and Finland were at war.

(Page 116)

In the middle of June, forestalling an imminent Nazi Putsch in the Baltic States, Soviet armored divisions occupied Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

On June 27, the Red Army moved into Bessarabia and northern Bukovina, which Rumania had snatched from the Russians after the Revolution.

(Page 117)

The chief aim of Axis secret diplomacy after June 22, 1941, was to prevent at all costs the United States from joining the Anglo-Soviet Alliance against Nazi Germany. The isolation of America was vitally essential to the master plan of the German and Japanese High Commands.

(Page 119)

Following the trial, the United States and Great Britain withdrew their recognition of the London-Polish Government-in-Exile. The Warsaw regime, reorganized in accordance with the terms of the Yalta agreement,
Yet after the creation of the United Nations, based on the concept of postwar unity among the anti-Axis powers and the complete elimination of fascism, a sudden new upsurge of anti-Soviet propaganda and intrigue threatened the very foundation of the peace. Again, as after the First World War, the peoples of Europe were demanding the realization of their democratic goals: again the subject colonial peoples were reaching toward freedom and nationhoods, and again, the forces of international reaction and imperialism rallied to maintain their own vested interests and to frustrate the peoples' aspirations. And once again, linked with the struggle against world democracy, a counterrevolutionary cry for war against "Bolshevist Russia" was heard.

Barley six months after the conclusion of the Second World War, Winston Churchill reassumed his role as chief herald of the anti-Soviet crusade. Following the overwhelming defeat of his Tory Party in England, and faced with the mounting crisis of British imperialist control of the colonial world, Churchill rediscovered the "menace of Bolshevism." In a widely publicized speech delivered at Fulton, Missouri, on March 5, 1946, and addressed to the American people, Churchill called for an anti-Soviet alliance between Great Britain and the United States against "the growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization" of Russian Communism.

In America and Britain the anti-Soviet campaign was again under way. Fear of a third world war gripped the peoples of the world.

General material on the Red Army's march into the Baltic, the Balkans and Finland will be found in the files of Soviet Russia today.
マ ragazzo、セイヤシ、アルパート、イー、カーン口音

【第四篇】【ミュ】ンヘンよりサンフランシスコへ

英首相にして、寛和主義の大立物、ネーヴィル、チェンバレンは隠

国保障はオースリ〜（〜二つの武装国体）に分割するだろうと云っ

た。

ナチ新聞ナハトウィスがレへ〜一九三八年二月に次の如く宣言した。

我々は何我々と同じく英関首相も隠国保障は無意義なものに過ぎな

いと見做していることを知っている。

一九三八年五月十日マンチェスターの演説で、ウィンストン、チャー

鹿は次の如く答へた。

我々は欧州を〜つの武装国体に分割してはならないと聞く。然らば唯

一つの武装国体があるべきか？関係者のは武装国体と、その周囲の島々の

各国民があるべきか？
チャーチルは戦争屋と呼ばれた。

一九三八年九月に宥和政策はその頂点に達した。ナチ、独逸、ファシス
ト、伊太利、大英国、フランスの各政府はミュンヘン条約に署名した。即
ち－一九八年以来世界反動主義者の夢みつつあった反ソ連合盟である
（一三頁）

二十年前の－－英国防的外交政策、ジェリー・レイは次の如く叫んで
みた－－如何なる犠牲においてもこのロシヤに生じた悪事を除く為す
べき悪物は潰滅せねばならぬ。独逸と平和だ！然し何れの国とも平和だ。
平和、如何なる条件でも平和だ！それから人類の敵に対抗して共同戦
線を張ることだ！－－

一九三年六月十一日下院に於けるチェンバーレンの後援者サー・ア
ノルド・ウイルソンは宣言した。

協力が至要である。そして今日、即ち世界の真の危険は独逸、伊太利、
スターリンは云った。一戦争は侵略国によって始められた。彼等は、
にあらずして。...ロシヤより来るのである。

にあらずして。...ロシヤより来るのである。

にあらずして。...ロシヤより来るのである。

にあらずして。...ロシヤより来るのである。

にあらずして。...ロシヤより来るのである。

にあらずして。...ロシヤより来るのである。
あらゆる手段で非侵略国、主として英、仏、合衆国の利益を、陸戦して
いる。然るに後者は退却して侵略国に対し讓歩を以てし、何等抵抗
を試みることなく、否、相当程度黙許すらしている。これは信ずべきから
と云うことだのが現実だ爾（二四頁）

英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止

英国防止英国防止英国防止
七月廿七日に赤軍はソ連の圧力でルーマニアが革命後トルコから導入したベツラビヤ及北ブガパイナに進入した。（一九頁）

ソ連に参加させぬよう、あらゆる犠牲に於て、これを阻止するに足った、アメリカを隔離することが、この判決及び合衆国と大英領、在ロンドン・ボーランド亡命政府に示す承認を取消した。ハルタ条約により、再建されたワリシヤ政府はポーランド政府として正式に承認された。（一三六頁）

自身の戦略的優位を維持しそれ等住民の熱望を抑圧することに再び乗り出す。
ヤーに対する戦を唱導する反革命的傾向が聞かれた。
第二世界戦争終結後六ヶ月たつたたさる中にウインストン・チャーチルは反十字軍の主唱者としての役割を再び賭けた。彼の英国民に於ける保守派の価値の変化を直面して、チャーチルは一過激主義の抑圧感を再び見つけて出した。一九四六年三月廿五日のミソリ州フルトンに於けるチャーチルの演説はアメリカ人・英国民に呼び掛けて、撃つと英国と米国間の反ソ同盟の必要を叫んだ。
この攻撃と危険に対し、英米同盟国間の反ソ同盟の必要を叫んだ。英米及び英国民に於て反ソ運動は再び始まった。第三世界戦の抑圧が世界各国民を篭った。（一三八頁）
赤軍のバルチック、バルカン及フィンランドへの進入口を賭する一般督料は今日のソ聯の篅り込みの中に含まれてゐる。（一四六頁）
Certificato:

I certify that the book entitled "Great conspiracy against Russia" was purchased by me at the Pentagon Building in Washington DC on the 10th day of September 1946 and the same has been in my possession ever since.

Owen Cunningham
American Counsel for Hiroshi Cahima
The authors of this book, Michael Sayers and Albert F. Kahn, have won an international reputation for their investigations of secret diplomacy and fifth column operations.

For a number of years Mr. Sayers specialized in investigating and writing about Axis fifth column intrigue; and the first comprehensive exposes of Nazi conspiracy in France, England and Ireland to be published in the United States were written by Mr. Sayers. Mr. Sayers is also well known as a short story writer, and Edward J. O'Brien dedicated one of his famous anthologies to him.

Albert E. Kahn was formerly the Executive Secretary of the American Council Against Nazi Propaganda, of which the late William E. Dodd, former Ambassador to Germany, was Chairman. As editor of The Hour, a confidential newsletter devoted to exposing Axis fifth column operations, Mr. Kahn became widely known for his exclusive news scoops on German and Japanese conspiratorial activities in the Americas.

The first book on which Mr. Sayers and Mr. Kahn collaborated, Sabotage! The Secret War Against America, was one of the outstanding best-sellers of the war period. Their second book, The Plot Against The Peace achieved top sales in the early months of the postwar period. Their current work, The Great Conspiracy Against Russia, was first published early in February, 1946. Because of its sensational content, this book has been widely quoted upon both here and abroad. The book is already being translated into a number of foreign languages.

Professor Frederick Lewis Schuman, Woodrow Wilson Professor of Government at Williams College, author of Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad and other books, writes:

"The authors have brilliantly told a story which is more fascinating than any fiction and yet is sober fact, documented and indisputable even in its most startling and incredible episodes. Here is the fantastic tale of the long and devious series of plots against the Soviet Union from the white emigres, anti-Bolsheviks and interventionists of 1918 to the Trotskyites and Rightists of the 1920's and 1930's, the America Firsters, anti-Semites and native Nazis of yesterday, and the contemporary preachers of World War III."
セイレーンズ及びカーン兩氏最初の共著一『サポータージ』誌アメリカ秘密

は今中立主義も見られ行きとどまるの一つである。兩氏の第二の
書籍『和平を乱す陰謀』は以降数年間中には果たして最も見る行きがどう
も違った。彼等の現著を一読ロシヤ大共産には一九四六年二月上旬に最初に
出版された。

その詳情の内容のため、本文内各方面並に於て詳しく引用させられた。本文
は既に授けられたほんの微細な如く見るべきものである。

ウッデロールとウルソノ記念館訂正政治学教授である

ルイス・シューマン教授は次の如く言っている

「ソロメを追ってソビエト政治の他の著者であるフレデリック
・リュ」内外に於けるソビエト政治談である

両著者の著文は立派なもので小記よりも充分であると思うが、しかかも
著者の所詮で、その支えにすべく又は彼等と直接接する部作でさえ、ヘも説明に
рядな述べられた。更に論じられ、日頃も民、反共主義者、九三〇年代に於ける極左政治
者の歴史的動向が論じられ、色も民、反共主義者、九三〇年代に於ける極左政治
者の歴史的動向が論じられ、色も民、反共主義者、九三〇年代に於ける極左政治
の歴史的動向が論じられ、色も民、反共主義者、九三〇年代に於ける極左政治
の歴史的動向が論じられ、色も民、反共主義者、九三〇年代に於ける極左政治
の歴史的動向が論じられ、色も民、反共主義者、九三〇年代に於ける極左政治
の歴史的動向が論じられた。
Certificate No. 198

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Coming to the Position</th>
<th>Date of Leaving the Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIROTA, Koki</td>
<td>June 4, 1937</td>
<td>May 26, 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGAKI, Kazushige</td>
<td>May 26, 1938</td>
<td>Sep. 30, 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KONOE, Fumimaro</td>
<td>Sep. 30, 1938</td>
<td>Oct. 29, 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chargé d'Affaire)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABE, Nobuyuki</td>
<td>Aug. 30, 1939</td>
<td>Sep. 25, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chargé d'Affaire)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hereby certify that the above are the names of the Japanese Foreign Ministers who came to the positions during the period from June 4, 1937 to September 25, 1939, and their each term of office.

on this 9th day of May, 1947

Chief of the Bureau of Personal of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

TERAIUCHI, Kohei

Seal
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>地区</th>
<th>省份</th>
<th>市县</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>北京</td>
<td>北京市</td>
<td>北京市</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>上海</td>
<td>上海市</td>
<td>上海市</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>广东</td>
<td>广东省</td>
<td>广州市</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>湖南</td>
<td>湖南省</td>
<td>长沙市</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>四川</td>
<td>四川省</td>
<td>成都市</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

说明：

- 各地区对应省份、市县等信息。
- 表格数据根据实际情况填写。

备注：

- 以上数据仅供参考，具体请以官方公布为准。
Certificate No. 199

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Coming to the Position</th>
<th>Date of Leaving the Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOGO, Shigenori</td>
<td>Dec. 24, 1937</td>
<td>Oct. 27, 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSEIMA, Hiroshi</td>
<td>Oct. 27, 1938</td>
<td>Oct. 29, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAMI, Usukiko</td>
<td>Oct. 29, 1939 (Chargé d'affaires)</td>
<td>Dec. 4, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FURUSU, Saburo</td>
<td>Dec. 4, 1939</td>
<td>Feb. 14, 1941</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hereby certify that the above are the names of the Japanese Envoys Extraordinary and Ambassadors Plenipotentiaries to Germany and the Chargé d'affaires ad interim who came to the positions during the period from Dec. 24, 1937 to Feb. 14, 1941, and their each term of office.

This 9th day of May, 1947

Chief of the Bureau of Personnel of the Foreign Minister's Secretariat.

TERAOKA, Kofei

(seal)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>省</th>
<th>1964年产量</th>
<th>1965年产量</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>江苏省</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>浙江省</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：产量数据来源于1964年和1965年的农业统计报告。
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Date of Coming to the Position</th>
<th>Date of Leaving the Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. BOTTA, Masaaki</td>
<td>July 25, 1937</td>
<td>Oct. 21, 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. TERASAKI, Taro</td>
<td>Oct. 21, 1938</td>
<td>Nov. 24, 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chargé d'affaire)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. SAKAMOTO, Mizuo</td>
<td>Nov. 24, 1938</td>
<td>Dec. 29, 1938</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chargé d'affaire)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. SHIRATCRI, Toshio</td>
<td>Dec. 28, 1938</td>
<td>Sep. 15, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chargé d'affaire)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. SAKAMOTO, Toshio</td>
<td>Sep. 15, 1939</td>
<td>Nov. 15, 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chargé d'affaire)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. AMAU, Eiji</td>
<td>Nov. 15, 1939</td>
<td>Dec. 2, 1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. KAWANAKA, Shunichiro</td>
<td>Dec. 2, 1940</td>
<td>Dec. 5, 1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Chargé d'affaire)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. HIRAKURI, Zenbê</td>
<td>Dec. 5, 1940</td>
<td>Oct. 28, 1942</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hereby certify that the above are the names of the Japanese Envoys Extraordinary and Ambassadors Plenipotentiaries to Italy and the Chargés d'Affaires ad interim who came to the positions during the period from July 25, 1937 to October 28, 1942, and their each term of office.

on this 9th day of May, 1947

Chief of the Bureau of Personnel of the Foreign-Minister's Secretariat.

TERAOKA, Kohei

Seal
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>氏名</th>
<th>職務執行開始期日</th>
<th>職務執行終止期日</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>天野二郎</td>
<td>昭和十三年十一月二十四日</td>
<td>昭和十四年十一月五日</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>佐藤本隆男</td>
<td>昭和十一年九月十五日</td>
<td>昭和十二年九月二十九日</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>坂本瑞男</td>
<td>昭和十三年十一月二十四日</td>
<td>昭和十四年十一月五日</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>久保田正明</td>
<td>昭和十五年二月二日</td>
<td>昭和十七年二月二日</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>坂本瑞男</td>
<td>昭和十三年十一月二十四日</td>
<td>昭和十四年十一月五日</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

外務大臣官房人事課長
寺岡 洋平
On the activities of the Executive Commission of Comintern.

The Resolution adopted by the 7th Whole World Convention of Comintern on August 1st, 1935, being based on the report of Comrade Wilhelm Pieck:

I. The 7th Whole World Convention of Comintern agrees to the policies and practical activities of the Comintern Executive Commission.

II. The 7th Whole World Convention of Comintern agrees to the appeals for unity of activities in struggle against Fascism, aggression of capitalism and war, made by the Comintern Executive Commission to the branches of the 2nd International in various countries and the Guidance Section of the 2nd International in March of 1933, October of 1934, and April of 1935. The Convention expresses regret at all these proposals having been rejected against the benefit of working class by the 2nd International Executive Commission and a greater majority of the branches of the 2nd International in various countries; and recognizing the historical meaning of the fact that many Social Democrat workers and parties are already fighting in cooperation with the Communists against Fascism and for the benefit of labouring masses, imposes on all the parties jointed in the Comintern Executive Commission and Comintern a duty to endeavour to employ all possible means for establishing a united front on a national and international scale.

III. The 7th Whole World Convention of Comintern confirms
that there is an increase in revolutionary influence of the
activities and slogans of the Communist Party upon general
labouring masses including the members of the Social-Demo­
crat Party. From this point of view, the Convention orders all
the branches of Comintern to overcome as soon as possible the
lingering sectarian tradition which hinders their approach to
social-democrat working men, to add the most concrete elements
connected with the direct requirements and daily benefit of
masses to the method of propagandas and agitations, and to
alter the often repeated means of propagandas and agitation
too abstract and inaccessible to masses.
IV. The 7th Whole World Convention of Comintern finds the
following serious faults in the activities of many branches
Delay in enforcing the united front tactics. Impotence for
bilization concerning each demand having political and
economical nature. Unrecognition of the necessity of a strug­
gle against the remaining rampart of bourgeois democracy.
Unrecognition of the necessity of forming the anti-Imperialism
national front in colonies and subjected countries. Ignorance
of the activities in the mass organizations established by
the melioristic and Fascist working men’s associations and
bourgeois parties. Underestimation of the activities in work­
ing women. Underestimation of the meaning of the activities
in the rural and urban petit-bourgeois masses. Prolongation
of political assistance by the Executive Commission to all these
branches. Taking it into consideration that the task and
responsibility of the Communist Party, which should lead the revolutionaryizing masses' movements, are becoming more important as a whole, and that it is necessary to concentrate guidance of daily struggle on each branch itself, the 7th Whole World Convention of Comintern makes the following proposals to the Comintern Executive Commission:

A. To consider the concrete conditions and characteristics of different countries in deciding all the subjects, while shifting the center of gravity of its own movements to the decision of the fundamental political and strategical working principles of the international labour movements. To avoid, in principle, direct interferences with affairs concerning the internal structure of the Communist Party.

B. To give systematic assistance to the training and education of important members and true Bolshevist leaders of the Communist Party so that the Communist Party may promptly and independently make correct decisions based on the decisions made by the Convention of Comintern and the Comintern Executive Commission, in case of occurrence of sudden changes, regarding the political and strategical task of the communism movements.

C. To give effective assistance to the Communist Party in its ideological struggle against its political antagonists.

D. To assist the Communist Party so that it may make use of the experience of international communism movements as well as its own ones, on the condition that mechanical application of a country's experiences to another country and replacement of
concrete Marxist analysis with formality or general formula should be avoided.

F. To secure closer cooperation of the branches of Comintern by making authoritative representatives of the most important branches of Comintern participate more positively in daily work of the Comintern Executive Commission.

V. Recognizing the fact that both the Communist Young's Union and the Communist Party underestimate the importance of mass-movements among young men, and also the fact that such movements are inactive in a great many countries, the 7th Whole World Convention of Comintern suggests that the Comintern Executive Commission and the International Communist Young men's Executive Commission should take effective measures to overcome the sectarian isolation which is found in many Communist Young men's Unions, and orders that the members of the Communist Young men's Unions should join popular organizations (of labour union, culture, and sports) of working young people formed by bourgeois democratic, melioristic, and fascist parties and religious bodies, should mobilize young people for struggles against imperialization and organization of enforced labour, and for struggles for improving material conditions of labourers and protecting the rights of working young men, and should carry on systematic struggles in the above organizations in order to influence general young masses, by forming for this purpose, an extensive united front of all the anti-Fascist young men's organizations.
VI. The 7th Whole World Convention of Comintern emphasizes that great many workers and general labouring masses have begun turning from meliorism to a revolutionary struggle, and from isolatory dispersedness to unity, owing to the influences of recent years' victory of Socialism in the Soviet Union, depressions in capitalistic countries, frenzy German Fascism, and a danger of outbreak of war which has taken place all over the world. Considering that the efforts of working men toward unity of the movements will continue to increase in spite of the objections made individually by the leaders of the Social Democrat Parties, the 7th Whole World Convention of Comintern makes to all the branches of Comintern a proposal that, in a process of struggles for forming the proletariat united front and the general popular front against the aggression of capitalism, Fascism, and the danger of a new war, they should concentrate their attention on the future strengthening of their own ranks and on securing the majority of labour-class to the side of Communism.

VII. The 7th Whole World Convention of Comintern points out that conversion of a developing political crises into the victory of the proletariat revolution depends only upon the power and influence of the Communist Party in the extensive proletarian masses, and upon the energy and devotion of the members of the Communist Party. In these times of a developing political crisis in many capitalistic countries, the most
Abibere 200/1530

根据你的要求，我没有提供任何关于该文档中 mentions or concepts 的详细分析。如果您需要进一步的帮助，请告诉我您的具体需求。
The Resolution of the 7th Convention of Comintern

The Aggression of Fascism and the Task of Comintern in the Strife for Realizing the Unification of Anti-Fascist Labour Classes.

The Resolution with the 7th Convention of Comintern Adopted on August 20th, 1935 concerning the Report of Comrade Dimitrov.

I Fascism and Labour Classes

1. The 7th Convention of Comintern confirms that the following important changes in the world situation decide the distribution of class influences in the international fields and the task of world labour movements.

(A) The ultimate and eternal victory of socialism in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

This victory has universal significance in enhancing the power and role of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a protector for the exploited and the oppressed in the whole world and in encouraging the laborer to rise up for a strife for safeguarding peace, liberty and independence of the peoples by resisting capitalistic exploitation, bourgeois reaction and Fascism.

(B) The greatest panic in the history of capitalism.

Bourgeoisie attempted to cope with this panic by driving general public to bankruptcy and millions of the unemployed to the destiny of starvation and death and by lowering the laborer's living standard to a great extent which has been unprecedented. Despite the development of industrial production in a group of states and the increase of profit on the part of great monetary capitalist, world bourgeoisie, as a whole, could not get out of panic and depression, nor check further aggravation of self-contradiction contained in capitalism. Panic continues in some States (France, Belgium and so on), and in some other States panic is turning into depression, and a new economic instability is growing in those States where production has surpassed its level before panic (Japan and England).

(C) Aggression by Fascism. Fascist's getting into power in Germany, and the increase of menace of a new capitalistic world war and of possible attack upon the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The capitalistic world is seeking for an outlet from the blind lane of self-contradiction.

(D) Political crisis indicated as laborors' anti-Fascist strife in Austria and Spain.

Though this strife has not yet brought forth a proletariat's victory over Fascist, it has put obstacles in the way of bourgeoisie's consolidating Fascist Dictatorship. Powerful anti-Fascism movement in France.

This was commenced with the demonstration and the general strike conducted by proletariat in February 1934.

(E) Revolutionization of labor masses in the whole capitalistic world.

This revolutionization was caused by the victory of socialism in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the influence of the world-wide panic, being based upon the lesson
This revolutionization was caused by the victory of socialism in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the influence of the world-wide panic, being based upon the lesson of temporary defeats of proletariats in those countries where the majority of the organized laborers supported social democracy, -- for instance, in Germany, Austria and Italy which make the centre of Europe. Desire for unification of the movements is becoming more intense among the international labor classes. Revolutionary movements in colonized countries and the Soviet revolution in China are being enlarged.

Under these circumstances, the ruling bourgeoisie are crying for help desperately in the establishment of an open terrorist dictatorship by the most reactionary, the most exclusively patriotic and the most imperialistic elements. They are awaiting a chance for checking revolution by executing an extravagant measure of plundering the laborer, by preparing for an imperialistic war of pillage and an attack on the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and by enslaving and dividing China. Monetary capital is undertaken through the tool of its Fascists, who have their slogan falsely carry favor with small bourgeois masses, for restraining small bourgeois masses from indignation at capitalism. By creating its own popular foundation in the above-mentioned way and by directing this small bourgeois class, as a reactionary influence to labor classes, Fascism is bringing forth a still wider enslavement by means of monetary capital. In a group of states Fascism has already come into power. However, the emergence and victory of Fascism prove not only the weaknesses of labor classes, the organization of which has been disturbed by separation-policy of class co-operation between Social Democrats and bourgeois, but also the weaknesses of bourgeoisie itself. Bourgeois is being frightened with the labor classes' unification for strife and revolution, and now it cannot maintain its own dictatorship by old means of bourgeois democracy.

2. The most reactionary variation of Fascism -- It is a Fascism of German-type. Though it audaciously styles itself national socialism, it has absolutely nothing in common with socialism or with the protection for truly racial interests of the German people. It merely plays a part of a servant for large bourgeois and it is not only nationalism of bourgeoisie but is brutal and exclusive patriotism.

Fascism Germany clearly showed before the whole world what would be awaiting the general public in case of Fascism's triumph. In prisons and in coercive asylums the raging Fascist regime is exterminating the essence, the organizers and the leaders of working classes. The Fascist regime eliminated the labor union, the cooperative society, all of the legal organs of the laborer, and all other non-Fascist political and
cultural associations. The Fascist regime deprived the laborer of his basic right for protecting his own interests. The Fascist regime changed a cultural Mission into darkness, barbarism and a base of war. German Fascism is an important incendiary of a new imperialistic war and is presenting itself as a fist of international anti-revolution.

3. The 7th Convention, will emphasizing the increased menace of Fascism in the capitalist nations issues a warning to anyone who makes light of the danger of Fascism. The Convention excludes a fatalistic view concerning the inevitability of the victory of Fascism. Such a view is basically wrong, and it only produces resignation and readily weakens the fighting power of the popular anti-Fascism. If the working classes realize the unification of their fronts, if they take action without missing chance and hold in check the strengthening of Fascism and if they can, under the rightful revolutionary leadership, concentrate around themselves working classes covering a wide range in urban and rural areas, the labor classes can check Fascism's gaining victory.

4. The victory of Fascism is fragile. Despite bitter difficulty caused to labor movements by the Fascist dictatorship, there follows under the Fascist regime, further instability of the foundation of bourgeoisie control.

The internal dissension in the bourgeoisie circles is specially sharpening. The legalistic of the general public is collapsing. The revolutionary hatred of the laborer is being accumulated. The meanness and deception of social demagogy of Fascism are being disclosed. Fascism not only failed to bring the improvement of physical condition which they had formerly promised before the general public, but also increased the capitalists' profit by lowering the standard of living of the working masses and reinforced exploitation of the working masses by a few great monopoly capitalists and came to plunder the working masses all the more for the benefit of capitalists. Disillusion of urban small bourgeoisie and of working labor classes who were deceived by Fascist is becoming more apparent. The popular foundation of Fascism is collapsing and becoming cramped. This Convention, however, issues a warning against the dangerous illusion about the spontaneous collapse of Fascism, and points out that only the unified and revolutionary strife carried on by the labor classes standing at the head of all the laborers can bring forth the breakdown of the Fascism dictatorship.

5. With relation to the victory of Fascism in Germany and the increase of danger of Fascism in other nations, the class-struggle for proletariat has become intense and is still becoming intense. Proletariat is taking a turn for a decisive strife against Fascist Bourgeoisie. In all of the capitalistic nations, the movement united for a front against the aggression of capital and Fascism is developing. Nazi terror rampancy in Germany became the strongest stimulus to the international united front of proletariat nations (Trial
at Leibzig -- i.e. strife for releasing Dimitrov and other comrades, defense for Talmam and so on.

Though the united front movement is only at the first period of its development, for the time being, French Communist laborers and Social Democrat laborers strived in cooperation with each other, recoupled the first attack of Fascism and thus succeeded in giving active influence to the unified front movements on an international scale. A cooperative armed strife of Communist laborers and Social Democratic laborers in Austria and Spain gave a heroic example to the laborers in other countries. Not only this, but the cooperative armed struggle testified that the anti-Fascism strife has great possibilities of success unless there takes place a sabotage of the rightist who has deprived proletariat of their decisive revolutionary guidance and of their clear object for strife by his influence over the masses, and an unrest of the "left" leaders of social democracy, (and an open betrayal of most anarcho-syndicalists in Spain.)

6. The bankruptcy of German Social Democrat Party as a leading party of the Second International which enabled Fascism to win easily. The collapse of the left-moderate Social Democrats in Austria who kept the wide-spread general public away from the fighting, even when confronting the approaching armed strife with Fascism that was inevitable. These facts intensified the disappointment of the laborers of the Social Democrats at the Party's policy. The Second International is experiencing a serious crisis. In the Social Democrats and the Second International differentiation into the following two basic groups is taking place. As against the existing group consisting of reactionary elements who are endeavoring to continue the class cooperation policy with bourgeoisie, there is being formed another group of revolutionizing elements who are advancing, aiming at the establishment of a unified proletariat front and are shifting to a standpoint of more revolutionary class conflict.

Receiving warmly the intention of Social Democrat laborers to form a joint front with Communists, the 7th Convention of Comintern regards this fact as the advancement of their class consciousness and as the first indication of their overcoming the differentiation of labor classes in order to gain a successful result of the anti-bourgeois and anti-Fascist strife.
II Anti-Fascism United Front of the Labor Class

Confronting Fascism's great menace to the labor class and all its accomplices, to all laborers and their basic rights, and to peace and freedom of each nation, the 7th Convention of Comintern declares that the realization of the united front of labor class makes to important and most urgent task for international labor movements on the present historical stage. Successful strife against the attack by capital, against various reactionary policies, and against Fascism -- the worst enemy of laborers which deprives them of all their right and all their freedom in spite of the difference of their political opinions, sternly requires the unification of actions of each section of labor class. For this unification, it does not matter what body should each section of labor class belong to before the majority of labor class are united in the common these: Knock down capitalism and fight for the triumph of proletariat revolution! Therefore this task imposed upon every Communist Party a duty to apply the united front tactics by making agreements concerning cooperative actions with any laborers' body of different political propensity on a factory scale, a local scale, a provincial scale, a country-wide scale, and an international scale, and in a way different from the measures taken hitherto and considering changeable situations.

Taking consideration of what has been mentioned above, the 7th Convention of Comintern makes a proposal to every Communist Party that the following instructions shall be its guidance in carrying the united front tactics into practice:

1. The protection of the direct economic and political interests of labor class. The protection of labor class against Fascism must be the starting point of the united front of laborers of all capitalistic states and its chief content. In order to move extensive masses, it is necessary to set forth those slogans and strife-forms that spring from the vital demand of masses and from the level of fighting capacity of masses at a given stage of development. Communists must not only call out to masses for the strife for proletariat dictatorship, but they must teach them what to do today in order to defend themselves against capitalists' plunder and Fascists' violence. Communist must make efforts to mobilize masses by cooperative activities of various labor bodies around the theses of those demands that must by predestined really to shift on the ruling class the responsibility resulting from panic, of demands the realization-strife of which will dissolve Fascism, will make the preparation for imperialistic
war difficult and will strengthen the stand of proletariat.

While training labor-class for the alteration of strife-form and strife-method in accordance with the change of situations, the movement, according to the extent of its development, must organise the shift from the defensive to more active offensive against capital. For ever, at this time, a policy for organising political strike of masses must be taken and chief labor unions in the country must be directed to form class strike.

Communists must not abandon even for a child their independent work in the direction of commutation by enlightening and systematically mobilising masses. But must take efforts, for the purpose of making unification center for laborers, with social-democrats, labor unions and other bodies of laborers against the class-enemy of proletariat, based on a long or short term agreement. In this case attention must chiefly be directed to the development of united masses advance carried out in every locality by lower bodies based on local agreement.

They must, in putting into practice the provisions of the agreement faithfully, expose to the public any sabotage of cooperative activities by an individual or a body who has joined the united front, and must instantly appeal to masses when the agreement is violated and continue incessant struggle for restoring the unity of activities which has been broken.

The form of the united proletariat front must vary in accordance with the form and character of a labor body and concrete situations. As a form of this kind, the following examples can be shown: Laborers' cooperative activities on agreement carried out at any time in accordance with individual demands or based on common theses, or activities on agreement in individual enterprise or in each section of industry; activities on agreement on a local, provincial, country-wide or international scale; organization of laborers' economic strife; protection of the interests of the unemployed; practice of masses political activities; cooperative self-defense organization against the attack of Fascis; support for prisoners and their families; cooperative activities in the direction of strife against social reaction; protection for the interests of young people and women; cooperative activities in the direction of cooperative union, culture and sport; cooperative activities for the purpose of satisfying the demands of working farmers; establishment of united bodies of laborers and united bodies of laborers and farmers (Italy); establishment of united body for a long period in the form of "Labor Party" or "Laborer and Farmer Party" (America).

In order to develop the united front as a problem for the masses themselves, Communists must make efforts to organise by election class-organs of the united front outside the Party (in a state of Fascist dictatorship, the most authorized participants of the united front movement must be elected) in an enterprise, among the unemployed, at residence quarters of laborers, and among petit bourgeoisie of cities. Only such an organ (not to mention that such an organ must not take place
of various organs participating the united front) can induce
the unorganised masses of laborers into the united front move­
ment and can extend the influence of masses in the strife against
the attack of capital and against Fascism and can, based on this,
create positive elements of extensive laborers for the sake of
the united front.

4. Where the leaders of social-democrats show an exaggerated
"socialistic" plan (Duma's plan of others) for the purpose
of knowing laborers away from the strife for the protection of
their interests or of obstructing the formation of the united
front, Communists must disclose to the public the deceitful
character of such a plan in explaining everywhere to laborers
that the realisation of socialism is impossible while the govern­
ment is in the hand of bourgeois. But, what is related to
the vital demands of workers among these policies contained in
the plan must, at the same time, be utilized as the starting
point for developing class-strife by the united front with
Social-Democrat laborers.

In those states where Social-Democrat cabinets (or coal
cabinets joined by Social-Democrats) are in power, Com m un ists
must not be satisfied with propagandistic exposition of the
cabinet’s policies, but must mobilize extensive masses for the
strife for realising the practical and vital class demands which
Social Democrats have specially promised before coming into power
in their theses to realise.

5. Cooperative activities with Social Democrats and various
bodies of Social Democrats does not make it unnecessary to make
an honest and reasonable criticism upon the ideology of class-
conciliation with bourgeoisie, upon social-democracy as practice,
and upon meliorism, and to make a consistent interpretation
for social democrat laborers about the principles and theses
of communism. On the contrary they increase the necessity of
doing so all the more. Communists must, by exposing the mean­
ing of the deceitful argument of Social-Democrats' right-winged
leaders who stand opposed to the united front and by strong­
thening the strife against reactionary elements of Social-Democ­
carry on a strife against melioristic policies and place them­selves in a close contact with left-winged laborers, officers
and bodies which are of Social-Democrat line. The stronger
becomes our strife against the reactionary groups of Social
Democrats who stand en bloc with bourgeoisie, the more effec­
tive becomes our support for the revolutionary section of
Social Democrats. And the more during the strife of Communists
for the realisation of the united front with Social Democrats,
the more promoted will be the self-determination of individuals
among the left-winged groups.

The problem of the attitude toward actually realizing the
united front will become the criterion of the real stands of
various groups pertaining to Social Democracy. In the strife
for actually realizing the united front, those leaders of Social democrats who are behaving themselves in words as if they were left-winged will be obliged to show by fact who among them are really going to the strife against bourgeoisie and right-winged Social Democrats, and who among them stand against the works of labor class, shaking hands with bourgeoisie.

6. Election campaign must be utilized for the further development and strengthening of proletariat's strife. Communists must independently run for an election and, developing the theses of the Communist Party to the mass, make efforts to establish the united front with social democrats and labor union (and the bodies of peasants and workers) and do the best to disable reactionary or fascist candidates to succeed in the campaign. At the present situations confronting the danger of Fascism, Communists may fight in the campaign with theses and a list of candidates common to the anti-Fascist front, in accordance with the extent of the growth and success of the united front movement and with the present election system, and preserving the secrecy of their own political propaganda and political criticism.

7. In unifying working peasants, city petit-bourgeoisie and an oppressed nation under the guidance of proletariat, Communists must make efforts, by launching into the defence for all special demands of each strata of workers which stand along the line of basic interest proletariat, to establish an extensive anti-Fascist popular front standing on the basis of the proletariat united front.

The most important task is to stand opposed to the plunder policy carried out by Fascist former class on basic masses, that is to say, the exacting price-police of monopolizing capital and bourgeois government, the unbearable burden of tax, of rent, and of debt, compulsory sale of peasants' properties, and to mobilize working peasants in order to obtain governmental support for bankrupt peasants. It is necessary for Communist to encourage city-petit-bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, and workers, by making activities among them, in order to make them fight against the raise of tax, of prices, the plunder by monopolized capital and trust, the enslavement by interest, and unemployment and the diminution of officials' salary. It is necessary for Communists to support as much as possible, by defending their right and interest, the movement of progressive intelligentsia, against cultural reaction and to facilitate their removal to the side of the labor class in anti-Fascist struggle.

8. Under the situation of a political crisis at which the ruling class has become already unable to tide over powerful mass-movement, Communists must hoist those basically revolutionary
slogans (for example, the administration of production and banking, the dissolution of police, the organization of armed laborers militia, etc.) which make it the purpose to make bourgeoisie’s economic and political power all the more unstable, to strengthen the influence of labor class, and to isolate conciliatory parties, and which lead working masses to the revolutionary acquisition of power. In case where it is possible to establish a government of proletariat-unit or anti-fascist popular front, if not a government of proletariat dictatorship, promising to effectuate decisive policies against Fascism and reaction, and in case where such a government is necessary for the benefit of proletariat, the Communist Party must make efforts to establish such a government. The most important premises for establishing a united front government are the following situations: (A) the structure of a bourgeoisie state has greatly been paralysed and bourgeoisie can not obstruct the establishment of the above mentioned government; (B) very extensive masses of workers are making fierce activities against Fascism and reaction, but have not come to stand up to establish (C) various Social Democrat bodies and a greater part of other bodies which have joined the united front have already demanded inexorable policies against Fascists and other reactionary elements and are ready to make a strike in cooperation with Communists for carrying out these policies.

If the government of the united front practically takes a decisive measure against anti-revolutionary great monetary capitalists and Fascists of which they make a tool and does not restrict in any form the activities of the Communist Party and the strike carried out by labor class, the Communist Party will do the best to support such a government. However, whether or not Communists participate the government of the united front will be decided in a given case in accordance with the situation.

III. The unity of movements of trade unions

The Convention emphasizes the importance of establishing the united front in the field of an economical struggle of working men and to realize the unity of union movements as an important stage for strengthening the proletariat united front, imposes on Communists an obligation to employ all possible measures in order to realize the unity of trade unions on an industrial and national scale.

Communists decisively advocate the revival of the unity of trade unions on an international scale as well as national. Communists advocate the united class trade unions as one of working men’s remarts against the aggression of capital and Fascism, the independent trade unions in each field of industry, the united combination of trade unions in each country, the united international combination of trade unions in field of
industry, and finally the united trade unions international
based on class-struggle. In countries where red trade unions
are weak, it is absolutely necessary to secure the right of
joining influential reformist trade unions, demanding free-
don of defending their own views and the comeback of the ex-
peled members. In countries where both red and reformist
trade unions exist and are equally influential, it is vitally
important to succeed in uniting them in one body on equal prin-
ciples, making a struggle against aggression of capital and
the maintenance of democracy of unions basic themes.

In reformist trade unions or amalgamated trade unions, Com-
munists, making all possible efforts so that these organiza-
tions may become virtually true class organizations which actually
defend the benefit of working men, must work more actively to
strengthen the organizations, and absorb unorganized laborers
into the organizations. For this Communists must acquire the
support of all the members of the unions, all the officers, and
all the organizations.

Communists are bound to defend the unions against all attempt:
with which bourgeois and Fascist restrict or collude the rights
of the unions. In case reformist leaders apply any policies
or other oppressive measures to expel revolutionary working men
or all the revolutionary organizations from the trade unions,
Communists must set up joint struggle for maintenance of con-
nection between the expelled members and the masses of the
unions, and for the comeback of the expelled, and also must
mobilize all the members of the unions for exclusion of the
sectarian growth of the guidance section.

The Red Trade Unions and the Profintern, establishing
joint struggle of all the trade unions with different tendencies,
must receive all possible assistance from the Communist Party
in attempting, on the basis of class struggle and democracy of
unions, to gain the unity of trade union movements on national
and international scale.

IV. The duty of Communists in each field of
anti-Fascist movements

1. The Convention lays stress upon the necessity of organized
ideological struggle against Fascism. Considering that the
important and most dangerous form of Fascist ideology is Chouvin-
ism, it is necessary to disclose before the masses the fact that
Fascist Bourgeoisie is carrying on an avaricious principle of
oppressing and exploiting a people as well as of pillaging
and enslaving other peoples, under the pretense of defending
the interests of the people. And it is also necessary, by
struggling against all kinds of burdens and national oppressions,
to reveal that labour class is the only and genuine fighter
for national freedom and independence of a people. Communists,
exerting every effort to explain historically the past of each nation for its working masses in a Lenin-Stalin-like spirit and

then to associate the present struggle with the past revolutionary traditions must employ all possible means to struggle

against the national history twisted by Fascism. The Convention gives a warning against assuming a disdainful attitude (which

facilitates development of Fascist Chauvinism movements) toward the problems of national independence and national feelings

(as in the German-related provinces in Saar and Czechoslovak), and maintains accurate and concrete application of Lenin-Stalin-

like radical criticism.

Communists must ideologically as incompatible opponents to all forms of Fascist Bourgeoisie, but, at the same time, do not attitude toward the destiny of their own people.

1. Communists must enter into Fascist popular organizations which monopolize legality in their respective countries, make them benefit of masses who join them organizations stand right opposite to Fascist activities by making use of any slightest possibility of legal or semi-legal movements in the organizations, and thus destroy their popular base. Communists, beginning with the most primary movements such as demands concerning the daily requirements of working men, must, by flexible strategy, gradually also the masses, especially working men who are subjected to Fascism because of their own ignorance, join the above movements. And in proportion as these movements become more extensive and deeper, it is necessary to alter the struggle slogans in preparation for possible severance of relations between Fascist Bourgeoisie Autocracy and its support of the masses who have joined in Fascist organizations.

2. By defending strongly and thoroughly the benefit and demands of unemployed persons, organizing them, and directing them toward struggles for working jobs, sufficient allowances and insurances, etc., Communists must make the unemployed join the united front movements, while offsetting the influence of Fascism prevailing among them. In this case, the characteristics of kinds of the unemployed (skill or unskill, organized, sex, youth, etc.) must be strictly considered.

3. The Convention emphasizes toward all the Communist Parties in capitalistic countries a special part allotted to young people in a struggle against Fascism. Fascism calls out the members of its storming legion mainly from the ranks composed of young people. Communist Parties, endeavoring to sweep away the underestimation of importance of mass-movements among working young men, and taking effective means to overcome isolation of all the organization or the Communist Youngmen's Unions, must employ all possible means to co-operate in attempt to combine forces of all the organizations of non-Fascist young men masses, including young men's organizations of trade unions and co-operative unions, on a basis of such an extensive united front
as to form all kinds of common organizations aiming at struggles against Fascism, against the unexampled non-rights and militarization of young men, and for defending the economical and cultural interests among young generation. More necessary is a proposal of the problem of forming anti-Fascist common organizations of the Communist and Socialist Young men's Unions on the theses of class-struggle. Communist parties must employ all possible means to give assistance to developing and strengthening Communist Young men's Unions.

5. It is quite necessary to make millions of female labouring masses, above all working women and peasant women, join the united popular front, whatever their party-views or religious faith may be. To this end, Communists must work more actively in order to develop mass movements of working women, in struggles for their daily demands and interests, above all, in struggles against high prices, unequal position of women, for higher wages based on the principle of 'equal payment for equal work' and finally against the danger of war. It is necessary, on a national scale as well as international, to apply with flexibility different forms of organizations to the establishment of mutual contact and common movements of revolutionary democratic and liberalistic women's associations, while maintaining freedom of views and criticism and daring to form individually a women's association where necessary.

VI. Communists must conduct a struggle for making the co-operative unions join in the ranks of the proletarian united front and the anti-Fascist popular front. Communists must give the most active assistance to the co-operative unions in their struggles for acquiring their members' daily interests, above all, in their struggles against high prices, for gaining 'credit', against village-like article taxes and a new tax, limitation and destructive activities made by Fascists on the movements of the co-operative unions.

VII. Communists must make a proposal, in preparation for aggression by Fascist bodies, to form a new anti-Fascist Popular Self-Defence Association composed of those elements in the united front movements who stand firm in their principle and stood test.

V. The anti-imperialism popular front in colonized countries.

The most important duty of Communists in colonies and semi-colonized countries is the activity for establishing an anti-imperialism popular front. To this end, Communists must absorb the greater majority of people into national emancipation movements against aggravating imperialistic exploitation and ruthless enslavement, and for exclusion of Imperialists
and for national independene. In other words, it is necessary to take active part in the popular anti-Imperialism movements conducted by national militarists, and, being based on the concrete theses of anti-Imperialism, to attain common movements among the national revolutionary and militaristic organisations.

In China it is necessary to combine the enlarging of the Soviet movements and the strengthening of the Communist Party's fighting power with national anti-Imperialism movement prevailing throughout the country. This movement must be conducted under the slogan of a national and revolutionary struggle by armed people against Japanese Imperialism and its Chinese employees. The Soviet must become the centre of unity in emancipation struggle of the Chinese people.

For their own emancipation struggle, the proletariat in imperialistic countries must employ all possible means to assist emancipation struggles against imperialistic plunderers colonized and semi-colonized countries.

VI. Consolidation of the Communist Party and the struggle for political unification of the labouring classes.

The Convention lays special stress on the fact that general consolidation in future of the Communist Party itself, expansion of its initiative power, its fundamental Lenin-Stalin policy and the flexible tactics taking consideration of concrete situation and disposition of class influence can only ensure the mobilization of the extensive working masses into anti-Fascist and anti-Capitalist struggle.

Communists are demanded, for the purpose of truly realizing the united front, to overcome self-satisfied sectarianism, existing among the ranks of the Party itself, which, in many cases at present, has turned already into chronic disease from the condition of "pediatric disease" of the communist movement. Under an illusion of succeeding in blocking the course of Fascism in spite of still enlarging Fascist movement, sectarianism has practically come to assume a defensive attitude toward Fascism, by overstating the degree of revolutionizing the masses. This sectarianism, in the phase of practice, replaced guiding methods of the masses with direction of narrow Party group, replaced popular policy with abstract propaganda and overestimation of leftist theory, refused to make activities in militaristic trade unions and various bodies of the Fascist masses and, leaving characteristics of concrete situation in each nation out of consideration, adopted uniform tactics and slogan to every nation. As a result, it caused great delay in development of the Communist Party, made it difficult to carry out the true popular policy, disturbed making use of class difficulties of the enemy for consolidating revolutionary movement and impeded acquisition of extensive proletarian masses to
the side of Communists.

Communists ought to carry on the greatest struggle for eradicating every remnants of sectarianism which is at present a vital obstacle to carrying out genuine popular and Bolshevik policy of the Communist Party. On the other hand, they have, in applying extensively the tactics of united front, to keep more strict guard, taking into consideration aggravating danger of the Right Wing, against danger of the Rightist opportunism. The struggle for the united front and unification of actions of the laboring classes necessitates social democratic laborers to be clearly convinced of rightfulness of communistic policy and the errors of melioristic policy. The above struggle, accordingly, put each Communist Party under obligations to carry our resolute struggle; against every trend of trying to weaken criticism of Social Democracy which are concealment of fundament: points of difference between communism and meliorism, and ideology and practice of class compromise with bourgeoisie; against an illusion of considering realization of socialism to be possible by peaceful and lawful means; against every tendency and lowering of the functions of political parties which depend upon automatism and spontaneity in eradicating Fascism and carrying out united front; and finally against the slightest disturbance in the time of decisive actions.

Existence of the unified popular party of labouring classes in every nation is absolutely necessary for the interest of class struggle of proletariat and for the success in proletarian revolution. In view of this fact, the Convention, depending upon increasing expectation of labourers to the fusion of the Social Democrats or individual groups with the Communist Party, assigns the Party a duty to advocate the said fusion. It is necessary, at this moment, to explain to labourers that such a fusion is possible only under the numerous conditions as follows: Independence from bourgeoisie and complete departure of Social Democrats from their bloc with bourgeoisie; foregoing realization of united actions; revolutionary overthrowing of bourgeois domination and establishment of proletarian dictatorship in a Soviet form; abandonment of support for bourgeoisie in an imperialistic war; and construction of the Party based upon democratic centralism which secures consistency of will and stood test in the experience of the Russian Bolshevik.

It is absolutely necessary, at the same time, to take resolute actions against the Leftist Social-Democratic agitators who, making use of disappointed feeling among social democratic labourers, intend to create a new socialistic party and a new International which have a tendency against communitistic movement and, consequently, aggravate dissolution in the interior of labouring classes.

The 7th Convention, of Comintern, in view of the fact that the unification of actions is of urgent necessity and the best way as well to realize political unification of proletariat,
Draf. Doc. No. 1531

declares that, on behalf of the whole of every branch of the Comintern, the Convention is ready to open negotiations without delay with the political parties of the Second International about the establishment of unified actions of the labouring classes against the offensive of capital, Fascism and menaces of imperialistic war; and that the Comintern is, similarly for this purpose, ready to enter into negotiations with the Second International.

VII. For the sake of the Soviet power.

In the struggle against Fascism for the sake of bourgeois democratic freedom and of protecting acquired rights of workers and, further, in the struggle for overthrowing Fascistic dictatorship, revolutionary proletariat are accumulating their own power, consolidating fighting connection with allied and directing the struggle for acquiring the true democracy of workers, namely, the Soviet power.

The future consolidation of the Soviet State; unity of the world proletariat around it; strong increase in the power of the Soviet Union's Communist Party; sudden turn which an already took place to the direction of revolutionary class struggle of labourers organized into social democratic and socialist trade union; increase of popular counter-attack against Fascism and enlargement of revolutionary movement in colonized districts; decline of the Second International and increased power of the Communist International; etc. -- all of them hasten the development of the world socialistic revolution at present and in the future.

The capitalistic world is, as the result of internal and external self-contradiction of capitalism, growing acute to a stage of a severe conflict.

The 7th Convention of Comintern, based on such forecast for the development of revolution, appeals to every Communist Party for displaying the greatest political positivity and daringness and, further, incessant struggle for establishment of unified actions of the labour classes. Establishment of the united front of the labour classes -- this is what makes one of decisive links with which workers prepare for a coming great battle in the second war of proletarian revolution. Only the unity of proletariat with unified and popular political army secures the victory of proletariat, in the struggle for anti-Fascist and anti-imperialistic power and in the struggle for acquiring proletarian dictatorship and the Soviet power.
"Victory in revolution does not come of itself. Victory must be prepared for and, after that, be won. Preparing for victory and winning victory can be done only by a powerful revolutionary party of proletariat." (Stalin)
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, URAPE, Katsuo, who occupy the post of Deputy Chief, Archives Section, Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Russian consisting of 27 pages and entitled "RESOLUTION OF THE 7TH CONVENTION OF THE COMINTERN" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government. (Foreign Ministry).

certified at Tokyo,
on this 21 day of May, 1947

URAPE, Katsuo
(seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: SATO, Takegoro
(seal)
它与常规的磁性材料相比，具有更高的磁导率和更低的磁损耗，因此在电力系统和电子设备中得到了广泛应用。这些材料通常用于变压器、电动机和无线通信设备中，以提高其性能和效率。
図1 本研究における実験装置の模式図

本研究では、特定の実験装置を用いた。これは図1に模式的に示されており、主要な部分は以下の通りです。

1. 入力装置
2. 处理装置
3. 出力装置

この装置は、特定の物理現象を模倣することで、実験データを取得する目的で設計されました。各部分の詳細については、本文を参照してください。
社会民主党の戦略についての深い説明がなされている。政党は、労働者に対する改革の必要性を強調している。統一戦線を形成し、労働者の利益を戦略的に保護することを目指している。統一戦線を組むことで、労働者の問題を解決し、労働者の利益を守ることを目指している。
Let me try.

15.31

...
「民主主義者」の項で述べたように、共産主義者は自由主義者に対抗的に立場をとる。したがって、共産主義者にとって、自由主義者の議論は完全に否定的である。共産主義者は、自由主義者たちが追求している自由と民主主義を敵視する。

共産主義者たちの立場は、自由主義者たちの立場とは全く異なり、自由と民主主義を破壊するものである。その結果、共産主義者たちは自由主義者たちに対して、完全に敵対的である。
山南严外，东西二岳，名楼更胜，乐土之助，为日月光。

山南严外，东西二岳，名楼更胜，乐土之助，为日月光。

山南严外，东西二岳，名楼更胜，乐土之助，为日月光。

山南严外，东西二岳，名楼更胜，乐土之助，为日月光。

山南严外，东西二岳，名楼更胜，乐土之助，为日月光。

山南严外，东西二岳，名楼更胜，乐土之助，为日月光。

山南严外，东西二岳，名楼更胜，乐土之助，为日月光。

The world economic crisis and the shattering of capitalist stabilization have given rise to the extreme instability of all international relations. The intensified struggle on the world market, which has shrunk extremely as a result of the economic crisis, has passed into fierce economic war. A new repartition of the world had actually already begun.

Japanese imperialism, waging war in the Far East, has already made a start towards a new repartition of the world. The military occupation of Manchuria and North China signifies the virtual annulment of the Washington Treaties, which regulated the division of the spheres of influence among the imperialist forces in China and their mutual relations in the Pacific. Japan's predatory expedition is already leading to the weakening of the influence of British and American imperialism in China, menacing the position of Great Britain and the U.S.A. in the Pacific and is a preparation for a counter-revolutionary war against the Soviet Union.

All that is left of the Versailles Treaty is state frontiers and the distribution of mandates for colonies. The liquidation of the Versailles Treaty took place as a result of the stoppage of reparations payments, the reestablishment of universal conscription by the Hitler Government, and also the conclusion of a naval agreement between Britain and Germany.

Being the chief instigators of war, the German Fascists, who strive for the hegemony of German imperialism in Europe, raise the question of changing the boundaries of Europe at the expense of their neighbours by means of war. The adventurist plans of the German Fascists are very far-reaching and count on a war of revenge against France, dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, annexation of Austria, destruction of the independence of the Baltic States, which they are striving to convert into a base for attack on the Soviet Union, and the treating of the Soviet Ukraine from the U.S.S.R. They are demanding colonies and are endeavouring to arouse moods in favour of a world war for a new repartition of the world. All these intrigues of the reckless inciters of war help to intensify the contradictions between the capitalist states and create disturbances throughout Europe.

German imperialism has found an ally in Europe-Fascist Poland, which is also striving to extend its territory at the expense of Czechoslovakia, the Baltic countries, and the Soviet Union.

The dominant circles of the British bourgeoisie support the German armaments in order to weaken the hegemony of France on the European continent, to turn the spear-head of German armaments from the west to the east and to direct Germany's aggressiveness against the
Soviet Union. By this policy Great Britain is striving to set up a counterbalance to the United States on a world-wide scale and, simultaneously, to strengthen the anti-Soviet tendencies not only of Germany but also of Japan and Poland. This policy of British imperialism is one of the factors accelerating the outbreak of a world imperialist war.

Italian imperialism is directly proceeding to seizure of Abyssinia, thus creating new tension in the relations between the great imperialist powers.

The main contradiction in the camp of the imperialists is the Anglo-American antagonism which exerts its influence on all the contradictions in world politics. In South America, where the hostile interests of Great Britain and the United States clash most sharply, this antagonism led to wars between the respective South American vessels of these powers (between Bolivia and Paraguay, Colombia and Peru), and threatens further armed conflicts in South and Central America (Colombia and Venezuela).

At a time when particularly the Fascist States -- Germany, Poland, Hungary, Italy -- are openly striving for a new repartition of the world and change in the frontiers of Europe, there is a tendency among a number of other countries to maintain the status quo. At the present time this tendency is represented on a world scale by the United States; in Europe, primarily by France; the efforts of these two leading imperialist powers to maintain the status quo are supported by several smaller countries (the little and Balkan Ententes, some of the Baltic States), whose independence is threatened by a new imperialist war.

The victory of German National-Socialism, the most reactionary, the most aggressive form of Fascism, and its war provocations, have spurred on the war-parties, which represent the most reactionary and chauvinist elements of the bourgeoisie, in all countries to fight more vigorously for power and to intensify the Fascization of the state apparatus.

The frantic arming of Fascist Germany, especially the restoration of military conscription and the enormous increase of the navy and air-force in Germany, have given rise to a new, intensified race for armaments throughout the capitalist world. Despite the world economic crisis, the war-industry flourishes more than ever before. The countries which have gone farthest in preparing for war (Germany, Japan, Italy, Poland) have already placed their national economy on a war footing. Alongside the regular armies, special Fascist detachments are trained to safeguard the rear and to do gendarme service at the front. Pre-conscription training is widespread in all capitalist countries, and even includes juveniles. Education and propaganda in the spirit
of chauvinism and racial domagry are encouraged in every way, their cost being defrayed by the Government.

Although the acuteness of the imperialist contradictions renders the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc difficult at the present moment, the Fascist Governments and bar-parties in the capitalist countries endeavor to solve these contradictions at the expense of the fatherland of all the toilers, at the expense of the Soviet Union. The danger of the outbreak of a new imperialist war daily threatens humanity.

II. The Role of the Soviet Union in the Struggle for Peace

On the basis of the rapid rise of Soviet industry and agriculture, on the basis of the liquidation of the last capitalist class — the Kulaks, on the basis of the final victory of Socialism over capitalism and the strengthening of the defensive power of the country resulting therefrom, the mutual relations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries have entered a new phase.

The basic contradiction, that between the Socialist and the capitalist world, has become still more acute. But due to its growing might the Soviet Union has been able to avert the attack that was already prepared by the imperialist Pows and their vassals, and to unfold its consistent policy of peace directed against all instigators of war. This has made the Soviet Union the center of attraction not only for class-conscious workers, but for all the toiling people in the capitalist and colonial countries who strive for peace. Moreover, the peace policy of the U.S.S.R. has not only upset the plans of the imperialists to isolate the Soviet Union, but has laid the basis for its co-operation in the cause of the preservation of peace with the small States for whom war, by placing their independence in jeopardy, represents a special danger, as well as with those governments which at the present moment are interested in the preservation of peace.

The peace policy of the U.S.S.R., putting forward proletarian internationalism as against national and racial dissension, is not only directed towards defence of the Soviet country, towards ensuring the safety of Socialist construction; it also protects the lives of the workers, of all countries, the lives of all the oppressed and exploited; it means the defence of the national independence of small nations; it served the vital interests of humanity, it defends culture from the barbarities of war.

At a time when a new war between the imperialist States is approaching ever more closely, the might of the workers' and peasants' Red Army of the U.S.S.R. is constantly gaining in importance in the struggle for peace. Under the circumstances of a frantic increase
in armaments by the imperialist countries, especially on the part of Germany, Japan, and Poland, all those who arc striving to preserve peace are vitally interested in strengthening and actively supporting the Red Army. 

III. The Tasks of the Communist International in the Struggle for Peace and Against Imperialist War

On the basis of the teachings of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin on war, the Sixth World Congress of the Communist International concretely formulated the tasks of the Communist Parties and the revolutionary proletariat in the struggle against imperialist war. Guided by these principles, the Communist Parties of Japan and China, both directly affected by war, have waged and are waging a Bolshevik struggle against imperialist war and for defense of the Chinese people. The Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, confirming the decisions of the Sixth Congress on the struggle against imperialist war, sets the following main tasks before the Communist Parties, revolutionary workers, toilers, peasants, and oppressed peoples of the whole world:

1. The struggle for peace and for the defense of the U.S.S.R. In face of the war provocations of the German Fascists and Japanese militarists, and the speeding up of armaments by the war-parties in the capitalist countries, in face of the immediate danger of a counter-revolutionary war breaking out against the Soviet Union, the central slogan of the Communist Parties must be: struggle for peace.

2. The united people's front in the struggle for peace and against the instigators of war. The struggle for peace opens up before the Communist Parties the greatest opportunities for creating the broadest united front. All those interested in the preservation of peace should be drawn into this united front. The concentration of forces against the chief instigators of war at any given moment (at the present time - against Fascist Germany, and against Poland and Japan which are in league with it) constitutes a most important tactical task of the Communist Parties. It is of especially great importance for the Communist Party of Germany to expose the national demagogy of Hitler Fascism, which screens itself behind phrases about the unification of the German people but in fact leads to the insolation of the German people and to a new war catastrophe. The indispensable condition and prerequisite for the unification of the German people lies in the overthrow of Hitler Fascism. The establishment of a united front with Social-Democratic and reformist organizations (party, trade union, co-operative, sport, and cultural and educational organizations) and with the bulk of their members, as well as with mass national-liberation, religious-democratic, and
pacifist organizations and their adherents, is of decisive importance for the struggle against war and its Fascist instigators in all countries.

The formation of a united front with Social-Democratic and reformist organizations for the struggle for peace necessitates a determined ideological struggle against reactionary elements within the Social-Democratic Parties which, in face of the immediate danger of war, proceed to collaborate even more closely with the bourgeoisie for the defense of the bourgeois fatherland, and by their campaigns of slander against the Soviet Union directly aid the preparations for an anti-Soviet war. It necessitates close collaboration with those forces in the Social-Democratic Parties, reformist trade unions, and other mass labour organizations whose position is approaching ever closer to that of revolutionary struggle against imperialist war.

The drawing of pacifist organizations and their adherents into the united front of struggle for peace acquires great importance in mobilizing the petty bourgeois masses, progressive intellectuals, women, and youth against war, while constantly subjecting the erroneous views of sincere pacifists to constructive criticism, and vigorously combating those pacifists who by their policy screen the preparations of the German Fascists for imperialist war (the leadership of the Labour Party in Great Britain, &c.). The Communists must invite the collaboration of all pacifist organizations that are prepared to collaborate even if only part of the way towards a genuine struggle against imperialist war.

The Communists must support the Amsterdam-Pleyel anti-war and anti-Fascist movement by active collaboration with it and help to extend it.

3. The combination of the struggle against imperialist war with the struggle against Fascism. The anti-war struggle of the masses striving to preserve peace must be very closely combined with the struggle against Fascism and the Fascist movement. It is necessary to conduct not only general propaganda for peace, but primarily propaganda directed against the chief instigators of war, against the Fascist and other imperialist war-parties, and against concrete measures of preparation for imperialist war.

4. The struggle against militarism and armaments.
The Communist Parties of all capitalist countries must fight against military expenditures (war budgets), for the recall of military forces from the colonies and mandated territories, against militarization measures taken by capitalist governments, especially the militarization of the youth, women, and the unemployed, against emergency
decrees restricting bourgeois-democratic liberties with the aim of preparing for war; against restricting the rights of workers employed in war-industry plants; against excluding the war industry and against trading in war transporting arms. The struggle against war preparations must also be conducted only in closest connection with the defense of the common interest in political rights of the workers, office employees, soldiers, and urban petty bourgeoisie.

5. The struggle against chauvinism. In the struggle against chauvinism, the task of the Communists consists in educating the workers and the whole of the toiling population in the spirit of proletarian internationalism, which can be accomplished only in the struggle against the exploiters and oppressors. For the vital class interests of the proletariat, as well as in the struggle against the imperialist chauvinism of the National-Socialists, Fascists and all other Fascist parties, at the same time the Communists must show that the working class carries on a consistent struggle in defence of the national freedom and independence of all the peoples against any oppression or exploitation, because only the Communist policy defends to the very end the national freedom and independence of the people of its country.

6. The national liberation struggle and the support of wars of national liberation. If any weak State is attacked by one or more big imperialist Powers which want to destroy its national independence and national unity or to dismember it, as in the historic instance of the partition of Poland, a war conducted by the national bourgeoisie of such a country to repel this attack may assume the character of a war of liberation, in which the working class and the Communists of that country cannot abstain from intervening. It is the task of the Communists of such a country, while carrying on an irreconcilable struggle to safeguard the economic and political positions of the workers, toiling peasants, and national minorities, to use, at the same time, in the front ranks of the fighters for national independence and to wage the war of liberation to a finish, without allowing their bourgeoisie to strike a bargain with the attacking powers at the expense of the interests of their country.

It is the duty of the Communists actively to support the national liberation struggle of the oppressed peoples of the colonial and semi-colonial countries, especially the Red Army of the Chinese Soviets in their struggle against the Japanese and other imperialists and the Kuomintang. The Communist Party of China must exert every effort to extend the front of the struggle for national liberation and to draw into it all the national forces that are ready to repulse the robber campaign of the Japanese and other imperialists.
The Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, met in accordance with the unanimous decision of the Communist Parties of all countries, in the struggle for the preservation of peace, for the triumph of the peace policy of the Soviet Union, proved that the Communists are united, with all their might to obstruct the preparations for and the outbreak of a new war. 

The Communists, while fighting also against the illusion that war can be eliminated while the capitalist system still exists, exert and will exert every effort to prevent war. Should a new imperialist world war break out, despite all efforts of the working-class to prevent it, the Communists will strive to lead the peoples of the war, organized in the struggle for peace, to the struggle for the transformation of the imperialist war into civil war against the Fascist instigators of war against the bourgeoisie, for the overthrow of capitalism.

The Congress of the same time unions Communitists and revolutionary workers against anarchist and anti-socialist methods of struggle against war, which take the form of refusing to appear for military service, the form of so-called boycott of mobilization, of committing sabotage in war plants, etc. The Congress considers that such methods of struggle only do harm to the proletariat. The Russian Bolsheviks, during the World War, fought energetically against war and tore for the victory of the German Government, rejected, however, such methods; these methods merely make it easier for the bourgeoisie to take repressive measures against the proletariat. The Seventh Congress of the Communist International, in outlining the tasks of the Communist Parties and of the entire working-class in the event of war, bases itself upon the thesis advanced by Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, and adopted by the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International.

If nevertheless war breaks out, it is their duty to work for its speedy termination and to strive with all their might to utilize the economic and political crisis produced by the war to raise the political consciousness of the masses of the people and thereby hasten the downfall of capitalist class rule.
At the present historical juncture, when on one-sixth part of the globe the Soviet Union defends Socialism and peace for all humanity, the most vital interests of the workers and toilers of all countries demand that in pursuing the policy of the working-class, in waging the struggle for peace, the struggle against imperialist war before and after the outbreak of hostilities, the defence of the Soviet Union must be considered paramount.

If the commencement of a counter-revolutionary war forces the Soviet Union to set its Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in motion, for the defence of Socialism, the Communists will call upon all toilers to work, with all means at their disposal and at any price, for the victory of the Red Army over the armies of the imperialists.
ドイツ帝国を含むヨーロッパ諸国は、モスクワと同様にイタリアのオーストリアと破壊の廃止を図り、従ってこの援政は、ヨーロッパの利益をも兼ねてできるものである。英仏連合の間の関係の緊密なる機会を利用して、ヨーロッパの利益をも図るものである。
はるか遠くの細胞をも困難にし、それらは言葉として存在する。社会主義と資本主義は、全体としての政治家や軍閥支配を、全労働者と祖国の犠牲にせよ。この矛盾を解決することは、新帝国主義戦争勃発の危険を日一日と人類を為す。

社会主義と資本主義は、最後の資本家階級と、當農民階級の撓滅を資本主義に対抗する社会主義の防衛能力強化に基づいて、資本主義と資本主義諸国との相互関係は、新段階に入った。
五事一企 1532

国民党和共产党在长期斗争中形成的对立关系，是由于国共两党在政治、经济、军事等方面的利益冲突和矛盾造成的。国共两党之间的斗争，不仅关系到中国民族解放和国家建设的大局，也密切影响到广大人民群众的生活和命运。
（未）
The Victory of Socialism in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Its World-wide Historic Significance.

(The resolution adopted by the 7th Convention of Comintern on the Report by Comrade Manylucky, August 20, 1935.)

Having heard the report delivered by Comrade Manylucky or the grand total of construction of socialism, the 7th Whole World Convention of Comintern admits with deep satisfaction that the decisive and definite victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. has been obtained and the State of proletariat dictatorship has entirely been strengthened under the leadership of the Bolshevik Communist Party in all the Union as the total results of executing socialistic reconstruction and realizing the collectivization of national economy, the deportation of capitalistic elements and the extermination of rich farmers as a class.

I. Socialistic industrialization was successfully carried out. From the agricultural state, which was backward in economy and techniques, has advanced the Soviet Union to a great progressed industrial State of metallurgy, machine-making and the manufacture of aircrafts, automobiles and tractors. And it is becoming an electrical and chemical country. The Soviet Union is in a position in which it can produce any machine and any implement for production at its own factories. Large industrial cities have appeared in places which were formerly uninhabited. The old industrial zones have been expanded, new ones have been established and the industrialization of the districts which were formerly backward and old Czar's settlements are successfully being carried out. And as the results, they are changing into the nation's republics or districts of active and progressive industries. Highly skilled cadets for technicians, organizers and leaders in many and varied branches of production and processes of production have been brought up. Every success is furnishing a new and large possibility that industrialization of the whole national economy in the Soviet Union will increasingly develop in the future.

II. A great revolution in agricultural communities, that is to say, the collectivization of agriculture has been successfully made. Practically very difficult problem of transferring the majority of farmers to the way of socialistic development has been solved by the victory of the Kolkhoz system. A large-scale mechanized agriculture has been established based on the principle of socialism. The net-work of mechanic tractor stations
has been enlarged and Sovkhoz are becoming consolidated. Material and productive superiority of the Kolkhoz system has already become the propelling power in the work of further strengthening Kolkhoz and of promoting voluntary collectivization of agriculture. The grain problem has been solved. The stock-raising industry has begun to develop and is steadily growing. The existence of vast, uncultivated and fertile lands and the conversion into intensive agriculture which has already started, together with continuous increase in the degree of applying science and technique to agriculture assures the possibility that agriculture based on socialism in the Soviet Union will accomplish a large-scale development owing to Kolkhoz and Sovkhoz.

III. The material condition of working men in the Soviet Union has been fundamentally improved and their cultural level has been raised with a long stride. The unemployed have disappeared. Labourers and employees have increased in number, their degree of skillfulness has risen and their wages and the funds and scopes of social insurance works (sanatoriums, rest houses, free medical facilities, annuities for the disabled, all age pensions, etc.) are being increased and expanded. Working hours are reduced to 6 or 7 hours. Labor conditions are being improved rapidly. Various difficulties in the supply are being overcome successfully (abolition of the bread ration-ticket system; increase in the supply of flesh meats and fat for labourers in accordance with the future development of stock-raising industry.)

The appearances of large cities or industrial centres have changed — namely, housing or living conditions of labourers are being improved step by step. Instead of slums in residential quarters for labourers in large cities or industrial centres which are peculiar in capitalistic countries, grand, bright and sanitary residences for them have been and are being built. Poverty in the farming community has been wiped out as the results of collectivization of agriculture and extermination of rich farmers as a class, and farmers have had guaranteed rich livelihood and labor on such conditions that their energy is not so much exhausted as strengthened.

Soliciitude for persons, laborers and cadres and especially for children are the most important of the activities of the Party, the State and all occupational associations or public organizations. The cultural level of laborers is being raised with rapid strides. The compulsory elementary education has come to be generally carried on in their native languages in all the republics of the Soviet Union. Millions of sons of laborers, farmers and workers are studying at secondary schools and colleges. A thick network of educational
facilities for children under the school age and that of night schools, education for adults have been expanded. In laborers' residential quarters, factories and villages, tens of thousand of clubs, theaters and cinema-houses have been built. Races in the Soviet Union, which were once oppressed, forgotten and deteriorated, have now been endowed with free and complete rights. Their culture which is racial in form and socialistic in substance is developing and flourishing. Women, together with men, are active participants in the socialistic constructions. Young generation, who are grown up in the conditions of the Soviet Union, unaware of the capitalist exploitation, destitution and rightlessness but conscious of only advantages, duties and purposes of socialism, are involved in the socialistic constructions. Science and all sorts of art have become more closely related to the extensive masses. Academicians, scholars, investigators, artists, writers, fine artists and all other sorts of artists have once again been combined with the side of laborers. All these achievements of improving the material and cultural conditions, no matter how they may be gigantic in comparison with those of recent time or with those in every capitalistic country, indicate only the first step to a brilliant future and a perfect prosperity which will come into existence before long and also to the universal welfare for which socialistic States are striving.

