

UNWCC

CHARGE FILES

ETHIOPIA vs. ITALIANS

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Date Submitted Decision of Committee I

4 MAR 1948

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LIST 30

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(For the Use of the Secretariat)

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Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

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10 FEB 1948

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

ETHIOPIAN CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 1, A - D. *

<p>Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position. (Not to be translated.)</p>	<p>B A D O G L I O, Pietro Marshal of Italy. Commander in Chief of the Italian Forces in East Africa, and High Commissioner for Eritrea and Somaliland (took over command on the 28th November, 1935). (In Italian: <i>Luogotenente d'Italia. Comandante superiore delle forze armate dell'Africa Orientale e Alto commissario per l'Eritrea e la Somalia.</i>)</p>
<p>Date and place of commission of alleged crime.</p>	<p>During the Italian invasion of Ethiopia October 1935 - May 1936. A number of places in Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Number and description of crime in war crimes list. References to relevant provisions of national law.</p>	<p>A) XXIII. Deliberate bombardment of hospitals. B) XIX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places. C) XXVI. Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases. D) XX. Wanton destruction of religious buildings. Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930). Third part Chapters 12 and 5, Fourth part Chapter 6. Preface Articles 11 and 12.</p>

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

- A) Bombardment of Red Cross Hospitals and Ambulances on seventeen different occasions from December 6th 1935, to March 29th, 1936, inclusive.
- B) Bombardment of a number of undefended places from December 5th, 1935, to April 17th, 1936, inclusive.
- C) Use of poisonous gases against troops and civilians from the 22nd December, 1935, onwards, greatly increased from March, 1936, onwards.
- D) Destruction of several churches during December, 1935, and January, 1936.

TRANSMITTED BY The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (in the Ministry of Justice, Addis Ababa.)

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the Accusing State.

(20055) WLP.2524 5,000 5/45 A. & E. W.L.D. GP.685
(30149) WLP.11-3 17 5,000 10/45

Director General of the Ministry of Justice

PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIMEA) Bombardment of Red Cross Hospitals and Ambulances:

- | | | |
|---------------------|---------------|---|
| 1) Dessie | December 6th | American Red Cross Hospital seriously damaged. Five bombs on hospital; others on operating-tent of ambulance. |
| 2) Negelli S. | December 15th | Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulance No.4. |
| 3) Malka Didaka S. | December 22nd | Swedish Ambulance. |
| 4) Malka Didaka S. | December 30th | Swedish ambulance bombed and machine-gunned; 100 bombs; all tents destroyed and twenty-seven patients killed; Dr. Hylander, head of ambulance, wounded. |
| 5) Bulale S. | December 30th | Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; five bombs dropped near ambulance. |
| 6) Bulale S. | December 31st | Renewed attack on Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance. |
| 7) Daganbur S. | January 4th | Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulance No.1. At least fifty bombs and machine-gun fire. |
| 8) Waldaia | January 15th | Ethiopian Red Cross Liaison Unit. |
| 9) Makalle | January 16th | No.3 Ambulance, Ethiopian Red Cross bombing and machine-gunning; eight wounded. |
| 10) Dessie | February 9th | Ethiopian hospital plane bombed. |
| 11) Bulale S. | February 11th | Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; eleven bombs and machine-gun fire. |
| 12) Bulale S. | February 12th | Renewed bombing on Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; twenty-two bombs. |
| 13) Quoram | March 4th | British Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned. |
| 14) Quoram | March 5th | British Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned. |
| 15) Quoram | March 17th | Ethiopian Red Cross aeroplane destroyed. |
| 16) Ilylan Serer S. | March 17th | Swedish Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned. |
| 17) Harrar S. | March 29th | Egyptian Red Crescent hospital; fifteen bombs; Ethiopian Red Cross Hospital and French Hospital. |

Note: S = Southern Front.

PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIMEB) Bombing of undefended places:

Gondar	December	5th	Ashangi	February	10th
Zeleo		28th	Waldia		10th
Adi Remoz		28th	Waldia		11th
Kebtia		28th	Waldia		12th
Debnat	January	2nd	Robbo		12th
Amba Birceuta		3rd	Mertho		13th
Dabat		10th	Combalcha		13th
Sokota		10th	Lake Naik Convent		13th
Amba Birauta		14th	Donka Mikael		13th
Waldia		15th	Waldia		13th
Quoram		16th	Jarre Guilbo		14th
Quoram		18th	Donka Mikael		14th
Quoram		19th	Segerat		14th
Quoram		30th	Wartia		14th
Chilga		30th	Waldia		14th
Dabeito	February	4th	Megalo S.		15th
Megalo S.		5th	Megalo S.		16th
Combalcha		9th	Guero S.		16th
Solele		9th	Ginnir S.		16th
Waldia		9th	Quoram (twice)		17th
Quoram		9th	Quoram		18th
Ashangi		9th	Quoram	March	4th
Mai Chow		9th	Harrar S.		29th
Quoram		10th			

(Town stated to have been demilitarised as notified to the League in 1935).

Note: S = Southern Front.

Addis Ababa April 17th

Apart from the bombing of open towns, aeroplanes were used to bomb mere villages and mow down the flocks and herds of the peasants in places far from any military operations or concentrations.

C) Use of poisonous gases:List of gas bombardments:

Takkaze	December	22nd	Kworam	March	18th
Amba Alaji	December	26th	Irga Alem S.	March	19th
Borana S	December	30th	Irga Alem S.	March	21st
Makale	December	31st	Inda Mehoni	March	29th
Sokota	January	10th	Inda Mehoni	March	30th
Makale	January	21st	Kworam	April	4th
Megalo S	February	16th	Kworam	April	5th
Waldia Road	February	27th	Kworam	April	6th
Kworam	March	16th	Kworam	April	7th
Ylan Berer S.	March	17th	Dagabur S.	April	8th
Kworam	March	17th	Sassalaneh S.	April	8th

The list is far from complete, because since the beginning of March the Italians were systematically bombing every day, on the fronts and on centres of civilian population, with gases prohibited by the Gas Protocol of 1925.

Note: S = Southern Front.

D) Destruction of religious buildings:

Churches in the Shibe	During the retreat after the defeat of Ada Selassie.
Churches in the Tembien	During the retreat from Washien.
Sokoto	January 10th
Abbi Addi	January 20th

(BADOGLIO)

0474

APPENDICES

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT.A. Bombing of Red Cross Hospitals and Ambulances.

The Analysis by League of Nations Committee of Jurists, see here below.

Case No. 1.Dessie December 6th.

a) Extract from Memorandum of March 2nd, 1936, from the President of the Ethiopian Red Cross to the President of the International Red Cross Committee (League of Nations Official Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 470):

"(Translation)

On December 6th, nine aircraft bombed the hospital of the American Adventist Mission, together with the Ethiopian Red Cross ambulances at Dessie. The statement attesting this violation by Dr. Belau, Dr. Loeb, Dr. Dassios and Dr. Bayen, as well as by a number of journalists and photographers and the representative of the International Red Cross Committee, makes it unnecessary to dwell on the facts of this case. But the following circumstances should be borne in mind. In spite of the affiliation of this hospital to the Ethiopian Red Cross, which was duly notified to the enemy, and in spite of the big Red Cross emblems clearly painted on the roof of the building and the tents of the ambulances together with other red crosses spread out on the ground, this hospital, full of sick persons, was hit by five bombs, which did serious damage to one of the wards. Other bombs completely destroyed the operating tent of Ambulance No. 2.

b) Telegram, dated December 6th, 1935, from His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations. (Off. Journal January, 1936, Annex 1573 Page 29):

"(Translation)

It has been evident to us since hostilities began that the Italian Government has adopted the policy of destroying our people, Not by the use of its own troops, but solely by that of mechanical means and of native troops recruited in Italian colonies. The Italian Government may indeed consider itself authorised to bombard us when we go out to share the sufferings of our soldiers and to defend our soil, but the bombardment of open towns such as Dabat, Gondar and of numerous villages inhabited by non-combatant peasants and containing neither troops nor means of defence, the killing of women and children, the bombardment of Red Cross hospitals, are undeniably violations of international law. This last action, which took place to-day at Dessieh, was established by four Red Cross doctors - namely Dr. Dassius, Dr. Loeb, Dr. Schuppler and Dr. Bellot - and by the representatives of the Associated Press, The Times, Reuter, Chicago Tribune and Daily Express. We have ourselves established the death of a woman and of two children; and the American hospital of Dessieh, which carries with authorisation the markings of the Red Cross, has been seriously damaged. Although Italy has never respected the engagements which she has taken towards Ethiopia, we believe it to be our duty to ask you to communicate to the States Members of the League these new violations by Italy of international law and custom. - HAILLE SELASSIE I."

c) Telegram, dated December 7th, 1935, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary General (Off. Journal January, 1936, Annex 1573 Page 30):

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"(Translation)

With reference to the Emperor's telegram of yesterday, we have the honour to transmit the following declaration from the Red Cross:

'We, the undersigned doctors at the Tafari Makonnen American Hospital, Dr. Stadin and Dr. Loeb, Dr. Dassius, Dr. Malako Beyene, of No. 2 Red Cross dressing-station, Dr. Belau of No. 5 Red Cross dressing-station, and Dr. Schuppler and Dr. Ahmad of No. 3 dressing-station, having our premises visibly marked with the international emblem of the Red Cross, make the following formal declaration: To-day, Friday, December 6th, 1935, at 7.48 a.m., three flights of Italian bombing aeroplanes consisting of four machines each flew over the town of Dessieh and dropped incendiary bombs, explosive shrapnel bombs and aerial torpedoes for one hour. We formally declare that the first explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped on all the Red Cross dressing-stations on which the international emblems were displayed in large numbers. In detail, five bombs were dropped on the Tafari Makonnen hospital building proper, which contained sixty-five sick and wounded men and had the Red Cross painted all over the roof. The instrument-room was completely burnt and destroyed by bombs, as were two wards by other bombs. The head nurse, Mlle. Havig, has an open fracture of the left leg and her condition is serious. The annex to the hospital, 100 metres away, containing sick men, was hit. Although it flew the Red Cross flag, the surgical tent of No. 2 dressing-station (Dr. Loeb, Dr. Dassius and Dr. Malako), 20 metres from the hospital, was completely destroyed and set on fire by bombs and all the material was destroyed. We declare that in the enclosure containing the dressing-stations and the hospital, which is outside the town, the Red Cross emblems were in place and in large numbers. We protest against this inhuman act and stigmatise it before the whole civilised world, and we give notice to all Governments, to the League of Nations and to all religions that more than forty explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped in the enclosure containing the Red Cross dressing-stations, which were plainly visible, and that we have to deplore some scores of victims killed or wounded by this atrocious and cruel demonstration contrary to all Conventions. In witness whereof we sign the present document for purposes of formal record and evidence. Done at Dessieh, Ethiopia, December 6th, 1935.

(Signed) M.J. Sorenson, A.R. Stadin, M.D., Dr. M.S. Belau, Dr. Loeb, Dr. Dassius, Malko Beyen, M.D. - Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

Case No. 2.

Negelli. December 15th.

Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 470):

"(Translation)

Nine days after the attack on Dessie, (December 6th), the fourth bombing took place of the Ethiopian Red Cross at Negelli."

Cases No. 3 and 4.

Malka Didaka. December 22nd and 30th.

a) Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 470):

"(Translation)

This bombing was followed on December 22nd by a first attack on the Swedish ambulance at Malka Didaka; and the same ambulance was again bombed eight days later, on December 30th, in the same

place. On the morning of December 30th, ten aeroplanes flying 200 metres high bombed and machine-gunned the ambulance in question. Not less than 100 bombs were dropped, and they were followed by machine-gun fire. All the tents were destroyed. The operating-tent alone was pierced by 450 machine-gun bullets; twenty-eight patients were killed, and the Swedish mechanic Lundstrom was seriously wounded and died the following day. Dr. Hylander, the head of the Ambulance, was also wounded. The nearest troops were 5 kilometres away. In spite of these undisputed facts, to which Dr. Hylander and the representative of the International Red Cross Committee bore witness, Italy has attempted to justify her aggression on the pretext that it was a case of reprisals for the alleged decapitation of an Italian airman. If so, it is hard to see why the Italian airmen should have directed their attacks against an ambulance of the Swedish Red Cross, which was a very long way from the place where the alleged decapitation is said to have taken place. Realising the weakness of its argument, the Italian Government subsequently asserted that only one bomb was dropped. But authentic evidence is available to prove that no fewer than 100 bombs were dropped on the ambulance. The Italian Government also avers that the bombing was a matter of pure chance. The 450 machine-gun bullet-holes in the operating-tent made by shots fired at a height of 200 metres, and the fact that there were no troops within a radius of 5 kilometres that could have been the object of the bombing, are sufficient to refute such a contention. The Ethiopian Red Cross need not dwell further on these details, an official report of the attack having been drawn up by one of the representatives of the International Red Cross Committee in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Red Cross ventures to express a hope that this report will be published and communicated to all national Red Cross societies."

b) Letter, dated May 4th, 1936, from the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal June, 1936, Annex 1597 Page 644):

"Three appendices.

Under cover of your letter of April 20th last, you were good enough to send me a copy of the Analysis of the Documents concerning the Conduct of the War in Ethiopia, which mentions the existence of reports from the Swedish Ambulance in Ethiopia.

With reference to that communication, I have the honour to send you herewith copies of the following documents relating to the Swedish Ambulance in Ethiopia - i.e.:

1) Note, dated January 14th, 1936, from the Swedish Minister in Rome to the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy;

2) Note, dated January 17th, 1936, from the Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish Minister in Rome;

3) Note, dated March 4th, 1936, from the Swedish Minister in Rome to the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, with the following appendices:

a) Account of the circumstances of the bombing of the Swedish Red Cross Ambulance at Melka Dida (Malka Didaka) on December 30th, 1935, photographic reproductions of a leaflet and of a sketch together with a list of the terms used on the sketch and the text underneath;

b) Official record of the hearing of a witness and translation of an exchange of telegrams between the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, and the Swedish Consul in Addis Ababa, February 15th-17th, 1936.

I must add that the Swedish Government, which is endeavouring to collect information regarding the attack on an ambulance unit at Ilylan Serer on March 17th, 1936 (see page 8 of the above-mentioned Analysis), is not yet in possession of definite information.

As the Swedish ambulance is mentioned in the analysis under the heading "Use of Poison Gas" (IV.C.), I think it my duty to

inform you that the Swedish Government has indeed received certain information pointing to the use of gas, but has not felt called upon to open an enquiry into the matter and therefore is not in a position to supply you with any material on the subject.

(Signed) Richard Sandler.

Appendix I.

0478

(Translation)

Rome, January 14th, 1936.

In continuation of previous conversations on the subject, the Swedish Government has the honour to inform the Italian Government of the following facts.

An ambulance equipped by the Swedish Red Cross for work in Ethiopia, which was sent to that country with the approval of the Swedish Government and after due notification of the Italian Government, was bombed from the air at Malka Bidaka, Province of Borona, on December 30th last by Italian military forces. The bombing caused a considerable number of victims among the sick and wounded and staff of the ambulance. Among those killed was an ambulance orderly named Lundström, of Swedish nationality. Another Swedish national, Dr. Nylander, the ambulance's doctor-in-chief, was wounded. The ambulance equipment was largely destroyed.

The Swedish Government immediately requested the Italian and Ethiopian Governments, and also the Swedish nationals serving with the ambulance at the time of the attack from the air, for information concerning the facts of this serious incident. The particulars received were communicated to the Italian Government.

They were, moreover, carefully examined by the Swedish Government itself, which now considers itself in a position to form a reasoned opinion of the facts in question, on the basis more particularly of the information supplied by the Swedish staff of the ambulance. The information which it has so far been able to obtain from the Italian authorities is not such as to lead it to alter that opinion.

The Swedish Government has thus reached the conviction that the Swedish ambulance was directly attacked by the Italian air forces. As this means that Swedish nationals were attacked by Italian forces when employed in rendering assistance in accordance with the 1929 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, the Swedish Government considers it its duty to address to the Italian Government a formal protest against this act.

Various Italian communiqués, together with a communication from General Graziani, officially transmitted to the Swedish Government, state that the bombing which had such disastrous consequences for the Swedish ambulance was a measure of reprisals adopted in consequence of breaches of the laws of which the Ethiopians are said to have been guilty. The Swedish Government is of opinion that such a reason cannot be held to justify the aggression committed against the ambulance.

As regards the activities of the ambulance, no evidence has been produced to support the allegation that it had in any way whatsoever misused the Red Cross emblem. The Swedish members of its staff have emphatically denied as baseless anything which may have been said to that effect. The Swedish Government has no reason to doubt the accuracy of their statements.

The Swedish Government, which has noted the Italian Government's regrets that Swedish subjects should have suffered from the bombing in question, assumes that it may rest assured that the enquiries set on foot by the Italian authorities with a view to establishing the responsibilities incurred will be rapidly proceeded with and that the aggression will be duly punished. The Swedish Government reserves its right to put forward subsequently any claims which it may regard as justified.

Appendix 2.

(Translation from the Italian.)

0479

Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, January 17th, 1936-XIV.

No. 806.

To His Excellency M. Erik Sjöborg,
Swedish Minister, Rome.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to reply to Your Excellency's note of January 14th last.

In our conversation of January 4th, I informed Your Excellency that the Italian Government was prepared to ask General Headquarters in Somaliland for all information which could throw light on the bombardment of December 30th last, during which the Swedish Red Cross ambulance was hit.

The information received, which provides a reply to some of Your Excellency's questions, was communicated to you by me at our interview of January 12th.

His Majesty's Government is always ready to ask General Headquarters in Somaliland to send any other additional information, but it must most strongly repudiate the suggestion, made in Your Excellency's above-mentioned note, that the Swedish ambulance was directly attacked by the Italian air forces and was consequently the victim of an aggression.

In accordance with the international obligations assumed by Italy and the instructions issued in consequence, and moreover, in obedience to their own innate feelings of humanity, the Italian airmen, in the course of the military operations which Italy finds herself obliged to conduct in East Africa, make a point of respecting the Red Cross emblem, even when they have good reason to suppose (as has frequently been the case in the course of the operations) that the enemy is abusing it for warlike purposes.

It may, however, happen, as it repeatedly has happened in the past on all battlefields, that some formations bearing the Red Cross emblem may sometimes accidentally find themselves involved in military operations.

No one regrets such an eventuality more than the Italian Government; and it is making every effort to see that it does not arise.

As appears from the statements and information received from Italian Headquarters, an example of such an incident is provided by the case of the Swedish ambulance, which was accidentally hit during the bombing of the tents pitched in its immediate vicinity, which Italian Headquarters had reason to believe were occupied by the chiefs of Ras Desta Damtu's army, and which were bombed in consequence of the barbarous torture and decapitation of an Italian prisoner who had fallen into the hands of the Ethiopian troops.

As I had occasion to inform Your Excellency, His Majesty's Government cannot but deplore this incident and wishes to take this further opportunity of expressing its regret that the Swedish Medical Mission should have been accidentally involved in the risks connected with the military operations during which it was accomplishing its mission in East Africa.

(Signed) Suvich.

Appendix 3.

0480

Two sub-appendices.

Acting on my Government's instructions, I have the honour to communicate to you the following regarding the question referred to in my note of January 14th, 1936, and in the official letter which I received on January 17th in reply to that note.

The Swedish Government has carefully examined the information given by the Italian Government in the said note of January 17th, and in the verbal communications made to me by M. Suvich, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Italian Government's note points out that it may sometimes happen that some formations bearing the Red Cross emblem may find themselves accidentally involved in military operations, and that according to the statements and information received from Italian Headquarters, it was in an incident of this kind that the Swedish ambulance was involved. The latter is stated to have been accidentally hit during a bombardment of tents pitched in its immediate neighbourhood, which the Italian Headquarters had reason to believe were occupied by the chiefs of Ras Desta Damtu's army.

The Swedish Government agrees with the Italian Government that a Medical Mission may find itself accidentally involved in military operations and be hit during a bombardment, without the authors of the latter incurring any responsibility. On the other hand it cannot accept the Italian Government's contention that the bombardment of the Swedish ambulance on December 30th, 1935, constituted an incident of this kind. In its note of January 14th, it expressed the conviction that the ambulance was directly attacked by the Italian air forces. Although in its reply to the said note the Italian Government does not accept this conclusion, the supplementary information received from the Swedish staff of the ambulance obliges the Swedish Government to maintain that the ambulance camp, whatever may have been the reason of the bombardment, was directly attacked by the Italian airmen, and that it constituted, so far as it has hitherto been possible to ascertain, the sole objective. A statement of the facts is attached to the present note. It is based on reports and sketches of the locality received from the chief doctor of the ambulance, and on evidence given by Swedish members of the ambulance on the occasion of the official hearing of witnesses by the Swedish Consul at Addis Ababa. A procès-verbal, drawn up by the said Consul and accompanied by an exchange of telegrams regarding it, is also attached to the present note. In the Swedish Government's opinion, the above-mentioned statement clears up the essential circumstances of the incident.

Evidently this statement does not concord with the Italian Headquarters' brief communications, which hitherto constitute the only information supplied by authorised Italian sources. Thus the assertion in the military report that no bomb hit the ambulance itself, but that the damage was caused by fragments of bombs, which fell near the Red Cross camp, is contradicted and must be considered as directly refuted by the fact, now ascertained, that a large number of bombs - practically all of them, in fact - fell into the middle of the camp, killing or wounding numerous persons among the sick, the wounded, and the ambulance staff. The Headquarters' assertion that the attack was directed against a tent pitched in the vicinity of the camp is also contrary to the evidence of the witnesses, who unanimously state that there were no other tents than those of the ambulance camp for tens of kilometres around. Lastly, it has now to be regarded as established that, on the day of the occurrence, the weather was perfectly clear and that no error was therefore possible on the part of the airmen regarding the nature of the camp. The existence at this place of any objective for a bombardment other than the Swedish ambulance has not been established. Leaflets signed "Graziani" and proclaiming that the attack was in the nature of reprisals were thrown by the airmen into the actual camp of the ambulance. In this connection, attention should be drawn to the particularly important fact that the ambulance camp had already been attacked on December 22nd by Italian airmen, who had subsequently flown over it nearly every day, sometimes at a very low altitude.

The Swedish Government has noted with satisfaction the regret expressed by the Italian Government for the damage caused to

the ambulance and its unreserved declarations concerning its duty to respect the Red Cross emblem and the instructions given in consequence to the Italian airmen. Owing to the facts which appear to it to have now been established, however, it is obliged to conclude that these instructions were not obeyed by the military personnel responsible for the bombardment of December 30th.

In consequence of the foregoing, the Swedish Government expresses the hope that the Italian Government, after taking cognisance of the information contained in the present note, will arrive on its own account at the same conclusion as itself on the actual facts and their interpretation. It maintains the request made in its previous note that the aggression committed against the Swedish ambulance should be duly punished. Lastly, it presumes that the Italian Government is prepared to pay compensation of an amount to be agreed upon between the two Governments, for the damage caused by the bombardment to Swedish nationals and property.

Sub-Appendix 1.

Account of the Circumstances of the bombing of the Swedish Red Cross Ambulance at Melka Dida on December 30th, 1935.

On December 21st, 1935, the Swedish ambulance reached Melka Dida on the Ganale Doria about 80 kilometres from Dolo. Owing to the torrid heat, the motor-lorries were immediately placed in the shade of a very thinly wooded palm-grove where the ground slopes down to the river. On the ground bordered by the palm-grove, two big Red Cross flags 2.1/2 x 2.1/2 metres were spread out and three flags 3 metres long attached to a rope stretched between two isolated palm-trees stripped of their leaves, the Red Cross flag being in the middle and the Swedish and Ethiopian on either side, so as to be visible from a great distance.

(Sketch and meaning of signs on the sketch).

On December 22nd, two Italian aeroplanes appeared on the south-east horizon and, after a flight over the neighbouring area, flew towards the ambulance camp. One of the machines, following the line of the stream, dropped some bombs before, and a few others after, having flown over the camp; it dropped some bombs also north of the site and on the open ground to the south. The second machine, which came up from the south and kept rather low, opened machine-gun fire right above the camp, though it was impossible to see where the bullets had hit the ground. The aeroplane then wheeled round again above the camp at a lower altitude and machine-gunned the whole camp, between two of the lorries, quite close to Dr. Norup and the orderly Lundgren, and about 1 metre from an Ethiopian orderly called Aga. When it fired its second volley, the aeroplane was about 200 metres up and the bullets hit the ground about 10 metres away from one of the Red Cross flags, stretched on the ground quite close to where five Swedes were standing. During the shooting the engine was cut out. This attack caused no damage.

Subsequently, Italian aeroplanes came over practically every day, but made no attack on the ambulance until December 30th. Meanwhile, the ambulance staff had made certain arrangements so as to be able to make a longer stay at that place. For instance, the side of the camp, which covered an area of about 125 x 250 metres, the longer side following the bank of the Ganale Doria, and the actual site of the tents measuring 75 x 75 metres, was marked out by fences and ropes. Near the river, still another Red Cross flag, 2.1/2 x 2.1/2 metres, was also laid out conspicuously on the ground. The three larger hospital tents of the eight ambulance tents were pitched in a very conspicuous spot on the level ground away from the wooded area along the river bank. The Red Cross emblem had been placed on three of the tents and also on the ambulance motor-lorries, which had been parked so far beyond the edge of the wood that they were clearly visible.

x)

15 times. The range of the first shower of bullets
was from the trees which were at 1300, across

On December 26th, Ras Desta had come near enough to Malka Dida for the members of the ambulance to be able to have an interview with him in the jungle at about 5 kilometres' distance from the ambulance. On December 29th, an Italian aeroplane flew over the camp at a height of about 300 metres and on leaving fired a machinegun volley. On December 30th, the distance from the ambulance to the Ethiopian front line was about 20 kilometres and to Ras Desta's headquarters at least 5 kilometres.

There were no troops nearer the camp, although it sometimes happened that individual Ethiopian soldiers or groups of soldiers, while marching or during air raids, hid themselves even nearer in the wood bordering the river. The ambulance escort of five men was not quartered in a tent and always remained outside the camp fence, except when its commander called in the course of his duties. The ambulance tents were the only tents within a radius of many kilometres, and there were none either in the military formations or at Ras Desta's headquarters.

On December 30th, as on the preceding days, the sky was cloudless and the visibility excellent. About 7.30 that morning, four Italian aeroplanes came up along the Ganale Doria, flew over the camp from a south-easterly direction and dropped a few bombs in the wood. A little later six other aeroplanes in two groups of three, flying in close formation, came over from the south, where there was a clear view of the camp. These six aeroplanes started to bombard the ambulance as soon as they were above the camp, the attack being continued by the four machines above mentioned, which had returned from the north-west. The attack lasted, it was calculated, altogether about twenty minutes, including some pauses during which the aeroplanes made a half-turn and came back over the camp. It is hard to tell the exact height at which they were flying during the bombardment, owing to the surprise caused by their attack and the clouds of dust raised by the very first explosion, and also because no member of the ambulance had experience in estimating the height of an aeroplane's flight. It is, however, believed that, when the first bombs were dropped, the planes were between 500 and 700 metres up. The noise of the bombs falling resembled a peal of thunder. The number of explosions was estimated at about 100, the noise of the explosions partly overlapping. Almost all the bombs fell in the centre of the camp, where great destruction was done, while the ambulance escort, for instance, only some hundred metres away and the members of the staff who had time to take shelter at the edge of the wood or outside the latter remained unscathed. The number of bombs which fell directly into the camp was not counted. From the place where he fell, nearly in the centre of the camp, Dr. Nylander thinks that he counted some thirty holes. As a matter of fact, the bombardment had made larger or smaller holes all over the ground, the biggest being more than two metres deep. Several were used later for burying the dead and were thus filled up. Many incendiary bombs were noticed burning.

During the bombardment, twenty-eight persons were killed outright or died the same day, while the number of wounded was about fifty. The death-roll then rose to forty-two, all wounded or sick persons undergoing treatment by the ambulance or members of its staff. At least one of the hospital tents had received a direct hit from a bomb and the others were torn to pieces by splinters flying in all directions; two, for instance, were perforated with hundreds of big and small irregular holes evenly distributed over the whole of their surface. All the lorries had also been more or less damaged.

During the bombardment, the orderly Lundström, who was sitting at the time on one of the lorries, was hit in the face by a big shell splinter which carried away the inside of the lower and upper jaws. He succumbed to his wounds shortly afterwards. The orderly Lundgren had his scalp pierced by a splinter, which grazed the skull. Dr. Nylander was injured in the back and left thigh and wounded by steel splinters in the right thigh and back muscles.

After the bombardment, hectographed leaflets in the Arabic tongue were picked up (photographed copy in exhibit) which had been dropped into the camp from the aeroplanes and which on the translation read as follows:

"You have transgressed the laws of God and man. You will be by

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killing a captive airman is allowed in war. According to the law prisoners must be treated with respect. Do not touch them. You will consequently receive a punishment if you do otherwise.

Sub-Appendix 2.

(Translation)

OFFICIAL RECORD OF THE HEARING OF A WITNESS.

On January 10th, 1936, at the Bethesda Hospital at Addis Ababa, there took place a further hearing before the Swedish Consul at Addis Ababa of Dr. Frida Nylander, Doctor-in-chief of the Swedish Ambulance in Ethiopia, concerning the bombardment of the said ambulance by Italian air forces on December 30th, 1935, of which the Consulate was first informed by telegram on December 31st, 1935.

The above-mentioned hearing was recommended by a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated January 15th, 1936.

The other members of the staff of the ambulance being at a distance from Addis Ababa, it was only been possible to record in the present statement the evidence of Dr. Nylander. The previous repeated hearings of Pastor Josef Svensson and Dr. Erik Smith, both eye-witnesses of the bombardment, on being compared with the description given by Dr. Jarceel Jonod, delegate of Geneva, have not resulted in any finding essentially modifying the statements of Dr. Nylander, which are, on the contrary, fully confirmed by the evidence of the above-mentioned persons.

Dr. Frida Nylander stated that he was born on February 2nd, 1898, and was domiciled at Jönköping, passed his examination as Licentiate in Medicine in 1926 and was appointed as First Assistant Doctor of the Central Hospital for the province of Jönköping in 1933. He was appointed Doctor-in-Chief of the Swedish Ambulance in Ethiopia in 1935.

In the first place, the report dated January 6th, 1936, to the Central Committee of the Swedish Red Cross was examined.

Place.- Dr. Nylander states that the Swedish ambulance was situated at Melka Dida, where it had arrived on December 21st, 1935; Melka Dida is situated on the west bank of the River Ganale at about 80 kilometres from the town of Dolo on the Upper Juba River.

Marking of the camp.- The camp was marked with three Red Cross flags measuring 2.1/2 x 2.1/2 metres spread on the ground and three flags measuring 3 metres-Red Cross, Ethiopian and Swedish-spread between two isolated trees stripped of their leaves. Three of the eight tents bore large red crosses on the roof.

Dimensions of the camp.- The camping-ground had a total area of 125 x 250 metres, the longer side following the bank of the river; the actual ground on which the tents were pitched measured 75 x 75 metres. The camp was separated from the neighbouring ground by an artificial hedge of thorn-bushes.

Distance from the military formations.- The distance of the ambulance from the first Ethiopian lines was about 20 kilometres and the distance from the headquarters of Ras Desta was at least 5 kilometres.

There were no troops at a lesser distance from the camp.

Escort.- The escort, which consisted of five men, always remained outside the camp enclosure, except for some visits from its head in connection with service requirements.

Atmospheric conditions.- On December 30th, the sky was perfectly clear, as on the previous day, and visibility was extraordinarily good.

Number of aircraft.- The attack was carried out by ten aeroplanes in two groups of six and four machines each.

Direction of the attack.- The six aeroplanes which began the attack came from the south, where there was nothing to prevent them from seeing the camp. The four which took part later had previously flown over the camp from the south-east, then made a half-turn and returned from the north-west.

Height of the aeroplanes.- It is difficult to state at what height the machines were flying, on account of the sudden nature of the attack and the enormous clouds of dust raised by the first explosion. Dr. Nylander, however, thinks he may estimate the height at 500 to 700 metres, since on the approach of the machines he

0184 raised his head to look at them and distinctly saw them throw the first bombs. Dr. Hylander points out that neither he nor any other member of the ambulance is accustomed to estimating the height at which aeroplanes fly.

Duration of the attack.- The duration of the attack is estimated at about twenty minutes in all, with pauses during which the machines made a half-turn in order to return over the camp.

Number of bombs.- The number of bomb explosions is estimated at about 100, the noise of the explosions partly overlapping.

Direct hits.- The number of bombs which fell directly into the camp was not counted. Dr. Hylander thinks he counted about thirty holes from the place where he fell, approximately in the middle of the camp. Several bomb holes were used for the burial of the dead and were then immediately filled in. One at least of the medical tents was directly hit by a bomb, while the other tents were torn into shreds by the splinters which flew from all sides. It is difficult to state whether there were any ricochets; if so, they would have been caused by the rebound against objects situated in the camp. There were no stones on the ground, but only fine sand, which had not been beaten down hard.

Number of killed and wounded.- Twenty-eight persons were killed immediately or died in same day and about fifty were wounded. The number of dead as a result of the bombardment amounted afterwards to forty-two, all sick, wounded or members of the ambulance staff.

Material damage.- All the tents were more or less in shreds, most of them to such an extent as to be rendered valueless, although it has been possible to make them provisionally fit for use. All the motor vehicles were more or less damaged, all the glass on them was splintered and the radiators of two of them were broken. It is proposed to have an estimate made by experts of the loss of value suffered by the motor vehicles. With regard to the damage caused to medicaments, instruments and other articles of equipment, the manager of the ambulance, Pastor Svensson, is preparing a list.

Neighbourhood.- No other tent than those of the camp was situated on the ground, not even in the distant military formations or at headquarters. Headquarters and the troops were camping in natural grottos and caves dug out for the purpose, so that there were no tents for a distance of several tens of kilometres. The nearest were certainly those of the Italian troops themselves.

No abuse of the red cross.- Dr. Hylander energetically denies having in any way abused the red cross, and states that there were neither European nor Ethiopian officers in the camp or even in the neighbourhood, with the exception of the escort, consisting of five men, which was outside the camping-ground (without a tent).

The attack not due to a mistake, but premeditated.- The attack was undoubtedly premeditated. The following facts tend to confirm this:

- 1) For more than a week there had been daily reconnaissances
- 2) The Red Cross camp was the only camp with tents for many tens of kilometres around;
- 3) The dropping of bombs was concentrated on the camp: the escort, which was at a distance of only 100 metres from the camp, remained uninjured, while the devastation in the camp was terrible.

The members of the staff who had time to hide on the edge of or outside the camp remained uninjured;

- 4) No other bombardment took place on the same day in this area;
- 5) The multigraphed communications thrown into the camp from the aeroplanes read, in translation, as follows:
"You have transgressed the laws of kingdoms and nations by killing a captive airman by beheading him. According to law, prisoners must be treated with respect. Do not touch them. You will consequently receive the punishment you deserve. - GRAZIANI."

The object was revenge.

On being specially questioned, Dr. Hylander stated that he had nothing more to say and nothing to add to the above statement, and his hearing was accordingly concluded.

Addis Ababa, Bethsaida Hospital, January 18th, 1936.

(Stamp of the Royal Swedish Consulate, Addis Ababa) (Signed) Knut Hanner, Consul.

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Translation of an exchange of telegrams between the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Stockholm and the Swedish Consul at Addis Ababa, February 15th-17th, 1936:

1) Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Swedish Consul at Addis Ababa, February 15th, 1936:

" Has the evidence of M. Nylander appearing in the statement been confirmed in your presence by other Swedish members of the ambulance? Which members?"

2) Swedish Consul at Addis Ababa to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 17th, 1936:

" Smith, Norup, Helm, Svensson, Allander, Lundgren, Joelsson confirm."

Cases No. 5 and 6.

Bulale. December 30th and 31st.

a) Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 471):

"(Translation)

On the same day (December 30th), when these atrocities were committed, three Italian aeroplanes flew over and bombarded the Egyptian Red Crescent ambulance at Bulale, and again on the following day, December 31st. Five bombs were dropped near the ambulance on the first occasion, the farthest being 100 metres away.

b) Extract from a note from H.H. Nabil Ismail Daoud to the President of the Abyssinian Red Cross Society.

"Addis Ababa, March 13th, 1936.

Your Excellency,

Again, the Italian aeroplanes did not fly over the mobile hospital at Bolaly on December 10th, as alleged by Labib Hassan Ibrahim. But the Italian aeroplanes flew over Bolaly on December 30th and 31st and dropped bombs and not circulars. Dr. Mohamed Ezzet's report, which I have now before me, fully confirms my personal memoirs in this connection.

(Signed) ISMAIL DAUD."

Case No. 7.

Dagahbur. January 4th.

a) Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 471):

"(Translation)

Quite oblivious to the disgust created by these attacks on December 30th, the Italian aeroplanes proceeded, on January 4th following-i.e., five days later-to bombard No.1 Ambulance of the Ethiopian Red Cross at Dagabur, which consisted of one Egyptian medical officer, one Egyptian orderly, two English attendants and Ethiopian stretcher-bearers. After dropping their bombs, the airmen machine-gunned the ambulance in question. At least fifty bombs were thrown, not only on the ambulance itself, but also on the personnel which had taken shelter in the trenches at a distance from the ambulance. The pinne-nez of one of the doctors which he was holding when he jumped into a trench was pierced by a small splinter. The Ethiopian Red Cross is in a position to assert that the

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ambulances with a distance of half from the town. There was not any contact with soldiers; furthermore, no shots were fired from the site of the ambulances at the aeroplanes. The ambulances were not damaged after the bombing."

Case No. 8.

Waldia. January 15th.

Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 471):

"(Translation)

On January 15th, the Liaison Unit of Ambulances Nos. 2, 3 and 5 of the Ethiopian Red Cross was bombed at Waldia. Though there were troops outside Waldia, which is an open town, there were none near the unit nor in the town, which was also bombed on the same occasion and on several occasions later."

Case No. 9.

Lakale. January 17th.

Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 471):

"(Translation)

Three days after this bombardment - i.e., on January 18th - No. 3 Ambulance of the Ethiopian Red Cross was bombed south of Lakale.

The Red Cross camp was situated in a tiny valley forming a triangle with sides fifty metres long at the foot of the plateau which rises in front of Lakale.

The ambulance itself was situated at the apex of this small valley and marked by a Red Cross flag. A similar flag was fixed right in the middle of the valley and a third stood at the base of the triangle.

On January 17th, the day before the bombardment, a member of the ambulance staff standing beside the middle flag suddenly noticed a big triple-engined plane flying about 200 feet above the Red Cross camp. At this distance he discerned one of the crew looking out of the cabin. The member of the ambulance staff immediately pointed out to him the flag beside him and signalled to the airman not to bomb the Red Cross camp. The latter signalled an acknowledgment.

The following day, January 18th, at 7 a.m., three triple-engined planes proceeded to bomb the camp for an hour. The first plane which dropped bombs bore the number 7, and the airman aimed specially at the Red Cross flag in the middle of the camp, the very flag which had been pointed out to the plane the evening before. The various bombs and marks of machine-gun bullets round this flag are evidence of the fact. Furthermore, eight Ethiopian women who were in the camp were wounded.

Later, about 2 p.m., three triple-engined planes flew over and bombed the ambulance for two and a half hours. After they left, thirty bombs were found near the Red Cross flag in the centre of the camp and there were also many traces of machine-gun bullets.

In this case there were two clearly premeditated bombardments. In the first place, the Italian airmen were undoubtedly aware of the presence at this place of a Red Cross ambulance, since it had been pointed out to them during their reconnaissance flight on the previous day. Further, there were no troops in the neighbourhood to excuse the bombing. On the contrary, a member of the staff of the ambulance in question had seen and heard Ras Mulugheta, before the first bombardment, formally forbid any soldier to go near the Red Cross camp. It should be observed that throughout both bombardments not a single shot was fired on the planes from any firearm in the neighbourhood. There can only be one conclusion: both bombardments of this ambulance were effected with the deliberate object of annihilating the Red Cross ambulance and its staff."

Case No. 10.

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Dessie. February 9th.

a) Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 471):

"(Translation)

On the morning of February 9th, the hospital plane of the Ethiopian Red Cross, parked in a field several kilometres away from the town of Dessie, was bombarded by Italian planes from a height of 200 metres. It should be noted that a description and photograph of this hospital plane had been sent to Rome through the International Red Cross Committee.

b) Extract from report on my flight to Kworam on March 16th, 1936, and on the destruction of the airplane of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, March 17th, 1936:

" - - - - -
We instantly decided to try to save our own Red Cross plane, which we had camouflaged with a view to the fact that it had been bombed twice before on the Dessie airfield, from only 200 metres, in spite of its having, at the time, its Red Cross emblems displayed.

- - - - -
(Signed) Carl Gustav von Rosen."

Cases Nos. 11 and 12.

Bulale. February 11th and 12th.

Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 471):

"(Translation)

Finally, on February 11th and 12th, two days after the last-named bombardment, the ambulance of the Egyptian Red Cross was bombed at Bulale. Five planes dropped eleven bombs on it during the first, and twenty-two during the second, bombardment. These bombs fell within five metres of the ambulance, which was also hit by machine-gun fire. It should be observed that the ambulance was flying, not only the Egyptian flag, but also the flags of the Red Cross and the Egyptian Red Crescent. The bombings of this ambulance were thus deliberate."