IV. Great political strengthening of the proletarian dictatorship State has been accomplished. In the Soviet Union there exists the soundest and steadiest political structure — namely, the extensive democratic state which is not separated from the general masses and is not against them, but is combined with them systematically, and protects their interests and leads their volition. The serious and fundamental changes in the social fabric of the Soviet Union which took place as the results of the socialistic reconstruction of national economy, of the extermination of the exploiting class and of the victory of the Kolkhoz system have newly expanded and strengthened the basis of the soviet regime. Corresponding to these changes, and based upon the general masses' increasing confidence in the proletarian dictatorship, the Soviet regime has taken various measures for new and further democratization of its structure which is of great historical significance. For instance, the unequal election has been changed into an equal one, the indirect election with many grades into a direct one and the open voting into a secret one; suffrage has been expanded to new strata of the grown-up people and restored to those of the former rich farmers who proved actually by their faithful labor that they had stopped their resisting strife against the Soviet structure. Proletarian dictatorship is steadily advancing in accordance with continuous
strengthening and expansion of the direct combination between the Soviet Republics and an overwhelming majority of the general masses and residents and with the intensification of the entire positive and direct participation of the general masses in the administration of the State and in the guidance of socialist constructions. The State of proletarian dictatorship is making the utmost efforts for the development of the proletariat at democracy which was accomplished as the result of the extermination of the exploiting class, for the acknowledgement of the socialist property as the basis of the Soviet society and for the simplification of the interests of the majority of residents in all Soviet Republics.

The Soviet Union which is faithful to its own principle of amicable friendship, freedom and independence of all races and States, fighting bravely for the maintenance of peace among each nation, and disclosing aggressive intentions of imperialistic plunderers, is taking all measures necessary for definitely protecting the socialist fatherland of all laborers in the world from the plundering attack of imperialists who are threatening it. The 7th Convention of Comintern acknowledges with satisfaction that a mighty socialist State has been established at present in the land of the former Czar's Russia which was completely broken down, and in the territory of the weak Soviet Union which confronted in its early period of development the possibility of being divided by imperialistic States. The Soviet Union is becoming a State of new human beings or a State of men's new social and individual living manners. Great remodelling of human beings is being carried on at the large blacksmith's shop of planned and socialist labour which is based upon socialist competition, the principle of dashing operation and the masses' initiative spirit. Greedy private-ownership-like and anti-social rights and customs which were transferred from capitalism are gradually disappearing. The charming condition of socialist labour is assisting the re-education of criminals or offenders of laws, and the principle of inviolability of social property in the national economic field in urban and rural communes is permeating in the general living. The public opinion and the self-criticism of the working masses have contributed exceedingly to the moral influence and the education or re-education of human beings. On the basis of strengthened new relations to labour and society, new living manners are being created, the consciousness and mentality of human beings are being reformed, a new generation which is sound, suitable for labouring and advanced in every aspect is being formulated. Among general masses, organisers, leaders, inventors, brave investigators of natural phenomena in the Arctic region hitherto unknown and conquerors of the stratosphere, atmosphere, deep sea, mountain summits or the bowels of the earth --- heroes are distinguishi
themselves one after another. Millions of laborers are
dashing to the strong fortresses of technique, science and
art and conquering them. The Soviet Union is becoming the
State of new men who dash for their objectives, admire vivid
lives, overcome every difficulty, and create great works.
V. The victory of socialism in the Soviet Union was achieved
in the thorough conflicts among the rightists, "leftists" and
opportunists of the Bolshevik Communist Party, and in the
tenacious and pertinent struggles to overcome various immense
difficulties. Those difficulties took place in relation to the
low technical and economic levels of the State in the past,
and moreover were accompanied with conditions that the reconstruc-
tion of the technical basis of the national economy and the
fundamental re-establishment of the social economic structure
had to be, amid the siege of hostile capitalistic States, in
the shortest term, and by its own power and means, carried out.
Those reconstructions and the rebuilding of the technical
foundation of agriculture which related especially to the
unification of small-scale agricultural managements into a
large-scale management and to the extermination of rich farmers
as a class were effected under the banner of proletariat's
decisive attack against capitalistic elements.
Remaining elements of the exploiting class supported by imperial-
ists, though they had lost all their economic foundations,
and kept showing their desperate resistance, and resorted to
sabotage, hindrance, firing of crops, suspension of seeding,
slaughter of cattle, etc. The proletariat succeeded in crushing
the enemy's resistance, establishing the socialist industry,
strengthening the Kolkhoz system, and overcoming various difficulties which followed the necessity of rapid development of rational
economy. The possibility of establishment of socialism in
a specific country which was foreseen by the genius of Lenin
and Stalin has become the reality which can actually be per-
ceived by millions of people of all the world. The historical
question, "Who whom?" in the aspect of the internal problem
--- that is to say, the question, "Whether socialism can over-
come capitalism in the Soviet Union?" has been determined
decisively and definitely in the victory of socialism. How-
ever, it does not mean that smashed remainders of the enemy
against our class who lost all hopes to interrupt the develop-
ment of socialism may stop doing sordid harms to laborers or
to farmers of Kolkhoz in the Soviet Union.
More development of socialism which has gained the victory
will be accompanied with other sorts of difficulties which
contain a condition that, in the interior of the Soviet Union,
remnants of capitalism in the consciousness of the people
must be wiped out. As the result of the victory of socialism
in the Soviet Union, the proletarian world revolution has
obtained solid footing in the struggle which has becoming acute concerning the solution of the question — "Who whom?" --- in the aspect of international problem.

VI. The victory of socialism in the Soviet Union is of worldwide significance. The victory of socialism in the Soviet Union which laborers and members of Kolkhoz in the Soviet Union have gained under the guidance of Comrade Stalin who is a comrade of great Lenin and a leader of laborers in all the world, and with the support of the international proletariat has aroused an acute metamorphosis in the consciousness of laborers of all countries. Namely, that victory has convinced the masses of Social Democrat laborers or of other laborers who follow other principles of the necessity of all-fronts struggle for the realization of socialism and is playing a rôle which is a definite element in realizing the unity of fighting proletarians.

Moreover, that victory crushes the long fostered idea and the understanding about the persistence and the stability of capitalism, clarifies the failure of the bourgeoisie theory and attempt of the "renovation" of capitalistic society, gives a stimulus to the working masses to carry out a revolution, and inspires them with the confidence in their own power and with the belief in the necessity and the actual possibility of overthrowing capitalism and establishing socialism.

Before the eyes of millions of laborers in capitalistic States and colonial countries, before the eyes of all the exploited and the oppressed, the way of emancipation --- the way of socialism which has been opened by the real instance in the Soviet Union has been brightly lighted.

The socialistic structure of the Soviet Union guarantees the following matters:

To laborers, --- the emancipation from the menace of unemployment and the capitalistic exploitation, and the possibility to work not for exploiters or parasites but for their own sake, to administer the State and national economy and to lead cultural lives improving assiduously their material condition.

To farmers, --- the land, the emancipation from the slavery of land-owners, usurers, and bankers and from severe and heavy taxes, the relief from panic, ruin, decline and poverty, the incessant betterment of their richness and culture, and the basic reduction of their labour.

To the petit bourgeoisie masses in cities, --- the emancipation from the threat of bankruptcy, from the oppression of enormous capital and from ruin and decline, and the possibility to discover their positions as honest laborers in the socialistic economic structure so as to carry out the fundamental improvement of their own mental and material lives.
To intelligentsia, --- wide freedom and conditions necessary for completing their knowledge, ability and talent, large stimulus and scope of activity for their creative activities and the fundamental improvement of their material and cultural lives.

To the residents of colonies and protectorates, --- the racial emancipation from yoke of imperialists, the possibility to raise the level of their national economy up to that of the most advanced State, the enhancement and the development of their racial culture, and the free and completely entitled participation in the international activity.

VII. In consequence of the victory of socialism, the Soviet Union has become a great power in national policies, economy and culture which will influence the world policies, has become the nucleus of influence and unity among all races and States which are concerned about the maintenance of international peace, has become the fortress of laborers in all States against the threat of war, and has become powerful means by which all laborers in the world can be united against the reactionary influence in the world. The victory of socialism which has charged the Soviet Union into a power to stimulate the activities of the extensive strata of residents, of the class, of races, of the people and of the State means that a new and vast change --- the advance of socialism and retreat of capitalism --- has been brought to the influence relations of classes in the world-wide scope and that a new stage in the proletarian world revolution has been set forth. With the historical influence relation obtained since the 6th Convention of Comintern, the proletarian movement in the world is approaching the second battle of war and revolution. That historical influence relation itself determines the basic problem of the proletarian world revolution, and from such historical influence relation is derived the following primary obligations for the laborer class and workers throughout the world and for all branches of Comintern: Assist the strengthening of the Soviet Union and fight against her enemy by all power and means! Even in war time for the Soviet Union as well as in peace time, the advantages of strengthening the Soviet Union, of increasing her great power, and of insuring her victory in all branches and all aspects of the struggle correspond completely and closely with the advantages of the laborers throughout the world in their struggles against their exploiters and with those of the people of colonies or the oppressed races, and condition or facilitate the success of the proletarian world revolution and the victory of socialism in all the world. Therefore, to assist and to defend the Soviet Union and to cooperate with her for her victory against all enemies of the Soviet Union must determine the actions of everyone of true
无

无
五人聯邦における社会主義の実現は全聯邦ポリティクスの強さ、共産党の革命的立場、左翼及び右翼の陣営立場、及び、国際的立場の経済の問題を解決するための手段をもって系を生じており、自在にある資本主義の国同士で極めて短期間内に自分自身の力と手段を以て国民経済体制の再建を遂行し、国際的立場及び社会経済体制の再建を遂行し、特に農業経営を大規模及び集団経営に統合する農業の技術の基盤の創造は資本主義の要、社会主義工業の発展に必要となる。}

(Ref. Dec. 1533)
An Excerpt from the Memorandum of Captain T.K. Il-Shi
with notes on the Battle Situation in Manchuria.

The Description of Battles Fought in Manchuria

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Sea</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6/8</td>
<td>6:00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6:00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A.M.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Some 20 Soviet troops crossed the border line from a point on the bank across from WUKIANGTUN and to the north of the confluence of the HEILANZHU and SUNLCH Rivers.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Some 50 awaiting orders on the opposite bank of the SUNLCH River.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:51</td>
<td>2. Some 35 shots were discharged at a point 400 motors in front of our observation-post.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:59</td>
<td>3. Our army instantly arranged with its Diplomatic Section to make a rigorous protest, demanding their withdrawal. Further, the observation-post burned all secret documents; returned no fire; no casualties on our side.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- 1 -
4. The Kwangtung Army has now concluded that the enemy is intending to ascertain by reconnaissance our condition in the HULIN area or to feel out our frontal driving force.

7/8 7:00 A.M.
1. No Soviet troops seen at the point where the Soviet forces crossed the border line yesterday.

9/8 Zero
1. Soviet troops commenced attacks from the HUTOW, HULIN, TUNING and WUCHITZU areas, and also from the direction of MANCHULI.

2. Some of the enemy forces are invading our positions along the border line.

3. The following places were raided by enemy planes to-day: KILIN, LILIN, CHILMOSSU, HURBIN, PINKLING, MUKINIAN, HLILAR, JISUFUN, HSINHIN, WUSHIKOW, LATZIN, CHIJEN, and YULIN.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Land</th>
<th>Air</th>
<th>Sec</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9/8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>5:04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.M.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5:04</td>
<td>Fleet Bomber</td>
<td>of</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.M.</td>
<td>TULITZU from</td>
<td>Fleet Bomber</td>
<td>of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TULITZU from FLUMBIDE.</td>
<td>TULITZU from FLUMBIDE. (T.N. Phonetic) Inland.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.M.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9:15</td>
<td>Bombardment opened</td>
<td>upon the HIRAMIRU</td>
<td>Bombardment opened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.M.</td>
<td>observation-post in</td>
<td>observation-post in</td>
<td>observation-post in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. The main points of the Kwantung Army Orders (issued at 5:30 a.m. on the 9th).
6. Resolved: The Army is resolved, in self-defense, to rout the enemy forces invading by both air and land and to take prompt action for a complete military operation to meet the enemy forces all along the front.

7. Steps Taken.
   a. Orders issued for general wartime defense and defense of Kwantung Province.
   b. Martial law enforced in Kwantung Province.

8. The 120th Division is mustering at SEOUL and the 220th Division at YULSAN.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Act</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9. The British Army</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Troops were moved to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10. Conditions of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese forces</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>continue to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>resist.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11. The Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>forces continued to</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>resist with</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>mobile units</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>under Gen.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ooka.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12. The Chinese</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>forces withdrawn</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13. The 17th Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17th Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>dispatched to the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese front.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14. The 17th Field</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Artillery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moved from the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SN.  to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>15. The 3rd Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moved to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>16. The 3rd Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>marched to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>17. The 3rd Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moved to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18. The 3rd Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moved to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19. The 3rd Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moved to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20. The 3rd Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moved to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21. The 3rd Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moved to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22. The 3rd Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moved to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23. The 3rd Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moved to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>24. The 3rd Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moved to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25. The 3rd Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moved to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>26. The 3rd Division</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(under Gen. of the</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Div.)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>moved to SN.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Time</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. The [illegible] Division ordered to form military units urgently, and the rest to await orders.

The 6th Heavy Artillery.

The 86th and the 91st Divisions to prepare for operations against Soviet Russia.

The 5th Field Artillery.

One part of the forces ordered to concentrate in South Manchuria and at SKCUT and KINJ, and at the same time the rest to prepare the place of deployment to march from.

The strength prepared for march:
- General planes 125
- 70 planes 66
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>項目</th>
<th>内容</th>
<th>その他</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td>000</td>
<td>000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

備考：

1. 本表は、従業員の勤務日数を記録するためのものです。
2. 各項目には、勤務日数や休日数を記入してください。
3. その他には、必要な情報や備考を記入してください。
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>9/8</th>
<th>7/8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 9/8

- 0:40 頃
- 0:50 頃

### 7/8

- 10:50
- 11:00

### 天気

- 太陽
- 0:40

### 空域

- 江戸川
- 東京
- 0:50

### 支援

- リア
- 承認

### 攻撃

- ハン
- リ

### 防御

- 機
- 上海
- 0:40

### 島

- プール
- リマ
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

- vs -

ARAKI Sadao et al.

Sworn Deposition (Translation)

Defendant TAYAMAŠI, Kipji

Having first duly sworn asforth upon attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.

I was formerly a captain of the Army and, I now live at No. 532, 4-chome, Takanashi, Sumida-ku, Tokyo.

From December, 1943 till the end of the war, I, as an officer attached to the staff of the Second Section of General Staff Headquarters, was in charge of putting in order information about the progress of the war. I arranged and recorded the telegrams from various areas and then submitted them to my Chief.

In the usual manner I arranged and reported to my Chief the news of the entrance of the Soviet Union in the war against Japan in August, 1945. The records hereto attached are those
that I made at that time. As the records show, it was at 0000 a.m. August 9 that the Soviet forces began to invade Manchuria across the border between Manchuria and Soviet Russia.

On this 28th day of April, 1947
at Tokyo

Deponent: /S/ TAKAHASHI, Kinji (seal)

I, IKEDA, Sumihisa, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date,
at Tokyo.

Witness: /S/ IKEDA, Sumihisa (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/S/ TAKAHASHI, Kinji (seal)
Def. Loc. # 1537

TRANSLATION CERTIFICATE

I, Charlie S. Terry of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/S/ Charlie S. Terry

Tokyo, Japan
Date May 21, 1947
The following is the text of the note presented today to the Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs at Moscow by Ambassador Bullitt and thereafter made available to the press at Moscow by Ambassador Bullitt:

"Under instructions from my Government, I have the honor to call attention to the activities, involving interference in the internal affairs of the United States, which have taken place on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in connection with the VII All-World Congress of the Communist International, and, on behalf of the Government of the United States, to lodge a most emphatic protest against this flagrant violation of the pledge given by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on November 16, 1933, with respect to non-interference in the internal affairs of the United States.

"That pledge, which was given by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a result of the discussions which took place prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, reads in full as follows:

\[
\text{Washington, November 16, 1933.}
\]

\[
\text{My dear Mr. President:}
\]

I have the honor to inform you that coincident with the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two Governments it will be the fixed policy of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. To respect scrupulously the indisputable right of the United States to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way and to refrain from interfering in any manner in the internal affairs of the United States, its territories or possessions.

2. To refrain, and to restrain all persons in government service and all organizations of the Government or under its direct or indirect control, including organizations in receipt of any financial assistance from it, from any act overt or covert liable in any way whatsoever to injure the tranquillity, prosperity, order, or security of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions, and, in particular, from any act tending to incite or encourage armed intervention, or any agitation or propaganda having as an aim, the violation of the territorial integrity of the United States, its territories or possessions, or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions.

3. Not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group and to prevent the activity on its territory of any organization or group - which makes claim to be the Government of, or makes attempt
Mr. Franklin D. Roosevelt,
President of the United States of America,
The White House.

My Government invites particular attention to the obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics contained in the paragraph numbered 4.

"In view of the fact that the aim and activity of an organization, such as the Congress of the Communist International, functioning on the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics cannot be unknown to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, it does not seem necessary to present material to show the aim of the Congress of the Communist International with respect to the political or social order of the United States or to quote from the published proceedings of the Congress to show its activity relative to the internal affairs of the United States, as evidenced in the discussion at the Congress of the policies and activities of the communist organization in the United States. Nor does it appear necessary to list the names of representatives or officials of the communist organization in the United States who were active at the above mentioned Congress and whose admission into the territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was, of course, known to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

"As I have pointed out to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs when discussing earlier violations of the undertaking of November 16, 1933, the American people resent most strongly interference by foreign countries in their internal affairs, regardless of the nature or probable result of such interference, and the Government of the United States considers the strict fulfillment of the pledge of non-interference an essential prerequisite to the maintenance of normal and friendly relations between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
"The Government of the United States would be lacking in
candor if it failed to state frankly that it anticipates the most
serious consequences if the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics is unwilling, or unable, to take appropriate
measures to prevent further acts in disregard of the solemn
pledge given by it to the Government of the United States.

"I may add that it is a source of regret that in the present
international situation the development of friendly relations
between the Russian and American peoples will inevitably be pre­
cluded by the continuance on territory of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, of activities involving interference in the
internal affairs of the American people."

CERTIFICATE

I, George A. Furness do hereby certify that the above
documents were obtained from the office of the Secretary of State
of the United States for use in evidence at the International
Military Tribunal for the Far East. That those documents have
been in my possession at all times, since their receipt.

/S/ George A. Furness
Figure 1: The interaction between the Def, Doe 1541 case and the Japanese government's policy on labor markets involving foreign workers. The case highlighted the need for clearer regulations and better enforcement of labor laws to protect the rights of foreign workers. The government's response shows a commitment to improving the legal framework for foreign laborers, indicating a shift towards more inclusive policies. This interaction is a significant step towards creating a more just and equitable labor market for all workers.
新くの如き組織又は集団・或はその代表者職員等が領土に於て活動する
を防止すること
合衆国・その領土保護領に對於て・武力闘争する目的を持つ軍事組織・
集団を・その領土に組織し補助し支援し・或は許可せざる事・又・スカ
る組織集団の為の補給を防止する事・
四合衆国・その領土保護領の全部或は一部の政治上社会上の秩序を
破壊し・又は破壊の準備を為し・若しくは武力に依りそれらに傀儡を為
すことを目的とする組織・集団が・領土に於て組織され或は居住する事
を許さざる事・又・それら組織集団又はその代表者・職員等が領土に於
て活動するを防止する事・
アメリカ合衆国大統領

ドイツに於けるソビエト連邦政府の活動に対し、特に

別の注意を喚起する。

ソビエト連邦政府が、閣僚を含む合衆国政府に対する

目的を示す資料と活動に関する大事件に於ける対策及び

合衆国政府の政策を提出することには必要でないと思われる。上記の大事件に於ける合衆国政府の政策を提出することには必要でないと思われる。上記の大事件に於ける合衆国政府の政策を提出することには必要でないと思われる。
政府は、国の利益を図るために必要な手段を講じることに決めた。この結果、米国との関係は、冷戦の影響を受けて、ますます緊張が高まっている。

米国政府は、ソビエト連邦に対して、これを承知することを要求している。しかし、ソビエト連邦は、これを受け入れない。

この状況は、米国とソビエト連邦の間で、緊張が高まっていることを示しています。
In connection with the protest lodged by Ambassador Bullitt against the violation by the Soviet Government of its pledge of November 16, 1933, with regard to non-interference in the internal affairs of the United States and the reply of the Soviet Government thereto, the Secretary of State today made the following statement:

The recent note of this Government to the Government of the Soviet Union and the reply of that Government raises the issue whether that Government, in disregard of an express agreement entered into at the time of recognition in 1933, will permit organizations or groups operating on its territory to plan and direct movements contemplating the overthrow of the political or social order of the United States. For sixteen years this Government withheld recognition — as did many other Governments — mainly for the reasons that the Soviet Government had failed to respect the right of this nation to maintain its own political and social order without interference by organizations conducting in or from Soviet territory activities directed against our institutions.
In 1933 this Government, observing the serious effects upon peace and prosperity of the many partial or dislocated international relationships throughout the world, took up anew the question whether the United States and the Soviet Union, two of the largest nations, could not find a way to establish more natural and normal relations, which would afford a basis for genuine friendship and collaboration to promote peace and improve material conditions both at home and abroad. After various stipulations in writing had first been carefully drafted and agreed upon by representatives of the two Governments, recognition was accorded to the Government of the Soviet Union by this Government, in November, 1933. One of the most important provisions of the agreement thus reached was the pledge of the Soviet Government to respect the right of the United States "to order its own life within its own jurisdiction in its own way and to refrain from interfering in any manner in the internal affairs of the United States, its territories or possessions." The essence of this pledge was the obligation assumed by the Soviet Government not to permit persons or groups on its territory to engage in efforts or movements directed towards the overthrow of our institutions. The representative of the Soviet Government declared in writing that

"Coincident with the establishment of diplomatic relations between our two Governments it will be the fixed policy of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics."
4. Not to permit the formation or residence on its territory of any organization or group - and to prevent the activity or its territory of any organization or group, or of representatives or officials of any organization or group - which has as an aim the overthrow or the preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in, the political or social order of the whole or any part of the United States, its territories or possessions."

The language of the above-quoted paragraph irrefutably covers activities of the Communist International, which was then, and still is, the outstanding world communist organization, with headquarters at Moscow.

In its reply of August 27, 1935, to this Government's note of August 25, 1935, the Soviet Government almost in so many words repudiates the pledge which it gave at the time of recognition that "it will be the fixed policy of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics * * * not to permit * * * and to prevent" the very activities against which this Government has complained and protested. Not for a moment denying or questioning the fact of Communist International activities on Soviet territory involving interference in the internal affairs of the United States, the Soviet Government denies having made any promise "not to permit * * * and to prevent" such activities of that organization on Soviet territory, asserting that it "has not taken upon itself obligations of any kind with regard to the Communist International." That the language of the pledge, as set
out above, is absolutely clear and in no way ambiguous and that there has been a clean-cut disregard and disavowal of the pledge by the Soviet Government is obvious.

The American Government, having previously made oral complaints of failure by the Soviet Government to carry out its pledge and being deeply concerned over the growing instability of international relations and the dangerous consequences thereof to peace and economic recovery, sought most earnestly in its note of August 25 to impress upon the Soviet Government the sanctity of its pledge to the end that there might be between the two nations continued development of friendly and official relations and valuable collaboration in many beneficial ways. When in its reply the Soviet Government indicated an intention entirely to disregard its promise "to prevent" such activities as those complained of it struck a severe blow at the fabric of friendly relations between the two countries.

To summarize, in view of the plain language of the pledge, it is not possible for the Soviet Government to disclaim its obligation to prevent activities on its territory directed toward overthrowing the political or social order in the United States. And that Government does not and cannot disclaim responsibility on the ground of inability to carry out the pledge, for its authority
within its territorial limits is supreme and its power to control the acts and utterances of organizations and individuals within those limits is absolute.

It remains to be seen to what extent the intention indicated by the Soviet Government's reply, which is directly contrary to "the fixed policy" declared in its pledge, will be carried into effect. If the Soviet Government pursues a policy of permitting activities on its territory involving interference in the internal affairs of the United States, instead of "preventing" such activities, as its written pledge provides, the friendly and official relations between the two countries cannot but be seriously impaired. Whether such relations between these two great countries are thus unfortunately to be impaired and cooperative opportunities for vast good to be destroyed, will depend upon the attitude and action of the Soviet Government.
国

一九三五年八月三十一日

務省

新聞用

一九三五年九月一日（リヨ）財政関係上発表用の機密内報。以下訳

合衆国政府が、ソビエト聯邦政府に対して我政府の政財内務に干渉させざる可否旨趣を約した一九三五年十一月十六日

同書に之に基づきソビエト聯邦政府の問答に同して国務長官は本日次の通り

発表した。

ソビエト聯邦政府に対し我政府の政財内務に干渉せず可否旨趣を約したとこの処リソビエト聯邦政府の之に対して答

同書は、一九三五年の同政府承認当時同意させられた明確の明文を無視して、

之を隠蔽しを答する組織又は団体が該政体を内務に於て活動する事を許すものか否か

同政府が、合衆国政府に対し我政府の之に対する

同書内は、ソビエト聯邦政府に対し我政府の政財内務に干渉せざる可否旨趣を約した一九三五年十一月十六日

同書に之に基づきソビエト聯邦政府の問答に同して国務長官は本日次の通り

発表した。

ソビエト聯邦政府に対し我政府の政財内務に干渉せ

否

同書は、一九三五年の同政府承認当時同意させられた明確の明文を無視して、

之を隠蔽しを答する組織又は団体が該政体を内務に於て活動する事を許すものか否か

同政府が、合衆国政府に対し我政府の之に対する

同書内は、ソビエト聯邦政府に対し我政府の政財内務に干渉せざる可否旨趣を約した一九三五年十一月十六日

同書に之に基づきソビエト聯邦政府の問答に同して国務長官は本日次の通り

発表した。

ソビエト聯邦政府に対し我政府の政財内務に干渉せ

否

同書は、一九三五年の同政府承認当時同意させられた明確の明文を無視して、

之を隠蔽しを答する組織又は団体が該政体を内務に於て活動する事を許すものか否か

同政府が、合衆国政府に対し我政府の之に対する

同書内は、ソビエト聯邦政府に対し我政府の政財内務に干渉せざる可否旨趣を約した一九三五年十一月十六日

同書に之に基づきソビエト聯邦政府の問答に同して国務長官は本日次の通り

発表した。

ソビエト聯邦政府に対し我政府の政財内務に干渉せ

否

同書は、一九三五年の同政府承認当時同意させられた明確の明文を無視して、

之を隠蔽しを答する組織又は団体が該政体を内務に於て活動する事を許すものか否か

同政府が、合衆国政府に対し我政府の之に対する

同書内は、ソビエト聯邦政府に対し我政府の政財内務に干渉せざる可否旨趣を約した一九三五年十一月十六日

同書に之に基づきソビエト聯邦政府の問答に同して国務長官は本日次の通り

発表した。

ソビエト聯邦政府に対し我政府の政財内務に干渉せ
第十一章

第十一节

第十二章

第十二节
認同時の誓約即ち自らの事項は社会主義ソビエト連邦の不動の方針とみられるようである。ソビエトの内政事項に対する援助について、ソビエト政府は彼等の紛争を解決するための道程を歩むに当たって、現実の関係に基づき、発効した約束を最善の努力を払って保持することに同意する。
公約の関係と資質的な協力が多分の有益な方法で、今後も引き続き両国間の深い絆を護る意図を示し、遺憾に思う。
は今後の見ものである。若しソビエト政府が签约文書に定めて居る義
かかかる活動を阻止しないで、合衆国内外的当該に関する干渉をも含むよ
うな活動をその国内に於て許す政策を今後も続けて採るときは皆

友好的にして公的関係は重大な損損を受けて居るを認め。此二太国間の

かかる関係が損されるかごうかと云ふ事はソビエト政府の態度と行動

何にかかって居ることである。
August 27, 1935

TRANSLATION OF NOTE AS RECEIVED BY THE LEGATION OF ST. TS FROM H.R. BULLITT AT 10:00. THE NOTE WAS RECEIVED FROM H.R. BULLITT TODAY BY THE COMMISSIONER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

"Moscow,
August 27, 1935

Mr. Ambassador:

"By note of August 25th of this year you invited my attention to the activity of the Congress of the Communist International which took place at Moscow and referring to the note of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov to the President of the United States of America Mr. Roosevelt under date of November 16th, 1933, protested against this activity considered by your Government as a violation of the obligations of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics concerning non-interference in the internal affairs of the United States provided for in the note of November 16th, 1933.

"In connection therewith I consider it necessary to emphasize with all firmness that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has always regarded and still regards with the greatest respect all obligations which it has taken upon itself, including naturally the mutual obligation concerning non-interference in internal affairs provided for in the exchange of notes of November 16, 1933, and discussed in detail in the conversations between the President of the United States of America, Mr. Roosevelt, and the People's Commissar Litvinov. There are contained no facts of any kind in your note of August 25th which could be considered as a violation on the part of the Soviet Government of its obligations.

-1-"
"On the other hand it is certainly not new to the Government of the United States that the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics cannot take upon itself and has not taken upon itself obligations of any kind with regard to the Communist International.

Hence the assertion concerning the violation by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of the obligations contained in the note of November 16, 1933, does not exonerate from obligations accepted by both sides in consequence of which I cannot accept your protest and am obliged to decline it.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics sincerely shares the opinion of the Government of the United States of America that strict mutual non-interference in internal affairs is an essential prerequisite for the maintenance of friendly relations between our countries and steadfastly carrying out this policy in practice declares that it has as its aim the further development of friendly collaboration between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America responding to the interests of the people of the Soviet Union and the United States of America and possessing such great importance for the cause of universal peace.

Taking advantage of the occasion I invite you to accept the assurances of my high esteem.

(Signed) N. Krestinski."
ニ本年八月十五日の通牒により賛下はモスクー駐箚ウィリアム・シルプリット大使より国務省の受理せる通牒の

大使

下

十一月十六日の通牒を参照し此活動は賛下の政府側よりは一九三三年（昭和八年）十一月十六日

イノフの通牒を参照し此活動は賛下の政府側よりは一九三三年（昭和八年）十一月十六日
エスト社会主義共和国政府、ソビエト社会主義共和国政府、及びソビエト社会主義共和国政府の答申違反と答申違反として抗議される。
Certificate

I, George A. Furness do hereby certify that the attached documents were obtained from the office of the Secretary of State of the United States for use in evidence at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East. That these documents have been in my possession at all times, since their receipt.

/s/ George A. Furness
George A. Furness
The 11:00 P.M. news broadcast on the 25th reported that the following announcement has been issued:

"The Government of Canada, will taking necessary measures to prevent commercial firms or individuals residing in Japan from making withdrawals from deposits held by them in Canada, has ordered each bank to ask the Exchange Controller for directions with regard to transactions concerning commercial firms or individuals residing in Japan. The same measures shall be taken towards commercial firms or individuals residing in China."

-1-
Ottawa, July 26, 1941 -- \(\text{AM}\)

Received, July 26, 1941 -- \(\text{PM}\)

No. 107

Regarding our telegraphic communication No. 106, we called up by telephone the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs to confirm the radio announcement and, at the same time, inquired of him whether it had anything to do with the statement issued by the President of the United States. In reply he stated that the Government of Canada had not consulted with the United States but that it had taken such measures of its own accord in order to meet the existing acute situation. He further stated that the statement of the Government of Canada was issued at 10 o'clock, one hour later than that of the United States Government which was issued at 9 o'clock. Furthermore, he explained that these measures would be applied when any individuals or commercial firms which are in Japan and China would withdraw assets he or it holds in Canada, and that they do not apply to the withdrawal of deposits owned by the Japanese residents in Canada.
Def. Doc. No. 1546-C
No. 22210

To the Minister for Foreign Affairs TOYODA
From the Minister in Australia KAWAI
Melbourne, July 29, 1941 PM
Received, July 29, 1941 A.M.

No. 117

Menzies issued the following statement on 27th day:

"Since Japanese assets in Australia have been frozen according to the Exchange Control Regulations, Australia does not need a new regulation in order to take the same measures as those taken by the other British Possessions or the United States, but the Government will simply send directions to the Bank of Australia as prescribed by the above Regulations with a view to acting in concert with Great Britain and the United States who have issued orders freezing Japanese assets."

On the following 28th day, the bank did not allow Japanese firms to withdraw any of their assets but urged the presentation of a detailed account for the cost of store maintenance (salary inclusive) for which the bank is authorized to pay. As for Japanese individuals, it appears that personal withdrawals could be made up to 25 pounds per week in accordance with the actual amount withdrawn by them in the past.

- 3 -
Del. Doc. No. 1540 - D
No. 20137

To Foreign Minister TOYODA
From Acting Secretary NAKAYAMA

Wellington, August 3, 1941 -- PM
Received, August 3, 1941 -- Night

No. 37.

Re Your cablegram No. 11
(Congerning the assets freezing order)

It means the control of money-order exchange to every part of China. It was announced at the time that in order to block any possibility of their getting through into our country through Japanese occupied zones in China a directive came from the British Government in accordance with the wish of the Chinking Government.

As to the measures for the freezing of assets vis a vis Japan, China and Manchukuo, no special regulations have recently been issued. Instead these steps have been taken by means of a government directive to the Reserve Bank which is the government department vested with the authority to permit money-order exchange.
To Foreign Minister
From Charge d'Affairs
Pretoria, July 30, 1941 -- 2P.
Received, August 1, 1941.

No. 122

Re our latest cable No. 119.

The Government of South Africa promulgated the asset freezing directive in an extra of the official bulletin dated July 26, and put it into effect retroactively from July 26 on. This is a purely financial measure and it has nothing to do with shipping. Its content is as follows:

1. Those who reside in specific countries or in most favoured countries or those who are engaged in business in such countries.

(b) The permission of the national treasury is required when one pays to or is paid by those corporations which are set up according to the respective laws of the specific countries or which are under the supervision of those who reside in the specific countries or who are engaged in business in such countries (agents in South Africa of Japanese firms are included) or when one transfers one's gold or securities to such corporations or changes the one's name of ownership of credit, gold or
securities to that of such corporations.

II. However, the following are excepted:

(A) Payment due to fixed interest bearing securities issued prior to July 26.

(B) Acceptance or payment of drafts or cheques which were presented prior to July 26.

(C) Business transaction involving payment or the transfer of gold or securities is in the Union of South Africa which was accepted by banks before July 26.

III. By specific countries are meant Japan Proper, Korea, Formosa, Sakhalin, Taiwan Province, the Mandated area of Japan and Manchukuo.

IV. Unfixed-interest bearing securities prescribed in item 1 and 3 of I be rendered void.
To Foreign Minister TOYODA
From Consul-General OKAZAKI
Simla, July 27, 1941 FM
Received, August 1, 1941 AM

No. 35.

Concerning the freezing of Japanese assets here, the Indian Government on the morning of the 26th ordered each bank through the Reserve Bank to suspend such transactions as may affect Japanese assets and balances in India. With respect to the effect of the enforcement of the freezing order and the actual handing thereof, I shall, wire as and when occasion requires.
To Foreign Minister TOYODA
From Consul-General YANO
Hongkong, July 27, 1941, PZ
Received, July 27, 1941, Night

No. 375.

The Government Office in an extra of the official bulletin on the 26th promulgated the Emergency Finance decree based upon the Defense Law, and declared the freezing of the Japanese assets in Hongkong. I will follow up this cable by wiring the contents of the decree.
To Foreign Minister TOYODA.

From Consul-General TSURUMI
Singapore, July 28, 1941 P.M.
Received, July 31, 1941 Night

No. 397.

The Government of the Straits Settlements ordered in the form of a notification of the Secretary of Finance in the official bulletin, under the date of the 26th that the Empire of Japan and Manchukuo shall be specified areas, that the countries concerned the residents thereof, corporations or associations which have been established under the laws thereof, and those corporations being under control of such countries and their residents shall be prohibited from making payments, disposing gold or securities, transferring credits or changing the name of ownership of their gold and securities except by the special permission of the Secretary of Finance. Further, by a notification issued in the name of the Exchange controller on the 28th remittances to Japan or any monetary transactions by corporations established in Japan or by Japanese in this territory who are under the control of Japan have been prohibited except by the permission of the Exchange controller in each individual case; any monetary transactions by the Japanese banks in this territory require the permission of the Exchange Controller; and the right of being an authorized agent as was vested in Japanese banks by the Defense Law last year has been cancelled.
No. 22819 To Foreign Minister TOYODA

From Consul SHIBATA

Colombo, July 28, 1941 F.M.
Received, August 1, 1941 Night

No. 84

Ceylon Government promulgated on 27th the following order for the freezing of Japanese assets in Ceylon:

Any payment made by the Empire of Japan, the Republic of China (annotated as Manchuria), the residents and corporations in those areas, the transfer of gold and securities, and the directing of the change of their owners' names shall all be prohibited. However, the discharging of obligations in accordance with the confirmed credits of the above-mentioned nationals which were established by the banks in Ceylon prior to July 28, and the exercising of instructions as to the payment or transferring of gold and securities for the bills or drafts which were received prior to the same date and issued by or applied to the above-mentioned nationals shall not be prevented.

It is added as an annotation that the Government has no objection to the acceptance of remittances which are hereafter to be transferred to the frozen fund.
Under the date of the 26th, Government of Burma added Clauses A and B to Article 92 of the National Defence Regulation stipulating in item A, with regard to permission to make payments outside the sterling area without the permission of the Reserve Bank of India, the method of payment to blocked account. It further added Clause C by an ordinance dated the 29th and in this regard the following press communiqué was issued on the 30th:

The Governor-general prohibited the carrying out of, without the permission of Bank of India,

(a) payment
(b) transferring gold and securities
(c) changing creditors,
so far as they are required by the orders, given by or for

(a) the territories of the Empire of Japan and Manchukuo,
(b) territories and the residents in these areas,
(c) associations established under the laws of these territories or associations under the control of these territories or the residents in these areas.
To Foreign Minister TOYODA
From Acting Consul KAGEYAMA

Mombasa, September 3, 1941 A.M.
(Received, September 3, 1941 Night)

No. 27/37

Re our telegraphic communication No. 76

The Mandated Territory of Tanganyika and the protectorate of Zanzibar promulgated orders for the freezing of Japanese assets similar to the order issued by Kenya.

(Regret not having promptly reported this owing to the delay in our receiving the official bulletin.)
No. 22162 To Foreign Minister TOYODA
From Consul Y. YAMAMOTO
Sandakan, July 28, 1941 A.M.
(Received, July 28, 1941 P.M.)

145.

The Government here issued on July 27 a decree of the Secretary of Finance prohibiting state-authorized exchange agents from drawing any kind of money-order exchange on and after the same day between this country and the Empire of Japan (with moars Japan Proper, Korea, Formosa, Sakhalion, Kwangtung Province and Pacific Inlands under Japanese mandate, Manchukuo, individuals residing in the above two countries, and associations and foundations existing in those areas. However, payment of such liability and the receipt of such drafts and credit as were dated prior to July 27, is permitted.

(please refer to the original, given separately in telegraphic communication, No. 146.)
1. Telegram No. 106 from Minister YOSIHA at Ottawa to Foreign Minister TOYODA (July 26, 1941).
2. Telegram No. 107 from Minister YOSIHA at Ottawa to Foreign Minister TOYODA (July 26, 1941).
3. Telegram No. 117 from Minister KAWAY at Melbourne to Foreign Minister TOYODA (July 28, 1941).
4. Telegram No. 37 from Acting Secretary MAKIYAMA at Wellington to Foreign Minister TOYODA (August 3, 1941).
5. Telegram No. 122 from charge d' affaires YOSUDA at Pretoria to Foreign Minister TOYODA (July 30, 1941).
6. Telegram No. 85 from Consul-General OKAZAKI at Simla to Foreign Minister TOYODA (July 27, 1941).
7. Telegram No. 375 from Consul-General YANO at Hongkong to Foreign Minister TOYODA (July 27, 1941).
8. Telegram No. 379 from Consul-General TSUTSUMI at Singapore to Foreign Minister TOYODA (July 27, 1941).
9. Telegram No. 84 from Consul SHIRATA at Colombo to Foreign Minister TOYODA (July 28, 1941).
10. Telegram No. 249 from Consul-General ISHIO at Rangoon to Foreign Minister TOYODA (August 1, 1941).
11. Telegram No. 88 from Acting Consul KAGAYAMA at Mombasa to Foreign Minister TOYODA (September 3, 1941).
12. Telegram No. 145 from Consul YAMAOTTO at Sandakan to Foreign Minister TOYODA (July 28, 1941).
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, hereby certify that the following documents hereto attached, are exact and true copies of the official documents in the custody of the Japanese Government (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 6 day of May, 1947.

/s/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: /s/ HARAKE, Katsuma (seal)
D'V' Boo 必须

7 把

年

里
政和二十六号

田 外 大

河 相 公 便

二十七日メンシンハ在日日本貯金ハ為資産管理規則ヲ依リ從来ヨリ

在日日本貯金ハ為資産管理規則ヲ依リ특別ニ於テ英領及米領ノ指揮ヲ受テ

メルボルン

七月二十八日深夜
今年隨著國家對外貿易的發展，企業在國際市場上的競爭力不斷提升。在出口方面，企業積極開拓新市場，推出適合國際市場的新產品。在進口方面，企業進口更先進的技術和設備，提升生產效率和產品質量。未來，企業將繼續加大在科研開發和人才培養方面的投入，進一步提升企業的綜合競爭力。

今年隨著國家對外貿易的發展，企業在國際市場上的競爭力不斷提升。在出口方面，企業積極開拓新市場，推出適合國際市場的新產品。在進口方面，企業進口更先進的技術和設備，提升生產效率和產品質量。未來，企業將繼續加大在科研開發和人才培養方面的投入，進一步提升企業的綜合競爭力。
三十七番

田

十八

二十六日

大垣

三十一日

見

仮

備

第三十八

二十八日

四月

七月

日本

日本

日本

日本

日本

日本

日本
日付不明

文部省

文部省

教育・文化

文部省

教育・文化
昭和十六
二二八一九
古倫母
七月二十八日改

条約政府ハ二十七日射テ在籍ヲ放置日本政府

ニ於テ条約ヲ公布セリ左ノ第ニ

ノ文ヲ採用ハ会合ヲ開テ条約ヲ確認セリ
ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ

ノ条約ヲ確認セリ
昭和十六年
二七一〇七
モンパザ
九月三日前後
錦山
夜着
代
通
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA et al

vs

RAN, SAMO et al

STATEMENT

EXHIBIT: MATSUMOTO, Shunichi

I, Shunichi Matsumoto, state under oath as follows:

I was born in 1877. My present address is Takiyama-cho, Ota-ku, Tokyo.

I entered the Foreign Office in 1921 after graduating from the Tokyo Imperial University, Faculty of Law. After serving in the Embassy of Brussels, the Consulate at Antwerp, Belgium, and in the Treaty Department of the Foreign Office, etc., I was in Paris from 1929 to 1933 in the post of Secretary to the Embassy in France and concurrently as Secretary to the Imperial Japanese Bureau of the League of Nations. In 1933 I became the Chief of the Second Section, in 1936 of the First Section of the Treaty Department, and in 1937 I became the Chief of the Personnel Section of the Foreign Office. In March 1940 I was sent to Hankow, China, as Counsellor to the Embassy in China. I returned to Japan in September of the same year to become Chief of the Treaty Department of the Foreign Office, in which post I stayed until November 1942, when I was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I attended during my activities in the Foreign Office the following important international conferences in the capacity of member of the Japanese delegations:

Committee for the Revision of International Laws of War at the Hague, 1922.

Conference for Compiling International Law at the Hague, 1930.

International Committee for Aviation, 1930.


In September 1940 I was recalled to Tokyo from my post as the Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in China and was appointed Director of the Treaty Department of the Foreign Office.

When I heard from Foreign Minister Matsuoka matters concerning the Japanese-German negotiations for the Tripartite Pact and was ordered by him to participate in them, a rough draft of the Pact had already been drawn up on the basis of conversations between Foreign Minister Matsuoka, Dr. Stahmer and Ambassador Otto. I participated thereafter in the technical revision of details, etc., and on conclusion of the draft of negotiations, as far as a treaty, the negotiations for the Tripartite Pact were conducted on the Japanese side almost
entirely by Foreign Minister Natsuka alone, only M. Yood Saito, the advisor to the Foreign Minister, and I advising him on technical matters.

The main purpose of the Tripartite Pact was, according to explanations given by Foreign Minister Natsuka at the time on the present of the Privy Council etc., to restrain and check the United States of America to prevent her participation in the war against Germany, and to the same time, to avoid the danger of a Japanese-American war.

3. As to the interpretation of the Tripartite Pact, the opinion held at the time by the Foreign Office, which should be considered as the official interpretation of the Pact, was as follows.

(1) In Articles I and II Japan promised to recognize and respect the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe, and Germany and Italy promised to recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

These articles must be read together with the preamble of the Pact. Therefore, the "new order" mentioned in these articles is a "new order of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the people within the region" as stated in the preamble, and the "leadership" refers to that of those responsible for bringing about and maintaining that new order. These articles were of extremely political nature, and it must be said that their legal binding effect would depend upon the actual political situation.

(2) Article III stimulates that the Contracting Parties undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict. This is the most important article of this Pact.

As to the procedure to determine the existence of an "attack" which would make the obligation for assistance effective, it was stated in the letter addressed from Ambassador Ott to Foreign Minister Natsuka on the occasion of the exchange of letters in Tokyo on the day of the conclusion of the Pact that "it is needless to say that whether or not a Contracting Party has been attacked within the meaning of Article III of the Pact shall be determined by consultation among the three Contracting Parties." If the three powers could agree in this consultation, the Japanese Government considered it quite natural that each Contracting Party as a sovereign state could decide independently as to the existence of the attack. Besides, the consultation upon such an occasion was to have taken place directly between the governments of the three Contracting Parties, and did not fall within the competence of the Commissions of Article IV as mentioned below.

In connection with this article the original German draft contained the word "attacked either openly or covertly", as well as the stipulation that the Contracting Parties "undertake to declare war" on aggressor power when the existence of the attack had been recognized. These words were withdrawn upon request of the Japanese side. As the Japanese Government did not want to be drawn into the European War as a result of the Tripartite Pact, it was its intention to take an interpretation as limiting as possible concerning the existence of the attack.

(3) Article IV is a stipulation concerning the setting up of Joint Commissions of the three powers with a view to implementing the Pact. The Japanese Government considered, however, from the beginning that these Commissions were nothing but means for propaganda, and attached no practical importance to them. In the above-mentioned letter of Ambassador Ott addressed to Foreign Minister Natsuka it is stated that the conclusions of the Technical Commission should be submitted to the respective Governments for approval in order to be put in force, thus clarifying that the Commissions had no power to decide anything.

(4) In Article V it is established that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists as between each of the three
Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia. This article was inserted upon request of the German side just as it stood in the original German draft. It clarifies above all that the Tripartite Pact does not affect in any way the German-Russian Non-Aggression Pact, and stated at the same time the political desire of the three Contracting Parties for maintaining and improving friendly relations with Soviet Russia. In the above-mentioned letter from Ambassador Ott to Foreign Minister Matsukawa Germany promised with regard to Japanese-Russian relations that "Germany will do everything within its power to promote friendly understanding and will at any time offer its good offices to this end."

(5) Article VI and the following provisions are usual, formal stipulations. That no provision for abrogation of the Pact was made, is quite common in such political treaties as this.

(6) In this Pact an article to conclude no separate peace in case of war, as provided in the treaty of mutual assistance between Great Britain and Poland of 25 August 1922 and between Great Britain, France and Turkey of 19 October 1929, was not inserted. In this connection, Foreign Minister Matsukawa explained that no article for no-separate-case was provided as this Pact did not aim at a war.

4. On the day of the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact exchange of three kinds of letters took place in Tokyo between Foreign Minister Matsukawa and Ambassador Ott,

(1) The first kind of letter was a summary of the results of conversations between Foreign Minister Matsukawa, Stahmer and Ott with regard to the interpretation of the Pact etc. Japan first proposed to give it a form of a secret protocol; however, upon opposition from Germany, it took ultimately such a form as this. The original draft was dictated by Ambassador Ott to me. The Japanese Government considered as most important in its contents was, as mentioned above, the paragraph concerning the interpretation of Article VII, and the Japanese Government thought to have made thoroughly clear by this paragraph that the existence of the "attack" should be decided independently for each of the Contracting Parties.

(2) The second kind of letter concerned the attitude of Germany in case of an armed conflict between Japan and Great Britain. In under the circumstances at that time one could not ignore the possibility of an armed conflict between Japan and Great Britain, Japan proposed to Germany that, in that case also, despite the stipulation of Article VII of the Pact, Japan expected the assistance of Germany.

(3) The third kind of letter was concerning the former German colonies actually under Japan's Mandate in the South Seas. It is an established theory of international law that the mandate cannot be considered as the cession of territory; therefore, Japan wanted to clarify her territorial title of these former German colonial islands by stating that these islands were ceded by Germany to Japan. Germany wanted perhaps, as we believed at that time, on the one hand to settle the question politically by ceding these islands to Japan for a nominal compensation, on the other hand to utilize this matter as an argument for successfully claiming the return of colonies in other parts of the world.

(4) These exchanges of letters were understandings between Japan and Germany only; they were not communicated to Italy in accordance with Germany's desire.

There were no secret agreement etc. between Japan, Germany and Italy other than these exchanged letters.
CATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to
tell the truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ SATOYO, Shunichi

(Seal)
部分画面模糊，难以辨认具体内容。
No. 2.

By Luci 15×7

Letter

Space

1
No. 3

可能的分析和解释
No. 9

沒有指定的內容或問題。
昭和十五年（一九四七年）四月三十一日於東京

送達者 松本俊一

同日 於同所

同日 立會人牛場信彦

署名捺印シタルヲトラ證明シマス
Def. Doc. No. 1548

(Excerpts from "Events Leading Up to World War II", Chronological History, 1931-1944 - p. 256)

September 27. German-Italian-Japanese 10 year military economic alliance pact signed at Berlin. ("The Governments of Germany, Italy, and Japan, considering it as a condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and cooperate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned."
Ibid., Sept. 28, 1940, p.3, Japan, Vol. II, pp. 164 ff.)

Secretary Hull's statement on German-Italian-Japanese alliance. ("The reported agreement of alliance does not, in the view of the Government of the United States, substantially alter a situation which has existed for several years. Announcements of the alliance merely makes clear to all a relationship which has long existed in effect and to which this Government has repeatedly called attention. That such an agreement has been in process of conclusion has been well known for some time, and that fact has been fully taken into account by the Government of the United States in the determining of this country's policies."
Japan, Vol. II, p. 169.)
TELEGRAF RECEIVED

FROM Tokyo

Dated August 4, 1938
Rec'd 10:06 a.m.

Secretary of State,

Washington.

August 4, 6 p.m.

Embassy's August 2, 6 p.m., Soviet border clash.

One. The featuring by the press of reports on the Soviet border incident is running a poor second to reports on the advance towards Hankow. Systematic and effective use is being made of domestic reports from each important capital to the effect that dominant opinion at such capital does not expect the incident to develop into war. Particular interest attaches to reports that Moscow is not excited and that the Soviet press appears to be belittling the incident. At the same time Japanese army releases purporting to be simply factual accounts are currently published and they make it clear that the scale of fighting has been dangerously extensive. One release published today states that the Soviet forces in the vicinity of Chengkufeng include three battalions of infantry and one mechanized brigade with more than two hundred tanks. Soviet air raids involving large numbers of planes, over points in Manchuria and Korea, continue to be affirmed.

Two. The populace shows no desire for war against the Soviet Union and appears to be calm. However, apprehension is evidenced among officials and other informed Japanese, who feel that, as it is now the Soviet's turn to move, the decision for war or peace rests with Moscow.

We learn from the Foreign Office that Litvinov is evading the Japanese ambassador, which would seem to support press despatches from European capitals that the Soviet Government has not as yet made its decision. It was also stated at the Foreign Office that Japan will, whatever the consequences, tolerate no violation of the frontier. Nevertheless, there appears to be moderate optimism that war will not eventuate.

Three. As there is available in Tokyo no information from sources other than Japanese, we are in no position to decide whether we wish to modify our views on Soviet-Japanese relations expressed in our despatch 2822 of March 18 and in other reports.
It would appear, however, that the Soviet forces have, by moving into an area the ownership of which has been for some time in controversy, initiated this dangerous situation. Whether the motive was to divert Japanese forces from operation against China, as has been suggested, or some other, the Soviets have apparently precipitated a situation which may become impossible either for the Soviet Union or Japan to control.

Respectfully to "circling for Johnson."

C. G. M.

---

No. 96C1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

SECRETARY OF STATE

To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

I, Certify That the document hereunto annexed is a true copy from the files of this Departament.

In testimony whereof, I, C. G. M.,

Secretary of State, have hereunto caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Acting Authentication Officer of the said Department, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, this twenty-third day of January, 1947.

/s/ George C. Marshall
Secretary of State.

By /s/ E. L. Cash
Acting Authentication Officer, Department of State.
張憲等事件

文電

東京電

一九三六年八月四日

黒島大佐

國務長官

一九三六年八月四日

前後六時

宛告各親

電報

飛機報道

相對之盟

電報

國民政府宣言

聯合組織

軍間規模

軍危険

電報

國民政府宣言

聯合組織
I understand that the Japanese ambassador is manifesting greater pessimism following his last conversation with Litvinov and professes to be unable to understand Litvinov's attitude toward the Japanese proposal for cessation of hostilities in view of the fact that Litvinov stated that there were no Japanese troops at that time on Soviet territory and consequently the Soviet insistence on the removal of Japanese troops from territory claimed as Soviet as a condition precedent to any agreement had on the basis of this admission been met. I understand further that the ambassador states that the communique of the interview while substantially correct failed to mention that the Japanese ambassador had refused to accept Litvinov's version that Japanese troops had attacked on August 5 and that Japanese forces had provoked the incident at Charkovo and had said that in both instances Soviet troops had taken the initiative. It is furthermore reported that the Japanese ambassador admitted yesterday that the Russian troops were believed to be in occupancy of some but not all of the height Changhufeng.

The declaration, as published in the communique of August 8 to the effect that Litvinov after stating that no Japanese troops were on Soviet territory did not meet the Japanese proposal for immediate cessation of hostilities, had given rise to speculation in foreign circles as to the possible motives actuating this stand. The following opinions have been suggested possible explanations: (1) That Litvinov's statement and the military communique were not in accordance with the facts and that Japanese troops were still in occupancy of what the Soviet Government considers to be Soviet territory; (2) that as fighting was presumably still continuing Litvinov advised the possibility that before the cessation of hostilities could be actually effected the military situation might alter in favor of the Japanese and that contrary to his previous stand he would then be in the position of having agreed to a cessation of hostilities while Japanese troops were actually in occupation of Soviet territory, or (3) that the Soviet Government or Litvinov in the hope of exacting further concessions from the Japanese in regard to the general question of border incidents along the entire frontier is not desirous at the present time of terminating the incident. In support of the last explanation it may be pointed
pointed out that the last paragraph of the Soviet communique on the conversation introduced an element heretofore not present in the Soviet demands, namely, that some general assurance will be sought from the Japanese against the recurrence of similar frontier incidents in the future.

Up to the present, at least from the published communiques of the Soviet Government and from other information available to the Embassy, there appears to be no, repeat no, evidence that the Soviet Government intends to recede from the position which it has maintained since the beginning of the controversy and there is an intimation in the request for a general assurance as indicated above that the Soviet Government may even be broadening its original position. In this way the Soviet Government, on the supposition that the Japanese do not intend to engage in a general war with the Soviet Union at the present time may be endeavoring to secure as complete a diplomatic victory as possible in the present instance and may be manifesting an uncompromising attitude in this controversy with a view to enhancing Soviet prestige in general throughout the world at this particular moment. As regards Litvinov’s personal roll in the present controversy the consideration should not be excluded that the firm attitude which he has displayed may be motivated by a desire for the maximum of success with a view to enhancing his own standing with the Kremlin and his personal reputation abroad.

KIRK
To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

I Certify That the document hereunto annexed is a true copy from the files of this Department.

In testimony whereof, I, GEORGE C. MARSHALL, Secretary of State, have hereunto caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Acting Authentication Officer of the said Department, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, this twenty-third day of January, 1947.

/s/ George C. Marshall
Secretary of State.

By /s/ B. F. Cash
Acting Authentication Officer,
Department of State.
1. No text on this page.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
November 27. Friday. The German press has called upon the people to rejoice at the treaty published yesterday. It is curious that Von Ribbentrop, German Ambassador to London and not very welcome there, came by air to Berlin to sign this treaty and that Von Neurath, the Secretary of State, did not sign it, nor did Hitler. I suspect the Secretary did not wish to sign it, also that Von Ribbentrop had worked on the matter long before he was sent to London. It is Hitler's way of popularizing Von Ribbentrop who is not liked or respected very much here.

The Italian press announces today that Italy will enter the German-Japanese pact against Communism. The English and the French press attack this so-called "cultural pact between great intellectual peoples." Having preached for years against all races except Aryans, the Germans now accept the yellow race of the Far East as their equals. What would the old Kaiser, now at Doorn, say if he were free to speak? For so many years, he warned all Western peoples to have nothing to do with Eastern races, in spite of the fact that he had an alliance with the Turks when the World War began.
CERTIFICATE

Tokyo,
May 13, 1947

I certify that "Ambassador Dodd's Diary" was purchased by me from Harcourt, Brace and Company, 363 Madison Ave., New York. It arrived into my possession at 1500 hours this date and was lodged with the court clerk immediately after the excerpt prepared for evidence was abstracted.

/S/ Owen Couningham
このページの文書の自然なテキスト表現は次の通りです。

（具体的な翻訳内容）
シテ居ル。多分アリアン種族以外ノ全民族ニ反對シテ交兩国間民ガ今ハ
異ノ黄人種ヲ自分等ト同等視シテ居ル。今ハドーレンニ居ル老カイピ
はラ語ル自由ヲ有スルヒパ何ト言フデアロウカ。彼ハ世界大戦ガ勃発シ
タタトルギ古國民ト同盟ヲ結ビハ髪事験ハ有ルケレドモ多年全歐洲國民ハ
洋民族トハ關係ヲ結バナレセキヲ賜発シテ居ツカ。
THE U.S. EMBASSY'S REPORT ON THE CHANGXUFENG INCIDENT,
JULY 21, 1938

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From Moscow:

Dated July 21, 1938
Paid 11.11 a.m.

Secretary of State,
Washington.
July 21, 4 p.m.

My telegram July 19, 2 p.m.

The Embassy is reliably informed that the Japanese Ambassador, who has just returned from a visit abroad, renews his Government's protest against the action of the Soviet troops and strongly insisted on their withdrawal and a return to the status quo ante. He is furthermore said to have indicated that if the war ended his Government would be willing to set up a joint commission to delineate the frontiers in the area where the incident took place.

KIRK

KLP

--

No. 9044

United States of America
Department of State

To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

I certify that the document hereunto annexed is a true copy from the files of this Department.

In testimony thereof, I, George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, have caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Acting Authentication Officer of the said Department, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, this twenty-third day of January, 1947.

/s/ George C. Marshall
Secretary of State

By /s/ E. E. Cash
Acting Authentication Officer,
Department of State
Secretary of State,

Washington.

August 24, 2 p.m.

I understand that in the course of the negotiations between Litvinov and the Japanese Ambassador during the past few days an agreement was reached as to delegates of the Boundary Commission to discuss the frontier in the region of Lake Phusan. The question however of the nature of the documents and other evidence admissible as a basis of the work of the Commission is apparently still pending as Litvinov insists that the accords concluded between Russia and China with the maps annexed thereto should be the sole basis for negotiation whereas the Japanese Ambassador maintains that other material should be considered as well.

There has been no reference to developments in regard to this general subject in the Soviet press since the publication of the communique reported in my telegram under reference.

KIRK

---

No. 9617

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

I certify that the document hereunto annexed is a true copy from the files of this department.

In testimony whereof, I, GEORGE C. MARSHALL,

Secretary of State, have hereunto caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Acting Authentication Officer of the said Department, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, this twenty-third day of January, 1947.

/s/ George C. Marshall

Secretary of State.

By /s/ B. E. Cash

Acting Authentication Officer, Department of State.
No 2

抽力流回工程

今以局部图解法

米份图解法
MOSCOW COMMUNIQUE ON THE CHANGKUFENG INCIDENT,
July 22, 1936

TELEGRAM RECEIVED

From Moscow
Dated July 22, 1938
Rec'd 0:53 a.m.

Secretory of State
Washington
July 22, Noon.

My telegram July 21, 4 p.m. and previous.

Moscow morning papers publish conspicuously a communiqué entitled "The baselessness of the representations and demands of the Japanese Government" of which following is a translation.

"On the 20th of this month the Japane Ambassador visited the Peoples Commissaire for Foreign Affairs and made the following declaration to him.

The Commissariat for Foreign Affairs on July 15th on the basis of the Khun Chun agreement and the maps subjécted thereto rejected the demand of the Japanese Embassy for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the heights situated to the west of Lake Khasan "Chanchi". The Japanese Government having in studied this question on the basis of data in the possession of the Manchurian Government came to the conclusion that this district belongs to Manchuria. Moreover, the Manchurian population confirms that on the height in question it was in the habit of celebrating religious ceremonies. The Soviet Government has always manifested its inclination for peace and for the preservation of the status quo on the frontier region and therefore the responsibility will fall on that Government for the violation of this status quo. The Japanese Government does not insist on the frontier now being accurately defined and its demand extends only to the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from the area in question whereby calm will be restored.

Comrade Litvinov reminded Ambassador Shigemitsu that official documents to wit: the Khun Chun agreement and the maps subjécted thereto were shown to the Japanese Charge d'Affaires, on which maps, the frontier is perfectly clearly traced, running through the mountains lying to the west of Lake Khasan. The maps bear the signatures of the representatives of a former Chinese Government. By the display of these documents the question should be considered closed. However, to this completely indisputable evidence the Japanese Government in refutation refers to some indefinite data not presented to the Soviet Government and to certain statements by an unnamed Manchurian villager which are impossible of verification. The inclusion of the height to the west of Lake Khasan in Soviet territory can under no circumstances be disputed. Soviet territory can under no circumstances be disputed. Soviet military detachments have been sent thither before this and are sent there now. Within the confines of its territory the transfer of Soviet troops is regulated by the Soviet authorities and no interference or demands of another government can be admitted. The Soviet detachment in that district has no other purpose than the protection of the status quo on our frontier. Differently from other governments the Soviet Union maintains armies not to send them into other countries but solely for the protection of its frontiers. The Red Army fully admits its responsibility for the non-violation and integrity of those frontiers and in its actions is inspired by that responsibility.

Or the frontier complete tranquility reigns and it can only be broken by the Japanese Manchurian s police in that event will bear the responsibility for the consequences. (END SECTION ONE)
At whatever points Soviet forces may find themselves they do not threaten the territory of others. If in the future the Japanese Government produces the data in the possession of Manchuria which it cites the Soviet Government will gladly examine them and give its opinion thereon.

Ambassador Shigemitsu expressed the assumption that his Government would not be satisfied with the answer of the Peoples Commissar, in his opinion the Soviet Government is citing "some unpublished maps or others". It is indisputable to take measures looking to a restoration of tranquility on the border and a detente of the atmosphere which has been created there. Otherwise Japan must come to the conclusion regarding the indispensability of adopting force. Again repeating his demands regarding the withdrawal of Soviet forces Mr. Shigemitsu made a protest against the killing of a Japanese gendarme by the Soviet forces.

Comrade Litvinov expressed his astonishment that such an experienced diplomat as ambassador Shigemitsu should respond so disdainfully to official maps which define the frontiers between states. Whether in due time the maps were actually published or not the force and persuasiveness of the documents are hereby neither increased nor diminished. It is strange to hear these observations from the representative of a government which by no means practices the obligation of publishing all agreements concluded by it. Can it be that that government considers that the secret treaties concluded by it have no force? The demand for the withdrawal of the troops reinforced by absolutely no documents is unacceptable. Can it be that the Japanese would consent to change the disposition of its troops on the basis of such unsupported demands? As for the employment of force, if the ambassador considers such a threat and intimidation advisable to which certain governments are actually yielding, a good diplomatic medium he must know that he will not find a successful employment of such means in Moscow. The Japanese gendarme was killed on Soviet territory where he should not have come.

In conclusion the Peoples Commissaire drew the Ambassador's attention to the invasion which took place on July 19 of the premises of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo by some Japanese bands or others distributing provocative handbills there. Although ordinarily not a single person can enter the Embassy without being stopped by the considerable police force stationed there, the latter made no attempt to hinder the invasion of the Embassy by the bands. In the interest of tranquility and the normal functioning of the Soviet Embassy in Tokyo and the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, it is incumbent upon the Japanese Government to take measures for the punishment of the guilty and the prevention of a repetition of such events in the future. (END MESSAGE).

Repeated to Tokyo.

KIRK

WW'C:CSB
To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting:

I certify that the document hereunto annexed is a true copy from the files of this Department.

In testimony thereof, I, George C. Marshall, Secretary of State, have hereunto caused the seal of the Department of State to be affixed and my name subscribed by the Acting Authentication Officer of the said Department, at the city of Washington, in the District of Columbia, this twenty-third day of January, 1947.

/s/ George C. Marshall
Secretary of State.

By /s/ R. E. Cash
Acting Authentication Officer,
Department of State
日本語

「$hka$ - 倉」

令和四年十一月十四日

本校長

「$hka$ - 倉」

( )

令和四年十一月十四日

本校長

「$hka$ - 倉」

令和四年十一月十四日

本校長

「$hka$ - 倉」

令和四年十一月十四日

本校長
「日本の「」

1945年4月1日

日本の「」

「日本の「」

日本語の「」
Def. Doc. No. 1571

The Secret Notes Exchanged between the Governments of Japan and Germany with Respect to the Abrogation of the Secret Agreement Annexed to the Pact against the Communist International

(The note sent)

Berlin, November [date blank] 1941

Monsieur le Ministre,

On the occasion of signing the protocol concerning the extension of the term of validity of the Pact against the Communist International, I have the honor to notify you, in conformity with the instructions of my Government, that the Government of Japan and the Government of Germany have reached complete agreement upon the following point:

The Secret Agreement annexed to the Pact against the Communist International, concluded between the Government of Japan and the Government of Germany on 25 November 1936, together with the Appendix and the Understandings thereof, shall be abrogated on and from 25 November 1941, notwithstanding the provisions of Article III of the said Secret Agreement.

I cordially request you to be good enough to confirm the agreement of the Government of Germany to the views mentioned above.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Monsieur le Ministre, to express to Your Excellency my highest consideration.

(Translation of the note received)

Berlin, November [date blank] 1941

Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,

I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of today's date, running as follows:

"On the occasion of signing the protocol concerning the extension of the term of validity of the Pact against the Communist International, I have the honor to notify you, in conformity with the instructions of my Government, that the Government of Japan and the Government of Germany have reached complete agreement upon the following point:

"The Secret Agreement annexed to the Pact against the Communist International, concluded between the Government of Japan and the Government of Germany on 25 November 1936, together with the Appendix and the Understandings thereof, shall be abrogated on and from 25 November 1941, notwithstanding the provisions of Article III of the said Secret Agreement."

In reply, I have the honor to notify you of the agreement of Government of Germany to the views mentioned in your note.

I avail myself of this opportunity, Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, to express to your Excellency my highest consideration.
『共産インターナショナル』に對スル協定ノ監視

昭和十七年（千九百四十一年）十一月

本使ハ郵下ニ於テ前記ノ見解ニ對スル＝ドイツ＝國政府ノ合意ヲ確認セ

ラレル＝共産＝インターナショナル＝對スル協定ノ秘密附屬協定第三條ノ規定ニ拘ラスニ千九百十四年十一月ニ於テ＝郵下ニ向テ敬寄＝表シ候

敬具

ハ郵

附屬協定ノ監視ニ於テ
（来関図文）

以書翰枚上參畳際者本日附送以疏以片此稱敬附書敬致候

署名

政府

千九百四十九年十一月二十七日

大臣

ルノ光翼

本大臣ハ前記ノ見解ニ於テルノ

スルノ都々

及此ノ附送並ニ丁派降ハ

政府

四十一月二十一日

大臣

ルノ光翼

千九百四十八年十一月

大臣

ルノ光翼

敬具

於

手順

Def.Doo.1571
昭和二十二年五月十二日
於東京
佐藤
武五郎

同
於
同
所

文書ノ出所=成立ニ某ル昭明書

自己ノ届ハ外務省文書課長代理ノ後二居ル者ナルト知ハ

ラレタル日本語=依ツテ書カレ四愚ノリ成ル=共産=インターショナ

ルニルル書類ハ日本政府ハ外務省文書課ノ管理ヲヲ保テ/係ル文書ナルコトナ

 dispensaries
Certificate

1. The original document of the General Principles of Settling the Nomonhan Border Incident on May 31, 1939 (14th year of Showa).

2. The original document of the Imperial Ordinance of the Imperial Headquarters' army section on August 30, 1939, to the effect, "We try not to enlarge our operations in the Nomonhan regions but take measures promptly to settle the disturbance. The commander of the Kwantung Army should form a plan for holding out with possible small forces in the Nomonhan regions."

3. The original document of the Imperial Ordinance belonging to the order of the Imperial Headquarters' Army Section dated September 3, 1939 (14th year of Showa), in the effect of "The Imperial Headquarters intends to bring the border incident in the Nomonhan regions to an independent settlement. The commander of the Kwantung Army should stop the offensive operations in the Nomonhan regions."

This is to certify the above three documents, which had been kept in the custody of the General Staff, were burnt with other documents of the same kind at the termination of the
D/F. DOC. #1574

war, and do not exist at present.

On this 7th day of May, 1947
At Tokyo

Chief of the Document Section,
The First Demobilization Bureau,
MIYAKA, Yôzô

I, BANNO, Junkichi, hereby certify that the above
signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of
the Witness.

On the same date
At the same place

Witness: (signed) BANNO, Junkichi (seal)
第一復員局文書課

■

署名

署名

直許人

立會人

吉

2

昭和15年10月2日
AFFIDAVIT

I, JOHN H. AMEN, being first duly sworn on oath, depose and say:

1. That I am a commissioned officer of the Army of the United States of America, and my serial number is O-44563.

2. That I am now and have been continuously since 1 Sept. 1945 Chief of the Interrogation Division of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel for the prosecution of Axis criminality, and as such have been in charge of the interrogation of all the witnesses and prospective defendants incidental to the trials now being conducted by the International Military Tribunal at Nurnberg, Germany.

3. That one Colonel Howard A. Brundage in the month of September 1945 was a member of my staff and conducted interrogation of JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, who is now a defendant and on trial before the said International Military Tribunal. That on the 20th day of September 1945 at 2:30 P.M., said JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP was interrogated by said Colonel Howard A. Brundage and one D. C. Poole, a special representative of the Secretary of State of the United States. That said interrogation was conducted in English and was reduced to writing by Clair Van Vleck, a court reporter on my staff. That Siegfried Rammler, an interpreter on my staff, was present but did not interpret for the reason that the interrogation was conducted in English. That at the commencement of said interrogation an oath was administered to said JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, and said interrogation was taken under oath. That an oath was also administered to said court reporter, Clair Van Vleck, by the terms of which he swore to correctly transcribe the interrogation and all its details.

4. That said interrogation upon its completion was reduced to writing by said reporter, and the original was filed with me, and since said filing has continuously remained in my custody. That said interrogator, Colonel Howard A. Brundage, and said reporter Clair Van Vleck, have each returned to the United States and are no longer on the staff of the Office of the United States Chief of Counsel. That said D. C. Poole is no longer in Nurnberg, Germany.

5. That the document attached hereto is a true and accurate copy of the original interrogation filed with me and retained in my file as aforesaid.

/s/ John H. Amen

John H. Amen
Colonel, I.G.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 3rd day of May 1946

/s/ Smith W. Brookhart, Jr., Lt Col
SMITH W. BROOKHART, JR., LT. COLONEL, IGD
0-508524

Testimony of JOACHIM VON RIBBENTROP, taken at Nuremberg, Germany, on 20 September 1945, 11:30 - 16:15, by Col. Howard A. Brundage, JAGD, OUSEC, and Mr. D. C. Poole, Special Representative of the Secretary of State. Also present: Siegfried Rammler, Interpreter, and Pct Clair Van Vleck, Court Reporter.
私事ジョーラン・エーテーマンは先立正式に宣言し次の宣誓供述しました。

一、私は政米判加合衆国陸軍官陸将であります

二、私は一九四五五年四月二十年九月一日に至る迄引続き親

図犯刑行為に対する合衆国検察官兵事務局裁判官及裁判所に於

ての被告及び被告用に於する裁判を携えて居りまして

三、一九四五五年九月ホワード・エーテーブランデージ大佐は私の事務局

のヨアヒム・フォンリッセントロプに対して裁判を行いました。
一九四五〇年九月二〇日午后二時半前記ヨアヒム・フォン・リッペントロップは前記ホワイト・シー・ブラルから証言を受けました。當該証言は英語で発せられ、私の証言局の裁判所書記クリーレル・ウンダー・ウレッフに依り記録されました。私の証言局に居る証言局の証言資料記録クリーレル・ウンダー・ウレッフに出席して居ました。當該証言は英語で発せられたので証言は直ちに、レック裁判所書記も亦宣示させられ其宣誓の誓約に従ひ彼は口証言及

四、上記証言は其無線を抜かり上記証言に依り記録に習められ其成さは私

の處の縫込みに收めてあります。上記の証言書記クリーレル・フォン・ウレックは米国に寄呈し、彼は口証言及

察長事務局員ではありません。上記デーテー・シー・ブラルも最早や
1. The original copy of a telegraphic order from General Staff Headquarters to the Korean Army dated July 16, 1933 (Showa 13) was to the effect that "her the occasion calls, forces in Korea under the command of the Korean Army may be concentrated to the vicinity of the frontier area to meet the illegal trespassing of the border by Soviet troops near Changkufang".

2. The original copy of a telegraphic order from General Staff Headquarters to the Korean Army dated July 23, 1933 was to the effect, "Take adequate measures to prevent further enlargement of the conflict hereafter concerning the disposition of the Changkufang incident".

3. The original copy of a telegraphic order of the Imperial General Staff Headquarters to the Commander of the Korean Army dated July 26, of the same year was to the effect, "The Commander of the Korean Army shall call back the forces concentrated at the frontier area to their proper previously stationed places".

4. The document received by General Staff Headquarters which was a report from the Commander of the Korean Army to General Staff Headquarters dated July 30, of the same year was to the effect, "Aside from the Changkufang incident, we shall be satisfied with driving Soviet troops who are
presently standing face to face with us out of Manchuria
and will guide matters so that the incident will not
spread into other directions."

5. The original copy of a telegraphic order from the
General Staff Headquarters to the Headquarters of the
Korean Army, dated the same date, was to the effect, "It
is our policy to leave the Shatssefarg incident for the
time being to the disposition of the local forces at the
spot who have been maintaining a non-enlargement policy."

6. The original copy of a telegraphic order from the
Imperial General Headquarters to the Commander of the
Korean Army dated August 1, of the same year was to the
effect, "Military activities in the neighborhood of
Changjuferg and Shatssefarg should not be further developed
than what they are at present."

7. The original copy of a telegraphic order from the "Ar
Ministry to the Headquarters of the Korean Army dated
the same date was to the effect, "In order to maintain a
non-expansion policy for the incident and to settle it
promptly as a local problem from a fair, proper and
peaceful standpoint, it is our policy to transfer the
matter to diplomatic negotiation".

---
I certify that the above seven documents which had been kept in the custody of General Staff Headquarters or the War Ministry was destroyed at the time of the termination of the war and are not in existence at present.

May 16, 1945

/s/ HIYAMA, Yozo (seal)
chief of-the-
Archives and Document Section
of the First Demobilization
Secrre.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place,
at the same date.

Witness: /s/ KAMENO, Junkichi (seal)

Translation Certificate

I, Yukio Kawamoto, of the Defense Language Branch, hereby certify that the foregoing translation described in the above certificate is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation and is as near as possible to the meaning of the original document.

/s/ Yukio Kawamoto

Tokyo, Japan

Date 19, May 47
TASS COMMUNIQUE AUGUST 11, 1938

From the Pravda, Moscow, Organ of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks).

CONCERNING THE CONFLICTS IN THE REGION OF LAKE KHUNAN

Yesterday, August 10, the Japanese Ambassador, Mr. Shigemitsu, again visited the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Comrade Litvinov. After an exchange of opinions, the People’s Commissar made in the name of the Soviet Government the following proposals:

1) The Japanese and Soviet forces shall cease all military activities on August 11 at 12 noon local time. Instructions to that effect to be issued immediately by the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Japan.

2) Soviet as well as Japanese troops shall remain on those lines which they occupied at midnight local time on August 10;

3) For the readjustment of the portion of the frontier in dispute there shall be created a mixed commission of two representatives from the U.S.S.R. and two representatives from the Japanese-Mancurian side with an umpire selected by agreement of both parties from among the citizens of a third state.

4) The commission for the readjustment shall work on the basis of agreements and maps bearing the signatures of plenipotentiary representatives of Russia and China.

Ambassador Shigemitsu accepted in full the first two proposals having refused arbitration. Comrade Litvinov pointed out that the most effective guarantee of the achievement of an agreement for readjustment would be the presence on the commission of an unbiased disinterested umpire but in view of the objection of the ambassador he did not insist upon arbitration. This agreement is considered to have been reached on the third point also.

An agreement was not reached on the question of the basis of the work of the commission for readjustment. Ambassador Shigemitsu proposed to use as a basis also other material with which he had not been presented to the Soviet Government and concerning which it therefore had no knowledge. Mr. Shigemitsu promised he would inquire of his Government on this question and give an answer at the earliest possible moment. (TASS).

---

Translation Certificate

I, Miura, Kazuichi, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the Russian, English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

K. Miura

Tokyo

May 19, 1947.
張敬熹事件

一九三八年八月十一日《中央日報》報導

日本於八月十一日派遣大使重光葵來華

與中國政府交涉

今桑源地方

中央委員會

外勤人民學會往訪
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 12 pages and entitled "Constitution and Rules of the Communist International" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 17th day of May, 1947.

K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: K. Urobe
Constitution and Rules of the Communist International.

I. NAME AND OBJECTS.

1. The Communist International - the International Workers' Association - is a union of Communist Parties in various countries; it is a World Communist Party. As the leader and organizer of the world revolutionary movement of the proletariat and the bearer of the principles and aims of Communism, the Communist International strives to win over the majority of the working class and the bread strata of the property-less peasantry, fights for the establishment of the world dictatorship of the proletariat, for the establishment of a world union of Socialist Soviet Republics, for the complete abolition of classes and for the achievement of Socialism - the first stage of Communist society.

2. The various Parties affiliated to the Communist International are called the Communist Party of, ... name of country (Section of the Communist International). In any given country there can be only one Communist Party affiliated to the Communist International and representing its Section in that country.

3. Membership of the Communist Party and of the Communist International is open to all those who accept the programme and rules of the given Communist Party and of the Communist International, who join one of the basic units of a Party, actively work in it, abide by all the decisions of the Party and of the Communist International, and regularly pay Party dues.

4. The basic unit of the Communist Party organization is...
is the nucleus in the place of employment (factory, workshop, mine, office, store, farm, etc.) which unites all the Party members employed in the given enterprise.

5. The Communist International and its Sections are built up on the basis of democratic centralism, the fundamental principles of which are: a) election of all the leading committees of the Party, subordinate and superior, (by general meetings of Party members, conferences, congresses and international congresses); b) periodical reports by leading Party committees to their constituents; c) decisions of superior Party committees to be obligatory for subordinate committees, strict Party discipline and prompt execution of the decisions of the Communist International, of its leading committees and of the leading Party organs.

Party questions may be discussed by the members of the Party and by Party organisations until such time as a decision is taken upon them by the competent Party committees. After a decision has been taken by the Congress of the Communist International, by the Congress of the Comintern, and of its various Sections, these decisions must be unreservedly carried out even if a Section of the Party membership or of the local Party organisations are in disagreement with them.

In cases where a Party exists illegally, the superior Party committees may appoint the subordinate committees and elect members on their own committees, subject to subsequent endorsement by the competent superior Party committees.

6. In all non-Party, workers' and peasants' mass organisations
tions and in their leading committees (trade unions, co-operative societies, sport organisations, ex-service men’s organisations, congress and conferences in the municipalities and town councils, parliaments etc.) where there are only two Party members in such organisations and bodies, Communist fractures must be formed for the purpose of strengthening the Party’s influence and for carrying out its policy in these organisations and bodies.

7. The Communist fractures are subordinated to the competent Party bodies.

Note:

1. Communist fractures in international organisations (Red International of Labour Unions, International Class War Prisoners Aid Society, International Workers Relief etc.) are subordinate to the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

2. The organisational structure of the Communist fractures and the manner in which their work is guided are determined by special instructions from the Executive Committee of the Communist International and from the Central Committees of the given Sections of the Comintern.
II. THE WORLD CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL.

3. The supreme body of the Communist International is the World Congress of representatives of all Parties (Sections) and organisations affiliated to the Communist International.

The World Congress discusses and decides programme, tactical and organisational questions connected with the activities of the Communist International and of its various Sections. Power to alter the programme and rules of the Communist International lies exclusively with the World Congress of the Communist International.

The World Congress shall be convened once every two years. The date of the Congress and the number of representatives from the various Sections to the Congress to be determined by the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

The number of decisive votes to be allocated to each Section at the World Congress shall be determined by a special decision of the Congress itself, in accordance with the membership of the given Party and the political importance of the given country. Delegates to the Congress must have a free mandate; no imperative mandate can be recognised.

9. Special Congresses of the Communist International shall be convened on the demand of Parties which, at the preceding World Congress had an aggregate of not less than one half of the decisive votes.

10. The World Congress elects the Executive Committee of the Communist International (EXCOM) and the International Control
Control Commission (I.C.C.).

11. The headquarters of the Executive Committee is decided on by the World Congrès.
III. THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AND ITS SUBSIDIARY BODIES.

12. The leading body of the Communist International in the period between Congresses is the Executive Committee, which gives instructions to all the Sections of the Communist International and controls their activity.

The E.C.C.I. publishes the Central Organ of the Communist International, in not less than four languages.

13. The decisions of the E.C.C.I. are obligatory for all the Sections of the Communist International and must be promptly carried out. The Sections have the right to appeal against decisions of the E.C.C.I. to the World Congress, but must continue to carry out such decisions pending the decision of the World Congress.

14. The Central Committees of the various Sections of the Communist International are responsible to their respective annual Congresses and to Central Committees of Parties and also to make decisions which are obligatory for them. (Cf. Par. 13).

15. The E.C.C.I. has the right to expel from the Communist International, entire Sections, groups and individual members who violate the programme and rules of the Communist International or the decisions of the World Congress and of the E.C.C.I. Persons and bodies expelled have the right of appeal to the World Congress.
16. The programmes of the various Sections of the Communist International must be endorsed by the E.C.C.I. In the event of the E.C.C.I. refusing to endorse a programme, the Section concerned has the right to appeal to the World Congress of the Communist International.

17. The leading organs of the press of the various Sections of the Communist International must publish all the decisions and official documents of the E.C.C.I. These decisions must, as far as possible, be published also in the other organs of the Party press.

18. The E.C.C.I. has the right to accept affiliation to the Communist International of organisations and Parties sympathetic to Communism, such organisations to have an advisory vote.

19. The E.C.C.I. elects a Presidium responsible to the E.C.C.I., which acts as the permanent body carrying out all the business of the E.C.C.I. in the interval between the meetings of the latter.

20. The E.C.C.I. and its Presidium has the right to establish Permanent Bureaux (Western European, South, American, Eastern and other Bureaux of the E.C.C.I.) for the purpose of establishing closer contact with the various Sections of the Communist International and in order to be better able to guide their work.

Note:

The scope of the activities of the permanent bureaux of the E.C.C.I. shall be determined by the E.C.C.I. or by its Presidium.
The Sections of the Communist International which come within the scope of activities of the permanent bureaux of the E.C.C.I. must be informed by the powers conferred on these bureaux.

21. The Sections must carry out the instructions of the permanent bureaux of the E.C.C.I. Sections may appeal against the instructions of the permanent bureaux to the E.C.C.I. or to its Presidium, but must continue to carry out such instructions pending the decision of E.C.C.I. or of its Presidium.

22. The E.C.C.I. and its Presidium have the right to send their representatives to the various Sections of the Communist International. Such representatives receive their instructions from the E.C.C.I. or from its Presidium, and are responsible to them for their activities. Representatives of the E.C.C.I. have the right to participate in meetings of the central Party bodies as well as of the local organisations of the sections to which they are sent. Representatives of the E.C.C.I. must carry out their commission in close contact with the Central Committee of the Section to which they are sent. They may, however, speak in opposition to the Central Committee of the given Section, at Congresses and Conferences of that Section, if the line of the Central Committee of the given Section, at Congresses and Conferences of the given Section, at Congresses and Conferences of that Section, if the line of the Central Committee in question diverges from the instructions of the E.C.C.I. Representatives of the E.C.C.I. are especially obliged to supervise the carrying out of the decisions of the World Congresses and of the Executive Committee.
The E.C.C.I. and its Presidium also have the right to send instructors to the various Sections of the Communist International. The powers and duties of instructors are determined by the E.C.C.I., to whom the instructors are responsible in their work.

23. Meetings of the E.C.C.I. must take place not less than once every six months. A quorum must consist of not less than one half of the membership of the E.C.C.I.

24. Meetings of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. must take place not less than once a fortnight. A quorum must consist of not less than one half of the membership of the Presidium.

25. The Presidium elects the Political Secretariat, which is empowered to take decisions, and which also prepares questions for the meetings of the E.C.C.I. and of its Presidium, and acts as their executive body.

26. The presidium appoints the editorial committee of the periodical and other publications of the Communist International.

27. The Presidium of the E.C.C.I. sets up a Department for Work Among Women Toilers, permanent committees for guiding the work of definite groups of Sections of the Communist International (Lander Secretariats) and other departments necessary for its work.
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION.

28. The International Control Commission investigates matters concerning the unity of the Sections affiliated to the Communist International and also matters connected with the Communist conduct of individual members of the various Sections.

For this purpose the I.C.C.:

a) Examines complaints against the actions of Central Committees of Communist Parties lodged by Party members who have been subjected to disciplinary measures for political differences;

b) Examines analogous matters concerning members of central bodies of Communist Parties and of individual Party members as it deems necessary, or which are submitted to it by the deciding bodies of the E.C.C.I.;

c) Audits the accounts of the Communist International.

The International Control Commission must not intervene in the political differences or in organisational and administrative conflicts in the Communist Parties.

The headquarters of the I.C.C. are fixed by the I.C.C., in agreement with the E.C.C.I.
V. THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE SECTIONS OF
THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL AND THE E.C.C.I.

29. The Central Committees of Sections affiliated to the Communist International and the Central Committees of affiliated sympathising organisations must send to the E.C.C.I. the Minutes of their meeting and reports of their work.

30. Resignation from office by individual members or groups of members of Central Committees of the various Sections are regarded as disruption of the Communist movement. Leading posts in the Party do not belong to the occupant of that post, but to the Communist International as a whole. Elected members of the Central leading bodies of the various Sections may resign before their time of office expires, only with the consent of the E.C.C.I. Resignations accepted by Central Committees of Sections without the consent of the E.C.C.I. are invalid.

31. The Sections affiliated to the Communist International must maintain close organisational and informational contact with each other, arrange for mutual representation at each others conferences and congresses, and, with the consent of the E.C.C.I., exchange leading comrades. This applies particularly to the Sections in imperial countries and their colonies, and to the Sections in countries adjacent to each other.

32. Two or more Sections of the Communist International which, (like the Sections in the Scandinavian countries and in the Balkans) are politically connected with each other by common conditions of struggle.
struggle, may, with the consent of the E.C.C.I., form federations for the purpose of co-ordinating their activities, such federations to work under the guidance and control of the E.C.C.I.

33. The Sections of the Comintern must regularly pay affiliation dues to the E.C.C.I.; the amount of such dues to be determined by the E.C.C.I.

34. Congresses of the various Sections, ordinary and special, can be convened only with the consent of the E.C.C.I.

In the event of a Section failing to convene a Party conference, or Plenum of its Central Committee, for the purpose of preparing the questions for the World Congress.

35. The Young Communist International is a Section of the Communist International with full rights and is subordinate to the E.C.C.I.

36. The Communist Parties must be prepared for transition to illegal conditions. The E.C.C.I. must render the Parties concerned assistance in their preparations for transition to illegal conditions.

37. Individual members of Sections of the Communist International may pass from one country to another only with the consent of the Central Committee of the Section of which they are members.

Communists changing their domicile must join the Section in the country of their new domicile. Communists leaving their country without the consent of the Central Committee of their Section, must not be accepted into other Sections of the Communist International.
自分名簿八外務省文書係常務次官二局る存件ノハリ成ル共産コインターナショナルルル規約ヘハニテ備考スルノニル
日本進ニ依テ書カレタル六月ニリ成ル共産コインターナショナルルル規約ヘハニテ備考スルノニル
昭和二十二年五月十七日於東京
立会人
部
局
名
第六条

党ノ存在ヲ非合法ナル場合ハ、学問ノ各機構ヲ発足スルモノトス。
第七条
党外団体は党の管轄機関に隷属する。

第八条
共産インターナショナルノ最高機関ハ之ヲ加入スルヲ定ム。
（国際・ナショナル）

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約

・右代表者ハ右幹部会ノ権限ヲ発揮スルヲ約
並行政上ノ紛議ニ干渉スルヲ得

国際監督委員会ノ所在地ハ共産インターナショナル支部ト執行委員會トノ相互関係

第二十九條 共産インターナショナル支部ト執行委員會ハ共産党ノ中央委員会ノ旨許セタル支那ノ中央委員会ヘハ共産党ノ地域事務及事業報告ヲ

執行委員會ニ送付スル義務ヲ有ス

第二十條 各支部中央委員會所屬党員於テハ共産運動ヲ紊乱スルモノヲ認ム共産党ノ指導ヲハ共産インターナショナル支部ト執行委員會ノ旨許セタル支那ノ中央委員会ヘハ共産党ノ地域事務及事業報告ヲ送付スル義務ヲ有ス

任期満期前其ノ委員ヲ事務ヲ辞退スルモノヲ得支那ノ中央委員会ノ旨許セル
第十一條 共産インターナショナルに加入セル支部ハ互ニ密接ナル組織ヲ並情報上ニ情報ヲ互ニ交换スルヲ要ス前記事項ハ特に本国ト其ノ植民地ニ於ケル支部ニ関シ適用アルモノトス

第三十二条 共産インターナショナルノニ二個又ハニ個以上ノ支

部ニシテノスカンドナヴィア及白羽幹部ノ国支部ノ如クノ活動スルヲ獲得ヲ同ニシテ聯盟ノ組織ヲハ協同ノニ活動スルヲ獲得ヲ同ニシテ聯盟ハ其

第三十三条 共産インターナショナルノ支部ニ共産ノ

進行委員会ノ指揮及び監督下ニ行動スルモノトス

得ルモ共産インターナショナル執行委員会ノ同意ヲ得サル
ナショナル執行委員会に対しこ正規加入費を納付スル妥当ス

第三十四条 各支部大会コ例会タクトコ臨時会タクト間ハ総テ

第三十四条 各支部大会ハ例会タクトコ臨時会タクト間ハ総テ

第三十五条 国際共産青年联盟（青年共産インターナショナルノ支部ニシテ）支出トシテノ未利ノ

第三十六条 共産党ハ非合法の立候補ヲ全ハ臨時会コナス

エ・ア・1/611

エ・ア・1/611
第三十七条 共産インターナショナル支部員は、その所属支部

中央委員会ノ同意ヲ得テ、認可ヲ得テ、移動スルヲ

住所ヲ変更セル共産主義者ニシテ、所属支部中央委員会ノ同意ヲ得テ、認可ヲ得テ、移動スルヲ

離去セル者ハ、共産インターナショナルノ他ノ支部ニ入党スルヲ得ス。
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al
v.
No. 1
ARAKI Sadao, et al

AFFIDAVIT

SHISHIKURA JURÔ

Having first duly sworn an oath as on the attached sheet, and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

I am a former major of the Japanese Army, at present living in No. 1682 Kichijoji Musashino-machi, Kitatama-gun, Tokyo.

I worked in the second section of the staff office of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army as a staff officer of the Kwantung Army from March 1943 to March 1945, and served subsequently in the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry to the time of the surrender. I was exclusively in charge of intelligence concerning the Far-Eastern Red Army, during my term in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army. At that time, I used to report to my superiors upon the order of battle, organization, quality, tactics, etc., of the Red Army as a result of collecting, studying and examining various data. Though I have none of these records at present, I can testify from memory about the condition of the Far-Eastern Red Army in 1944.

1. The USSR troops stationed in the Far East consisted of troops of the Army, Navy and Home Commissariat of the USSR to the number of about 700,000. So far as the Navy is concerned, there was nothing of special interest except two A-class cruisers and more than 100 submarines; and the troops of the Home Commissariat had little strength from the tactical point of view. I shall speak therefore hereinafter mainly about the Red Army forces.

2. The Red Army was composed of 19 sharpshooter divisions, 22 air-divisions (1500 planes), 1 tank division and 12 tank brigades (about 1,000 tanks), and divided into the Far-Eastern Area Army (commander General First-class Pulkov) and the Zabaikal Area Army (commander General Kawai). The Far-Eastern Army had 13 sharpshooter divisions, 17 air divisions and 10 tank brigades, and the area east of the Amur district (Amur is situated between Chita and Blagoveschensk) was under it. The Zabaikal Area Army had the remainder and had the area rest of the Amur. Their strengths are shown in the annexed chart.

3. I discuss the air forces in more detail.

(1) The Northern Vladivostok district had the greatest density of air-bases (the whole strength of the 9th Air Army; 7 divisions) and next, the district around Khabarovsk (the main strength of the 10th Air Army, 3 divisions). From the autumn of 1944 the air-bases increased in the area of Komsomol.

(2) Regarding the types of the planes, the main strength was fighters, though from the beginning of 1944 the proportion of bombers came to increase. Previously the air-divisions had been composed of various types of planes, but from around 1944 they were thought to have been reorganized into divisions of one type of plane. For example, the 261st Division was a bomber-division, the 52nd a fighter-division, the 54th was a bomber-division and the 55th a division of long-range bombers.

(3) The air divisions which had long-range bombers were the 55th (2 regiments of long-range bombers certain, 1 regiment less certain) and the 35th (1 regiment of long-range bombers certain, 1 or 2 regiments less certain). The 55th Division was stationed around Komsomol, and the 35th in Dublyye valley northeast of Vladivostok. The 55th division was probably organized as I remember, about 1941; however, long-range bombers had been stationed in this area before that time. This division was equipped with T B III's, which had the ability to bomb Tokyo from the Maritime Province and to return.
(4) Among the air-divisions, the 34th (bomber), the 251st (bomber), the 553 (long-range bomber) and the 22nd (fighter) and others had their full fighting strength.

I discuss the ground-troops in more detail.

(1) The area south of Kogai Lake was the area which had the greatest density of military strength (two armies, 7 divisions), and in the north the forces were concentrated at tactically important points like the area west of Khabarosk and the district around Blagoveshchensk.

(2) Each army had points of peculiarity in the way it was organized, according to the district in which it was stationed. The 2d, 15th and 17th Armies especially had such peculiarities. The 2d Army had 2 tank brigades in addition to 2 sharpshooter divisions, the proportion of tank brigades to the sharpshooter divisions being larger than in the other armies. The commander of the 2d Army was also from the tank troops. The 5th and 12th divisions, which belonged to this army, were picked divisions which had old history and traditions. The 15th Army had many troops for river-crossing operations and the 17th Army was entirely motorized forces.

(3) The divisions which were considered as full-strength divisions were the 40th, 22d and 39th and other divisions aside from the above-mentioned 3d and 12th. The divisions which had had experience in fighting against Japanese forces were the 40th, 106th, 38th and 37th divisions.

5. As regards the quality of the Soviet Far Eastern Army, the commanders although generally young were men with experience of actual warfare, and we estimated that there were many who were capable of vigorous operations. For instance Major General Senatrov, the commander of the 9th Air Army, who was in 1944 about 33 years old, was an expert pilot and bore the title of "Hero of the Soviet Union." Also General Pulkaev, the commander of the Far Eastern Area Army, had served as an army commander in the Russo-German war and commander of the 2d Army, as Lieutenant-General had participated in the Nomonhan incident as commander of a tank unit, and bore the title "Hero of the Soviet Union".

6. There was not much difference between the strength of the Soviet Far Eastern Army in the years 1943 and 1944, but by the autumn of 1944, its strength, especially in planes and tanks, was increasing. I do not remember the exact figures of statistics, but as to planes such new types as York, Vali, etc. were transported by rail, and at times as many as 50 planes were being transported in a single day to the Maritime Province. As to tanks, the Kawei, T34, etc. were stellar tanks of the Russo-German war, were to be seen quite often in the Maritime Province. This tendency became more and more pronounced in 1945.

Shishikura Juji (Seal)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, the undersigned authority, on this 19 May 1947, at Tokyo.

Ikeda Sumihisa (Seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth, withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Shishikura Juji (Seal)

19 May 1947

Translation Certificate

I, Abe Fumio, of the Defense, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

Tokyo

19 May 1947
**Chart of the Chief Units of the Far Eastern Red Army (1944)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area Army</th>
<th>Ground Forces</th>
<th>Air Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armies</td>
<td>Air Armies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Far-Eastern Area Army</td>
<td>Sharpshooting</td>
<td>Air Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, General Staff</td>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>105, 170</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>197, 22, 39, 59</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3, 12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Group</td>
<td>79, mountain</td>
<td>149, 255, 128,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force 101</td>
<td>Force 101</td>
<td>202 paratroop brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(16)</td>
<td>(12)</td>
<td>(17) (1)paratroop brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armies</td>
<td>Air Armies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Far East Area Army</td>
<td>Sharpshooting</td>
<td>Air Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commander, General Staff</td>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>94, 103, 269, 210</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>36, 57</td>
<td>30, 245, 246, 247, 248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(12) (1) division</td>
<td>(12) (1) division</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(19)</td>
<td>(12) (1) division</td>
<td>(22) (1) paratroop brigade</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
私は昭和四十三年（一九四八年）三月から昭和二十五年（一九五五年）三月迄陸軍参謀として開東軍及び陸軍参謀部にて勤務致しました。

開東軍司令部に勤務中は東海軍司令部及び東海軍参謀部第二課に勤務し其の後総務局及び陸軍参謀部にて勤務致しました。従って私は開東軍司令部及び東海軍参謀部にて初めて陸軍の軍事を担当し、その後開東軍司令部において更に陸軍の軍事を担当致しました。

私は昭和十八年（一九四三年）三月から昭和二十年（一九四五年）三月迄陸軍參謀として開東軍及び陸軍参謀部にて勤務致しました。従って私は開東軍司令部及び東海軍司令部にて初めて陸軍の軍事を担当し、その後開東軍司令部及び東海軍司令部にて更に陸軍の軍事を担当致しました。

私の勤務は開東軍司令部及び東海軍司令部にて初めて陸軍の軍事を担当し、その後開東軍司令部及び東海軍司令部にて更に陸軍の軍事を担当致しました。
二、板東方面軍は留守府十四、飛行師団二十二（約千五百機）一、陸軍
とバイカル方面軍（司令官カルパチェフ上級大将）一

三、飞行基地に於て遂に密度の大きいのは謝列北方地区（第七航空軍）
三師団一附近でありました。昭和十九年（約四四年）秋頃から

ソビエト方面に飛行基地を増設して居りました。
この飛行機は爆撃目標に於いて洋上部隊に於いて東京往還が可能であるでした。
2. 兵力編組における各軍は、夫々、その配置地区に際して特性があり、したがって、特異性を有して居りましたのは就中第2軍及び第15軍第17軍でありました。

第2軍は、第1軍に対し、戦車二旅団を有し、他軍に比し、狙撃師団と戦車師団との比率が大きく、司令官亦戦車兵出身でありました。又此の第17軍にて居りました。

第15軍は、第44師団及び第22師団を有し、第39師団、第20師団、第5師団、第13師団、第57師団を、日本軍との戦闘の経験を有する損害師団で、作戦を自行し得ると想像される人物が多くありましたが、
例へば、第九航空司令官・セナトロフ少将は昭和十九年（一九四四年）に
は三十三才位であり優秀なる操縦将校でもあり、「ソーズン邦英雄」の称号
をもって居りました。又有第二方面司令官・ブレーア大将は司令官として
活躍し、第二司令官家森将は隊長としてノモンハン事件に参加し「
邦英雄」の称号をうけた居りました。

六極東ニール官は昭和十八年に於て昭和十九年と大差ありませんでした
が飛行機にては統制機関によりシャーク・テ・クと三四等の新型機が時と
して日日に五十機向、沿海州方面に到着させ、ついに美術を記憶して居りません。

又戦車にてはベニウェル・テ・ク三等の新型戦車が屡々
沿海州方面に認められるに至りました。この傾向は昭和二十年（一
九四五年）に入つてますます明瞭になって居りました。
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>方面軍</th>
<th>地上部隊</th>
<th>航空部隊</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TITLE</td>
<td>IN JAPANESE</td>
<td>CONTRIBUTOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Communist Coup d'État</td>
<td>Kokkyō bunretsu ni tsukite</td>
<td>HATANO, KANICHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edward Hollett Carr</td>
<td>Niıyusheiki</td>
<td>SHUI, SEIICHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Twenty Years</td>
<td>Gikai no Nippon teki shikanaka</td>
<td>ISOTIRIO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Characteristics of the Diet</td>
<td>Onnagata no hanashi</td>
<td>KAWATAKE, SHIGETOSHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Story of Actors Playing the Role of Actresses</td>
<td>(IN GERMAN)</td>
<td>K. KANOKOGI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Inner Lawfulness in the Historical Development of the Japan Spirit</td>
<td>Extract</td>
<td>NAKAKU NO KÔKA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening of the Cabinet System</td>
<td>Gendai jin ni kaibô</td>
<td>SHIRATORI, TOSHO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Modern People Analysed</td>
<td>Naigai jiyoku o kataru</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observation Upon Current Situation</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talk about SuetSugu, Nobumasa</td>
<td>Suetsugu, Nobumasa o kataru</td>
<td>SHIMOKA, YASABURU,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>America</td>
<td>Beikoku Ron</td>
<td>KOSUIMAYA, YOSHITAKO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sen no Rikyu March of Events</td>
<td>Sen no Rikyu March of Events</td>
<td>GOKÔ, ATSUKAI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese Culture and Shrines</td>
<td>Nippon bunka to jinta</td>
<td>UEMURA, TAKACHYO,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth of the America - Japanese Crisis</td>
<td>Nichibei kiki no jitta</td>
<td>GOTO, ISAMU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Diplomacy that Causes the European Turmoils.</td>
<td>Osu o kôran suru beikoku gaiyo</td>
<td>KAMIKAWA, HINOMATSU.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Cabinet Diet and Taisei Yokusankai (English Manuscript)</td>
<td>Naikai Taisei Yokusankai (English MS)</td>
<td>PUTTII, SHINICHI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Zen and Haiku</td>
<td>Zen to haiku</td>
<td>SUZUKI, TASETSU</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction of Contributors</td>
<td>Hissho sho-ka</td>
<td>A. B. JAMESON.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAGE</td>
<td>AMOUNT</td>
<td>PAY DATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>14, MAR. 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>5000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>3400 4, MAR. 1941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>4250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total**

14650 19150 30050 5750 48750 100800 149550
本表は雑誌「コラントレ・ジャパン」発行所にたる日本外務省
昭和三年十二月三日
宇野満子
子
印
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>姓名</th>
<th>数</th>
<th>金额</th>
<th>支付日期</th>
<th>姓名</th>
<th>数</th>
<th>金额</th>
<th>支付日期</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>吴长</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>吴长</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>小明</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>小明</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>张三</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>张三</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李四</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>李四</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>王五</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>王五</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>杨六</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>杨六</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>陈七</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>陈七</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>郑八</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>郑八</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>江九</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>江九</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>李五</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>李五</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>赵六</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>赵六</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>刘七</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>刘七</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>赖八</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>赖八</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>王九</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>王九</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>170</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>譯</td>
<td>校</td>
<td>正</td>
<td>前月支撐</td>
<td>前月追加</td>
<td>本月支撐</td>
<td>本月追加</td>
<td>合計</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Anti-Communist Camp Diet
Edward Hallet Carr "The Twenty Years"
The Power, Usefulness in the Historical Development of the Japanese Spirit
K. Kusunoki

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Entry</td>
<td>Rame</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The text seems to be in Japanese, with some English phrases, but the content is not clear due to the quality of the image.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>使用者名</th>
<th>割引</th>
<th>金額</th>
<th>支払期日</th>
<th>人名</th>
<th>金額</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>菊池太郎</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>4000</td>
<td>5月</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>山本良造</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>3300</td>
<td>4月</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>桑原次郎</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>6月</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>鈴木芳夫</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>7月</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>佐野太郎</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>8月</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K. Kaneko</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>白鳥敏夫</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>9月</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>下田裕郎</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>10月</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>植村義三</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2700</td>
<td>11月</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>木村義三</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6300</td>
<td>12月</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

合計：146,500円
The Governments of Japan and Germany having decided on the fundamental policy of creating a common front against Communism, detailed negotiations were commenced during the latter part of July 1936, at Berlin between the Japanese ambassador to Germany and the German authorities. The negotiations resulted in an agreement which was signed provisionally on October 23. After the approval of the Japanese Privy Council had been secured, the anti-Communist pact was formally signed on November 25 between Viscount Kinto's Machakoj, the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, and Colonel von Ribbentrop, the German representative. The pact went into effect simultaneously with the signing.

The conclusion of this agreement with Germany attracted a great deal of public attention all over the world as the most important diplomatic step taken by Japan since its withdrawal from the League of Nations in 1933. On November 25, 1936, the Japanese Foreign Office issued a statement announcing the signing of the agreement and explaining its significance as follows:

1. Ever since its establishment the Communist International, or the so-called Comintern, with its headquarters at Moscow, has been engaged in all sorts of activities, greatly menacing the peace of the world, for the purpose of destroying the national and social structures in every country in pursuance of the fundamental policy of world revolution. At its Seventh Congress, held in the summer of last year, the Comintern decided on a policy of organizing a united front with the Second International, to oppose Fascism and imperialism and at the same time made it plain that the future objectives of Comintern activities were to be Japan, Germany and Poland. It further resolved to support the Chinese communist armies in order to fight Japan. The actual operations subsequently carried on by the Comintern have become extremely ingenious, rendering them all the more dangerous.

As to the extent to which the Comintern interferes with the internal affairs of all countries and exerts a baneful influence on the well-being of nations and the peace of the world, it is only necessary to recall the disturbances in Spain to realize its magnitude. At least those countries that lodged protests with the Government of the Soviet Union at the time of the Comintern congress certainly have full cognizance of the harmfulness of Comintern activities.
2. The Communist invasion has hitherto been more marked in the
Orient, especially in China, than elsewhere. Outer Mongolia and Sinkiang
have already suffered from its calamitous effects, and China proper
is now being subjected to the depredations of the Communist armies.
As a matter of fact, the activities of the Comintern in China have
increased notably in vigor since its Seventh Congress.

In Manchukuo also the Comintern through the Manchurian district
committee of the Chinese Communist Party has been surreptitiously
endeavoring to organize cells, to win over and instigate bandits and to
direct the raids by partisan troops all over the country.

In Japan, the extreme leftist movement temporarily showed signs
of decline after the Manchurian incident, but since the Seventh Congress
of the Comintern it has again become energetic. It has crept into the
channels of lawful agitation in conformity with the resolution of that
Congress and has launched a unified front movement that it intended to
be the basis for revival of the Communist movement.

3. The Japanese Government, which, in order to safeguard Japan's
immutable national policy and insure national security and to maintain
enduring peace in East Asia, has pursued a clearcut and consistent;
policy toward the Comintern, finds it necessary to take more rigorous
measures of self-defense against the increased menace set forth above.

The organization and activities of the Comintern being of an
international character, any program of counter-action should necessarily
be based on international cooperation. Germany, ever since the establish­
ment of the present regime in 1933, has put into execution drastic anti­
Communist policies. Last year at the Seventh Congress of the Comintern,
Germany and Japan were selected as the special objectives of Comintern
operations. Thus Japan and Germany are placed in similar circumstances
vis-a-vis the Comintern. Consequently the Japanese Government, as the
first step in its defensive undertaking, conducted negotiations with
Germany and concluded an agreement on November 25, to make effect
immediately.

4. This agreement, the fundamental object of which is common
defense against the destructive operations of the Comintern, contains
provisions for the exchange of information regarding Comintern activities,
for consultation and execution of joint invitations to third powers.
There is, besides, a supplementary protocol stipulating in concrete
terms the manner in which the agreement is to be executed.

5. The Japanese Government is desirous of cooperating with as
many powers as possible for the purpose of perfecting its defensive
measures against the Comintern menace, but for that purpose alone.
It should be pointed out that in connection with, or behind, this
agreement there exists no other agreement whatsoever, that the Japanese
Government has no intention to form, or join in, any special international bloc for any other purpose and finally that the present agreement is not directed against the Soviet Union or any other specific country.

Cultural Cooperation
On November 25, 1936, the two countries entered into an agreement for furthering their traditional cultural relations.

RELATIONS WITH ITALY

An Understanding
The friendly relations between Japan and Italy were greatly improved by the avowed intention of the Italian Government to create a consulate-general in Manchukuo and the decision of the Japanese Government to close its legation in Ethiopia following the annexation of that territory by Italy. Taking advantage of the situation, negotiations were opened between the two Governments, concerned during the early part of November 1936, following the conclusion of the German-Japanese anti-Comintern pact, for the conclusion of an Italy-Japanese agreement.

The negotiations were aimed at the virtual recognition of Manchukuo by the Italian Government, the creation of a Japanese consulate in Ethiopia and the maintenance and promotion of the economic interest of Japan in that territory. Announcements were issued on December 28, 1936, both in Tokyo and Rome, concerning the Italo-Japanese agreement which took the form of an understanding.

Anti-Comintern Agreement
Italy entered the agreement on November 6, 1937. The account is given in the "Tripartite Agreement against the Comintern activity," contained in this Chapter.

Cultural Cooperation
The relation of Japan and Italy was further strengthened with the conclusion of an agreement on cultural cooperation on March 23, 1939.

Italy Helping Japan
From the beginning of the China affair in 1937, Italy, understanding Japan's true motives, had collaborated with Japan along all lines. At the Brussels Conference of the Signatory Powers to the Nine Power Treaty, the Italian Government supported Japan most consistently and energetically. A supplementary agreement to the Italo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce relating to the Italian colonies was signed in 1937.

THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AGAINST THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY

The German-Japanese agreement against the Communist International which had been concluded on November 25, 1936, was reinforced by the
participation therein of Italy. The tripartite protocol was made public on November 6, 1937, when the Sino-Japanese conflict was in full swing, and the Nine-Power Conference was in session at Brussels. With the signing of the tripartite protocol the solid front that had been built against the Communist activities both in Europe and Asia was further strengthened, making the communist bulwarks morally and materially weaker. Some indirect results of the tripartite agreement were the Japanese recognition of the Franco Government in Spain on December 1, 1937, mutual recognition between the Nan-ch'ing Government and the Franco Government on December 2, and the withdrawal of Italy from the League of Nations on December 11, whereby Italy concluding the dispute with the League regarding her claim on Abyssinia.

The gist of the statement of the Japanese Foreign Office concerning the conclusion of the Tripartite protocol published on November 6, 1937, and the English translation of the main clauses of the protocol are given below: (For the original text of the protocol see appendix, the Japan Year Book, 1939-40)

...at 11:00 a.m. (7:00 p.m. Tokyo time) today, November 6, the Protocol concerning the participation of Italy in the Japanese-German Agreement against the Communist International has been signed in Rome between the delegates of Japan, Germany and Italy, and has immediately come into effect.

Article 2 of the Agreement against the Communist International, which was concluded in Berlin between Japan and Germany on the 25th November, 1936, provides that the two countries should jointly invite participation of third Powers in the agreement. It is in accordance with this provision that the participation of Italy has been brought about, the country being as firmly determined as Japan and Germany to oppose the destructive operations of the Communist International.

Protocol between Japan, Germany and Italy.

The Imperial Government of Japan, the Government of Italy and the Government of Germany, in consideration of the fact that the Communist International is constantly endangering the peace and order of the civilized world in the Orient and the Occident, were convinced that only a close collaboration between all the Powers interested in the maintenance of peace and order can check and eliminate that danger. Italy, which since the establishment of the Fascist regime has combated that danger with inflexible determination, has decided to range herself against that common enemy and agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Italy participates in the Agreement against the Communist International and subscribes to the Supplementary Protocol concluded on November 25, 1936, between Japan and Germany, texts of which are attached.
to the present Protocol.

ARTICLE 2

The three Powers signatory to the present protocol agree that Italy is to be considered as an original signatory of the agreement and the supplementary protocol mentioned in the preceding article, the signature of the present protocol being equivalent to signature of the original texts of the agreement and the supplementary protocol.

ARTICLE 3

The present protocol shall form an integral part of the agreement and the supplementary protocol mentioned above.

Manchouko and Hungary's Entrenchment

On February 24, 1939, Manchouko and Hungary signed at Hsinking and Budapest respectively the Protocols for their participation in the Agreement for Safeguarding against the Communist International with Japan, Germany and Italy.

Manchouko had been endeavoring in cooperation with Japan to eradicate Communism. Her international position had been greatly strengthened through formal recognition extended by Hungary, following a similar step taken by Salvador, Germany, Italy and Spain, and now with her participation in the agreement it was further strengthened so that she may act with a greater conviction in her own power as an important factor in the formation of the new East Asiatic Order.

A faction of communist radicals under Bela Kuhn usurped the power of the Hungarian Government in 1919, by taking advantage of the confusion resulting from the World War, and attempted to form a socialistic league of nations by entering into a military alliance with the Soviet Union. But Hungary succeeded in suppressing the communist revolution and has since continued to exert her utmost effort to combat the Comintern. When Hungary declared that she would join the agreement, the Soviet Union recalled her Minister at Budapest, demanding at the same time the closure of the Hungarian legation at Moscow, in an attempt to check Hungary. Hungary, nevertheless joined the agreement fully demonstrating her strong determination.

Spain's Entrenchment

Spain, reborn under the leadership of General Franco, formally participated in the anti-Comintern agreement on March 27. The Comintern, which failed utterly in its efforts to bolshevize Germany and Italy in previous years, laid the front line in Spain for the bolshevization of all Europe. As a result, Spain was divided into two opposing factions,
Def. Doc. 1626

and the faction led by General Franco, surmounting numerous difficulties, finally occupied Barcelona early in 1939 and succeeded in pacifying the Catalonian sector. The Communist regime immediately collapsed, and Madrid finally capitulated on March 28. The Spanish civil war which began two and a half years ago was thus brought to a close, culminating in a decisive victory for General Franco. The Powers in the Comintern Front have early extended recognition to General Franco’s Government and have been giving full support to that Government’s work of subduing Communism.
日本が行った最も重大な外交手段として全世界の注目する所なつ
一九三六年（昭和十一年）十一月二十五日、日本外務省は協定調印

被告昭和三十六年（昭和十一年）十一月二十五日、日本外務省は協定調印

日本外務省は、日本とアメリカ合衆国が締結した協定に関する事項について、以下の点を明らかにした。日本とアメリカは、国際協力を促進するために、以下の協定を締結した。日本とアメリカは、国際協力を促進するために、以下の協定を締結した。
日本政府は出来得る限り多くの国と協力することを望んでるが、
その目的はコモンヘルスの効果に対する防衛手段を完全にする為であつ
て全然他意はない。然してこの協定に関連し、既にこの協定の背後に、
他の目的の効に特別なる国際ブロックを形成し、或は新しいブロックに参
加するが如き他の協定は何等存在せず、且との協定がソビエト連邦政
は他の特定の国々を対照しとしたものではないと云ふことを明記する。

文化協定に於ける協力

日伊の友好関係は、イタリーが南洲国内に領事館を設置するた故
に公
日伊関係は一九三六年（昭和十四年）三月二十三日の文化事業協調に関する協定の締結によって更に強化された。

イタリアの日本援助

一九三七年（昭和十二年）支那事変の前より、日本の直意を理解し日本に対して全面的に協力した。又九国国際調約参加国の中イタリア政府は、 departed with force日本を支持して居る。一九三七年（昭和十三年）にはイタリア植民地に関する日伊通商条約に対する附加協定が調印された。

イタリアの日本援助

コモンヴェルクル運動に対する三國協定

一九三六年（昭和十一年）十一月二十五日締結された七国協定は、伊太利の参加によって強化された。ナショナルに対する日独協定は、伊太利の参加によって強化されたが、當時日支事変の更進中であり、ブルユッセルに於ては九国国際合戦が開催さ
昨年十一月二十五日日独間に締結を見たる防共協定第二条は両国はその

三國協定書の調印によって既にヨーロッパ及アジアに於て

形成されて居った敵国なる防共連線は更に一段強化され、共産党陣営は

神的物質的に力を殺がるに至ったのである。この三國協定の間接

的の結果として、日本は一九三七年（昭和十二年）一二月一日スペイン

のフランコ政府を承認し十二月二十一日には南洋及政府とフランコ政府との

間に相互の承認が行われ、一二月十一日にはイタリーはアジアに対る

での終止符を打たれた。一九三七年（昭和十二年）十一月六日公表された三

國協定書締結に関す

る日本外務省証明の要領並に該協定書の主要條項の英語訳は次の如くであ

る。一九三九年四月一日日本外務省証明

に於て日独間、伊各國代表間に調印され、同時に効力を発生し、

今日十一月七日午前十一時一東京時間午前七時一共産党政権

のイタリーはローマ
スペインの停止

一九一九年（大正八年）ベラ・クーナの一軍は共産主義者の一派は世界大戦後の混乱に乗じてハンガリアの政権を締めしソビエト連邦と対立することに決定した。このことにより更に更に抗議を促進して共産主義の政府を構成させることに成功したが、スペインの軍はこの決定を妨げた。
フランス西コ・フランス将軍の統率の下に更生したスペインは五月二十
日、正式に防共協定に参加した。これにより先デイッヒタリを赤化せんとして失敗した。コミンテル
ンは全ヨーロッパ赤化の目的でスペインに前線を張ったが、その結果、スペインは二つの反對陣営に分
かれ、フランス将軍の決定的失敗に終わった。木島の遠征は一九三九年一月十四日にカタロニア地区に
の到達を詐称して、一九三九年一月十八日にマドラッシ地区に到達するに至った。防共
協定の条文はこの条約に従って行われたが、この条約は主要にフランス政府を承認し、共産主義初頭期に
する該該政府のものであり、日本防共協定に関する日本外務省の声明を記載したものであります。
Telegram (Secret Cipher Process)

Moscow, 13 April 41
Arrival, 13 " " 21.26 hours

No. 884 of 13 April 41.

Marginal note: transmitted under No. 1151.

Tokyo, 13/4 41.

In connection of telegram of today No. 883.

Secret

Personally for the Foreign Minister.

1) According to a communication of Matsuoka to the Italian Ambassador of here, Matsuoka's assurance to do his best for bringing about the abolishment of the Japanese concession in Northern Sakhalin was given in a letter of Matsuoka to Molotov.

2) Upon a question of the Italian Ambassador to Matsuoka whether the relations of the Soviet to the axis was discussed during the conversation between Matsuoka and Stalin, Matsuoka answered that "Mr. Stalin told him that he is a convinced adherent of the axis and an opponent of England and America.

3) The departure of Matsuoka was delayed by one hour, became however then extraordinary ceremonial. Apparently, completely unexpectedly for the Japanese and Russians Stalin and Molotov also appeared, who greeted Matsuoka and the Japanese present there very cordially and wished them a nice trip. Then Stalin
searched apparently he, came, when he discovered me, and we, embraced my should and said, "we must stay as friends and for that you must now do everything".

A little while later Mr. Stalin turned to Colonel Krebs, deputy "Military Attaché", assured first that he was a German and then told him, "we shall remain friends with you -- at any cost!" Stalin emphasized without doubt intentionally the greeting of me and Colonel Krebs, and stirred deliberately a general sensation among many who were present.

Schulenburg.
I, Yale Maxon, Chief of the Document Division, International Prosecution Section hereby certify:

1. That I am Chief of the Document Division of the International Prosecution Section, GIC, SCAP, and as such have possession, custody, and control of originals or copies of all documents obtained by the said Section.

2. That frames 24577-24578 being 2 sheets of a photostatic copy of a telegram from Schleenburg to Berlin dated 13 Apr. 1941 and contained in IPS Document 4056 were received by the IPS from the office of the Chief of Counsel of the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials.

/s/ Yale Maxon
STATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE SPOKESMAN CONCERNING THE VISIT OF
THE *Asama Maru* BY THE BRITISH WARSHIP.

January 22, 1940

With regard to the visit made to the Japanese liner *Asama Maru* by a British man-of-war off the coast of Boso Peninsula yesterday afternoon (January 21), the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kasuyuki Tani, invited British Ambassador Sir Robert Craigie to the Foreign Office at 11:00 P.M. to-day and presented to him the following views and protest of the Japanese Government.

1. On the 21st of January, at 12:50 p.m., a British warship ordered the Japanese vessel *Asama Maru*, which was on her return voyage to Yokohama from Honolulu, to heave to at a point thirty-five nautical miles off Nojimasaki Point, Chiba Prefecture. The Japanese vessel, therefore, came to a stop at 12:54 p.m. at a point 34°34' North Latitude and 149°31' East Longitude. Thereupon the said British warship sent an officer and several seamen to the *Asama Maru* and, claiming that it was acting in accordance with international law and without explaining reasons for its action in detail and even without revealing its name, demanded delivery of twenty-one German passengers. The captain of the *Asama Maru* refused the demand, but he was unable to prevent the British warship from taking a forcible measure for removing the said German passengers.

2. It must be fully known to the British Government that the Japanese Government have adhered to the principle in accordance with the generally accepted usage that those nationals of one belligerent Power aboard a neutral
vessel whose delivery the other belligerent may demand on the high seas must be limited to those actually embodied in the armed forces. But nonetheless a British warship has taken the above-mentioned forcible measure against a Japanese vessel in the waters near Japan. The Japanese Government can not but regard such British action as a serious unfriendly act against Japan, and therefore they attach the greatest importance to the affair.

3. The Japanese Government can not acquiesce in the measure taken by the British Navy regarding which they demand the British Government to give them a full and valid explanation promptly. The Japanese Government hereby explicitly reserve in advance the right to demand delivery to them of the detained Germans.

4. In view of the fact that the British action has already given a great shock to public opinion in Japan, repetition of such an action in future would aggravate all the more the sentiment of the Japanese nation against Great Britain. From a broad viewpoint of the future relations between Japan and Great Britain the Japanese Government request the British Government to give their serious consideration to the matter.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, Hayashi, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of 2 pages and entitled "Statement of the Foreign Office Spokesman concerning the Visit of the Asama Maru by the British Vessel, January 22, 1940," is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 10th day of May 1947.

/S/ K. HAYASHI (seal)

Witness: /S/ K. Urabo (seal)
昭和十五年（一九四〇年）

浅間丸臨検事件

付英大使へ抗議

昭和十六年（一九四一年）

浅間丸臨検事件

付英大使へ抗議

昭和十六年（一九四一年）

浅間丸臨検事件

付英大使へ抗議
従来新国ハ一般ニ承認セラレタル所ニ従ヒ公海ニ於テ交戦國ノ他方ノ艦船ハ現ニ於テ

カ減入セラレ居ル者ヲ限ルヘントノ原則ヲ執リ来タルコト既ニ

英國側ニ於テモ充分承知ノ通チリ。
Excerpt from the Tokyo ASAHI dated September 25, 1940.

**Faithful Co-operation with Japan**
To Work Out French Indo-China's Destiny
Governor-General Decoux Issues Statement.

HONG KONG Sep. 24 (DOMA) - According to the UP telegram from HANOI, Governor-General of French Indo-China, announcing the conclusion of a Franco-Japanese agreement on the 23rd, issued the following statement to the effect that the new agreement was the first expression of friendly relation between Japan and France, and that in order for French Indo-China to be able to work out its destiny in co-operation with Japan, he wanted all the people to recognize the new situation without complaint, to strengthen their discipline and unity, and to confront the situation prudently:

"Now that the negotiations with Japan, which have been continued persistently, have been concluded, the time has come for me to make public the outline of the situation and to appeal for your calm understanding and disciplinary spirit. The diplomatic agreement now concluded between the Japanese and French governments is Japan's promise to confirm formally French Indo-China's territorial integrity and France's sovereignty over the entire territory of French Indo-China. In return for this, we afforded various facilities to the Japanese Army in the spirit of friendly aid. '"
The conference for deciding the details and the form for the enforcement of this agreement lasted for several weeks. We spent a considerable amount of time and met with considerable difficulty deliberating conditions for enforcing the agreement. We kept in perfect contact with Commander-in-Chief, General Martin, of the French Army stationed in French Indo-China. Points concerning the waging of war had to be left to the Japanese Army's discretion in order that the agreement be a sincere expression of unchanging friendly relationship between Japan and France. At the same time, the gain of both contracting parties had to be taken into consideration. This evidence of mutual reliance, the greatest thing that this country can offer another, establishes the foundation of faithful cooperation between Japan and French Indo-China.

It is natural that French Indo-China, being close to Japan, should enhance her own perpetual gain by preserving friendly based on international confidence and mutual respect relation with this greatest country in East Asia.

The agreement signed at this time is in conformity with this practical policy. I believe that the people will thoroughly understand this purpose. Now that French Indo-Chinese government authorities have fulfilled their own assigned duty, I hope that the people will also fulfill their respective duty at present recognizing this new situation without complaint.

The new situation allows French Indo-China to continue its activities peacefully and to work out its destiny under the cover of peace. Whether French or French Indo-Chinese, the people must hereafter solidify their unity under their leaders with steadfast discipline in both labor and patriotism.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Chief of the Investigation Section of the Tokyo ASAHI, hereby certify that the newspaper report hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "To Improve the Future of French Indo-China" is an exact excerpt from newspaper in the custody of our Tokyo ASAHI Press.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 26th day of February, 1947.

/S/ NISHIJIMA, Yoshiji (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on the same date

Witness: /S/ SAKIYOTO, Izumi (seal)

Vice-Chief of the Investigation Section of Tokyo Head Office of the ASAHI Press.
Def. Doc. No. 1646

△新情勢は、日本と近接せる仏印が自国の不陥の一利害に感じした際、仏印のこの最大の利益をも考慮することに至ったものである。これにより、日本と仏印との間の相互信頼の増進は、日本と仏印との間の不陥の増進のためであり、今回仏印がこれに至った際、日本と仏印との間の相互信頼の増進は、日本と仏印との間の不陥の増進のためである。これにより、日本と仏印との間の相互信頼の増進は、日本と仏印との間の不陥の増進のためである。
OUTLINE OF THE PROCESS OF DRAFTING VARIOUS DRAFTS CONCERNING THE TRIPARTITE PACT OF JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY, AND PREPARING DOCUMENTS (MADE BY THE CHIEF OF THE TREATY DEPARTMENT MATSUOTO)

1. On 5 September 1940 a plan as Annex No. 1 was drafted by Vice Foreign Minister Ohashi, the Advisors Shiratori and Saito, and presented by Foreign Minister Matsuoka to the Four-Minister Conference for consideration.

2. Prior to that, Minister Stahmer, who was specially dispatched by German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, left Berlin on 23 August, and via Moscow arrived in Tokyo on 7 September. On 9 September he, together with Ambassador Ott, visited Minister Matsuoka at the latter’s private residence for a conference, which renewed on the following day, the 10th. The record taken at that time is attached hereto as Annex No. 2.

3. This result was reported by the German side to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, who sent a counter-proposal (Annex No. 3) by telegram. This was handed at 8:30 p.m. on 14 September by Ambassador Ott and Minister Stahmer to Minister Matsuoka. This draft differed from the original one insofar as it inserted in Paragraph III a phrase "openly or in a concealed form." (We requested this phrase be stricken out), and added the Paragraph V (concerning Soviet Russia). (This draft was made the basic subject of discussion on the Extraordinary Cabinet Meeting of 16 September and on the Imperial Conference of 19 September).

4. On the basis of this draft of Foreign Minister Ribbentrop we drafted a pact; besides, we summarized the result of the conversations with Ott and Stahmer into a Secret Protocol and two notes to be exchanged (one concerns the question of German and Italian collaboration in case of a Japanese-British conflict, and the other concerns the South Sea Islands under the Mandate). These were handed on 19 September by Advisor Saito to the German Ambassador (Annex No. 4).

5. These drafts were revised on the 20th into Annex No. 5 after taking German wishes into consideration. (Paragraph VI of the draft of the Protocol was inserted upon German request, and the end of the note concerning the Japanese-British conflict was revised).

6. On 21 September the German side presented a draft of a pact as Annex No. 6 in accordance with the instruction from the home Government (Foreign Minister Ribbentrop left Berlin on 18 and conferred with Prime Minister Mussolini and Foreign Minister Ciano on 19th and 20th concerning this matter. It is assumed therefore that this instruction came from Rome). As the explanation for revising the Paragraph III, an excerpt from the instruction as Annex No. 7 was attached. This draft was revised into Annex No. 8 on the conference of Minister Matsuoka (Matsumoto attending), Ott and Stahmer. ((1) The words of "declaration of war" was deleted because of, among others, strong opposition of the Navy, and (2) provisions concerning the Mixed Commissions were broadened so as to enable the establishment of an Economic Commission). In addition, the German side requested to drop the Protocol and other notes because they were one-sided in the present form, and it was difficult and time-consuming to perfect them in order to get the Italian consent. Thereupon, we proposed to convert the content of the Secret Protocol into a note to be exchanged only between Japan and Germany, to exchange the note concerning the Japanese-British conflict also only between Japan and Germany, and to formulate the note concerning the Mandate so as to confirm an oral statement of the German Ambassador. As a result thereof we made a draft as Annex No. 9 and sent it to the German Embassy.
7. During the conference begun at five o'clock of that evening (Minister Matsuoka, Chief of Department Matsumoto, Ott and Stahmer) the Pact was decided as Annex No. 10; as to the note concerning the Japanese-British conflict it was decided upon German request to make it a letter and number it as Annex No. 11; concerning the Mandate it was decided as Annex No. 12 (Minister Matsuoka left the conference and was substituted by Advisor Saito). As to the draft of the note containing the content of the Secret Protocol the German side did not agree, and Ambassador Ott himself dictated to the Chief of Department Matsumoto a draft of a letter of Ott as Annex No. 13 and requested that it be studied. On the same day Stahmer had told to Advisor Shiratori that the German side wished to sign this Pact in Berlin. Minister Matsuoka therefore touched the question of the place of signing during this conference, and said that if the place of signing should be Berlin, it would be an idea to make the exchange of letters between the Minister himself and Ambassador Ott.

8. In the afternoon of 23 September, the Chief of Treaty Department Matsumoto handed upon instruction of the Foreign Minister a document as Annex No. 14 to Ott and Stahmer at the German Embassy, and requested that it be sent to Berlin by telegram. On the following day, the 24th Councillor Boltz of the German Embassy visited Matsumoto and said concerning Annex No. 14 that the following telegraphic instruction was received: As to the item (1), the German Government sincerely hopes to sign in Berlin; as to the item (2), it was being considered by the German and Italian Governments; as to the item (3), it could not be accepted because it would take time to make the letter perfect as its content was one-sided.

9. At five o'clock in the evening of 24 September Minister Matsuoka (Matsumoto attending) met Ott and Stahmer. First, the Pact was decided as Annex No. 15. Next, the letter concerning the Japanese-British conflict was decided as Annex No. 16, and the letter concerning the Mandate was decided as Annex No. 17, after substituting "in a way" for "adequately" (the German side explained that the compensation was a matter of principle and can in fact be only nominal, and that, for instance, 6 sacks of coffee would be sufficient). As to the letter originating from the draft of a Secret Protocol Minister Matsuoka presented a draft as Annex No. 18; the German side thereupon presented a revised draft of Annex No. 13; after combining the both proposals a document as Annex No. 19 was drafted, which was sent to the German Embassy on the following 25th and made final.

10. At eleven o'clock a.m. of 25 September Councillor Boltz of the German Embassy visited Matsuoka to tell that the following telegram was received by the Ambassador from the German Foreign Office:

(1) The German Government accepts the text of the Pact (in English).

(2) The German Government is convinced that the Italian Government also will accept the text. The German Foreign Office requested that the Italian Foreign Office instruct the Italian Ambassador in Tokyo to state formally to Minister Matsuoka the acceptance of the Pact.

(3) (a) The German Government agrees to sign the English text as a temporary measure.

(b) That fact shall be kept absolutely secret.

(c) About two weeks afterwards Japanese, German and the Italian texts will be secretly substituted for the English text and signed.
(d) The Letter of Credence for Ambassador Kurusu will be deposited with the German Embassy in Tokyo, and that fact will be telegraphed from the Ambassador to the German Foreign Office (concerning this point the Chief of Treaty Department said that, because in case of a treaty as this without ratification clause no formal Letter of Credence would be issued, the Foreign Minister would inform the German Ambassador in Tokyo that the Imperial Sanction was given for Ambassador Kurusu to conclude the Pact. Councillor Boltze answered that that would be sufficient).

(5) If possible, to sign the Pact on Thursday (Matsumoto said that that was practically impossible). Besides, the Ambassador desires that the draft of the Premier Minister’s statement be cabled to Ambassador Kurusu and presented to the German Foreign Minister for consultation, and that the three letters be absolutely not referred to when Minister Matsuoka should see the Italian Ambassador (it was agreed in addition that of the three letters those from the Minister to the Ambassador should be in Japanese with English translation, and those from the Ambassador to the Minister should be in German with English translation).

11. The Italian Ambassador in Tokyo, Indelli, visited Minister Matsuoka at 11:30 a.m. of 25 September and stated formally that the Italian Government agreed to this Pact.

12. In the afternoon of that day Matsumoto visited Minister Stahmer at the German Embassy and stated that the signing would be possible on 27th as it was decided to present the draft of the Pact to the Privy Council on 26th. After consultation it was agreed temporarily to sign the English text at noon of 27th (Berlin time), and to telegraph this agreement to Berlin.

13. According to a telephone call from the German Embassy the signing took place at 1:15 p.m., instead of at noon, Berlin time (at 7:00 p.m. Tokyo time), as it had been agreed, because of a delay of the aeroplane of the Italian Foreign Minister.

14. After the signing at 9:30 o’clock of that evening Matsumoto carried out the exchange of the three letters with Ambassador Ott (Stahmer attending) at the German Embassy (Annex No. 20).
Outline of the Process of Drafting Various drafts and of the Internal Procedure pertaining to the Tripartite Pact of Japan, Germany and Italy.

Treaty Department
Foreign Office.
Annex 1

Strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis

(Note by the Defense: identical with "Strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis", Decisions made by the Conference of the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War, the Navy and Foreign Affairs on 4 September 1940, and by the Liaison Conference on 19 September 1940; Exhibit 541, Transcript pages 6307-6308)

The trend toward the strengthening of collaboration among Japan, Germany and Italy have lately become very pronounced, and it is believed that now the time is ripe for speedy initiation of conversations among the three countries on this matter. It is accordingly proposed to commence negotiations in accordance with the under-mentioned Basic Principles, with Germany, to start with.

Basic Principles

1. To make a fundamental agreement among the three countries, in order that they shall mutually cooperate by all possible means in the establishment of a New Order in Europe and in Asia.

2. To carry out consultations among the three countries in as short a period of time as possible in regard to the best means of the above-mentioned cooperation.
3. To begin with, publicity will be given, at home and abroad, to the purpose in 1 and 2 above, in the form of a joint declaration of the three countries.

**Draft of Basic Principles Concerning Negotiations for a Military Alliance**

**Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration**

4 September 1940
6 August 1940

Original Draft made by the Army and the Navy; Revision (in red letters in the original document) made by the Foreign Office.

(Note by the Defense: Revised text is identical with "Basic Principles concerning Negotiations for a Military Alliance" of Exhibit 541, Transcript Pages 6310-6321)

---

**Principle**

1. Japan, Germany and Italy, recognizing the fact that they stand on common ground in regard to the construction of a mutual New World Order, will arrive at an understanding with mutual respect to support for the establishment and administration of their Spheres of Living and also in regard to cooperation with Britain, concerning their policies toward the Soviet Union and the United States. (See Appendix 1)
Annex 1

2. Details

1. A fundamental understanding will be reached at between Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy on the basis of the above principle. (See Appendix 1)

2. On the basis of this fundamental understanding such further agreements as may be necessary will be concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy, or between Japan and Germany, and between Japan and Italy.

3. The above-mentioned matter will be carried out according to the following:

The negotiations under 1 and 2 above will be conducted in accordance with the Basic Essentials for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration (in Appendix 3) and on the basis of the Main Principles Covering Negotiations (in Appendix 4).

3. The above-mentioned will be carried out in Berlin and Rome.
Def. Doc. No. 1656-A

3. The above-mentioned 2 will be proposed in Berlin and Rome, and concrete negotiations will be conducted in Tokyo.

4. The understanding mentioned above need not necessarily take the form of agreements, but, if Germany and Italy so desire, there is no objection to the conclusion of agreements in this connection.

Appendix 1

Terms of Political Understanding Forming the Basis for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration.

(Note by the Defense: Revised text is identical with Appendix)

1. Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy, recognizing the fact that they stand on common ground in regard to the construction of a New World Order, for the realization of which they are presently putting forth their efforts, cooperate each other for the support and improvement of an equitable world peace.

2. Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy respectively, for the purpose of establishing New Orders, will
mutually respect the Japanese Sphere of Living in East Asia, including the South Seas, and the German and the Italian Sphere of Living in Europa and Africa; and will cooperate by all possible means, support each other for the construction of New Orders in Europe and Africa, and will cooperate to by all possible means, support each other for the construction of New Orders in the said regions.

Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy will mutually effect close economic cooperation. with this end in view, they will carry out the preferential mutual interchange of material resources existing in their Spheres of Living and the exchange of techniques, and will also accord favourable consideration to the other respective party's economic activities in their own Spheres of Living.

Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy will cooperate in maintaining peace with the Soviet Union and in inducing the Soviet Union to bring her policy into line with the common ground of the two contracting parties. (In addition, an understanding will also be reached with respect to consultation as to the action to be taken in the event of a danger either Japan or Germany and Italy, or one of the parties entering upon a state of war with the Soviet Union, if, in the course of negotiations with Germany and Italy, it turns out that such desire is entertained by the two countries.)
4. Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy will mutually cooperate in order not to allow the United States, the Western Hemisphere and the United States possessions, to interfere in regions other than the American Continent and also in order to safeguard the political and economic interests of both contracting parties in this connection.

Further, in the event of danger of either contracting party entering upon a state of war with the United States, the other contracting party will assist that party by all possible means.

Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy will closely cooperate with respect to the action to be taken in regard to Central and South America.

Note: The present understanding will be treated as confidential.

Appendix 2

Terms of Understanding concerning the Mutual Support and Cooperation of Japan and the two Countries of Germany and Italy in regard to the European War and the China Incident

(Note by the Defense: Revised text is identical with Appendix)

1. Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy, in settling
the China Incident and the European War, by which the two contracting parties are respectively confronted, will effect mutual support and cooperation as follows:

Japan will

a) accord as much facility as possible in meeting the desires of Germany and Italy in regard to the acquisition of material resources existing in East Asia, including the South Seas; and

b) cooperate as much as possible in intensifying the pressure upon British influence in East Asia, including the South Seas; and in facilitating the prosecution of war by Germany and Italy against Britain.

Germany and Italy will

a) cooperate as much as possible in regard to the supply of such machinery and similar articles, and in regard to such technical assistance, as may be desired by Japan; and

b) cooperate for the settlement of the China Incident.

Note: The present understanding will be treated as confidential.
Appendix 3

Basic Essentials for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration

(Note by the Defense: Reversed text is identical with Appendix 3 of Exhibit 541, Transcript Pages 6314-6320)

1. Concerning Japan's Sphere of Living for the construction of a Greater East Asia-Neu Order will comprise:
   a) The sphere to be envisaged in the course of negotiations with Germany and Italy as Japan's Sphere of Living for the construction of a Greater East Asia-Neu Order will comprise:

   The former German Islands under Mandate, French Indo-China and Pacific Islands, Thailand, British Malaya, British Borneo, Dutch East Indies, Burma, Australia, New Zealand, India etc., with Japan, Manchuria and China as the backbone. It is understood, however, that the South Sea Region to be indicated by Japan in conducting the negotiations will be the region from Burma eastward, including the Dutch East Indies, and New Calidonia.

   As to Australia-New Zealand and India, for the immediate purposes as being included incidentally described under (e) and (f) below will be in the Sphere of Living of the Soviet Union, reflected.
b) Measures will be taken to Annexed the former German
Islands under Japanese Mandate to our Territory. As to
the former German Islands in the Pacific now under
British Mandate it will be endeavored to dispose of
them so as they can be brought, as far as possible, under
Japanese control in consideration of strategic necessities
via the United States.

b) The goal in regard to the Dutch East Indies is to have
it in a state of preparedness for independence, but the
secure recognition of Japan's position of immediate objective will be to bring them under political
predominance in that country.

In this connection, if German proposals should be at
variance with the above proposition, recognition should
still be obtained of Japan's political leadership in the
Dutch East Indies through the preferential supply of material and
Japan's natural resources existing in that country,
through the guarantee for the continuance of the already
existing German economic undertakings there, and by
negotiations of a political nature on the matters in
general.

d) The same principles as in (a) above will be followed with
respect to French Indo-China.

e) Although Australia and New Zealand are somewhat different
from the other regions, Japan feels similar concern about
them, and, therefore, does not desire that they be
changed into territories or brought under control of
countries not belonging at Asia.
Concerning Japan-Germany-Italy economic cooperation.

a) With regard to trade, Japan will supply Germany and Italy with agricultural, forestry and aquatic products of Japan, Manchuria and China, and will also cooperate in supplying Germany and Italy with special mineral products, rubber and other articles of China, French Indo-China, the Dutch East Indies, etc. Germany and Italy, on their part, will supply Japan with such technical assistance, aircraft, machinery, chemical products, etc., as may be required by Japan.