Cases Nos. 13 and 14.

Quoram. March 4th and 5th.

a) C.107.M.48.1936.VII.
Telegram, dated March 5th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General.

(Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 5th, 1936.

Following our previous telegrams regarding bombing Red Cross units, I have to inform you that yesterday about noon an Italian aeroplane, S.62, after bombing the open town of Quoram killing non-combatants, proceeded towards British Red Cross ambulance situated three kilometres from the nearest military encampment. After circling over it nine times at a very low altitude, it dropped no fewer than forty large bombs, killing three wounded men under treatment by the ambulance and further seriously wounding four others, destroying material and damaging three lorries. In view of this fresh deliberate and barbarous bombardment of a Red Cross ambulance, the Ethiopian Government renews its previous protests.-
Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

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C.109.M.49.1936.VII.

Telegram, dated March 7th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592, Page 437).

(Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 7th, 1936.

Ethiopian Government again enters protest against a second Italian bombing of the British Red Cross ambulance on March 5th near Quoram. There were happily no killed or wounded, as the staff, together with the sick and wounded, were removed from the ambulance before the bombing took place; Red Cross emblems and British flags - all of large dimensions - were, however, left prominently displayed all over the camp. It is impossible for Ethiopian and foreign Red Cross societies to continue their humanitarian work if they are obliged to abandon ambulances to escape bombing by Italian civilisers. -

Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

b) C.116.M.55.1936.VII.

Telegram, dated March 11th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 455):

(Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 11th, 1936.

In continuation of previous telegrams, Ethiopian Government formally protests against third bombardment of British Red Cross ambulance on March 5th near Quoram. Red Cross and British flags displayed. In view of bombardment of two previous days, Italy cannot deny knowledge of exact position of ambulance. Ethiopia appeals to all League Members against these barbarous aggressions cynically and deliberately prepared in pursuit of Italian war of civilisation.-

Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

c) C.129.M.68.1936.VII.

Telegram, dated March 29th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 457):

(Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 29th, 1936, 12 h.5.

In reply your telegram of February (March) 18th, I have the honour to state the following: On March 3rd, at 9 a.m., Italian aeroplane at altitude 1,000 metres flew over encampment British Red Cross Ambulance, No. 1 in uninhabited grassy and not rocky plain west of Quoram and 3 1/2 kilometres from the nearest troops. There were not thirty lorries, but only two belonging to some journalists and consequently not containing ammunition. On the other hand, four lorries belonging to that ambulance and all bearing large red crosses were bombed on that day on the Alamata road by Italian aeroplane flying low. The Ethiopian Government makes the most formal declaration that no shots were fired from the Red Cross encampment or from the neighbourhood at the aeroplane while it was flying over the encampment. On March 4th, between 8 and 9 a.m., aeroplane 62 flew over the encampment at altitude between 800 and 1,000 metres. The same aeroplane again flew over it at 10 a.m. About noon the same aeroplane returned, descending in circles on the encampment as if to land. Circling nine times it dropped forty bombs right in the middle of the encampment, killing seven wounded men, giving others additional wounds and destroying thirty-five tents, including the operation and sterilisation tents. No case was touched, but one of the journalists' lorries was burnt. The Ethiopian Government denies that the aircraft were fired upon. Italian bombardments were repeated on March 5th and 6th, again wounding wounded men who had presented themselves for treatment. The Italian reply, like that given at the time of the Italian bombardments of the Swedish ambulance at Malka Didaka, is a tissue of lies.- Belatengueta Heuy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

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d) C.165.M.101.1936.VII.
Letter, dated April 15th, 1936, from the United Kingdom
Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal April 1936,
Annex 1592 Page 480):

"London, April 15th, 1936.

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to transmit to you herewith, for the information of all States Members of the League of Nations, translation of a semi-official letter, as well as of the aide-mémoire referred to therein, addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador in Rome by the Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on March 12th last concerning the bombing by Italian aircraft of British Red Cross Ambulance Unit No. 1 in the neighbourhood of Quoram, Ethiopia, on March 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th of this year.

2. I am also to enclose a copy of the note which Sir Eric Drummond handed to Signor Suvich on April 10th replying to the two Italian communications above mentioned.

(Signed) G.H. Thompson.

Copy.
(J. 2628/4/1.) Letter from Signor Suvich to Sir E. Drummond.
(Translation.)

Under-Secretary of State
for Foreign Affairs.

208997/20.

My dear Ambassador,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of March 10th.

Your Excellency had already sent me on the 7th and 9th instant two aide-mémoire to which I am replying in a corresponding aide-mémoire of to-day's date.

As Your Excellency will observe, it appears from the detailed information supplied by the General Headquarters in East Africa that fire was opened on the Italian aeroplanes on three successive days, the 3rd, 4th and 5th instant, from the British ambulance; in the attack on the 4th, the Italian aeroplane was struck in the fusillage; in the attack on the 5th instant, the aeroplane was in danger of being disabled. Information is lacking, however, about the occurrence on the 6th instant and it is being immediately asked for.

The information supplied by the Italian Headquarters shows the occurrences in their proper light and illustrates their logical development.

The Italian aircraft have as their objective the Abyssinian bands in the Quoram area. They cannot avoid flying over the area in which the ambulance is situated, since this constitutes the only normal route of transit in the Enderta sector; but, as they are flying over the ambulance, they are made the target for shots coming from the latter.

In the present circumstances, the responsibility for the occurrence does not fall upon the Italian authorities, who have, on the contrary, every reason to regret it, but on the unit of the British ambulance.

It is unnecessary to assure you that no one more than the Italian Government sincerely desires that incidents of this nature should not occur and should not be repeated. Their cause would automatically be removed if, as I hope will be the case, the strictly neutral and humanitarian character of the mission to which they belong were observed by all the members of the ambulance.

(Signed) Suvich.

Copy.

(Enclosure No.2 in Sir E. Drummond's despatch No.326 (267/181/36) of March 13th, 1936).

(Translation)

Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

208998/21.

Aide-mémoire.

In reply to the aide-mémoire of the 7th and 9th instant, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform the British Embassy that His Excellency Marshal Badoglio has reported that an Italian aircraft on the 3rd instant sighted to the south of Quoram, in the immediate neighbourhood of an Abyssinian encampment, a column consisting of about thirty lorries which were discharging boxes, and also a large baggage train which was equally loaded with boxes; in the centre was a large sheet stretched on the ground bearing the Red Cross emblem. On descending in order to ascertain what was the true nature of the above-mentioned transports, the Italian aeroplane was met, in the neighbourhood of the sheet bearing the Red Cross, with a violent anti-aircraft fire. The machine returned to the camp on the 4th instant, and on this occasion it was made the target of anti-aircraft fire and struck in the fusillage. In consequence of this, they proceeded to the bombardment of the camp from which dense smoke arose, so as to lead one to think that there was a munitions dump there, as had been already suspected.

The Air Force Headquarters have formally declared that the lorries and the tents belonging to the encampment were unprovided with any Red Cross sign, which, as has been said, was only on the sheet placed on the ground.

On the 5th instant, also, an Italian aeroplane was struck and almost disabled by shots coming from the same locality.

The coincidence of locality and dates leads one to believe that the bombardment in question is the same as that in which, according to the statements of the British Embassy, a section of the British ambulance in Ethiopia was involved.

In this case, on the basis of the information supplied by the Headquarters in East Africa, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs must energetically protest against the most grave repeated and flagrant violations of the fundamental principles of the Geneva Convention, constituted by the fact that Italian aircraft in the neighbourhood of the insignia of neutrality were repeatedly fired on.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs expresses the hope that His Britannic Majesty's Government will urgently take steps by all possible means to ascertain how the British ambulance can have been thus gravely compromised in the repeated attacks against the Italian aircraft and that they will, in the meantime, see to it that the strictest measures are taken in order that incidents of this nature may not be repeated. It is not a question, as the director of the ambulance claims, of abandoning the Red Cross emblem, which is sacred among all civilised nations; it is a question of preventing provocative acts of war from being carried out from localities protected by this emblem.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs will be grateful if the British Embassy will be so good as to communicate to them as soon as possible their reply in regard to the points raised in the present aide-mémoire, and, in particular, as to the measures which it may be possible to take to prevent the repetition of incidents which are all the more deplorable at the present moment.

The British Embassy may be perfectly sure that no unit of the British ambulance in Ethiopia will ever run any abnormal risk so long as it takes care to conform perfectly to conditions corresponding to the rules of the Geneva Convention.
Rome, March 12th, 1936. - Year XIV.

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Copy.
(J.3107/4/1.)
No. 99.
(65/70/36.)

British Embassy, Rome, April 10th, 1936.

His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rome.

Excellency,

I did not fail to communicate immediately to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom translations of the letter which Signor Suvich addressed to me on March 12th, and of the aide-mémoire referred to therein, dealing with the several attacks made in the first week of March by Italian military aircraft on the British Red Cross Ambulance No. 1 operating in Ethiopia. I regret to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, after carefully considering the statements contained in these documents and comparing them with the reports furnished by the medical officer in charge of the ambulance, are unable to accept the Italian version of the facts as having any relation to what actually occurred.

2. Before proceeding to explain the reasons which have influenced His Majesty's Government in arriving at this conclusion, I have been directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to remind Your Excellency that, on January 18th last, Mr. Ingram, at that time His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, acting on instructions from His Majesty's Government, drew Signor Suvich's personal attention to the fact that the British Red Cross ambulance, the formation and despatch of which to Ethiopia had been officially notified to the Italian Government on November 16th last, had been diverted from service on the Ogaden front to the northern zone, and was then actually established at Dessie. As Mr. Ingram explained at the time, this information was conveyed to Signor Suvich in the belief that the Italian Government would be glad, in the light of certain then recent and unfortunate incidents (such as the bombing of the Swedish ambulance near Dolo in December) to know the locality of the British ambulance in case the military authorities were not already aware of its movements. It will be recalled that, having noted Mr. Ingram's communication, Signor Suvich took the opportunity to urge that, in view of the aforesaid recent occurrences, the ambulance should be placed at a reasonable distance from military concentrations. The observations made by His Excellency on this occasion were telegraphed on January 20th to His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa with instructions that they should be brought to the notice of the medical officer in charge of the ambulance, in order that all possible precautions might be taken, and Signor Suvich was informed accordingly on January 21st, with the intimation that the ambulance had left Dessie for Waldia with the probable intention of proceeding shortly to Quoram. Later, on February 20th, I handed Signor Suvich an aide-mémoire showing, inter alia, the precautions taken by the ambulance while in the vicinity of Waldia. Its camp was placed about two miles by air, or three miles by road, from that village, and one and a half miles from the nearest Ethiopian encampment. There were displayed Red Cross ground flags 36 feet and 46 feet square; Red Cross, British and Ethiopian national flags were flown from three flagstuffs, and all tents and lorries were marked with the Red Cross emblem; at the same time, I requested that the Italian military authorities should be so informed, in order that all possible care might be taken to avoid an incident. At that date I was unaware that the ambulance either had moved, or was then about to move, to Quoram. Since, however, the medical officer in charge of the ambulance was careful, on establishing his camp at the latter place, to repeat all the precautions enforced at Waldia, this fact is of no particular importance, more especially as the Italian Government had been notified a month earlier that Quoram was likely to be the ambulance's ultimate objective.

3. I have dealt with the above points in some detail in illustration of the fact that His Majesty's Government exerted themselves to the utmost to acquaint the Italian Government with the movements of the ambulance. This was the only foreign hospital unit actually operating with the Ethiopian forces in the northern

advances zone; it was also very considerably larger than any purely Ethiopian Red Cross unit on that front. In these circumstances, and in the light of the information supplied to the Italian Government, His Majesty's Government are unable to understand how any trained military air observer can ever have harboured illusions as to the identity of so plainly marked and substantial an ambulance encampment as that noted in patrols over the Quoram area.

4. According to the reports furnished by the medical officer in charge of the ambulance, three of his Red Cross lorries were deliberately bombed at 10 a.m. on March 3rd between Quoram and Alamata. At noon on March 4th the camp of the British ambulance, 2.0 miles east of Lake Ashangi and two miles from the village of Quoram, was deliberately bombed, four patients being killed and several wounded. Such serious material damage was done that the ambulance has since had to be withdrawn for reorganisation and re-equipment. On March 5th, the camp site, on which tents were still pitched and which was plainly marked by Red Cross flags, was again bombed, although patients, personnel and stores had by that time been moved elsewhere, the commanding officer considering it desirable to refrain from displaying their position by use of the Red Cross. On March 6th, the deserted camp site, on which lorries and tents had been abandoned, was heavily bombed for the fourth time. The categorical nature of Dr. Wells's statements on the deliberate and unprovoked nature of these attacks leaves no room for doubt as to their accuracy. Allegations that fire was opened against the aircraft, or that the camp was being used as cover for Ethiopian combatants, are denied emphatically, as is the allegation that Ethiopian anti-aircraft guns were in position in close proximity to the ambulance. In short, on the reliable evidence available to them - evidence which it is understood has been substantiated by photographs taken on the spot at the time of the first raid - His Majesty's Government can only regard the pretensions advanced in Signor Suvich's letter and the aide-mémoire which accompanied it as due to the not unnatural desire of the officers responsible for the raids on the British ambulance to present excuses for their actions.

5. Apart, however, from the actual facts of the attacks, it is suggested in the communications under reply that no unit of the British ambulance service in Ethiopia would ever run any abnormal risk so long as it took care to operate in complete conformity with the rules of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929. The implication clearly is that, in various ways which will be dealt with in detail below, the British ambulance laid itself open to hostile action on the part of Italian aircraft through its neglect of the rules laid down in the above-mentioned Convention. The provisions which appear to apply to this case are Articles 6, 7 and 8 of the Convention in question. Article 6 provides that medical formations which accompany armies in the field shall be respected and protected by the belligerents; Article 7 lays down that the protection to which medical formations are entitled shall cease if they are made use of to permit actions harmful to the enemy; and Article 8 provides that the following conditions are not to be considered to be of such a nature as to deprive medical formations of the protection guaranteed by Article 6 - viz. (1) that the personnel of the formation is armed, and uses its arms in its own defence, and (2) that, in the absence of armed orderlies, the formation or establishment is protected by a picket or sentries.

6. In the present instance, the Italian Government do not dispute that the ambulance was bombed by Italian aircraft - that is to say, that the bombs were aimed directly at the encampment which Italian air observers had noted was marked with a Red Cross. An attempt is, however, made to justify the attacks under Article 7 of the Red Cross Convention - that is to say, it is suggested that the ambulance had been made use of to permit actions harmful to Italy. In these circumstances, it is necessary to examine the acts which are alleged to have produced this result. It is stated in the first place that certain lorries in the baggage train were unloading boxes at the ambulance. Assuming this to be a fact, it is impossible to argue that it involved any improper activity on

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the part of an ambulance, which might well require, and does in fact require, many stores packed in boxes. It is then alleged that, when the Italian aircraft concerned descended in order to investigate what was happening, it encountered violent anti-aircraft fire. While it is emphatically denied that any such fire was, in fact, directed against the aircraft, His Majesty's Government are not aware of any rule of international law which provides that aircraft flying over enemy territory must not be fired at when they descend low to inspect encampments, even should the latter be marked with Red Cross emblems. It is, indeed, confidently assumed by His Majesty's Government that any Ethiopian aircraft which indulged in similar scouting activities over an Italian hospital area would be greeted with anti-aircraft fire from all sides. Secondly, it seems to be suggested that illegal use is made of a Red Cross ambulance to perform acts harmful to Italy within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention of 1929 if there should be situated close to the ambulance either anti-aircraft artillery or Ethiopian troops. While again reiterating that neither Ethiopian forces nor anti-aircraft artillery were in a position of any proximity to the ambulance (the nearest Ethiopian troops on March 4th being two miles away), His Majesty's Government cannot accept any such interpretation of the legal issue raised. In this connection, I am to emphasise that no evidence is produced in the aide-memoire purporting to show that any of the ambulance's personnel, or the wounded or sick under their charge, were engaged in manning the anti-aircraft gun alleged to be close to the Red Cross insignia. Even if it were admitted, which it is not, that such a gun had been placed close to the ambulance, and that the bombs which struck the latter were intended for the former, it is nowhere suggested in the aide-memoire that the ambulance camp was struck by accident. Moreover, I am instructed to observe that, whatever the circumstances on the occasion of the first attack against the ambulance, it might well be argued that, on the second, third and fourth occasions on which it was attacked, the ambulance personnel might be entitled under Article 8, Section 1, of the 1929 Convention to fire at the aircraft, since in this case they would only be acting in self-defence, seeing that the ambulance had been deliberately bombed by Italian aircraft on the preceding day or days. However, no such firing by the ambulance personnel or from the camp of the ambulance took place. For all these reasons, His Majesty's Government are unable to admit that the Italian aide-memoire embodies any valid legal defence for the action of the Italian air force against the British ambulance, even on the supposition that the facts as set forth in that document are correct.

7. In conclusion, I have been instructed to request that Your Excellency will be so good as to furnish His Majesty's Government with a categorical assurance that clear and definite instructions have been issued to the Italian military authorities in Ethiopia that the air force operating under their command will in future exercise the utmost care to avoid attacks upon British Red Cross hospitals and ambulance units operating with the Ethiopian forces. In making this request, I am directed to add that His Majesty's Government reserve the right, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner, to claim compensation for the heavy material losses suffered by the British ambulance service in Ethiopia as the result of the deliberate attacks which form the subject of this correspondence.

(Signed) Eric Drummond.

e) 32 (thirty-two) photographs showing the effects of the bombing of No. 1 ambulance of the British Red Cross at Quoram on March 4th, 1936. (See Appendix 10. Bombing of No. 1 British Red Cross Ambulance in the plain of Kworam, March, 4th, 1936. Off. Journal June 1936, Annex 1597 Pages 631-642.)

Case No. 15.

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Quoram. March 17th.

- a) C.122.N.61.1936.VII.
Telegram, dated March 18th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 456):

(Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 18th, 1936.

The Ethiopian Government formally protests against the complete destruction by Italian bombardment of the aeroplane of the Ethiopian Red Cross on March 17th at Quoram, notwithstanding clear emblems and in spite of the previous communication to the enemy of the description of this aeroplane. This aggression has been established by a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who describes it as intentional.-

Meruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

- b) Report on my flight to Kworam on March 16th, 1936 and on the destruction of the airplane of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, March 17th, 1936. (Off. Journal June 1936, Annex 1597 Page 626).

I took off from the Akaki Aerodrome, Addis Ababa, on Monday, March 16th, at 2 p.m., with Dr. Junod, delegate of the International Red Cross Committee, Geneva, and with one mechanic and a cargo of special drugs against gas-wounds, the Red Cross mail, etc., in the Fokker belonging to the Ethiopian Red Cross, marked with the regular signs, the photos of which had been transmitted to Geneva and to the Italian Government. Our orders were to deliver the medical material, etc., to the Red Cross Ambulance stationed at Kworam and to bring back to Addis Ababa Dr. Van Schelven, of the Netherlands Red Cross Ambulance, who had been wounded.

We arrived at the Dessie airfield at 3.50 p.m., tanked petrol and started for Kworam at 4.55 p.m., aiming at the Kworam airfield at 6.05. A Government airplane had preceded us by half-an-hour and was already on the field when we arrived.

The same evening we were very graciously and cordially received by His Majesty the Emperor. His Majesty's Secretary, Ato Wolde Giorguis, informed us, amongst other things, that the distance between the Ghebi (the Emperor's temporary residence) and places where the Dutch and British Ambulances were stationed was too far and too difficult to pass at night, so that we very reluctantly realised that we had to abandon all hopes of reaching Dr. van Schelven and executing our plan in one night. I was all the more reluctant to act on Ato Wolde Giorguis' suggestions in that I know that it would be very difficult to camouflage any plane in country such as around Kworam, let alone one so big and with such characteristic colours as our Fokker. Nevertheless, Ato Wolde Giorguis assured Dr. Junod that it was quite possible and it was finally decided to camouflage the plane early next morning.

We spent the night at the Ghebi and next morning at 6.30 we were at the airfield and camouflaging our plane, which was stationed at a distance of about 200 metres from the Government plane that had been camouflaged by the employees of the Government.

At 7 a.m. we started on our way to the British Red Cross Ambulance. About 8 a.m. appeared the first Italian planes. We counted three bombing machines. While we were having breakfast, our boy came up and told us that one plane was burning. At the same moment we saw the Government plane, which was being consumed by fire very rapidly.