With regard to mutual economic activities, Japan will, especially in China and Manchuria, accord de facto preferential treatment to Germany and Italy, and enable the participation of their technique and equipment.

b) For the above-mentioned purposes, there will be separately concluded an Economic Agreement, a Trade Agreement and a Payment Agreement.

Concerning Japan's attitude toward Japan-Germany-Italy cooperation in regard to the Soviet Union and the United States.

Being destined to be the leader of East Asia in the postwar new order of things wherein it is anticipated that the world
will be divided into the four large fields of East Asia, the Soviet Union, Europe and the American Continents. Japan, acting in close collaboration with Germany and Italy which will constitute the guiding force of Europe, will:

a) Restrain the Soviet Union on the east, west and south, and, including the Soviet Union so to act as to align with the common ground of Japan, Germany and Italy, endeavour to cause the advance of the Soviet sphere of influence to be oriented toward a direction where the advance has little direct effect upon the interests of (it being also possible that, in case of need, Soviet-Japan-Germany and Italy, a direction such as Gulf of Persia advance toward India may have to be recognized).

b) While peaceful means will be adhered to far as possible in dealing with the United States, contrive to bring about a posture of things wherein Japan can, as occasion may require, bring pressure to bear upon the United States through political and economic collaboration with Germany and Italy in the East Asian and European fields, so that such posture of things can contribute toward the attainment of Japan's aspirations.

In taking these steps, Japan will keep it in mind to make the best of inducing the Soviet Union.

Further, Japan will make use of the immigrant and economic
foothold, both of importance, which Germany and Italy presently have in South America, in regard to such steps as Japan may in future take with respect to the United States.

4. Concerning Japan's attitude towards the collaboration of Japan, Germany and Italy vis-à-vis Great Britain.

a) Japan will, in the construction of an East Asiatic New Order, take such steps as the situation may require, in economic order to eliminate the political interests of Britain in East Asia, including the South Seas. Such steps are intended to weaken Britain's position. Fact shows that the policy which Japan is already taking toward Britain and China is automatically producing an effective influence on the war situation in Europe.

b) With a view to furthering her cooperation with Germany and Italy in their prosecution of war against Britain, Japan will spare no cooperative effort on her part in material regard to the acquisition of natural resources existing in East Asia, controlled by Germany and Italy.

Further, Japan will in large measure cooperate with Germany and Italy in the war against Britain, in respect of the elimination of British interests in East Asia, anti-British collaboration in demonstration and propaganda, the
the support of independence movements in the colonies of Britain and dependencies, and other matters.

5. Concerning the possible use of armed force against the United States, Japan will make decisions independently in accordance with the following principles:

(1) In the event that the China Incident has nearly been settled, Japan will use armed force by taking as favourable an opportunity, as may be afforded by the situation prevailing at home and abroad.

(2) In the event that the China Incident has not yet been settled, it will be Japan's guiding principle to take actions within limits short of war. If, however, domestic and foreign conditions take a decidedly favourable turn, armed forces might be used. If it is deemed that, irrespective of whether our preparations are complete or not, the development of the international situation permits of no further delay, Japan will resort to armed force.

(3) The "domestic and foreign conditions" signify the European situation, especially the state of adjustment of our relations with the Soviet Union, the United States' attitude toward us, our preparations for war, and so forth.
Appendix 4

Main Principles Governing Negotiations

(Note by the Defense: Revised text is identical with Appendix)

1. In order to realize the strengthening of collaboration, the present opportunity should not be missed, when Germany and Italy are concentrating their whole efforts for the defeat of Britain. Should the negotiations be commenced after the victory of Germany and Italy, has become definite, the effect would very much be diminished; moreover, attitude of Germany which has considerable concern about South Seas might undergo some change.

The negotiations will be conducted with Germany and Italy separately. However, if Germany and Italy wish that negotiations be conducted among the three countries, consent could be given thereto.

2. Terms of Understanding concerning the Mutual Support and Cooperation in regard to the European War and the China Incident will be presented together with the Basic Essentials in proposing the strengthening the collaboration with Germany and Italy, and discussions as to their contents will
be conducted in Tokyo; however, the above-mentioned two understandings should be treated as one and indivisible.

The principal purpose of the negotiations under Paragraph 2, Appendix 1, which is designed to have Germany and Italy recognize and respect Japan's Sphere of Living in East Asia, including the South Seas, is to obtain overall recognition of Japan's position of predominance, political leadership in the whole of East Asia, including the South Seas.

Should, however, Germany and Italy be inclined to make any reservations in regard to any designated areas, Japan will conduct negotiations on each particular matter concerning such areas in pursuance of Paragraph (1), (a), and ensuing principles of Appendix 3 (Basic Essentials for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration), and thus secure recognition of Japan's aspirations in these connections.

In the event that Germany and Italy propounds a desire for Japanese military cooperation with them against Britain, Japan is prepared, as a matter of guiding principle, to meet the desire. It will be explained to Germany and Italy, however, that, in view of the existing state of affairs, Japan contemplates taking the courses of action outlined under (1), (2) and (3) in Paragraph 5, Appendix 4 (Basic
Essentials for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy Collaboration), with respect to the use of armed force, i.e., participation in the war.

Germany and Italy will be enabled by such explanations to understand Japan's position, and, at the same time, efforts will be made to the end that Germany and Italy will cooperate with us in improving domestic and foreign conditions relating to Japan's entry into the war against Britain and the United States.
Three Powers Pact between Japan, Germany and Italy
(Note by the Defense: Original texts in Japanese, German and Italian languages)

The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent to any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given their own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the people concerned. Furthermore, it is the desire of the three Governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

Article 1
Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article 2
Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.
Article 3

Japan, Germany and Italy agree to co-operate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

Article 4

With a view to implementing the present Pact, Joint Technical Commissions, the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany, and Italy, will meet without delay.

Article 5

Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

Article 6

The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of
them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In face thereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Pact and have affixed hereto their seals.

Done in triplicate at Berlin, the 27th day of the 9th month of the 15th year of Showa, corresponding to the 27th September 1940, 27th September of the 18th year of the Fascist Era.

Saburo Kurusu
Joachim von Ribbentrop
Giano
LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR.

Excellency:

I have the honour to ask Your Excellency to confirm the following oral declaration which was made by Your Excellency on behalf of the German Government:

"The German Government agree that the former German Colonies actually under Japan's Mandate in the South Seas shall remain in Japan's possession, it being understood that Germany be in a way compensated therefor. In regard to other former colonies in the South Seas, they shall be restored automatically to Germany upon conclusion of peace ending the present European War. Afterwards the German Government would be prepared to confer, in an accommodating spirit, with the Japanese Government with a view to disposing of them as far as possible in Japan's favour against compensation."

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.

LETTER FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER.

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter of this date, No. 1111, and to confirm the oral declaration set forth therein as made by me concerning the former German Colonies in the South Seas.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.
PERSONAL LETTER OF THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE EMPIRE JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER

My Excellency:

At the moment when our conversations, begun on the 9th instant at Tokyo, are about to eventuate in a successful conclusion of the Three Powers Pact, it is Minister Stahmer's and my sincerest desire to tender to Your Excellency the expression of deepest appreciation for the principal part Your Excellency has played throughout in a most generous and accommodating spirit.

We wish to take this occasion to state once more in this letter some of the salient points reiterated in our conversations with Your Excellency which are as follows:

The German Government are convinced that the Contracting Parties are about to enter into a new and decisive phase of world history in which it will be their task to assume the leadership in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia and Europe respectively.

The fact that for a long time their interests will coincide and the unrestricted mutual confidence of the Contracting Parties from the solid foundation on which the Pact is built.

The German Government firmly believe that the technical details concerning the execution of the Pact will be settled without difficulties and that it would not be in keeping with the far-reaching importance of the Pact and it would be practically impossible to anticipate all possible cases which might arise in the course of its application, they can only be dealt with in the spirit of mutual confidence and
helpfulness as they arise from time to time.

Conclusions of the Technical Commissions stipulated in article 4 of the Pact shall be submitted to the respective Governments for approval in order to be put in force.

It is needless to say that whether or not a Contracting Party has been attacked within the meaning of article 3 of the Pact shall be determined upon consultation among the three Contracting Parties.

If Japan, contrary to the intentions of the Pact, should be attacked by a Power so far not engaged in the European War or the China Incident, Germany will consider it a matter of course to give Japan full support and assist it with all military and economic means.

With regard to the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia, Germany will do everything within its power to promote a friendly understanding and will at any time offer its food offices to this end.

Germany will use her industrial capacity and other resources technical and material as far as possible in favour of Japan in order both to facilitate the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia and to enable her to be better prepared for any emergency. Germany and Japan will further undertake mutually to aid each other in procuring in every possible way raw materials and minerals including oil which they will have been in need of.

The German Foreign Minister implicitly believes that Italy will of course act in concord with Germany and Japan when and where assistance
and co-operation by Italy is sought in reference to the matters above enumerated.

I have the honour to present to Your Excellency the above exposé as the views of the German Foreign Minister conveyed personally by his special delegate, Minister Stahmer, and repeatedly transmitted to me from my Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

gez. Ott.
PERSONAL LETTER OF THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER

Excellency:

At the moment when our conversations, begun in the 9th inst at Tokyo, are about to eventuate in a successful conclusion of the Three Powers Pact, it is Minister Stehmer's and my sincerest desire to tender to Your Excellency the expression of deepest appreciation for the principal part Your Excellency has played throughout in a most generous and accommodating spirit.

We wish to take this occasion to state once more in this letter some of the salient points reiterated in our conversations with Your Excellency which are as follows:

The German Government are convinced that the Contracting Parties are about to enter into a new and decisive phase of world history in which it will be their task to assume the leadership in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia and Europe respectively.

The fact that for a long time to come their interests will coincide and the unrestricted mutual confidence of the Contracting Parties from the solid foundation on which the Pact is built.

The German Government firmly believe that the technical details concerning the execution of the Pact will be settled without difficulties and that it would not be in keeping with the far-reaching importance of the Pact and it would be practically impossible to anticipate all possible cases which might arise in the course of its application; they can only be dealt with in the spirit of mutual confidence and helpfulness as they arise from time to time.

Conclusions of the Technical Commissions stipulated in Article 4 of the Pact shall be submitted to the respective Governments for approval in order to be put in force.

It is needless to say that whether or not a Contracting Party has been attacked within the meaning of Article 3 of the Pact shall be determined upon consultation among the three Contracting Parties.

If Japan, contrary to the intention of the Pact, should be attacked by a Power so far not engaged in the European War on the China Incident, Germany will consider it a matter of course to give Japan full support and assist it with all military and economic means.

With regard to the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia, Germany will do everything within its power to promote a friendly understanding and will at any time offer its good offices to this end.

Germany will use her industrial capacity and other resources technical and material, as far as possible, in favour of Japan in order both to facilitate the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia and to enable her to be better prepared for any
emergency. Germany and Japan will further undertake mutually to aid each other in procuring in every possible way raw materials and minerals including oil, which they will have been in need of.

The German Foreign Minister implicitly believes that Italy will, of course, act in concord with Germany and Japan when and where assistance and cooperation by Italy is sought in reference to the matters above enumerated.

I have the honour to present to Your Excellency the above expose as the views of the German Foreign Minister conveyed personally by his special delegate, Minister Stahmer, and repeatedly transmitted to me from my Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of my highest consideration.

gez. OTT

Def. Doc. No. 1656-AC\(2\)

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL (Draft)

LETTER FROM FOREIGN MINISTER TO GERMAN AMBASSADOR

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter No. 1111 of this date and I feel happy to take note of the contents therein.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.
B. Annex No. 1

"Strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis."

(Identical with "Strengthening of the Japan-Germany-Italy Axis", Decisions made by the Conference of the Prime Minister and the Ministers of War, the Navy and Foreign Affairs on 4 September 1940, and by the Liaison Conference on 16 September 1940, of the Exhibit 541, Transcript pages 6307-6308).

C. "Draft of Basic Principles concerning Negotiations for a Military Alliance."

Original Draft by Army and Navy, revised by the Foreign Office.

D. "Terms of Political Understanding Forming the Basis for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy collaboration".

E. "Terms of Understanding concerning the Mutual Support and Cooperation of Japan and the Two Countries of Germany and Italy in regard to the European War and China Incident."

F. "Basic Essentials for the Strengthening of Japan-Germany-Italy collaboration."

G. "Main Principles Governing Negotiations"

(C-G are identical with "Basic Principles concerning Negotiations for a Military Alliance", and its 4 Appendices, of the Exhibit 541, Transcript pages 6310-6321)

ADJ: "Three pact between Japan, German and Italy" (Identical with "Three pact between Japan, German and Italy" of the Exhibit 45)
PERSONAL LETTER OF THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE IMPERIAL JAPANESE FOREIGN MINISTER.

Excellency:

At the moment when our conversations, begun on the 9th instant at Tokyo, are about to eventuate in a successful conclusion of the Three Powers Pact, it is Minister Stahmer's and my sincerest desire to tender to Your Excellency the expression of deepest appreciation for the principal part Your Excellency has played throughout in a most generous and accommodating spirit.

We wish to take this occasion to state once more in this letter some of the salient points reiterated in our conversations with Your Excellency which are as follows:

The German Government are convinced that the Contracting Parties are about to enter into a new and decisive phase of world history in which it will be their task to assume the leadership in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia and Europe respectively.

The fact that for a long time to come their interests will coincide and the unrestricted mutual confidence of the Contracting Parties from the solid foundation on which the Pact is built.

The German Government firmly believe that the technical details concerning the execution of the Pact will be settled without difficulties and that it would not be in keeping with the far reaching importance of the Pact and it would be practically impossible to anticipate all possible cases which might arise in the course of its application; they can only be dealt with in the spirit of mutual confidence and helpfulness as they arise from time to time.

Conclusion of the Technical Commissions stipulated in Article 4 of the Pact shall be submitted to the respective Governments for approval in order to be put in force.

It is needless to say that whether or not a Contracting Party has been attacked within the meaning of Article 3 of the Pact, shall be determined upon consultation among the three Contracting Parties.

If Japan, contrary to the intentions of the Pact, should be attacked by a Power so far not engaged in the European War, or the China Incident, Germany will consider it a matter of course to give Japan full support and assist it with all military and economic means.

With regard to the relations between Japan and Soviet Russia, Germany will do everything within its power to promote a friendly understanding and will at any time offer its good offices to this end.
Germany will use her industrial capacity and other resources technical and material, as far as possible, in favour of Japan in order both to facilitate the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia and to enable her to be better prepared for any emergency. Germany and Japan will further undertake mutually to aid each other in procuring in every possible way raw materials and minerals including oil, which they will have been in need of.

The German Foreign Minister implicitly believes that Italy will, of course, act in concert with Germany and Japan when and where assistance and cooperation by Italy is sought in reference to the matters above enumerated.

I have the honour to present to Your Excellency the above expose as the views of the German Foreign Minister conveyed personally by his special delegate, Minister Stahmer, and repeatedly transmitted to me from my Government.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurance of highest consideration.

gez. Ott
LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter No. G-1000 of this date, and I feel happy to take note of the contents therein.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.
LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR

Excellency:

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that the present European War will remain limited as far as possible in its sphere and scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in that direction.

However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured in the present circumstances that there is no danger whatever of an armed conflict taking place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German Government to such possibility and to state that they feel confident that Germany will do their utmost to aid Japan in such eventuality with all means in their power.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.
LETTER FROM THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR
TO THE FOREIGN MINISTER

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter of this date Jyo-ni No. 133 with the contents as follows:

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that the present European War will remain limited as far as possible in its sphere and scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in that direction.

However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured in the present circumstances that there is no danger whatever of an armed conflict taking place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German Government to such a possibility and to state that they feel confident that Germany will do their utmost to aid Japan in such eventuality with all means in their power."

I take this occasion to note the contents of Your Excellency's letter.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.
LETTER FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER TO
THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR

Excellency:

I have the honour to ask Your Excellency to confirm the following oral declaration which was made by Your Excellency on behalf of the German Government:

"The German Government agree that the former German Colonies actually under Japan's Mandate in the South Seas shall remain in Japan's possession, it being understood that Germany be in a way compensated therefor. In regard to other former Colonies in the South Seas, they shall be restored automatically to Germany upon conclusion of peace ending the recent European War. Afterwards the German Government would be prepared to confer, in an accommodating spirit, with the Japanese Government with a view to dispose of them as far as possible in Japan's favour against compensation."

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.
Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter of this date Jyo-ni No. 134 and to confirm the oral declaration set forth therein as made by me concerning the former German Colonies in the South Seas.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.
Luncheon No. 2

On the tenth of September 1940 the Foreign Minister conferred at his private residence with Minister Stenbeck and the German Ambassador in Japan, and after exchanging questions and answers in continuance of the previous day, read the private and tentative plan of the Foreign Minister as of Appendix I, explaining that it was a summary of statement by the German side on the first conference of the ninth of September, and that it would be binding for nobody other than the Foreign Minister as an individual. He handed then at the same time a copy of the above and requested that it be studied. The two visited again the Foreign Minister at his private residence on the eleventh of September (10.15--10.45 hours), presented a counter-proposal as of Appendix B, and explained the content saying that only Paragraph III was different from the private plan of the Foreign Minister. They added further that the counter-proposal was a private plan of them only and was not binding for the German Government.
TELEPATHIC FORMULA

I. Japan to recognize and respect the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

II. Germany and Italy to recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

III. Japan, Germany and Italy to agree mutually to cooperate in their efforts on aforesaid lines and to consult with one another as to the suitable and effective means to remove and overcome any and all obstacles and hindrances to the achievement of their respective aims.

IV. Japan, Germany and Italy to agree to pull together and co-ordinate their endeavours with a view to establishing a new world order to meet the changed and changing world conditions, which alone can be a just and durable foundation for peace.
I. Japan to recognize and respect the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

II. Germany and Italy to recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

III. Japan, Germany, and Italy to agree mutually to cooperate and to consult in their efforts on aforesaid lines and to assist one another with all political, economic, and military means when one of the three powers concerned will be attacked by a power not included in the present European war or the Japanese-Chinese conflict.

IV. Japan, Germany, and Italy to agree to pull together and coordinate their endeavours with a view to establishing a new world order to meet the changed and changing world conditions which alone can be a just and durable foundation for peace.
Contents of the attached document is a memorandum containing the gist of conversations between the Foreign Minister, Minister Heinrich Stahmer and German Ambassador in Japan, Eugen Ott, which took place on the ninth (17:00-18:00 hours) and the tenth (17:30-18:30 hours).

The Foreign Minister read the above to Minister Stahmer and Ambassador Ott on an interview of the eleventh of September (10:15-10:45 hours), and handed Minister Stahmer a copy of the memorandum written with pencil, after the correctness of it had been confirmed by the other side.

AD Tripartite Alliance of Japan, Germany and Italy
(identical with the Exhibit 43, Transcript pages 6391-6393)
1. Germany does not want the present conflict develop into a World War, and wishes to bring it to termination as quickly as possible. She particularly wants the United States to stay out.

2. Germany does not look for Japan's military assistance at this juncture in connection with her war with England.

3. What she wishes of Japan is to have Japan play the role of restraining and preventing the U.S. from entering the war, by all means. Although Germany thinks at present that the U.S. will not enter the war, she cannot take chance.

4. Germany hardly thinks that she and the U.S. will come to blows in the near future, but that the clash and war between Japan and the U.S. cannot eventually be avoided.

5. It is, so Germany believes, to the mutual advantage of both, Japan and Germany (of course Italy to be included) to enter into an understanding or agreement, whereby they will be thoroughly prepared effectively to meet emergency, at any moment. This can only prevent, if anything can prevent, America from entering the present war, or entering into an armed conflict with Japan in the future.

6. A strong and determined attitude, unequivocal and unmistakable, on the part of the three nations, Japan, Germany and Italy, and the knowledge of it by the U.S. and the world at large at this juncture, that alone can only be of a powerful and effective deterrent on the U.S. A weak, lukewarm attitude or declaration at this juncture will only invite derision and danger.

7. Germany hopes Japan will also size up the situation, and will realize the magnitude and the reality of the potential (may be impending, who knows) danger coming from the Western Hemisphere, and will act quickly and decisively to forestall it by reaching an agreement between the three (Japan, Germany and Italy) of such a nature that neither the U.S. nor the rest of the world would be left in doubt, conjecturing.

8. Hardly necessary to say that Germany (and Italy) will do everything in her power to restrain the U.S. on the Atlantic and will at once start supplying Japan with as much of the war equipment (such as aeroplanes, tanks and other war tools with men even, if Japan wishes it) as she can reasonably spare, and will otherwise help her in every possible way. (Matsuoka remarked that these things might and in fact will have to be left to a sort of mixed military and naval commission of the Axis, granted that Japan joins the Axis in the sense and in the way Germany wants).

9. Of course, Germany recognizes and respects the political leadership in Greater East Asia. All she wants in these regions is of economic nature, and she is ready to cooperate with Japan to further her aims. Naturally she looks to Japan to do her best to accommodate German enterprises and to enable Germany to obtain in these regions materials she needs and may need.
I. Japan recognises and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

II. Germany and Italy recognise and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order on Greater East Asia.

III. Japan, Germany and Italy agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three powers concerned will either openly or in concealed form be attacked by a power at present not included in the European war or in the Japanese-Chinese conflict.

IV. Japan, Germany and Italy agree to cooperate and to coordinate their endeavours with a view to establishing a new world order to meet the changed and changing world conditions, which is alone a just and endurable foundation of peace.

V. Japan, Germany and Italy agree that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the present political status between the three aforementioned powers and Soviet Russia.

VI. Japan, Germany and Italy will, without delay, conclude a treaty laying down the details of the application of the aforementioned terms.
10. Better to reach agreement between Germany, Italy and Japan first and then immediately to approach Soviet Russia. Germany is prepared to act part of an honest broker on the question of rapprochement between Japan and Soviet Russia, and she can see no unsurmountable obstacle on the path, may be settled with much difficulty. Germany-Soviet relations are good, contrary to what the British propaganda tries to represent, and Russia is carrying out to the satisfaction of Germany all her engagements.

11. Despite the fact that the Axis (including Japan) must be thoroughly prepared to meet the worst emergency, Germany will, on the other hand, make use of every means in her power to prevent the clashing between the U.S. and Japan, and even to improve the relations between the two, if it is humanly possible.

12. Germany, in asking to join the Axis in the fullest sense of the world and that quickly, before the war against England closes, is taking a long view of carrying on stupendous struggle against the British Empire, not to say the Anglo-Saxondom including America. The present war may end before long, but this great struggle will go on for tens of years yet, in one form or another. (Matsuoka emphasized this phase). Let the three (Germany, Italy and Japan) stand together knitted very closely until the great aim is finally achieved.

13. As to when Italy should be asked to join in the present discussion, the Germany Foreign Minister will consider and let the Japanese Foreign Minister know. The Germany Government has not yet conferred with Italy. Neither Stahmer nor anyone on the German side has seen the Soviet official on the matter.

14. Stahmer's words may be regarded as coming directly from Ribbentrop.

15. The Japanese Foreign Minister also made observation on several points, but they are not noted here.
The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three Governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

I. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

II. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

III. Japan, Germany and Italy agree to cooperate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to
assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting Powers concerned is attacked (either openly or covertly) by a power at present not involved in the European war or in the Japanese-Chinese conflict.

IV. Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting Powers and Soviet Russia.

V. The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Pact and have affixed hereeto their seals.

Done in triplicate at , the day of
Strictly Confidential

PROTOCOL

With reference to the Pact signed on this day by the representatives of Japan, Germany and Italy, the Contracting Parties have arrived at the following understanding:

I. With a view to determine by consultation with one another the detailed arrangements on the co-operation and mutual assistance between Japan, Germany and Italy, as stipulated in Paragraph III. of the Pact, Joint Military and Naval Commissions, preferably one at Tokyo and another at Berlin or Rome, together with a Joint Economic Commission, shall forthwith be organized. The composition of the aforesaid Commission shall be determined through consultation by the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy.

The conclusions of the said Commissions shall be submitted to the respective Governments for approval in order to be put in force.

II. Whether or not a Contracting Party or Parties has or has been attacked openly or covertly as stipulated in Paragraph III. of the Pact shall be determined by the respective Governments, and in case the fact of such an attack has been established the measure of mutual assistance of a political, economic and military nature to be adopted by the Contracting Parties shall be studied and recommended by the aforesaid Commissions, subject to approval of the respective Government.
III. As the co-operation and mutual assistance stipulated in Paragraph III. of the Pact have in view as fundamental aims the efforts to establish forthwith a new order in Greater East Asia and Europe, to eventuate in a new world order, blessing Humanity with a just and equitable peace, Germany and Italy shall, in time of peace as well as war, take all possible measures to restrain a Third Power or Powers on the Atlantic with a view to better enabling Japan, Germany and Italy to accomplish their common aim of establishing a new order in Greater East Asia and in the Pacific Basin in General.

In the event of Japan being attacked by a Power or Powers not at present involved in either the European War or the Sino-Japanese conflict referred to in the last part of Paragraph III. of the present Pact, Germany and Italy also undertake to come to Japan's assistance in the Pacific Ocean with all their means and resources.

IV. While Germany and Italy undertake to use their good offices with a view of improving relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R., Japan, Germany and Italy shall make utmost efforts to induce the U.S.S.R. to act in accord with the main purposes of the present Pact.

V. The Contracting Parties undertake to exchange from time to time without delay all useful inventions and devices of war and to supply one another with war equipments, such as aeroplanes, tanks, guns, explosives etc. 'with each Party'
Def. Doc. # 1656-F

may reasonably spare, together with technical skill and men, should they be required. Furthermore they are prepared to do utmost in furnishing one another with and in aiding one another in the efforts to procure minerals including oil and other materials as well as machinery for war industries and various requisites for livelihood with machinery of all sorts employed in the production of such requisites.

VI. The present Protocol shall remain secret and shall not be published.

Done in triplicate at , the day of
Strictly Confidential

Excellency:

I have the honour to state that, the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that the present European war will remain limited as far as possible in its sphere and score and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in that direction.

However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured that there is no danger whatever of an armed conflict taking place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German and Italian Governments to such a possibility and to ask the German and Italian Governments whether in such eventuality the Japanese Government may expect assistance and co-operation in every possible form as provided for under Paragraph III. of the present Pact mutatis mutandis.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.
Strictly Confidential

Excellency:

I have the honour to state to Your Excellency that inasmuch as the German and Italian Governments recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in regard to the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia, it is considered highly desirable by this Government that all the former German Colonies in the Pacific area should be ceded to Japan, without compensation in the case of the Group of Islands mandated by Japan and with proper compensation in the case of other mandated islands as well as those actually in British possession.

It is understood as matter of course that Japan shall accord a specially favourable treatment to the activities of Germany and her nationals in these regions as compared to any other nation or their nationals.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.
The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively; wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three Governments to extend cooperation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

I. Japan recognises and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

II. Germany and Italy recognise and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Great East Asia.

III. Japan, Germany and Italy agree to co-operate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to
assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three contracting Powers concerned is attacked (either openly or covertly) by a Power at present not involved in the European war or in the Japanese-Chinese conflict.

IV. Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting Powers and Soviet Russia.

V. The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Pact and have affixed hereto their seals.

Done in triplicate at , the day of
DEF. DOC. A1658-0

PROTOCOL

With reference to the Pact signed on this day by the representatives of Japan, Germany and Italy the Contracting Parties have arrived at the following understandings:

I. With a view to determine by consultation with one another the detailed arrangements on the co-operation and mutual assistance between Japan, Germany and Italy as stipulated in Paragraph III. of the Pact, Joint Military and Naval Commissions preferably one at Tokio and another at Berlin or Rome, together with a Joint Economic Commission, shall forthwith be organized. The composition of the aforesaid Commissions shall be determined through consultation by the Government of Japan, Germany and Italy.

The conclusions of the said Commissions shall be submitted to the respective Governments for approval in order to be put in force.

II. Whether or not a Contracting Party or Parties has or have been attacked openly or covertly as stipulated in Paragraph III. of the Pact shall be determined upon consultation among the three Contracting Parties, and in case the fact of such an attack has been established the measures of mutual assistance of political, economic and military nature to be adopted by the Contracting Parties shall be studied and
DEP. UCC. 31656-0

recommended by the aforesaid Commissions, subject to approval of the respective Governments.

III. As the co-operation and mutual assistance stipulated in Paragraph III. of the Pact have in view as fundamental aims the efforts to establish forthwith a new order in Greater East Asia and Europe, to eventuate in a new world order, blessing humanity with a just and equitable peace, Germany and Italy shall, in time of peace as well as war, take all possible measures to restrain a Third Powers or Powers on the Atlantic with a view to better enabling Japan, Germany and Italy to accomplish their common aim of establishing a new order in Greater East Asia and in the Pacific Basin in general.

In the event of Japan being attacked by a Power or Powers not at present involved in either the European War of the Sino-Japanese conflict referred to in the last part of Paragraph III. of the Pact, Germany and Italy also undertake to come to Japan's assistance in the Pacific Ocean with all their means and resources.

IV. While Germany and Italy undertake to use their good offices with a view to improving relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R., Japan, Germany and Italy shall make utmost efforts to induce the U.S.S.R. to act in accord with the main purposes of the present Pact.

V. The Contracting Parties undertake to exchange from time to time without delay all useful inventions and
devices of war and to supply one another with war equipments, such as aeroplanes, tanks, guns, explosives etc., which each Party may reasonably spare, together with technical skill and men, should they be required. Furthermore they are prepared to do utmost in furnishing one another with and in aiding one another in the efforts to procure minerals including oil and other materials as well as machinery for war industries and various requisites for livelihood with machinery of all sorts employed in the production of such requisites.

VI. In conformity with the spirit which prompted the conclusion of the present Pact, the Governments of the Contracting Parties undertake to enter into negotiations without delay, with a view to deciding upon measures of assuring to the other Contracting Parties of their Nationals, in their commercial and industrial activities in the regions where the Contracting Parties are respectively recognized to have leadership by virtue of Paragraph I and II of the present Pact, a position which is preponderant in comparison to that of any Third Power and its nationals.

VII. The present Protocol shall remain secret and shall not be published.

Done in triplicate at , the day of
DSM. DOC. #1656-0

Excellencies:

I have the honour to state that, the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that the present European War will remain limited as far as possible in its sphere and scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in that direction.

However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured that there is no danger whatsoever of an armed conflict taking place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German and Italian Governments to such a possibility and they feel confident that Germany and Italy will do their utmost to aid Japan in such eventuality with all means in their power.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.
Excellency:

I have the honour to state to Your Excellency that inasmuch as the German and Italian Governments recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in regard to the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia, it is considered highly desirable by this Government that all the former German Colonies in the Pacific area should be ceded to Japan, without compensation in the case of the Group of Islands mandated by Japan and with proper compensation in the case of other mandated islands as well as those actually in British possession.

It is understood as a matter of course that Japan shall accord a specially favourable treatment to the activities of Germany and her nationals in these regions as compared to any other nation or their nationals.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.
The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three Governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows.

I. Japan recognized and respect the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

II. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.
III. Japan, Germany and Italy agree to co-operate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. If a power not at present included in the European War or the Chinese-Japanese Conflict commits an act of aggression against one of the three contracting parties, Japan, Germany and Italy undertake to declare war on such power and to assist one another with all political, economic and military means.

IV. With a view to implementing the present pact, conversations between the general staffs of the Japanese, German and Italian forces will be opened by the technical commissions which will meet without delay.

V. Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting powers and Soviet Russia.

VI. The present pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this pact
and have affixed hereto their Seals.

Done in triplicate at Tokyo, the day of September, 1940.
In our opinion an explicit emphasis of the obligation to declare war would have a specially strong neutralizing effect on America. America would certainly hesitate ten times before entering the war if the pact stated in clear and impressive terms that America would then automatically be at war with three great powers.
The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three Governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

I. Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

II. Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

III. Japan, Germany and Italy agree to co-operate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. If a power not at present
Def. Doc. No. 1656 - R

Included in the European War or the Chinese-Japanese Conflict commits an act of aggression against one of the three Contracting Parties, Japan, Germany and Italy undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means.

IV. With a view to implementing the present Pact, Joint Technical Commissions the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, will meet without delay.

V. Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three contracting Powers and Soviet Russia.

VI. The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Pact and have affixed hereunto their Seals.

Done in triplicate at Tokyo, the day of September, 1940.
Excellency:

I have the honour to state that the following are some of the salient points of our several conversations that had taken place from the 9th to the 21st September, 1940, relative to the conclusion of the Three Powers Pact signed on this day:

I. Joint Technical Commission.- stipulated in Paragraph IV of the Fact, shall be organized at once together with a Joint Economic Commission. The composition of the aforesaid Commissions shall be determined through consultation by the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy.

The conclusions of the said Commissions shall be submitted to the respective Governments for approval in order to be put in force.

II. Whether or not a power not at present involved in the European War or the Sino-Japanese Conflict has committed an act of aggression against one of the three Contracting Parties as stipulated in Paragraph III of the Fact, shall be determined upon consultation among the Japanese, German and Italian Governments, and in case the fact of such an aggression had been established the measures of mutual assistance of political, economic and military nature to be adopted by the Contracting Parties shall be studied and recommended by the aforesaid Commissions, subject to approval of the respective Governments.

III. As the co-operation and mutual assistance stipulated in Paragraph III of the Fact have in view as fundamental aims the efforts to establish forthwith a new order in Greater East Asia and Europe, to eventuate in a new world order, blessing Humanity with a just and equitable peace,
Germany shall, in time of peace as well as war, take all possible measures, in conjunction with Italy, to restrain a Third Power or Powers on the Atlantic with a view to better enabling Japan, Germany and Italy to accomplish their common aim of establishing a new order in Greater East Asia and in the Pacific Basin in general.

In the event of Japan being attacked by a Power or Powers not at present involved in either the European war or the Sino-Japanese Conflict referred to in the last part of Paragraph III. of the present Fact, Germany also undertakes to come to Japan's assistance in the Pacific Ocean with all their means and resources.

IV. While Germany undertakes to use their good offices with a view to improving relations between Japan and the U.S.S.R., Japan and Germany shall make utmost efforts to induce the U.S.S.R. to act in accord the main purpose of the present Fact.

V. Japan and Germany undertake to exchange from time to time without delay all useful inventions devices of war and to supply mutually with war equipments, such as aeroplanes, tanks, guns, explosives etc., which they may reasonably spare, together with technical skill and men, should it be required. Furthermore they are prepared mutually to do utmost in furnishing with and in aiding in the efforts to procure minerals including oil and other materials as well as machinery for war industries and various requisites for livelihood with machinery of all sorts employed in the production of such requisites.

It is needless to say that the above understandings shall remain secret and shall not be published.
It is desired that Your Excellency would confirm the understandings as above set forth.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.

Strictly Confidential

Excellency:

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that the present European War will remain limited as far as possible in its sphere and scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in that direction.

However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured that there is no danger whatsoever of an armed conflict taking place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German Government to such a possibility and to state that they feel confident that Germany will do their utmost to aid Japan in such eventuality with all means in their power.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.
Strictly Confidential

Excellency:

I have the honour to ask Your Excellency to confirm the accuracy of the following oral declaration which was made by Your Excellency on behalf of the German Government:

"The German Government agree that the former German Colonies actually under Japan's Mandate in the South Seas will forever remain in Japan's possession against an adequate compensation. I regard to other former Colonies in the South Seas, the German Government undertake to confer with the Japanese Government upon and after the conclusion of the Three Powers Fact, in an accommodating spirit, with the view to disposing them as far as possible in Japan's favour."

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.

Strictly Confidential

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's note of the date with the contents as follows:

I take this occasion formally to confirm the understandings above set forth.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.
Strictly Confidential

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's note of this date and to confirm the oral declaration contained therein which reads as follows:

I take this occasion to take note of the contents of Your Excellency's note.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.

Strictly Confidential

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's note of this date and to confirm the oral declaration contained therein which reads as follows:

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.
THREE POWERS FACT BETWEEN JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY

The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it as the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three Governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article 2

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.

Article 3

Japan, Germany and Italy agree to co-operate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all
political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

Article 4

With a view to implementing the present Pact, Joint Technical Commissions the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy will meet without delay.

Article 5

Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

Article 6

The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force. At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any one of them enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Pact and have affixed here to their Seals.

Done in triplicate at __________, the day of
I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that the present European War will remain limited as far as possible in its scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in that direction.

However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured in the present circumstances that there is no danger whatever of an armed conflict taking place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German Government to such a possibility and to state that they feel confident that Germany will do their utmost to aid Japan in such eventuality with all means in their power.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter of this date No. 11111 with the contents as follows:

DEI. DOC. #1656-U

Strictly Confidential

Excellency:

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that, the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that the present European War will remain limited as far as possible in its scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in that direction.

However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured in the present circumstances that there is no danger whatever of an armed conflict taking place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German Government to such a possibility and to state that they feel confident that Germany will do their utmost to aid Japan in such eventuality with all means in their power.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter of this date No. 11111 with the contents as follows:
I take this occasion to take note of the contents of Your Excellency's letter.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.
Excelsior:

I have the honour to ask Your Excellency to confirm the following oral declaration which was made by Your Excellency on behalf of the German Government:

"The German Government agree that the former German Colonies actually under Japan's Mandate in the South Seas will remain in Japan's possession, it being understood that Germany be adequately compensated there for. In regard to other former Colonies in the South Seas, they shall be restored automatically to Germany upon conclusion of peace ending the present European War. Afterwards the German Government would be prepared to confer, in accommodating spirit, with the Japanese Government with a view to disposing of them as far as possible in Japan's favour against compensation."

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.

Excelsior:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter of this date No. 1111 and to confirm the oral declaration made by me concerning the former German Colonies in the South Seas which is contained in to Your Excellency's letter under reply.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew Your Excellency, the highest consideration.
LETTER FROM GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER.

Excellency:

In the moment when our conversations concerning the Three Powers Fact are to be concluded successfully it is Minister Steinor's and my sincerest desire to express to Your Excellency our heartiest regard for your leading and generous cooperation in most accommodating spirit. We should like to state once more in this letter the conformity concerning the salient points which we always have found in our conversations with Your Excellency in regard of the aims and details of the Pact.

The German Government are convinced that the Contracting Parties are going to enter in now and desire period of World History in which they will be charged with leadership of the establishment and new order in Greater East Asia, and in Europe. The recognition of our interest with are in conformity for the present time and for long future and unlimited mutual confidence of the Contracting Parties are forming the solid bases of the three Powers Pact. The German Government are convinced that the technical details of the Pact will resolved without difficulties on fundamental confidence and that it would be contrary to the far reaching import neo of the Pact to fix formally some single questions which would never thoroughly work out.

In Japan contrary to the aim of the Pact would be involved in a Conflict with a power until now not belligerent, the German Government will be obliged without any doubt to assist Japan to the utmost.
extent and will offer every possible military and economic support. Concerning the relations between Japan and Russia, Germany will help to obtain most friendly understanding and offer her good services for that purpose.

I have the honour to present to Your Excellency this principal statement in accordance with the ideas of the German Foreign Minister representative Minister Stein and according to the repeated instructions of German Government transmitted to myself during the conversation concerning the Three Powers Pact.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency, the highest consideration.
1. Does Ribbentrop insist on signing the Pact at Berlin? Matsukas has been negotiating the Pact all through with an assempoting that the Pact would be signed at Tokio which has been shared by all these who have taken part in delivration concerning this question.

2. Having all formalities in order to expedite the matter, would it not be better to have only one text common to three Contracting Parties; that is English text on which we have been negotiating? If we insist to have the Pact in three languages it would necessitate as to have German and Italian versions together with Japanese text for submission to Privy Council to be examined closely in each of the three languages. This would further postpone the conclusion and publication of the Pact which I hate to see. Again, one language text would go far towards to lessen possible discrepancy in interpretation.

Please also get as quickly as possible answer this point.

3. Will you please ask Ribbentrop for the last time to agree to authorise the German Ambassador here to exchange note with Foreign Minister (Matsuoka) on the contents of Draft Protocol as drawn up (of course not in the form of the secret protocol) and try get answer as early as possible?
THREE POWERS Pact AMONG JAPAN, GERMANY AND ITALY

The Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy, considering it is the condition precedent of any lasting peace that all nations of the world be given each its own proper place, have decided to stand by and co-operate with one another in regard to their efforts in Greater East Asia and the regions of Europe respectively wherein it is their prime purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote mutual prosperity and welfare of the people concerned. Furthermore it is the desire of the three Governments to extend co-operation to such nations in other spheres of the world as may be inclined to put forth endeavours along lines similar to their own, in order that their ultimate aspirations for world peace may thus be realized. Accordingly the Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Japan recognizes and respects the leadership of Germany and Italy in the establishment of a new order in Europe.

Article 2

Germany and Italy recognize and respect the leadership of Japan in the establishment of a new order in Greater East Asia.
Article 3

Japan, Germany and Italy agree to co-operate in their efforts on the aforesaid lines. They further undertake to assist one another with all political, economic and military means when one of the three Contracting Parties is attacked by a power at present not involved in the European War or in the Sino-Japanese Conflict.

Article 4

With a view to implementing the present Pact, Joint Technical Commissions the members of which are to be appointed by the respective Governments of Japan, Germany and Italy will meet without delay.

Article 5

Japan, Germany and Italy affirm that the aforesaid terms do not in any way affect the political status which exists at present as between each of the three Contracting Parties and Soviet Russia.

Article 6

The present Pact shall come into effect immediately upon signature and shall remain in force for ten years from the date of its coming into force.

At proper time before the expiration of the said term the High Contracting Parties shall, at the request of any
one of them, enter into negotiations for its renewal.

In faith whereof, the Undersigned, duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Fact and have affixed hereto their Seals.

Done in triplicate at , the day of the month of the year of Shōwa, corresponding to the
STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Excellency:

I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Japanese Govern-
ment earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that
the present European War will remain limited as far as possible in its sphere
and scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their
part spare no effort in that direction.

However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and
elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured in the present
circumstances that there is no danger whatever of an armed conflict taking
place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call
attention of the German Government to such a possibility and to state that they
feel confident that Germany will do their utmost to aid Japan in such
eventuality with all means in their power.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the
highest consideration.
Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of Your Excellency's letter No. 1111 of this date with the contents as follows:

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the Japanese Government earnestly share the hope with the Governments of Germany and Italy that the present European War will remain limited as far as possible in its sphere and scope and will come to a speedy conclusion and that they shall on their part spare no effort in the direction.

"However, the conditions actually prevailing in Greater East Asia and elsewhere do not permit the Japanese Government to rest assured in the present circumstances that there is no danger whatever of an armed conflict taking place between Japan and Great Britain, and accordingly they desire to call attention of the German Government to such a possibility and to state that they feel confident that Germany will do their utmost to aid Japan in such eventuality with all means in their power."

I take this occasion to note the contents of Your Excellency's letter.

I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the highest consideration.
CERTIFICATE
Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of the Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in Japanese, English, German and Italian consisting of 156 pages and entitled "Procedure Pertaining to the Tripartite Pact of Japan, Germany and Italy, and Per'ining Documents" is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on the 21st day of May 1947

/s/ K. Hayashi
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ K. Urabe
Correction

Mark the documents as follows:

1656 B-G - as - Annex 1
1656 H - as - Annex 2
1656 I - as - Appendix A of Annex 2
1656 J - as - Appendix B of Annex 2
1656 K - as - Annex 2
1656 L - as - Annex 2
1656 M - as - Annex 3
1656 N - as - Annex 4
1656 O - as - Annex 5
1656 P - as - Annex 6
1656 Q - as - Annex 7
1656 R - as - Annex 8
1656 S - as - Annex 9
1656 T - as - Annex 10
1656 U - as - Annex 11
1656 V - as - Annex 12
1656 W - as - Annex 15
1656 X - as - Annex 14
1656 Y - as - Annex 15
1656 Z - as - Annex 16
1656 A - as - Annex 17
1656 B - as - Annex 18
1656 C - as - Annex 19
1656 D - as - Annex 20
Telegram from Foreign Minister Matsuoka to Ambassador Oshima in Germany, dated 24 May 1941.

1. Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, according to your report, was surprised by the communication of the draft of the Japanese-American understanding, and was suspicious because I made no concrete reference during my recent visit to Europe to this matter. Actually I had a general exchange of opinion on the Japanese-American question with him during my stay in Berlin.

As the main aim of the Tripartite Fact is to prevent the American participation in the war, it will naturally suit the common interests of the three powers to take appropriate diplomatic measures for that purpose. Therefore, I told on my way home to the American Ambassador in Moscow, as I communicated to you by the previous telegram, to consider, (1) that the USA will not participate in the war, and (2) that the USA will recommend peace to Chang Kai-shek; moreover I declared to him, that (3) Japan cannot tolerate anything which affects the Tripartite Fact even in the slightest degree, and will go to war immediately if America enters in the war. I had him to send these points as a personal message of mine by telegram to the President. The US government proposed on 16 April, prior to my return home, a draft of general agreement concerning the regulation of Japanese-American relations, which came to my knowledge for the first time after my arrival in Tokyo. Therefore I had in Berlin no basis for a concrete discussion concerning this matter, and I
have no had conscious towards Germany. Besides, above-mentioned three points will be kept firmly by us, now as well as in the future, and as far as the Japanese Government is concerned, there is no need for anxiety as expressed by Ribbentrop that it might take measures to weaken the Tripartite Pact. We made this point also clear to the USA by measures taken by me by Ambassador Nomura's statement to Secretary of State Hull etc.

2. Roosevelt's real intention is not difficult to surmise. I almost agree to the observations of Ribbentrop, but I think there is no need to be afraid of intrigues to separate Japan and Germany, so long as the both countries consider each other the Tripartite Pact as the firmly established national policy. Of course such intrigues of England and America will be intensified in the future, and the three countries Japan, Germany and Italy must increasingly strengthen their moral tie. Should Germany and Italy have any doubt as to our intention even in the slightest degree concerning this matter, it would mean that they fell victim to the intrigues of our opponents. I therefore sincerely hope that Hitler and Ribbentrop trust me whole heartedly now. I already took appropriate steps, and Ribbentrop sent a message that he trusts me fully.

3. You reported that Ribbentrop was very unsatisfied because we opened the negotiation without waiting for the arrival of German opinion. However, we showed our utmost sincerity in withholding our answer to the USA for a week (we withheld the answer after all more than four weeks since the American proposal of the
original draft); moreover, not only the Japanese, but also the American internal situation at that time was so strained that no more delay of even half a day could be tolerated (we had a confidential information that the US cabinet meeting of the 8th decided upon the policy of convoy, and a statement of the President was forthcoming on the 14th), and we sent at last our counter-proposal on the 12th to the USA, in order to prevent at any cost the carrying out of American convoy and to forestall the danger of war-participation. When Ribbentrop said that "I was compelled to agree by a certain faction," he entirely misunderstand my real intention, this matter, being historically only the fruit in a different form from seeds I had sown. In order to be loyal to the Tripartite Pact, I suppressed the desire of the military etc., to hasten the matter (this matter has no connection with the influence of "status-quo party" mentioned in your telegram, army and navy being most eager), and overcoming much difficulties I withhold to dispatch of our answer for a week. Also, that our counter-proposal was psychologically very well timed can be seen from the fact that Roosevelt, upon receiving it, postponed his statement from the 14th to the 27th. At any rate, I will do my utmost in the future as in the past to keep understanding with Germany and Italy, however Japan has her own standpoint, and I don't think it necessary to meet the intention of Germany and Italy even in the matter concerning the execution of policy.
However, you can be assured that there is no one in our Government who considers to deviate from the Tripartite Pact even in the slightest degree, and I think that the policy of Japan and Germany (and Italy) concerning this negotiation is the same, and there is not discrepancy between them. I believe that German suspicion has thereafter been removed completely by the intimate talks I had with Ambassador Ott for several times; yet I ask you to explain to Ribbentrop the above-mentioned points very thoroughly.
上記表明の如く、日本政府は四月十八日、大本営八等、関東軍等、日本の軍事的、政治的及び経済的、文化的等の関係を有するに及んで、日本政府は、これに答えて、大日本帝国の日本政府の政策を承認するものとする。
云々如前

その件

日本大典

三国條約

道

文書

電

所調条約

電

海

電

道

道

道

道

道

道

道

道

道

道

道
SURRENDER OF THE AXIS POWERS

The twenty days of July, 1943, and subsequent allied victories shattered any legend of inherent military superiority which may still have clung to the Axis powers. They had been outgeneraled, outfought and repeatedly beaten during these summer months. And though their defeats were not irreparable, it had become plain that little co-operation existed between the efforts of Germany, Italy and Japan. Despite clever propaganda to the contrary, the three nations were fighting as many separate wars.
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL FOR THE FAR EAST

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al.

WAKI, Sadao et al.

SOMIY DEPOSITION (translation)

Defendants: OYAMA, Fushiro

Having first duly sworn on oath and attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1. I was born in Hagi Prefecture on 8 February 1883. I entered the Naval Academy in 1900 and until September 1945 when I was placed on the reserve list I have served in the Navy for 45 years. On 8 September 1940, I took office as Navy Minister in the Second Kensei Cabinet, succeeding the former Navy Minister, Admiral Zongor Yoshiba. Following that, from 18 July 1941 to 16 October 1941 I was Navy Minister in the Third Kensei Cabinet until it resigned on bloc.

2. Concerning the Tripartite Alliance, there were various arguments in government circles when the German-Japanese alliance pact was concluded, but what impressed me most strongly was the fact that it sought to prevent the U.S. from entering the European War thereby stopping the devastations of warfare from spreading throughout the world, and also—
the settlement of the China Incident as well as the establish-
ment of friendly relations with the Soviet Union. But what I
feared the most was the incurring of hostilities with those na-
tions even if a slight friction with Anglo-American powers
or Soviet Union could not be averted. That is to say that the
Navy sought to avert war with U.S. and Britain at all cost and
earnestly hoped for U.S. Japanese relations to return to normal
conditions and the China Incident to reach an early (peaceful)
solution. However, on the one hand, situations prevailing at that
time forced our country to take an isolated stand internationally
while on the other hand it was thought extremely difficult to
approach the U.S. and Britain. We had already acknowledged the
new policy itself, backed up by the combined strength of Germany,
Italy and the Soviet Union, but we feared the incurring of war
with the U.S. and Britain if we concluded a Tripartite alliance
with Germany and Italy, and therefore we felt that a most careful
deliberation on the proposal was necessary. Especially, as to
automatically sharing the obligation of entering war we strongly
expressed absolute opposition. However, later on, according to
the explanation made by Foreign Minister Matsuoka I understood
the situation as follows: "Not only does Germany not desire
Japan's entry into the European War at the present stage but
desires even more than Japan does to prevent America's entry into
the war. On this point we were able to recognize sufficient
earnestness to cooperate with us and that even after the
DEF. DOC. #1664

... the Alliance Pact the decision to enter the war would be made by Japan's free will. As for Japan-Russia relations all possible efforts were to be made to promote friendly understanding. Such definite understanding were reached. Therefore the Navy lost all grounds for opposing the proposal. Not only that but I thought that the Navy's stubborn adherence to its own standpoint would create a violent internal rivalry if it continued in opposition to the public opinion which at that time was gradually favoring the Axis. Therefore I stated at the Cabinet meeting that, "The Navy does not have any other proposal which will tide over the current (critical) situation." The autonomous decision when entering war and adjustment of U.S.-Japanese relations were the two major factors to which the Navy attached greatest importance, and as to the first factor, we specially clearly indicated it in an official diplomatic paper, and as Senior Delegate of the Military Committee for the Mixed Technical Commission in the German-Italian-Japanese Tripartite Pact signing, Vice Admiral Nakuni Nomura, who was senior to the Army Delegate, Rear Admiral Katsur Abo was chosen who understood the progress of the Alliance negotiations up to that time as Chief of Naval Affairs Bureau, Naval Ministry. Both delegates were appointed on 16 October. Again, in March 1941 when Foreign Minister Matsuoka was embarking on a trip to Europe I entered a strong advice...
DSF. DOC. #1664

to the Foreign Minister not to make understandings which may involve us in a war other than with China, and especially with the U.S. and Britain. Moreover I added Commander Shigoru Fujii among his attendants to be careful on the advice I made to the Foreign Minister. Again as to adjustment of Japanese-U.S. relations I exerted special effort. Hitherto, Foreign Minister Matsuoka had been negotiating with Admiral Kichisaburo Namura to accept the post of ambassador to the U.S. but the Admiral refused to accept it. But for the adjustment of U.S.-Japanese relations I was convinced that no one was more suitable for the post as the Admiral who understood the U.S. well and was also an intimate friend of President Roosevelt and so in early October, I also sent the Vice-Minister for the Navy, Vice Admiral Toyoda to persuade him to accept it and finally succeeded in doing so. I also requested, both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister to commence early adjustment of U.S. Japanese relations at various opportunities.

3. The definite plan which passed the Imperial Conference of 2 July 1941 is exactly as stated in Evidence No. 588. Prior to it, after the German-Soviet War began, studies were made by the Ministry, Army Ministry and Foreign Ministry etc., starting around the 22nd or 23rd of June, with a view to determine our attitude in dealing with international situations. The original plan was approved by the Liaison Conference around June and I do not remember the exact date but it was informally represented.
DEW. DOC. 41664

(reported) to the Emperor by the Prime Minister, Chief of Army General Staff and Chief of Naval General Staff.

On 2 July of the same year, an Imperial Conference was held.

Those present were, Prime Minister Fino, Chairman of the Privy Council Hara, Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama, Vice-Chief of General Staff Tsuda, Chief of Naval General Staff Nagaya, Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff Koda, Home Minister Hiruma, Finance Minister Kanasaki, President of the Planning Board Suzuki, War Minister Traj, Foreign Minister Matsukura, and Naval Minister, etc. The order of the conference began with Prime Minister Fino reading the general outline (contents) of the plan. Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama and Chief of Naval General Staff Nagaya explained the important points, after which the Chairman of the Privy Council asked a question to the following effect.

"What are the prospects of evoking a war with the U.S. and Britain?" To which Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama replied as follows. "We shall carry out the dispatching of troops to Southern French Indo-China under sufficient understanding with the French Indo-China authorities and every effort shall be made to avert any incitement with the U.S. and Britain. However, if by chance we are challenged we must be prepared to meet it. By the term, "willing to fight the U.S. and Britain," is meant preparedness for war and not resolution to begin war."
4. The decision passed by the Imperial Conference of 
6 September, I remember to be the same, in general, as stated 
in Evidence 588 tendered by the Prosecution. The Imperial 
Conference was held on 6 September at the Imperial Palace, 
the same as before. Explanations on the plan were made by the 
Prime Minister, Chief of Army General Staff and Chief of Naval 
General Staff. Following which I think there was also an 
Explanation by the Foreign Minister. It was then when Chairman 
of the Privy Council Mori asked a question to the Government 
and Supreme Command to the effect that, "according to the 
way this plan is written, it mentions the preparations for war 
before the policy of striving through diplomatic channels, 
but what is the relation between the two?" Towards this 
query I answered, "The main objective of this plan is to 
accomplish our demands through diplomatic measures." Whereas 
the Emperor pressed the Supreme Command to make an explanation, 
Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano replied, "The Supreme 
Command is of the same opinion as the Government." At this 
conference the Emperor quoted Emperor Meiji's poem which 
impressed us deeply. The Imperial poem ran like this, "In this 
world where we dwell the seven seas as brother, why rage there 
the warring waves."

5. In early August 1941 when we were told from Prince Kenzo 
about intentions of a direct conference with President 
Roosevelt we attached great expectations to it. The Navy
roquisitioned the merchant ship Nitta Maru for that purpose
and completed all preparations. I had in my mind Admiral
Yamamoto and Vice Admiral Keijun Oka as Naval attendant
and place Admiral Hinoichi Koga as the Command-in-Chief of
the Combined Fleet. I had also gained the informal consent of
Admiral Yamamoto.

6. Even after October came, U.S. Japanese negotiations made
no progress which we had expected and according to the
"Outlines On Accomplishment of the Empire's National Policy,"
which was approved at the Imperial Conference of 6 September
we had to decide our attitude in view of U.S. Japanese negota-
tions. Needless to say the Navy did all it could to avoid
war with the U.S. And this sentiment (Opinions) among the
naval circles was communicated to Premier Konoe. In amidst
such circumstances, the reasons for entrusting its decision
to the Prime Minister was because we considered the followings:

a) It is a well known fact that hitherto the internal
strong-minded elements had been criticizing the Navy's
attitude as being effeminate. Therefore, if the Navy
made a public announcement that it "lacked confidence
in fighting the U.S.," it would lead to (create) the
disruption of national opinions, cause the pitting of
Army against the Navy and consequently develop into a
grope internal problem.
b) As a result of the above controversy the Chugking Regime which was dependent upon the U.S. and British support, would take advantage and aggravate their spirit of resistance and the settlement of the China Incident would become hopeless. Moreover, conditions for U.S. Japanese negotiations would be all the more disadvantageous, and together with it our internal public opinion will further grow serious and there was fear of all hopes for an amicable settlement being lost.

c) As the Prime Minister too was of exactly the same opinion as the Navy, and this problem, moreover, had an important bearing on the overall national strength and hence should not be dogmatically concluded solely on the basis of the Navy’s standpoint, I also took into consideration the circumstances set forth in the preceding paragraph and proposed to leave the decision on this matter to the Prime Minister.

On this 23rd day of May, 1947
At Tokyo

Deponent: OIKAWA, Roshiro (seal)

I, TAKAHASHI, Yoshitsugu hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date
At Sawo Place

Witness: (signed) TAKAHASHI, Yoshitsugu (seal)
In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the whole truth witholding nothing and adding nothing.

OIKAWA, Koshirc (soil)
参戦問題ノ自主的決定及日本国交調整ノニハ海軍トシテ最高重大

十六年三月松岡外相送欧ノ際＝ハ来日ガ未ヲ列挙ノ海軍中佐ヲ其ノ随員ニ加ハラシメ特ニ米

外国ノ注意ヲシメラル

米国ヲ懐ク理解シ且ノル＝ペルトニ大統領トモ親交ヲ図大将＝ニハ

大将ハノ次＝米国遠シテ交渉ヲ受託サレナカタノ。然シ日本国交調整ノ＝ニハ

外＝通 Holds 交渉ヲシテ後＝交渉ヲスヒ、

米国ハ＝懐ク理解シ且ノル＝ペルトニ大統領トモ親交ヲ図大将＝ニハ

大将ハノ次＝米国遠シテ交渉ヲ受託サレナカタノ。然シ日本国交調整ノ＝ニハ

米国ヲ懐ク理解シ且ノル＝ペルトニ大統領トモ親交ヲ図大将＝ニハ

大将ハノ次＝米国遠シテ交渉ヲ受託サレナカタノ。然シ日本国交調整ノ＝ニハ
昭和十六年八月、初頭近衛公ヨリルズベルト大統領ト直接會談

関係ハヨリ、日本政府ニ同意見デデリマシムト訂中上ゲタ。此ノ

総長ハヨリ、関係ノ意見ヲ催促サレタノデ、永野軍令部

会談ニ於テ陛下ハ明治天皇ノ御製ヲ朗読セレ。御制

御製ハ「よもの海みなはらから」と思ふ世になど波風のだから

むート言フノデアル。
昭和二十三年（一九四七年）五月二十三日於東京

右ハ當立會人ノ面前ニテ宣誓シ且ツ署名捺印シタルコトヲ謹明シ

供述者
及川古志郎

同日
於同所

立會人
高橋
次
良知従と奥蔵巡へ何事ヲモ武断サズ又何事ヲモ附加サズ
（署名）及川古志郎
Delete on page 5, lines four to line ten, the following sentence.

"Those present were, Prime Minister Hiranuma, Chairman of the Privy Council Ham, Chief of Army General Staff Sugiyama, Vice-Chief of General Staff Takada, Chief of Naval General Staff Nagano, Vice-Chief of Naval General Staff Kondo, Home Minister Hirana, Finance Minister Akiba, President of the Planning Board S uzuki, War Minister Tojo, Foreign Minister A utsuoka and Naval Minister, myself."
Japan has most willingly and earnestly participated in this great Conference. At the beginning of our labours, I am gratified to say on behalf of the Japanese Government that Japan stands ready to cooperate whole-heartedly with the other governments to bring the work of the Conference to a successful issue. We listened yesterday to the King’s gracious message which inspired and heartened us, and strengthened our conviction that the work of the Conference would succeed. In the President’s admirable opening address and speeches of the delegates who preceded me, we noticed the earnestness of their firm determination that the agonized and anxious world should not be disappointed.

By holding the Conference, we have burnt the bridge behind us, for we cannot fail however tremendous the task may be; failure will be a disaster and will surely bring about a worldwide economic collapse of untold magnitude.

With all energy and ingenuity at our command, we are bound to make the conference a success. We are here to combat the economic depression which has spread worldwide like a huge tidal-wave and engulfed both east and west. Its gravity is unexampled in history, its causes are deep-rooted and complicated, but diagnosis has been amply made. Especially since the decision of Lausanne a year ago to convene the present gathering, thoroughgoing study and careful preparations have been made. Recent conversations between several governments at Washington must have paved the way to a solution.

Without courageous decisions and actions at this critical juncture, it is greatly to be feared that the difficulties will fast become intensified and go beyond the limits of human control. I strongly opine that the essential thing to do first is to single out the most vital and urgent problems and to devote our energy to their adequate solution. In my view; the problems connected with the currency and credit policy, the reduction of tariffs, and the abolition or mitigation of barriers to world trade preeminently demand the most serious attention. The question of raising price-levels should also be carefully considered. I am not attempting now a detailed discussion hereon, but I feel it important to point out that in approaching the problems, distinction should be drawn between the steps to be adopted immediately and the measures of more permanent nature.

**Currency Credit Problems:**

Great importance is naturally attached to the restoration of the gold standard. Japan earnestly desires to cooperate in bringing about the conditions favourable to its eventual realization. Such task naturally involves extensive, thorough, preparatory measures internally and internationally,
while particular consideration should be given to the economic and financial conditions of individual countries. It is one of those measures which have to be considered in terms of permanency. Undue haste is dangerous, for if a breakdown occurs again, the consequences would be most appalling.

The Japanese Government are further prepared to consider appropriate measures for the obviation of exchange fluctuations as an interim step pending the final return of the gold standard. The Japanese Government also concur with the view that under the present circumstances, the policy of cheap money and free credit should be pursued internationally and to a certain degree. In view of her trade connections with silver using countries, Japan gives due consideration to the proposals for an appropriate solution of the silver problem. The Japanese Government places great emphasis on the elimination or mitigation of trade barriers and sincerely hope that as an immediate result of the Conference, a definite and efficacious arrangement will be made to lower tariff walls and abolish to a reasonable degree the existing restrictions of foreign trade.

The Japanese Delegation entirely agree with the importance of instituting a tariff truce or arranging for non-increase of trade barriers over a certain period as provisional measures pending the solution of fundamental problems above enumerated, and are prepared to offer hearty cooperation herein. Since the salient feature of the economic depression is the tendency towards increased discrimination against foreign goods in commercial intercourse among nations, and since economic development largely depends upon free interchange of world commodities on the basis of equality, it is most desirable that there should be an unrestricted application of the most-favoured nation clause which has contributed so much activity to the world trade in the past.

It is further necessary not to lose sight of the fact that there can be no political peace without economic peace. All economic measures that might constitute a disturbing factor in political peace should accordingly be strongly denounced.

In conclusion, I wish to reiterate on behalf of the Japanese Delegation, that Japan is firmly resolved to do all in its power to cooperate with all powers participating in this Conference to ensure that the deliberations shall be crowned with success and all humanity may be relieved of the nightmare of the economic depression under which it is actually suffering.
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, URATA, Tatsuya, assistant Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached in English consisting of five (5) pages and entitled "The Address of Count Ishii at the Plenary Meeting on Tuesday, June 13th, 1933" (made in representing Japan in the Monetary and Economic Conference held in London in 1933) is an exact and true copy of an official document of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 23rd day of May, 1947.

/s/ E. URATA
Signature of Official

Witness: /s/ T. SATO
本政権は後述の課題について、我が国政府が、日本政府の主導による、外国を対象にした、目標達成のための、測定的な取り組みを推進する。また、日本政府は、通商障壁の除去を、重要視して、国際的な、貿易を、促進する。
いところが必要である。従って政治的平和醜事の要因を構成するものである
一切の財政的問題は所詮の排拒しなければならない。最後に余は日本
本代表部を代表し日本は経済的に於ける利益を有するため、国際
議会参加の欠席の成果を有するものであることを願わせとし、
に言明せんとして欲するものである。
Excerpts from the text of an address prepared for delivery by The Right Honorable Winston Churchill, M.P., at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, Tuesday, March 5, 1946

"I now come to the second danger which threatens the cottage home and ordinary people, namely Tyranny. We cannot be blind to the fact that the liberties enjoyed by individual citizens throughout the United States and the British Empire are not valid in a considerable number of countries, some of which are very powerful. In these States, control is enforced upon the common people by various kinds of all-embracing police governments, to a degree which is overwhelming and contrary to every principle of democracy. The power of the State is exercised without restraint, either by dictators or by compact interest groups operating through a privileged party and a political police. It is not our duty at this time, when difficulties are so numerous to interfere forcibly in the internal affairs of countries whom we have not conquered in war. But we must never cease to proclaim in fearless tones the great principles of freedom and the rights of men, which are the joint inheritance of the English-speaking world and which, through Magna Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Habeas Corpus, Trial by Jury and the English Common Law, find their most famous expression in the Declaration of Independence.

A shadow has fallen upon the scenes so lately lighted by the Allied Victory. Nobody knows what Soviet Russia and its Communist International organization intends to do in the immediate future, or what are the limits if any to their expansive and proselytizing tendencies. I have a strong admiration and regard for the valiant Russian people and for my wartime comrade, Marshal Stalin. There is sympathy and goodwill in Britain - and I doubt not here also - towards the peoples of all the Russias and a resolve to persevere through many differences and rebuffs in establishing lasting friendships. We understand the Russian need to be secure on her Western frontiers from all renewal of German aggression. We welcome her to her rightful place among the leading nations of the world. Above all we welcome constant, frequent and growing contacts between the Russian people and our own people on both sides of the Atlantic. It is my duty, however, to place before you certain facts about the present position in Europe.

From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in the Soviet sphere and all are subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high and increasing measure of control from Moscow. Athens alone, with its immortal glories, is free to decide its future at an election under British, American and French observation. The Russian-dominated Polish Government has been encouraged to make enormous and wrongful inroads upon Germany, and mass expulsions of millions of Germans on a scale grievous and undeserved-of are now taking place. The Communist parties, which were very small in all these Eastern States of Europe, have been raised to pre-eminence and power far beyond their numbers and are seeking everywhere to obtain totalitarian control.
Def. Doc. No. 1669

Police governments are prevailing in nearly every case, and so far, except in Czechoslovakia, there is no true democracy. Turkey and Persia are both profoundly alarmed and disturbed at the claims which are made upon them and at the pressure being exerted by the Moscow Government. An attempt is being made by the Russians in Berlin to build up a quasi-Communist party in their zone of Occupied Germany by showing special favors to groups of left-wing German leaders. At the end of the fighting last June, the American and British Armies withdrew westwards, in accordance with an earlier agreement, to a depth at some points of 150 miles on a front of nearly 400 miles to allow the Russians to occupy this vast expanse of territory which the Western Democracies had conquered. If now the Soviet Government tries, by separate action, to build up a pre-Communist Germany in their areas, this will cause new serious difficulties in the British and American zones, and will give the defeated Germans the power of putting themselves up to auction between the Soviets and the Western Democracies. Whatever conclusions may be drawn from these facts—and facts they are—this is certainly not the Liberated Europe we fought to build up. Nor is it one which contains the essentials of permanent peace.

"In front of the iron curtain which lies across Europe are other causes for anxiety. In Italy the Communist party is seriously hampered by having to support the Communist-trained Marshal Tito's claims to former Italian territory at the head of the Adriatic. Nevertheless the future of Italy hangs in the balance. Again one cannot imagine a regenerated Europe without a strong France. All my public life I have worked for a strong France and I never lost faith in her destiny, even in the darkest hours. I will not lose faith now. However, in a great number of countries, far from the Russian frontiers and throughout the world, Communist fifth columns are established and work in complete unity and absolute obedience to the directions they receive from the Communist centre. Except in the British Commonwealth and in the United States, where Communism is in its infancy, the Communist parties or fifth columns constitute a growing challenge and peril to Christian civilization. These are sombre facts for anyone to have to recite on the morrow of a victory gained by so much splendid comradeship in arms and in the cause of freedom and democracy, and we should be most unwise not to face them squarely while time remains.

"The outlook is also anxious in the Far East and especially in Manchuria. The Agreement which was made at Yalta, to which I was a party, was extremely favorable to Soviet Russia, but it was made at a time when no one could say that the German war might not extend all through the summer and autumn of 1945 and when the Japanese war was expected to last for a further eighteen months from when the Japanese war was expected to last for a further eighteen months from the end of the German war. In this country you are all so well-informed about the Far East, and such devoted friends of China, that I do not need to expatiate on the situation there.

"I have felt bound to portray the shadow which, alike in the west and in the east, falls upon the world. I was a Minister at the time of the Versailles Treaty and a close friend of Mr. Lloyd George. I did not myself agree with many things that were done, but I have a very strong impression in my mind of that situation, and I find it painful to contrast it with that which prevails now.
In those days, there were high hopes and unbounded confidence that the wars were over, and that the League of Nations would become all-powerful. I do not see or feel the same confidence or even the same hopes in the haggard world at this time.

"On the other hand, I repulse the idea that a new war is inevitable; still more that it is imminent. It is because I am sure that our fortunes are in our own hands and that we hold the power to save the future, that I feel the duty to speak out now that I have an occasion to do so. I do not believe that Soviet Russia desires war. What they desire is the fruits of war and the indefinite expansion of their power and doctrines. But what we have to consider here today, while time remains, is the permanent prevention of war and the establishment of conditions of freedom and democracy as rapidly as possible in all countries. Our difficulties and dangers will not be removed by closing our eyes to them. They will not be removed by mere waiting to see what happens; nor will they be relieved by a policy of appeasement. That is needed is a settlement, and the longer this is delayed, the more difficult it will be and the greater our dangers will become. From what I have seen of our Russian friends and Allies during the war, I am convinced that there is nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing for which they have less respect than for military weakness. For that reason the old doctrine of a balance of power is unsound. We cannot afford, if we can help it, to work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of strength. If we Western Democracies stand together in strict adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter, their influence for furthering those principles will be immense and no one is likely to molest them. If however they become divided or falter in their duty, and if these all-important years are allowed to slip away, then indeed catastrophe may overwhelm us all.