We instantly decided to try to save our own Red Cross plane, which we had camouflaged with a view to the fact that it had been bombed twice before on the Dessie airfield, from only 200 metres, in spite of its having at the time, its Red Cross emblems displayed. So we rushed down into the plain as fast as we could, but were obliged to hide ourselves several times for fear of being spotted by the Italian aviators. As soon as we were down on the big plain our progress was stopped by large masses of mustard gas (Yperite) dropped by the Italian flyers all around the Red Cross machine and

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with which the air and the ground were saturated. At about 10 a.m. two further bombing-planes came over Kworam and altogether the five of them dropped about 200 bombs over our airplane, but not one touched it. We were near the field when, at 11 a.m., three new fighting machines appeared from the north. They flew very low, down to about 20 metres, and proceeded to attack in good formation, shooting at our plane with machine-guns about five times from every direction. But still the Red Cross plane was standing where it was, apparently untouched. Crossing large patches covered with mustard gas, we finally managed to run up to our machine, with the intention of taking off from the field, but on our reaching it we found its two tanks perforated and all the petrol gone. So it was impossible for us to take off with it; we took away all the camouflage in order to show the Italians the Red Cross sign. We just had time to run away again to about 300 metres distance when three Italian bombing-planes returned. They started bombing operations at about 12.30 p.m., dropping about 300 bombs from an altitude of about 800 metres for about one hour and a-half. The last plane came down much lower, to about 200 metres, and dropped something like ten incendiary bombs. After that, the same plane turned, came back once more, still lower, down to about 100 metres, but did not bomb again and flew away in the direction of Amba Alaji. This time, Dr. Junod believed that the aviator had recognised the Red Cross signs on our plane and had stopped bombing it in consequence. We therefore went up to the Radio Station and Dr. Junod called to the International Red Cross Committee, Geneva, urging them to make the Italians stop bombing the Red Cross plane.

However, when we returned to the airfield at 3.30 p.m., we saw that our plane was burning, and we also saw three fighting machines making attacks the same as they had done in the morning. When they saw that they had succeeded in setting the Red Cross plane on fire, they flew off. When I saw our burning machine, I started to run towards it; but as I was about halfway on the field, suddenly three new Italian planes appeared and - probably when they noticed that our plane was finished and done with - they started throwing bombs on the pack-mules that were on the airfield. I was without cover at the time and unable to find a hiding-place. I had to remain lying down flat on the ground. After half-an-hour the planes flew off in the direction of Kworam, which village they bombed with incendiary bombs.

When they had gone, I had time to go up to the burning Red Cross machine in order to investigate if there was any possible way of saving it. I found, however, that the plane was completely burned with the exception of the engine, which might possibly have been repaired. But as I had no tools, etc., at my disposal, I had to abandon it.

On the next day (March 18th) we had ample occasion to observe how the Italian planes dropped mustard gas (Yperite) in liquid form. A liquid solution is squirted directly from the planes, the gas falling like a light rain covering a large space of ground and each drop that touches one's skin leaving a burn-wound. We saw several hundred people, mostly civilians, old men, women and children, with these dreadful wounds. I myself had my left hand and wrist burned from touching a bush in passing which had probably been sprayed with Yperite. I also had a sensation of burning on my tongue and on the mucous membranes of my respiratory organs.

We left Kworam on March 18th by lorry and arrived back at Dessie after travelling for two days. From there we returned to Addis by a Government airplane.

(Signed) Carl Gustaf von Rosen."

Case No. 16.

Ilylan Serer. March 17th.

C.127.M.66.1936.VII.

Telegram, dated March 26th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 456):

(Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 26th, 1936.

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Ethiopian Government formally protests to all Members of the League against bombardment on March 17th at Ylan Serer by two Italian aeroplanes of Swedish Red Cross ambulance. Large tent bearing big Red Cross emblems was bombed, machine-gunned and destroyed. Fortunately, no wounded or other damage, as wounded, drugs and instruments had been removed as a precaution from ambulance.-

Belatengueta Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

Case No. 17.

Harrar. March 29th.

C.129.M.68.1936.VII.

Telegram, dated March 29th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 457):

(Translation). "Addis Ababa, March 29th, 1936, 17 h.

Reference my telegram dated December 2nd, 1935, regarding the demilitarisation of the town of Harrar and its allotment as a hospital centre for wounded from the southern fronts, I have the honour to inform you that, after making a reconnaissance flight over the town on March 26th and dropping next day lying propaganda to the effect that entrenched fortifications, gun-emplacements and military roads had been constructed there, the Italians bombed that open town on March 29th. The Ethiopian Government protests against this flagrant violation of Article 25 of the rules of Hague Convention No. IV of 1907. We have had no communication with Harrar since the bombardment. Details will follow.-

Belatengueta Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

C.129.M.68.1936.VII.

Telegram, dated March 29th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General.

(Translation) Addis Ababa, March 29th, 1936, 18 h.35.

Reference last telegram I have the honour to communicate following details. This morning March 29th, at 7.30 a.m., thirty-seven enemy aircraft bombed and machine-gunned the open town of Harrar for an hour. Number of casualties not yet known. Among the numerous buildings destroyed are the Church of St. Saviour, the Catholic Church, several of the French Catholic Mission's buildings, the French hospital and consular agency, the wireless station and the prison. Fifteen bombs also fell on the Egyptian Red Crescent Hospital. Ethiopian Red Cross Hospital hit by several bombs. Two explosive bombs fell near the enclosure of the Swedish Hospital. Ras Imru's house, which formerly contained the Italian Consulate, was bombed. It should be noted that all the aforesaid hospitals were plainly marked with the Red Cross.-

Belatengueta Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

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Analysis

by the Committee of Jurists of the Documents concerning the Conduct of War in Ethiopia, which have been communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations down to April 16th, 1936. (Off. Journal April 1936, Page 364).

Extract. Page 368.

"IV. ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ITALY.

A. Alleged Deliberate Bombing of Red Cross (Red Crescent) Hospitals and Ambulances.

See documents C.470.M.247.1935 (telegram of December 30th, 1935), C.8.M.7.1936 (telegram of January 1st, 1936), C.16.M.14.1936 (letter of January 6th, 1936), C.107.M.48.1936 (telegram of March 5th, 1936), C.116.M.55.1936 (telegram of March 11th, 1936), C.122.M.61.1936 (telegram of March 18th, 1936), C.127.M.66.1936 (telegram of March 26th, 1936), C.129.M.68.1936 (telegrams of March 28th and 29th, 1936), C.155.M.93.1936 (memorandum of March 2nd, 1936, addressed to the International Committee of the Red Cross).

The following is a summary of cases reported:

- | | | | |
|----|--------------|---------------|---|
| 1. | Adowa | October 3rd | Red Cross Hospital |
| 2. | Dessie | December 6th | American Red Cross Hospital seriously damaged; witnessed by foreign doctors and journalists. Five bombs on hospital; others on operating-tent of ambulance. |
| 3. | Negelli | December 15th | Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulance No. 4. |
| 4. | Malka Didaka | December 22nd | Swedish ambulance. |
| 5. | Malka Didaka | December 30th | Swedish ambulance bombed and machine-gunned; 100 bombs; all tents destroyed and twenty-seven patients killed; Dr. Hylander, head of ambulance, wounded. Report said to have been drawn up by representative of International Red Cross. |
| 6. | Bulale | December 30th | Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; five bombs dropped near ambulance. |
| 7. | Bulale | December 31st | Renewed attack on Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance. |

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| 6. | Bulale | December 30th | Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; five bombs dropped near ambulance. |
| 7. | Bulale | December 31st | Renewed attack on Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance. |

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- 8. Dagahbur January 4th Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulance No.1. At least fifty bombs and machine-gun fire.
- 9. Waldia January 15th Ethiopian Red Cross Liaison Unit.
- 10. Makalle January 18th No.3 Ambulance, Ethiopian Red Cross; bombing and machine-gunning; eight wounded; special pains had been taken to indicate presence of this ambulance to the Italian aeroplanes.
- 11. Dessie February 9th Ethiopian hospital plane bombed.
- 12. Bulale February 11th Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; eleven bombs and machine-gun fire.
- 13. Bulale February 12th Renewed bombing on Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; twenty-two bombs.
- 14. Quoram March 4th British Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned.
- 15. Quoram March 5th British Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned; finding it necessary thereafter to discard Red Cross insignia.
- 16. Quoram March 17th Ethiopian Red Cross aeroplane destroyed; witnessed by representative of International Red Cross.
- 17. Ilylan Serer March 17th Swedish Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned.
- 18. Chilga March 20th British Field Ambulance No.2.
- 19. Harrar March 29th Egyptian Red Crescent hospital; fifteen bombs; Ethiopian Red Cross Hospital and French Hospital.

According to the memorandum of March 2nd, 1936 (pages 10-14), a representative of the International Red Cross witnessed (or investigated) some of these attacks (Dessie, December 6th, 1935; Swedish ambulance at Malka Didaka, December 22nd and 30th, 1935), in which case he made a report to the International Committee.

In four cases (Malka Didaka, December 30th, 1935; Dagahbur, January 4th, 1936; Makalle, January 18th, 1936; Dessie, February 9th, 1936), an attack with machine-guns from a very low elevation or bombing from a very low elevation is alleged to have occurred. In the instance of the Bombing of the Ethiopian Red Cross ambulance at Makalle on January 18th, 1936, it is stated that reconnaissance on the preceding day had shown the Italians the presence of the ambulance and the absence of troops. The bombing at Quoram on March 17th of the Ethiopian Red Cross aeroplane is said to have been described as intentional by the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Regarding the bombing of Dessie Hospital and dressing-stations on December 6th, 1935, stated to be contained in an enclosure outside the town, the Ethiopian Government forwarded by telegram on December 7th (document C.474.M.250.1935) a declaration signed by six doctors. There is a controversy between the Italian Government and one of the doctors, Dr. M.S. Belau, who is alleged to be a person of very doubtful character. The character of the others has not been impugned."

and

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT.

B. Bombing of undefended places.

The Analysis by League of Nations Committee of Jurists, see here below.

a) Extract from Telegram, dated December 6th, 1935, from His Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal January 1936, Annex 1573 Page 29):

(Translation.)

"Addis Ababa, December 6th, 1935,
15 h. 30.

It has been evident to us since hostilities began that the Italian Government has adopted the policy of destroying our people, not by the use of its own troops, but solely by that of mechanical means and of native troops recruited in Italian colonies. The Italian Government may indeed consider itself authorised to bombard us when we go out to share the sufferings of our soldiers and to defend our soil, but the bombardment of open towns such as Dabat, Gondar and of numerous villages inhabited by non-combatant peasants and containing neither troops nor means of defence, the killing of women and children, the bombardment of Red Cross hospitals, are undeniably violations of international law. This last action - - - - -

HAILE SELASSIE I "

b) Extract from Telegram, dated March 5th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal, April 1936 Page 437):

(Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 5th, 1936.

Following our previous telegrams regarding bombing Red Cross units, I have to inform you that yesterday about noon an Italian aeroplane, S.62, after bombing the open town of Quoram killing non-combatants, proceeded towards British Red Cross ambulance situated - - - - -

HERUY, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

c) Telegram, dated March 17th, 1936, from The Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal April 1936, Annex 1592, Page 455):

(Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 17th, 1936.
11 h. 15.

The Imperial Government formally protests to all the States Members of the League against the continual use by the Italians of asphyxiating and similar gases all along the northern front and during the bombardment of open towns in the interior of the country. Those proceedings constitute the most flagrant breach of the Declaration of 1925. - HERUY, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

d) Telegram, dated March 29th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal April 1936, Annex 1592 Page 457):

(Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 29th, 1936, 17h.

Reference my telegram dated December 2nd, 1935, regarding the demilitarisation of the town of Harrar and its allotment as a hospital centre for wounded from the southern fronts, I have the honour to inform you that, after making a reconnaissance flight over the town on March 26th and dropping next day lying propaganda to the effect that entrenched fortifications, gun-emplacements and military roads had been constructed there, the Italians bombed that open town on March 29th. The Ethiopian Government protests against this flagrant violation of Article 25 of the rules of Hague Convention No. IV of 1907. We have had no communication with Harrar since the bombardment. Details will follow. - Selateangueta HERUY, Minister for Foreign Affairs!"

Telegram, dated March 29th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General (Off. Journal April 1936 Annex 1592 Page 457):
(Translation) "Addis Ababa, March 29th, 1936,
10 h. 35.

Reference last telegram I have the honour to communicate following details. This morning, March 29th, at 7.30 a.m., thirty-seven enemy aircraft bombed and machine-gunned the open town of Harrar for an hour. Number of casualties not yet known. Among the numerous buildings destroyed are the Church of St. Saviour, the Catholic Church, several of the French Catholic Mission's buildings, the French hospital and consular agency, the wireless station and the prison. Fifteen bombs also fell on the Egyptian Red Crescent Hospital. Ethiopian Red Cross Hospital hit by several bombs. Two explosive bombs fell near the enclosure of the Swedish Hospital. Ras Imru's house, which formerly contained the Italian Consulate, was bombed. It should be noted that all the aforesaid hospitals were plainly marked with the Red Cross. - Belatengueta MERUY, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

e) Telegram, dated April 17th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal April 1936 Annex 1592 Page 484):
(Translation) "Addis Ababa, April 17th, 1936,
12 h. 05.

This morning, at 8 a.m., two Italian bombing aeroplanes flew over the open town of Addis Ababa for a long time, firing machine-guns and discharging rockets. The Ethiopian Government expects the enemy to allege that, during this attack, the said aeroplanes were riddled with bullets, the purpose being to fabricate a false pretext for bombing the town. The Ethiopian Government declares that during this aggression no shots were fired at the aeroplanes. The fact that Italian aeroplanes have flown over the town on four occasions and the fact that, during these attacks, machine-guns were fired and rockets discharged clearly show the enemy's intention of bombing this open town. - Belatengueta MERUY, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

f) Extract from statement, attached to Memorandum of March 2nd, 1936, from the President of the Ethiopian Red Cross to the President of the International Red Cross Committee (Off. Journal April 1936 Annex 1592 Page 472):

"(Translation) Bombing of Open Towns.

The Ethiopian Red Cross calls the attention of National Red Cross Societies to the following facts:

The Press Secretary of the Italian Embassy in London stated on October 4th, 1935:

'I can assure you that Mussolini gave express instructions to our armies that centres of civilian population were on no account to be bombed.'

According to a message broadcast from Berlin on October 24th, 1935, Count Ciano, Minister of Propaganda, stated at Asmara that:

'The Italian army has always endeavoured to spare the civilian population and it is easy for Italian armies to recognise the Ethiopian fighting forces, which usually camp outside the inhabited areas.'

The following passage is part of a telegram sent to the League of Nations by the Italian Government on December 15th, 1935:

'The Italian Government formally denies that any open town has ever been bombed by the Air Force in East Africa, since every action has always been directed solely against military columns and concentrations.'

The Ethiopian Red Cross does not claim that the following list (not copied here) enumerates every instance of the bombing of open towns. Apart from such attacks, the Italian aircraft have flown everywhere, both over and behind the fronts, discharging explosive and

Incendary bombs haphazard on peaceful peasant villages, massacring live-stock by means of machine-gun fire, even in provincial districts remote from all military operations or concentrations.

by the Committee of Jurists of the documents concerning the conduct of the War in Ethiopia which have been communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations down to April 16th, 1936. (O.F. Journal April 1936, Page 264).

Extract. Page 270.

"B. Alleged Bombing of Open Towns.

See documents C.470.M.247.1935 (telegram of December 6th, 1935), C.107.M.48.1936 (telegram of March 5th, 1936), C.116.M.55.1936 (telegram of March 11th, 1936), C.119.M.58.1936 (telegram of March 17th, 1936), C.129.M.68.1936 (telegrams of March 28th, 1936), C.131.M.73.1936 (telegram of April 4th, 1936), C.155.M.92.1936 (memorandum of March 2nd, 1936, to the International Committee of the Red Cross).

The following cases are reported:

Month	Date	Location	Notes
February	10th	Quoram	
	10th	Ashangt	
	10th	Walata	
	11th	Walata	
	12th	Walata	
	12th	Kobbo	
	12th	Mertno	
	13th	Combalcha	
	13th	Lake Halk Convent	
	13th	Donka Mikael	
January	2nd	Donka Mikael	
	2nd	Walata	
	3rd	Walata	
	10th	Jarre Gulibo	
	10th	Donka Mikael	
	14th	Segerat	
	14th	Wartia	
	14th	Walata	
	16th	Megalo	
	16th	Megalo	
December	5th	Kobbo	
	5th	Mertno	
	28th	Zeleo	
	28th	Adi Remoz	
	28th	Kebtia	
	28th	Debnat	
	2nd	Debnat	
	2nd	Amba Bircousta	
	3rd	Amba Bircousta	
	3rd	Dabat	
November	18th	Sokota	
	18th	Dabat	
	18th	Amba Bircousta	
	18th	Walata	
	18th	Walata	
	18th	Walata	
	18th	Walata	
	18th	Walata	
	18th	Walata	
	18th	Walata	
October	3rd	Adigrat	
	3rd	Amba Alaji	
	14th	Kebrt Dehart	
	25th	Walata	
	25th	Walata	
	18th	Walata	
	18th	Walata	
	18th	Walata	
	18th	Walata	
	18th	Walata	
September	10th	Walata	
	10th	Walata	
	10th	Walata	
	10th	Walata	
	10th	Walata	
	10th	Walata	
	10th	Walata	
	10th	Walata	
	10th	Walata	
	10th	Walata	

(Town stated to have been de-litharised as notified to the League in 1935.)

Apart from the bombing of open towns, the memorandum accuses the Italians of using aeroplanes to bomb mere villages and now down the flocks and herds of the peasants in places far from any military operations or concentrations.

5/11/36

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT.

0502

C. Use of poisonous gases.

The Analysis by League of Nations Committee of Jurists, see here below.

a) Extract from Télégramme, en date du 30 Décembre 1935, de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Ethiopie au Secrétaire Général. (Journal Off. Février 1936, Annexe 1587 Page 241):

"Addis Abeba, le 30 décembre 1935.

Maintenant, le 23 décembre, ils ont fait usage contre nos troupes, dans la région du Takkaze, des gaz asphyxiants et toxiques, ce qui constitue une nouvelle adjonction à la liste déjà longue des violations par l'Italie de ses engagements internationaux. Nous protestons énergiquement contre de tels procédés inhumains.-

HAILÉ SELASSIÉ Ier, Empereur."

b) Télégramme, en date du 1er Janvier 1936, de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Ethiopie au Secrétaire Général. (Journal Off. Février 1936, Annexe 1587 Page 242):

"Addis Abeba, le 1er Janvier 1936.

Faisant suite à notre protestation en date du 30 décembre, nous portons à votre connaissance ce qui suit. Le 30 décembre encore, les Italiens après avoir bombardé violemment notre armée du sud ont fait usage de gaz toxiques. Au cours de ce même bombardement, les Italiens ont détruit complètement ambulance de la Croix-Rouge suédoise où étaient hospitalisés de nombreux malades et blessés en dépit des signes conventionnels évidents. Le médecin chef de cette ambulance, le Dr Hylander, a été lui-même très gravement blessé. Après les bombardement de hôpital Adeoua, hôpital et ambulances Bessie, ambulance suédoise et usage gaz l'Italie poursuit impunément et soi-disant au nom de la civilisation son action inhumaine. Nous élevons de nouveau nos protestations les plus formelles contre les agissements criminels du Gouvernement italien au mépris et en violation de ses engagements internationaux.-

HAILÉ SELASSIÉ, Ier, Empereur."

c) Lettre, en date du 6 Janvier, 1936, du Représentant de l'Ethiopie au Secrétaire Général. (Journal Off. Février 1936, Annexe 1587 Page 242):

"Paris, le 6 Janvier 1936.

D'ordre de mon Gouvernement, je prie Votre Excellence de vouloir bien communiquer au Conseil et aux membres de la Société des Nations la déclaration suivante:

Malgré la réprobation universelle provoquée par le bombardement et la destruction de l'ambulance de la Croix-Rouge suédoise, les autorités militaires italiennes continuent leur politique de terreur en employant contre nos troupes éthiopiennes des gaz toxiques dans le secteur sud des opérations.

De plus, les autorités italiennes refusent de se livrer à un bombardement d'ambulances de la Croix-Rouge à Addis Abeba.

Le Gouvernement éthiopien insiste vigilement auprès de la Société des Nations pour qu'elle enquête soit précédée sur les violations nouvelles à répétées des lois de la guerre et les conventions internationales. Ce ne sont pas les actes isolés et accidentels imputables à des individus, c'est une violation, la violation constante et délibérée de la Convention internationale sur l'usage des gaz toxiques, qui a été commise par l'Italie.

Le Gouvernement éthiopien prie respectueusement le Conseil de la Société des Nations d'appliquer la égalité de ses votes originaux en vue d'une intervention décisive pour les faits ci-dessus.

(Signé) Wolde Mariam.

Ministre d'Etat."

0503

d) Telegram, dated March 17th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General (Off. Journal April 1936 Annex 1592 Page 455):

"(Translation) Addis Ababa, March 17th, 1936, 11 P.M. 15.

The Imperial Government formally protests to all the States Members of the League against the continual use by the Italians of asphyxiating and similar gases all along the northern front and during the bombardment of open towns in the interior of the country. These proceedings constitute the most flagrant breach of the Declaration of 1925.- HERUY, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

e) Extract from Letter, dated April 10th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Representative to the Secretary-General (Off. Journal April 1936 Annex 1592 Page 474):

"(Translation) Geneva, April 10th, 1936.

IV. To complete the evidence contained in its report, the Ethiopian Government has instructed its delegation at Geneva to lay before the Committee of Thirteen two new items of information:

2) A telegram in clear, just received, from its Government by the Ethiopian delegation states as follows:

'Please inform the League of Nations immediately that the Italians have also begun to use asphyxiating gases on the Ogaden front. On April 8th, they discharged gas on Dagabur and Sassabaneh. Eighty persons were affected; they are suffering horribly in the eyes and lungs and from skin burns. Protest energetically against these inhuman and forbidden acts.'

(Signed) Wolde Maryam,
Ethiopian Minister "

f) Extract from Letter, dated April 13th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Representative to the Secretary-General (Off. Journal April 1936, Annex 1592 Page 479):

"(Translation) Geneva, April 13th, 1936.

The Ethiopian delegation has the honour to transmit to Your Excellency for immediate communication to the Committee of Thirteen, the Committee of Eighteen, the Council and all the Members of the League of Nations the following telegram, dated April 12th, 1936, which has just been received from the Ethiopian Government:

'Herewith list, with dates, of the towns attacked with poison gas:

During these last four bombardments of Quoram (April 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 1936), the town was literally drenched with gas. The gas most frequently used is mustard-gas (yperite).

(Signed) Wolde Maryam,
Minister of Ethiopia"

g) Extract from Letter, dated May 2nd, 1936, from the Ethiopian Representative to the Secretary-General (Off. Journal June 1936 Annex 1597 Page 605):

"(Translation) Paris, May 2nd 1936.

I beg you to bring the following declaration, together with the documents attached thereto, to the knowledge of the Council and of all the Members of the League of Nations.

IV. The third document is a statement dated April 9th, 1936, by Doctor Schuppler, Head of Ambulance No. 3 on the use of

0504 poison gases.

V. The fourth document is a report dated April 11th, 1936, on the use of poison gases, signed by Mr. Walter H. Holmes, correspondent of the Nordisk Telegraph Agency, Copenhagen, and The Times, of London.

VII. The sixth document is a report dated April 10th, 1936, on the use of poison gases, signed by Dr. John M. Nelly, Head of the British Red Cross Ambulance in Ethiopia.

VIII. The seventh document is a report dated March 19th, 1936, on the use of poison gases, sent to the International Red Cross in Addis Ababa by Messrs. Gunnar Ulland and Vale, doctors attached to the Norwegian Red Cross at Irga Alem, together with an extract from a letter dated March 20th, 1936, from Mr. Smith.

IX. The eighth document, dated April 10th, 1936, is a list of places bombed with poison gases, with the dates of the bombing, during the period December 22nd, 1935-April 7th, 1936. The document reproduces the figures showing the consignments of poison gases to East Africa through the Suez Canal.

(Signed) Wolde Maryam,
Ethiopian Minister."

Appendix 3.

Addis Ababa, April 9th, 1936.

Dr. Schuppler,
Chief of Ambulance No. 3.

To the Imperial Foreign Office,
Addis Ababa.

I have the honour to inform you that on January 14th, 1936, for the first time battle gasbombs were used through bomb-throwing by Italian flyers. Through these bombs 20 country people were killed, and I treated about 15 cases from gas-bombing, 2 children being among them. The burning is caused from (Senfgas) mustard gas, used south of the Pass Alaghi on January 30th, 1936.

Five miles westward of Amba Aradam, we have been ourselves lightly gassed. In what manner it was applied I cannot state: but it also was mustard gas. I alone could stipulate nearly 80 cases of poison gas; all were soldiers.

In Tembien, no gas was used by the Italians. At the same time, I found a gas-bomb (mustard gas) 16 km. west of the plain Koram on January 19th. In this district there were only civilians. The bomb measured 1.30 m. by 10 cm.

Appendix 4.

To His Excellency Belatengueta Herouy,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Addis Ababa.

During my experience of aerial bombardment in the area of the northern front during the past four months, the use of mustard gas has been a frequent occurrence. My own first personal experience of gas bombardment was on Sunday, March 1st, in the bush between Alamata and Kobbo about ten miles south of Kworam. From the early morning of this day, Italian aeroplanes were maintaining a continual reconnaissance over this area, in which not only soldiers of the Imperial Guard were encamped, but through which large bodies of irregulars, accompanied according to their custom by women and boys, were advancing. The population of the neighbourhood, one of whose occupations is the maintenance of large herds of cattle, were of course also present following their usual pursuits. The Italian bombardment was carried out indiscriminately and claimed its victims irrespective of the categories to which they belonged. During this morning, the dropping of several large containers of corrosive liquid was noted and the presence of gas was quickly felt through the impregnation of the atmosphere over considerable zones with vapour whose pungent biting character left no doubt that it was a substance of the nature familiarly known to us in the Great War as mustard.

0505

Later in the same day I visited the base which the British Ambulance had then established at Alamata and saw there a number of persons suffering from burns which, judging from my own experience, were undoubtedly inflicted by a liquid of the "mustard" type. Some of these cases, I was informed, had been brought in during that day, while others had arrived on the two or three preceding days during which the base had been established there. A notable fact about these cases was that, while a number showed burns on head and shoulders caused obviously by falling liquid, a much greater number were severely injured in the legs and lower parts of the bodies. In the case of several men, large areas of skin had been removed from the legs and thighs and some of these also had suffered extremely severe and painful burning of the genital organs. The cause of this particular form of injury is as follows. The gas was being dropped in large containers, one of which had actually been brought into the ambulance compound and was inspected and photographed by myself and colleagues. It was a torpedo-shaped object of a total length of about four feet. On striking the ground, the nose of the container becomes detached and from a bottle within is released a quantity of liquid amounting, I estimate, to about 40 lb. Falling in dense bush, this liquid is scattered over ground and foliage and remains there for a considerable period. I am informed that its corrosive quality persists for some two or three days. Not only troops but peasants passing through the bush on their usual occupations and coming into contact unawares with contaminated foliage sustain the terrible injuries described above.

During the subsequent months which I spent at Kworam and in the neighbourhood of Lake Ashangi, I witnessed daily bombardments by Italian aeroplanes in which gas-bombs were very frequently used. In addition to the containers already described, the Italians flying over Kworam Plain at relatively low altitudes used the method of spraying from the machine. This method causes possibly more widespread injury and is certainly more difficult to escape from than the dropping of gas-shells. From the fine rain of corrosive liquid which descends from the plane there seems little protection unless possibly something in the nature of a diving suit were devised, but in any case Ethiopian soldiers and peasants are not provided with even the most elementary forms of mask or protective clothing. Consequently, large numbers of them, subjected to this form of attack, receive ghastly injuries to head, face and upper parts of bodies. I may mention as an example that, one evening when I was riding across Kworam Plain shortly after such a gas attack, I came upon the British Ambulance Warrant Officer Atkinson administering first aid to victims. It had been necessary to send him down from the cave in which the Ambulance was then located because many of the victims had been blinded by the gas-spraying and could not go up into the hills for treatments. After this it became a daily occurrence for the Ambulance to send officers down to the plain to treat victims thus incapacitated. On the evening in question, while I was present, Atkinson treated fully 100 cases of burning by corrosive liquid. Another example of injury by gas within my own experience occurred when the British Ambulance officers Captain Townshend Stephens and Dr. Ampey went to the assistance of the crew of the Ethiopian Red Cross plane which was bombed by the Italians while lying on the open ground at Kworam.

The officers found themselves passing through a zone of mustard gas and both shortly afterwards when I met them showed marked indications of inhalation of the vapour, while Captain Townshend Stephens suffered slight but distinct burns on the throat. Among the wounded who during my stay in the region of Kworam were streaming back from the battles south of Takalle and in the Tembien were a great proportion of gas victims. Many were suffering from gangrened wounds owing to the lack of facilities and materials for treating the effects of gas at the front.

All the facts here recorded were observed by me in company with other European witnesses.

(Signed) Walter M. Holmes.

Correspondent of the Nordisk Telegraph Agency, Copenhagen,
and for "The Times" at the Northern Front.
Neutral's Bureau, Addis Ababa,
April 12th, 1941.

Appendix 6.
British Ambulance Service,
c/o Ethiopian Red Cross,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

0506

Report on the use of gas on the northern front.

In the latter half of February, while the British Ambulance Service was situated at Walaila, several cases of severe burn from mustard gas were treated. These cases had made their own way down from the front. On February 28th, 29th and March 1st, about 150 cases of severe burn from mustard gas were treated by the advance unit of the British Ambulance Service in Ethiopia near Alamata. Many of these patients were women, children and infants. The burns of the large majority of them had been contracted locally. During the three days while the unit was situated near Alamata, several mustard gas bombs were dropped in the region.

Between March 7th and March 2nd, while the unit was situated in the region of Lake Ashangi, between 200 and 300 cases of burning by mustard gas were treated by the unit. Many of these had been temporarily blinded, and a special clinic, about a mile away from the unit where the gassing had been most severe, had to be held, as the victims, being blind, were unable to find their way to the ambulance. While the unit was in this situation, mustard gas was frequently used in the vicinity.

A large number of the burns treated were of a very severe and terrible nature.

(Signed) John M. Kelly,
Commandant,
British Ambulance Service in Ethiopia.
April 10th, 1936.

Appendix 7.

Yerga Alem, March 19th, 1936.

To the International Red Cross,
Addis Ababa.

The following will be a statement of gas bomb being used by the Italians to-day at Yerga Alem.

At 8 a.m. two trimotor Italian bombing planes went over Yerga Alem. At 5 p.m. two patients were brought along to our camp, both suffering from severe irritation of the eyes with epiphora and blepharospasm and strong irritation of the mucous membranes of the nose and throat. One of them had also a bulbous burn of the skin of the dorsals on both feet.

We immediately left for the town, as we heard that more persons were injured. We found four persons suffering from exactly the same symptoms as regards eyes, nose and throat. All six patients, who were very suffering, were put into our hospital.

On investigation of the spot where the bomb exploded, we found a hole by 3 metres in diameter and 1.1/2 metres deep. Judging by the three pieces of the bomb that we found in the hole, we should say it to have been 75 cm. long and about 30 cm. in diameter, made up of 2 mm. thick sheet-steel welded together. The grass around the hole for about 5 metres was faded, not burned. We enclose a little sample of the powder found nearby. There was a distinct smell of mustard up to 30 metres from the spot. No rain had fallen since the bomb dropped, but the wind had been rather strong in the afternoon.

The injured persons were located 10-20 metres from the exploding bomb.

(Signed) Gunnar Ulland.

P.S. - March 20th. - To-day we have treated furthermore fifteen patients injured from the gas-bomb yesterday. All these patients had bulbous burns of the feet and legs, and a few in the face. These burns had all characteristics of burns from mustard gas. I have taken two photos of these burns on the enclosed film in 32 and 33. With you have most of these pictures, please forward the whole film to the Norwegian Red Cross, Oslo.

(Signed) Vale.

0507

Excerpt from letter from Mr. Smith, Sudan Interior Mission missionary at Yerga Alem (March 20th, 1936):

"- - - - Yesterday, gas was dropped here. Two containers; one exploded, one unexploded. Over thirty people were affected. We have been working on them yesterday and to-day at N.R.C. camp. Seems to be mustard gas mixed with another gas."

Appendix B.

(Translation)

April 10th, 1936.

We give herewith a list, with dates, of gas bombardments carried out by the Italians in flagrant violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The list is far from complete, because since the beginning of March the Italians have been systematically bombing every day, on the fronts and on centres of civilian population, with gases prohibited by that Protocol:

Takkaze	December 22nd	Kworam	March 17th
Amba Alaji	December 26th	Kworam	March 18th
Borana	December 30th	Irga Alem	March 19th
Makale	December 31st	Irga Alem	March 21st
Sokota	January 10th	Inda Mehoni	March 29th
Makale	January 21st	Inda Mehoni	March 30th
Megalo	February 16th	Kworam	April 4th
Waldia Road	February 27th	Kworam	April 5th
Kworam	March 16th	Kworam	April 6th
Ylan Serer	March 17th	Kworam	April 7th

It is also desirable to give statistics of consignments of gas to East Africa which have passed through the Suez Canal: Between June 25th and December 25th, 1935, there passed through the Suez Canal, consigned to Massawa:

- 265 tons of asphyxiating gas;
- 45 tons of mustard gas;
- 7,483 gas-bombs.

On January 4th, at 6.35 a.m., the S.S. Sicilia passed through the Suez Canal carrying:

- 4,700 asphyxiating and tear-gas bombs.

Analysis

by the Committee of Jurists of the Documents concerning the Conduct of the War in Ethiopia which have been communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations down to April 16th, 1936. (Off. Journal April 1936 Page 364):

Extract. Page 370.

"C. Use of Poison Gas.

1. Ethiopian Allegations of Use of Gas.

See documents C.506.M.275.1935 (Telegram of December 30th, 1935), C.8.M.7.1936 (telegram of January 1st, 1936), C.9.M.8.1936 (letter of December 31st, 1935), C.16.M.14.1936 (letter of January 6th, 1936), C.119.M.58.1936 (telegram of March 17th, 1936, alleging use by the Italians of asphyxiating and similar gases all along the northern front and during the bombardment of open towns in the interior of the country), C.152.M.98.1936 (letter of April 10th, 1936, alleging use of gas on Ogaden front), C.155.M.93.1936 (memorandum of March 2nd to the International Committee of the Red Cross), C.159.M.97.1936 and C.161.M.99.1936.

Document C.161.M.99.1936 gives the following list of

0507

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Ylan Serer	March 17th	Kworam	April 7th

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Extract. Page 37C.

"C. Use of Poison Gas.

1. Ethiopian Allegations of Use of Gas.

See documents C.506.M.275.1935 (Telegram of December 30th, 1935), C.8.M.7.1936 (telegram of January 1st, 1936), C.9.M.8.1936 (letter of December 31st, 1935), C.16.M.14.1936 (letter of January 6th, 1936), C.119.M.58.1936 (telegram of March 17th, 1936, alleging use by the Italians of asphyxiating and similar gases all along the northern front and during the bombardment of open towns in the interior of the country), C.152.M.90.1936 (letter of April 10th, 1936, alleging use of gas on Ogaden front), C.155.M.93.1936 (memorandum of March 2nd to the International Committee of the Red Cross), C.159.M.97.1936 and C.161.M.99.1936.

Document C.161.M.99.1936 gives the following list of

towns attacked with poison gas;

0508

Takkaze	December 22nd, 1935
Arba Abba	December 24th, 1935
Borana	December 31st, 1935
Sokota	January 10th, 1936
Takkaze	January 21st, 1936
Dagalo	February 1936 (as the date cannot be exactly deciphered, confirmation has been asked for).
Waldia Road	February 27th, 1936
Quoram	March 16th, 1936
Ylanserer	March 17th, 1936
Quoram	March 17th, 18th, 1936
Irga Alem	March 19th and 21st, 1936
Indomahoni	March 29th and 30th, 1936
Quoram	April 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 1936.

During the last four bombardments of Quoram (April 4th to 7th), the town is said to have been literally drenched with gas. The gas most frequently used is said to be mustard gas (yperite).

Use of gas against the troops is alleged to have occurred in the Takkaze region on December 23rd, against the southern army on December 30th, in the northern section of operations in January, continuously all along the northern front in March, on Dagahbur and Dassabaneh (on the Ogaden front on April 8th), with resulting injury to eighty persons.

2. Alleged Import of Gas to Massawa.

The memorandum reproduced in document C.155.M.93.1936 states that, between June 25th and December 25th, 1935, 45 tons of jostiprity, 265 tons of asphyxiating materials and 7,483 gas bombs, and on January 4th, 1936, 4,700 gas bombs passed the Suez Canal on their way to Massawa.

3. Statements from Non-Ethiopian Sources regarding Actual Cases of Casualties from Gas.

The note (unnumbered) circulated by the United Kingdom delegation to the Committee of Thirteen, under date April 8th, 1936, refers to the following:

'(a) Statement of Dr. Nelly, of the British Red Cross, that, on March 1st, 2nd and 3rd, he treated about a hundred serious cases of mustard-gas burns, a statement supported by photos showing gas burns, which were taken on March 4th and are in the possession of the British Minister at Addis Ababa.

'(b) Signed statement by Dr. J.W.C. Macfie, of the British Ambulance, that, between March 1st and March 8th, 1936, he personally saw and treated several hundred men, women and children who were suffering from mustard-gas burns.

'(c) Report that there exists an authenticated report of the Norwegian ambulance (southern front) proving that, on March 19th, twenty-one cases of mustard-gas burns were caused by one bomb.

'(d) Report that the Swedish ambulance has reported treating cases in December on the southern front.

'(e) Report that Dr. Junod, of the International Red Cross, and Count von Rosen (Swedish Red Cross Pilot) saw gas used at Quoram on March 17th and suffered from it. Dr. Junod sent a report to the International Committee.

'(f) Report that Dr. Trophil, an Irishman attached to the Ethiopian Army sanitary service command and serving with the Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulance No. 3, has made a statement in London that, in the last week of December and the first week of January, about thirty cases of mustard-gas burns were treated by the ambulance.

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT.D. Destruction of religious buildings.

The Analysis by League of Nations Committee of Jurists, see here below.

a) Extract from Télégramme, en date du 30 Décembre 1935, de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Ethiopie au Secrétaire Général. (Off. Journal February 1936 Annex 1587 Page 241): "Addis-Abeba, le 30 décembre 1935.

En plus des violations par les Italiens des lois et coutumes de la guerre qui ont été déjà rapportées à la Société des Nations, ils ont, lors de leur retraite récente dans le Shire et dans le Tembien, brûlé les églises et procédé à l'extermination systématique de la population civile.

 HAILE SELASSIÉ I^{er}, Empereur."

b) Extract from statement, attached to Memorandum of March 2nd, 1936, from the President of the Ethiopian Red Cross to the President of the International Red Cross Committee (Off. Journal April 1936 Annex 1592 Page 473):

"(Translation) Bombing and Burning of Churches.

 The Ethiopian Red Cross begs to draw attention to the fact that the Italian authorities themselves admit to such bombing and incendiarism in the following leaflet, copies of which were scattered on January 15th and 16th during the air attacks on the open towns of Quoram and Waldia:

'Peoples of Eritrea and the Tigre, hearken!

War brings both good and evil. That being so, it even happens that churches are damaged and destroyed. But do not imagine that such damage or destruction does not cause regret and pain to the Italian Government, which hereby announces that, when by the grace of God peace is restored, every church damaged, to whatever extent, or destroyed will be completely restored to an even better state than before.

(Signed) COMMANDER OF THE ITALIAN ARMY,
 MARSHAL OF ITALY."

Analysis

by the Committee of Jurists of the Documents concerning the Conduct of the War in Ethiopia which have been communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations down to April 16th, 1936. (Off. Journal April 1936 Page 364):

Extract. Page 372.

"D. Bombing or Burning of Churches.

The Ethiopian memorandum of March 2nd, 1936, to the International Red Cross Committee (page 18) gives the following six instances of bombing or burning of churches by the Italian forces and quotes as corroborative evidence an Italian proclamation dropped during air-bombing operations on January 15th and 16th promising that any churches damaged in the course of the war will be restored:

Dagahbur	November 14th
Dagahbur	November 26th.
Churches in the Shire	During the retreat after the defeat of Eda Selassie.
Churches in the Tembien	During the retreat from Tembien.
Sokoto	January 10th
Abbi Addi	January 20th."

3)

EXTRACT

"La Guerra Italo-Etiopica"
Fronte Sud
Edita by the Comando delle Forze armate
della Somalia.

Page 223.

(Translation)

"The command of the Armed Forces of the Somalia (New designation of the Expedition force) considers the moment to have come to strengthen our hold of the menaced area and orders new detachments to enter the western subsection.

At the same time it orders the Aviation to begin the work of exhausting the enemy in order to cut all activity and asks for the authorization to use all arms, included the bombing with gas to react against the barbaric plunderings carried out by the enemy hordes. It received the consent of H.E. the Chief of Government, who authorizes the use of gas 'where it is indicated by supreme defence reasons'."

0512

C. Observations on the Charges Brought by the ex-Ethiopian Red Cross.

1. Alleged Bombing of Medical Units.

The Ethiopian note gave a list of bombardments of medical units, which either never took place or have already been formally denied, or were cases in which no Red Cross emblem was visible, or were purely accidental, occurring in the course of legitimate military operations. I may refer to my various communications upon this subject.