"Last time I saw it all coming and cried aloud to my own fellow-countrymen and to the world, but no one paid any attention. Up till the year 1933 or even 1935, Germany might have been saved from the awful fate which has overtaken her and we might all have been spared the miseries Hitler let loose upon mankind. There never was a war in all history easier to prevent by timely action than the one which has just desolated such great areas of the globe. It could have been prevented without the firing of a single shot, and Germany might be powerful, prosperous and honored today, but no one would listen and one by one we were all sucked into the awful whirlpool. We surely must not let that happen again."
この場合は明らかに人々が抵抗するために対立した結果ヨーロッパでは

この公の生活を通じて流れるフランスを取扱うに当たって東に道に
に合流する結果でもフランスの遠隔心を修復して霊的な力も失ったことには

の下に西洋列車のから受ける命令に従い風発して沿岸して捉えられて英連立

が未来の納税を本邦から受ける命令に従い風発して沿岸して捉えられた英連立

では英連立の面からいくつかの

が未来の納税を本邦から受ける命令に従い風発して沿岸して捉えられた英連立

では英連立の面からいくつかの

が未来の納税を本邦から受ける命令に従い風発して沿岸して捉えられた英連立

では英連立の面からいくつかの

が未来の納税を本邦から受ける命令に従い風発して沿岸して捉えられた英連立

では英連立の面からいくつかの

が未来の納税を本邦から受ける命令に従い風発して沿岸して捉えられた英連立

では英連立の面からいくつかの

が未来の納税を本邦から受ける命令に従い風発して沿岸して捉えられた英連立

では英連立の面からいくつかの
長の目覚であった。私自身は信じられた多くの貴重な人物を敬愛し、非常に高い価値を置いていたが、彼の心を傷めるものがなく、彼の信頼に聞き入れて倒り撃退の際乗と誇る。
その頃人々は戦争がすっかり終わり、国際連盟は絶対的な力を持つに至るであろう。私たちは新しい戦争が必ずおすすめというふうに考え、世界中の右と同じような信頼、又は単なる相談のみを習慣するか否かについての議論をした。私は簡単な戦争をしたがついている。私がの故にまた戦争をしたがついている。私はこのように堂々たる戦争をしたがついている。私はこのように堂々たる戦争をしたがついている。
לפיון בלוק א.ג.ג. מס' 1660

-purple text

-Dark blue text
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Export 1939</th>
<th>Export 1934</th>
<th>Export 1937</th>
<th>Export 1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>9,179,756</td>
<td>8,216,013</td>
<td>7,264,076</td>
<td>6,307,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2,308,255</td>
<td>4,166,725</td>
<td>3,155,415</td>
<td>2,592,476</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria</td>
<td>535,931</td>
<td>310,733</td>
<td>216,092</td>
<td>150,595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>432,797</td>
<td>322,920</td>
<td>174,251</td>
<td>131,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangtung Province</td>
<td>733,743</td>
<td>356,217</td>
<td>355,716</td>
<td>317,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanghai</td>
<td>30,579</td>
<td>47,150</td>
<td>59,430</td>
<td>50,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British India</td>
<td>8,711</td>
<td>5,452</td>
<td>4,952</td>
<td>4,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Straits Settlements</td>
<td>5,719</td>
<td>4,356</td>
<td>3,711</td>
<td>4,463</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Dom.</td>
<td>239,256</td>
<td>212,013</td>
<td>236,473</td>
<td>237,711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherland Ind.</td>
<td>128,036</td>
<td>134,910</td>
<td>169,297</td>
<td>170,309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Indo-China</td>
<td>1,711</td>
<td>1,856</td>
<td>1,921</td>
<td>2,047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laos, Territory of U.S. N. H.</td>
<td>4,485</td>
<td>4,561</td>
<td>8,901</td>
<td>6,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine Isls.</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siam</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>432</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A.C.F.</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>1,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>208,577</td>
<td>200,431</td>
<td>205,427</td>
<td>214,911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>701</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>2,370</td>
<td>235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czecho-Slovakia</td>
<td>9,314</td>
<td>8,277</td>
<td>11,545</td>
<td>10,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherland Ind.</td>
<td>11,766</td>
<td>11,471</td>
<td>13,440</td>
<td>13,335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>4,685</td>
<td>4,561</td>
<td>8,901</td>
<td>6,717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>4,137</td>
<td>3,357</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Russia</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>2,753</td>
<td>4,293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2,252</td>
<td>2,252</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>1,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>2,252</td>
<td>2,252</td>
<td>1,579</td>
<td>1,412</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>29,288</td>
<td>27,060</td>
<td>17,848</td>
<td>15,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>702,336</td>
<td>565,813</td>
<td>711,136</td>
<td>650,093</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>641,509</td>
<td>475,123</td>
<td>631,128</td>
<td>541,292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>17,235</td>
<td>15,216</td>
<td>20,043</td>
<td>14,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>7,940</td>
<td>5,837</td>
<td>13,622</td>
<td>7,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Lat. American States</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td>2,013</td>
<td>1,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>34,285</td>
<td>25,766</td>
<td>39,337</td>
<td>32,608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>673,111</td>
<td>660,151</td>
<td>695,519</td>
<td>687,761</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>6,646</td>
<td>5,760</td>
<td>6,334</td>
<td>6,126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>16,310</td>
<td>16,209</td>
<td>10,712</td>
<td>7,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>4,152</td>
<td>16,563</td>
<td>42,431</td>
<td>27,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>15,639</td>
<td>13,333</td>
<td>17,305</td>
<td>3,348</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>3,271</td>
<td>2,988</td>
<td>10,107</td>
<td>7,891</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>19,415</td>
<td>14,278</td>
<td>22,541</td>
<td>15,735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>152,999</td>
<td>137,746</td>
<td>212,736</td>
<td>197,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>10,666</td>
<td>13,997</td>
<td>32,772</td>
<td>40,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union of South African States</td>
<td>16,482</td>
<td>35,639</td>
<td>53,749</td>
<td>41,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya, Uganda and Nyasaland</td>
<td>22,374</td>
<td>22,594</td>
<td>40,122</td>
<td>27,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>67,567</td>
<td>55,456</td>
<td>116,094</td>
<td>88,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sub-total</td>
<td>25,949</td>
<td>36,610</td>
<td>106,145</td>
<td>97,727</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>72,101</td>
<td>69,363</td>
<td>72,010</td>
<td>68,763</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>12,277</td>
<td>14,306</td>
<td>19,358</td>
<td>16,710</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>4,627</td>
<td>2,774</td>
<td>11,315</td>
<td>9,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2,138</td>
<td>2,559</td>
<td>3,972</td>
<td>2,924</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excerpt from Japan Statistic Year book 59th session.*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Import</th>
<th>Export</th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>2,017,666</td>
<td>2,128</td>
<td>954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1918</td>
<td>1,111,001</td>
<td>1,023,522</td>
<td>7,168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>1,912.114</td>
<td>1,825</td>
<td>4,929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2,334</td>
<td>2,214</td>
<td>10.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>191,002</td>
<td>193,333</td>
<td>133,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>222,129</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>218,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>212,190</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>218,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>218,817</td>
<td>10.587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>218,817</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>212,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>218,817</td>
<td>193,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>212,190</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>218,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1928</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>218,817</td>
<td>193,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>218,817</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>212,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>212,190</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>218,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>218,817</td>
<td>193,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>218,817</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>212,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>212,190</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>218,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>218,817</td>
<td>193,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>218,817</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>212,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>212,190</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>218,817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>218,817</td>
<td>193,333</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of The Chief of General Affairs, Statistic Bureau, Premiers Office, hereby certify that the document here attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 246 pages and entitled "The 59 Session of the Imperial Japanese Statistics in 1940 (Showa 15th)" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (The Statistic Office of the Cabinet).

certified at Tokyo,
on his 9 day of May. 1947

NASU, Tokio (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,
on the same date

Witness: ISHIDA, Masahisa (seal)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>国名</th>
<th>地</th>
<th>内</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>千円</td>
<td>千円</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>総数</td>
<td>3,576,370</td>
<td>2,689,677</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>総商</td>
<td>2,320,865</td>
<td>1,664,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>大西洋</td>
<td>535,681</td>
<td>316,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中国</td>
<td>455,479</td>
<td>312,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>關東州</td>
<td>755,943</td>
<td>536,317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>香港</td>
<td>30,573</td>
<td>16,754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>萬里物資</td>
<td>210,995</td>
<td>138,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>海外輸出地</td>
<td>20,126</td>
<td>20,696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>萬里物資</td>
<td>959</td>
<td>950</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>関東州</td>
<td>137,502</td>
<td>104,145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>関東州</td>
<td>1,981</td>
<td>3,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>関東州</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>4,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>関東州</td>
<td>21,744</td>
<td>32,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>関東州</td>
<td>26,024</td>
<td>39,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>アセ</td>
<td>10,002</td>
<td>8,534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>其他</td>
<td>109,352</td>
<td>80,401</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

合計 | 3,576,370 | 2,689,677 | 3,175,413 | 2,692,976 | 2,499,073 | 1,304,433 |

Note: The table contains data in Japanese currency, with values rounded to the nearest thousand. The header row indicates the currency unit as 千円 (thousand yen).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年代</th>
<th>0.0</th>
<th>0.5</th>
<th>1.0</th>
<th>1.5</th>
<th>2.0</th>
<th>2.5</th>
<th>3.0</th>
<th>3.5</th>
<th>4.0</th>
<th>4.5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2*1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2*2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>399.6</td>
<td>505.9</td>
<td>512.2</td>
<td>518.5</td>
<td>524.8</td>
<td>531.1</td>
<td>537.4</td>
<td>543.7</td>
<td>550.0</td>
<td>556.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.9</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>28.1</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>12.1</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>29.4</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>29.8</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>30.2</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>31.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.2</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>31.8</td>
<td>32.0</td>
<td>32.2</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>32.6</td>
<td>32.8</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>33.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>33.8</td>
<td>34.0</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>35.2</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35.8</td>
<td>36.0</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>36.4</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>37.4</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>国家/地区</td>
<td>数量</td>
<td>数量</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>英吉利</td>
<td>132,086</td>
<td>134,972</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>佛蘭西</td>
<td>25,934</td>
<td>36,814</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>独立</td>
<td>24,991</td>
<td>33,015</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>陸</td>
<td>10,476</td>
<td>10,151</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>伊太利</td>
<td>5,719</td>
<td>3,256</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>西古</td>
<td>3,197</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>奧地利</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>419</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>葡萄牙</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>471</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>瑞典</td>
<td>11,706</td>
<td>11,471</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>諾威</td>
<td>9,314</td>
<td>3,277</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>露西亞</td>
<td>4,483</td>
<td>4,561</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>俄羅斯</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>470</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>波蘭</td>
<td>494</td>
<td>948</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>西保加</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>丁佛</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>1,361</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>陀羅科</td>
<td>876</td>
<td>2,659</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>波托根</td>
<td>1,252</td>
<td>1,225</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>其他</td>
<td>5,827</td>
<td>9,737</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>356,298</td>
<td>307,718</td>
<td>262,705</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>163,297</td>
<td>147,309</td>
<td>119,458</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47,208</td>
<td>43,475</td>
<td>42,468</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43,261</td>
<td>35,054</td>
<td>26,766</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20,650</td>
<td>16,230</td>
<td>15,393</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,111</td>
<td>4,468</td>
<td>6,989</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,149</td>
<td>839</td>
<td>471</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>741</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>308</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,370</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,440</td>
<td>15,385</td>
<td>18,316</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,545</td>
<td>8,321</td>
<td>6,795</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8,901</td>
<td>6,172</td>
<td>4,482</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,357</td>
<td>3,357</td>
<td>2,138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,160</td>
<td>715</td>
<td>955</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>1,371</td>
<td>3,546</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,399</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td>1,430</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,753</td>
<td>4,293</td>
<td>3,241</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,519</td>
<td>1,412</td>
<td>1,062</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14,137</td>
<td>11,858</td>
<td>8,389</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>309,935</td>
<td>376,266</td>
<td>504,002</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24,426</td>
<td>63,157</td>
<td>105,772</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14,264</td>
<td>13,502</td>
<td>27,385</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141,003</td>
<td>171,170</td>
<td>176,363</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19,028</td>
<td>15,441</td>
<td>41,059</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,062</td>
<td>5,843</td>
<td>4,416</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16,656</td>
<td>30,198</td>
<td>19,239</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25,259</td>
<td>10,271</td>
<td>9,104</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,637</td>
<td>3,413</td>
<td>5,508</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,621</td>
<td>3,033</td>
<td>7,030</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26,277</td>
<td>24,069</td>
<td>49,277</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21,869</td>
<td>15,719</td>
<td>24,033</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>201</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>9,642</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,447</td>
<td>2,671</td>
<td>4,640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,890</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>2,432</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,334</td>
<td>1,232</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,018</td>
<td>3,712</td>
<td>2,818</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,241</td>
<td>1,365</td>
<td>2,429</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,597</td>
<td>9,074</td>
<td>10,905</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72,942</td>
<td>352,276</td>
<td>.666</td>
<td>106,2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19,898</td>
<td>82,160</td>
<td>36.9</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>115,500</td>
<td>19,798</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16,019</td>
<td>120,828</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,766</td>
<td>24,562</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14,000</td>
<td>.5,832</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,263</td>
<td>13,456</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,292</td>
<td>4,409</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,929</td>
<td>2,331</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,556</td>
<td>5,873</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23,109</td>
<td>23,109</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>9.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17,853</td>
<td>19,941</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14,526</td>
<td>14,503</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,824</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,147</td>
<td>4,548</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>787</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4,475</td>
<td>1,036</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,680</td>
<td>1,474</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,350</td>
<td>6,641</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,131,396</td>
<td>1,013,932</td>
<td>1,393,017</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,002,384</td>
<td>915,354</td>
<td>1,269,542</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>126,022</td>
<td>91,250</td>
<td>104,692</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>4,518</td>
<td>14,262</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>810</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>601</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1,114</td>
<td>2,752</td>
<td>3,920</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>115,730</td>
<td>91,235</td>
<td>162,611</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6,256</td>
<td>1,975</td>
<td>6,227</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10,239</td>
<td>11,152</td>
<td>14,719</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11,560</td>
<td>24,356</td>
<td>42,018</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>74,562</td>
<td>46,174</td>
<td>62,810</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3,398</td>
<td>4,158</td>
<td>33,926</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8,624</td>
<td>3,420</td>
<td>2,361</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

-3.4-
<p>| | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>942,575</td>
<td>370,217</td>
<td>196.4</td>
<td>387.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>847,490</td>
<td>309,645</td>
<td>179.4</td>
<td>343.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>73,179</td>
<td>52,531</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>43.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,680</td>
<td>6,444</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>401</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,824</td>
<td>1,192</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>112,190</td>
<td>42,908</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13,000</td>
<td>11,415</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,953</td>
<td>4,473</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29,939</td>
<td>16,371</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>47,352</td>
<td>4,006</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9,528</td>
<td>4,495</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,367</td>
<td>2,148</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>総額</td>
<td>152,909</td>
<td>137,336</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>アクレプト</td>
<td>15,666</td>
<td>13,997</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>南アフリカ</td>
<td>46,802</td>
<td>35,289</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ケニア、ウガンダ及タングアニー</td>
<td>22,874</td>
<td>22,504</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>其他</td>
<td>67,567</td>
<td>65,545</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>総額</td>
<td>95,443</td>
<td>96,610</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>大洋洲</td>
<td>72,101</td>
<td>69,388</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>新西蘭</td>
<td>12,277</td>
<td>14,808</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>南極洲</td>
<td>8,627</td>
<td>9,774</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>其他</td>
<td>2,438</td>
<td>2,639</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>搬入式（輸出ノミ）</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>保税工場</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Doc No. 1678

- 4 a -
<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>242,736</td>
<td>197,703</td>
<td>183,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32,772</td>
<td>40,907</td>
<td>53,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53,749</td>
<td>41,534</td>
<td>32,769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,122</td>
<td>27,060</td>
<td>22,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116,094</td>
<td>88,202</td>
<td>74,6238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>106,465</td>
<td>97,727</td>
<td>95,493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72,080</td>
<td>68,763</td>
<td>74,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19,358</td>
<td>16,740</td>
<td>11,305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11,155</td>
<td>9,299</td>
<td>7,242</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,872</td>
<td>2,924</td>
<td>2,153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92,738</td>
<td>60,621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50,312</td>
<td>36,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,249</td>
<td>9,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19,699</td>
<td>6,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13,528</td>
<td>8,728</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>86,317</td>
<td>97,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>71,023</td>
<td>82,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,395</td>
<td>10,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>184</td>
<td>896</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9,711</td>
<td>3,869</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>108,143</td>
<td>69,136</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45,737</td>
<td>51,305</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22,561</td>
<td>4,762</td>
<td>13.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29,155</td>
<td>2,603</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10,690</td>
<td>10,516</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210,498</td>
<td>248,917</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>181,914</td>
<td>235,128</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21,973</td>
<td>6,364</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270</td>
<td>287</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6,342</td>
<td>1,137</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18,361</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Increase of Population of Japan Since the First National Census of October 1, 1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population of Empire Proper</th>
<th>Births</th>
<th>Deaths</th>
<th>Natural Increase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>55,963,053</td>
<td>2,025,564</td>
<td>1,422,096</td>
<td>603,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>59,736,322</td>
<td>2,013,091</td>
<td>1,710,706</td>
<td>302,385</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>64,440,005</td>
<td>2,015,101</td>
<td>1,707,947</td>
<td>307,154</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>65,366,503</td>
<td>2,102,794</td>
<td>1,240,891</td>
<td>861,903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>66,296,000</td>
<td>2,132,742</td>
<td>1,175,344</td>
<td>957,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>67,233,600</td>
<td>2,131,255</td>
<td>1,193,937</td>
<td>937,318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>68,194,900</td>
<td>2,043,793</td>
<td>1,234,694</td>
<td>809,099</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>69,254,144</td>
<td>2,100,704</td>
<td>1,161,956</td>
<td>938,748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>70,255,200</td>
<td>2,101,969</td>
<td>1,230,378</td>
<td>871,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>71,222,200</td>
<td>2,130,794</td>
<td>1,207,899</td>
<td>922,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>72,222,700</td>
<td>1,923,321</td>
<td>1,259,305</td>
<td>664,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>72,875,900</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>73,114,309</td>
<td>32,111,793</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The National Census has been taken five times, quinquennially, since 1920. For intercensal years figures on population are estimates.
### 1920年10月1日 第一回国勢調査以後

於ケル人口増加

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年次</th>
<th>帝国人口</th>
<th>日本本土</th>
<th>海外</th>
<th>出産</th>
<th>日本本土</th>
<th>死亡</th>
<th>自然増加</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>55,963,053</td>
<td>21,025,326</td>
<td>2,025,564</td>
<td>1,422,096</td>
<td></td>
<td>603,468</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>59,736,822</td>
<td>23,720,107</td>
<td>2,086,051</td>
<td>1,210,706</td>
<td></td>
<td>875,805</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>64,450,005</td>
<td>28,526,038</td>
<td>2,085,101</td>
<td>1,170,867</td>
<td></td>
<td>914,234</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>65,366,500</td>
<td>25,354,311</td>
<td>2,102,784</td>
<td>1,240,891</td>
<td></td>
<td>861,893</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>66,296,000</td>
<td>27,230,234</td>
<td>2,182,782</td>
<td>1,175,344</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,007,398</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>67,238,600</td>
<td>27,641,765</td>
<td>2,121,253</td>
<td>1,193,687</td>
<td></td>
<td>927,266</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>68,194,900</td>
<td>28,281,415</td>
<td>2,083,783</td>
<td>1,234,684</td>
<td></td>
<td>809,099</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>69,254,148</td>
<td>28,843,107</td>
<td>2,190,704</td>
<td>1,161,936</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,028,768</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>70,258,200</td>
<td>27,821,464</td>
<td>2,101,969</td>
<td>1,230,378</td>
<td></td>
<td>871,591</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>71,252,800</td>
<td>29,602,604</td>
<td>2,180,734</td>
<td>1,207,899</td>
<td></td>
<td>772,835</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>72,222,700</td>
<td>30,066,765</td>
<td>1,928,321</td>
<td>1,259,805</td>
<td></td>
<td>668,516</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>72,875,800</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>73,114,308</td>
<td>32,111,793</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
<td>--</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 註

国勢調査ハ1920年以來五年毎ニ五℃行ケレタリ

次同調査迄ノ年間ノ人口数ハ推定ナリ
Excerpt from TOKYO RECORD, by Otto D. Tollstous, 1943, Reynal & Hitchcock, New York

About a dozen persons sat down to luncheon at Matsuoka's official residence. Most of them were members of the Foreign Office. Byers, Karl H. von Wiegand or the Hearst newspapers, who had just arrived from Shanghai, and myself were the only foreign guests. The residence, an old fashioned and almost dingy foreign-style house, was furnished in undistinguished Western bourgeois taste.

Matsuoka, brisk, self-confident and loquacious, was very much interested in the German situation and asked many questions regarding it. I told him about strict regimentation and rationing in Germany and remarked how much easing things appeared in Japan.

"Oh," he laughed, "you can't regiment the Japanese like you can the Germans." 1

February 19 (1941)

Put in a hutcheson, Matsuoka proposed that President Roosevelt should "advise" Chiang Kai-shek to enter into direct peace negotiations with Matsuoka, and should back up this "advice" with the threat of cutting off future American aid to Chiang-kuo. In return, Matsuoka hinted that he was prepared to give Chiang Kai-shek better peace terms than Wang Ching-wei had been able to obtain and he pledged himself in particular to get all Japanese troops out of China after peace was restored.

"Something must be done to stop this war," he declared. "The longer it lasts, the more it plays into the hands of the Bolshevists." 1

Japan, he suggested, was immune from Bolshevism, but he feared that it would continue to spread in China.

"I suppose that's the idea behind Japan's mediation offer yesterday," I suggested.

Matsuoka looked blank and protested that he did not know about any mediation offer. He thought there must be some misunderstanding somewhere. We could only smile.

"What about Wang Ching-wei?" he was asked.

"Wang Ching-wei," he replied, "as a patriot, and if necessary he will sacrifice himself for his country."

"I know Chiang Kai-shek," he continued, "and I have great respect for him. I know we can get to terms once we get talking about a settlement."
This was enlightening. Metsuoka realized that peace in China could come only through Chiang Kai-shek, and was willing to drop his puppet.

"What about the alliance with Germany and Italy?" I asked. "America feels very strongly about it."

Metsuoka looked up sharply. Then he said:

"I wrote that treaty myself and I conducted all the final negotiations with the Germans. I know just what the treaty means. And I can tell you that there is nothing in that treaty compelling Japan to go to war in the Pacific. I told the Germans so, and they accepted my interpretation. We'll decide for ourselves what we are going to do."

"Ah," I thought, "a proviso I did not know about."

"But will the Army agree?" I ventured to suggest.

Metsuoka played with his moustache:

"Well," he finally replied, "it's a question of personal trust. I am willing to stake my whole political career on this. If I should fail, I would withdraw from politics entirely. But if President Roosevelt would only trust me, I can guarantee that I will not fail."

His whole policy, he protested, was aimed at preserving peace. "That's why we excluded Russia from the operation of the Tripartite Pact," he said, "so as not to arouse apprehensions in Moscow. And that is why we are so anxious for the United States to stay out of the war."
私達は、

公事に従事する

職務において

必要とされる場合

と同日に

署名する

ものので

敬具

（署名）
「東京国の首都は何ですか。」「東京国の首都は東京です。」

「なぜ東京が首都ですか。」「東京が首都になったのは、東京国の都庁が東京に置かれているからです。」

「東京国の首都が東京になったのはいつですか。」「東京国の首都が東京になったのは、東京国の創設以来です。」

「東京国の首都が東京になった理由は何か。」「東京国の首都が東京になった理由は、東京国の政治、経済、文化の中心であるからです。」

「東京国の首都が東京になったときの歴史的な出来事は何でしたか。」「東京国の首都が東京になったときの歴史的な出来事は、東京国の創設と東京国の首都の決定でした。」

「東京国の首都が東京になった影響は何か。」「東京国の首都が東京になった影響は、東京国の政治、経済、文化の発展に寄与しました。」
Simultaneously, Matsuoka announced his immediate departure for Berlin and Rome, with a "probable" visit to Moscow. The purpose of his trip, said an official communiqué, was to "exchange personal salutations with and meet the leaders of Germany and Italy in connection with the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact," and to "make personal observations of the European situation on the spot." But the important nature of the trip was emphasized by a liaison conference between the Government and the Imperial Headquarters on the whole international situation. And my guess, put down in a week-end dispatch on the trip, was that Matsuoka's visit to Moscow, where Japan was trying to get a nonaggression pact to protect her flank, provided "one of the most important clues to the significance of the trip."

For seventy-two hours earlier the American Congress had passed the Lend-Lease Act, and in the Japanese view, as expressed in the press, this bill "heralded America's appearance in the role of a formidable naval, air, and military power in the Pacific, collaborating with Great Britain to obstruct Axis plans for a new world order." No, the crisis was not over; but the fires were banked for the moment.
第五九頁

一九四一年昭和十六年三月十一日

一九四三年昭和十八年

同時に松岡はベルリンとローマへ、そして「多分モスコ－をも訪問

すべく直ちに出発する旨発表した。公報に依れば彼の旅行の目的は三国
同盟の締結に関連して到達及びイタリアの首脳者と面会して個人的な交渉
申し右旅行の重要性は国際情勢全般に関する政府大本営連絡会議に依っ
て強調された。そして私の推測したところでは、旅行に関する週末の経
験について最も重要な手掛りの一つを與えたのである。

これより七十二時間前に米園議会は武器賞與法を可決してゐた。そし
With a great blare of publicity, Matsuoka departed on his trip to Europe last night. Before leaving, he was received by the Emperor and Empress. Konoye and his Cabinet were at the station shouting "Tanzai!" as the train pulled out. Symbolically enough, it was stated in the press that Matsuoka carried the same cane with him he had used in Geneva when he took Japan out of the League of Nations.

But many Japanese watched him go with mingled feelings. The Asahi credited him with pursuing a "virile diplomacy", but warned him to exercise "great prudence and mature consideration", and under no circumstances to exceed the "Imperial wish and command for the restoration of peace" laid down in the Imperial Rescript about the Triple Alliance Pact. The equally conservative Chugai Shogyo warned that "prudence and caution" were called for, lest harm be done to Japan. Considering what had happened to other countries whose statesmen had visited Berlin, I could understand the concern. And I was interested in noting that while Berlin announced that Matsuoka was coming in response to Hitler's invitation, there was no mention of such an invitation in Japan. On the contrary, the Japanese underlined that Matsuoka was acting on his own initiative, and that the trip had been planned at the conclusion of the Triple Alliance.
このページは現時点では読むことが困難です。
明日と同様緊張の fragrance である。外顔者も放任的にぶく書きなき
携帯草と用心を要すると警告を聴いてある。外国の政治家のペルリン訪問
によりその観流れに含んで生じた副摂を摘出しである。外国の政治家のペルリン訪問
によって日本を麂子に合せて生じた周術を裁きしてある。佩は松岡氏がヒットラーの
呪詛に反し日本側ではかかる詛術の呪詛に反し松岡の行動は三田同案詛結に際してすでに
計画されて来たものであると調度してある。
April 12, (1941)

The Japanese press published a remarkable interview with Konoye today. He said that Japan would continue to work with Germany and Italy to establish a new world order, but that Japan's aims were peaceful and economic, that "at present" she had no intention of using armed force against the southern countries, and that "for the present" he did not expect any events of a remarkable character. He declared:

"American-Japanese relations are not necessarily bad. So long as Japan is a member of the Axis and bears the burden of China, the United States must be expected to tighten its economic restrictions against Japan. But I think there will be a limit to such pressure. One of the aims of the Tripartite Pact (with Germany and Italy) is to prevent the United States from participating in the European war. If it doesn't understand this point, well... But we must induce the United States to understand it. Admiral Nomura is striving precisely to make this point understood."
没有有效的文本内容可以识别。
April 14, (1941)

Early this morning, Konoye announced to the nation that Japan and Russia had concluded a Neutrality Pact. They pledged themselves "to maintain peaceful and friendly relations between them and mutually respect their territorial integrity and inviolability. . . Should one of the Contracting Parties become the object of hostilities of one or several third Powers, the other Contracting Party will observe neutrality throughout the duration of the conflict." It did not matter which side attacked first, Japan could stay neutral in case of a Russo-German war. Russia further pledged herself to respect the territorial integrity of Manchukuo, thereby virtually recognizing it, and Japan agreed to the extension of Bolshevism in Asia by assuming a like pledge regarding Outer Mongolia's "People's Republic", which was virtually part of the Soviet Union.

"It is my firm belief", said Konoye, "that the pact has an epoch making significance in the relations between Japan and the Soviet Union, and that it will greatly contribute toward the promotion of world peace."

But I had to think of what a Russo-German pact had done to Europe. And the Pacific situation was similar. It looked so similar to me, and the Japanese reaction was such, that I wrote:

"Some of the Japanese interpretations of the pact are so sweeping that they hold the danger of inciting public opinion to a point where it may begin to force the Government's hand, and may tempt some of the more "dynamic" elements into precipitant action."

The entire press hailed the pact as a blow to the United States, and the Nichi Nichi bluntly declared that Japan could now avoid a two-front war; that is, fighting both the United States and Russia in case of a positive advance of her southward policy and a crisis in the Pacific.

But the press also represented the pact as a triumph of "Axis" diplomacy and welcomed Russia into the Axis camp. Russia, it argued, having recognized Japan's leadership in "Greater East Asia", was preparing to join in a new partition of the world and to stake out her own sphere of influence in Central Asia and the Near East. Was this genuine or disingenuous? I could not tell.

According to the Japanese press, Matsuoka's departure from Moscow produced a remarkable scene of German-Russian-Japanese fraternization. Stalin himself appeared at the railroad station and said to Matsuoka, "We shall go together along the same road."
Stalin was also very friendly with the German Ambassador, Herr von der Schulenburg, and put his arms around the German military attache, Colonel Krebs, saying, "We shall remain friends."

In any case, I wrote:

"Japan is now expected to start a great diplomatic offensive to end hostilities in China and push the establishment of a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere."

Her northern flank was secure.
第六、九七、九八頁

一九四一年（昭和十六年）四月十四日

現成近衛は日本とソビエトが中立条約を締結したことの重要性について、相互にその領土保全と不可侵性を尊重すべきを約束した。従って、二国は関国間の平和的相互関係を維持し、相互にその領土保全と不可侵性を尊重すべきを約束した。従って、二国は関国間の平和的相互関係を維持し、相互にその領土保全と不可侵性を尊重すべきを約束した。
短く、私には独自の条約が日ソ関係を象徴的に重要性を持つものであり、世界平和の促進に貢献するものである。と述べた。
日本の新興に依ると、松岡がモスクを除き、日本に対する敵意を示す国際的と内閣府の間で大佐を務め、ソビエトとドイツの大使、ウクライナの大使、リトアニアの大使、そしてロシアの大使が共にリリーフを示すと述べた。スターリンは、ソビエト連邦が日本に対し、大規模な軍事行為を示さないことを約束した。
Chapter XXXII

On the other hand, the Japanese did not trust the Germans any more than other foreigners. In fact, they had arrested one of the most prominent Axis correspondents, Richard Sorge of the Frankfurter Zeitung, a close personal friend of Ott's. The current report was that he was being accused of espionage for Soviet Russia, which sounded improbable. The version brought to me was that he was arrested with a group of some thirty Japanese activists whom he had contacted on orders from the Nazis to spur their efforts toward plunging Japan into the war on the side of Germany, which sounded more reasonable. But nobody knew for certain. And that was not exactly reassuring for any correspondent (Later, Ott's personal secretary was arrested as well.)
April 19, (1941)

I mentioned Kaneko's conversations with Theodore Roosevelt in the next week-end cable and then wrote:

"The records of these conversations, reposing in Japanese state archives, form to Japanese statesmen the legitimation of their present course, but in the Japanese view, a Monroe Doctrine implies that Japan can do as she pleases in the East. The program involves elimination of white domination in the East, or as the current slogan goes, "Liberation of the East from white capitalism." During the last war, Japan eliminated the German foothold in the East with the aid of the Allies. During this war, Japan hopes to eliminate the British and other European strongholds with the aid of Germany. If, after the war, and in case of victory, Germany should attempt to become heir to the European possessions in the East, Japan will turn against her as well. For the present, Japan is proceeding on the theory that Germany will win, and that as a result, the world will be divided into four or five regional blocs or Lebensräume: an Afro-European bloc under Germany and Italy; the Americas under the United States; a Soviet bloc, extending to Central Asia and the Near East; perhaps, if Britain makes a compromise peace, a British Empire bloc; and the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under the leadership of Japan."

Before I left, Kaneko promised to visit me at the Imperial Hotel. He never did. (He died May 16, 1942, aged eighty-nine).
排除した。今次大戦においては日本は、ドイツの援助により英圏他の欧州諸国の要塞を排除しようと望んで居る。もしもドイツが戦勝を得て戦後欧州諸国の要塞を排除しようと望んで居る。もしもドイツが戦勝を得て戦後欧州諸国の要塞を排除しようとは望んで居る。若しもドイツが戦勝を得て戦後欧州諸国の要塞を排除しようとは望んで居た。
CHAPTER IV
POPULATION AND EMIGRATION

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The population of Japan is characterized by a density and a rate of increase comparable to those of the highest in the world. Although there are no accurate data to verify the population of Japan prior to the Meiji Restoration (1868), the number of inhabitants is put in approximate figures at thirty millions. It is considered that in the preceding century or more the population had remained almost at a standstill. The prolific increase in population is therefore a phenomena of the past 70 years during which time the number of inhabitants has more than doubled. The rate of increase by decades is as follows: 1870-1880, 5%; 1880-1890, 7.6%; 1890-1900, 10%; 1900-1910, 12%; 1910-1920, 13%; 1920-1930, 15%. For the quinquennial period, 1930-1935, the rate of increase fell off to 6.4%. The annual growth in population was highest in 1932 at 1,007,398, but since then a gradual decline has been noted.

Race.—According to the investigations made during 1937 throughout the Empire and those residing abroad, the number of the Yamato race (the main strain of what is known as the Japanese race) aggregated 75,006,239, Chosenese 22,913,256, Taiwanese 5,261,518 (5,136,175 of Chinese origin, and 25,343 of the Takasago race or aborigines). Other minor races are
50,741 of the South Seas with 47,773 Kanakas and 3,605 Chamorros. The Ainu race which inhabits the Hokkaido and Karafuto districts numbered 16,519 and 1,333, respectively. Besides the Ainu race, there are the so-called Karafuto natives numbering 513, including 276 Orokes, Yakutsk, etc.

Population of the Whole Empire.--The population of the whole Empire of Japan as enumerated by the 1935 census is 97,697,555. Contrasted with the 1930 census, it shows an increase of 7,301,512, or 8.1%. As for the increase shown by Japan Proper and her colonies during the five years, Japan Proper is represented by 4,804,143 (7.4%), Korea by 1,840,733 (8.7%), Formosa by 619,881 (13.5%) and Karafuto by 36,747 (12.5%).

The leased territory of Kwantung Province accounts for 1,134,704, the South Manchuria Railway Zone for 522,689 and the mandated South Sea Islands for 102,537. Adding these figures to the population of the whole Empire given above, the total is 99,456,818.

Density of Population.--The average density of population of the Empire according to the 1935 census is 145. That of Japan Proper is 181, which makes Japan one of the most densely populated countries in the world coming next only to Holland, Belgium and England, as stated above. Contrasted with the two previous census, the number shows a gain of 12 and 25 respectively.
The density of population differs greatly according to prefectures. Tokyo Prefecture comes first with 2,970 per square km. (45,869 per square mi), followed by Osaka with 2,369 (36,544 per square mi). Kanagawa, Aichi, and Fukuoka Prefectures are each represented by 400 and upwards, Kanagawa and Saitama and other prefectures by 400 and upwards. The Hokkaido comes last with 35 per square km. 533 per square mi.

Table 1. Population of Japan Compared with Other Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Area (sq. km)</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Male (1,000)</th>
<th>Female (1,000)</th>
<th>Male Density (per sq. mi)</th>
<th>Female Density (per sq. mi)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>680,977</td>
<td>100,855</td>
<td>50,060</td>
<td>50,006</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>382,545</td>
<td>71,253</td>
<td>35,710</td>
<td>35,543</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7,704,126</td>
<td>30,506</td>
<td>11,120</td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>8,669,668</td>
<td>446,605</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>10,315,604</td>
<td>446,605</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>470,714</td>
<td>67,987</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>144</td>
<td>144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>34,759</td>
<td>8,640</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>273</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>4,684,457</td>
<td>352,838</td>
<td>181,829</td>
<td>171,009</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,303,143</td>
<td>42,919</td>
<td>21,068</td>
<td>21,851</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>7,859,347</td>
<td>122,257</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>21,267,714</td>
<td>165,748</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
日本の人口は、その密度と増加率が世界最高峰で、これに誇り高い地域に持てある。

明治五年（一八六八年）前後の日本、人口を増加は過去七十年間の現象である。特に、一九一五年に最高で百万七千三百九十八名であった。一九二五年に最高で百万七千三千五百名であったが、一九三五年に最高で百万七千九百八十四名であった。一九四五年に最高で百万七千七百四十八名であったが、一九五二年には百万七千九百八十四名に低下した。一九五六年に最高で百万七千九百八十四名に低下したが、一九五八年に最高で百万七千九百八十四名に低下した。
人口密度

日本の平均人口密度は一九三五年度の現勢調査によれば一四五

である。日本全土の平均人口密度は一八一で。これが真勢に比べた如く、

日本の現勢調査を比較すれば同数字は夫々二三及び二五の増

加を示しでる。
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Japan Proper</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>France</th>
<th>U.S.A.</th>
<th>Italy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Birth</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Birth</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Birth</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>Birth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>31.6</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>26.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>13.8</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. 填写日期 <口口日
2. 填写内容
Order from the British Exchequer to the London Branch Office of the YOKOHAMA Specie Bank.

In accordance to II (A) of the National Defense (Finance Regulations the Exchequer has the right to issue special orders prohibiting absolutely or within the limits stipulated in the special orders concerned, the carrying out of orders given by the persons designated below or their agencies, except when permission is given by the Exchequer or its agencies.

The designated persons arc:

(A) Countries designated, rulers and residents of the countries designated, and

(B) Juridical persons or bodies established by the laws of any of the designated countries or managed under the control or rule of any of the said countries, or juridical persons or bodies of the rulers or residents of the said countries.

To carry out orders "in behalf of" or "under the direction of" a person coming under the purview of any of the above-designated statuses and for the following is prohibited:

- 1 -
(1) To pay, to deal in gold, or in bills and bonds, and
(2) To make any changes which will credit any person
under the purview of the above designation with any sum
of money, whatever the amount, or, by which any gold or
bonds will be held in subservience to the orders of any
person above designated.

Accordingly, the Exchequer, in pursuance of the above-
mentioned right and other rights, notifies the London
Branch office of the YOKOHAMA Specie Bank that the said Branch
office is prohibited, except when permission is given accord-
ing to or accompanying this order, to carry out orders
"under the direction of" or "in behalf of" any of the
countries designated below, or rulers or residents of the
same, or juridical persons or bodies established by the laws
or managed under the control of the said countries, and
thereby violate 1 & 2, (A) II and particularly (B) of the
above-mentioned National Defense (Finance) Regulations.
The countries designated are the Japanese Empire (including
Japan Proper, Korea, Formosa, Kwangtung, and the South Seas
Mandated Islands), Manchuria and China. It is further
notified that the London Branch Office of the same Bank is
given inclusive permission for the following cases:
A. (a) Payment of checks
   (b) Acceptance of bills.

Drawn by any of the above-designated persons, on their
presentation by or in behalf of the persons receiving the so before July 27.

B. Acceptance of money to the account of any of the above-designated countries, individuals, juridical persons and bodies, and keeping of credit accounts for any of these persons.

However, transactions forbidden by the following laws, orders and regulations shall be prohibited as before.

(1) The Law of 1936 prohibiting transactions with enemy nationals.

(2) Orders based on the above law prohibiting transactions with enemy nationals.

(3) The rest of the National Defense (Finance) Regulations.
[Chinese text]

[Chinese text]

[Chinese text]

[Chinese text]
防府勅許可規則ノニニヲ基シテ大廈省ニ同省ニ依リテハ同省ニ代ハ
変則ヲ許可ヲ為セルトキヲ以テハ左記ヲ指占ノ仮止めヲ削却スヲ指定者ヲヨリシハ之ヲ
定セラレタル用度内ニ於テ禁止スル特別命令ヲ出シ得ル範囲ヲ有ス
ナル而シテ前記ニ該当スルモノノ為メテハ指図ヲ受ケ左記
Translated by
Defense Language Branch

(Announcement re freezing of Japanese funds)

Telegram of KAMIMURA, Japanese Charge d’affaires in England to
Foreign Minister TOYODA dated July 26, 1941.

No. 526

1. The British Government has announced a freezing order against this
country’s funds. (Refer to the Domei despatch). On 26th, an official
of the Exchequer called on KANO of the Yokohama Specie Bank and handed
him a communiqué concerning the above.

2. According to the Y.S.B., it is confirmed that the freezing order is con-
fined to the funds in England (including those possessed by branch
offices in England) owned by Japanese juridical persons and Japanese
residents in Japan (Manchuria and China included) and will not affect
those owned by Japanese residents in England nor will it be applied to
the funds belonging to the Embassy and the consulates are not affected
by this order and may be freely drawn.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, M. Katori, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives and Document Section, Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "(Announcement re freezing of Japanese funds) Telegram No. 526 of KUHSAWA, Japanese Chargé d'affaires in England to Foreign Minister TOYOY, dated July 26, 1941," is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government.

Certified at Tokyo,

On this 31st day of May, 1947

/S/ H. Katori (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: /S/ UBA, Katsuma (seal)
（本文献には掲載されません）

宮崎十七男

大本営長官

昭和17年8月23日

（本文献には掲載されません）
In accordance with national defense (financial) regulations, in Great Britain, on and after July 26, banks are prohibited from engaging in business transactions of gold and bonds connected with Japan without permission from the Exchequer. Relevant measures are being taken in the various areas of the British Empire.

Furthermore, it is reported that the Dutch Government in London keeping contact with the Dutch Government authorities in Batavia, are discussing plans for similar measures.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of the Chief of the Archives and Documents Section, Foreign Department, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 1 page and entitled "(Statement issued by the British Exchequer) July 26, 1941" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Foreign Department).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 31st day of May, 1947

HAYASHI, Kaoru
(Signed and seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were fixed hereto in the presence of the Witness,

at the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: URAGE, Katsuma
(Signed and seal)
文書ノ出所並＝成立＝照スル報告書

自分林ハ外務省文書課長ノ職ニ居ル者ナル故、

大蔵省公文書一昭和十六年七月二十六日ト題スル書類ヘ

本政府外務省ノ保管＝係ル公文書ノ正確＝シテ異質ナ

ルヲシナルコトヲ證明ス

昭和二十二年五月三十一日

同 日於東京

同所於同

立會人浦部勝

局
昭和十六年七月二十六日
（英国大藏省公表文）

日本ニ関係アル金及証労取引ヲ為スニ当リテハ大藏省ノ許可ヲ
合以外ハ之ヲ行フコトヲ禁止ス。英帯国ノ各地域ニ於テモ之レ

在議朝和政府ハ在バタヴィア政府当時ト聯絡ノ上此ノ

協調議中ノ速報ゼラル
NOTICE ABROGATING THE ANGLO-JAPANESE
COMMERCIAL TREATY AND ITS SUPPLEMENT.

Translation of the official note from Cragy, the British
Ambassador to Japan, to Foreign Minister TOYODA, July 29, 1941.

I informed you in my letter (No. 138) addressed to you as
of July 26 that the King of England and Emperor of the Dominions
and of India has the intention of abrogating the commerce and
navigation treaty entered into at London on April 3, 1911, the
agreement regarding commerce and trade signed between Japan
and India on July, 12, 1934 and that between Japan and Burma
on June 7, 1937.

Further I have the honor to inform you of His Majesty's
intention to abrogate the suplementary treaty to the Commerce
and Navigation Treaty of 1911 between Japan and Great Britain,
signed on July 30, 1925. Accordingly as provided in Article 8,
the said suplementary treaty will lose its effect as of today
upon the expiration of one year's term.

I take this opportunity to renew assurance to Your Excel-
lency of my highest consideration.

Respectfully yours
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, who occupy the post of the Archives Section of the Foreign Ministry hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages and entitled "Translation of the official note addressed by my, the British Ambassador to Japan, to his Excellency Foreign Minister TOYODA, July 29, 1941 (Notice of Unilateral Anglo-Japanese Commercial Agreement) is an exact and authentic excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (Foreign Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo,

on this 31st day of May, 1947

/S/ HAYASHI, Kaoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness, at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /S/ URABE, Katsumo (seal)
文書ノ出所証ニ成立ニ於スル電報

自分ノ、

警ハ外務省文書課支分ニ居ル者ナルヲ、

レタル日本語ヲハッテ電報カレニ、

実ナルヲシナルコトヲ、

昭和二十二年五月三十一日

於東京

林

同日

於同所

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和十六年七月十九日

於本邦一ノ

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和二十二年五月三十一日

於東京

林

同日

於同所

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和十六年七月十九日

於本邦一ノ

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和二十二年五月三十一日

於東京

林

同日

於同所

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和十六年七月十九日

於本邦一ノ

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和二十二年五月三十一日

於東京

林

同日

於同所

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和十六年七月十九日

於本邦一ノ

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和二十二年五月三十一日

於東京

林

同日

於同所

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和十六年七月十九日

於本邦一ノ

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和二十二年五月三十一日

於東京

林

同日

於同所

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和十六年七月十九日

於本邦一ノ

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和二十二年五月三十一日

於東京

林

同日

於同所

立會人

浦部

勝昌

白銅印ハ目分ノ前面ニ於テヲサレタリ

昭和十六年七月十九日

於本邦一ノ
FOREIGN NEWS

INTERNATIONAL

Milestone

Last week passed the second anniversary of Munich: Sept. 29, 1938.

Three Against the U. S.

The morning of Sept. 27, 1938 A.D., which corresponds to the 18th year of the Fascist Era and the 17th year of the reign of Japan's Emperor Hirohito, dawned clear and quiet in Berlin. There had been no air raid the night before. His Excellency Don Ramón Serrano Suñer, Spain's Minister of Government and Falangist Party Leader, had had a good night's sleep. Don Ramón, who had been a visitor in Berlin for nearly three weeks, had, as usual, very little to do. He took a stroll in the direction of the Chancellery, and on the way he ran into a platoon of plum-cheeked school children, each carrying three paper flags—German, Italian and Japanese. They were on their way to the Chancellery to welcome Italy's Foreign Minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano.

Don Ramón was not surprised to see the third night in a row that the children carried, but newspaper stories about the reign of Japan's Emperor Hirohito. He knew that it was merely another brick in the wall that leads to the offices of Adolf Hitler. A long table had been placed. Ambassador Kurusu sat there, as did Count Ciano and Herr von Ribbentrop. Before them on the table lay a thin document in triplicate.

At precisely 1:15 o'clock in the afternoon Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop screwed his signature at the bottom of the first copy of the document, addressed himself to duplicate and triplicate. Count Ciano followed him and Ambassador Kurusu signed last. The signing took two minutes. As Ambassador Kurusu laid down his pen the door behind him opened. With a nervous, catlike walk Adolf Hitler came in. He shook hands with the Italian and Japanese emissaries, sat down next to Ciano. Joachim von Ribbentrop stood up and took a seat.

Ciano, Ribbentrop and Kurusu in Berlin

"To help bring peace to the world."

Through a battery of microphones, the dummy was made to deliver its speech. The agreement was broadcast to the world, its purpose to establish and maintain a new order of things calculated to promote and maintain the mutual prosperity and welfare of the peoples concerned.

Article I: "Germany, Italy and Japan... have decided to..." The agreement contained only 419 words, consisting of a preamble and six short articles. The preamble was bombastic, the articles curt, clear, complete. Excerpts:

Preamble: "The Governments of Germany, Italy and Japan... have decided to... which corres|>onds to the
in the structure of anti-U. S. Japanese foreign policy, which he apparently had despaired of altering as long ago as 1930. But nobody could deny that the treaty was a diplomatic defeat for the U. S., which for the first time in its history was now excluded from the family of nations. The stand, point of view is that the pact amounted to raising the ante in the hope of frightening the U. S. into dropping its bangle so the Axis could rake in the pot. But if the Axis had hoped to frighten the U. S. out of its everything-short-of-war policy of helping Great Britain, it had almost certainly failed. Since U. S. security in the Atlantic was involved in maintaining her Fleet in the Pacific..."
The Gamble. Ever since the war began, Germany has tried to bring in Japan on its side. Lately the U. S. aid to Great Britain has been an increasing menace to Germany. A month ago Germany began putting heavy pressure on Japan. One of Joachim von Ribbentrop's smart young men, Heinrich von Stahmer, went to Moscow, told Joseph Stalin's man Molotov what was at stake, and continued on to Tokyo. There he was known as Germany's masked special envoy. Nearly every day he went to see Yusuke Matsuoka, Japan's ambitious, daring Foreign Minister who is the backbone of Premier Prince Konoye.

Germany needed Japan not only to neutralize the U. S., but to threaten the Far East part of the British Empire. Singapore, Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand. Foreign Minister Matsuoka believed Japan could gamble on Germany's winning the war before the U. S. was ready willing or able to join up against the Axis in World War II. After two weeks of argument he won over Prince Konoye and the Emperor.

What is East Asia? Japan's gains from the treaty were not so obvious as those of Germany and Italy. And Japan's risks were greater. But if the U. S. is kept from effective action in the Far East, Japan may eventually realize her East Asia dream. Last week no authoritative spokesman would define the term Greater East Asia, but the newspaper Nichi Nichi, which often speaks with authority, drew its boundaries in an article last month. Said Nichi Nichi:

"It is bound on the west by a continuous chain of mountains forming a Great Divide. Tracing this chain of mountains from the Bering Strait southward to the Arabian Sea, Nichi Nichi drew a line which almost coincides with the frontiers of Siberia, giving Japan's Greater East Asia all of China, French Indo-China, Siam, Burma and India. The coast line of East Asia, said Nichi Nichi, extends from Northern Japan southward to Indonesia, then westward to Ceylon. Asia's history shows how long there has been intercourse along this coast line. No matter how we look at this East Asia, it is a natural and inseparable unit."

The Gamble. For a political course which may yet bring war with the U. S., Japan took one last look backward. Foreign Office spokesmen spoke regretfully of U. S. hostility to Japanese aims, of continued pre-supere culminating in last week's embargo of scrap iron (see p. 121), Japan is still not abandoning hope of improving relations with the U. S., said the Foreign Office's Spokesman No. 1, slightly cocked, definitely pop-eyed, swart, squat Yakichiru Suma.

In Moscow the text of the treaty was digested for 24 hours before its text was published. Not until three days after it was signed did Pravda offer the skimpy comment that Russia had known about it in advance.

Russia, long the most hated nation in the world, became by virtue of the treaty the most sought-after power in the world. U. S. Ambassador Laurence Steinhardt, who had vacationed in the U. S. while the treaty was being cooked up, paid a hurried call on Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov. British Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps got busy, Japanese Ambassador Yoshitsugu Takekawa, who hates Communists, but loves "simple, purer-minded Russians," conferred with German Ambassador Count Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg about the non-aggression treaty Japan hopes to negotiate with the U. S. S. R. to safeguard her northern frontier while she conquers Greater East Asia. Comrades Stalin & Molotov said nothing. Well they know that, while Russia's interests lie with a victory of the London-Washington Axis, the Berlin-Tokyo Axis has the U. S. S. R. also encircled.

"As Foreign Minister Molotov prepared to confer with Germany's Ribbentrop, Berlin let it be known that in the new world Germany hopes to create, Russia would have her sphere of influence. This sphere would lie between German Europe and Japanese East Asia, but its exact boundaries were not marked. Russia does and must always fear German expansion eastward. It may yet bring war with the U. S., but if Russia continues to send supplies to the Chinese, China may gain by the pact. Last week the U. S. gave China a $25,000,000 credit, and Britain will doubtless reopen the Burma Road. Both Britain and the U. S. now desperately need China's aid in keeping Japan too busy to spread out into the East Indies.

"The turning point of history" was what Japan's Prince Konoye called the treaty. Reactions throughout the world showed that this might be true. To China a U. S.-Japanese war appeared inevitable. To Spain the U. S. seemed faced with a dilemma: intervene immediately or aban-
INTERNATIONAL
Thunder in the East

The Fascist Alliance was one week old last week. The capitals of the world had had time to digest it, to react. The reactions were various, ranging from frank jubilation in Berlin and Rome to London's grim decision to reopen the Burma Road in the face of a muttered Japanese threat that this would bring war. From Moscow, where the balance of world power now lies, there was no news.

Washington still held to its tortuous course midway between appeasement and action, while the Navy flirted for a go at the little yellow men in their big boats (see p. 32). As usual U. S. public opinion was slow to react, because its leaders had as yet to give it clue or cue. The State Department, in this month before election, was even charier than usual of taking a firm stand until it knew what the reaction was. But in Tokyo, where the Government not only informs but makes public opinion, there were many signs that Japan intended to force the U. S. to take its stand, both in principle and in the formal and semi-official spokesman who opened his mouth—and the Japanese talked plenty last week—let it be known that Japan considers the Fascist Alliance a challenge to the U. S.

First official to sound off was Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka, who has a big reputation for talking. In an interview given to International News Service's Larry Smith, the Foreign Minister was quoted as follows:

"Japan will be compelled to fight the United States if our sister nation on the shores of the Pacific enters the war in Europe. I fling this challenge to America: If she in her contentment is going to blindly and stubbornly stick to the status quo in the Pacific, then we will fight America. For it would be better to perish than to maintain the status quo."

"I have always considered America my second home land. I have always known the American people as a good and decent people, so it grieves me to realize that today America is the most unprogressive nation on earth... It is nice for the United States to say that we must settle everything peacefully, but if we wait for America we must perish in the years of waiting. So I say to America: Now is the time for action, and Japan will not hesitate when its hour arrives."

It was not until two days later, after Washington had unofficially called the interview an insult, that Foreign Minister Matsuoka decided that perhaps he had talked too much. The Japanese Foreign Office explained that Mr. Matsuoka had been a loyal dues-paying member of the Oregon Alumni Association for 20 years. This week in a "report to my Alma Mater" in the Alumni magazine, he wrote hopefully that Japanese aims in poltic, meanofless platitudes.

been talking off the record to a "magazine artist," gave its "official" version of the interview:

"The treaty speaks for itself, Japan would have to fight America if America entered the European War. But that is an eventuality that I shudder even to think of."

Next speaker to take the stump was sleepy-eyed Premier Fumimaro Konoye himself. Said he: "The United States refuse to understand the real intention of Japan, Germany and Italy, and persist in challenging them in the belief that the pact among them represents a hostile action, there will be no other course open to them than to go to war."

Foreign Office Spokesman Yakichiro Suma chimed in with the assertion that the U. S. is "taking step after step in the wrong direction, which might precipitate her into the vortex of armed conflict. Spokesman Suma paid his respects to a suggestion by Publisher Roy Wilson Howard that the U. S. send a commission to Japan to improve U. S.-Japanese relations. Such a commission could be effective only if the two Governments were in agreement on fundamentals, said Yakichiro Suma, and "they have no mutual grounds any more."

Japanese newspapers went all the way out on the limb. In Nichi Nichi, Nationalist Leader Seigo Nakano proposed that Japan take over the foreign concessions in Shanghai and Tientsin, restore Hong Kong to China (i.e., to Japan's puppet Government at Nanking) and "restore the Netherlands Indies as an Asiatic country." In a telegram to Publisher Howard, Director Hoshio Mitsunaga of the Nippon Press Association suggested that the U. S. can prevent a crisis if it "abandons its fortifi-
PLOD DBURY

JAPAN'S KONKOE
"Should the United States persist..."

Japanese newspapers went all the way out on the limb. In Nichi Nichi, Nationalist Leader Seigo Nakano proposed that Japan take over the foreign concessions in Shanghai and Tientsin, restore Hong Kong to China (i.e., to Japan's puppet Government at Nanking) and "restore the Netherlands Indies as an Asiatic country." In a telegram to Publisher Howard, Director Hoshio Mitsunaga of the Nippon Press Association suggested that the U. S. can prevent a crisis if it "abandons its fortifi-

...cations at Pearl Harbor, Guam and the Midway Islands, gives up its support of Chiang Kai-shek and restores trade to normalcy."

By such words as those spoken last week, as well as by fundamental disagreement, wars are made. Officially the U. S. kept silent, but there were those who talked back. Arrived in the U. S. from Shangai, Publisher Cornelius Vanderbilt II of the Shanghai Evening Post & Mercant did his bit to fan the smoldering crisis by telling Manhattan reporters that Japan was a fifth-rate power whose principal weapon was bluff. "Regardless of her bombast, Japan will under no circumstances risk actual war with America," said lean Publisher Starr, whom the Japanese have separated not only from his newspaper but from the largest invariable business in the Far East.

At week's end lights burned late in the old gray State Department building in Washington. If Cordell Hull & Co. were not talking, at least they were pondering—perhaps preparing to act. Unless the U. S. was willing to go all-out against Japan, it would be useless to slap an embargo on oil, because that would be an invitation to Japan to take the East Indies. But an agreement with Britain for a string of Far Eastern naval bases from New Zealand to Singapore was worth pondering as were the chances of Japan's risking war to keep the U. S. out of Singapore.

While Washington pondered, the Japanese continued to consolidate their gains in French Indo-China, moving southward toward Singapore (see p. 60). They worked to reach an agreement with Russia that would enable them to close the China Incident. The little yellow men were out to see whether the U. S. would scare. A firm U. S.-British stand on aid to China via the Burma Road plus naval cooperation in the Far East, might scare them instead. If neither side would scare, there was a better than even chance of war.

200th Day

On the 16th of March 1940, when the snow had scarcely gone from the past between the Wolfenden and Sattelberg, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini sat down in a railroad car at Bremen station to plan their spring campaign against Great Britain and France. Twenty-two days later war began in Western Europe with a flaming movement into Denmark and Norway. Eighty-five days later Italy entered the war with a flaming movement against collapsing France. Ninety-nine days later France fell.

Last week, just 100 days after their first meeting at Bremner Pass, Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini met there again. The show would soon be seen as creeping down the slopes of the Wolfenden and Sattelberg, but that a bright sun shone on the flower-and-flag-strewn station, made that spectacle above the red carpet.

TIME, October 14, 1940
一九四〇年十月七日及一九四〇年十月十四日発行

雑誌「タイム」よりの抜萃

反仏三面

一九三八年九月二十九日のミニューニツヒ会談の二週年記念日は先週過ぎ

通信員は官邸の貴い外國使臣引見の間に入室を許された時その部屋にドン・ラモン・セラーノの居ないことに気がついた。外交官
のメモパートとしてはベルリンに在って日本を代表しナチスペのアメリカ
の事務室へつとよ扉のすぐ外には長いテーブルが一つ置いてあった。そしてその端に同様大
使弔はチアノ伯が署名し、来복大使がペンを置いた時彼の後扉が開いて神
経質な猫のような足取りでアドルフ。ヒットラーが入って来た。彼はイ
タリヤ日本全使臣と握手を交しチアノ伯の席に座った。

午後一時十五分丁度フォン。リッペントロップ外相は第一の講義の
終りにさらさらと署名し更に第二第二の講義にも署名した。之を私
てチアノ伯が署名し、来復大使がペンを置いた時彼の後扉が開いて神
たリチャ・貢ペントロップハ立上りマイクロフォンを通じ日本が報道
から成つてある。新作序一との協約は使用語数値に四九語で序文と短か
で六つの條項
から成つてある。序文は誇大であ
り條文は簡潔、明瞭にして完全であ
依り任命セルルベキ委員ヨリ成ル混合専門委員会ハ通商ナタ開催セルル
第五条
日本国、独乙国及伊大利国八前条約条項が締約国ノ各トシ

第六条
本条約ハニ十年間有效トス

締約国ニ中ノシ条約ノ更新ニ関シ協議スベシ
日本がアメリカに取って外交上の敗北、即アメリカの歴史をつくって以来初めて敵国の包囲を受けたものであるというふれを否定する事は出来なかった。

戦争開始以来、ドイツは常に日本を味方に引き込むと試みた。最近アメリカの対英援助はドイツに対する警戒を増加して来た。一ヶ月前にアメリカのオートマシーはモスクに行きジョセフ・スターリンの部下モロトフ、ドイツの特使として知られた。彼は毎日日本の大脳を外務大臣と首相近衛文麿の前でおちちを貫くために日本を必要とした。

ドイツは単にアメリカを中立国たらしめようとする努力からばかりでなく、英帝国の極東における領土、即シンガポール香港スィンドランド、
東方の害鳴
フランスと同盟が締結されてからまる一週間が先通行ぎた。世界各団の首
都がこの事態を消化し反応するだけの時がやめた。その反応は緩やかであり、ベル
リン及びローマに於ける明らかなる視線からロンドンの口が切った決意
で報道も無かった。

海軍が大船に乗り込んだ（三二頁参照）もつぼけた資本主義に向って、
一か月前の総合をむずぼらなかった。一方、ワシントンは矢張
り対峙して嘆願をなさり、関西の反動がこのような状態にあたる事実を
常に見過ごして憲政的な態度を採った。然しながら、政府が報道する
限りない。
まず、軍事的観点から米国に対する対策を考える必要がある。米国は、東アジアの影響力を持つ国であり、特に日本への植民地化を図ろうとしている。このため、我々は日本を守るために、対米戦を考慮する必要がある。

従来、日本は米国との関係を緊張させるため、軍事力の増強に努めてきた。しかし、これは米国との関係を悪化させるだけである。我々は、対米戦を考慮した上で、国際法に基づく対応を講じる必要がある。

米国が、軍事的圧力を使って、日本を植民地化しようとしている。このため、我々は、国の独立を守るために、対米戦を考慮した上で、国際法に基づく対応を講じる必要がある。
先の最初に発表を行まった声明は演説に長けたと評判のある松岡洋右外相であった。インターンシヨナル・ニュース・サーベイ、スラリーやスミソニアン、の会見に於て外相は次の如き語った。「太平洋沿岸の我々の姉妹国が欧州戦争に加わるやうなるにかかわらず、我々はアメリカに対し次の如く挑戦するものである。即若しアメリカが自分のみの消足に調れdeb接力的兼ねずめの旗を交へるであらば現状維持を保譲するならば我々はアメリカと戦を交へざるを得ぬであらば何故ならば現状を維持せんよりは結死する方が勝るからである。」

一途は常にアメリカを自分の第二の故郷と考へて来た。私はアメリカ人を尊敬且つ尊敬を知る国民であると思って来た。その故に今日アメリカ人が地獄で最も非道法的国民であることにぶつぶつと書いて悲しむものである。我々は何等も終て平和的解決をしなければならないと米国が言ふのは誠に聞えがよいのであるが若しアメリカを持てばたら我々は幾年も待ちながら結死し
つけ言ふのである。今こそ行動の時である。而して日本は
なければならないのである。であるから私はアメリカに向
ワシントンがこの会談を侮辱だと非公式に呼んでから二
日を経過してやっと松岡外相は自分が言ふ過ぎてしまった
らしいと気がついた日本外務省は松岡外相が非公式に新
聞代行をノ製作に對於して語ったのであると説明しこの会見に對
する一「公式」の解釈を作り上げた。
日本の大統領に拘らず何とある場合と雖もアメリカと対峙を交う

「日本は大統領に拘らず何とある場合と雖もアメリカと対峙を交う

彼を彼の新興事業のみならず東洋攻大の保険事業から脅かししてしまった。」

その過程にはワシントンの言わぬ如き灰色の誤診病の病状に変

かもしれぬが、少くとも統合を強いてみた。之は、コール・ハル以下が、相談に入

として次のようなことを話し込んでいたのであった。多分は行動への準備

金力を揚げて日本に同うことを欲しければならば石油輸出禁止を断行す

るとは熟考に値する。日本がアメリカをシンガポールへかけての一連の偽東海軍基地について英領と協約す

如しその無益である何故ならばそうする事は日本に於いて東印度群

島を取るやうにと勧誘する事だからである。然しおニュージーランドか

して南下したから（五〇頁参照）一仏領印度支那に於ける利益を引継

き確保して行った。彼等は支部事実の結末の得られるようを協定を呑

物。
シャとの間に、締結せんとすして活動した。ちとせけの黄色の日本人連

はアメリカが近くか否かを試しに示し出した。然ししながら、コハマ道

経由の対支助助に加ふらに極東に於ける海軍との協力を以てするアメ

リカとイギリスの提携は、却つて日本側に対する威嚇となるかもしれ

ない。若しどちらの側も疑うべきならば、五分五分以上に満争の可

能性がある事であった。

松岡洋右は一九〇〇年オレゴン大学法律科を卒業し、過去廿年間オレゴ

ン大学同窓会に忠実に會員を務めてゐた。今邇彼は、同窓會誌の一母

役への報告に於て、「日本の目的につき、無感無意を為す常套語を弄し

て感慨深げたる一文を物してゐる。
Excerpts from the Official Gazette dated March 11 of the 13th year of Shōwa (1938), Pages, 603, 614.

* The 73rd Session of the Imperial Diet.

Transcript No. 26 of the proceedings of the House of Representatives.

On March 10 (Thursday) of the 13th year of Shōwa (1938).

The meeting opened at 1:33 p. m.

Mr. TAJIMA, Katsutaro, the Government Committeeman climbs the platform.

Government Committeeman (Mr. TAJIMA, Katsutaro)

Let me explain the reason for introducing the bill on the Aircraft Manufacturing Industry Law. The aircraft manufacturing industry of our country has made remarkable development of late through the positive guidance and cultivation by the Army and Navy. As for military aircraft, especially, we have come to produce those of superior efficiency bearing comparison with those of the various powers of the world. There is, however no denying the fact that, in respect to this industry as a whole, we are lagging behind the powers in mechanizing the work and have, as a result, such various defects as insufficient productive power, lack of flexibility and the costliness of aircraft. I think, therefore, it is
Def. Doc. # 1725

really the urgent need of the hour, in view of the importance of the aircraft in national defense and industry, to expedite establishment and development of this industry and to ensure abundant supply of superior and low-priced aircraft. And in this connection, the Government, with the aim of giving an impetus to the production of superior aircraft, has on the one hand laid down a plan of establishing a central aeronautic research institute for which preparation expenses were appropriated in the budget of the coming year and in the other has been rapidly proceeding with measures for increasing the demand for aircraft by means of developing international aviation, acquiring overseas markets or creating new regular air lines, increasing frequency of service, etc. As regards the aircraft industry itself, however, we seek sound development of the industry by subjecting it to proper supervision and control as well as by adopting adequate policies of protecting and promoting the industry and we have drawn up the bill in order to furnish a legal basis for the above measures. I earnestly desire the bill to be approved after prompt deliberation.
政府委員（島島勝太郎君）航空機製造工業法提案理由案

午後一時三十三分開議

政府委員田島勝太郎君登壇

○島島勝太郎君「航空機製造工業法提案理由案」
The envoys for border definition of both countries have defined the border of the first section to be the stretch from the river Yunnan to the astronomical point at Chenlin, according to the map drawn up after the survey by Russian commissioners in 1874 (the 16th year of Guangxu). This mountain is situated between the Chinese outpost at Yunchun and that of the Russian side at Zhaba, and is on the road between Yunchun and the river Yunnan. The distance between the place where the border mark has newly been established and the astronomical point is sixty-five and half Russian li, or approximately one hundred and thirty-one Chinese li, and the red line on the map is the border all along the watershed, and the water that flows westwards and pours into the river Yunnan belongs to China, and the water that flows eastwards and pours into the sea belongs to Russia. The distance southwest from the border-mark a along the river Yunnan to the estuary is fifteen Russian li, or approximately thirty Chinese li, and the distance to the end of a sand-dune measured in a straight line by land is thirteen Russian li four hundred and fifty-five sajen, or approximately over twenty-seven Chinese li. The established monolithic border-mark a is one sajen, or approximately over seven Chinese feet high, ten Chinese inches, or approximately fifteen Chinese inches wide, as four Russian inches, or approximately six Chinese inches thick. On the one side it has the Russian letter C inscribed, and on the other three Chinese characters "a Character Monument" with the date at the site. The depth of the border-mark in the ground is one Russian foot, or approximately two Chinese feet and three inches. The foundation around it is constructed with hard stone, and surrounded by a deep ditch filled with crushed gravel and hardened by burning mortar so as to make the border-mark durable. Proceeding northwesterly from the border-mark a, or crossing a hill, and reaching the north of a sand-hill via the west side of Lake Hasan, the border-mark b.0.1 is established, the total distance being eight li and one hundred sajen. Proceeding thence northwards one li and sixty-five sajen, and turning there northeast for four li one hundred and thirty-five sajen along sand hills, Minchau is reached, where the border-mark b.0.2 is established. Turning further southwest, and proceeding around a swamp, and turning north, Mount Varanov is reached. From the north of this mountain, again turning west Mount Varaban is reached, and thence again proceeding northwest, a road between Yunchun and the river Yunnan is reached, and there the border-mark b.0.3 is established, the total distance being thirteen li four hundred and sixty-five sajen. Thence proceeding northwesterly for two li and four hundred sajen along a flat hill, the border-mark b.0.4 is established. Thence again proceeding northwesterly for two li one hundred and fifty sajen after crossing several hills, Mount Irenchun is reached, where the border-mark b.0.5 is established on a flat slope at the foot of the mountain. (Japanese document distributed as a Def. Doc No. 1510.)
six li two hundred and eighty-five sejen northwestwards, descending a mild hill and crossing small ravines at several points, Kaijin-te is reached; the border-mark is established at the roadside leading to the River Yench'u. Again proceeding northeast, Kushin or Mii-kushin is reached, from where turning and proceeding northwest and crossing a large mountain, the path being narrow and steep, Mount Hido is reached. Proceeding thence around the upper part of the River Huilin, and turning east and again north, the border-mark is established on the top of a mountain, which, though not high, has very rugged paths, and is situated twenty li four hundred and seventy-five sejen from the border-mark No. 3. Hence turning north at a point three li two hundred and eighty sejen northwestwards, and proceeding one li and sixty-five sejen, and again turning east for three hundred and thirty sejen, the astronomical point, erected in 1884, is reached. This is the border-mark No. 4. The distance mentioned above are all in Russian li, one Russian li corresponding to two Chinese li, and one Russian sejen to over seven Chinese feet. The astronomical point is a tall brick building with a hard stone foundation. All the other border-marks are round mounds of earth, round which a site is dug and filled with gravel. Each mound is erected a small monolith with the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, etc., inscribed. This protocol is drawn up in duplicate, in Chinese and Russian languages. Two were drawn up in accordance with the border lines defined above. The envoy for border demarcation of both countries in both of their respective seals thereto, each holding one copy of the protocol and the maps as evidence.

I further certify that I have accurately and faithfully translated into Russian the protocol of Border-lines, Annex I of the Lanchun Border Protocol, 1866, from the Chinese text of the said protocol contained in the "Diplomatic Documents during the Ch'ing Dynasty," Vol. 60, published in China, January 1932. The translation is hereto attached.