2. Alleged Bombing of Open Towns and Churches.

No open and undefended places were ever bombed, but only military concentrations and posts. It is common knowledge, moreover, that the so-called "towns" in Ethiopia are mainly collections of tukula, chiefly built of wood and mud; in these settlements, the armed men concentrated and kept up a sustained rifle and anti-aircraft fire against the Italian aircraft flying over the area.

In any case, the long list of so-called towns bombed was completely imaginary. Many of them do not exist, and on most of the dates given no bombing took place. In some cases, such as those of Adowa, Acha Alaji, Lal Washish, Senjar, Gabat, Waldia, Kworaa, Assangi, Mertho and Seguerat, bombs were dropped upon concentrations of armed men outside the inhabited areas, and often some kilometres distant from them.

The same remarks apply to churches, which, in Ethiopia, are often merely tukula surmounted by a cross.

3. Alleged Use of Gas.

The statements in the Ethiopian note contained many falsehoods. I would refer to my note of May 11th, 1936, but may at the same time point out, as an illustration of the reliability of those statements, that:

Complaint was made of the bombing of Makale with asphyxiating gas on December 31st, 1935, and January 21st, 1936, at which times the town was in the possession of the Italian troops, having been occupied since November 6th, 1935;

Complaint was made of the transport of gas by the s.s. MELLINI, a ship which, according to information received, was used exclusively for the transport of troops, and therefore could not carry explosives, for which special equipment is necessary.

Complaint was also made of the transport of gas by the s.s. NADDA, which was alleged to have passed through the Suez Canal on January 19th, 1936, whereas it has been ascertained that the vessel in question sailed on her first voyage to East Africa from Naples on February 27th, 1936, carrying nothing but motor-vehicles and foodstuffs.

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

A) Bombing of Red Cross Hospitals and Ambulances:

See Appendix I.

B) Bombing of undefended places:

See Appendix II.

C) Use of poisonous gases:

See Appendix III.

D) Destruction of Churches:

See Appendix IV.

NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

Badoglio was Commander in Chief of all Italian forces in East Africa. His relations to Mussolini are illustrated by himself in his book "La Guerra d'Etiopia". See Appendix V under 1). His relations to Graziani, the Commander on the Southern Front may be inferred from an extract from "Con Badoglio in Etiopia" by General Quirino Armellini, see Appendix V under 2).

As to the use of gas, there is an official statement from the Southern Front, see Appendix V under 3). The bombing of the Red Cross and of undefended places were so persistent that the High Command and the Command in Somalia cannot possibly deny that such actions were a method of warfare ordered or at least approved by them. The same applies to the destruction of churches on the Northern Front.

b) The probable defence.

Here is referred to the above quoted Analysis by the Committee of Jurists, Part V: "Italian answers to Ethiopian allegations" (League of Nations Journal, April 1936, page 372) and to Part 3 of a Memorandum of the Italian Red Cross (see Appendix VI), containing in a condensed form the Italian observations in the matter.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete, but the collecting of evidence, especially in the form of affidavits, continues.

Possibly even other charges may be brought against the accused.



7879/E/96/2

0515

GRAZIANI

Date Submitted Decision of Committee I

4 MAR 1948

A on counts
I, III, VII, VIII, XIII,
XVIII, XX, XXVI,
XXIII.

R.2W LIST 80

7879/E/96/2

(For the Use of the Secretariat)

0516

Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

7879/E/IC/2

16 FEB 48

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

ETHIOPIAN CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 2 A-C * (of 2 B)

<p>Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position. <i>(Not to be translated.)</i></p>	<p>GRAZIANI, Rodolfo Marshal of Italy (General) Commander of the Forces in Somalia. (In Italian: Maresciallo d'Italia. - Generale - Comandante delle Forze della Somalia.)</p>
<p>Date and place of commission of alleged crime.</p>	<p>During the Italian invasion of Ethiopia October 1935 - May 1936. A number of places on the Southern Front.</p>
<p>Number and description of crime in war crimes list. References to relevant provisions of national law.</p>	<p>A) XXIII. Deliberate bombardment of hospitals. B) XIX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places. C) XVI. Use of delsterious and asphyxiating gases. Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930). Third part Chapters 12 and 5. Fourth part Chapter 6. Preface Articles 11 and 12.</p>

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

- A) Bombing of Red Cross Hospitals and Ambulances on nine different occasions from December 15th, 1935, to March 29th, 1936, inclusive.
- B) Bombing of a number of undefended places from February 5th, 1936, to March 29th, 1936, inclusive.
- C) Use of poisonous gases against troops and civilians from December 30th, 1935, onwards, increased from March 1936 onwards.

TRANSMITTED BY The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (in the Ministry of Justice, Addis Ababa)

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the accusing State.

(29855) W.P.252 4 5,000 545 A. & E. W. Ltd. GP.685
(30119) W.P. 1183 17 5,000 1045

Director General of the Ministry of Justice

(For the Use of the Secretariat)

0516

Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

7879/E/IC/2

16 FEB 1948

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

ETHIOPIAN CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 2 A-C * (of 2 D)

<p>Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position. (Not to be translated.)</p>	<p>GRAZIANI, Rodolfo Marshal of Italy (General) Commander of the Forces in Somalia. (In Italian: Maresciallo d'Italia. - Generale - Comandante delle Forze della Somalia.)</p>
<p>Date and place of commission of alleged crime.</p>	<p>During the Italian invasion of Ethiopia. October 1935 - May 1936. A number of places on the Southern Front.</p>
<p>Number and description of crime in war crimes list. References to relevant provisions of national law.</p>	<p>A) XXIII. Deliberate bombardment of hospitals. B) XIX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places. C) XXVI. Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases. Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930). Third part Chapters 12 and 5. Fourth part Chapter 6. Preface Articles 11 and 12.</p>

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

- A) Bombing of Red Cross hospitals and Ambulances on nine different occasions from December 15th, 1935, to March 29th, 1936, inclusive.
- B) Bombing of a number of undefended places from February 9th, 1936, to March 29th, 1936, inclusive.
- C) Use of poisonous gases against troops and civilians from December 30th 1935, onwards, increased from March 1936 onwards.

TRANSMITTED BY The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (in the Ministry of Justice, Addis Ababa)

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the accused State.

(29655) W.P.2524 5,000 5/45 A.S.E. W.Ltd. GP.685
(30449) W.P.1183 17 5,000 10/45

Director General of the Ministry of Justice

PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

See Case No. 1 (Badoglio) A-C, the incidents on the Southern Front.

See Case No. 1 (Badoglio) A-C, evidence of incidents on the
Southern Front.

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

Page 3

0518

NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision ; (b) the probable defence ; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

See Case No. 1 (Daño lio).



(For the Use of the Secretariat)

0520

Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

7879/E/IC/2

10 FEB 1950

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

ETHIOPIAN CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 2 D * (of 2 A-C)

<p>Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position. (Not to be translated.)</p>	<p>GRAZIANI, Rodolfo Marshal of Italy Governor General and Vice-Roy of Ethiopia (In Italian: Maresciallo d'Italia, Governatore Generale e Vice Re d'Etiopia.)</p>
<p>Date and place of commission of alleged crime.</p>	<p>During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, the time of Graziani's governorship, viz. 20th May 1936-26th December 1937, inclusive. A great number of places all over Ethiopia. Concentration camps outside Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Number and description of crime in war crimes list. References to relevant provisions of national law.</p>	<p>I, III, VII, VIII, XII, XIII, XIV, XV, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXVI, XXIX. Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930). Third part Chapters 5, 7 and 12. Fourth part Chapters 1, 2 and 6. Preface Articles 11 and 12.</p>

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Systematic terrorism during Graziani's governorship involving crimes of many kinds, e.g. murder and massacres, plundering and burning of whole districts, frequent use of gas, relentless killing of captured patriots, deportations to concentration camps.

TRANSMITTED BY The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (in the Ministry of Justice, Addis Ababa)

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the accusing State.
(29655) W.P.2524 5,000 5.45 A. & E. W. Ltd. GP.655
(30449) W.P.1183.17 5,000 10.45

Director General of the Ministry of Justice

PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

- I. Murder and massacres - systematic terrorism.
- 1) Summary execution of captured or surrendered patriots. This policy was consistently adopted during Graziani's governorship.
 - 2) The killing of native populations in connection with the pillaging and destruction of whole districts.
 - 3) The putting to death of thousands of persons, the plundering and burning which took place in Addis Ababa on the day of the attempt on Graziani (February 1941, 1937) and the two following days, and the repression which followed in the country (the so-called Graziani-massacre).
 - 4) The killing in May 1937 of all monks and members of the monastery at Debra Libanos and the plundering of the monastery.
- III. Torture of civilians.
Torture was often used at examinations in police stations and in prisons.
- VII. Deportation of civilians.
Frequent and wanton deportations of civilians to camps in Italian Somalia (Danane), Eritrea (Nocra) and Italy (Asinara).
- VIII. Internment of civilians under inhuman conditions.
Many camps and prisons inside and outside Ethiopia were used for internment of civilians, who there suffered from bad nutrition and unhealthy hygienic conditions and other forms of ill-treatment.
- XII. Attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory.
The Italians aimed at the complete elimination of educated Ethiopians especially the destruction of the Amharic elements.
- XIII. Pillage.
See under I. 2), 3) and 4).
- XIV. Confiscation of property.
- XV. Exaction of ill-treatments or of exorbitant contributions and requisitions.
Land, houses, cattle etc. were frequently seized or requisitioned without proper compensation.
- XVII. Imposition of collective penalties.
See under I 2), 3) and 4).
- XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
In connection with operations against patriot forces reprisals were carried out by destroying in vast regions whole villages and other inhabited places (see also under I 2) and 3)).
- XIX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.
Air bombardments were carried out on a large scale and designed also intentionally, places containing no military objectives.
- XX. Wanton destruction of religious buildings.
When destroying villages and whole districts the Italians usually did not spare churches and monasteries.
- XXVI. Use of collective as an executing agent.
This was frequently used in the occupied territory.
- XXIX. Ill-treatment of wounded and prisoners of war.
See under I 1) and VIII.

(GRAZIANI 2 D)

0522 APPENDICES.

a) Il 1^o Anno dell'Impero
 published by:
 Governo Generale A.O.I.
 Stato Maggiore
 Allegati al 1^o Volume
 Pages 21-22

Heading
 (in Italian)

ESERCIZIO IN PARTENZA

X

Mittente: S.E. Comandante T.A. - Giggiga.
 Destinatari: S.E. Ministro Colonie - S.M. Badoglio.
 Data di presentazione: 14 maggio 1936 - XIV.

Text
 (translated
 into Italian)

6501 6502 May 14th at 21 hours. Yesterday afternoon our native company working on the road Giggiga-Harer at 34 kms from Giggiga was attacked by groups of armed Abyssinians. The attackers were driven back with serious losses and six prisoners. Our losses six killed and 12 wounded all natives. Through my message spread everywhere by means of aircraft and by messengers I have told Ethiopian chiefs and privates that after the fall of the Empire of Haile Selassie, those who dared to commit hostile actions against our troops would be considered as rebels and treated as such, while I guaranteed immunity to those who have surrendered, so I have given orders that the prisoners taken shall be shot immediately. Of this I have notified chiefs and soldiers who have not yet submitted by means of another appropriate message which will be spread by aircraft and messengers. And I have warned them that this fate will befall without mercy all those who hereafter in any way commit actions of rebellion. Arms hitherto sequestered at Harar 1.500 rifles, 11 machine guns of various type, 5 guns of various calibre, considerable quantity of munitions. In the Dire Dawa zone raids operated by armed Abyssinian groups continue harming the populations.

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

b)

Heading
 (in Italian)

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
 GABINETTO UFFICIO

ASSEGNAZIONE

S.E. GRAZIANI

Da Roma il 5 giugno 1936 XIV Ore 14.15
 Ricevuto il 6 giugno 1936 XIV Ore 2.45

URGENTE

S.E. GRAZIANI

ADDIS ABEBA

Text
 (translated
 into English)

6496 /./ All the rebels who are taken prisoners
 shall be shot /./

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

0524

Heading
(in Italian)

c) GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO-UFFICIO GIURA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO

Ufficio Mittente: GABINETTO
N. 5046 di prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente
Addis Abeba li 18 ott. 1936 - XIV
Indicazioni di Urgenza

TELEGRAMMA DI MANTENENZA STATO

Copia per conoscenza: S.S.V. Gov. Gener. Com. Sup. Aviazione
Stato Maggiore Governatorato AA Dir. Sup. A.S.I.
Uff. Politico Uff. Informazioni Uff. Gius. Militare
Com. Sup. CC. RR.

- S.S. Governatore ----- Asmara
- S.S. Governatore ----- Gondar
- S.S. Governatore ----- Harar
- S.S. Governatore ----- Mogadiscio
- S.S. Governatore ----- Aghbrevatium
- Comando Settore Nord Orientale ----- Debra Brehan
- Comando Settore Occidentale ----- Ambo'
- Comando Settore Occidentale per Ovia
- Comando Piazza di ----- Addis Abeba (a mano)

Text
(translated
into English)

21/21 Cabinet // I communicate for the information the following telegram sent today to the commander of the sector west of the railway // Quote // "Lieutenant CC RR Garcia (Boggio) wires as follows // quote // "I ask you to inform me if natives proved to be rebels and having taken part in the new serious attempts against the railway are to be shot" // Unquote // I repeat to V.S. and those under you the strict orders from the Duce, many times stressed by me that all those responsible in any way of revolt under whatever forms are to be shot immediately // If they continue to expose uncertainty and reserve I shall give orders of immediate repatriation of the commanders responsible // It is time to put an end to all kinds of weakness, when our Italian soldiers continue to be barbarously tortured // From now on I order reports to be sent to me from time to time about those shot // This telegram given for information to M.S. The Minister of Colonies presented here and transmitted for information to Rome // Office of Military Justice informed // " Unquote //

Signature

M. A. S. I. A. I.

J.c.c.
12 CABO DI GABINETTO
A. Mazi

d)

Heads
(in addition)

REVISED THE ...

...

Ufficio Mittente: ...

N.2/25 (1) di prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente.
Addis Abeba li 3 marzo 1937 N°

Indicazioni di urgenza: ...

...

Copia per conoscenza: S.M. Gov. Gen. UFF. Giust. Mil.
Sig. Capo S.M. UFF. Politico
Dir. Sup. A.C.I. Com. Sup. C.C.M.

S.M. ...

Text
(translated
into English)

11077 Cabinet // As mine 10/25 I communicate the full text from H.S. Nasi of the 2nd instant with which he has given directions to the dependent commands about the treatment of rebels captured in fighting or presenting themselves leaving rebel formations // I fully approve the directions in question // Quote // H.S. the Viceroy has demanded absolute rigorous observance of the directions of the Duce for the treatment of the rebels // Consequently I give you orders to shoot all // I say all // rebels notables, chiefs, simple men, either captured in action or presented, leaving their formations or isolated fugitives or cunning elements hiding among the local populations or who even though they have not taken active part in the revolt yet are suspected of bad faith or guilty of favouring rebels in a concrete way or only intentionally or if they hide arms // Women are of course excluded // except in particular cases // and children // The commanders addressed will give necessary directions to dependent commands and proceed meanwhile to execute elements captured hitherto or who are found in conditions exposed by me above // In particular // I allude // regarding the Subeddu column // to the nobles or former members of rank in the regular troops // about those the farouquier from Colonel Mario // As to Colonel Santini and Colonel Lorenzo // the immediate application of the present orders regarding particularly rebel elements fleeing from the front of the rebels // Commanders addressed will give no hesitating assurances with the word "shot" // and communicate to me as soon as possible measures taken and which they will take later time in accordance with these orders // In addition please consult // It is evident that the application of these orders is due to commanders of columns and detachments and sectors and sectors and garrisons and not // I say not // be left to single individuals // The command of the above forces in question is to give due directives also to the military commanders of the various dependencies and ... // Unquote //

...

A.C.I.
...

a)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'A.S.I.
 CABINETTO UFFICIO CIMA
 TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
 N. 8073 di prot. Uff. Mittente
 Ufficio Mittente: Gabinetto.
 Addis Abeba 11 Dicembre 1936 XV
 Indicazione di Urgenza: M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE M.P.A.
 GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.E.V. Gov. Gen. Sig. Capo di S.A.
 S.E. Liotta Governator. AA.
 Dir. Sup. A.C.P. Uff. Politico
 Uff. Informaz. Com. Pusteria
 Com. Piazza AA. Uff. Giust. Milit.
 Com. Sup. C.C. RR. Intendenza ACI.

S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE ROMA

Text
(translated
into English)

31306 Cabinet // Following mine 31305 I communicate the following wire to-day from His Excellency Pirzio Biroli // Quote // With lively satisfaction I report that after 4 months of intense uninterrupted efforts by my troops on the 10th at 19 hours the Uollo band Captain Farello managed after a day of difficult siege to capture in the caves over Tacasse valley degiac Onduossen who was shot at 21.30 hours the same day // Captain Farello is at work arresting and disarming the suite of the Degiac // Abuna Isaac who had been reported to be with the Degiac turns out not to have been in his company // Further reports later on // Unquote // I think that execution was the best solution // I hope I shall be able in a few days to announce definitely the position of the remaining two sons of Ras Cassa // Operations to that end are as is well-known already in progress //

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

p.c.c.
 IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
 A. Mazzi

STAMP

b) Extract from

"Affidavit No. 4

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Lij Haile Mariam Gazmu, age: 45 years, profession: employee at the Ministry of Finance, address: Duke of Harrar Road, Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

1) In the month of Miyazia, 1928, (E.C.) after the Italians occupied Addis Ababa, I stayed with the sons of Ras Kassa, Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa and Dedjazmatch Assfao Wossen Kassa for 9 months under their commands. Then in the same year in the month of Talisas the Italian armies marched towards Fitcha from all directions in a pincer movement, an army under general Trachia from Dabre Birahan, an army under general Belli and Ras Haile from Ambo and an army under colonel Sarelli from Addis Ababa. During these happenings I surrendered myself to General Trachia in a place called

0527

Wobari. The very day I submitted myself to the general, a messenger of Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa, called Tadese Chinkilo brought a message from Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa to General Trachia, and the content of the message was as follows:

'To the Commanding Officer of the Italian Armies, coming from Debrabrahan front.

I have already communicated with Graziani to comply with all formalities of surrendering. As the armies which are coming towards us with you are burning the houses and plundering the cattle and property of peaceful countrymen whom I look after and as my countrymen may try to defend their property and life so may defect my peacefulness, I respectfully draw your attention to stay all these actions of killing people and burning the houses of countrymen without motive.

Abara Kassa (signed)'

2) The messenger returned back without receiving reply for the message. The armies camped in the country where I was appointed by countrymen to look after. Then the General kept me in their camp from going home, and sent me to Dedjazmatch with the following message:

'To Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa.

I was glad to see from a message sent by you about your concluding an agreement with Graziani. If you are really a peaceful man assemble your soldiers on Fitché and receive in a peaceful parade and if you comply with this, I assure you on behalf of my Government, that your life will be saved.'

Thinking that this letter will be a hope for him to be safe, so I took the letter and gave to Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa while he was in Fitché in Dedjazmatch Wandirad's house covertly. He read the letter, and after making agreement with his nobles in reply he wrote the following letter:

'To General Trachia.

As you have assured me of our salvation in your letter to me, we will assemble our armies and will receive you by peaceful parade in a place called Bidigon.

Abara Kassa (signed)''

I took this letter and gave it to General Trachia while he was camping in a place called Shankurt.

Then the very day, the army which was coming with Ras Hailu, from Ambo came over Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa's camp and he was obliged to retreat to the warmer part of the country and so in the morning next day he was not present to meet General Trachia at the appointed place Bidigon. Nevertheless to continue their contemplation to conclude agreement they communicated with Ras Hailu, and the latter sent them one of his personal representatives, called Mitaurari Tafere to receive them. Then Ras Hailu himself received them at the outskirts of the town Fitché and then they were brought to the camp where General Trachia was camping. When they arrived there, the General came out of his tent and received them, after which he took them to his tent and offered them chair to sit on. After this he ordered them coffee and went outside without reproaching them.

Just immediately Italian carabinieri came and took them away. The people who came with them were also encompassed by Italian soldiers and disarmed. Then they were taken to the big hall in the town and were released the next morning. //

We thought that they took Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa and Dedjazmatch Assfao Wassan Kassa to other part for safe custody. But in the evening at about 7 o'clock, we heard shots being fired in the center of the town, when we asked the motive, we heard the news about their death. //

The population of the town were agitated and felt uneasy the whole night about such atrocious and cruel act.

In the morning I went to General Trachia's camp and stood in far distance from it. Then the General called me and asked me if I was sorry about last night's act. I said: 'You are a General and perhaps you know better than I do about the interest of your Government. Is this the way your Government respects its words? In my opinion you will have to correct your mistakes which you have done to-day for many centuries to come.' Then he said: 'What shall I do? Graziani ordered me to do so by this telegram', and so he showed me a telegram, written in cipher of which I did not know the content.

After this I requested him if they may show us the corps from where they have been thrown, so that we shall bury them in the church. In reply to my request he allowed us by saying that 'without crying and making noises you may bury them', and so we buried both corpses in St. George's cathedral. x e

Signature: Haile Mariam Gazmu

Sworn before me on this the 3rd day of September, 1947.

Tadesse Mengasha (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia."

c)

Reading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'A.O.I. TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Cabinetto-Ufficio Cifra Ufficio Mittente:
n. 3634 di prot. UFF. Mitt. Cabinetto

Addis Abeba, 21 December 1936 XV

Indicazioni di Urgenza: M.P.A. SU TUTTI I M.P.A. SUDANESI
TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.V.V. Gov. Gen. Uff. Informazioni
Stato Maggiore Com. Div. Fusteria
Superaereo Com. Piazza AA.
Governatorato AA. Uff. Giust. Militar.
Dir. Sup. A.O.P. Intendenza A.O.I.
Uff. Politico Com. Sup. CC. RR.

S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE ROMA

Text
(translated
into English)

3311 Cabinet // In to-day's action the brothers Averra and Asfaossen Cassa have been captured // In obedience to my orders they were shot at dusk on the piazza at Mecca // Salala situation liquidated //

Signature

M A R I A M I

STAMP

p.c.c.
IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
A. Marzi

0529

d)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA

Heading
(in Italian)

Text
(translated
into English)

The Governor General Vice Roy of Ethiopia
a u t h o r i z e s

the Supreme Direction of Political Affairs to the
General Government of Italian East Africa to give to
Lieutenant Alborini Cesare of the Headquarters the
amount of 10.000 (ten thousand) S.P. thalers, as a
prize for the capturing and killing of the two rebel
chiefs Deino Merid and Gabrevarian.

Addis Ababa 20 giugno 1937-XV

IL GOVERNO GENERALE
VICE RE D'ETIOPIA

Graziani (signed)

Signature

e)

EXTRACT.

Il I° Anno dell'Impero
published by
Governo Generale A.O.I.
Stato Maggiore
Volume II° Testo

Page 267.

(Translation)

Banda Tucci - Capture of Ras Desta.

At dawn on the 24th ras Desta's den was surrounded.
After short fighting the ras renounced from any further
resistance and surrendered asking for mercy.

Towards the end of the day he was shot.

The news was rapidly spread in all the Empire by
means of the following telegram:

24th February, 1937-XV.

"9618 Staraggiore. After ignoble attempt on the
19th divine justice has visibly announced its con-
demnation salting one of the chiefs still rebels.
After Shimellis also Beyene Merid and then Gabre-
varian have fallen; to-day ras Desta was captured
and killed by colonn Tucci. Give maximum diffusion."

0530

a)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO-UFFICIO CIPRA

TELEGRAMMA A MANO

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO

Ufficio Mittente GABINETTO

N. 610 di prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente.

Addis Abeba li 25 giugno 1936-XIV

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Per conoscenza:	Segr. Gener.	Uff. Politico
	Com. Super.	Com. Superiore CS.M.
	Forz. Arm.	Uff. Informaz.
	A.S.I.	Avvocato
	Dir. Sup.	Militare
	Aff. Civ. Pol.	
	Com. Milit.	
	dello Scioa	

AL CO. ANDANTE MILITARE DELLO SCIOA ADDIS ABEBA

Text
(translated
into English)

610 Cabinet // Re yours 840/24 // I order that 35 rebels captured by a platoon of blackshirts shall be shot immediately according to peremptory orders from the Duce // I ask you for confirmation to allow me in my turn to report to Rome // This is the first terrifying example which ought to be set in order to preserve the absolute integrity of the railway // About Basciai Uoldeidames who has come for submission I ask you to present him to the political office of this General Governatorate //

tc
te

Signature

E H A Z I A N I

p.c.c.
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
(Maggiore Alberto Mazzi)
A. Mazzi (signed)

b)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO-UFFICIO CIPRA

STAMP

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO

Ufficio Mittente: Gabinetto

Addis Abeba li 25 ottobre 1936
-XIV

Indicazioni di Urgenza M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE M.P.A. GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza:	S.E.V. Gov. Gen.	Uff. Informazioni
	Com. Sup. Aviazione	Com. Piazza A.A.
	Stato Maggiore	Uff. Giust. Milit.
	Governatorato A.A.	V. Com. Posteria
	Dir. Sup. A.C.P.	Com. Sup. CC.RR.
	Ufficio Politico	

SEGNORIO GABINETTO ROMA

per conoscenza:
S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE ROSSADISSIO (via Aerea)

Text
(translated
into English)

22719 cabinet // General Tracchia sends the following telegram dated 24th instant // quote // Debra Sina // Major Angelini with the 10th company who carried out reconnaissance North of the Farabber zone met rebel group

0531

which fled leaving two killed and an uncontrolled number of wounded // Captured 40 cattle // On our part no losses // Motorized column which was to have reached Debra Brehan yesterday is still at Tarnaber because of yesterday's rain // Debra Brehan // This morning the repentful traitor Locria presented himself with his son Mogossie and his nephew Bondie Ater and another 36 very faithful followers // After being examined in the afternoon the rebels and also Lig Beine Azbi and brother Aile with two followers were all shot // In all 43 // The execution produced favourable comments on a very crowded market place // Ancober // Shot the well-known brigand Ghebre Cristos // Sciano // The motorized column with supplies which left Debra Brehan this morning arrived in due order // For information until to-day shot in my sector 504 traitors, brigands, thieves, spies and hiders of arms // Clearing up continues // Unquote // H.E. Minister informed //

Signature

G. M. A. Z. I. A. N. I

p.c.c.
 IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
 A. Mazzi (signed)

c)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
 CABINETTO-UFFICIO CIPRA
 N.29528 TELEGRAMMA DI STATO STAFF

Provenienza Harrar il 23/4/1937 Ore 22.00
 Ricevuto il 23/4/1937 Ore 22.30

Decifrato
 MPA/30 TUTTI LA SPA/

TELEGRAMMA IN ARRIVO

Per conoscenza: Diriz.(ACP) Giust.Milit.
 CC.RR. Off.Politico

GOVERNO GENERALE ADDIS ABEBA

Text
(translated into English)

6403 Political // Re yours 20211 // As Your Excellency knows well 600, I say 600 chiefs and privates were killed in the first times in the Bale who had surrendered at our mercy or had abandoned fitaurari Bahade and had presented themselves for submission // Later on to favour the dissolution of the formations which had passed the Uebi Scebeli with fitaurari Bahade and proceeded eastwards, I asked Your Excellency when I came to Addis Abeba to be authorized to grant the life to those coming for submission // Your Excellency agreed in a line of a maxime and concluded with the word "relativita" // Thus as for fitaurari Bahade I took upon myself to promise security of life if he handed over rifles and the captured airman, according to my telegram 223 March on the 22nd of March which I sent from Aba itself // On the basis of the above mentioned directions I gave orders to commissars and to columns which they published in the middle of the valleys which from Cercer descend to the Scebeli to favour submissions promising security of life and commissars and residents thus had various submitted rebels among whom Mellion who was with his band at Gergertu with 2nd Somali battalion write letters to rebel chiefs // Some letters were even countersigned by our officers // It was due solely to propaganda that 4.000 persons with about 200 chiefs and notables left Bahade and submitted, handing over about 2.000 rifles // I permit myself to stress the importance of the result obtained also for the reason that a great part of those submitted could have reached Somaliland with

Bahade or delivered battle increasing the banditism which might have given us serious troubles and difficulties, especially during the rains // As matters stand the mass shooting of 54 chiefs would have infavourable effects on the efforts for pacifying creating a mistrust in the word of the Government // It may be added that many of those submitted have relatives in the Pellizzari band and in the Ashara battalions // Already where I had all the emigrants put into concentration camp, the rumour was spread that the Government had shot all the chiefs // Residents pointed out to me that at the Cercer that notice created panic and commotion also because leaders who in the name of the Government had promised safety feared the vendetta // For these reasons I beseech Your Excellency to let the Court procedure be carried through, assuring you that it will be very severe and will end with capital punishment for more compromised and dangerous chiefs // Wizards and soothsayers will be shot without trial //

Signature

N A S I

tc
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a)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO-UFFICIO CIMA
n.1056 di prot. Ufficio Mittente: Gabinetto
Addis Abeba, 11 11 luglio 1936
XIV

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Per conoscenza: Segr. Generale S.M. Com.Mil.Scioa
Dirsup. AA.CC.FP. Uff.Giust.Mil.
Ufficio Politico Com.Sup.RM.CC.
Uffic.Inform/ni Com.Aviazione

M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE M.P.A.

S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE ROMA

Text
(translated
into English)

6315 Cabinet // Re mine 6250 // Calm during the night
all the line from Addis Abeba to Hadama // But during
the night rebels have destroyed the water conduit Hausc
that supplies Hadama with water where consequently there
is actually a severe shortage // I have given immediate
orders to General Gallina in the matter in order to have
the conduit repaired // Anyhow the line Hadama-Haoash
was yesterday practicable and I think this may be a way
of supply if the reparation of the water conduit should
be delayed // General Gallina to whom I transmitted
the complete directives of H.E. Chief of Government 8103
has proceeded to set fire to all native houses encountered
on his direct march from Akaki to Hadama moreover shooting
all rebels captured and spreading terror in the zone //

Signature

B A B I A N I

p.e.c.
IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
Magg.inserv. S.M.
A. Mazz

STAMP

b)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO-UFFICIO CIMA
n.5782 di prot.dell'Ufficio Mittente
TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Ufficio Mittente: Gabinetto
Addis Abeba 11 2 Novembre 1936-XV
Indicazioni di Urgenza M.P.A.

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.E.V.Gov.Gen. Stato Maggiore
Com.Sup.Aviat. Governatorato AA.
Uff.Politico Uff.Informazioni
Com.Piazza A.A. Uff.Giust.Milit.
V.Com.Pusteria Com.Sup.CC.RR.

COLONIE - GABINETTO ROMA

per conoscenza:
S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE SOGADICIC - V.Aerea

Text
(translated
into English)

23940 Cabinet // Following mine 23087 // The columns
of General Mariotti and Major Lanuti marching different
ways on the 25th October last set north of Mount
Deboocio without meeting any resistance except some
shots fired by some armed men left to guard the cattle //

The report of the... towards the... side and I went to... while I was... from I saw... longed -... for... and two... and...

I, the... the... of... and... the... of... and...

SECRET NO. 1

EMERGENCY FROM
(c)

SECRET

Signature

between the... of our troops... take steps to prevent... of the... to... I inform you that... of the... to... what are the... of our... of 500... who opposed the... all... with... and... at a place... near... about the... and of... on the 8th... this... of Government orders

Next
(translated
into English)

GENERAL... ADDIS ABABA
CAFFRANO... IN...
DROBIVATO

Per conoscenza: St. Capo Stata. S.B. Piana Uff. Politico
Uff. Informaz. Dir. Sup. A.C.F.P.

PREVENTIVA COLONIA GELATO 11 DICEMBRE ORE 00.10 1956
RICEVUTO 11 DICEMBRE ORE 03.30
INTEGRAZIONE CABINETTO

Heading
(in Italian)

(c)

IN... A. HAZZI

Signature

The village of... more than... 100 natives... of the cattle... and 100... the Minister... informed

Appendix D. 1 0521

the older people came to me and said; 'Do not fight otherwise you will be the cause of ruin'. Then I left that place and went to the mountain called Medezait and camped there. In the evening I went down searching for my brothers and son. I found all the villages burnt down and almost all the people were killed. Some of the remaining people were mutilated - females their breasts and also their copulatory organs were cut. They beg of me water on their way to death.

Immediately afterwards I found my son and asked him about my brothers. He told me that Lidj Ababa was fighting but he did not know whether he is alive or dead. Then I met one of the injured countrymen who told me that Lidj Ababa is safe and had left just now; Tilahun Shankut has been captured and Inaxu Shankut was fighting with the enemy but he did not think that he was alive. Later on I also learnt that he was dead. One brother, Tilahun Shankut, who was captured came with our captured cattle after three days. In 1929 I passed the whole month of Sane x) in that country helping the injured countrymen by taking them to the cave and providing them with water and by collecting the skeletons of those who were killed. I cannot tell you in detail all about that massacre which took place, but I think approximately 6,000 people were killed. Some of them who are alive cannot keep their urine and some cannot work due to the loss of their hands. You can get the exact number of the people who were killed in the massacre from the Governor General of the country. The area over which the massacre took place and where the burning and destroying was performed, was quite a big area - in Manth from Kadila to the end of Marabeta, in Girru from Arwish to Insarow. I think the length of the area is approximately 150 kilometres. I have been told that the Italians were under command of General Maletti on the northern side and General Nasi on my side.

Signature: Teshome Shankut

Sworn before me on this the 17th day of August, 1947.

Tadesse Mangosha (signed)-
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.

x) Note: Sane 1929 Ethiopian Calendar = June 1937."

e)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 6.

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Lidj Abebe Shankut,
age: 40 years, profession: Governor of Ambo,
address: Ambo, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

2) Then the above mentioned patriots retreated towards Gansabarot. But we resisted against the enemy moving through our own country desert. Ginbut 1929 we moved through Madabagi to Girru. Sane 2nd, 1929, x) while we were camping in Madabagi, in a place called

x) Note: Sane 1929 Ethiopian Calendar = June 1937.

Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.
Tadesso Haugessa (signed)

Sworn before me on this the 6th day of September, 1947.

Signature: Yeebo Shantant

In my opinion I think not less than 7,000 people were killed in this accident. It is necessary to know the exact amount of properties plundered and the number of people killed one can find it from the countrymen. Even now there are many people who are mutilated because of mutilation, and there are also many people including children, who are made to keep their urine. I was told later on the name of the Italian commander who was responsible for these atrocities. He was General Gullina.

Whatever up to garden in given from Asplah up to Inaaro. These atrocities took place in Karabet from house standing and plundered all the properties and the houses of the countrymen, without leaving a single they cut his delicate sexual organ. They also burned all take out the concealed baby and if the creature was male used to operate the stomach of pregnant females and sexual organ and female her breast. Worse than this they weapons as "Pan-a" and mutilated male his delicate these Italian soldiers chopped the people with cutting. Then after all the countrymen were assembled together, so that the ones who were not present might be assembled. people to shout hilariously to show their merryments when the Italian army arrives there they instructed the were waiting ready to welcome them peacefully. Especially the Italians were coming only for inspection, so they But the countrymen have been provisionally told that

about 1 and 1/2 Waddemaw, Genna Tachome went for hunt with two servants. There we saw Italian troops and Galla tribesmen in many columns, the field full, on horse-backs marching towards the country where we were. Then as the countrymen were busy threshing and gathering their crops I wanted them to shout as far as my voice could reach, saying that an army was marching towards them.

a)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 1.

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Dedjazmatch Tesario
Gilashi, age: 31 years, profession: Pensioned Chief-Archivist,
address: Via Napoli No.37, Asmara, do hereby take oath and
say as follows:

5. I was present on the 19th of February, 1937, when
Graziani intended to distribute alms at the Palace, at 6
o'clock in the morning I went there with Dedjazmatch Haile
Selassie Gussa. The first man I saw was Major Palavecino and I
introduced Haile Selassie Gussa to him.

Palavecino told me to take Haile Selassie Gussa to
Borciano, an Italian official interpreter who was supposed to
introduce Haile Selassie Gussa to Graziani, to whom Haile
Selassie Gussa should present his compliments. After the
introducing had taken place I was tired, I saw the people
outside the Palace who should receive the alms, but I went
with a friend Kidanem Abraham and Doctor Picoveri to another
corner of the Palace.

We were talking something about Eritrea as, all of
the sudden, we heard an explosion. This must have been shortly
after 1 p.m. as we had just seen the planes leave, which used
to leave at 1 o'clock. When we heard that explosion we thought
it was a shot from a gun and we thought that the celebration
was over and went towards that place. We noticed that there
was a big disorder, because some people were rushing towards
the Palace and some were rushing to come outside the Palace
compound. My chief, Conte de la Porta ordered me to retire
with some Ethiopian priests and we tried to reach the Northern
gate but when we arrived there Italian soldiers were posted
there and they stopped us. The Italian soldiers told us that
they had order to shoot any Ethiopian who tried to come out
through that gate so I had to return with the priests and I
locked them in the cellar under some offices close to there and
I also ordered some orderlies to take protection there and
took myself position at the side of an Italian soldier above.
Then there came soldiers with arms and handgranades searching
for Ethiopians in all buildings. The priests and the orderlies
were hidden and as regards myself the soldier explained that
this is an Eritrean and he has come on duty and he shall not
be harmed.

When I took care of the priests, I had heard shooting
outside the Palace building. Cars going here and there, people
running, machinegunning, it was a big disorder. Ethiopians
running from Italians, Italians running from Ethiopians. The
Italians apparently suspected that the rebels had come to the
city. It had been said before that Ras Deala would menace the
city and that the Ethiopian patriots would come and kill every
Italian.

I stayed at the Palace till four o'clock. At four
o'clock some "ascaris" came and took me to the Gibi. At the
Gibi Conte de la Porta came with Capitano Bechis. I then took
the priests by command from the cellar to a big room in the
Palace. At that time all the notables were grouped in that
room. It was an order issued now that any one who came outside
the Palace without a written permit was to be shot. Before the
attempt on Graziani there was a standing official order between
the Italians that if some rebels came to the city, every
Ethiopian must stay inside his house if he was found circulating
in the streets, he should be shot.

0538

De la Porta and Pechis took me in a car and I went with them to the seat of the Fascists, to their office, because de la Porta who was a fascist had received an order to go there. There we met the secretario federale Guido Cortese, a good number of fascists were present. Cortese spoke to them, saying: 'Comrades, it is to-day the day in which we should show our devotion to our Vice Roy by reacting and destroying the Ethiopians within three days. Within three days I give you carta bianca to destroy and kill and do what you want to the Ethiopians.'

They went out well equipped with their arms, and started their work. People who were not arrested by the carabinieri and were found in their houses or in the streets were killed. I went together with de la Porta and Avolio, director superior of political affairs of all East Africa, in a car and I saw with my own eyes burning houses, I heard the Italians cry 'civiltà italiana'. I have seen young boys coming out from burning houses, but the Italians pushed them back into the fire. Then we went to the Western side of the City to the Hapte Guiorguis Bridge. Up to that bridge we had seen them destroying houses, killing people. Then on the Western side not a single house was burnt. The American Legation had assembled all their neighbours in their compound. One Mareshallo from the carabinieri (who did not like the order from Cortese) stopped us at the bridge saying 'I do not want any help from the blackshirts, I will do this myself.' From there we went to the ex-Belgium Legation where Avolio was living, and then to de la Porta's house at the end of the street called Duke of Harrar Street. On this trip we saw that they were burning houses. To recollect everything is difficult because I had nearly lost my senses when seeing what was going on.

The next day, Saturday, the Italians were still burning houses (small houses). On the bigger houses they wrote down their names to keep for themselves. They broke the doors and went in looting. They could not find a single man to kill, the ones who were not killed were arrested or had run away. They said it is "hygenic" to destroy small houses so they went on destroying. During the day I could not go out but during the night I went out with de la Porta in a car. At about 6.30 p.m. on Saturday we saw the flames from the petrol when they tried to put St. George Cathedral on fire. The windows broke from the heat, but the building resisted.

The next day, Sunday, they tried to bomb the cathedral. An order was given for a special plane to bomb the cathedral, but the same day in the evening an order was given from Graziani to stop everything and this order was not carried out. Graziani sent a note saying: 'By the grace of God I am feeling well. Stop the hostilities.'

On Friday evening I was called to the Palace to the President of the Military Court, General Olivieri to act as interpreter. People who were brought before that court were shot, afterwards I know of 12. One asked me what I thought of the attempt against Graziani and I said, this is something which has been done by some persons but is not a conspiracy of the people and because of that you ought not to punish the people en masse. This I said to Carlo Avolio and Gerardo de la Porta.

When I was called as an interpreter to General Olivieri he started to ask me of the prisoners, Mesfin Salema was the first one he asked and he said that he had been taken to the Legation of Ethiopia, saying that the British Legation could have a representative at 10 a.m. and he said that he would go to the Legation. Olivieri then asked me if I knew anything about the 12th of October. I said that I did not know anything about it. He then said: 'I have some questions to ask you about the 12th of October. Did you see anything about the Graziani attempt, if you saw anything about it, please tell me what you saw.' I said that I did not see anything about it.

Hardly a single Ethiopian escaped alive from the courtyard. The general massacre there was particularly senseless and revolting, for the people who were a crowd of aged and feeble, blind and crippled beggars and poor mothers of little children. The blackbirds ran through the courtyard, seeking any Ethiopians still alive, and shooting any still breathing.