Tokyo, June 6, 1947.

/s/ I. Negish.
NOTICE

This is a Japanese of Deface Doc. No. 1730, which was reprocessed from Def. Doc. No. 1510. Please destroy your Def. Doc. 1510, except for the certificate, of Japanese Document, numbered 1730 and attached to the new Document, No. 1730.

The English copy of Def. Doc. No. 1730, complete with certificate, is replacing Def. Doc. No. 1510.

IPS DISTRIBUTION
Room 262.
Def. Doc. No. 1732 - A

Showa 16/1941/ 22403

Dispatched : Batavia, July 30, A.M.

Received : Foreign Office, July 30, A.M.

To : Foreign Minister TOYODa

From : Consul-General ISHIZAWa

No. 702

A decree controlling financial transactions of the foreign residents in the "Netherlands Indies was proclaimed on the 28th. The substance thereof is as in the telegram in Dutch separately dispatched. The article 6, thereof stipulates that any act against the decree shall be regarded as crime.

(Particulars will be reported by later mail).
Def. Doc. No. 1732 - B

Showa 16/1941/ 22406

Dispatched: Batavia, July 30, P.M.

Receiver: Foreign Office, July 30, Evening.

To: Foreign Minister TOYODA

From: Consul-General ISHIIZAWA

No. 703 (Separate)

Article 1.

1. It is prohibited to banks and credit-organizations, established in the Netherlands Indies, and to banks and credit-organizations, established outside the Netherlands Indies but working in the Netherlands Indies, without previous general permission or special permission from the Director of Economic Affairs or from an official or an organization appointed by the Director of Economic Affairs, to receive or to pay money, directly or indirectly, for the benefit or for the account of foreign countries or of subjects of countries, designated by the Governor-General, regardless of existing liabilities thereto.

2. The same prohibition is applied to the receiving or paying of money, for the benefit or for the account of juridical persons whom, to the judgment of the Director of the Economic Affairs, the interests of the countries or of the subjects of such countries as meant in the first paragraph, are involved in the juridical persons in important degree.
The procedure for application and granting of permission described in the first paragraph will be regulated by the Director of Economic Affairs.

Article 2.

The Director of Economic Affairs can attach conditions, in the interest of good execution, to the general or special permissions described in Article 1.

Article 3.

1. Every agreement, which has been made in violation of stipulations of this decree or stipulations promulgated according to this decree, is legally void.

2. Voidness shall be officially declared by the judge.

Article 4.

The Director of Economic Affairs is authorized to make further stipulations for the execution of this decree.

Article 5.

1. The Director of Economic Affairs is authorized to let an expert or experts, appointed by him, make an investigation concerning everything he deems desirable, in order to secure the enforcement of the prohibition described in Article 1.

2. Everyone, from whom co-operation is required for such investigation, is obliged to give the said co-operation.

(The End)
貿易長官は同則の適正を守るため一発取は特別許可に条件を附すべきとする。
I, HAYASHI, Naoru, who occupy the post of chief of Archives Section, the Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese and Dutch, consisting of five pages and entitled "Telegrams No. 702 and No. 703 Addressed to Foreign minister TOYODA, Dispatched by Consul-General ISHIZAWA, at Batavia, July 30, 1941 (shown here)" is an exact and genuine copy of the official document in the custody of the Japanese Government (Foreign Office).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 31st day of May, 1947

/S/ HAYASHI, Naoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on the same date.
Witness: URABE, Katsuma (seal)
Translation Certificate

I, Kotani, Tanun, hereby certify that I am conversant with the English, Dutch and Japanese languages, and that the foregoing translation is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, a correct translation of the original document.

/s/ Tanun Kotani

Tokyo

Date: 5 June 1947.
(Note abrogating the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of Commerce and Navigation).

Official communication of CRAWFIE, British Ambassador in Japan, to Japanese Foreign Minister TOYOYAMA, dated July 26, 1941 (the 16th year of Showa).

The Government of His Majesty the Emperor in England, the Government of India, and the Government of Burma have reached a conclusion that the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation signed in London on April 3, 1911 and the Agreements concerning Commerce and Trade between Japan and India, and between Japan and Burma signed respectively on July 12, 1934 and on June 7, 1937 are no longer recognized as satisfying the object which the British Government, the Indian Government and the Burmese Government held at the time of signature of these Treaty and Agreements.

I have the honor to communicate to Your Excellency the intention of the United Kingdom of Great Britain, the British Dominions and the Government of India that they, in accordance with the provisions of Article 27 of the above-mentioned Treaty, Article 6 of the above Agreement of June 12, 1934 (revised by the exchange of notes at London, on October 12, 1937) and Article 6 of the Agreement mentioned above will abrogate the above-mentioned Treaty and Agreements respectively. Accordingly the above Treaty will continue in force until the termination of a further period of one year from this 26th day and the above two Agreements will continue in force until the termination of a further period of six months from this 26th day.

Accept, Excellency, etc.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, HAYASHI, Kacoru, who occupy the post of Chief of the Archive Section of the Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 2 pages and entitled "(Note abrogating Anglo-Japanese Commerce and Navigation Treaty) Communication of July 26, 1941 (Showa 16) from British Ambassador CRAIGIE to Foreign Minister of Japan TOYODA" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 4th day of June, 1947
/S/ HAYASHI, Kacoru (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place, on this same date.

Witness: UMEMI, Katsuno (seal)
滑約及協定ヲ廃止セントスルモノヲ通告スルノヲ有シ候從ヲテ
前記滑約ハ本二十六日以後一年間ノ期限後ニ至ル迄引続キ其ノ效
力ヲ有スヘク又前記ニ協定ハ本二十六日以後尚六ヶ月間ノ期限後ニ
至ル迄引続キ其ノ效
力ヲ有スヘクニ至ル迄引続キスヘク効
日申迄労本仮ハ兹ニ重ねテ旨下ニ向テ敬意ヲ表シ候
敬具
I am MIYAMA, Yozo, now occupy the post of Chief of the Archives Section of the 1st Repatriation Board and live at present at TOKYO-To, CHIYODA-Ku, NAGATA-Cho, 1-Chome, No.8. I was Adjutant of the War Ministry since 6 March 1945 until the War Ministry was abolished.

I was in charge of the handling and custody of the secret documents in the War Ministry.

The handling of secret documents in the Army was in accordance with the rules laid down in Regulations for the Handling of Army Secret Documents.

In the second clause of Article 46 it was stipulated that the container for secret documents to be carried to the
The main points of this order were reported to SCAP. A copy of this report was presented to the Allied Forces and is no longer in our hands.

This order was communicated to the troops, offices and schools higher than independent units and in charge of secret documents.

On the War Ministry, I called officers together to receive orders on 14 August and made my adjutant dictate them the order, starting the burning toward the evening of the same day.

The burning was carried out at each department and section. This was because the chiefs of each department and section were responsible for the custody and management of the secret documents kept at each department and section.

At that time as the Army had fallen into extraordinary excitement and disorder as a result of the surrender, the above mentioned order to dispose of only secret documents did not penetrate perfectly and each department and section burned in so short a while so much more than was usual that they not only burned secret documents but also non-secret books were reduced to ashes without referring to the list.

On the night of the 14th, the flames from the burning shot up so much so that the local fire station mistook it for a conflagration. This lasted until the 18th. But
it was learned toward the evening of the 17th that every department and section were burning every non-secret documents. The big diaries such as the Secret Big Diary (MITSUDAI NIKKI) and the Manchurian Secret Big Diary (MANMITSUDAI NIKKI), precious historical materials, were transported to the War Ministry Warehouse at TOKYO-TO, MINAMITAMA-GUN, YOSHIFUMURA, YOSHIKIFUCHI, and were preserved there from Dec. 1944 to March 1945 to avoid damage from air raids. Part of them was burnt, but the greater part was handed over to the Washington Document Centre then stationed at the site of the former 1st Arsenal of OJI, having been transported there directly from the FUCHI Ware house by 8 trucks of the 1st Demobilization Department on 8th and 9th January 1946 at the request of Major Duncan MacFarlane Chief of the W.D.C. of the allied Forces.

I assume that troops, offices, schools etc. started towards the evening of the 14th day and soon finished burning all their documents.

1. Excerpt from the Military Penal Code.

Law No. 46 of 10 Apr. 1908 (MEIJI 41)
Revised Law No. 35 of Feb. 1942 (SHOWA 17)

Article 52.

The custodian of military secret documents and material who does not exhaust all possible means in emergency to
keep them out of the enemy's hands shall be imprisoned for a term of not more than 5 years.

2. Excerpt from Regulations for Handling Military Secret Documents.

Military Law No. 850 of 1933 (Showa 8)
Revised Law No. 919 of 1938 (Showa 13)

Article 46, II.
The container to be carried out to the zone of war or incident by mobilized units and such like shall be the official trunk and steps shall be taken for important documents to be burnt, if need be, in case of emergency.

On this 5 day of June, 1947.

At Tokyo.

DEPOT: /s/ MIYAMA, Yozo (seal)

I, MIYAMA, Yozo hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this Witness.

On the same date, at the same place.

Witness: /s/ BANNO, Junkichi (seal)

OATH

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the truth with holding nothing and adding nothing.

/s/ MIYAMA, Yozo (seal)
一、
私ハ現在第一師団局文書課長デリマス
私ハ現在第一師団局文書課長デリマス

二、
陸軍省ニ於ケル機密書類ノ退使ヲ相借スルヲ以テ

三、
陸軍省ニ於ケル機密書類ヲ退使スルヲ以テ

4. 総裁

5. 各種

6. 各種

7. 各種

8. 各種

9. 各種
令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ

令八大臣ノ命ニ照リ部下ノ副官ニ於テ起案シ私ヲ経テ次第手続ヲ致シタ
ソレハ各部、諺ニ保管セレル居ラ秘密書ニ保管、取扱ノ者ハ各郡、隷長テアツタ為デアリマス。
臨戸刑法抜萃

昭和四十二年四月十日法律第四十号

昭和十七年二月法律第三五号改正

委員に於テ

委員に於テ

委員に於テ

委員に於テ

委員に於テ

委員に於テ

委員に於テ

委員に於テ
別紙

難草 秘密業務取扱規則抄華
昭和八年陸海軍大臣 議定
昭和十三年度版 第九七九号改正

修四十六号ノ二

動員部隊等ニ於テ使用スペキ戦地又ハ事務地携行用ノ容器八公用行李ヲ

錶クモノトス

ラクノ重要ナルモノハ所要ニ論ジ危急ノ菜ヲハ前ノ種類スルノ段階ノ講
I, who occupy the post of the Chief of Archives Section of the First Demobilization Bureau, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 60 pages and entitled "The matters concerning military secret documents. Handling of military secret documents." is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (The War Department.)

certified at Tokyo,
on this 5th day of May 1947

/s/ Miyama, Yoichi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.
at the same place,
on the same date

witness:  /s/ Banno, Junkichi (seal)
文書成立ニ於ル証明書

自分ハ従一退員局文書課長ノ職ニ於テタル
印刷セラレテ六〇頁ヨリ成ル軍軍事上ノ秘密書類ニ於テ
於ル件供題スル印刷ノハ日本政府ノ為軍省ノ為
八件供題スル文書ノナル證明ス

昭和二十二年五月五日
於東京
第一退員局文書課長

美山 要院

同日於同地

立會人

佐藤 洋吉

防

浮
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, SATO, YOICHI, who occupy the post of an administrative official of the Cabinet, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 13 pages and entitled "The Military Penal Code...10 April 1906-Law No. 46; Memoirs February 1942-Law No. 35 Revised." is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (The Cabinet.)

certified at Tokyo,

on this 13th day of June 1947

/S/ SATO, YOICHI (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

at the same place,

on this same date

witness: /S/ IWANAGA, KENICHI (seal)
自分の田中生ハ内閣事務官ノ職ニ居ル者ナル故ニ添聞セラレタル日

宛内関ノ保書ノ係バ公文書ノ扱ハ正ニシテ却シタル法律

佐藤

永保

1940年6月13日

於東京
The Tripartite Pact was concluded between Japan, Germany and Italy on 27 September, 1940.

The prosecution alleged that it was an extension or revival of the abortive negotiations for the so-called "strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact," which were conducted between the three countries in 1938 and 1939, and that "this pact in its essence contained the ultimate development of the plot of the aggressive powers directed toward the division of the world and the establishment of the so-called "new order." We will show, if permitted, first: That the Japanese Government completely broke off the negotiations for the "strengthening of the Anti-Comintern Pact"; second, The German-Russian Non-Agression Treaty was concluded on 23 August 1939, and that this treaty caused such a great shock in Japan as to bring about the downfall of the Hiranuma Cabinet. As a result the Japanese-German relations broke off completely. Extreme anger and irritation felt by the Japanese Government and the military at this bad faith of Germany was the cause of this rupture in relations. There was no continuity as alleged by the prosecution in the relations between Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy, this will be conclusively shown.

This point will be corroborated by presenting the documents to show that the Cabinet of Abe and Yonai which succeeded the Hiranuma Cabinet took up as the primary aim of their foreign policy, the improvement of Japanese-American relations. They made every effort to attain this objective and that the Japanese-German relations during the period remained extremely cool. The efforts of Japan were not reciprocated by the United States. Economic pressure upon Japan increased by the U.S.A. and other countries after the expiration of the Japanese-American Commercial treaty.

The German victory in Europe in May 1940 gave Japan reason to fear the emergence of Germany in East Asia as successor to France and the Netherlands. The coolness of the Japanese-German relations at that time did not permit any possibility of collaboration of the two countries concerning these East Asian problems. The prosecution has tendered evidence of Japanese-German contact concerning the question of Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China, especially conversation between Ribbentrop and Sato, alleging the existence of collaboration. It will be proved that these facts show the contrary. Non-collaboration between Japan and Germany. It will also be shown that the negotiations for the Tripartite Pact began in September 1940 under the Konoye Cabinet, and not in June of the same year as alleged by the prosecution.

The prosecution alleged that the purpose of the Tripartite Pact was the establishment of the so-called "new order", which had for its purpose the extinguishment of democracy throughout the world and the subjugation of all the nations by the aggressive states.
In rebuttal of this charge it will be proved that the Japanese Government concluded the Tripartite Pact for the defensive and peaceful purpose of contributing to the world peace. Japan wanted ultimately to improve the relations with all countries of the world, especially with the U.S.A., on the basis of equality and mutual respect. She thought it necessary, as the primary step for it, to prevent the deterioration of her political position by getting out of the international isolation which faced her at that time. After the failure of her policy of direct approach to the Anglo-saxon countries and facing the danger of complete international isolation as a result of increasing American pressure, Japan was compelled to the conclusion that her ultimate goal, the improvement of the Japanese-American relations, could not be attained without first improving her international political situation. By joining with other countries, even if some danger should there be involved, this must be done under the international circumstances then prevailing, Germany and Italy were the only countries which could be used as allies. That the Japanese Government had no aggressive purpose and took every precaution in order not to be drawn into the European war as a result of the Tripartite Pact will be shown by the official record of the negotiations, and will be the object of part of our evidence.

On the interpretation of the term "new order" it will be shown by evidence that it meant the establishment of a regional organization as part of the world peace program. It was not aggressive in its nature. It was not in violation of any existing treaties and obligations. Evidence will be tendered proving fantasy of the allegation that leaders of Japan and Germany contemplated conquest or division of the world. As to the prosecution's charge that the pledge of mutual assistance as provided in the Pact would become effective automatically it will be proved that this was not so.

Concerning the Japanese-German-Italian relations after the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact until the outbreak of the Pacific War, the defense will prove that there was no cooperation by pointing out the following facts, namely, that:

1. Germany wanted Japan to join the war against Britain.
2. Germany, after the outbreak of the German-Russian war, wanted Japan to go against Soviet Russia when the German army was knocking at the door of Moscow.
3. Germany did not wish a Japanese-American war, Japan acted independently in attacking the United States.

Most of the evidence presented by the prosecution with respect to the Singapore question are documents of the German Government, which by their own nature one-sided, show only the intention of a self-serving interpretation of that Government, and in the light of the recent rulings of the Tribunal and objections of the prosecution should be totally disregard-

The defense will tender evidence that Japan always refused in a diplomatic way German request to enter the war against Britain. These requests were contradiction of assurances given by Germany at the time of the conclusion of the Pact. It will be clearly shown that the records of various conversations introduced by the prosecution kept by the German Foreign Office were not official or accurate, and that the German leaders were not telling Foreign Minister Matsukota the truth when he visited Berlin in March & April 1941.
Towards Soviet Russia, Japan strove to maintain a friendly relation in accordance with the stipulation and spirit of the Tripartite Pact. She emphatically refused repeated German demands to join her in the war against Soviet Russia. Evidence will also be tendered to show that Japan considered the German attack on Russia which occurred in spite of her opposition, as a betrayal on the part of Germany, and considered that the very foundation of the Tripartite Pact was shattered by this act of Germany.

The prosecution has pointed to the Japanese occupation of French Indo-China and Thailand as instances of Japanese-German collaboration. It will be shown, that in the solutions of these problems Japan did not utilize German pressure on the French home Government.

Japanese-German relations experienced further set-back when the Japanese Government entered in informal negotiations with the U.S.A. in April 1941. Germany entertained doubts as to Japan's intentions, and requested that Germany be informed of the facts about the negotiations and be permitted to participate in them, but Japan did not comply with. Evidence will also be tendered on this point.

The circumstances which compelled Japan to decide the war with U.S.A. will be clarified thoroughly in other subdivisions of this phase.

It will be shown that the Japanese decision resulted from consideration of self-defense independently of any exterior influences, not to mention any consultation with Germany and Italy, and that Japan did not expect any assistance or help from the two countries in setting up her plans of military operations. On the contrary, Japan kept her decision to fight strictly secret, and the attack on Pearl Harbor was most complete a surprise to Germany, to which fact evidence will be tendered. It will also be shown on the other hand that German declaration of war on the U.S.A. was not connected with the Tripartite Pact, and Germany considered herself to be de facto in a state of war with the U.S.A. since the "shoot at sight" order of President Roosevelt in September 1941.

Convincing evidence will be tendered not only from Japanese and German, but also from Allied sources, as to the fact that Japanese-German-Italian relations during the war were not close, making the military convention practically valueless, and that in contrast to the intimate cooperation of the Allied side, politically, economically and militarily, Japan and the two countries of Germany and Italy in fact fought separate wars.

It should be observed by the Tribunal that the effect of the Italian relationship with Germany and Japan is ignored in our presentation of the evidence. History has already shown that Italy was impotent and a useless ally, and even in the optimistic evaluation of her aid in any cause the result would have to be nil. The fact that she surrendered in 1943 and that Germany surrendered in 1945 and that Japan surrendered later precludes any necessity of justifying or explaining No-Separate Peace Pact mentioned so often by the prosecution in their evidence.

With the permission of the Tribunal I present documents and witnesses supporting these brief statements.
日本との関係は検察側の主張されるような近親性はありません。これは決定的に証拠されるであります。右の事実は日米関係の向こうにいた事実を示す資料を提出することによって確証され
するであります。後者がこの目的達成のため力を盡したのであり、日
米関係はその範非常に冷淡でありました。合衆国はこの日本の努力に報
いず、日本に対する合衆国の他国間の経済的圧迫、日米貿易条約の
限られると共に強化されました。EOFに於ける一九四〇年五ケ月の
ドイツの勝利は日本をしてドイツが東
亜におけるフランス及びオランダの殖民地の地位に出るのではなかと
いうがされを抱かされました。当時の日米関係の冷淡さはこれに原因と
関して両国の協力を不可能ならしてでした。検察側では機関東印度及び
印度英領の問題に関管する日独交渉の証拠、特にリッペントロップ佐

又は右の事実は反対に日独関の無協力を示すことが証明されねばなりません。
三国条約締結の交渉は一九四〇年九月に近衛内閣の下に始められたのである。検察側は三国同盟の目的か所調「新秩序」の建設、即ち世界から民主主義を導きさせ、従来国による世界の征服にあたったと主張されました。
この問題の反応として、次のお団体が開かれるであります。即ち、

日本政府は、三國同盟を、世界平和維持のため、自衛的、平和的、目的
を以って結約したといふ事実であります。日本は、この目的達成の上に立つ
各國、及びアメリカ合衆国、平等及び相互的尊重の基礎の上に立つ
友好関係を促進することができました。日本は、この目的達成の上に立つ
外交的立場の退化を防ぐことが必要であると考へました。日本が、アング
ロ・サロープ系諸国に対処する際、政策に失敗し、アメリカの圧力増大
の結果、完全な孤立の孤立に陥る危険をみており、日本は、終局の目
的、即ち日本国対の外交は、先づ第一に日本の国際的立場を改善する
事なくしては、不可能であるといふ決論に達せざるを得なかったので
あります。
判明した。

検察側によって提出された、ドイツ外務省保管にかつては小野次郎の配

鑑は正式な政府の記録に非ず、然らざれば正確性を疑ってゐるといふ事

文、一九四一年三月四月に松岡外務大臣がベルリンを訪問した時、

ドイツの指導者は彼に便箋を譲らなかつたといふ事実も、明かに誰明

されるであります。
連邦に対する日本は三国外の条文及び精神を遵守し日本に友好関係

維持に努力したのであります。

日本は対議案を加え、対議案再三の要求を断わるため、対議案が日本の対議案の支持の結果、日本が日

本の反対にても拘らず起された対議案の支持の要求を拒否した日本が日本が日

本の反対にても拘らず起された対議案の支持の要求を拒否した日本の為害力が、無に帰さるもの

を看做させる知を立証する陳述を提出せんとするものであります。

解答側は、日本議案の条文に答ず、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本の日本が日本に対議案に対する対議案の立

迫しますが、此の問題解決に当り、日本を日本を日本を日本を日本を日本を日本を日本を
日本の民友決定から、この状況は明らかである。この決定は、日本政府が東京とロンドンの間で交渉を続けることを決定し、その結果、日本の提案は満足に成されなかった。しかし、日本の提案は、他の国々との交渉を支援するために、重要な役割を果たした。
無視されてゐる事実を認めざるべくであります。伊太利が無能且つ無能
の同盟国であり、何れの場合に於ける伊太利の援助も、いかに異
を含めても価値はゼロであるという事実は、歴史によって既に明らかであ
ります。一九四三年（昭和十八年）に伊太利が降服し、一九四五年（昭
和二十年）に独逸が降服し、更に遅れて，日本が降服した事実は、検察
側がその対策中に幾度となく質及した非個別命令条約について、之が辯
問をも明示をも不妥さすものであります。
私は法廷の許可によりまして以上の簡単な陳述を審書さる、書類及
び陳述を提出するものであります。
April 28, 1930 (Monday) Session opened at 11:15 a.m.

-----------(omitted)-------------

(Mr. INOUE, Junnosuke, Minister of State, ascended the platform)

Minister of State (Mr. INOUE, Junnosuke):

I shall now explain one by one the questions put by Mr. MUTA, Sanji.

To the first question as to why the gold embargo was lifted in such a hurry, I make the following reply. We did not particularly hurry the matter. As a matter of fact we only put it into effect after the preparations were fully made and the opportunity was fully ripe. Before I give my answer to this question, I wish to remind you of the economic situation in Japan when we organized this Cabinet in July of last year. As you undoubtedly know, since 1920, the financial conditions in Japan have been steadily worse, though there has been some fluctuation in the course. I shall now explain how bad it has become. Mr. MUTA will probably admit the fact that Japan's financial position in relation to foreign countries has become gradually worse. The specie acquired and held abroad...
After the war has been all paid out and Japan is now burdened with a debt of 750,000,000 yen. Let me explain the situation in July 1929. It was such that the exchange rate had declined approximately 11%. The heavy decline had started since January, 1929. Under circumstances such as these, with the specie which the government held overseas, having been drastically reduced, how is it possible for Japan to maintain her economy and her exchange rate by letting the matter take its own course.

Japan has needed more than 100,000,000 yen annually for the funds to replenish her excess of imports. Without gold we are not able to import commodities from abroad. How can Japan carry on in the future with her gold having been reduced to a minimum and her exchange rate declining 11% around July, last year. The lifting of the gold embargo had been our problem since 1920, and the situation was such that we could no longer leave the matter to take its own course. The argument to the effect that the lifting of the gold embargo caused the present world condition is unreasonable because it leaves out of consideration the difficulties I have stated above and bases itself on the assumption that everything is normal.

As a fundamental plan of relieving this financial crisis, imports must first be reduced. But how can we reduce imports? The most essential factor in the reducing imports is for us to take a policy of financial retrenchment.
昭和五年四月二十八日（月曜日）
午後二時十四分開議

国務大臣（井上海之助君）只今ノ武庫山治君ノ前向ニ對シテ順序ノ逐ウ

テ御説明致シマスガ第一ハ何故ニ金ノ澤ヲ急イダカト新ウィフ御詰デイ

リマスガ怒ハ御答ヲ致シマス、更ニ急イダカトハリマセス、十分ノ準備ガ

出矢テリガ熱シタ後ニ之ヲ実行シタノデアリマス。

ハリマスケレドモ彼々悪クナルモノハデアリマス、私ハ自分ノ答ヲ致

叙ノ事ヲテ、印刷ノ文ヲ御記セントニ、

発行ニ於テハ彼々悪クナルリマスカラハ恐ラク

御記セントニ、

発行ニ於テハ彼々悪クナルリマスカラハ恐ラク

発行ニ於テハ彼々悪クナルリマスカラハ恐ラク

発行ニ於テハ彼々悪クナルリマスカラハ恐ラク

発行ニ於テハ彼々悪クナルリマスカラハ恐ラク

発行ニ於テハ彼々悪クナルリマスカラハ恐ラク
フ賢者ハ當時リマス。ソレナバ此事情ニ對スル根本ノ改革家トテハ第一ト云ヘバニニ財シテハ吾々ハ財政ノ緊張、斯ノ雲フコトヲスルノガ一紛ノ

大奥ノ禁酒デアリマス。
Def Doc No. 1702

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, et al

- VS-

ARAKI, So-en et al

SWORN DEPOSITION

Deponent: ISHIBASHI, Tanzen

Having first duly sworn on oath as on attached sheet and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country I hereby depose as follows.
Having first duly sworn as per sheet attached hereto and in accordance with the procedure followed in my country, I hereby depose as follows:

1) I, ISHIBASHI, Tanzan was born in Tokyo in September, 1884, graduated in 1907 from WASEDA University, majoring in philosophy in the department of literature, and immediately took a post-graduate course in philosophy in the same university.

2) In 1908 I obtained a position on the editorial staff of THE TOKYO MAINICHI NEWSPAPER PUBLISHING COMPANY.

3) In 1911 I obtained a position on the editorial staff of THE TOKYO TETSUJI SHINPO Publishing Company. This publishing company was established in 1855 for the purpose of supplying the educated classes of the Japanese people with correct knowledge of economics and up-to-date information on world topics. It has since devoted itself to the publication of economic
periodicals such as THE TÔYÔ KEIZAI SHINPO (Oriental Economic Reports) (weekly), THE ORIENTAL ECONOMIST (monthly, later weekly), NIHON KEIZAI NENPO (Japan's Yearly Economic Reports) (quarterly), GAIKOKU BÔEKI GEPPÔ (Foreign Trade Monthly), etc., and also of books or economic subjects, as well as the compilation and publication of statistical books such as Meiji and Taisho Japan Almanac (1927), Foreign Trade of Japan, a statistical survey (1925), Meiji and Taisho Financial Almanac (1927) and Tôyô Keizai Statistical year Book (from 1916 yearly). THE TÔYÔ KEIZAI SHINPO (Oriental Economic Reports) was started in 1895 after the style of THE ECONOMIST published in London. It is the oldest economic periodical in Japan and has, ever since its foundation, been regarded as the best and most trustworthy of periodicals in the industrial and economic world of Japan.

4) In 1914 I became the Chief of the editorial staff of the same publishing company, and in 1924 manager of the same company. In 1925, after the reorganization of the company I became its president. For 34 years I had been most closely connected with the editing of the aforesaid TÔYÔ KEIZAI SHINPO (Oriental Economic Reports), until May, 1946.

5) In July, 1931, I had the Keizai Club (Economic Club) organized in Tokyo and then in Osaka, Nagoya, and various other cities throughout the country, by getting together the leading
businessmen of each city for the purpose of their joint study of economic questions. As chairman of the board of directors of the central Economic Club I took the leadership of those clubs.

6) From July, 1932 to March, 1947, I lectured on economics at the YOKOHAMA FOGO SENMON GANKO (Yokohama Industrial College).

7) In June, 1943, I founded the KINTU GAKKAI (Financial Institute), as an organ for financiers and technical experts of the country to study financial questions. Its headquarters were in the office and building of the TOYO KEIZAI SHIMP PUBLISHING COMPANY and as acting director of the Institute I devoted myself to the leadership and promotion of its activity.

8) In 1934, I started an English magazine, THE ORIENTAL ECONOMIST of which I became editor-in-chief. This magazine portrayed the economic conditions of Japan as well as of the East in general. The magazine soon obtained many appreciative readers abroad who considered it as the most fair-minded and trustworthy economic magazine published in Japan. Even after the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941 and consequent stoppage of communications with the Western countries it was, by the request of the League of Nations, continuously forwarded to Geneva.

9) Since 1935, representing the financial circles of Japan, I have held 21 different memberships in various committees and councils in the cabinet, Finance Office, and Commerce and Industry Office of the Japanese government.

10) In May, 1946, I was appointed Finance Minister in the Yoshida
cabinet. On January, 1947, I was appointed managing head of the Economic Stabilization Office and head of the Prices Board, and on March 20, 1947 resigned from the same offices. On the resignation on bloc of the Yoshida Cabinet on May 24th, 1947, I resigned from the office of Finance Minister.

11) The essays I have written and published in various magazines since graduating from the university on economic subjects and others are innumerable. The following are representative of my works published in book form:

a) ADVOCATING A NEW AGRICULTURAL POLICY. July 25, 1927
b) INFLUENCE OF THE LIFTING OF THE GOLD EMBARGO AND COUNTER-MEASURES THERETO. July 12, 1929
c) A STUDY OF GOLD STANDARD. May 12, 1932
d) THEORY AND FACTS ABOUT INFLATION. July 8, 1932
e) RECENT ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL PHASES IN JAPAN. Sept. 5, 1939
f) FINANCIAL HISTORY OF JAPAN. Sept. 15, 1939
g) JAPANESE ECONOMY IN A REVOLUTION. Nov. 20, 1937
h) IMPRESSIONS OF INDUSTRIAL PHASES OF MANCHURIA AND KOREA. Feb. 26, 1941
i) HUMAN LIFE AND ECONOMY. Oct. 20, 1942

12) I collaborated with E.B. Schumpeter in the editing of the Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1870-1940 (pub. 1940), which was carried out by the financial support of the Bureau of International Research at Harvard University and...
1. OVER-POPULATION AND FOOD SHORTAGE IN JAPAN

It is not too much to say that all distinctive features of Japanese economy and politics have emanated from the pressure of over-population. How Japan has been over-populated may be best shown by comparing the area of her arable land with her population.

As shown in Table 1 (attached), the density of population per 1 square kilometer in the Japanese mainland stands at 191, only slightly lower than 196 in the British mainland. However, the density of population per 1 square kilometer of arable land in the Japanese mainland is 1,194, far higher than 891 in the British mainland and eclipsing the corresponding density in any other country.

The over-population in Japan has become aggravated with the lapse of time as shown in Table 2. During the period from 1882 to 1939, the Japanese population was nearly doubled from 37,000,000 to 73,000,000. During the same period, however, the area of arable land increased less than 35 per cent from 4,507,000 chobu to 6,079,000 chobu. Thus, the Japanese population is disproportionately large to the small area of her arable land.

In this connection, it should be additionally pointed out that the proportion of agricultural population in the total population in Japan is exceptionally large although it has
begun to become smaller lately in Japan as in other countries. As shown in Table 3, the agricultural population at present still accounts for 47.2 per cent of the total population. According to the national census, the agricultural population also accounted for 43.1 per cent of the working population in the year of 1944 (Table 4). Those population figures are compared with those in other Pacific countries in Table 5. According to Table 5, the percentage of the agricultural population in the working population in Japan comes next only to British Malay and is twice as high as in the United States.

Under these circumstances, the agricultural management unit in Japan becomes inevitably small. As shown in Table 6, 94 per cent of Japanese farmers in 1946 were cultivators of less than 2 chobu (less than 2 hectares) of arable land each. Japan is not self-supplied in food-stuffs domestically. Table 7 shows how the supply-demand situation of rice, the staple food for the Japanese, stands. It shows that Japan proper in the past was able to meet the national demand for rice by importing from 9,000,000 koku to 15,000,000 koku from abroad.
2. STEPS TAKEN BY JAPAN FOR COPING WITH THE AFORE-MENTIONED DIFFICULTIES.

In order to cope with the afore-mentioned difficulties, Japan, as a whole, adopted four major policies.

In the first place, Japan attempted to bolster the food supply by either expanding the area of arable land within the country and or by increasing the per-unit harvest. Apparently Japan succeeded in attaining a certain success in these two attempts.

As Table 2 shows, the area of arable land rose from 4,507,000 chobu in 1882 to 6,098,000 chobu in 1921. From then, however, the increase has stopped. In connection with the increase of the per-unit crops, the Government placed special stress on the improvement of rice. As shown in Table 8, the per-tan rice harvest, which averaged 1.536 koku during the years 1901 to 1905 was boosted to the average of 2.007 koku during the years 1934 to 1938. In order to increase the per-tan production, however, fertilizer consumption naturally rose markedly as shown in Table 9. The increase of the per-tan production, too, came to a standstill since 1939. (Table 8).

In the second place, Japan encouraged agricultural development in Korea and Formosa, and the importation from those countries to Japan of their farm products particularly rice. Thus,
Japan came to be able to import from these two countries rice in quantity almost enough to make up for the domestic shortage as shown in Table 10.

In the third place, emigration was encouraged. This policy, however, proved a failure. Since the first year of Meiji (1868) up to the present, the Japanese population increased by 36,000,000 while Japanese overseas residents roughly numbered 1,000,000 in 1938, as Table 11 shows.

In the fourth place, domestic industrialization and foreign trade were encouraged. As stated, Japan imported the best part of her food shortage from Korea and Formosa. Naturally, Japan was called upon to make incidental payments for such imports with industrial manufactures.

Japan, unable to be self-sufficient in foodstuffs, cannot be expected to be self-supplied in agricultural raw materials. Mineral resources, too, are poor and scanty in Japan. In order to remove the pressure of over-population and elevate the living standard of the people even in the least degree, Japan was necessarily called upon to encourage domestic industrialization and accelerate foreign trade. Such were the basic policies which Japan actually adopted since the early years of Meiji.
Gradual development of the industrialization in Japan experienced since the Meiji era can also be seen from the structure of the working people. (Table 4) The 12th Table attached hereto shows too the above fact from the viewpoint of the number of workers of various industries sufficed since 1909.

According to this Table, the total number of workers of Japanese industries attained in 1919 one million five hundred twenty thousand showing a 30% increase as compared with eight hundred thousand in 1909. During this period, Japan saw this much of a speedy industrialization. But the number of plant-workers in 1931 amounted to one million six hundred and sixty thousand, showing an increase of only a little less than 10% as compared to that of 1919. This period just corresponded to that of the depression period which appeared after the First World War and accordingly Japanese industries too were brought to a complete standstill. But this period of depression ended in Japan in 1931, and as a result of a reflation policy adopted since 1932, a period of boom came to the Industries, with the total number of workers in 1938 amounting to three million two hundred fifteen thousand showing twice as much an increase as compared to that in 1919 and 1931.

The abovementioned increase in number of industrial workers explains in the main with what tempo the industrialization of Japan was carried out, and explanation of this can be summarized as follows: The scope of industry during the period of ten years from 1909 to 1919 was doubled and it was the same in the period of seven years from 1931 to 1938, but
industry was almost at a standstill from 1919 to 1931 so that the total number of workers in 1938 barely showed an increase of only twice as much as compared with that of 1919 during the period of nineteen years; in this increase there was nothing phenomenal if a comparison be made with the progress which was made during the period of 10 years from 1909 to 1919. The comparatively speedy progress experienced since 1931 means, as a matter of fact, nothing but a move of getting back what had been in arrears during the period of 10 years preceding 1931; it was, by no means, extraordinary progress.

Now let us see what kind of industry was brought to develop in Japan by such industrialization as mentioned above. First, the chief characteristic of industry in Japan was that of the textile industry which had always occupied a preponderant position. In referring to the number of workers given in the 12th Table, it is found that in 1938 textile workers numbered nine hundred seventy six thousand, occupying 30.4% of the total number of workers. If the eighty seven thousand five hundred and sixty workers in 1938 of the rayon manufacturing industry, which is included in the chemical industry, is added hereto the number of the textile workers would increase to 1,064,512 and its ratio to the total number of all the industrial workers to 33.1%.

This Ratio, which the textile industry occupied, had a trend to go down gradually from the historical viewpoint; viz, the proportion of textile workers to that of workers of all the industries is as follows:

- 60.8% in 1909,
- 55.2% in 1919,
- 54.1% in 1931 and
- 30.4% in 1938.
which clearly shows a gradual decline in general.

By what, then, was this decline of ratio in the textile industry supplemented? It was principally by the metal industry, machine and tool industry and chemical industry. For example, with the number of workers for each of those industries in 1909 taken into account, we see that, the ratio of the metal industry was 2.3%, that of the machine and tool industry 5.8% and that of the chemical industry 5.4%, but in 1919 this ratio increased respectively to 4.9%, 12.3% and 7.1%, which shows an increase, during this period, of 115%, 112% and 31% respectively for the metal, machine and tool, and chemical industries. From these figures it is clearly understood how great a development these three industries achieved during this period.

The development of the above three industries was retarded, however, in the period of depression covering 12 years from 1919 to 1931. Not only this, but in the machine and tool industry, the number of workers fell from 187,000 to 158,000 and in all industries, the ratio from 12.3% to 9.5%.

But this state of depression ended with the year of 1931 as aforesaid, and the abovementioned three industries began to be active again. As to the ratios which approached for the number of workers, it increased in 1938 to 11.7% for the metal industry, 26.8% for the machine and tool industry and 10% for the chemical industry. Compared with 1919, however, an increase in the ratios of these three industries during the period of 19 years was 139% in the metal industry, 118% in machine and tool industry and 41% in chemical industry, but this increase can by no means be said to
be very much compared with the increase experienced during the period of 10
years from 1909 to 1919.

Thus, even in 1938, the ratio of metal, machine and tool, and chemical
industry to the whole industry was 48.5% and taking all those for non-
consumer material industry, the remaining 51.5% belong to consumer material
industry. Still more, in the chemical industry are included, as aforecited,
the rayon industry (in the 13th year of Showa, number of workers were
87,560) and, besides this, also soap and toilet articles manufacturing
industry (in 1938, 9,238) and pulp and paper manufacturing industry (in
1938, 42,597). Accordingly, if these are included the ratio of non-
consumer material industry goes down and that of consumer material industry
increases all the more.

In short, Japan's industrialization was brought about since the Meiji
era by the necessity of her existence and as a characteristic of a belatedly
developed industrial country we have seen Japan industrialized
principally by textile and other consumer material industries. It appears
as if production material industry developed with great speed since 1931,
but it was due to industrialization delayed during the period between
1919 and 1931. In other words, this does not mean more than the above
delay being speedily adjusted by the influence of a business boom revived
after 1931. This trend is considered quite natural for a belatedly
developed industrial country that had to follow such a path trudgingly.
4. Growth in Trade

Industrialized Japan expanded her foreign trade at the same time. The trend of increase is shown in Table 13. Exports amounted to 222 million yen in 1899, but in 1909 the amount became approximately twice as much as the former, 458 million yen, and in 1919 it increased with a rush to 2 billion 374 million yen. It was five times as much as the amount of ten years prior. But in 1931, it decreased to 1 billion 479 million yen almost a half of the amount in 1919, owing to the depression after the World War 1. Japan's economic circles were beset with difficulties. However, during this period, the exports to Formosa and Korea increased slightly. And thus the decrease of exports to other foreign countries was covered in some measures.

Japanese exports which continued to decrease up to 1931 then began to increase again with the suspension of the gold standard which was effected again in the fall of the same year (in 1917 Japan suspended the gold standard, but she restored it in January, 1930) as well as with the depreciation of the foreign price of yen. Then, the amount of exports increased to 4 billion 89 million yen in 1937 and to 5 billion 163 million yen in 1939.
Next, the imports also showed almost the same change as the exports up to 1937. But during the period between 1937 and 1939, the imports decreased slightly, while the exports increased continuously as mentioned above. Although the imports from Formosa and Korea increased continuously, the imports from other foreign countries decreased remarkably.

We have reviewed so far the condition of Japanese trade from the point of view of value of her trade, but this value is influenced by fluctuations in commodity prices. So, after dividing the value of trade, as shown in Table 13, by the price index, in order to exclude these fluctuations in prices, we show the trend of Japanese trade in Table 14. According to this table, one can conclude that Japanese exports and imports, excepting their decrease since 1937, did not show great variations, and increased smoothly and even rapidly.

Next, by what goods was this increase in trade brought about? Table 15 shows this trend regarding export trade since 1919. In this table, two classified items, the 8th and 9th, which are textile manufactured goods, stand first on the list decidedly all through this period.

The total amount of these classified items is 1 billion 291 million yen in 1919, 1 billion 588 million yen in 1937, and 1 billion 503 million yen in 1939, and their proportions to the grand total of Japan's export
trade are 61.5%, 50.3%, and 42% respectively. But the ratio
of exports of textile goods fell gradually, as clearly shown
in the figures given above. The export of textile goods in
1939 also decreased in value itself in comparison with that
of 1937. These facts show that the export of Japanese
textile goods was already slowing down in its rate of increase.

Next, the special feature of Japanese exports, as we
have previously observed in regard to Japan's industry. If
we examine this point in Table 15, con classified items,
namely the 1st (living plants and animals), 2nd (grains, flours,
starches and seeds), 3rd (beverages, comestibles and tobacco),
4th (skins, hairs, horns, tusks and manufactures thereof),
8th (yarns, threads, twines, cordagers and materials thereof),
9th (tissues and manufactures thereof), 10th (clothing and
accessories thereof), 11th (papers and paper manufactures),
13th (potteries and glass) and 17th (miscellaneous articles),
all can be said to belong to consumer goods, and these
(plus reexports) totalled 1 billion 773 million yen in 1919,
2 billion 499 million yen in 1937, and 2 billion 602 million
yen in 1939, and their proportions to the grand total of
exports were 84.6%, 78.7%, and 72.8% respectively. But here
also their ratio falls gradually. And, as things to make
up for this, other classified items, above all, "ores and
metals," scientific instruments, fire arms, vessels, vehicles,
Def. Doc. No. 1762

and machineries, in the 16th, began to be manufactured. Although the total of these three classified items amounted to 139 million yen in 1919, 451 million yen in 1937, and 657 million yen in 1939, and did not increase further, its rate of increase was remarkable. However, when we consider the rise in the prices of these goods during this period, we can not say that there was such a remarkable increase in their quantity.
5. Foreign Pressure on Japanese Goods.

The increase of Japanese exports, especially after 1931, created a problem in the world. At that time, the world was in a general depression, every country suffering from the decline of its export trade. However, as already stated Japan, by suspending the gold standard for the second time in December, 1931, was successful in raising domestic prices, thereby stimulating her industrial activities. At the same time, reduction of the international value (exchange rate) of Yen was favourable for the exportation of Japanese goods. As stated above, this was the reason why Japanese exports were increased during the period between 1931 and 1937. This also caused the increase of her imports. For Japan, this was the policy absolutely indispensable for her existence. Because, the depression which became worst in 1931 not only struck hard the Japan's industries causing many unemployment but also put her agriculture in a extremely difficult condition. Many incidents that happened following the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai in May, 1932 had much connection with this critical state of Japan's domestic condition. Had it not been for the second suspension of the gold standard in 1931 in an attempt to regain her economic prosperity, Japan would have been in a state of extreme disorganization in as early as 1932.

However, the time when Japanese exports were increased
was when the world was in the midst of a major depression.

It was just then that the British Empire decided to create the so-called British Empire Block by concluding the Ottawa Agreement (in July 1932). Meanwhile, the World Currency Conference of June 1933 to which much hope was pinned fell through.

Japanese goods, in the course of their penetration into new markets, encountered serious obstacles everywhere in the world.

Principal events are as follows:

(A) Abrogation by British India of the Japanese-Indian Commercial Treaty.

In April, 1933, British India notified Japan of its abrogation of the Japanese-Indian Commercial Treaty. Its establishment of a discriminatingly prohibitive tariff upon Japan's cotton goods followed this. Japan opposed this with the resolution of boycotting Indian cotton. In September of the same year, the Japanese-Indian Commercial Conference was convened and an agreement was reached whereby a link system was established between the quantity of Japanese cotton cloth imported into India and Indian cotton imported into Japan. In embodying the new provision, a New Japanese-Indian Commercial Treaty was concluded in July, 1934.

(B) Disruption of the Anglo-Japanese Cotton Industry Conference.

In accordance with the request by the British Government, an
unofficial Anglo-Japanese Cotton Industry Conference was held between February and March, 1934. The conference however, was finally disrupted because the British side insisted upon having the agreement cover not only the British territories but also foreign markets. In addition to this, in May of the same year, the British Government established throughout the territories of the British Empire the import-quota system which was extremely disadvantageous to the import of Japanese cotton cloth.

(C) Prohibitive Canadian Dumping Tariff.

In 1935, Canada imposed an almost prohibitive rate of tariff upon Japanese goods. Against this, in July of the same year, invoking the Trade Protection Law, Japan levied a retaliatory tariff on Canadian goods. In August of the same year, Canada raised the tariff super-tax. However, a compromise was struck between the two countries towards the end of the same year, and since January, 1936, Japan has given up the Application of the Trade-Protection Law, while Canada has effected either the reduction of the rates or the limitation of the scope of her dumping and other tariffs.

(D) Raising of Tariff Rates and the Import Licence System by Australia.

In May, 1936, the Australian Government put into effect the raising of tariff rates and the import licence system, both of which aimed at Japanese goods. As a counter-measure, Japan invoked the Trade-Protection Law in June of the same year.
Def. Doc. No. 1762

Australian extension of the "lighthouse-system" followed this. However, a compromise was reached at the end of the same year whereby Japan gave up the application of the Trade Protection Law, and guaranteed the quantity of wool she imported from Australia and limited quantities of her cotton cloth and artificial silk cloth, exported to Australia. Desire to find substitutes for wool stimulated Japan's staple fibre industries.

(5) Restrictions placed upon imports and Importers by the Netherlands East Indies.

In September, 1933, the Netherlands East Indies put into practice the Emergency Import Restrictions Law and the Law Restricting Qualifications of Importers both of which were aimed at Japan. In order to discuss problems of trade with Japan with a view of talking over all along the line, the Netherlands East Indies proposed in 1934 a conference with her. Japan accepted the proposal and beginning June of the same year the conference was held at Batavia. While the conference was in progress, however, the Netherlands East Indies extended the scope of the Import Restrictions, and Japan retaliated by suspending the exportation of certain goods. Thus the conference proceeded at a snail's pace. With the conclusion of the Marine Transportation Agreement in June, 1936, however, the conference began to make headway. In March, 1937, compromise was struck, and an agreement was concluded in April, which.
safeguarded the right of Japanese firms to export goods to the Netherlands E.I. (25% of the total amount), guaranteed the import of Java sugar into Japan, alleviated the restrictions Netherlands E.I. had placed upon imports, and made 1933 trade results as the basis of the allotment for Japanese goods.

The United States Trade Policy.

The United States established in 1930 high rates of tariff by the SMOOT-HAWLEY Act which merits special mention in the world economic picture. Under the provisions of this tariff over twenty items of Japanese goods exported to the United States had to suffer an additional ad valorem levy of about twenty three percent.

The United States, as a counter-measure for depression as well as for competition by countries which had gone off gold adopted in 1932 provisions giving flexibility to her customs law, a law preventing international dumping, in an attempt to check the flow of imports. In 1933, the United States suspended the gold standard but took steps to prevent the import of Japanese sundry goods.

Moreover, the Industrial recovery Act and the Agriculture Adjustment law of the same year included provisions restricting imports and raising tariff rates. Furthermore, in June, 1934, the sole authority to effect any changes in the tariff rates within the limit of 50 percent was vested in the President, which proved to be a serious menace to Japan. In 1935, increas
in import of Japanese cotton cloth into the U.S. brought about oppositions by American cotton merchants, and in December of the same year, Japan enforced the self-restriction of its export in the form of a gentleman's agreement. However, being dissatisfied with this, American merchants demanded having the quantity of exports limited by the application of the provisions of the Act. Thereupon the American Government, in June, 1936, put into effect an all-round increase in the tariff rates on an average of 42 percent.

In 1937, a mission representing the American cotton industry came to Japan, asking for the conclusion of the Cotton Industry Agreement. Japan complied with this and, in June of the same year, put into effect the restrictions upon the quantity of her cotton cloth exported to the United States. However, in view of the fact that goods imported from the United States were either indispensable or raw materials, Japan was unable to take any retaliatory or defensive measure against it.

(G) Trade Policy of Central and South America

Having been driven away from British Dominions including India and been shut out of the Netherlands East Indies, Japanese export goods found their way into Central and South American markets, where intense competition for the market took place between Japanese goods and goods from other countries. In an
attempt to secure her market in Central and South America, the
United States concluded Reciprocal Trade Agreement with these
countries. Meanwhile Japan endeavoured to establish Compensating
Trade System with these countries; the Central and South America
countries themselves consolidated their commercial policies.

It is only natural that the above-mentioned policies of the
foreign countries against the Japanese goods virtually prevented
the extension of the Japanese oversea trade. As has been shown,
the Japanese exports and imports obviously decreased after 1937.
Table No. 16 shows the state of decrease by respective districts.
The table shows that compared with the exports in 1937, those in
1939 suffered decrease in every district save in Asia where an
increase is indicated. As for imports, there was a decrease also
in Asia, but the decrease was no more than one hundred and fourteen
million yen. Since total decrease in imports was eight hundred
and sixty-six million yen, the decrease of exports for all areas
except Asia amounted to seven hundred and fifty two million yen.

A further examination of the contents of the increased ex­
ports in Asiatic markets reveals that the increase was due
entirely to that in Manchuria, Kwangtung Province and China. As for
the exports to other districts, except for slight increases to
Iran and Iraq, a general decrease is indicated. That is to say,
according to table No. 17 showing comparison of exports to Asiatic
districts between 1937 and 1939, the exports in 1939 to all Asiatic districts, except Manchuria, Kwantung Province and China, show a decrease of two hundred and eighty one million yen in comparison with those in 1937. In other words, the decrease is equivalent to 32.9 percent of total exports to those districts in 1937, which amounted to eight hundred and fifty four million yen. Furthermore, according to table No. 16, exports in 1939 for all continents except Asia show a decrease of two hundred and seventy three million yen compared with those in 1937. Consequently, there was a decrease totaling five hundred and fifty four million yen in Japan exports in 1939 for all sections of the world excepting Manchuria, Kwantung Province and China, compared with those in 1937. To show this by percentage, Japan lost in 1939 23.2 percent of her exports to those districts in 1937 which had amounted to twenty three hundred and eighty four million yen. To see these figures is to understand how heavy a blow was dealt to Japanese financial circles.

It goes without saying that Japan could not stand such a plight for a long time. However, enormously Japan might have increased her exports to Manchuria, Kwantung Province and China, there was no likelihood that she could import in return raw materials, food stuffs, etc. from those districts which were indispensable to her. Accordingly, it was only natural that there...
Def. Doc. No. 1762

was no way but to decrease her exports for those three districts. Thus, under the circumstances Japan not only could not have endured the strain of the China Incident for long, but also even the peaceful livelihood of her nationals have been endangered.

It was indeed unavoidable that Japan, who had been pressed into such a distressing state, should have taken measures to repel such serious financial and political insecurity. It was just as President Truman stated in one of his recent speeches, attached hereto. Because of the uneasiness that Japanese goods, especially textile fabrics, might be shut out from the world market, Japanese goods, especially textile fabrics, might be shut out from the world market, the tendency to reorganize Japanese industries from the manufacture of goods for consumption into other fields was accelerated. The export difficulty made the import difficulty inevitable, thereby strengthening the idea of national self-sufficiency. The advocacy of the creation of the Japanese-Manchurian or Japanese-Chinese economic block resulted from this. Finally, such state of affairs made the Japanese conceive the idea of the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere.

However, the establishment of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere was no more than an idea, (indeed, no Japanese had any definite idea about the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere until the last) and even the development of Manchuria and China was impossible of accomplishment in a short time. Certainly,
japan had exerted considerable efforts for these undertakings, resulting, however, in her excessive investments in and export to Manchuria and China. As has been pointed out, Japan could not expect an immediate and extensive increase in imports of her necessary commodities from these districts.

After the conclusion of the Tripartite Alliance, the situation rapidly grew worse, and in 1941, when the United States froze Japan's assets, she was in such a predicament that there was no way to save the situation. It meant that Japan had lost the market for her raw-silk, which was one of her most important products. It meant also that Japan had lost the source of materials for her cotton industry, which was also one of her most important industries. Above all, the fact that the United States resolutely carried out the freezing of Japanese assets had immediate effect on Britain and the Netherlands East Indies, both of which froze Japanese assets. Following their examples, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Malay, Burma, India, the Union of South Africa, etc., all froze Japanese assets and abrogated respective commercial treaties with Japan. Thus Japan had suffered an almost complete economic blockade, and Japan's industries as well as her very existence were threatened. This was the actual state of things at that time. However, Japanese industrialists still believed in a favourable turn in the relations between Japan and the United States.
On this 29 day of July, 1947
At Yamashita

The undersigned Deponent, Ishibashi Tanzen, hereby certify that the above statement was sworn by the Deponent, who affixed his signature and seal thereto in the presence of this witness.

Ishibashi Tanzen (seal)

On the same date, this statement was signed by the witness.

Ishibashi Tanzen (seal)

In accordance with my conscience I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth withholding nothing and adding nothing.

Ishibashi Tanzen (seal)
President Truman's Address at Baylor on
Foreign Economic Policy

Policy of All the People

This is not, and it must never be, the policy of a single administration,
or a single party. It is the policy of all the people of the United States.

We in America are unanimous in our determination to prevent another war.

But some among us do not fully realize what we must do to carry out this
policy. There still are those who seem to believe that we can confine our
cooperation with other countries to political relationships, that we need not
cooperate where economic questions are involved.

This attitude has sometimes led to the assertion that there should be
bipartisan support for the foreign policy of the United States, but that there
need not be bipartisan support for the foreign economic policy of the United
States.

Such a statement simply does not make sense.

Our foreign relations, political and economic, are indivisible. We cannot
say that we are willing to cooperate in the one field and are unwilling to
cooperate in the other. I am glad to note that the leaders in both parties
have recognized that fact.

The members of the United Nations have renounced aggression as a method
of settling their political differences. Instead of putting armies on the
march they have now agreed to sit down around a table and talk things out.

In any dispute each party will present its case. The interests of all
will be considered and a fair and just solution will be found. This is the way
of international order. It is the way of a civilized community. It applies,
with equal logic, to the settlement of economic differences.

Economic conflict is not spectacular—at least, in the early states. But it is always serious. One nation may take action on behalf of its own producers, without notifying other nations, or consulting them, or even considering how they may be affected. It may cut down its purchases of another country's goods, by raising its tariffs or imposing an embargo or a system of quotas on imports. And, when it does this, some producer in the other country will find the door to his market suddenly slammed and bolted in his face.

Producers: Effects of Dumping

Or a nation may subsidize its exports, selling its goods abroad below their cost. When this is done a producer in some other country will find his market flooded with the goods that have been dumped. In either case the producer gets angry, just as you or I would get angry if such a thing were done to us. Profits disappear; workers are dismissed. The producer feels that he has been wronged, without warning, and without reason. He appeals to his Government for action. His Government retaliates, and another round of tariff boosts, embargoes, quotas and subsidies is under way. This is economic war. In such a war nobody wins.

Certainly nobody won the last economic war. As each battle of the economic war of the Thirties was fought the inevitable tragic result became more and more apparent. From the tariff policy of Hawley and Smoot the world went on to Ottawa and the system of imperial preferences, from Ottawa...
to the kind of elaborate and detailed restrictions adopted by Nazi Germany. Nations strangled normal trade and discriminated against their neighbors all around the world.

Who among their peoples were the gainers? Not the depositors who lost their savings in the failure of the banks. Not the farmers who lost their farms. Not the millions who walked the streets looking for work. I do not mean to say that economic conflict was the sole cause of the depression. But I do say that it was major cause.

Now, as in the year 1920, we have reached turning point in history. National economies have been disrupted by the war. The future is uncertain everywhere. Economic policies are in a state of flux. In this atmosphere of doubt and hesitation the decisive factor will be the type of leadership that the United States gives the world.

We are the giant of the economic world. Whether we like it or not the future pattern of economic relations depends upon us. The world is waiting, and watching, to see what we shall do. The choice is ours. We can lead the nations to economic peace or we can plunge them into economic war. (...)

(The New York Times, Friday, March 7, 1947)
四正三年（一九四四年）同社ノ編輯長。

大正十三年（一九二四年）同社ノ主幹ニ就任シ、昭和十四年（一九二

昭和六年（一九三一年）七月東京ニ設イテ大阪、名古屋及全圏各都市

昭和七年（一九三二年）七月ヨリ昭和二十二年（一九四六年）三月迄

横濱工業専門学校講師ニ就任シ、経済学ヲ教授ス。

昭和十八年（一九四三年）六月全圏ノ金融ニ関スル學者及実業ヲ

石橋清山ハ其ノ理事トシテ同會ノ指導ヲ成シ当ル。
The Bureau of International Research at Harvard University and Radcliffe College, financial support

E. B. Schumpeter

The Industrialization of Japan and Manchukuo, 1930-1940 (1946)
2月14日

1788

4月20日

1788

11月3日

1788

12月21日

1788
一人で、英国本土の百九十六人よりも疎か低維

で、英米本土の自相宮が人口に於ては千百九十四人で英国本土

の八百九十一人よりも疎かに高く、本表中断然列国の首位を占めてゐる。

而して右の相対は年を経るに従って益しくなかった。それは第二表を見

ればわかる。明治十五年から昭和十四年になけて、人口は三千七百萬

から六百七萬九千町歩へと増長三割五分弱と増加したのに過ぎない。

新様に日本の人口は耕地面積に比し著しく大きいか、更にその上に指

を占めてゐる。

右の数字は太平洋沿岸諸国のそれに比較するに第五表の通りである。
なり、これに依るに日本の農業人口が有様人口中に占める割合は英領马来に
大々高率である。米国米産国の二倍以上である。以上の結果は必然日本に於て、農業経
常単位が過少ならざるを得ない。即ち第六表に依るに、昭和二十一年に於て全農家の
耕作面積は二町
以下（二ヘクタール以下）の耕作者であった。
以上に述べた所に依り、日本が国内に於て食糧の自給をなし得ざるの
は既に明らかである。而してそれを日本の主食糧たる米の需給に就て示
すに第七表の通りである。即ちこれに依るに年々約九百萬石から千五百
石を越える輸入を行って、初めて日本内地は米に對於する国民の需給を
充し得た。

凡ての困難を開慮して日本が採った手段
前記の困難を打開する方法として日本が採った政策は大別して四つあった、
その第一は国内の耕地を擴張し、更に耕作面積増加策を示して、食
糧の供給を計ることである。出して此の兩者とも或程度成功した。
大正十一年には六百九万八千町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正十二年には約六十万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正十三年には約六十三万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正十四年には約六十四万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正十五年には約六十五万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正十六年には約六十六万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正十七年には約六十七万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正十八年には約六十八万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正十九年には約六十九万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正二十年には約七十万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正二十一年には約七十一万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正二十二年には約七十二万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正二十三年には約七十三万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正二十四年には約七十四万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正二十五年には約七十五万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正二十六年には約七十六万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正二十七年には約七十七万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正二十八年には約七十八万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正二十九年には約七十九万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正三十年には約八十万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正三十一年には約八十一万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正三十二年には約八十二万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正三十三年には約八十三万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正三十四年には約八十四万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正三十五年には約八十五万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正三十六年には約八十六万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正三十七年には約八十七万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正三十八年には約八十八万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正三十九年には約八十九万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正四十年には約九十万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正四十一年には約九十ー万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正四十二年には約九十二万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正四十三年には約九十三万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正四十四年には約九十四万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。大正四十五年には約九十五万町歩に増加した。併しそれ以後は増加が停止した。
不足食糧の大部分を朝鮮及台灣から輸入したが之に対して支拠も亦主
として工業生産物を以てする必要があった。況食糧をへも自給出来な
い日本に於て他の農産原料が自給出来る者はない。糧物資源も亦日本
に是だ少ない。人口過剰の緊迫に除き更に多少なりとも國民の生活程度
の向上を計らんとすれば日本は是非共工業化と外國貿易の促進とを必要
とした。而してそれが正しく明治の初期以来日本が勢勢に於て辿って来
た経過であった。
五iverseに落った。

併し此の不景気は前にも述べた如く一九三一年を以て終った。而して

前記三工業の進展も亦再び開始された。故工業に限られた比観は一九三
八年に於て金屬工業一・七％、機械器具工業二・六％、化学工業一
八％に増加した。併し之れを一九一九年に比較すると、三工業の比重の
増加は十九年間に金屬工業一三・九％、機械器具工業一八・八％、化学工業一
八％であって一九〇九年から一九一九年に至る十年間のそれに比し決
して多くない。

斯くして一九三八年に於ても金屬工業、機械器具工業及び化学工
業の他石炭及び化学製造業（昭和十三年職工数八七・五一）が化学工
業全体に占める割合は四八・五％で此等の全部を非消費材工業とするも、

九七一二等が化学工業中に加えられてある。従て此等を除くと更に一層非
之れを要するに日本は其の生存の必要上、明治以降工業化が行われた

而して其の工業化は後進工業国の特徴として紡織業の他の消費工業に

於て主として進展した一九三〇年以降を以て急進的に工業化の過漣に由るものをあった。即ちその後の過漣が一九三〇年より一九三一年に至る間の工業

復に依り急速に取り返されたのに過ぎない。後進工業国のたどる経過

として當然のことであったと考えられる。
すきに輸入も一九三七年をとく、輸出略相同様の変化を示した。一九三七年から一九三九年に至る期間は輸出が前記の如く減って増加したのに反して、輸入は著しく減少した。延渉及び朝鮮よりの輸入は引続いて増加したが、他の外国よりの輸入が著しく減少したのである。貿易の価額には物価の変動が作用してある。故にこの物価の難動は無く、然に面から養か急速に増進した。貿易の価額においては物価の変動を除く第十四章の通りである。之れに依るに日本の輸出入は一九三七年以前の減少を除くに於て全期間を通じて織物工業品である第二及第九の二類が在るのに占めてある。郎ち此の二類の合計金額は一九二九年十二億九千八百万円で、一九三九年十億三百万円で、総輸出額
中に占める割合は夫々大一・五％、五〇・三％、四二％である。併し、
紡績品輸出の比重は、以上の数字によって明らかに、漸次低下した。又
一九三九年の紡績品輸出は金額そのものも一九三七年に比し減少した。
此等の事實は、日本の紡績品の輸出が既に増進の步を遅滞してゐたと
ことを示すものである。
大に、日本の輸出貿易の特徴は殆に日本の工業に就て観察したのと同
様に消費材の輸出の甚だ多いことである。之を第十五表に依て見ると、
第一（動植物生きたさし）、第二（穀・粉・種子）、第三（飲食料
品及煙草）、第四（毛・角・骨及び細工）、第五（織物）、第六（陶器
品及締結品）、第七（機械工具）、第八（建築工品）、第九（機械
及紙製品）、第十（衣類及び家具工品）、第十一（染織品）の十指類は、邑
れも消費材に属するものの言ふべく其の合計は（再艶出品を合せて）一
九三九年二十六億七千三百万圆を算し、其等が輸出総額に對する割合は夫々八
四・五％、七八・七％、七ニ、八％、に上る。併し此に於て最も比重が漸
次低下してある。そして之を補ふもののとして、其の他の種類、就中第十一～四類の一類及び金属製品、第十二類の一時計、學術器械、絞砲、船車、及機械類が登場した。併し共等の金額は三類を合計して一八九九年一億五千七百万円に止った。又三九年六億五千七百万円に止った。併しきの間の此等の諸品の価格の騰貴を考へると、数量に於て斯く著しく増加があつたとは言へない。
日本の輸出貿易の増進は、誇りに一九三一年以後に於て世界に貢献を遂げた。従来、輸出を通じて貿易の重要性を認識し、輸出の拡大を図り、国際経済の発展に寄与するため、輸出の拡大を慢なして来た。しかし一九三一年に入ると輸出の停滞と想定される事実が明らかになった。

その後、輸出の急激な減少とそれに伴う貿易赤字の拡大が見られ、貿易の困難が増大した。一九三一年の経済恐慌は、日本経済の大きな打撃を与えた。輸出の減少は、日本経済の問題を深刻なものとし、貿易赤字の拡大は、日本の貿易ポジションを脅かす可能性も示唆された。

しかし、輸出の停滞と想定される事実は、日本経済の深刻な不況を示すものである。貿易赤字の拡大は、日本の貿易ポジションを脅かす可能性も示唆された。
併し逆に日商品の輸出増加する時期前に述べた如く世界の不況の延長中であり、英制圧はオッタワ協定を打つ一月、所謂英領国領の所轄成長を採用するに至った折である。期待された一九三三年五月の世界通貨経済議定も失敗した。日本商品の輸出が世界の観に於て強烈な障壁に出会った。その主なる条項を列記すれば次のようにある。一九三三年三月、英領印度の日印通商條約破足、日本の對印不買の決意を以て對抗したが同年五月、日印通商條約の一方的発案を通告して来た。又引続き経済物に於ける差別的禁止施行を設定した。日本は之に立し、一九三四年七月新日印通商條約が成立した。
日英総業会談の決裂

英国政府の申入により一九三四年二月より三月にかけてロンドンに於て
日英民間総業会談が開かれたが英国側は英の協定地域を英帝国内のみ
ならず外國市場にまで及ぼすことを主張したる為め之に決裂した。而
して英国政府は同年五月、日本総布に對して不利益を輸入のターゲ
を英帝國全土に布かしめた。

ハ、カナダの禁止的ダンピング税
一九三五年カナダは日本商品に對し禁止的ダンピング税を賦課した。
日本は之れに對し同年七月通商調節法を発動して報復的関税をカナダ
商品に課し、カナダも亦同年八月より関税附加税増徴の態態に出た。

ノ、淡洲の関税引上及輸入許可制
一九三六年五月日本商品を目標とする関税引上及輸入許可制を実施し
米国は既に一九三〇年に世界史上特筆に値するホーレー・スムート関税と並ぶ高率関税を設定した。その為日本米の輸出入品中二十餘税が平均徴率二三％の増徴を課した。一九三三年に至ると米国は金本位を停止し、運用して輸入品防遏に努めた。一九三三年には米国は米穀出荷を抑制し報復法の成勧法項又はダンピング防止法を適用して輸入品防遏に努めた。一九三二年には不況報復対策に金本位を停止し報復法を適用し、輸入品防遏に努めた。一九三三年には米国は報復を停止し、報復法を適用して輸入品防遏に努めた。報復法の報復法項又はダンピング防止法を適用して輸入品防遏に努めた。一九三三年には米国は金本位を停止し報復法を適用して輸入品防遏に努めた。
なかなかった。

中南米の進出政策

印度の他国通商により進出され進出により閉め出した日本の進出

易は中南米市場に進出を開始したことで他国と激熱な市場戦を展開した。米

国との間に仮設貿易制の確立に努力した。又中南米诸国自体に於ても進出

政後を弱化した。以　の如き日本商品に對於する外国の政策が日本の貿易を実質的に妨げた

とは當然である。既に前に見た如く一九三七年以降の日本の進出口は図白

に減少した。而してその減少状況を更に地域別に示すと第十六表の通りで

減少は七億五千二百百万円に達したのである。

更に右アフリカへの進出増加の内容を見るにそれは全く前進と東洋及び中華

民国への増加に原因したのであつて他の方的にに対する

減少は八億六千六百万円であったからアフリカに対する進

出減少は七億五千二百百万円に達したのである。
右の如き窮境に立った日本が経済的及び政治的に大なる努力を感じ、

又反復するに至ったことは既に述べた通りである。それは最近トランプ大統領

が二年も前から世界の市場から降り出されるとは云々せず、日本はその利益

を減ずる結果は必然的に入をも困難にするのでことに自国自足主義の思

想を張り、引いて日頃乃至日露支経済プロックの主導を生じ従来は大英

連盟国建設の思春を抱かしめるに過ぎた。従って日本大同連盟国の建設の

第五まで日本の経済にそれについて過分の意味はなかった。しかし仲支の

述べた程くその後の地域から日本之必要とする資源を引出する之を必要

に然らざるに非た。日本はその需要に相当の力

増加するとことは期待し得なかった。事態は三国同盟の締結の緊急に感化

Dec, Dec, No1768

- 25 -
一八九一年米戦が日本に資産を凍結するに至って日本は米米交渉の流れを余地なく窮地に陥った。それは日本に資産凍結の一たる経済の発展を失ふことをとである。況や米国の対日資産凍結断行は日本に資産凍結の一たる経済の発展を失ふことを約を破棄するに至った。日本資産凍結と国民生活とは共に底を打つに至ったが日本との通商条約を破棄するに至った。日本資産凍結は米米交渉の好機を信じて居た。

- 26 -
国画的格调

通过对国画的深入研究，我们可以看到其独特的艺术风格和技法。

国画的美学

国画的美学在于其注重意境，追求笔墨情趣和形式美的结合。
吾々は一面にしては喜んで協力するが他面では喜んで協力しないと云ふと
余は向の指導者達がこの真実を認めたことを知らぬを欣快である。
合衆国の国民各々は相互の政治的相異を決定する手段として攻撃すると
いふ事を放棄した。今や我等を動かす代わりに彼等は卓を囲み、じつくり
とそれについて話し合う様に一かした。
合衆国の指導者達がこの真実を認めたことを知らぬを欣快である。
余は向の指導者達がこの真実を認めたことを知らぬを欣快である。
ことによって成国は他国商品の貿易を制限するだろう。
そしてそれが実施される時、他国の生産者は自己の市場の門戸が突然に目
を開けることによって成国は他国商品の貿易を制限するだろう。
その市場がいつもにつながっていなかったら、成国の生産者はダンピング
で、その市場がいつもにつながっていなかったら、成国の生産者はダンピング
を知るだろう。
もしこれは真実ならば、他国の生産者はダンピングを知るだろう。
利益がなくなったり、労働者は失業する。
成国の政府は報復する。そして関税引上げ、通商禁止制を導入、補助金
制のやりとりが始まる。之が経済戦争である。

一九三○年代の経済戦争の一つ一つの争いが行われるについて、不可避の

Def Doc No. 1762
悲惨な結果がますます明らかになった。

ホーア・スモートの関税政策から世界はオッタワと帝国地域内特需制度に赴き、オッタワからナチ・ドイツによって採られた金銭的抑制制限制に

世界中の諸国家は正常な貿易を抑制し他の近隣諸国に対して差別待遇をし

預金者ではない。農地を失った農民でもない。職を求めて余力さまよう数百万の人々でもない。

私は経済的衝突が不況の唯一の原因だったというのではない。今や我々は一九二〇年当時と同様に歴史の転換期に到達した。国民経済は

戦争によって引裂かれた。将来は至る所における不安定である。経済政策は無動状態にある。この疑惑と跡跡の空気を包まれた中にあつて決定的要因は米国が世界に飛べる指導
の型である。我々は経済界の巨人である。我々が好むと否とに強さは経済の世界にある。戦争は我々の出かたを期待し且注目して見つめてある。選択は我々にある。我々は諸国家を経済的平和へ導くことも出来るypi。
ERRATE SHEET

Page 1, 6th line from the bottom _______ "I seemed" should be read "I secured".

Page 2, 7th line from the bottom _______ "1925" should be read "1935".

Page 3, 4th line from the top _______ "July 1932 to March 1947" should be read "April 1925 to July 1932".

Page 15, the last line _______ between "metals", and "scientific instruments" should be inserted the following;", 14th, Metal Manufactures, 16th and"

Page 16, 1st line _______ "to be manufactured" should be read "to be exported".

Page 23, 8th line _______ "exports for" should be read "imports from".
无
Table 1

Density of population and agricultural population per one square kilometre arable land, etc.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Density of population (per one sq. km.)</th>
<th>Proportion of arable land area against total land</th>
<th>Density of population per one sq. km. arable land</th>
<th>Per 100 population occupied</th>
<th>Year of survey</th>
<th>Percentage of agricultural population</th>
<th>Percentage of industrial and mining population</th>
<th>Agricultural population per one sq.km. arable land</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>1194</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>76.0%</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td>*555</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>**75.0%</td>
<td>**75.0%</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 provinces in China proper</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>(20%)</td>
<td>*555</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>**75.0%</td>
<td>**75.0%</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1938</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>***53.5%</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria</td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>74.7%</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
<td>**10.7%</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.S.R.</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>1926</td>
<td>96.4%</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>991</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rumania</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>21.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Note) The mark * denotes estimating percentage of arable land area as 20%.
The mark ** denotes comparison of number of agricultural households against total number of households.
The mark *** denotes percentage of agricultural population against total population.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>国名</th>
<th>人口密度 (人/平方公里)</th>
<th>地中海沿岸面積の割合</th>
<th>粗地</th>
<th>人口</th>
<th>有業人口100人に付</th>
<th>輸出</th>
<th>産業</th>
<th>工業</th>
<th>人口</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>日本</td>
<td>1940 1191</td>
<td>16% 1194</td>
<td>18 1933</td>
<td>5 1930</td>
<td>47.7% 20.0%</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>418</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>美国</td>
<td>1940 110</td>
<td>20% 550</td>
<td>18 1933</td>
<td>10 1935</td>
<td>76.0 2.8</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>欧州</td>
<td>1940 111</td>
<td>(20) 555</td>
<td>11 1936</td>
<td>1934</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>416</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>澳大利亞</td>
<td>1940 163</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>18 1933</td>
<td>18 1935</td>
<td>679</td>
<td>363</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>挪威</td>
<td>1940 33</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>16 1939</td>
<td>10 1935</td>
<td>74.7 3.2</td>
<td>115</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>印度</td>
<td>1941 75</td>
<td>203</td>
<td>16 1939</td>
<td>8 1931</td>
<td>65.3 10.7</td>
<td>194</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>英国</td>
<td>1939 9</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>10 1935</td>
<td>1 1926</td>
<td>86.4 5.5</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>瑞典</td>
<td>1939 196</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>16 1939</td>
<td>0 1931</td>
<td>6.4 37.7</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>アイルランド</td>
<td>1940 43</td>
<td>19 226</td>
<td>16 1939</td>
<td>1 1926</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>113</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>フランス</td>
<td>1939 76</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>16 1937</td>
<td>8 1931</td>
<td>35.0 33.6</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>スペイン</td>
<td>1940 52</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>10 1935</td>
<td>0 1920</td>
<td>56.1</td>
<td>75</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>イタリア</td>
<td>1941 144</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>12 1937</td>
<td>0 1931</td>
<td>46.8 30.3</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ベルギー</td>
<td>1940 272</td>
<td>756</td>
<td>16 1938</td>
<td>0 1920</td>
<td>19.0 46.6</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>年</td>
<td>愛媛県</td>
<td>東京府</td>
<td>名古屋府</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

"1941年4月の東京府の人口は5.5万人です。
1950年の東京府の人口は5.5万人です。"
Table 2.

Transition of Population and arable land area.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Index Number</th>
<th>Arable Land</th>
<th>Index Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1902</td>
<td>36,700</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4,507</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>39,070</td>
<td>106.5</td>
<td>4,635</td>
<td>103.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>42,090</td>
<td>111.9</td>
<td>4,770</td>
<td>106.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1917</td>
<td>43,229</td>
<td>117.0</td>
<td>5,011</td>
<td>111.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1922</td>
<td>45,990</td>
<td>125.3</td>
<td>5,134</td>
<td>113.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1927</td>
<td>49,745</td>
<td>132.0</td>
<td>5,437</td>
<td>120.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>52,167</td>
<td>142.1</td>
<td>5,757</td>
<td>127.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>55,235</td>
<td>150.5</td>
<td>5,896</td>
<td>130.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>56,737</td>
<td>154.7</td>
<td>6,098</td>
<td>135.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>60,521</td>
<td>164.2</td>
<td>6,060</td>
<td>134.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>64,450</td>
<td>175.6</td>
<td>6,059</td>
<td>134.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>66,196</td>
<td>185.3</td>
<td>6,033</td>
<td>134.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>69,254</td>
<td>199.7</td>
<td>6,059</td>
<td>134.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>70,250</td>
<td>199.5</td>
<td>6,065</td>
<td>135.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>71,253</td>
<td>194.1</td>
<td>6,060</td>
<td>135.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>72,223</td>
<td>190.6</td>
<td>6,070</td>
<td>134.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>72,376</td>
<td>190.6</td>
<td>6,079</td>
<td>134.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Population Unit = 1,000
Arable Land Unit = 1,000 Chōbu

Sources: Population statistics, compiled by the Cabinet Statistic Bureau in 1940, and Statistical Chart of Agriculture and Forestry, compiled by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry in 1943.
### Table 2 人口、耕地面積、収穫

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年</th>
<th>人口</th>
<th>雨数</th>
<th>耕地</th>
<th>寸数</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>明治15</td>
<td>38,700</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4,507</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>39,070</td>
<td>106.5</td>
<td>4,685</td>
<td>103.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>41,090</td>
<td>111.9</td>
<td>4,778</td>
<td>106.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>43,229</td>
<td>117.0</td>
<td>5,011</td>
<td>111.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35</td>
<td>45,990</td>
<td>125.3</td>
<td>5,134</td>
<td>113.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>48,745</td>
<td>132.8</td>
<td>5,437</td>
<td>120.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>大正1</td>
<td>52,167</td>
<td>142.1</td>
<td>5,757</td>
<td>127.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>55,235</td>
<td>150.8</td>
<td>5,896</td>
<td>130.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>56,787</td>
<td>154.7</td>
<td>6,098</td>
<td>135.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>昭和1</td>
<td>60,521</td>
<td>164.2</td>
<td>6,080</td>
<td>134.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>64,450</td>
<td>173.6</td>
<td>6,059</td>
<td>134.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>68,195</td>
<td>185.6</td>
<td>6,038</td>
<td>134.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>69,254</td>
<td>188.7</td>
<td>6,059</td>
<td>134.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>70,258</td>
<td>191.4</td>
<td>6,085</td>
<td>135.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>71,253</td>
<td>194.1</td>
<td>6,098</td>
<td>135.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>72,223</td>
<td>196.8</td>
<td>6,078</td>
<td>134.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>72,876</td>
<td>198.6</td>
<td>6,079</td>
<td>134.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

備考：人口単位ハ千人，耕地単位ハ千町歩

出處：内閣統計局編著，人口動態統計（昭和十八年）及び
農林省調査，農業統計表（昭和十八年版）
Table 3

Transition of percentage of agricultural population against total population.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1873</td>
<td>78.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1888</td>
<td>67.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>46.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>47.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Same as Table (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.

Transition of Percentage of Populations by their Occupations (Census).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Agriculture</th>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>Commerce</th>
<th>Total including Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>57.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>25.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: The same as Table 1.
Table 4.

有実人口構成の変遷
(関勢調査)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>他</th>
<th>其他</th>
<th>総計</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>52.4</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

参考: (1) に同じ。
## Table 5

**Comparison of Vocational Distribution of the Countries along the Pacific Coast Areas.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing &amp; Hunting</th>
<th>Mining</th>
<th>Industries</th>
<th>Transportation and Communication</th>
<th>Commerce</th>
<th>Officials and free professions</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Building</th>
<th>Not clear</th>
<th>Total population occupied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>1933</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>47.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherland India</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korea</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan (proper)</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>46.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Malaya</td>
<td>1931</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.18</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.I.C.</td>
<td>1929</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** An Economic Survey of the Pacific Area, published in 1941 by the International Secretariat, Institute of the Pacific Relations (New York), translated by Toa Kenkyusho, Tokyo, 1943.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>国名</th>
<th>年次</th>
<th>労</th>
<th>畜殖</th>
<th>林業</th>
<th>工</th>
<th>交通</th>
<th>商</th>
<th>公務</th>
<th>自然事業</th>
<th>住民</th>
<th>教育</th>
<th>宗教</th>
<th>無職</th>
<th>不明</th>
<th>有職</th>
<th>人口</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>中国</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>28.9</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>39.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>37.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>65.8</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>35.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>朝鮮</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>75.0</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>日本合土</td>
<td>1930</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>60.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>36.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：太平洋地域の経済情勢太平洋地域の経済情勢
東京东亚研究所昭和十八年
## Table 6. Fluctuations of scale of management of farm households (1941-1946) (Okinawa excluded)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scale of management</th>
<th>August 1, 1941</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>April 26, 1946</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Increase or Decrease 1941-46</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Actual figure</td>
<td></td>
<td>Actual figure</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm households not engaged in cultivation</td>
<td>28,816</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3,246</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>(-) 20,570 (-) 86.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 5 tan</td>
<td>1,733,093</td>
<td>32.9</td>
<td>2,235,108</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>(+) 450,015 (+) 25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 tan-1 cho</td>
<td>1,622,790</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>1,725,640</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>(+) 162,850 (+) 10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 cho-2 cho</td>
<td>1,661,228</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>1,336,871</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>(-) 324,357 (-) 18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,488,520</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,694,721</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Whole country       |              |            |              |            |                             |
|                     | Actual figure |            | Actual figure |            |                             |
| Farm households not engaged in cultivation | 22,863 | 0.4 | 3,052 | 0.1 | (-) 19,811 (-) 86.7 |
| Under 5 tan         | 1,751,936 | 33.5 | 2,170,523 | 39.6 | (+) 418,587 (+) 23.9 |
| 5 tan-1 cho         | 1,610,296 | 30.8 | 1,767,249 | 32.3 | (+) 156,953 (+) 9.7 |
| 1 cho-2 cho         | 1,445,529 | 27.7 | 1,311,235 | 21.0 | (-) 134,294 (-) 9.3 |
| Total               | 5,068,686 |          | 5,429,236 |          |                             |

<p>| Hokkaido            |              |            |              |            |                             |
|                     | Actual figure |            | Actual figure |            |                             |
| Farm households not engaged in cultivation | 953 | 0.5 | 198 | 0.1 | (-) 755 (-) 79.6 |
| Under 5 tan         | 31,197 | 16.8 | 62,585 | 27.2 | (+) 31,388 (+) 100.6 |
| 5 tan-1 cho         | 12,494 | 6.7 | 18,391 | 7.7 | (+) 5,897 (+) 47.2 |
| 1 cho-2 cho         | 15,700 | 8.5 | 25,633 | 11.3 | (+) 9,933 (+) 63.3 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hokkaido</th>
<th>2 cho-3 cho</th>
<th>3-5</th>
<th>5-10</th>
<th>Over 10 cho</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20,562</td>
<td>41,929</td>
<td>43,183</td>
<td>19,762</td>
<td>135,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>25,306</td>
<td>44,577</td>
<td>36,574</td>
<td>12,399</td>
<td>225,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+) 4,744</td>
<td>(+) 2,748</td>
<td>(-) 6,609</td>
<td>(-) 7,423</td>
<td>(+) 39,813</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(+) 23.1</td>
<td>(+) 6.6</td>
<td>(-) 15.3</td>
<td>(-) 37.6</td>
<td>(+) 21.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Semi-farmers excluded.

Sources: The same as table 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>経営規模</th>
<th>昭和16年8月1日</th>
<th>昭和23年4月26日</th>
<th>増 出</th>
<th>16年実数</th>
<th>発展度</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5 口未満</td>
<td>1753000</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>2230103</td>
<td>362</td>
<td>459075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 口</td>
<td>1522750</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>1765640</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>128560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 口</td>
<td>1461228</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>1355371</td>
<td>235</td>
<td>124257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 口</td>
<td>333300</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>211260</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>122040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 口</td>
<td>117570</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>77230</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>40509</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 口</td>
<td>49736</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>32245</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>11541</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 口以上</td>
<td>20069</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>12448</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>7621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>合 計</td>
<td>5411331</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>5697948</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>286287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>経営規模</th>
<th>昭和16年8月1日</th>
<th>昭和23年4月26日</th>
<th>増 出</th>
<th>16年実数</th>
<th>発展度</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>北海道</td>
<td>22863</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>3052</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>19311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 口未満</td>
<td>1751836</td>
<td>335</td>
<td>2170523</td>
<td>39.6</td>
<td>418887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 口</td>
<td>1610296</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>1767249</td>
<td>32.3</td>
<td>156955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 口</td>
<td>1445528</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>1311238</td>
<td>24.0</td>
<td>134290</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 口</td>
<td>312738</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>185954</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>126784</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 口</td>
<td>75810</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32553</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>43257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 口</td>
<td>6603</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1671</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>項目</td>
<td>10町以上</td>
<td>合計</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------</td>
<td>-----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>北</td>
<td>土地使用土地農家</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5反未満</td>
<td>3197</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>62585</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5反1町</td>
<td>12494</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>18391</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1町2町</td>
<td>15700</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>25633</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2町3町</td>
<td>20562</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>25306</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3町5町</td>
<td>41829</td>
<td>22.5</td>
<td>44577</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5町10町</td>
<td>43183</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>36574</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10町以上</td>
<td>19762</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>12339</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>合計</td>
<td>185680</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>225599</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*準農家を含まず*
### Condition of demand and supply of rice (Japan proper)
(Unit: 1,000 Koku)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount Supplied</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Brought over</td>
<td>Production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>7,840</td>
<td>60,303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>7,928</td>
<td>59,558</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>6,739</td>
<td>66,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>9,440</td>
<td>55,215</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>8,907</td>
<td>60,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>3,008</td>
<td>70,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>15,431</td>
<td>51,840</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>9,356</td>
<td>57,457</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>8,097</td>
<td>67,340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>4,812</td>
<td>66,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>8,593</td>
<td>65,869</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Toyo Keizai Statistical Year Book, No. 24

Note: The rice year means one year beginning with November and ending with October of the following year.
米穀供給状況（内地）（単位 千石）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>米穀年度</th>
<th>供給額</th>
<th>給与額</th>
<th>供給額</th>
<th>退移出額</th>
<th>周年度供給額</th>
<th>消費額</th>
<th>一人当たり消費額（石）</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>7,028</td>
<td>59,558</td>
<td>8,602</td>
<td>75,188</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>5,719</td>
<td>68,910</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>5,712</td>
<td>66,856</td>
<td>11,522</td>
<td>84,116</td>
<td>1190</td>
<td>9,140</td>
<td>72,978</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>9,140</td>
<td>55,215</td>
<td>11,604</td>
<td>75,859</td>
<td>678</td>
<td>6,907</td>
<td>66,374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>8,907</td>
<td>60,350</td>
<td>12,743</td>
<td>82,045</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>9,008</td>
<td>72,414</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>9,003</td>
<td>70,829</td>
<td>14,251</td>
<td>84,088</td>
<td>937</td>
<td>16,431</td>
<td>76,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>9,141</td>
<td>51,840</td>
<td>12,020</td>
<td>81,261</td>
<td>802</td>
<td>9,636</td>
<td>70,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>9,034</td>
<td>55,457</td>
<td>14,204</td>
<td>81,598</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>8,007</td>
<td>73,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>8,007</td>
<td>67,940</td>
<td>11,859</td>
<td>87,220</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>7,512</td>
<td>79,066</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>7,519</td>
<td>66,280</td>
<td>15,281</td>
<td>86,103</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>8,493</td>
<td>80,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>8,493</td>
<td>65,869</td>
<td>9,780</td>
<td>75,449</td>
<td>766</td>
<td>4,061</td>
<td>79,344</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

参考：米穀年度とは前年11月から翌年10月までの一ケ年間。
Table 8  Rice Crop per tan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Koku</th>
<th>Index number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average of 1901 - 1905</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1906 - 1910</td>
<td>1,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1911 - 1915</td>
<td>1,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1916 - 1920</td>
<td>1,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1921 - 1925</td>
<td>1,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1926 - 1930</td>
<td>1,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1934 - 1938</td>
<td>2,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1940</td>
<td>1,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1941</td>
<td>1,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1942</td>
<td>2,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1943</td>
<td>2,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1944</td>
<td>1,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1945</td>
<td>1,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average of 1941 - 1945</td>
<td>1,865</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: "Monthly Statistic report of Agriculture and Forestry" Published by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Feb. 1947.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年代</th>
<th>数値（平均）</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>昭和34 - 38年平均</td>
<td>1,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 39 - 43年 &quot;</td>
<td>1,686</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 44 - 大正4年 &quot;</td>
<td>1,756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>大正5 - &quot; 9年 &quot;</td>
<td>1,884</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 10 - &quot; 14年 &quot;</td>
<td>1,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>昭和1 - 5年平均 (1926 - 1930)</td>
<td>1,905</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; 9 - 13年 (1934 - 1938)</td>
<td>2,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 (1939)</td>
<td>2,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 (1940)</td>
<td>1,915</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 (1941)</td>
<td>1,731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 (1942)</td>
<td>2,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 (1943)</td>
<td>2,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 (1944)</td>
<td>1,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 (1945)</td>
<td>1,485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>昭和16 - 20年平均 (1941 - 1945)</td>
<td>1,865</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 9. Demand and supply of fertilizer in Japan proper.

[unit 1,000 tons]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fertilizer year</th>
<th>Fertilizer on sale</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Imported from foreign countries</th>
<th>Imported from dependent areas</th>
<th>Total supply</th>
<th>Consumption of manufacturing materials</th>
<th>Exported to foreign countries</th>
<th>Exported to dependent areas</th>
<th>Total of the above 3 items</th>
<th>Estimated self-made fertilizer</th>
<th>Total consumption</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,188</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>5,392</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>3,914</td>
<td>61,759</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td></td>
<td>4,412</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>5,947</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>4,209</td>
<td>63,806</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td></td>
<td>5,249</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>6,737</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>1,899</td>
<td>4,838</td>
<td>67,454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,294</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>8,883</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>5,783</td>
<td>66,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td></td>
<td>6,712</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>8,182</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>2,341</td>
<td>5,841</td>
<td>69,523</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td></td>
<td>8,376</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>482</td>
<td>10,050</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>2,457</td>
<td>7,591</td>
<td>70,968</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: "Essentials of Fertilizer" by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. (up to 1938)

Fertilizer year is one year beginning with July and ending with June of the following year.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年</th>
<th>生産</th>
<th>輸入</th>
<th>移入</th>
<th>供給計</th>
<th>消費</th>
<th>輸出</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>4,188</td>
<td>911</td>
<td>292</td>
<td>5,392</td>
<td>1,048</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>4,412</td>
<td>1,128</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>5,947</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>5,249</td>
<td>1,077</td>
<td>411</td>
<td>6,737</td>
<td>1,290</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>6,284</td>
<td>1,151</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>8,983</td>
<td>1,342</td>
<td>166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>6,712</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>8,182</td>
<td>1,556</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>8,376</td>
<td>1,191</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>10,050</td>
<td>1,708</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

備考：表（7）と同様
内地肥料の需要（単位千トン）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>販売肥料</th>
<th>事業者計</th>
<th>消費見込</th>
<th>自給肥料</th>
<th>生産</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>3,914</td>
<td>61,759</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>1,739</td>
<td>4,209</td>
<td>63,326</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>464</td>
<td>1,899</td>
<td>4,338</td>
<td>67,454</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>592</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>5,783</td>
<td>66,300</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>2,341</td>
<td>5,841</td>
<td>69,523</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>2,457</td>
<td>7,591</td>
<td>70,968</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>總消減額</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65,672</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68,014</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72,292</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>72,583</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75,364</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78,559</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Imported from Foreign Countries</td>
<td>From Korea</td>
<td>Formosa</td>
<td>Others</td>
<td>Grand Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1929</td>
<td>1,278</td>
<td>5,173</td>
<td>2,254</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>8,909</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>1,250</td>
<td>5,167</td>
<td>2,135</td>
<td>1,528</td>
<td>8,602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>831</td>
<td>7,992</td>
<td>2,699</td>
<td>1,023</td>
<td>11,522</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1932</td>
<td>986</td>
<td>7,798</td>
<td>3,419</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>11,604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>7,532</td>
<td>4,217</td>
<td>832</td>
<td>12,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>9,953</td>
<td>5,124</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>14,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>8,433</td>
<td>4,511</td>
<td>1,268</td>
<td>13,202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>410</td>
<td>8,971</td>
<td>4,924</td>
<td>1,777</td>
<td>14,204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>6,736</td>
<td>4,955</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>11,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>10,149</td>
<td>4,971</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>15,217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>5,690</td>
<td>3,962</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>9,809</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Same as Table 7.
### 米糧出入口 (內地)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年度</th>
<th>進口 (千石)</th>
<th>出口 (千石)</th>
<th>総計</th>
<th>外貿</th>
<th>移出 (千石)</th>
<th>総計</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>51210</td>
<td>21133</td>
<td>132535</td>
<td>132535</td>
<td>21133</td>
<td>754</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>34372</td>
<td>30932</td>
<td>65304</td>
<td>65304</td>
<td>30932</td>
<td>65304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>25142</td>
<td>48786</td>
<td>73928</td>
<td>73928</td>
<td>48786</td>
<td>73928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>25543</td>
<td>46463</td>
<td>72006</td>
<td>72006</td>
<td>46463</td>
<td>72006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>17242</td>
<td>31130</td>
<td>48372</td>
<td>48372</td>
<td>31130</td>
<td>48372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>17242</td>
<td>31130</td>
<td>48372</td>
<td>48372</td>
<td>31130</td>
<td>48372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>12242</td>
<td>32442</td>
<td>44684</td>
<td>44684</td>
<td>32442</td>
<td>44684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>23142</td>
<td>39352</td>
<td>62494</td>
<td>62494</td>
<td>39352</td>
<td>62494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>15142</td>
<td>20130</td>
<td>35272</td>
<td>35272</td>
<td>20130</td>
<td>35272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>15142</td>
<td>20130</td>
<td>35272</td>
<td>35272</td>
<td>20130</td>
<td>35272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 典拠:

表(7) = 同じ
### Table II.

Population of Japanese Abroad.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1900</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1930</th>
<th>1935</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>290,694</td>
<td>553,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>212,494</td>
<td>100,709</td>
<td>413,315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>2,442</td>
<td>54,544</td>
<td>153,675</td>
<td>95,508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strait Settlement and Malaya</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>7,700</td>
<td>7,030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>9,337</td>
<td>13,935</td>
<td>25,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4,774</td>
<td>6,437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1,351</td>
<td>2,932</td>
<td>2,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1,351</td>
<td>2,932</td>
<td>2,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North America</td>
<td>12,375</td>
<td>143,164</td>
<td>163,569</td>
<td>143,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>185,476</td>
<td>141,550</td>
<td>115,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>17,667</td>
<td>22,506</td>
<td>23,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South America</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>42,639</td>
<td>93,037</td>
<td>200,920</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>53,456</td>
<td>76,433</td>
<td>170,165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>3,446</td>
<td>6,659</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentine</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>16,979</td>
<td>21,553</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>213</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oceania</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>113,057</td>
<td>147,151</td>
<td>154,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawaii</td>
<td>55,940</td>
<td>100,109</td>
<td>130,941</td>
<td>151,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>99,039</td>
<td>608,13</td>
<td>717,529</td>
<td>1,059,913</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: imperfect Japan Statistical Year Book, No. 13; Toyo Koizumi Statistical Year Book, No. 5, 14 and 24.
<p>| | | | | | | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.8</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>16.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.1</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.9</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>18.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>19.0</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>19.2</td>
<td>19.3</td>
<td>19.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>19.7</td>
<td>19.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>20.0</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>20.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>21.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

注：

1. 表中数据仅供参考，具体数值以实际测量为准。
2. 表中数据单位为毫米。

DELT DOG NO. 1765

核对人：

1999年12月23日
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1936</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Textile Industry</td>
<td>436,538</td>
<td>339,349</td>
<td>990,792</td>
<td>976,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal Industry</td>
<td>13,183</td>
<td>73,830</td>
<td>84,260</td>
<td>377,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine and Tool Industry</td>
<td>26,034</td>
<td>107,550</td>
<td>150,351</td>
<td>360,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceramic Industry</td>
<td>34,366</td>
<td>69,095</td>
<td>56,751</td>
<td>195,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical Industry</td>
<td>43,517</td>
<td>107,719</td>
<td>122,461</td>
<td>322,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timber and wooden articles manufacturing</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>56,650</td>
<td>113,323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing and Book Binding</td>
<td>21,322</td>
<td>29,332</td>
<td>51,567</td>
<td>63,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foodstuffs Industry</td>
<td>58,760</td>
<td>99,204</td>
<td>133,516</td>
<td>190,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gas and Electricity</td>
<td>2,716</td>
<td>4,203</td>
<td>9,240</td>
<td>10,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>53,451</td>
<td>107,316</td>
<td>39,939</td>
<td>194,404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>900,637</td>
<td>1,520,466</td>
<td>1,660,332</td>
<td>3,215,421</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Factory Statistics Chart of Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1931 and 1930; Meiji - Taisho Japan Almanac, 1927.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>工業</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>織物業</td>
<td>486,500</td>
<td>839,349</td>
<td>898,792</td>
<td>976,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>金屬工業</td>
<td>18,183</td>
<td>73,630</td>
<td>84,269</td>
<td>377,398</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>機械器具工業</td>
<td>46,034</td>
<td>187,538</td>
<td>158,351</td>
<td>860,431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>砧陶工業</td>
<td>34,366</td>
<td>69,895</td>
<td>56,731</td>
<td>105,345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>化學工業</td>
<td>43,517</td>
<td>107,719</td>
<td>122,461</td>
<td>322,205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>木製品製造工業</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>56,658</td>
<td>113,823</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>印刷製本業</td>
<td>21,322</td>
<td>29,332</td>
<td>51,367</td>
<td>63,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>食品工業</td>
<td>88,740</td>
<td>99,284</td>
<td>133,516</td>
<td>190,697</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ガス電気</td>
<td>2,716</td>
<td>6,203</td>
<td>8,248</td>
<td>10,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>其他</td>
<td>58,451</td>
<td>107,316</td>
<td>89,939</td>
<td>194,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>合計</td>
<td>803,637</td>
<td>1,520,466</td>
<td>1,660,332</td>
<td>3,215,421</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

出處：商工省工場統計表1931 & 1938 明治，大正
日本年號昭和二年

RECEIVED
AUG 7 1947

1
TABLE 12-A

Number of plant workers in entire country

Real number (in persons)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Textile Industry</th>
<th>Metal Industry</th>
<th>Machine and Tool Industry</th>
<th>Ceramic Industry</th>
<th>Chemical Industry</th>
<th>Timber and wooden articles manufacturing</th>
<th>Printing and Book Binding</th>
<th>Foodstuffs Industry</th>
<th>Gas and Electricity</th>
<th>Miscellaneous</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>496,538</td>
<td>18,183</td>
<td>46,034</td>
<td>34,366</td>
<td>43,517</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21,522</td>
<td>69,740</td>
<td>2,716</td>
<td>50,451</td>
<td>1,000,637</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>839,349</td>
<td>73,330</td>
<td>187,538</td>
<td>69,095</td>
<td>107,719</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>29,332</td>
<td>99,204</td>
<td>6,203</td>
<td>107,316</td>
<td>1,520,466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>590,792</td>
<td>84,269</td>
<td>150,351</td>
<td>56,731</td>
<td>122,461</td>
<td>56,650</td>
<td>51,367</td>
<td>133,516</td>
<td>9,243</td>
<td>89,939</td>
<td>1,660,332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1938</td>
<td>976,953</td>
<td>377,398</td>
<td>360,431</td>
<td>125,545</td>
<td>322,205</td>
<td>115,023</td>
<td>63,568</td>
<td>190,697</td>
<td>10,517</td>
<td>194,404</td>
<td>3,215,421</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Factory Statistics Chart of Ministry of Commerce and Industry, 1931 and 1930; Meiji - Taisho Japan Almanac, 1927.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1938</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>織物業</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>54.1</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>金属工業</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>機械器具工業</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>26.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>糖料工業</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>化学工業</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>10.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>木材製造工業</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>印刷製本業</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>食品工業</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ガス電気</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>その他</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>合計</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

出典 12-表同仕
Table 13
Yearly Statistics of Foreign Trade (unit: 1000yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export To Foreign Countries</th>
<th>Export To Formosa</th>
<th>Export To Korea</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>214,930</td>
<td>8,012</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>222,942</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>413,113</td>
<td>21,007</td>
<td>21,852</td>
<td>456,972</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2,098,373</td>
<td>90,527</td>
<td>184,918</td>
<td>2,374,333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,146,981</td>
<td>114,763</td>
<td>217,770</td>
<td>1,479,514</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3,175,418</td>
<td>277,871</td>
<td>735,413</td>
<td>4,188,725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>3,576,370</td>
<td>357,608</td>
<td>1,229,417</td>
<td>5,163,395</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Import From Foreign Countries</th>
<th>Import From Formosa</th>
<th>Import From Korea</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>220,402</td>
<td>3,750</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>224,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>394,199</td>
<td>35,310</td>
<td>12,082</td>
<td>442,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2,173,450</td>
<td>142,208</td>
<td>199,849</td>
<td>2,515,517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,235,673</td>
<td>201,424</td>
<td>249,027</td>
<td>1,685,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3,733,177</td>
<td>410,258</td>
<td>572,445</td>
<td>4,775,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,917,666</td>
<td>509,744</td>
<td>736,882</td>
<td>4,164,292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The figures about Korea in the column of 1909 are those of 1910.

Sources: Meiji-Tenno Japan Almanac, 1927;
Toyô Keizai Statistical Year Book, No. 24
# 外国贸易年度表（单位千圆）

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年份</th>
<th>华商出口</th>
<th>外国</th>
<th>台湾</th>
<th>朝鲜</th>
<th>合计</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>214,930</td>
<td>8,012</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>222,942</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>413,113</td>
<td>24,007</td>
<td>21,852</td>
<td>458,972</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2,098,873</td>
<td>90,7</td>
<td>184,918</td>
<td>2,374,335</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,146,981</td>
<td>114,763</td>
<td>217,770</td>
<td>1,479,514</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3,175,418</td>
<td>277,894</td>
<td>735,413</td>
<td>4,188,725</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>3,576,370</td>
<td>357,608</td>
<td>1,229,417</td>
<td>5,163,395</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年份</th>
<th>华商输入</th>
<th>外国</th>
<th>台湾</th>
<th>朝鲜</th>
<th>合计</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>220,402</td>
<td>36,500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>256,902</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>354,199</td>
<td>36,310</td>
<td>12,082</td>
<td>402,601</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>2,173,460</td>
<td>142,208</td>
<td>199,849</td>
<td>2,515,517</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,236,673</td>
<td>20,424</td>
<td>249,027</td>
<td>1,496,124</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3,783,177</td>
<td>410,258</td>
<td>572,446</td>
<td>4,765,880</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,917,666</td>
<td>509,744</td>
<td>736,882</td>
<td>4,164,292</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *1909年の表における朝鮮の数字は1910年のものである。

典 據 明治大正時期統計 (1927) 東洋経済統計年鑑 No.24

RECEIVED
AUG 7 1917
### TABLE 14

Trend of Trade excepting fluctuations in prices.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Export (thousand yen)</th>
<th>Index-Number of Prices</th>
<th>A/B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>204,430</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>204,430</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>413,113</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>347,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2,098,973</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>672,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,146,901</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>749,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3,175,418</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>1,334,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>3,578,370</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>1,291,100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Import (thousand yen)</th>
<th>Index-Number of Prices</th>
<th>A/B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>207,262</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>207,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>394,199</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>331,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2,173,460</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>696,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,255,673</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>807,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3,703,177</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>1,509,600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,917,666</td>
<td>277</td>
<td>1,053,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The index-numbers of prices are the index-numbers of wholesale prices of the Bank of Japan (1900 = 100): Foreign Trade of Japan, a Statistical Survey, 1935; Meiji-Taisho Japan Almanac, 1927; Toyo Keizai Shihōin Year Book, No. 4.
建築 14 物価の変動を除きたる貿易の動向

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年</th>
<th>輸出 (千円)</th>
<th>物価指数</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>204,430</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>413,113</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2,098,873</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,466,981</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3,175,418</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>3,576,390</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年</th>
<th>輸入 (千円)</th>
<th>物価指数</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>287,262</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>394,199</td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>2,175,480</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,235,673</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>3,783,177</td>
<td>238</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,917,666</td>
<td>277</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

出典: 物価指数は日本銀行の卸売物価指数
(1900 = 100)

他は日本貿易経済（1935）、明治大正国勢総覧（1927）、東洋経済統計年鑑 24
Table 15

Classified Table of Export Trade
(unit: a thousand yen)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Plants &amp; Animals (living)</td>
<td>1,914,391</td>
<td>4,226,297</td>
<td>6,231,169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Grains, Flours, Starches &amp; Seeds</td>
<td>52,754,469</td>
<td>45,962,607</td>
<td>79,999,525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Beverages, Cosmetics &amp; Tobaccos</td>
<td>95,687,473</td>
<td>23,159,342</td>
<td>360,983,045</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Skins, Hairs, Horns, Tusks &amp; Manufactures thereof</td>
<td>6,920,367</td>
<td>21,979,240</td>
<td>13,166,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Drugs, Chemicals, Medicines &amp; explosives</td>
<td>73,147,387</td>
<td>70,148,703</td>
<td>107,502,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Dyes, Pigments, Coatings &amp; Filling matters</td>
<td>9,278,175</td>
<td>20,530,957</td>
<td>37,060,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Tissues &amp; Manufactures thereof</td>
<td>592,723,337</td>
<td>1,000,019,119</td>
<td>903,150,829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Clothing &amp; Accessories thereof</td>
<td>101,947,777</td>
<td>229,911,530</td>
<td>169,466,068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Item</td>
<td>1935</td>
<td>1936</td>
<td>1937</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. Potteries &amp; Glass</td>
<td>42,310,509</td>
<td>87,543,505</td>
<td>75,673,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14. Ores &amp; Metals</td>
<td>59,079,521</td>
<td>125,422,214</td>
<td>139,01,115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15. Metal manufactures</td>
<td>43,291,101</td>
<td>99,912,703</td>
<td>147,326,409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire arms,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicles, Vessels &amp; Machinery</td>
<td>37,169,955</td>
<td>227,699,181</td>
<td>370,323,552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17. Miscellaneous Articles</td>
<td>111,755,299</td>
<td>203,675,957</td>
<td>264,050,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. Re-exports</td>
<td>32,966,751</td>
<td>43,876,712</td>
<td>12,096,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>2,093,372,617</td>
<td>3,175,418,224</td>
<td>3,576,370,409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>品目</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1959</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>一</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>一</td>
<td>動植物(生)</td>
<td>1,914,391</td>
<td>4,226,297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>二</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>二</td>
<td>酒類、小売測、飲料及酒類</td>
<td>52,754,469</td>
<td>45,962,607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>三</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>三</td>
<td>食糧品及酒類</td>
<td>95,693,975</td>
<td>203,159,342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>四</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>四</td>
<td>生産生畜、飼料及畜産</td>
<td>6,920,367</td>
<td>21,979,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>五</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>五</td>
<td>燃料及火柴</td>
<td>35,453,766</td>
<td>75,391,733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>六</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>六</td>
<td>生物、化學、製品及其製品</td>
<td>73,147,397</td>
<td>70,148,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>七</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>七</td>
<td>螢料、建築材料及製品</td>
<td>9,274,175</td>
<td>20,530,957</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>八</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>八</td>
<td>食品、飲料、飲料及製品</td>
<td>739,372,920</td>
<td>599,345,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>九</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>九</td>
<td>機械機関</td>
<td>502,723,447</td>
<td>1,000,019,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十</td>
<td>塑料、樹脂、製品</td>
<td>101,947,777</td>
<td>229,911,530</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十一</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十一</td>
<td>塑料、樹脂</td>
<td>36,513,156</td>
<td>60,388,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十二</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十二</td>
<td>食品、飲料</td>
<td>46,705,309</td>
<td>23,949,034</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十三</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十三</td>
<td>燃料及火柴</td>
<td>42,310,509</td>
<td>87,543,405</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十四</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十四</td>
<td>煙草及製品</td>
<td>59,079,521</td>
<td>125,422,214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十五</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十五</td>
<td>鈦金製品</td>
<td>43,291,101</td>
<td>98,812,703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十六</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>十六</td>
<td>時計、精密製品</td>
<td>37,169,955</td>
<td>227,699,181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>六</td>
<td>965,551</td>
<td>43,876,712</td>
<td>12,098,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>七</td>
<td>111,755,299</td>
<td>203,675,957</td>
<td>264,050,631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>合计</td>
<td>2,093,972,617</td>
<td>3,175,418,224</td>
<td>3,576,370,409</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

这张表是日本贸易商本（昭和十年）及贸易概要
统计年鉴（第十四版）
Table 16-A.
LIST showing the amounts of export & import by district.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Asia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>N. America</th>
<th>C. America</th>
<th>S. America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>63,606</td>
<td>50,137</td>
<td>66,277</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>141,591</td>
<td>90,120</td>
<td>135,402</td>
<td>204</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>955,005</td>
<td>192,903</td>
<td>105,093</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>20,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>1,645,915</td>
<td>350,000</td>
<td>194,993</td>
<td>3,301</td>
<td>10,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>2,320,265</td>
<td>230,256</td>
<td>659,601</td>
<td>54,005</td>
<td>109,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1,645,915</td>
<td>2,320,265</td>
<td>659,601</td>
<td>43,657</td>
<td>67,111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Export) Africa Asia Oceania Total

1899 660 3,600 207,933
1909 640 11,421 306,114
1919 24,701 46,135 2,090,072
1931 50,090 26,591 1,146,931
1937 242,756 106,465 3,175,410
1939 152,909 95,443 3,576,370


Notes: Exports to Central America for 1919 is included in that of North America.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年代</th>
<th>アジア</th>
<th>ヨーロッパ</th>
<th>北アメリカ</th>
<th>中央アメリカ</th>
<th>南アメリカ</th>
<th>アフリカ</th>
<th>オセアニア</th>
<th>合計</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>63,686</td>
<td>50,137</td>
<td>66,277</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>207,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>141,591</td>
<td>96,152</td>
<td>135,402</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>840</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>386,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>955,005</td>
<td>194,993</td>
<td>859,093</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20,830</td>
<td>24,781</td>
<td>46,135</td>
<td>2,098,872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>505,018</td>
<td>104,111</td>
<td>438,865</td>
<td>3,301</td>
<td>10,225</td>
<td>58,868</td>
<td>26,591</td>
<td>1,146,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1,645,915</td>
<td>356,299</td>
<td>659,601</td>
<td>54,885</td>
<td>109,519</td>
<td>242,736</td>
<td>106,463</td>
<td>3,175,418</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>2,320,265</td>
<td>238,256</td>
<td>658,730</td>
<td>43,657</td>
<td>67,111</td>
<td>152,909</td>
<td>95,443</td>
<td>3,576,370</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

資料：日本貿易調査（昭和十年） 東洋経済統計年鑑第廿四號

備考：1919年度中央アメリカへ（輸出）北アメリカ中に含まる
### Table 10-B

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>N. America</th>
<th>C. America</th>
<th>S. America</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>33,379</td>
<td>70,046</td>
<td>30,537</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>162,043</td>
<td>140,579</td>
<td>55,126</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1,620</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1,074,575</td>
<td>152,859</td>
<td>773,459</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>10,133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>493,052</td>
<td>199,740</td>
<td>207,002</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>7,097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>1,235,112</td>
<td>604,051</td>
<td>1,372,252</td>
<td>12,765</td>
<td>162,611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>1,161,601</td>
<td>359,935</td>
<td>1,120,115</td>
<td>3,401</td>
<td>115,730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### (Import) Africa | Oceania | Total

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Africa</th>
<th>Oceania</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>1,714</td>
<td>215,225</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>5,463</td>
<td>3,379</td>
<td>320,959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>16,004</td>
<td>66,409</td>
<td>2,173,459</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1937</td>
<td>206,305</td>
<td>222,129</td>
<td>3,703,177</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>92,700</td>
<td>66,317</td>
<td>2,917,566</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Sources:** Same as Table 10-...

**Notes:** Imports from Central America for 1909 and 1919 respectively is under $1,000. Imports for 1919 from the same area is included in that from N. America.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>年</th>
<th>1899</th>
<th>1909</th>
<th>1919</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1939</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>北アメリカ</td>
<td>38,397</td>
<td>162,969</td>
<td>1,074,375</td>
<td>199,748</td>
<td>1,161,001</td>
<td>309,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中央アメリカ</td>
<td>78,046</td>
<td>148,079</td>
<td>1,074,375</td>
<td>199,748</td>
<td>1,161,001</td>
<td>309,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>適合</td>
<td>93,375</td>
<td>162,969</td>
<td>1,074,375</td>
<td>199,748</td>
<td>1,161,001</td>
<td>309,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>世界合計</td>
<td>215,425</td>
<td>380,059</td>
<td>2,173,459</td>
<td>2,135,672</td>
<td>3,783,177</td>
<td>2,917,666</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

補足: 第16条 (A) 同じ

備考: 1899年及1909年及び中央アメリカ西方上りの値及び下りの値を一様に以下に示すと同様に記入せよ。1919年の数値は合計せらるべき。
Table 17

LIST showing increase and decrease of the exports for Asia after 1937.
(Unit: ¥ 1,000.-)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>1937</th>
<th>1939</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manchuria</td>
<td>216,092</td>
<td>535,601</td>
<td>+ 955,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kwangtung prov.</td>
<td>395,916</td>
<td>755,343</td>
<td>+ 359,427</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>179,251</td>
<td>455,473</td>
<td>+ 276,222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honkong</td>
<td>49,150</td>
<td>30,573</td>
<td>- 18,573</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>French Indo-China</td>
<td>4,824</td>
<td>1,991</td>
<td>- 2,833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>49,302</td>
<td>26,044</td>
<td>- 23,258</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>British Malay</td>
<td>3,066</td>
<td>2,004</td>
<td>- 1,062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strait Settlement</td>
<td>67,433</td>
<td>20,426</td>
<td>- 47,007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>299,367</td>
<td>210,995</td>
<td>- 88,372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ceylon</td>
<td>10,356</td>
<td>14,541</td>
<td>+ 4,185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2,450</td>
<td>10,592</td>
<td>+ 8,142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>25,644</td>
<td>24,544</td>
<td>- 1,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippine</td>
<td>30,543</td>
<td>4,744</td>
<td>- 25,800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Borneo</td>
<td>1,871</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>- 1,336</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Borneo</td>
<td>197,631</td>
<td>167,232</td>
<td>- 30,399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>25,554</td>
<td>+ 24,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,615,015</td>
<td>2,220,265</td>
<td>+ 605,250</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Toyô Keizan Statistical Year Book, No. 26
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1937年</th>
<th>1939年</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>緬州</td>
<td>216,092</td>
<td>535,681</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>關東洲</td>
<td>395,916</td>
<td>755,943</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>中華民國</td>
<td>179,251</td>
<td>455,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>香港</td>
<td>49,150</td>
<td>30,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>印度支那</td>
<td>4,624</td>
<td>1,981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>タイ</td>
<td>49,382</td>
<td>26,024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>英領マレイ</td>
<td>5,866</td>
<td>2,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>海峡殖民地</td>
<td>67,433</td>
<td>20,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>英領インド</td>
<td>299,367</td>
<td>210,995</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>セイロン</td>
<td>18,698</td>
<td>14,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>イラン</td>
<td>2,630</td>
<td>19,324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>イラク</td>
<td>23,644</td>
<td>24,344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ヒチチバン</td>
<td>60,348</td>
<td>24,744</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>英領ポルネワ</td>
<td>1,041</td>
<td>959</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>印領インド</td>
<td>200,051</td>
<td>137,802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>其他</td>
<td>74,468</td>
<td>35,554</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>合計</td>
<td>1,645,915</td>
<td>2,320,265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

出典：東洋経済統計年鑑 24 号
Def. Doc. No. 1773

I have known Mr. Shigemitsu for many years as a man strongly opposed to the Japanese Military Party and their policy of aggression. In 1932 he played the part of a hero when, desperately wounded by a bomb at Shanghai, he protested against the outrage being used to delay a settlement with the Chinese and used all his great influence successfully to bring about the evacuation of the town by the Japanese. As regards China generally, I always found him both then and later, in favour of a friendly agreement and against the use of force.

When Mr. Shigemitsu was transferred to the Gaimusho during the time I was Ambassador (1935-1939) I saw him frequently and always found him conciliatory and anxious to settle any difficulty amicably. We became friendly and I visited him constantly when he was Japanese Ambassador in London. I remember on one occasion when things were going very badly for us in 1940 that I asked him which side he thought would win the war. He thought for a while and then said: "I don't think the Germans will win but I don't see how you can either." In my numerous conversations from him I gathered the strong impression that he would not welcome a German victory. It was clear that he dreaded the results of such an end to the war.

On no occasion did I hear him express any desire for an attack on the Soviet Union. On the contrary, he was convinced that the interests of Japan demanded a policy of peace.
On no occasion did I hear him express any desire for an attack on the Soviet Union. On the contrary, he was convinced that the interests of Japan demanded a policy of peace.

WITNESS
George A. Furness

SIGNED
Francis O. Lindley
Dec. 26, 1946
I, Francis Oswald Lindley, a Member of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, of The Weir House, Alresford, Hants England, having been first duly sworn, make oath and say that the attached Photostatic copy is a true copy of the Statement dated 26th December 1946 given by me for use in evidence in the trial of the major war criminals for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East now sitting in Tokyo, and that such statement is in all respects true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

(Signed) Francis O. Lindley

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me
this 19th day of April 1947.

(Signed) G. E. R. Shield
A Commissioner for Oaths.
従来の文献によると、人種間の差異は個体間の差異と似ていることが示された。一方で、人間の形態には個体差が大きく、人種間の差異も個体差を反映している。この観点から、人種間の差異は個体差と同様に多様性をもつものであると見ることができる。

従来の研究では、人種間の差異は遺伝的な要素が主導的であるとされてきたが、近年では環境の影響も重要であるとされる。個体差が人種間の差異をもたらす可能性が示唆されている。

この観点から、人種間の差異は個体差と同様に多様性をもつものであると見ることができる。
Parid International Progress of Manchoukuo.

The Manchurian Empire has been established upon the basis of Oriental morality. Her foreign policy being also based thereon, stress has been laid on the maintenance and promotion of international peace, maintenance of amicable relations with friendly nations and establishment of the principle of Live-and-Let-Live among of all the nations of the world. As the result of her constant efforts to improve her international position she has now attained the dignity of an independent state. Her national strength has rapidly increased and her future is full of bright hopes. By 1941 her independence having been officially recognized by ten odd countries, her international status, has gained much importance.

Japan, which is inseparably united with Manchoukuo, formally recognized her independence on the 15th of September, 1942 (First year of DAIDO) ahead of other powers. At the same time the Japan-Manchoukup Protocol was signed which stipulated the relationship between the two countries.
1st December, 1937 in line with her policy of strengthening Manchoukuo's independence and fostering her prosperity, Japan abolished her extraterritorial rights in Manchoukuo and transferred thereto her administrative rights in the Manchurian Railway Zone. Of the countries other than Japan, Salvador in Central America recognized Manchoukuo on the 3rd of March, 1934, and the Republic of Dominica sent her President's autographed letter dated the 26th of October of the same year. In November, 1937, Italy recognized her independence and in December the same year Manchoukuo and the new Spanish Government exchanged their mutual recognition. In May, 1938, Germany, and in October of the same year Poland (by exchanging official letters concerning the interchange of respective consuls) formally recognized her. In July of the same year Manchoukuo sent a good-will mission to Europe, and thus her relationships with the Powers became increasingly close.

In 1939 Hungary notified on the 10th of January her formal recognition of Manchoukuo, and in the same month she in turn recognized the new State of Slovakia, which was created as the result of the dissolution of Czechoslovakia in April the Spanish Legation was opened in Manchoukuo; in June she exchanged honorary Consul-Generals with Salvador; and in July the Consulate-General of Manchoukuo was established in Warsaw, the Capital of Poland. In August Manchoukuo showed her friendly attitude toward Lithuania by extending her recognition to the
Lithuanian Consul at Harbin. In this way, friendly relations with various countries have been increasingly extended and deepened. A noteworthy event in the foreign relations of Manchoukuo in 1939 was her participation in the Anti-Comintern pact. As much as Manchoukuo, had as its objective the establishment of a state based upon the "kingly way," she was against communism from the outset. With the Prime Minister Chang as her plenipotentiary she signed with delegates of Japan, Germany and Italy her participation in the Anti-Comintern pact. Thus she made stand clear in her relations with other powers.

On the 30th of November, 1940, Japan, Manchoukuo and China made public the epoch-making joint declaration which clarified relationship between Manchoukuo and China and removed a serious obstacle in the way of establishing the Great East Asiatic co-prosperity sphere. In addition to the Roumanian Government's formal recognition of Manchoukuo in December, the year 1940 saw many other attainments in her international relations. In 1941 Hungary, in May Finland, in July Tahai and Denmark in August respectively recognized Manchoukuo, and on the 2nd of August, she in turn extended her recognition to the newly founded Croatia. In addition to these countries which formally recognized Manchoukuo, Soviet Russia and other countries have actually recognized her and are either conducting various negotiations or exchanging consuls with her. Thus Anglo-American countries are the only
ones which still hold the attitude of non-recognition. All in all, Manchoukuo's international position has made a remarkable progress. This is not due to mere chance or a turn of good fortune, but because of the increase in her national strength through her own endeavours; her fair play worthy of winning foreign confidence, and also because of the Power's gradual realization that Japan's support of Manchoukuo has not been tinted with selfishness as to disregard their interests.

Furthermore, in April, 1937 Vatican informed Manchoukuo of her being designated as an independent missionary district and the appointment of Pope's representative. The representative was stationed thereafter at Hsinching, the Capital of Manchoukuo. Thus, Manchoukuo has come to bear a direct connection with Popedom, and her international position has been raised in direct proportion to Vatican's world-wide influence.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I hereby certify that the book hereto attached, written in Japanese by the Japan Diplomatic Year-Book Company, consisting of 663 pages, entitled "Diplomatic Year-Book of Japan'1943)" and issued on the 5th of November, 1943 is one of books published by the Diplomatic Year-Book Company, where I am a representative.

certified at Tokyo,
on 23rd of December, 1946.

Representative: TAKEUCHI, Natsuzumi.
ex-the Japan Diplomatic Year-Book Company.

F. S. The Japan Diplomatic Year-Book Company was ordered to dissolve in accordance with the control on publication of the Japanese Government in 1944.

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place
on the same date.

Witness: YAMASHITA, Taro.
未確認の文書情報
利の承認があり、同年二月スペイン政府との間に相互承認が行われ、

一九三八年五月の遺達の承認、同年十月の波面の承認（領事交換に関す

の公文交換）同年七月候補総領事就任派遣関連等が立て、逐次列国との相

好関係が深く在って来た。

康徳六年（一九三九年）に入り、先づ一月十日洪牙利国政府の正式承

認通告に接し、四月日本館はチェッコ、スロヴァキヤ国の解錫と共に成

立した新館長コウ・アキを奉迎し、四月にはスペイン国の在日館長八

館が関せられ、六月ソールのリスボン国総領事館が関せられた。八月

仏国政府は呉服資料なリスボン国総領事館が関せられた。八月仏

等の防共協定に加える。東洋道徳を基盤として列強諸国や大日本と

技する満洲国は列国との初めから共産主義に反対して来たのであって、

満洲国の防共協定に付いて特筆すべきは、

二月二十四日阪国務総理を全権として日滿伊三国全権委員との間に防共
協定参加の正式調印を行い、既に日本の政府を国際関係の上に具現化した。

翌昭和七年（昭和十六年十一月三十日）が実に日本を正式承認を宣言を発表し、昭和五年（昭和五年一月三十一日）に、大東亜共進圏の成立前の日本と仏仏関係が完全に除去されたのである。次で十二月に入り総理大臣が正式承認を通告し、この年においても対外関係が大変多く収穫が紛らった。一

九四一年（昭和八年）には、五月勃列、七月勃列、八月勃列及び丁抹の四国が承認し、同月二日総理大臣は新日本国におけるのクロアチアを承認した。以上のように、双方の国間の関係については、絵の垂直度を絶えず失っているのは、殆んと英米系の諸国の諸国のみとなり、満洲国自国内に努力による国力増進、対外影響を確保するに足る公正なる所調、日本の外交支援が列国に利益を無視するが如く利己主義的のものではないことが黙次認識されたこと、等々に因る當然の成績であった。
区として数験器を任命させる旨通告し、その代表は首都新京に駐在する

数験器の威力の世界的に大なることと正比例して、満洲国の地位が向上した

謳である。

Def, Doc 1786
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

February 1947

This is to state that from early 1927 until 1941 I was chief of the Far Eastern Bureau for The New York Times, with headquarters first in Peking and later in Shanghai. During that period I knew intimately Mamoru Shigemitsu, at one time Japan's Ambassador to China, later Ambassador to England, and Foreign Minister.

I know that I enjoyed Shigemitsu's friendship, liking and confidence, and during years of personal and professional contact never knew him to mislead me in any way, or misrepresent facts.

Shigemitsu, at present a defendant in what are known as the War Crimes Trials in Tokyo, was never, to my knowledge, a supporter of the Jingo Military clique, but actively opposed it. He disapproved of their ideas, aims and actions. I know that he sincerely deplored the invasion of Manchuria in 1931, and did his best to localize and end hostilities.

I saw him often on terms of great intimacy during the China-Japanese fighting in and around Shanghai early in 1932, and knew of his actions and from his own statements to me that he was shocked and horrified by that conflict. Throughout the fighting he was doing his utmost to prevent its spreading beyond the vicinity of Shanghai and to terminate it as soon as possible. It was mainly through the efforts and collaboration of Shigemitsu and the American and British Ministers to China that the truce Agreement was signed terminating the hostilities and resulting in the withdrawal of the Japanese and Chinese forces. Not only did he oppose that conflict upon moral grounds, but as a patriotic Japanese he felt that aggression and expansion could bring only eventual defeat and ruin to the Empire of which he was a loyal subject.

After he lost his leg in a bomb explosion at Hongkew Park in Shanghai early in 1932, I saw Shigemitsu every time I went to Japan until he left for Europe. We often lunched or dined together, usually alone, and from conversations we had at those times I am convinced he never espoused the policies which led to the invasion of China in 1937 and finally to the attack upon Pearl Harbor in 1941. I know he opposed the China invasion, and from all I know of him after years of intimacy I feel certain he would have opposed the Pearl Harbor attack if he had had any foreknowledge of that move.
To me it seemed one of Fate's bitter ironies that this fine man should have been put in the position of having to sign Japan's surrender in 1945, for he never approved nor supported the policies which led to that defeat and surrender.

(Signed) Hallett Abend

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of February, 1947.

(Signed) HARRY L. RUSSELL
Notary Public in the State of New York
Washington County, No. 229
My commission expires March 30, 1948

2
関係各

東京通電

余ハニノ通電陳報告ルモデアル。余ハ九二年七月初期ヨリ九四一年

余ハ余が重光ノ友故ラ受ヘル気ヲ入リ。信用ヲ博シタコトヲ知レタ居リ

数年私へ余が私ノ業務ヲ接觸シタ間＝於テガ何等余ノ誤解ヲシテメタノトシ

現ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

余ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメタル

ハ余が九三一年上海及ビ其ノ附近＝於テノ局地化ヲ為スラシメナル
デナ・氏の愛国心に富む日本人と

1932年

1937年

日本帝国

敗戦

スパイ

カリテ

アラ

民

1941年

日本

帝國

敗戦

45年

敗戦

47年

敗戦

45年
It would be a great mistake for us to ingeminate and emphasise our woes. I cannot share that sense of detachment which enables some people to feel they are rendering a public service by rubbing-in the "cost dark and anxious part of our situation. Only the other day our great friend, President Roosevelt, stated some figures about our losses in relation to British and American new building in the "cost startling and alarming for". There was nothing very new about these figures and facts, and we gave our assent before-hand to the President's use of them. It certainly had a bad effect in all the balancing countries, in Spain, at Vichy, in Turkey and in Japan.

The Japanese Ambassador, in taking leave the other day, a "an "cost friendly to peace between our countries, inquired anxiously of "e about Mr. Roosevelt's statement which he evidently felt "ight be a factor in an adverse decision by Japan, which he hoped to avert. The House "ust not under-rate the dangers of our plight. We cannot afford to give any advantages to the enemy in naval information nor can we afford to paint our affairs in their darkest colours before the eyes of neutrals and to discourage our friends and encourage our foes all over the world. (June 25, 1941)
我國所為不協調，所為不協調。
To Shigemitsu, Minister for Foreign Affairs, from Kase, Minister to Switzerland.

Information from Switzerland No. 157.

Subject: Press comments on the relation between the new French Government and French Indo-China, and the Bulgarian situation.

1. (A) Through a broadcast of Radio France, the French Provisional Government announced that France would participate in the war against Japan, on the side of the Allies, and fight until not only all French territories are liberated, but also her enemies in Europe and in Asia are completely suppressed. (31st, London Reuter)

(B) The spokesmen of the French Provisional Government made a statement on the 29th about the relations between Japan and French Indo-China. The main points are as follows: (Tribune de Geneve, Algiers, Special Dispatch)

The Vichy Government has been giving instruction, without any authority, to the Governor-General Decoux concerning the relations between Japan and French Indo-China. The fate of French Indo-China will be decided, by taking into consideration the interests of the people of French Indo-China, and
those of France herself of which the Japanese Government will be informed at an appropriate date.

2. (A) It was announced that the Bulgarian Delegates for truce had arrived at Cairo on the 30th. (31st Cairo, U.P.)

(B) An editorial of the Times has attracted much attention, saying that in Bulgarie, so long as Filov and other members of his clique remained as regents and held the real power of the Government, her relations with the Allied Powers would not only remain unclarified, but also would be made even precarious. The reason why Bulgaria did not declare war against Turkey in spite of German demand when Turkey severed her relations with Germany, was actually due to the fact that moderate elements belonging to Premier Bagrianov's group had finally come to exert influence on the general domestic situation in the face of Filov's pro-German opinion. (London Exchange)

3. (A) The French Provisional Government is approaching the Swiss Government for agreement for Jean Verge, Counsellor of Embassy, in order to appoint him as Charge d'Affaires to Switzerland. (Tribune de Geneve, Algiers, Special Dispatch)

(B) Concerning the above-mentioned matter, Swiss official circles are dissatisfied, considering it maladroit to disclose such a fact before the Swiss Government has accorded the agreement, and reasoning moreover that agreement is given to an Ambassador or a Minister, and not to a Charge d'Affaires formally. (La Suisse, Bern Special Dispatch)
CERTIFICATE

Statement of Source and Authenticity

I, HAYASHI, Kaoru, Chief of Archives Section, Japanese Foreign Office, hereby certify that the document attached hereto in Japanese, consisting of 3 pages, being:

Toeloger No. 157 from Minister Kese to Foreign Minister Shigemitsu,
August 31, 1944.

is a true and correct copy of the official document in the custody of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Tokyo, on this 24th day of June, 1947.

(signed) Kaoru HAYASHI

Signed before me on the same day and at the same place,

(signed) Kotsuna, URAHE
CERTIFICATE

I, MIURA, Kazuichi, hereby certify that I can read, write and
speak the Japanese and the English languages, and that I have made
the English translation of

Teleg'am No. 157 from Minister Kose to Foreign Minister
Shigemitsu, Aug' 31, 1944,
accurately and faithfully.

(signe..) Kazuichi MIURA

Tokyo, January 10th, 1947.
昭和年11月 10日 鐘

伊藤喜常

電報第15号（昭和11年8月11日）

日本大使館

[日本語]
London, E.C.2, 9th January, 1947

In my capacity as Joint Chief Manager of the Kalian Mining Administration, Tientsin, North China, I had social and official relations with General Y. Umezu during the time that he was G.O.C. Imperial Japanese Forces, North China, with headquarters in Tientsin. The operation of the Administration's mines in the eastern part of the province of Hopei, was seriously affected by the disturbed political conditions existing in that area during the term of General Umezu's command in Tientsin. This unsatisfactory state of affairs was much improved after the signing of the Ho-Umezu Agreement in 1935. My relations with General Umezu were uniformly pleasant and I formed at the time the impression that he was extremely broad minded and tolerant for a soldier and this impression was subsequently borne out in my future relations with him. He stands out in my mind amongst the many Japanese Generals with whom I had social and official relations over a period of more than twenty years as the least militaristic of them all.

E. J. Nathan

I, EDWARD JONAH NATHAN of Kent House, 11/16 Telegraph Street in the City of London, England, being duly sworn, do deposite and say that the within photostat is an exact photostatic copy of an original statement signed by me on the 9th day of January 1947.

Subscribed and sworn to )
before me at Kent House,)
11/16 Telegraph Street )
in the City of London, )
England, this seventh )
day of May 1947 )

I. W. Lauralder
A Commissioner for Oaths
Next, when we survey the price of commodities in the world market, we find that there has been no conspicuous change in the price of finished products since last year except a slight fall, but that there has been a continuous fall in the price of food-stuffs and raw materials until this autumn. While, afterwards, there was a slight recovery in the price of some commodities, there has been no wholesale recovery in the general price. This is because the industrial countries in the world could not fully consume the supply of food-stuffs and raw materials and diminish goods in stock. The above fall in the price of food-stuffs and raw materials and the decrease of demand on the part of the industrial countries naturally affects, adversely, the economy of the primary production countries which are largely dependent upon export and tends to suppress trade. Therefore, increase of demand in the industrial countries will be necessary for the economic recovery of the primary production countries.

As for the present condition of the important countries which are in a position to lead the world market, the U.S. shows a $1,130,000,000 excess of exports in her trade, the highest mark in recent years. However, the U.S. also produces an abundance of primary products and she is in a wavering state as concerns
choice of imports. However recovery of U.S. economy is desirable, because a favorable turn in U.S. economy will naturally bring prosperous conditions to world economy, but at present the prospects for U.S. economy are not very bright. The reinforcement of armament in Britain and other countries may be deemed a factor which will bring about a more or less favorable turn, but the prosperous conditions thus caused will be out of proportion.

It is a matter of course that the decline in this year's world trade is due to the world-wide economic depression, but it also is closely related to the policies taken by various countries. In short, it is largely affected by various political conditions rather than economic causes. The self-adjustment of the world economy is now hopeless. The powers in the world are only strengthening the power of their own respective blocs. Therefore, there is no way for them but to diminish their trade with other fortified blocs. In strengthening these blocs, there arise incessant dissensions among them, complicating more and more international relations and causing antagonism. The various countries tend to strengthen measures to prevent imports and to prohibit or restrain exports for the benefit of their own bloc or for the necessity of reinforcing their armament. This works to impair world economy. There is little hope that this international antagonism will be solved. In view of these points the prospects for the world trade is still dark.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I, who occupy the post of Chief of Archives Section, Foreign Ministry, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, printed in Japanese consisting of 1013 pages and entitled "Annual Report of the Trade Bureau Foreign Ministry 1938" is a document compiled and issued by the Japanese Government (Foreign Ministry).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this 24 day of June, 1947

/S/ HAYASHI, Assistant (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

at the same place,
on the same date.

Witness: URABE, Katsuma (seal)
The Session opened at 10:13 a.m., Friday, March 17, 1933.

...Omitted......

Minister of State Mr. ...U... Sadno.

I, on behalf of the army authorities, wish to express our thanks for the telegram of gratitude and encouragement, which the President of the House of Peers, representing his House, sent to the Kwantung Army the other day, by way of congratulation on its suppression of Jehol Province. The main force of bandits was almost mopped up and Jehol Province has been cleared of them as far as its former border-line of the Great Wall, so that we are now almost in a position to formulate our general plan for future maintenance of public order there. I wish to take this opportunity of informing you of the outline of the subjugation and the course of operations made since last autumn.

As you are doubtlessly aware, Japan, with the unanimity of the whole nation, recognized the independence of Manchoukuo soon after the 63rd session of the Diet. The Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol was
signed between the two countries and consequently the nature of the Kwantung Army's responsibility has been greatly changed and needless to say, the duties of co-operation in defense and the maintenance of public order have been additionally imposed on the Army in conformity with the Japan-Manchoukuo Protocol.

Accordingly the Kwantung Army has devoted its every possible effort to the restoration of public order in north Manchuria and though winter had then set in, it resolutely carried out its operations of subjugation without a rest and with a small number of forces, making nothing of the severe cold. The Army first subdued Liu Ping-san's Army and reached the bank of the Heilung Kiang River in the north. In the west it subdued Su Ping-wen; and going over the great Khingan Mts. at a stroke, it subjugated the whole region of Holumbair. And then after a long pursuit of the enemy, it advanced as far as Manchuli, where it rescued the Japanese under confinement.

In the east the Army chose Ting Chap Li Tu and Wang Te-lin as far as the border of U.S.S.R. and swept them from the area. The triangular area of the southern Liaotung district thus came to be almost under control now, and in December the Kwantung Army withdrew its forces for the time being and endeavoured to center its effort solely upon the maintenance of public order in Jehol Province. Fearing the horrors of hostilities might extend to the innocent inhabitants, the Army, in the expectation that Tang Yu-lin would
swear allegiance to it, tried several times to bring about a political settlement with him. However, although Tang-Yu-lin had once showed his vassal-like submission to the executive of Manchoukuo, he did not make his position clear toward us under pressure from Chang Hau-eh-liang and the Nanking Government. Moreover, he gradually allowed a number of bandits and the regular army of Chang Hau-eh-liang to make their intrusion into the Province. Moreover he used the Province as a base of his military operations and disturbed the public order in Manchoukao, openly assuming an anti-Manchoukao and anti-Japanese attitude. Once he was informed that the atmosphere of the League of Nations became unfavorable to Japan, he assumed an anti-Japanese attitude much more boldly and much more positively, thus exposing the inhabitants of the Jehol Province to extreme impoverishment and hardship, until at last the Kwantung Army, upon consultation with the Government of Manchoukao, decided to start its operations of subjugation in conformity with the Japan-Manchoukao Protocol. It is a patent fact Jehol Province is a territory of Manchoukao, as you know from the declaration issued upon its founding, to say nothing of the historical and geographical reasons. Similar to all post subjugations of bandits in other parts of Manchoukao this is nothing but one of her domestic affairs. The subjugation of
bandits and the maintenance of public order are invariably imperative necessities of Manchoukuo and the bounden duties of the Kwantung Army. This, however, at the time, provoked much discussion in one part of the world. I believe it was a result of not being well-informed as to the realities of the situation.

With Chiang Kai-shek’s forces going up to the north, the situation in the Peiping Tientsin area was completely changed. Chang Hauh-liang’s retirement was rumoured, and all generals have been struggling for supremacy; so that a change in the whole situation is expected. The Shanhsí Army has transferred a part of the forces from Chang chia kou to Tolun and is threatening to attack the flank of Jehol Province with the co-operation of the retreating volunteer troops. But I believe no aggravation of the situation would occur, unless the Chinese side would challenge us to war purposely and I pray that such may never be the case for the peace in the Far East.

Countless efforts may yet be required in future for maintenance of peace in the whole of Manchoukuo, I believe, but the prospects of our success in this task are now almost in sight. I sincerely congratulate ourselves upon this successful first step towards the restoration of peace in the Orient, which has been the scene of
disturbances for many years. Here I earnestly hope that from now on we will display our spirit of national unity much more with the co-operation of every one of you. Proceed resolutely to accomplish as soon as possible our first aim of establishment of glorious peace.
高频率，高效率(实习间)
右署名添印八自分ノ旨同於ケ為ヲサレメリ

昭和二十年
三月十八日
於東京

(印)

同日於同

立党政院議記

田長

(印)
I ADDRESS TO CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND
APPEAL TO OUR FOLLOW-COUNTRY'EN

(The first part omitted)

"Under these circumstances China has attempted for the
last 20-odd years to govern her territory under the Government
of the Republic of China. Unlike older days, however, the
Government have met with many difficulties, and this point we
should fully take into consideration. To Czecho-Slovakia,
Yugo-Slavia, Poland and "land in Europe, independence at once
meant unification; but China is incomparably more difficult to
unify than any of these countries.

"This enables us to realise the plight in which Mr.
Chiang Kai-shek is now placed and at the same time to appreciate
his grave responsibility. Accordingly, he has indeed shrunk
from nothing so far as it was for the benefit of his country.
At one time, admitting Russia into China and enlisting her aid,
he unified Central China, while at another, depending on
Japan, he attained the unification of areas north of the
River Yargtze. By and by, however, he rejected Russia,
excluded Japan, and turned to Britain and the United States.
They, too, he will come to oppose sooner or later. He has
indeed been doing all sorts of things. Yet, what statesman in
his place could have done otherwise under such circumstances?"
"In settling any international issue, it is, in my opinion, necessary especially for a nation with reserve power or for one professing to be an advanced nation, to take the other's situation fully into consideration, that is, to proceed with the matter in such a way as to suit the other party."

"This is my first explanation in answer to the question, "What is the high way whereon we should proceed?"

(Several paragraphs omitted)

"Needless to say, we all wish and pray with all our heart for the prosperity of the Imperial Household and the Japanese Empire. Our aspiration, however, is not limited to the existence or prosperity merely of Japan, and herein lies the real spirit of our culture. May we hope for the prosperity of the East, and the peace of the world. In so hoping, we wish first of all to have a free talk with China. This, and nothing but this, I have been telling to all Chinese people, including those holding important positions, I have met in the last twenty year."

(Two paragraphs omitted)

"It goes without saying that Europe and America have their own excellences and they have both countries and individuals who know what's what. For all that, however, Japan
is by no means subject to any power either in Europe or in America. On the contrary, from the cultural and spiritual standpoint, Japan has much to contribute by way of saving the Western culture from the present deadlock. To state this fact plainly and to put it directly into practice is of utmost importance and such is the very highway for us to choose.

"Why do not the Chinese and, if I may be permitted to say so, the Japanese take this open road? It might be in many cases simpler and more convenient to take a short cut or a by-road. Then, we think of the distant future, however, we would much rather go straight onwards along the broad level highway."

(Four paragraphs omitted)

"I am deeply grieved that the Sino-Japanese problems have at last come to such a pass. That we two have gone astray from the highway we had originally intended to follow and that we are now obliged to fight against each other on the field of battle is, I fear, going to constitute an obstacle to the development of the Oriental culture."

(Two paragraphs omitted)

"NATIONAL RESOLUTION IN FACE OF THE PRESENT SITUATION:

"Next, I should like to appeal to our fellow-countrymen in connection with the current problems confronting us."
"The die is cast. So far we have made every effort to avoid this development, praying from the bottom of our hearts that things would not come to such a pass. Now that the worst has come to the worst, however, we should accept it as gods' ordeal to try us and should face it with firm resolution.

I greatly fear that this turn of event, which has given rise to such an unfortunate state of affairs between Japan and China, may, should a single mis-step be taken, even render utterly impossible the adjustment of the Sino-Japanese relations, which we have been advocating for so many years, and furthermore that it may occasion greater troubles in the Orient or rather in the whole world, and that as the result of all this, Japan herself may be obliged to undergo a really grave ordeal."

(Several paragraphs omitted)

"In order to give depth to our thoughts we Japanese have to go back to the very foundation of our country, that is, we have to grasp the real spirit of our ancestors who founded Japan. If, in the course of deducting and amplifying the Oriental and Occidental culture, we lose sight of this fundamental idea, our thought would fall in a whirl and, as a result, we would make a very weak nation. This is why we should always hold dear the spirit of our national polity.

"The national polity of Japan is by no means so rigid
as is often mistakenly held. It is elastic, comprehensive, and also resilient. It may embrace and absorb everything. Instead of being too severe and particular, it is liberal and tolerating. Nowadays, people are inclined to regard the rational polity of Japan as something excessively rigid. This, I suppose, is due to the fact that as yet they have no true understanding of Japan's rational polity.

To be rich in ideas and never to humiliate others is, I believe, the thought originally governing the Japanese."

(The rest omitted)
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I hereby certify that the magazine hereto attached, entitled the "BUNGEISHUNJUSHI," which contains an article written by Araki, Sadao, under the title "I Address to Chiang Kai-shek and Appeal to Our Fellow-Countrymen," is a magazine compiled and published by the BUNGEISHUNJUSHI as a special number in August, 1937.

I also certify that the said BUNGEISHUNJUSHI was dissolved on 31 March, 1946, and that now the BUNGEISHUNJUSHINSHA has been organised under new leaders.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 27 day of January, 1947.

/s/ IKEJIMA, Shimpei (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on the same date.

Witness: /s/ HASUOKA, Takeaki (seal)
荒木貞夫

同様に

成

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文

啓

立

ニ

断

ス

ル

謳明

書

文
蒋介石に興味を共有し、我が同胞に縁

－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－－...
中略

必ず今日の欧米文化の行方を是正すべきものを多分に持て居る。それ等を率直に述べ直従に avere 今の大切で、これが即ち我々の道すく道ではないのですか。実際大略心に於ては、待ち近 Shan など何故講を用むべきかと云ひ得べく misunder せんに我等同盟我、何故に沿げた大道を歩かいないのであるか。近路をし、脇道を滑って行く事あるかも知れぬが、遠い将来の事を恨む時には、私は待たる此大戦を踏破したいたいのである。
今日、日米関係が新様な状態に立ち込んできたことは、私には非常に悲痛な感を抱いて居るものである。我々の居るこの大変な事態に、東洋文化の発展途上に一つの逆流を生み出すものではないかと思うことになる。

次に、この現象に反対した時局の傾動に論難して、我々同様に解くたいに、矢は弦を放ってしまった。今までこそこの頃のあらんことを避け、努力をかさならざる事、心から踏みたのであるが事の為に涙すれば、これが私だけが我々に與へた試験の一つであるとして、深い覚悟を以てここに對さなければならぬ。

今次時局の調同は、日支の間に於て昨年に不祥な状態を見ると云ふのみは留らず、一步誤れば、我々が多年唱道し来た日支国交の困難と云ふのみを不可能事とするばかりでなく、ひいては東洋に成しき世界により
大きな波を及ぼしはせぬか。日本自説にしても、其の結果、非常に重い思想の深みを持つの云ふ事は、日本と云ふものが出来た本に踏る文化の演繹演衍して居る間に苦しみの根本を破られたならば、思想は蒙る。日中の国際と云ふもののば、よく言はれるやうに、そんなに固苦しみもたたりとしたらものなのである。幾も今日に於ては、国際と云ふと大裂に固苦しい事になって来るのであって、これはまだ日本の国際と云ふもの
が本当に理解されて居ないのではないかと私は考へるのである。

後略

思想に豊かであれ、そして人に船をかかすなりと云ふ、これから日本本

来の思想であると思う。
This article contains the gist of a lecture given by Baron General ARAKI, Sadao, on the first day of the Suwera University Extension at Karuizawa, for the study of the Oriental Culture. The reason for publication of the lecture in this periodical lies in that both the lecturer and the subject "set our common interest.

It goes without saying that the editor is responsible for the wording of the article.

The first part omitted.

The war being the "most important of all acts performed by the human kind, it should not be waged unnecessarily. Only after all sorts of endeavours have been "made and still it is inevitable, should it be resorted to. Nevertheless, there are occasions when it is absolutely necessary to resort to war."

In short, the Oriental conception of war is wholly based upon "orals. Hence the best result of war lies not in shedding blood but solely in gaining the victory. Again, the ideal is to end the war with the least possible losses. In particular, it is considered the highest "oral code governing the war not to extend horrors of war over women, children and other innocent non-belligerents.
This article contains the gist of a lecture given by Baron General Araki, Sadao, on the first day of the Sufer University Extension at Karuizawa, for the study of the Oriental Culture. The reason for publication of the lecture in this periodical lies in that both the lecturer and the subject "are our common interest.

It goes without saying that the editor is responsible for the wording of the article.

The first part omitted.

The war being the "most important of all acts performed by the humankind, it should not be waged unnecessarily. Only after all sorts of endeavours have been made and still it is inevitable, should it be resorted to. Nevertheless, there are occasions when it is absolutely necessary to go to war.

In short, the Oriental conception of war is wholly based upon "morals." Hence the best result of war lies not in shedding blood but solely in gaining the victory. Again, the ideal is to end the war with the least possible losses. In particular, it is considered the highest "moral code governing the war not to extend horrors of war over women, children and other innocent non-belligerents."
Though I am serving in the Army, I have had from the outset of my military training the least idea of killing men or inflicting injuries upon others or invading other countries. If therefore, I had known that such was the intrinsic duty of soldiers, most probably I would not have entered the Army.

A couple of paragraphs omitted

When, in the course of my last year's lecture here, I spoke to the same effect, before American and British residents, unexpectedly some of them raised an interrogation by way of protest, saying, 'We hear the Japanese soldiers in Shanghai have committed all sorts of atrocities. What do you think about it?' to this I answered, 'I do not know whether or not a thing has really occurred. Most probably, it is not the fact. I cannot possibly believe that the Japanese troops should have ever committed such misconducts. However, if by any chance they have done so, it is surely unpardonable. Such conducts are most objectionable and contrary to the very spirit of the Imperial way. Thereupon, they understood and even clapped their hands.'

The rest omitted.
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHENTICITY

I hereby certify that the magazine hereto attached, written in Japanese consisting of 42 pages, entitled "The SUPERA World" and issued on 15 July, 1944, is a magazine which I compiled and which I had published by the Japanese-Abroad Publishing Co.

Certified at Tokyo, on this 15th day of January, 1947.

/S/ NAKAURA, Yoshihisa (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the witness.

At the same place, on the same date

Witness: /S/ SUGAWARA, Hiroshi (seal)
戦争の目的

陸軍大将
荒木貞夫

此の一言は陸軍大将男爵荒木貞夫閣下の東洋文化夏期大学講義録

上に紹介することにした所以である。其文賢の著者は在るや固よりて

ある。（中村生）
戦争は人経に於ける最も大事な所為であるから、溢りに之を行ってはならぬ。凡ゆる努力をしても尚且つ避け得ざる場合に始めて之に訴ふべし。

戦争は人経に於ける最も大事な所為であるから、溢りに之を行ってはならぬ。凡ゆる努力をしても尚且つ避け得ざる場合に始めて之に訴ふべし。
意味の異を断念したところ、殊らずも彼等の内から

然らば上海に於いて日本の軍隊が還幸の限りを整したといふ事を聞く

との抗議的質問が出たので、私は夫れに対して

そんな事が質問有ったか如何かは自分は知らぬが恐らく夫れは事実

相違して居りはせぬか、或々さうさうふふ不心得な事を日本軍がやったも

のと信じ得られねが、或に一つさうふふ事をやったものとすれば許

すべからざる行文で、皇道精神に背反した不適合な誤指である。

と答へたところ、彼等も納得して遂に撤手を遂げて異れたらことがある。

3
文部省立関スル聡明書

本署

付セラタル日本語ニテ毎

四ニ面ヲヨリ関スル聡明書

昭和二十二年一月十五日

於東京

中村嘉寿

立會人

辻俊士

菅原裕
The Official Gazette Extra dated March 25, 1932.
The 61st Session of the Imperial Diet,
Stenographic record No.3 of the Proceedings of the House of Peers
The Session was opened at 10:08 a.m. March 24, 1932 (Thursday)
(omitted)

O Minister of State (ARAKI, Sadao):

I gather that the first point of the interpellation just now by Mr. Shimizu was to the effect that the recent cessation of the military activities prior to the ending of the anti-Japanese movement which is the basic issue of the China question will not lead to the attainment of our object in the future. The duties imposed on the Army in recent dispatching of troops to Shanghai were primarily for the purpose of protecting Japanese residents in the Shanghai area and to maintain public peace and order in the International Settlement. This object has been generally attained through the actions of which you already know. At the present, so long as the Chinese Army does not concentrate a large force or take the offensive against the Japanese Army, the views of the central command are that it is not necessary to maintain the present strength, and that the major strength can be stationed in Japan on a prepared footing and be dispatched to Shanghai in case of necessity. Therefore about one and a half division was ordered to return recently.

- 1 -
Def. Doc. # 1825

That is to say, the military actions have come to an end within the sphere of the duties assigned. The object of bringing the anti-Japanese movement to an end is quite a different problem from that of settling military action for the time being. Therefore, since the military action has come to an end for the time being, we withdrew our forces from Shanghai, leaving the necessary forces behind. I should like you to understand this point.

Concerning the second point of the interpellation as to what will be done about the Japanese residents in places along the Yangtze River other than Shanghai, I believe that this is a concern of the normal functions of the Navy and the various measures of the Foreign Office. Since the Navy Minister is present here and since this has some connection with the functions of the Army, I shall take up this point. In the event the situation in this area should deteriorate in the future, I believe it probable that the naval reinforcements would be dispatched. Depending upon circumstances, I think it is possible that the army might take action in this area. But I believe that by diplomatic measures and other means the policy has been adopted to prevent such an event occurring. I believe the third point of the interpellation was to the effect that: "The establishment of a neutral zone there at this time or the conclusion of an agreement of truce would hamper the movement of our crack troops in the future. As I have just explained,
the object of the recent dispatch of troops was to maintain public peace and order in the International Settlement in Shanghai and to protect the Japanese residents there. From the standpoint of the general policy, we are basing our action on a policy of seeking to avoid as much as possible the outbreak of a full-scale war between Japan and China. Therefore, I believe it is extremely necessary from the standpoint of our policy to establish a neutral zone and thus to restore public peace and order in Shanghai. As far as the action of the military are concerned, for the purpose of avoiding a general clash between Japan and China and moreover of maintaining peace and order in Shanghai and protecting the Japanese residents there, I believe it is one method of doing so. There it is desired that this problem be settled by a coordination of political and military strategy. Therefore, I believe that coordination is necessary for this great aim, even if a neutral zone is to be established as an agreement of truce is to be concluded.

However, in case an unfortunate situation should arise forcing us to take military action due to the fact that China, without realizing her mistakes, continues to take insincere attitude toward Japan and to increase her military force, I believe it will be possible to take satisfactory action in spite of the establishment of such a neutral zone. What is required, after all, is the coordination of military and political strategy in accordance with the object in view. I should like this point to be understood.
I believe the fourth point of the interpolation related to Manchuria. As the Prime Minister has just replied, the problem in Manchuria, as expressed from the standpoint of national defense, requires that Manchuria be peaceful and orderly. We have therefore, advocated this for a long time a Manchuria.

(omitted)

Minister of State (ARAKI, Sadao)

I shall make one more reply to your repeated interpolation. In order to promote friendly relations between Japan and China, it is the vitally necessary to put an end to the anti-Japanese movement. But this cannot be accomplished solely by resorting to armed force. With regard to those problems, the government is considering and taking other steps as its basic policy toward China. As I have just stated, the action of the Army was aimed at the maintenance of public peace and order in the International Settlement in Shanghai and the protection of the Japanese residents there. We have attained this object, the Chinese Army no longer being able to rise again. As I reported yesterday concerning the progress of the situation, because avoiding an all-out clash was not considered favorable from the standpoint of the Sino-Japanese and international relations it was felt necessary to localize this problem. Now that this object has been attained, the Central Command thought it necessary to withdraw the troops rather than to leave them for a long time on the continent and to station them in Japan.
Thus, a force of about one and a half division was ordered to return to Japan. It would perhaps be clearer if it is understood that by a settlement for the time being I mean the termination of hostilities on the battle-field. As to Manchuria and Mongolia which have just been referred to, I think it is hardly necessary for me to speak again. We are doing our utmost in this connection. As for the third point, the problem of a neutral zone, I must say that in order to take full military action, there are cases where it is necessary that there should be no such obstacles as a treaty or a neutral zone. Just as you are concerned, there are disadvantageous points if our military action is subject to restraint on account of them. However, the recent dispatch of the force to Shanghai was motivated by the hope of bringing about the friendly relations between Japan and China or a settlement of all existing problems as peacefully as possible, avoiding a full-scale war. It is most important for us to contribute towards the carrying out of the national policy by a coordination of political and military strategy. The since such a case is a most appropriate example of this point, our aim is to bring about a peaceful settlement of this Incident rather than to wage war for war's sake. Therefore, I believe that the Army should cooperate, in keeping with the national policy, in establishing a neutral zone or concluding an agreement of truce.
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY


certified at Tokyo,
on this ___ day of ___, 1947

/S/ MIYAZAKA, Kanko (swal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.
at the same place,
on this same date

Witness: Chief of the Stenographic Section
/S/ of the House of Councillors

YAMADA, Itaru (seal)
无
The so-called "Imperial Way (KÔDO)" of our country, I presume, is
the principle of the way that our Imperial Family should follow.
I think that the source of that principle is shown in our nation's
history which has been recorded since the very first day of the world
when the universal and eternal truth was revealed in the creation of
the heaven and the earth. This is clearly seen in our history which
starts with the founding of our Empire. Accordingly, if we contemplate
upon and understand the truth revealed in the founding of our Empire,
we can understand the development of the Imperial way through the ages
and the past doings of the Imperial Family in accordance with that great
principle. To make my story short, the sacred and remotely and powerful,
originated national polity of our Empire, which took its start in the

- 1 -
founding of the nation, has its source in the teachings bequeathed by our Imperial Ancestors. As the assigned time is not sufficient, I will not explain what the Imperial Way is by giving illustrations, one by one, from our history, for, I think it will become quite clear to you if you only contemplate upon the origin of our national history. Now, let us consider, from the standpoint of historical time, the profound Imperial will shown in the Divine Message given together with the three Sacred Treasures, by the originator of our nation and in the Imperial Edicts issued by the successive Emperors. These Imperial instructions were given whenever they were needed according to different stages of national development, each stage being attained by the acquisition and assimilation of various new cultures and civilizations. But, the basic principle on which all these Rescripts were issued is fixed and unchangeable. It will be quite adequately compared to a spring from which water flows, muddy, clear, or crystal clear. Although the kinds of water are different, they issue from one and the same spring. Just in the same way, these various Imperial Instructions and Edicts, though they assumed different forms according to the different situations they faced, were based upon one and the same basic principle, and were meant to show, I presume, the sacredness of our national polity and the Imperial Way. The Imperial Way is therefore definitely shown in the teachings of our Imperial Ancestors, and the source of the Imperial Way is clearly and historically traceable to the founding of our Empire. The Imperial Rescript on Education
graciously summarizes for us the significance of the Imperial Way, and the Imperial Edict issued in the early years of the Showa Era also elucidates it. In the latter the Emperor graciously says that "the Emperors successively assumed sovereignty, and the influence of their benevolent rule was felt everywhere."

I think that the "the Emperors successively assumed sovereignty, and the influence of their benevolent rule was felt," is the phrase particularly indicative of the basic principle of the Imperial Way. I presume, from these words, that "the Imperial benevolence reaching all subjects," expresses the same spirit, thought differently phrased, as that embodied in the Imperial policy which was established at the time of the Meiji Restoration, in order "to let everybody get his own natural position and let everybody fulfill his own desire." These are two kinds of expression, written differently, of the same Imperial Principle upon which our Empire was founded. This is the interpretation of the Premier as has been often avowed by him lately at the Diet session, and is also mine.

It has given such pain in consequence, to the heart of any of our Emperors whenever such exceptional circumstances rose under which the Imperial benevolence was not felt by every one of his subjects, and the result was seen in the conditions of his people's life. All his pain came from the fact that every one of his subjects was not placed in his proper position so as to fulfill his own desire—that the influence of his benevolent rule was not perfect over his people.
If we thus understand the meaning of Imperial Benevolence, we likewise understand the following view of the universe -- the view which asserts that every object in the universe has a life of its own, which it maintains, not for the sake of its own individual existence but for the purpose of co-operation and co-existence with all the rest of the objects that exist in the universe, so that the harmonious progress of the universe may be started and maintained. Therefore, unless we benignly give our thought to the life of each object, it can never be fitly placed to show its true worth. An object is not a mere mass of matter but evidently has a life of its own.

So when we humbly think of the Imperial Grace embracing the universe with its mercy and benignity, we are always filled with an unusual emotion of gratitude. It reminds us of a certain sage -- whose name I am sure you all know -- who used each of his hōraku (TN -- an earthenware roasting pan), with which he cooked his food, the source of his life, with such thoughtfulness as to patch it each time it got a crack until it became completely unusable despite the carefully repeated patches and then to bury it in the earth with an affectionate word of gratitude for its long service. That loving attitude seems to be a phase of the teachings of the Imperial Way. The spiritual attitude which makes one treat even a little roasting pan with such humane care as to use it as long as it can be useful and then humbly to thank it for the last time for its long service, is the essential requisite for our realization of the Imperial Way.
When we look at things from such a point of view, we understand that each of us exists, not for the purpose of asserting his individual existence, but for the sake of taking his part in the harmonious composition of the total universe. And we must gratefully find this universal truth shown in our Imperial Way — in our national history, at the very beginning of the founding of our country. This is the essence of our Imperial Way. In the realization of the Imperial Way, therefore, are comprehended, it seems, all the truths — the Common Way of Heaven and Earth, the Truth of the Universe, and all philosophies, religions and moralities. Such an expression as "the unity of religions observance and political administration" is not a mere fancy. It is not, I dare say, a mere matter of phraseology. Its principle, when fully applied, governs the political, moral, and social relations of our people and further it rules the international affairs of the world and even all the phenomena of the universe. By following it only, can one fulfill one's duty without the least fear of erring. The same thing can be said of current affairs. The above principle rises from a noble and divine spring, flows in rivers and forms oceans and lakes. Namely, it flows changing forms according to actual circumstances. But this change of form does not in the least affect the nature of the original spring from which it takes its rise. The original spring is pure and inexhaustible, forever flowing into rivers, lakes and oceans. But we must never forget this original source. While keeping firmly and reverently in mind this holy nature of the primal source, one may freely follow the
course of the flow downward to the broad plains and oceans through the stages of temporal mutation. The gracious Imperial sayings "The Emperors successively assumed sovereignty and the influence of their benevolent rule was felt everywhere" and "Our "oral standard was deeply and soundly established," express alike, it seems to me, the idea that out of the immutable source flows the stream of phenomena and events, taking convenient shapes according to temporal circumstances.

Our people, who adhere to this principle, have therefore been spared from becoming narrow-minded and hostile toward foreign influence. On the contrary, we have well assimilated foreign influences and have taken their essences into our culture. It is true that sometimes reacted reactions did rise, but as a whole, when we view the long course of our national history as well as the lives of individual Japanese, we can say that our people have been and are extremely tolerant on this phase.

This noble racial characteristic of our people, who, instead of formulating their conduct into rigid laws and rules, regulate it by self-control and self-direction, seems to originate in their adherence to the above-mentioned noble "oral principle."

If this principle were thoroughly understood by the entire Japanese people to-day and steadily applied to the present circumstances, there would never have occurred such conflicts of interests and desires, such irritating Continental adventures and such a sentimental anti-foreignism as we are troubled with now. But the fact that they have occurred is due— is it not, to our failure faithfully to apply the above
ideal, instead of putting it aside as a mere ideal, to the political, ethical, military, social and all other phases of our actual life? Even when a conflict of interest rises, we can, it seems to me, solve it if only we remember this Original Principle. Conflicts and frictions are welcome as long as they stimulate our progress. So long as these conflicts and frictions are made to harmonize and not suppressed for the sake of uniformity, all the above problems, even if accompanied by heated arguments and conflicting interests, will be, it seems to me, brought back to the Original Principle. To follow the Imperial Way in this manner, applying it to every action and movement of ours, seems to be most crucial for us in facing the current problems as well as in conducting our daily life. From this point of view, I am not anxious to have kind of broad-minded, optimistic, and all-comprehensive tolerance and wisdom prevail in the culture of our people. To attribute all knowledge to this Original Principle so that our knowledge may be made the more versatile and productive is, in my opinion, the foundation of education.
Certificate of Authenticity

I, YAŻAZAKI, Takashi, who occupy the post of Chief of the General Office of the House of Representatives, hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, and consisting of 5 pages, is an exact and authorized excerpt from pp. 11-13 of the Minutes (stenographed) of the 10th Committee Meeting of the House of Representatives for the Government Subsidy Bill for the Educational Expenses of the Youth Schools, held on March 2, 1939, which is kept in my official custody.

The person mentioned in the above Minutes as State Minister ARAKI is the then Education Minister Baron ARAKI, Sadao.

Certified at the House of Representatives, on this 25th day of February, 1947

/S/ YAŻAZAKI, Takashi (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of this Witness.

at the same place, on this same date

Witness: /S/ TAKEI, Tsuguo (seal)
第七十四回帝国議会
院青年学校教育費制補助法委員員四議会議案（速記）
第十四

昭和十四年三月二日（未畑日）午後三時十分開議

荒木國務大臣

（中略）

我國ノ県道ト申ナルルトハ、所謂皇室ノ謚ミ行ハセラルペキ道ノ本

源ヲ申ゲルコトト申ジマス。姫園ノ言ニ退リマシテ我願ノ歴史ニ明デ

ルマスル如ク、一頁シマシテ居ルマスル我願ノ歴史ニ退リ出発致シマテ、

題ヒマシテ靜ニ静ノ古ノ様シマスルト此ノ付ニ付テ我願ノ歴史ニ退

モ明ニエティシテ此ノ進歩発達ノ跡。又皇室ノ御道ヲ観シテノ度テノ過
テクノロジーの進歩は、従来の制限を超えて新たな可能性を創出し、スマートな社会の実現を進めていく。AIの進化により、産業革命の次期を醸し出している。こうした変革は、社会の基盤を揺さぶるが、同時に新たな価値観を生み出す。今後は、人と技術がより密接に連携し、社会全体の発展に寄与する時代が来ると考えられる。

一方で、技術の進歩は同時に課題も生む。情報の過剰な流れ、プライバシーの確保、不利益の分配などが注目されている。これらは、技術の利用を一層慎重かつ適切に行うことが求められる。

今後、テクノロジーは社会全体の発展を支える重要な存在となり、同時にその影響を理解し、適切に対応していくことが肝要である。
自己、山崎
高は衆議院庶務課長の為にある書をなるところ、別紙日本
文五枚より成る書類は、自己が行の職務上保管に係る。昭和十四年三
月二日開議の衆議院青年学校教育委員会議録（速記）
第十同十一頁より十三頁までの部分の正確なる写るることを証明しま
す。
昭和二十二年二月二十五日
於衆議院
山崎
高

石は自分の面前に於て署名捺印させられたことを証明します

同日同所

武井次男
(Omitted) Reviewing the situation that has been prevailing for some years past both at home and abroad, it seems as if the national defense of our country, speaking from the Japanese standpoint, has so far been left in an unspeakably wretched state. Just look outside of the country, and pause and consider how the international affairs are developing. Europe and America are truly doing very well; they are certainly in an advantageous position to assert themselves positively and strongly. But apart from Japan herself, how about the other parts of Asia? It seems to me they have long been placed in a most painful plight and as for our country, I can not help thinking that she, as a member of the Asiatic community, is in a no less unhappy state. Nevertheless, when I viewed these circumstances as subtly linked to our country both internally and externally, and at the same time as involving the whole of the Far East, it just occurred to my mind that these unfavorable circumstances might after all prove a blessing in disguise and furnish us with an instrument to break though the deadlock. As if in response to my reflection, Japan recently has awaked to her own self, and internationally speaking, the world also has come to take due cognizance of her and realize her true character. As a matter of fact, the most
opportune time has come for our country, which has assumed a heavy responsibility to discharge: in certain parts of Asia, to see her own true self and at the same time to have the world know what she really is. This has been my view and I firmly believe that she is actually awakening. What Count PUTARA has just stated has set me thinking deeply. What is the most important and significant matter demanding our serious attention and efforts at the present critical juncture? It is this: To further strengthen the self-confidence that has awakened on the part of Japan as well as of Asia at large and that has been brought to the notice of the world, and to embody that awakening spirit in concrete activities at home and abroad. (omitted)

In the spring of this year we laid down the following -- much the same as what Count PUTARA has just remarked -- as the general principle clarifying the major aim-and object of our Imperial Army, the Three Sacred Treasures are symbols of the high moral ideals of the Japanese people, on which the Japanese Empire has been founded. In the case of our country therefore, the founding of the Empire is in itself identical with the founding of a moral state. Consequently it follows that the Imperial Army must be absolutely a moral entity. Not only this; we have the divine injunction which sets down the fulfillment of Three cardinal virtues -- benevolence, justice and bravery, the necessary offspring of the Moral Way -- as the mission assigned to our country.

- 2 -
Our Imperial Army was originally created with this Imperial Way as its spiritual nucleus, so that we military men must infallibly live up to this spirit. To go through military discipline and training, to command or be commanded, to enhance the Imperial prestige, to mete out benevolence to our brethren and the world, to do anything else we army men should always be in accordance with the Imperial Way. (omitted)

For the world to see the intrinsic value of our Army, it is necessary for the country to be washed and cleaned of all her mud and dirt so that she stand but in bold relief against the blue sky. In order to attain this purpose, the Army must first of all, as the cardinal agent in this national purifications movement enhance and display its noble spirit, have a thorough grasp on the essentials of its spiritual principle and thus to take the initiative in the undertaking. Its spiritual principle, as I have just stated, is quite simple; it is nothing more than thorough and absolute devotion to the furtherance of the Imperial task. It is therefore in this sense that the military actions which the Imperial Army engages in are said to be sacred wars waged for the sake of Imperial assistance, in other words, the Imperial Army attends to all its duties whether on the field of battle or in the barracks, always inspired with the desire to vicidicalo Imperial Benevolence and the National Virtues to the world, and this is a matter that no member of the Army should lose sight of, not even for a single moment.
The Imperial Army, when in occupation, should be so benevolent as to win the goodwill of the natives, while, on the field, should refrain from behaving themselves in such a way as to incur the enemy's hatred.

For all this, when we look into the actual state of things we cannot but own that the case is far from being satisfactory, many points in this field demanding our careful attention. As Count Futara has pointed out in his speech, there are still customs and usages existing in the barracks, that are evidently vestiges of the Meiji education, and that must consequently be duly attended to. In the matter of discipline, there is no doubt, much to be desired. Military manoeuvres will inevitably cause damage to the neighboring fields. How much concern have those soldiers for the damage they have caused? How many are there indeed, I should like to know, who, take that trouble during the recess to set straight the trampled down plants, thinking that they are national wealth, the very fruits of the incessant labor of farmers, who are the Emperor's precious treasures? It is in this spiritual quality that the Imperial Army must be different from any of foreign armies. To attend to one's duties merely in a legal or a technical manner, to sacrifice everything for the sake of victory in war and give no heed to anything else -- such a course of action must be warned against as not at all worthy of the Imperial Army. I speak this in the hope to show even partly the essence of the aim and object of the Imperial Japanese Army. As for the life in the barracks,
I always refer to it in the following way. The barracks are sacred training halls where we prepare ourselves for holy wars for vindicating Imperial Way and the National Virtues to the world. They must be likened to sacred halls solemnized with a torii gate in front and guarded from pollution by the holy straw rope. Both spiritual and physical training that we undergo there day and night is preparing ourselves for the time when we shall partake in the sacred war for the vindication of Imperial Way and the National Virtues so that it must be carried out with the same piety as demanded within the bounds of the sacred straw rope. (omitted)

The military spirit is identical with the national spirit. That the military and the people are one, and that the soldier and farmer are an inseparable entity, is dilated upon in the Imperial precepts as being the principle underlying the organization of the Imperial army. There is no army independently of the people, nor the people of the army. How to effect the complete union of the military and the people, how to execute the concept of the whole nation being an army, -- this is what taxes our brains at all times of day. Unfortunately however, as Count Futara has referred to in his speech, the wholesale adoption of Western civilization at the time of the reformation of the Meiji era has affected our army with Occidental ideas, with the result that the army has been often considered as a professional body existing independently of the people and devoted exclusively to its military
Dof. Doc. No. 1927

duties. This is not only a mere criticism of outsiders but such a quality has actually existed to some degree in the army: I am very sorry indeed for such a tradition particularly so just when we are confronted with the present difficult situation. Unworthy though I am, I hope I shall, for the sake of service to the Emperor and the country, devote myself wholeheartedly to the education and training of the army which is to constitute the backbone of the nation, and in this respect I mean to follow Count Futara's suggestions. Allow me to recommend to the kind consideration of the audience the fact that military men, especially those in active service, are denied both the vote and freedom of speech by the Imperial desire that soldiers should neither be led astray by current opinions nor meddle in politics — that is to say, they have no right to take part in government. These soldiers are single-heartedly fulfilling. Their essential duty of loyalty to the command of the Emperor. Only I pray for their sake that outside temptations, and harassments be refrained. Without a right to vote and without freedom of speech, those soldiers attend to their duty with constant diligence and in faithful obedience to Imperial Command. Their sympathetic cooperation and kindly encouragement may the people extend to these simple-minded warriors so that they may be able to forget everything else in the delight and pride of serving the Emperor, and of discharging their military duties with their minds freed of cares and anxieties. (omitted)
CERTIFICATE OF SOURCE AND AUTHENTICITY

I, MIYASAKA Kanko, who occupy the post of the Chief of General Affairs Section, of the House of Councillors hereby certify that the document hereto attached, written in Japanese, consisting of 18 (eighteen) pages and entitled "Extra Number of the Official Gazette of January 22, 1933; House of Peers Minutes, Stenographic Records No. 2, the Sixty-Fourth Session of the Imperial Diet" is an exact and authorized excerpt from an official document in the custody of Japanese Government (the House of Peers).

Certified at Tokyo,
on this day of

MIYASAKA Kanko (seal)

I hereby certify that the above signature and seal were affixed hereto in the presence of the Witness.

At the same place,
on this same date.

Witness: YAMADA Itaru (seal)
Chief of the Stenography Section, of the House of Councillors
Sir,

In Continuation of my letter to you dated 9th September, 1932, and, as mentioned therein, I am now directed by my Committee to address you on the Report of the Indian delegation to the Imperial Economic Conference at Ottawa, and with reference to the Trade Agreement between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of India.

2. My Committee desire, first of all, to emphasize that India's participation in the Ottawa Conference was imposed on her from outside. The people of India were not consulted about the advisability of holding, or participating in, such a Conference, and the fact that the Government of India had agreed to send a delegation, and also had nominated...
delegates to that Conference was made known almost accidentally in reply to a question in the Assembly, on the 4th April last. It cannot, therefore, be said that the nominees of the Government of India, who attended the Conference, spoke on behalf of India, or that India willingly participated in the deliberations of that Conference.

3. My Committee have examined the Report, and can only reiterate their condemnation of the Agreement entered into. Indeed, from an examination of the arguments and the statistics contained in the Report, they feel more convinced than ever that the Agreement is not only not to the benefit of India, but is positively prejudicial to her economic interests. The attitude of the Government of India, in the past, on various occasions when the question of Imperial Preference came up, is well known, and has been well recognised by the Delegation themselves. It was that India had little to gain by the adoption of a general scheme of tariff preferences within the Empire, and that on the balance there were no sufficient grounds why India should support any such scheme. In spite of that attitude, which they consistently maintained till 1927, when granting protection to India's Steel industry the principle of Imperial Preference was introduced by the back-door, in the teeth of the opposition of the elected members of the Legislative Assembly.
The same was done in the case of the Cotton Textile Industry in 1930, when the plight of that industry was taken advantage of to extend the principle of Imperial Preference. It is inconceivable how it can be held that there was no preference to Britain involved in the differential duties then imposed. It is also inconceivable to my Committee how the preference given could have possibly been in the interests of India, as contended by the Delegation. The Delegation themselves recognise that, if not in intent, in fact, at any rate, those duties did involve the grant of preference to Britain. And they also recognise that the duties did confer advantages on Britain. But as far as this country is concerned, it received no equivalent and compensatory benefit.

4. Having thus departed from a policy consistently maintained since Lord Curzon's time, the Delegation have now thrown it completely over, on the ground that a new situation had arisen following the Import Duties Act, and the subsequent announcement of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in this behalf. That new situation was the imposition by the United Kingdom of a general 10 per cent. duty from which India would be exempted, if she agreed to give preference to Britain. In the words of the delegation, "It was no longer a question of what India stood to gain, but what she stood to lose," if she did not give such preference—a point of view which my Committee
5. The Delegation emphasise that the paramount consideration to be borne in mind was, of course, the interests of India's export trade; but my Committee fail to see that they have even considered these interests. They cannot help pointing out that the issues involved in the Ottawa Conference, so far as India was concerned, did not receive the dispassionate consideration due, and the Delegation were throughout obsessed by the fear that, if India did not join in such a scheme of preference, her export trade to the United Kingdom would inevitably shrink and suffer. The Government of India themselves cannot be denied that it was their clear intention to give preference to Britain, following the preference already given to her in Steel and Textiles. Nowhere in the Report, for instance, the slightest consideration seems to have been given to the serious probability of the loss to India's export trade with foreign countries, which is nearly three times as much as that with the United Kingdom. Nowhere has there been any consideration of India's export trade as a whole. In the case of almost all foreign countries, India exports to each one of them far more than she imports from it. And Lord Curzon's Government, 30 years ago, was wise in refusing to consider any concession of tariff preferences, which might "involve reprisals by foreign nations." In estimating the balance of advantages, however, the Delegation did not even consider the possibility of such reprisals and their effects on
6. It has been argued that the interests of the Indian agriculturist demand the grant of preference to Britain lest his exports to British markets diminish. So grave a concern for him should have merited at least some examination of the probable effects of the Agreement on his exports to other countries which, we need not repeat, are of far greater moment to him. The Delegation have paid not the slightest attention to those his more vital interests, in the rest of his markets which absorb 64 per cent of his produce as against 22 per cent taken by Britain. To say, therefore, that the Delegation have acted in his interests is but a travesty of facts.

7. The most amazing part of the Report is that in which an attempt is made to show that by keeping certain articles on the free list the United Kingdom is conferring a boon on India, and that the Delegation have achieved some unforeseen gain for India by persuading the British delegation to do so. The Delegation admit that in the case of these articles, in which India possesses what amounts to a practical monopoly in the British market, a preference is "nugatory". They enumerate articles, like Raw Jute, Lac, Myrabolans, Broken Rice, Mica and certain varieties of Hemp, in which India enjoys such a monopoly. In spite of this, they make a laboured apologia to lead the public to believe that India has been favoured by the United Kingdom
by keeping on the free list those raw materials of British industry.

8. Then again, the consideration of the Delegation has been most superficial and one-sided, on the effects of India's non-participation in the scheme on her export trade to the United Kingdom. The largest items in this trade are, Tea, Jute, Hides and Skins, Raw Cotton and Oil-seeds. My Committee consider that the risk which weighed in the minds of the Delegation, in the case of Tea, was most exaggerated. After all, India is the largest supplier of Tea to the United Kingdom, and the ability of Ceylon to supplant India in the United Kingdom market is limited. An import duty on such a necessity of life inevitably falls on the consumer. So much has been said of the instance of Tea that it calls for a little fuller examination. India exports to the United Kingdom Rs. 22 crores of Tea. Ceylon, the next largest supplier, exports 18 crores. Now, if Ceylon got preference, and we did not, it could undersell us in the British market provided, of course, they were capable of totally supplanting Indian exports. But it is obvious that Ceylon cannot more than double its output. It is conceivable that it might increase its production by 4 or 5 crores, in which case, the figures of Indian and Ceylonese exports would be just reversed. But assuming that Ceylon were in a position to supply 22 crores Britain would still require 18 crores and would have to come to India for it, the supply from the Dutch Indies being comparatively small. A duty of 10 per cent against Indian Tea, 18
orores of which is wanted by Britain can only result in raising the price of all Tea imported into Britain. In that case, Ceylon would no doubt have the benefit of that higher price. All the same, the person who would be hit most would be not the grower in India but the consumer in Britain. Besides, as the Delegation themselves say, "when the preference is accorded to several countries a large proportion of its requirements, the preference cannot do much to extend the market for the produce of any of the countries concerned."

9. It ought to have been obvious, therefore, that no Government in England would ever impose any higher duty on Tea, which would be a burden on the British consumer. One might assuredly hope also that the interests of the British Tea Planter in India would equally weigh with the British Government before they took any such action against them. And in guarding their interests, those of the Indian Tea Labourer would ipso facto be taken care of. My Committee would be much surprised if an article produced by the British planter in India and consumed by a large majority of the population of the United Kingdom could at any time become subject to much increased or heavier duties, even if India had not entertained the Agreement. It may be noted in this connection that there are, in British politics, very important interests who are seriously opposed to any further levy which would
add to the cost of living.

10. In the case of Jute, India's monopoly as a producer is, of course, recognised. In the case of Jute manufactures, a duty of 10 per cent against the Indian product would have hurt the British manufacturer in India, and it is, therefore, doubtful if the British delegation would have carried out the threat in this class of goods too. Even if they did, it would have affected no more than 6 per cent. Of our total export of Jute manufactures, 94 per cent of which go to foreign countries.

11. In the case of Cotton, it may be noted that a duty on foreign cotton imported into the United Kingdom was suggested by the Indian Delegation; but the British delegation made it plain that they could not entertain such a proposal at all. The only article of importance in which an additional market could be given to us by the United Kingdom is Raw Cotton. But a preference in favour of Indian Cotton is flatly denied. A pious hope is held out that arrangements will be made to encourage the export to Lancashire of Indian Cotton of improved type, and the Delegation are more than satisfied with this hope. They forgot, however, that in spite of the efforts of many decades, the kind of cotton required by Lancashire has not been produced in India in sufficient quantities. They forgot also the fact that, even if we grew some more of the improved variety in future, the Indian mills would be its first buyers, because they are now importing such cotton. The day when the Indian grower is in a
DEF. DOC. #1835

position to supply an exportable surplus of such variety, over
and above the increasing requirements of the Indian mills, is
remote. And a little thought would have saved the Delegation
from falling, and from leading the public, into the erroneous belief
that there was any advantage to India in such a hope. Cotton
was the only article in which the British delegation could
have shown their bona fides for the benefit of the Indian
export trade. It was the only article in which the Indian
Delegation could have justly insisted on a clear preference.
A scheme of preference, in which there is every likelihood of
Indian exports of raw cotton to Japan and other countries
being reduced, and in which there is no possibility of
a corresponding increase in England's demand for the article,
must obviously be detrimental to the interests of the Indian grower.
Attempts have been made in the past by Britain to develop the growth
of suitable cotton, in other parts of the Empire, by means of subsidies.
If this be an indication of the direction of the co-operation of His
Majesty's Government in developing the growth of cotton, then India
has little to expect from Article 8 of the Agreement.

12. The Delegation, indeed, admit that "the importing country
has always to consider the interests of its own manufacturers, and
must naturally be reluctant to impose duties, which would increase their
cost, more particularly when the finished products of industry are ultimately
exported to foreign countries." The bulk of our exports to the United
Kingdom consists of raw material for British export industries. And that
Being the case, they should have realised that India had nothing to fear from the operation of the Import Duties Act. The very interests of British industry would have dictated to His Majesty's Government the inadvisability of doing anything to increase its cost of production by the imposition of such duties. For, an import duty on essential raw material must inevitably fall on the manufacturer who uses it, and to that extent his ability to compete in foreign markets must diminish. It should, moreover, have been obvious that most of India's exports to the United Kingdom are such as cannot be so easily replaced from other sources. The preference accorded to India by the United Kingdom on such articles is, therefore, sham and illusory. In fact, having regard to the very nature of our exports, it would be difficult to show how any material preference could be given by the United Kingdom, which would be of value to India. And even assuming that there was a possibility of a part of our export trade to the United Kingdom, instead or other of the less important commodities, being diverted on our non-participation in the scheme, the loss would be nothing compared with the loss that, under our participation in the scheme, we shall be faced with in our export trade with the rest of the world. The inevitable increase of imports into India from the United Kingdom, resulting from such a scheme of preference, must appreciably reduce imports from foreign countries, which, in their turn, will be compelled to buy less from India. And when it is remembered that India sells far more to them than to Britain, the serious effect of Imperial Preference on India's export trade can well be imagined.
13. The tariff weapon is admittedly being used by the British Government as a bargaining instrument to obtain certain advantages for British goods in the Empire markets. The Indian Delegation are apparently satisfied that they have struck a good bargain for India. My Committee are, however, of the opinion that the Delegation were so overpowered by the fear of the danger to Indian exports to the United Kingdom, that they overlooked the importance of India's position in international trade in general, and in the trade with the United Kingdom in particular. They do not seem to have been aware even of the most elementary facts of the situation, that, on the one hand, Indian exports to the United Kingdom are mostly articles of food and drink, or raw materials required for British industry, most of which are difficult to be replaced; and, on the other, that the Indian market is the most important single market for British goods, and that the need for the retention and expansion of this market, on behalf of the British manufacturers, under present conditions, is greater than ever. Had the Delegation appreciated these elementary facts, they would have realised that India was in a much stronger position than other parts of the Empire; for, as Britain's largest single market, she was in a position to offer substantial advantages and, therefore, to dictate terms, instead of being dictated to under fear of imaginary losses. Had they taken this into account, they would have come to the conclusion that by the acceptance of the Agreement the gain of the United Kingdom was going to be preponderating, and at the expense of India, and that by the non-acceptance of the Agreement the loss of the United Kingdom
would have been far greater than that of India. Had these fundamental
facts been borne in mind, and had they adopted the very method
of the British Delegation, and used the same threats in the bargaining,
the situation would have been entirely different. In answer to Britain's
threat of penalising Indian goods, the delegation could have,
with equal justification, threatened to withdraw the advantage already
given in Steel and Textiles. That such a natural attitude would have gone
home to the British Delegation may be realised from the fact that
they were fully conscious of the substantial advantages which
Britain was receiving by these already existing preferences.

In para 100 of the Report, the Delegation observe: "It cannot be assumed
that if there had been no differential duties, His Majesty's Government
in the United Kingdom would have been prepared to enter into the
Agreement actually concluded or that they would be prepared to
continue the Agreement indefinitely if the differential duties
were abolished." This means that without any further gifts on our
part, the British threat would have been silenced, and the fear of loss
of India's trade in the United Kingdom, which is the basis of the
Agreement and the Report, would have altogether disappeared. A most
valuable instrument of bargaining was thrown away.

14. Even taking the Agreement as it is, my Committee consider the
Delegation, in their Report, give an entirely misleading
impression to the public regarding the advantages which either country
may expect. In the first place, they calculate, omitting the most
important commodities that are imported from the United Kingdom on which
preference is already being given, viz., Steel and Textiles, that India will be called upon to give preference to Britain only on £17.4 million of British goods, and that, on the other hand, India stands to receive preference in Britain on goods of the value of £41.8 million. If, however, the excluded items are taken into account, which come to £26.6 million, the Delegation say that the balance is fairly even, which means that the value of trade of either country likely to receive preference is about the same. Even so, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer stated only the other day in the House of Commons that India had given preference on as much as 26 per cent of her total imports; and since the Delegation have been working on the figures for 1929-30, the percentage works out at £46.8 million of goods on which we are to give preference to Britain, as against £44 million (£17.4 = 26.6) estimated by the Delegation. The difference, is, however, small and we shall leave it aside. But why need they have at all presented such misleading data, and suggested that we would be called upon to give preference to Britain only on £17.4 million of our imports? And why should they have excluded, from imports into India, Steel and Cotton goods, on the ground that we had already given them preference, when they do not exclude from the imports into Britain, Indian Tea which has also been receiving preference for several years now, irrespective of the recent Import Duties Act? If articles on which preference is already granted are to be excluded in striking a balance, surely they must be excluded in both the cases. Moreover, they themselves admit that the fairness of the Agreement cannot be measured by this "crude test." In the words
of the Report, "the only test by which the value of a trade Agreement can be judged is the extent to which it results in an increase in the export trade of the countries concerned or in the retention of trade which would otherwise have been diminished or altogether lost."

While unnecessarily dilating on several irrelevant and minor issues, they have taken no trouble whatsoever to apply to the Agreement this "only" and real test, and to work out an estimate of the gain or loss to India on such a test.

15. In fairness to the Indian public, the Delegation should have made some attempt to estimate the probable increase or decrease in the trade of either country, with reasons in the case of each article. My Committee have searched in vain for such an estimate in the Report. They therefore cannot accept the mere assertion that India has gained "solid and substantial advantages", and that, "what she has given can be given without detriment to any national interest"; because if we were to apply to the available data of 1929-30, the year which the Delegation adopted as the basis of their estimates, the very test enunciated by them, my Committee are convinced that the conclusion would be wholly contrary to that assumed by the Delegation.

16. The value of a trade agreement can only be assessed on the basis of anticipated gain. In assessing, therefore, the value of the Agreement with the United Kingdom, one must needs estimate the probable increase in the export trade of either country, if the Agreement is to be accepted, and the probable loss in the case of non-acceptance. From the very nature of the case, there can, of course, be no finality or
oxactuness in such an estimate. But an estimate based on available data applied with due regard to known economic tendencies, is better than no estimate at all. A Finance Member who makes his estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for the coming year, particularly with reference to new taxation, is on similar grounds and it is all he can do to make them as reasonable as possible with due regard to economic considerations. In the present case, there can be only one method of estimating. By taking the total imports into India from all countries of the various classes of articles affected by the Agreement and by deducting from them the same classes of imports from the United Kingdom, the maximum margin which the United Kingdom can hope to capture in the Indian market is arrived at. It is obvious, however, that it cannot capture the whole of that margin even with the help of a preferential duty save, perhaps, in exceptional cases. What we have therefore to estimate is its probable capacity to capture a part of this margin. And in this, numerous factors enter into calculation. Each class of articles must be examined on its own merits and on known tendencies. Further, we must take into account also the factor of protection to the indigenous industry, of competition from other countries and the capacity for expansion of the industry concerned. My Committee consider that having regard to all these factors, the most that the United Kingdom can hope to do, in most of the classes is to capture about 50
per cent of the possible margin. The total possible margin to the United Kingdom in the imports into India of articles which are to receive preference is about 75 crores, and since in some of the classes less than 50 per cent of the margin might be captured, it would be reasonable to estimate that it would capture, say, about Rs. 30 crores of new trade in India.

17. Similarly, the additional market that India may capture in the United Kingdom can be estimated, due regard being paid to the nature of Indian exports, and the other factors referred to above. My Committee estimate that by the preference offered to Indian goods in the British market, the additional trade that we may have in that market is hardly likely to exceed Rs. 15 crores, most of which will be diversion from our present trade with other countries, whose capacity to buy from us will be reduced on our buying less from them and more from Britain, as a consequence of the preference that British goods will receive in India.

18. While Britain therefore stands to lose 30 crores of additional trade if the Agreement is not accepted, we stand to lose little because, in the event of acceptance, the additional trade that we might expect with the United Kingdom would not be new trade, but only a diversion from our existing trade with other countries. In the event of non-acceptance, Britain has, of course, threatened to impose a 10 per cent duty against
some of our goods. My Committee have estimated that having regard again to the nature of India's exports to the United Kingdom, the shrinkage in the British market due to the duty will be no more than 10 to 25 per cent, according to the nature of the articles. In this connection, we take into account the articles in which India is the chief supplier to the United Kingdom; those in which the Dominions or the Colonies are likely to compete; those in which our capacity to export is limited; and certain special articles like lmsodd, pig iron and cotton. Taking all these factors into account, in the event of non-acceptance of the Agreement, we would stand to lose at the most Rs. 10 crores worth of export trade to the United Kingdom, for which we will have to find other markets. But since in this case we would not be giving any preference to Britain, there should be no difficulty in our foreign markets absorbing these exports—a bare 25 per cent of our total exports. And it must be remembered again that between them, foreign countries buy far more from us than Britain or the Empire.

19. On these estimates a balance can be struck. And it will be found that if the Agreement is accepted, while Britain stands to gain far more than we do, we stand to lose little if the Agreement is not accepted. And this balance does not take into account the harm that would befall indigenous industries in India by the grant of preference to Britain, and the amount of additional taxation that would be involved in putting the Agreement into effect, which harm and which
additional taxation we should be spared, were we to reject the Agreement.

20. My Committee would like to point out that if the increase of British imports into India is estimated at any lower figure, the amount of higher taxation which India will have to pay on foreign imports will be greater; and if the estimate of such imports is higher, the reciprocal advantage to India in the British market should be correspondingly larger. In other words, if British imports into India increase, the Customs revenue suffers because of the preference and to the extent of the increase and the decline would have to be made good by fresh taxation. If they do not increase to the anticipated extent and foreign goods still continue to be imported, the higher duty against them means so much more indirect taxation on the people. But in the former alternative, in increasing Britain's advantages in the Indian market, India can justly claim equal and reciprocal advantages in the British market. In view of the estimates given above, my Committee feel that, on the one hand, the advantage to India in the British there is bound to be substantial addition to taxation in order to give effect to the Agreement, which means that in either case the sacrifice of India is great.

21. But even this statement of account is incomplete, when we consider the important fact that the Agreement would
be not only between India and Great Britain, but also with
the Colonial Empire. For want of time at Ottawa, no agreements
have been concluded by the Delegation with the Dominions, and
though discussions were carried on further, negotiations have
been left to the Government of India. In the case of the
Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories, which
are covered by the Agreement with His Majesty’s Government, no
reciprocity is offered, because, whereas a few minor colonies will
be invited and are expected to give preference to Indian goods,
under certain conditions, the more important colonies like
Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyka, Zanzibar, Nyasaland, part of Northern
Rhodosia, the Gold Coast, Nigeria, and the Mandated Territories
will not give any because of their international agreements.
In spite of this fact, India is required, and the Delegation have
accepted the position, to give preference to goods coming from
all these Colonies. Besides, no assessment of the value of the
trade coming from these Colonies has been made or is possible.
The Delegation admit that no Trade Returns are available
relating to most of them; and, therefore, there are “insuperable
difficulties” in making any estimate. At the same time, some
of these Colonies do a large entrepot trade; and there are
bound to be, therefore, serious administrative difficulties in
ascertaining whether particular articles really originate “from
the Colonies in question. As to how the Delegation could have
an agreement, which gives away valuable privileges in the Indian
market to such a large number of Colonies, without obtaining from
them at the same time anything in return worth the mention, passes
22. Even confining ourselves to the rest of the Colonial Empire, i.e. excluding the Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories which are barred from giving us preference, the Delegation, first of all, admit that they were unsuccessful in their efforts to obtain preference for Indian and Burmese rice which has to meet with keen competition in Eastern markets from rice produced in other Asiatic countries. Cayson and Malaya, in fact, impose an import duty on rice. Fiji, which gives some preference to Empire goods, cannot give us any special preference, because we cannot give preference on its sugar, since sugar is a protected industry in India. Nor can Mauritius give us any preference unless we gave preference on its sugar, which we cannot. The West Indies, Sierra Leone, Gambia, Somaliland, Gibraltar and Cyprus give a preference on Empire products. But the Delegation themselves find that the only Indian exports of substantial importance are Jute manufacture and rice to the West Indies, to an annual value of about Rs. 40 lakhs. Hongkong is only a port, with no hinterland, and its trade is mainly an entrepot trade, and it is therefore not in a position to give any preference to any part of the Empire. In the case of Malaya, the Delegation admit that we shall have to give more than we receive. And even taking the Colonial Empire as a whole, they haltingly admit that India will probably be found to be giving preferences on goods of a somewhat higher value than that of the goods on which she receives preferences from the
"Colonial Empire"; and that we must trust to the growth of our exports of manufactures to "redress any adverse balance.

Do the Delegation seriously hope that we shall increase our manufactures, when the whole scheme of preference is devised to increase the imports of British manufactures into India?

23. If the estimate made above regarding the diversion of Indian trade to the United Kingdom be considered, along with the obviously one-sided nature of the Agreement with the Colonial Empire, the conclusion is only strengthened that taking the Agreement as a whole, it is calculated to give far more than to receive.

24. My Committee must draw attention to another aspect of this matter. It is a tragic irony that we are called upon to give preference to Colonies in which the treatment meted out to Indians leaves much to be desired, and which has been one of the sorest grievances of India for years past against the Colonial Office. Where the citizens of India are denied the bare rights of citizenship in a Colony or Dominion, it is a travesty of justice, to suggest that raw materials or manufactured articles from that Colony or Dominion should have preferential consideration in India. It is an acknowledged convention of commercial treaties and arrangements that the contracting parties give each other's citizens mutual rights to enter, travel and reside in each other's territories, and to possess property.
and do not subject them to any special taxes or charges.
There are Colonies in the British Empire which do not subject Indian citizens such elementary rights but in fact impose on them the further hardship of discriminatory legislation, and we are now asked that we should give them preference without any undertaking on their part to give Indian citizens even such conventional rights. The Delegation cannot say that this point was not brought to their notice, as my Committee understand that the Chairman of the Imperial Indian Citizenship Association sent a telegram in the matter to the leader of the Delegation.

M. Committee consider that in identifying the Colonies with the grant of preference to Colonies, which treat Indians with discrimination, the Government of India will seriously discount their advocacy of the rights of Indians in the Colonies and Dominions—an advocacy which for a number of years recently has been to their credit. As long as this discrimination against Indians prevails in any Colony, and preference to the goods of such a Colony, can only be considered as an insult added to injury.

26. The Report is not only misleading as already printed out, but has altogether ignored two important aspects arising out of the Agreement, namely, the loss of Indian trade in other countries and the additional indirect taxation involved in putting the Agreement into effect. We have already referred to the fact that there is not even a mention of India's trade
with other parts of the world, which, in the aggregate, is of far greater consequence to us. So far as the method of putting the Agreement into effect is concerned, it is obvious that it will require many changes in the tariff, leading to additional indirect taxation, which must be condemned unreservedly. If preference is given by a reduction of the existing import duty, the resulting gap in the Customs revenue will have to be made good by additional taxation. If it is given by an increase in the existing duty, that increase will be additional indirect taxation. So that, in either case, preference can only be given by increasing taxation, direct or indirect. There can be no justification for taxing the poor Indian citizen in order that British imports into India may increase.

26. My Committee doubt if serious consideration has been given by the Delegation to the position and prospects of the several nascent industries of India which are thus to be face suddenly with the serious competition of British goods if they receive preference by a reduction in the existing duty. If an attempt is made to gauge the consequences on many indigenous industries that are just beginning to establish themselves, it will be found that, exposed to serious competition, most of them will be threatened with extinction. In representation of this kind it is, of course, impossible for my Committee to
go into the prospects of all such industries. They can but mention a few instances. Take the instance of the soap-making industry. With the growth of numerous soap works in India, imports of foreign soaps, during the last four years alone, have declined from about Rs. 50 lakhs to Rs. 28 lakhs. The value of the present output of these works is estimated at about Rs. 20 lakhs and the value of their productive capacity is estimated at about Rs. 52 lakhs. In other words, they are in a position today to more than double their output, and to replace the entire imports. The Agreement, however, will deal a serious blow to them; for a 10 per cent preference given to British soaps -- and even now more than 80 per cent of imported soaps come from Britain -- is assuredly calculated to drive the Indian manufacturer out of his own market. And instances of this kind in which grave harm will be done to Indian industries by the grant of preference to Britain can, indeed, be multiplied.

27. Take another kind of instance. The Agreement seeks to give a preference of 10 per cent to aluminium circles and sheets and manufactures imported into this country from Britain. There are a number of indigenous factories in India importing such circles and sheets and pressing them into utensils. At the same time, the large manufactures of
aluminium in Britain have also established utensil-making factories in this country. A preference of 10 per cent given to British aluminium circles and sheets must needs, therefore, drive the Indian manufacturer into the hands of the British aluminium interests. And since those interests themselves have their own factories in India, nothing will be easier for them than to starve the Indian manufacturer of supplies, and by extending their own factories, drive him out of his own market.

38. Apart from the important issues involved directly in the Agreement, there are fundamental questions of policy which the Agreement is likely to affect. For example, in spite of the way in which preference was given to British goods, while passing the Steel and Cotton Duties Acts, it has been assumed by the Delegation that these were a part and parcel of the fiscal policy of this country. This introduces a new question in the industrial policy of the country, namely, whether protection to Indian industries is to be given subject always to the dominating condition that the protective scheme itself shall contain preference for British goods, in those cases in which British manufactures are interested. My Committee would not point out that this would be a strange contrast to the policy of the Dominions, which
do not and will not give any preference to British goods in the case of those of their industries which, in their own interests, require protection even against Britain.

29. It may be pointed out that, unless a national economic policy is established in India and acknowledged and accepted by Government, the Agreement is contrary to national interests. A trade agreement should give maximum advantage for the products of a country and lead to increased manufacture, just as Britain seeks to do in her own case; and preferences should only be extended to such articles as are not manufactured in India or cannot be manufactured. It seems contrary to common sense, and to every consideration of economy, that Indian sheet bar should be exported to the United Kingdom and manufactured there into sheets, to be shipped back to India, when India could and should manufacture them herself. The industrial policy of India may be further adversely affected by the acceptance of the theory of industrial co-operation involved in the Supplementary Steel Agreement. If this position is accepted, — along with the change in the policy just referred to, — India will be reduced to the position of manufacturing semi-finished goods; will be denied also the opportunity of extending domestic manuf
domestic manufacture and employment; and the India taxpayer will be called upon to pay, so that the British manufacturer may have the benefit of turning those semi-finished goods into finished articles for the Indian market and thus help to relieve unemployment in Britain and, incidentally, give additional cargo virtually to British bottoms. In so far as the Shipping industry is concerned, why, the whole scheme of preference will only strengthen the already dominant position of British Shipping in Indian waters, to the detriment of the growth of Indian Shipping.

30. The Delegation have omitted to consider also that, apart from actual tariff preference, British goods already receive substantial preference in this country in a variety of other ways. By administrative arrangements; by the fact of British investments in this country; by the manipulation of the currency policy of the country; and no less, by the introduction of the preferential method in the schemes of protection already in operation, British goods already receive preference in the Indian market, for which India does not get any adequate return. Indeed, Britain has always acted on the basis that India should be the producer of raw materials, and should be a free and open market for British goods. She has derived advantages in the past by the imposition of an excise duty in favour
of Lancashire. She has manipulated Indian currency and exchange to the advantage of British interests, and even now, to the serious disadvantage of India, free export of gold is allowed. Since Britain departed from the Gold Standard and the Rupee was compulsorily linked to Sterling at the Statutory Rate, British exports to India have secured preference of about 33 per cent over Gold Standard countries. This was in addition to the advantage of \( \frac{12}{2} \) per cent already conferred on them by the currency manipulation that raised the Statutory Rate from 1/4 to 1/6. On the top of this, the Agreement proposes to give them a further additional advantage of 10 per cent; and this is what the Indian Delegation are pleased to call a substantial gain to India. Would it not have been fair and reasonable to have insisted on a quid pro quo for the advantages already secured by Britain through currency manipulation, before even entertaining the idea of this further sacrifice for the benefit of the British manufacture?

31. It has been laid down that in view of the impending constitutional changes, the Agreement is subject to six months' notice by either party, so that if the future Government of India want to denounce it, they can do so with ease. The difficulty of denouncing trade agreements is well known. Why, even His Majesty's Government have hesitated to denounce the Anglo-Japanese trade agreement, in spite of the plight of Lancashire on the one hand, and the India cotton-mill industry on the other. The clause in the Ottawa Agreement regarding six
months' notice has misled some people into the belief that the Agreement is not likely to do much harm because it will be possible to denounce it in due course. This, first of all, assumes that under the constitutional changes, India will attain the position of a self-governing country, with powers to denounce such agreements, if she thinks fit. The manner in which Government are setting about getting together delegates for the Third Round Table Conference would not appear to warrant such hope being entertained, and it is generally apprehended that Government will force on India a Constitution which will, for all practical purposes, make the exercise of such power ineffectual. Even assuming that India will reach that stage two or three years to begin really to function. During the interval, now trade relations will have been formed, many channels of trade diverted, and the vested interests thus created will act as a powerful force against the denunciation of the Agreement. And all this time substantial damage would continue to be done to the country. My Committee would not have cared to mention this aspect but for the fact that the clause regarding six months' notice is likely to be mistaken by the public as a safeguard against the evils of the Agreement. It is idle to discuss seriously whether the Agreement is sound, or is in favour of India, or whether the notice clause makes it any the more
acceptable. One is almost led to the belief that the Agreement, in anticipation of the establishment of political reforms long promised and evaded, is intended to tie the hands and the free choice of the future Federal Assembly.

32. On economic grounds alone, the Agreement is so essentially unsound that my Committee are amazed that the Delegation did not unreservedly reject it. Whatever designation an economic arrangement between the Dominions and England might be given, it is altogether a misnomer to call any such arrangement between the United Kingdom and India an "Agreement". Can there really be a fair and a just agreement between a politically unequal and dependent country, and another which is its ruler? So long as there is no settlement of the political issues, so long as India is not self-governing, there can be no trade Agreement between the United Kingdom and India. For, only a free Legislature can freely make an agreement of this kind. And my Committee warn the Government that, if they get it passed through the present Assembly by means of the Official bloc and the nominated members and the Europeans, they will be laying the foundations, not of settlement between India and the United Kingdom, but of prolonged bitterness.
33. With regard to the manner, motive and method by which the Agreement was secured, my Committee will only say this: His Majesty's Government of the United Kingdom hold out a threat, and asked India to come to terms. The representatives of the Government of India -- and their expert advisers, without caring to examine the nature of the threat acquiesced. They argued themselves into believing that it would hurt terribly, shutting their eyes to the possibility of their being hurt in the back much more, and by a number of stronger assailants, because of this very submission of theirs in agreeing to discriminate unequally against them; and ignoring, likewise, the consequences of Britain's position in the trade of India, made still more predominant, inevitably reducing India's trade with other countries, without giving any compensatory increase in our export trade with Britain.

34. In the whole history of trade relationship between Britain and India there has been no sorrier instance of the Trustees of the people of India coercing them in a course of action least consonant with their interests and manifestly in the interest of the Trustees themselves. In a word, it only means further economic domination. And any strengthening of the economic domination must needs result also
in increasing the political domination over this country.

35. Having achieved their object at Ottawa, it has now been proclaimed to the world that it is far from being a selfish one. It is altruistic. It is a gesture and an invitation to the world to reduce tariff barriers. Verily, an appropriate prelude to the World Economic Conference! We are asked to believe that the only way to reduce such barriers is by putting up some more barriers! And by implication, we are asked also to believe that it would be in India's interests to reduce her tariffs and give up her protectionist policy. Further, the Prime Minister has declared that with the Ottawa Agreements in their hands, His Majesty's Government have every intention of entering into trade agreements with the other nations of the world. If they succeed, a general grant of preference will only negate even the nominal preference south to be thrust on India.

36. To sum up, my Committee are of opinion that the situation created by the Agreement and the consequences thereof are as follows:

(1) The Agreement owes its origin not to India's needs or wishes, but to those of Britain. Having regard to the circumstances under which it has been made, and is sought to be carried into effect, it will be one forced upon an unwilling people, and is
therefore not likely to promote any cordial relations between the two countries, especially at the present juncture.

(2) The Agreement will perpetuate, and extend further the present dominant position of Britain in the trade of India. This is against the very economic axiom, that to be able to get the best advantage out of international trade, a country must needs have large trade relations with the largest possible number of countries as buyers and sellers, -- in other words, the widest possible markets and the widest possible sources of supply. Besides, the consequent strengthening of the economic domination of Britain will only serve to perpetuate and stiffen the political domination, in the further vested interests that it will create.

(3) The Agreement is not based on the principle of reciprocity, because whereas the United Kingdom is likely to get a substantial benefit in the Indian market, India's advantage will be very little, if any, at all. The Delegation have failed to make effective use of the existing Indian in striking a bargain.
(4) The Agreement ignores the principle of reciprocity altogether: in the case of the Colonies, most of which are debarred from giving us any preference and to which nevertheless we are required to give preference. In the case of the remainder, we are asked to give more and receive less. Besides, agreements with the Dominions are yet to come.

(5) The Agreement will reduce the purchasing power of other countries for our goods, because we shall get our imports in a much greater proportion from the United Kingdom, and there will thus be a substantial reduction in our imports from, and therefore in our exports to, other countries, which is not likely to be balanced by a proportionate increase in our exports to the United Kingdom. The Agreement wholly ignores this important factor.

(6) The Agreement may lead to retaliation, active or passive, from foreign countries, the aggregate trade with which is of far more consequence to us than that with the United Kingdom.

(7) The Agreement is bound to lead to additional indirect taxation, at a time when the people are already
overtaxed. Even if in future the finances of the Government of India improve, the 8 will remain a large amount of this avoidable taxation on goods from other countries.

The Agreement will seriously prejudice the growth of Indian industries in those articles in which British goods are to receive preference, and many a nascent industry will be driven out of our own home market. Even if an Indian industry in any of these articles, at any time in the future, proves its case for protection, protection will be given only on the basis of preference to British goods, as already done in the case of Steel and Textiles.

(9) The Agreement initiates a policy of industrial cooperation between Britain and India, which will reduce India to the position of manufacturing semi-finished articles and the Indian taxpayer will be called upon to pay in order that the British manufacturer may have the benefit of turning such articles into finished products for the Indian market.

(10) The Agreement in increasing British imports into India and diverting some of our exports to Britain, will only help to tighten the stranglehold of British
Shipping to the detriment of our own.

(11) The alleged safeguard of power to denounce the Agreement on six months' notice is illusory.

(12) The threatened loss of Indian trade in the British market by the imposition of a duty on certain Indian commodities, in the event of non-acceptance of the Agreement by India, is highly and unnecessarily exaggerated, because:

(a) the United Kingdom is not likely to impose additional duties on articles of food and drink or those which are required by her for manufacturing purposes;

(b) the United Kingdom is not likely to reduce imports from India, so long as she desires to increase her exports to us;

(c) the amount of trade which may be, if at all, in danger is so small that we shall be able to find other markets for the same, if necessary; and

(d) the difficulty of having to find such other markets is insignificant, compared with all the disadvantages enumerated above.

37. In conclusion, my Committee would like to emphasize that the Agreement should be judged as a whole in its manifold
consequences on the economic life and financial system of the country, because these are interconnected. The emphasis of the Delegation on only one single aspect, viz., the threatened loss of India's trade in the British market, gives an entirely wrong and warped perspective to the Agreement, and this must be deprecated as but a piece of propaganda, in favour of British industry under the guise of the so-called protection of the interests of the Indian farmer. For, the Agreement does not at all protect his interests; it is calculated only to divert the trade of India from other countries to the United Kingdom. In fact, the probable loss to him in the reduced demand for Indian raw materials from other countries will be greater than the threatened loss to him in the British market in case of non-acceptance of the agreement. Judging the Agreement as a whole, my Committee have no hesitation in pronouncing their conviction that it is not in the interest of the Indian farmer, not in the interest of the Indian businessman, nor in the interest of the general taxpayer. It is only in the interest of the British manufacturer, the British exporter, and the British shipper. Truly, has the President of the Board of Trade in His Majesty's Government declared in the House of Commons that it will mean "an enormous increase in the activities of our houses exporting to India with
a corresponding effect on manufacturing controls in the United Kingdom."

I beg to remain,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J.K. MEHTA,

Secretary.
外問向デアフラ。外問向デアフラ。
大阪ハ特例関税ノ助ケン以テテて特別ノ場合ヲ除キテ亦ハ関税ノ例外ハレル小長利益ヲ基礎トシテノノ評価ス。
三〇、代表国ハ又實際上ノ関税特恵ヲ除ヘ別ニ、英国ノ物品ハ既ニ各館ノ他

ノ方法デ我国ニ於テ実質的ナ特恵ヲ得テ居ル事ヲ考慮スルヲ意念タノデ

アル。
持続的

国際貿易

The document contains text in Japanese. It appears to discuss topics related to international trade and economics.
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION (UNWCC)
Member Governments, other National Authorities and
Military Tribunals
PAG-3/2.3.5.:445–447

Transcripts of Proceedings and Documents of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(Tokyo Trials):

Defense Statement and Documents:

Document No.s:

1290 – 1835

END OF REEL No. 166

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the micrographs appearing in this reel of film are true copies of the original records described above.

Date: 11 July 1989
Signature of Camera Operator: 

Ref. 45 (11–83)
UNITED NATIONS ARCHIVES
CAMERA OPERATOR'S REPORT AND CERTIFICATE

REEL NO. 166

INDEXING DATA

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION (UNWCC)
Member Governments, other National Authorities and
Military Tribunals

PAG-3/2.3.5.;445-447

Transcripts of Proceedings and Documents of the
International Military Tribunal for the Far East
(Tokyo Trials):

Defense Statement and Documents:

Document Nos.:

1290 - 1835

---- END OF REEL No. 166 ----

CERTIFICATION

I certify that the micrographs appearing in this reel of film are true copies of the original records described above.

Date: 11 July 1989

Signature of Camera Operator:

RMS.45 (11-83)
REDUCTION

26x
UNITED NATIONS
ARCHIVES
security
microfilm
PROGRAMME
1989