A moment of silence followed, which lasted until the Italian realized that no more bombs were to be feared. Then the shooting was started by Correse, who fired with his revolver into the group of Ethiopian dignitaries. The Italian carabinieri followed the example. In a few moments there were more than 300 dead in the courtyard and around the palace alone.

In the beginning the Ethiopian people behaved quietly, hiding their outraged feelings as best they could. Then suddenly bombs were thrown towards the table at which Graziani was sitting with his lieutenants. At the moment of the explosion he was hiding under the table, while the other Italian officers had flung themselves to the ground. The assassin was an Italian whom the Italians employed as interpreter.

Dr. Ladislav Shaska, Ethiopian War Crimes Commission) made by an Hungarian physician, exact from statement (not yet in the hand of the

b)

Fadessa Langessa (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.

Sworn before me on this the 1st day of July, 1947.

Signature: ROZARIO CILAZZI

Avolio and he in love went on Friday to see Correse who was sitting at the table with his lieutenants. I saw that you were doing, Avolio said to Correse and Correse told Graziani at the moment that Correse went to Graziani and I saw because Correse told Avolio and he told me. We went another time, on Saturday, to see Correse. Both on Friday and on Saturday we wanted to find out what Correse had said, but Correse only answered: 'These men are barbaric and nothing can be done.'

On Friday when Correse was being taken to the hospital, he was taken to the hospital in the morning. The same day on Friday evening he was taken to the hospital. The same day on Friday evening he was taken to the hospital. The same day on Friday evening he was taken to the hospital.

I was reported by Correse that Correse had been taken to the hospital. I was reported by Correse that Correse had been taken to the hospital. I was reported by Correse that Correse had been taken to the hospital.

The work of the committee was to find out who had been taken to the hospital. The work of the committee was to find out who had been taken to the hospital. The work of the committee was to find out who had been taken to the hospital.

Like Likimtu Gabre-As, chairman, Negarus Wodajo Ali, Blatta Ayale Gebre, who became doctor, who became doctor, who became doctor.

a camp. Some Ethiopians were selected to investigate who were responsible for the

0539

0540

The bomb had been thrown at 11 a.m. A few minutes later Blackshirts, Carabinieri and soldiers were running all over the town, ordering every shopkeeper to close his doors, and everyone else abroad to return home. In an hour there were no more people in the streets. Postal and telephonic communications were suspended. In the Palace and the neighbouring streets for within about 400 yards' radius the ground was covered with the dead.

Cortese convoked the Blackshirts to the seat of the Fascio - the chiefs to a consultation, the others to wait for orders. Soon they sped from the Fascio in every direction, fully armed. Everyone in the town was a prey to terrified anticipation, but what really happened was worse than any had feared. I am bound to say, for it is true, that blood was literally streaming down the streets. The corpses of men, women and children, over which vultures hovered, were lying in all directions. Great flames from the burning houses illuminated the Africa night.

The organisation of the massacre was systematic. The stopping of telegraphic and telephonic communication, in order to prevent people from giving any information to Europe, the closing of the shops, and the evacuation of the streets, were precautionary measures, carried out between 11 a.m. and 6 p.m. If the first shooting in the courtyard and around the Palace occurred under the immediate fear and panic spread by the bomb thrown at Graziani, the massacre which started in the night was carefully prepared during seven hours, and cannot thus be excused.

During that awful night, Ethiopians were thrust into lorries, heavily guarded by armed Blackshirts. Revolvers, truncheons, rifles and daggers were used to murder unarmed black people, of both sexes and all ages. Every black person seen was arrested, bundled into a lorry and killed, either in the lorry or near the Emperor's Palace, sometimes even at the moment when he met the Blackshirts. Ethiopian homes were searched and then burnt with their inhabitants inside. To quicken the flame, benzine and oil were used in great quantities. The shooting never ceased all night, but most of the murders were committed with daggers and truncheons. Whole streets were burned down, and if any of the occupants of the houses ran out from the flames they were machine-gunned or stabbed with cries of 'Duce, Duce.' From the lorries in which groups of prisoners were brought up to be murdered near the Palace the blood flowed on to the streets, and again from the lorries we heard the cry, 'Duce, Duce.'

I shall never forget that I saw the Italian officers passing in their luxurious cars through the blood-strewn streets, stopping to smoke, but whence they could have a better view of the carnage than the women, men, and children of the town, who I am very reluctant to call names.

When I went to the Italian hospital, I saw a man lying on the floor, looking out from the window at the scene of horror, sitting in the flames. He heard the cry of 'Duce, Duce,' and knew that each of these cries, each stab of a dagger or firing of a rifle meant another cruel murder.

It was a mass murder of men, women and children, and also an immense slaughtering of animals. Ethiopian heifers were being pushed into a corral, which was a goodly one, but even the animals were being machine-gunned.

The scene was a scene of horror, and the night was a night of horror.

The scene was a scene of horror, and the night was a night of horror.

0541

... I have seen men's heads split open by truncheons so that their brains gushed out; that murder was accompanied by the most horrible mutilation possible to imagine; that murder was accompanied by robbery; that the massacre was so systematic that three places in the town were appointed for the collection of corpses.

If anything can increase the horror of the bloody sight of thousands of dead, it is the feeling that we ourselves are safe, and that those people are not killed because they are enemies fighting with weapon against weapon, but defenceless civilians being murdered, and the knowledge, which I have in the present case, that while the lorries were still collecting the dead bodies from the streets, while the blood was still congealing on the ground, Blackshirts were already running to the Bank of Italy to change the thalers they had stolen in the night from Ethiopian houses and the gold and silver ornaments, from the necks of Ethiopian women they had killed.

No decent man could tell these things without reluctance, to reveal that they were done by white men like himself. But it is my duty to speak; it is my duty to tell that lorries were covered and dripping with blood, that Blackshirts put a stick from behind between the feet of running black men, in order to throw them to the ground, the more easily to murder them. It is my duty to say that I have seen men's heads split open by truncheons so that their brains gushed out; that murder was accompanied by the most horrible mutilation possible to imagine; that murder was accompanied by robbery; that the massacre was so systematic that three places in the town were appointed for the collection of corpses.

Fascists in groups of four or five, heavily armed, again and again attacked a single unarmed Ethiopian. Machine-guns were used even against women. No means of destroying human life was neglected on the night of the 19th of February, 1937.

A second night of massacre followed. I was again in my room. Since the beginning of the massacre I had kept my Ethiopian servant there with me, forbidding him even to show himself at the window, as any sight of him by an Italian might have meant his death. He had a little house beside mine, which was spared on the first night, but burned on the second. He sat during those terrible hours quite speechless, and with his head in his hands. I dared not ask him what he thought.

The killing was done in the night to prevent photographs being taken. If any white person ventured into the streets he was stopped at every corner and searched to see if he had a camera on him. The houses of white people were visited by Italian soldiers, who confiscated cameras.

There was military aviation in the town and these officers were dissatisfied that they had not been able to share the glory of the Blackshirt action on the 19th. So they were ordered to bomb the surroundings the next night, in order that they too should have their part in the massacre.

I have had many Italians in my surgery who told with great pride how many black people they had killed. One of them was very modest, he had killed only two. Others killed, or pretended to have killed eighty or a hundred. I have heard them praising themselves for having stolen four or five hundred thalers in one night. Man-hunting was a much appreciated sport.

The hours of daylight between the first and the second night of the massacre, I shall never forget. We knew already before nightfall that the horror was not at an end; proclamations in Italian appeared in the streets, announcing that more blood would flow: 'Graziani has hitherto shown his good heart to the Ethiopians; to-night he will show them his immense power.'

0542

The second night resembled the first in every way, except for some bombing around the town.

In the days which followed one could see black people meeting in the street, embracing each other and putting a hundred questions. It was a surprise to any Ethiopian in Addis Ababa to know that one or other of his relations or friends was not dead.

The massacre was closed by an incident which I relate, still trembling at the mere thought of it. A venerable Coptic priest had survived the war, the first terrible period of the occupation, and even the massacre of the 19th and 20th of February. He was still alive on the 21st, when the Italians finally stopped killing and robbing, though he was one of the men against whom the Fascist daggers were aimed. When the Italian authorities became aware that he was still alive, Cortese convoked the murderers to the seat of the Fascio. An order was given to Gallini, one of the most able dagger-men, to stab the Coptic prelate. The priest was surprised in a house where some twenty to twenty-five Ethiopians, mostly women, were assembled to offer up a devoted prayer to the One who hears the cry of suffering humanity. While the Prelate was kneeling in prayer, Gallini stabbed him with his dagger from behind, and retired with the satisfaction of one who had done his job.

It was also on the 19th and 20th of February that most of the black intelligentsia perished. These cultured, educated, young Ethiopians, with whom our relations were so friendly before the invasion, had to perish for two reasons; first because their learning and their position assured them a certain influence over their compatriots; secondly, because many of them possessed in their homes objects of value, especially from Europe, which the murderers distributed among themselves.

In a domiciliary search, ostensibly for British hand grenades, a group of Italians entered a humble Ethiopian home near the Makonnen Bridge. Of course they found no hand grenades, but there were thalers, kept for safety in a moneybox and these were confiscated as a trophy of war, victory and civilisation. In the same room they found a picture of the Emperor Haile Selassie. For this symbol the whole family were condemned to death. In a few moments the house was in flames, and with it perished the members of the family locked inside. Their desperate cries were heard, but the Italians did not move from the place till they had ceased; they were anxious that none should escape the fire.

c)

EXHIBIT from

Affidavit No. 31.

(Translation)

1, the undersigned, name: Captain Teka Binegid, age: 35 years old, profession: Commanding Officer of the Fire Brigade, address: Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and declare as follows:

2) I state the following facts of the massacre which took place on the 19th of Yekatit 1942 (A.C.) because of the attempt on Graziani's life, as follows:

a) Mories and inhabitants of the town of Addis Ababa were ordered to assemble at the upper palace on Yekatit 12th, on St. Michael's day. Just when all the people were assembled, bomb explosions were heard. After there was a big confusion and pell-mell all over the town.

b) Our commanding officer at the Fire Brigade, called Yemane Bahai, lieutenant Colonel, the cause, told us that we must go where the fire had started and took us to Sisayt Abo.

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c) Just when we arrived there we saw the Italians burning the houses intentionally, so our officer ordered us not to put out the fire, saying that he understood what it was all about.

d) While still standing there we saw many people being killed by Italians while trying to escape from burning houses.

3) The Italians divided themselves into different formations, while some of them were murdering, some collected the corpses and threw them on the trucks. They were gathering the corpses from the roads with iron racks. From among the persons who were pulled by iron racks many were alive.

Furthermore I saw Italian soldiers being photographed while standing on the dead bodies of their victims. The burning of houses and killing of the people which started on Friday at about 12 o'clock (E.T.) continued up to Monday morning. Therefore many persons, difficult to calculate their number, were killed and I saw also many houses burnt.

4) We Fire Brigade Section were especially ordered not to put out the fires from any other houses except the Italian ones. Then we understood that their scheme for committing atrocity was a big one. While a priest was trying to hide himself at St. George's cathedral compound in a tomb house, I saw, while standing at the Fire Brigade, a certain Italian sergeant, called pursuing the priest and killed him with a pistol. On Friday night many fascist officers assembled in the compound of St. George's cathedral. They sprinkled many drums of petrol on the cathedral and threw incendiary bombs all the night.

5) There were - at least - 10,000 persons detained in Fit-Ser prison, deprived of water and food. On the third day of the attempt, i.e. on Monday, we took drinking water with us and went to visit the prisoners. There, when they were struggling to quench their thirst, the Italians struck them with cudgels and stabbed them with bayonets.

Signature: Teka Binigid.

Sworn before me on this the 12th day of January, 1948.

Salomon
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia. "

d)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 23.

I, the undersigned, name: Edouard Carabedian, age: 37 years old, nationality: Ethiopian, profession: Merchant, address: 15, General Cunningham Street, Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

4) I was present in Addis Ababa the day when the attempt, on Graziani's life took place. That day I left my home in General Wavel Street in the morning in order to go to my work at about 9 o'clock. I left my house and went to my shop where I was informed by all people I met that an attempt on Graziani's life had been effected. This morning there was a great movement of Italians in the streets. I heard myself comments from some of them, saying that they were waiting orders for reprisals. In the afternoon I heard them saying that the 'federale' ordered them to call on indicated places in groups. In the evening at about 5 o'clock they began. I saw them with my own eyes, to beat every Ethiopian they met in the streets with anything they could find. These Italians were civilians. They were using what they could find, as cudgels etc. This was going on until the circulation of people had finished. I learnt from some of the Italians that they had received orders to burn different Ethiopian quarters. They were burning

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houses during the whole night.

5) I entered my house at about 7.30 p.m. Next morning I heard that many Ethiopians had been killed during the night when the Italians were burning their houses and during the second I saw the following things.

The following day I started to go to my work at 9 o'clock but there was a great panic and Ethiopians were running from everywhere without self-control. The Italian blackshirts were pursuing them and beating them. When I saw this I decided to return to my house where I found my mother weeping and a group of Italians who had entered my house. They tried to get hold of our waiter. My mother had hidden him and they could not find him. They left our house and went to our neighbours' houses and did the same thing. Another group had entered the house of Blatta Ayele Gebre (now vice governor in the province of Harrar) who was at that time my neighbour. They had caught him and tried to tear him to pieces. They were doing the same to all our neighbours. Naturally I saw that the Italians were beating them as much as they could. This day I did not go out from my house but from there I heard much shooting and I saw burning houses all around. On the third day I went to my shop. This time there were no Ethiopians to be seen in the Streets, but many Italians were circulating. I heard many of them saying that they had burnt such and such places and that they had murdered so many Ethiopians. It seemed as if the reprisals had continued also in the interior. In Addis Ababa itself from that day on during some months they used to arrest many Ethiopians.

Signature: Edouard Carabedian.
Sworn before me on this the 10th day of January, 1948.

Tadesse Mangesha (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia."

e)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 10.

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Blatta David Ogbazqui, age: 40 years, profession: Ex-Governor of Adua, President of Ethiopico-Eritrean Unity Association, Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

9) Then in 1937 on the 19th of February I was here, I was just going home at about 12 o'clock when a carabinieri got hold of me and asked me where I was going. I told him that I was going home. He took me to the Carabinieri station. When I passed the streets I noticed that something was in disorder, people were running up and down and troops were moving, especially the fascists. I was examined at the station and I was asked if I had been at the Palace in the morning. Then they told me to go out on the compound. There I found about one thousand people. This was close to the Takonnen bridge, where the Police Station No. 2 is nowadays. Then the same day people were brought with lorries, they were taken without distinction and most of them were bleeding from hits. The fascists used to throw them down from the lorries. Some of them rolled down to the river, because they were thrown from the lorries, and these the Italians shot in front of us. All houses, tukuls, which were in front of us, were burning. The next day when I was still in that compound the burning of houses was continued and more people brought to our compound. In the evening, however, the commander said, he could not receive any more, there was no place at all. On Saturday they also took away the corpses of the persons they had

e. per conoscenza:

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COLOMBA

Text
(translated
into English)

24/M // It has been reported to il Duce that during the days following the attempt against Your Excellency near Tarmaber three writers were captured and two castrated and that many of the Abyssinians shot on first March cried before they died "long live independent Ethiopia" // Please wire me at once what is true in such reports //

Signature

L e s s o n a "

E)

EXTRACT

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO - UFFICIO CIFA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Ufficio Mittente: GABINETTO

N.3883 di prot.dell'Ufficio Mittente.
Addis Abeba li 19 marzo 1937-XV

Indicazioni di urgenza: M.P.A. SU TUTTA
LE M.P.A. GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza:	S.E.V. Gov. Gen. Stato Maggiore Dir. Sup. A.C.I. Uff. Politico	Uff. Giust. Mil. Com. Sup. CC. RR. Ispettorato Fasc. del Lavoro A.O.I.
-----------------------	---	---

S.E. MINISTRO UCRONIA	TRIPOLI
per conoscenza:	
MINISTRO COLONIE	ROMA

Text
(translated
into English)

14154 Cabinet // - - - - -
About report second part of telegram which I answer I cannot deny that some executed Abyssinians have cried before dying "long live independent Ethiopia" // However I beg to state that executions ordered in consequence of mentioned attempt are made at isolated places and that nobody - I say nobody - can witness them //

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

F.c.c.
P. IL CASO DI GABINETTO
(unreadable signature)

H)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO - UFFICIO CIFA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Ufficio Mittente: GABINETTO

N.3974 di prot.dell'Ufficio Mittente.
Addis Abeba, li 21 marzo 1937-XV

Indicazioni di urgenza: M.P.A. SU TUTTA
LE M.P.A.
GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.E.V. Gov. Gen.
 Sig. Capo di S.L.
 Sig. Com. te Su. CC. RR.
 Sig. Governatore A. A. Abata
 Sig. Capo Off. Politico
 Sig. Gen. Olivieri Capo Ufficio
 Giust. Milit.

S.E. CAPO GOVERNO

TRIGLI

Text
 (translated
 into English)

14440 Cabinet // Re 27/N Y.E. // I give Y.E. a formal confirmation of the last paragraph of the telegram to which I reply // From February 19th up to this day 324 summary executions have taken place, yet with guilt always discriminated and proved // (I repeat three hundred and twenty-four) of course without including into that figure the repressions of the 19th and 20th of February // I have further provided for sending to Danane (Danane Somalia) to the concentration camp existing there after the end of the war 1.100 persons including men, women children belonging to the prisoners captured during the last encounters and who represent Amhara people of no particular value but who for the moment had better be hindered from roaming about //

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

p.c.c.
 p. IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
 E. Mameli (signed)

STAMP

/

ed

/

/

tc

to

..

a

n

had shot to-day at 13 o'clock the hundred and ninety-seven monks including vice prior and further twenty-three accomplices // The young deacons // teachers and pupils were spared // they were transferred to the churches of Debra Libanos and accommodated for there // Monastery has consequently been definitely closed and keys consigned to local carabinieri after a commission having made inventory of objects of value found in the monastery // I may send further particulars //

Signature

G A M I A S I

ed

P.S.C.
p. IL CAPO DI CA METTO
(unreadable signature)

c)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNIO SECONDAZIONE D'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
CABINETTO - UFFICIO CIVILE
Indicazioni di urgenza: TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE M.P.A. Mittente: CABINETTO
CRAXIANI R.9505 di prot.
IN CIVILE Addis Abeba li 27 maggio 1937 XV
TELEGRAMMA IN PAROLE

Copia per conoscenza: S.E.V. Gov. Gen. Uff. Politico
Stato Maggiore Uff. Giust. Mil.
Dir. Sup. A.I. IT. Com. Sup. C.C. RR.

S.E. MINISTRO AFRICA ORIENTALE ROMA

Text
(translated into English)

27136 Cabinet // Reserved personnel // Following mine 26320 // The complicity of the deacons too being proved I have given orders to shoot them also numbering 120 at Debra Libanos // Thus there are left in life only 30 boys seminary students who have been sent to their original homes in the various parts of Scioa // Thus there remains no more trace of the Debra Libanos convent (being for centuries a nest of murderers under the names of monks and which once before during the reign of the Negus had the same fate for identical crimes) //

to

n

Signature

G A M I A S I

STAFF

P.S.C.
p. IL CAPO DI CA METTO
B. Maseli (signed)

d)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 16."

(translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Abe Woldemariam Idrate, age: 43 years old, profession: Monk, a priest: Debra Libanos, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

1) From 1912 (P.S.) up to this day I am still living in Debra Libanos. Before the Italians came to Debra Libanos and said: 'We have appointed you as king and you shall receive us by peaceful assembly' and then they went to the monks. I went to a certain place called Mikhalo just nearby. On Yekatit 16th, 1929 (E.S.) on St. Michael's day the Italian arrived came from Debra Libanos and encircled the monastery by machine guns and troops. There they confined all the monks they could get hold of for the time being, so told us 'to bring the rebels you have hidden'. Two persons attempted to escape and were killed by the Italians. As we did not really hide any rebels - besides Abba Bahlegerges who escaped and joined the patriots - we told them that we had absolutely

Febr. 1937

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not hinder any patriots from them. As it was a European name I cannot remember the name of the commander of that army. I have only heard that the army was from Debra Libanos. After this we were released and the army left immediately for Fiecc.

March 1937

2) In the month of Magabit, 1929 (A.C.), I cannot remember the exact date, a few Italian officers came by a truck to the monastery. There they called seven distinguished monks by their names and told that they were wanted by the Government and took them away. After this these monks did not return to the monastery. But from the information we got later on, we were told that they were put in Dedjassatch Juche prison and died there of some illness. We assumed that they have died and commemorated their death.

The names of the above said seven monks are as follows:

No.	General Title	Name	Rank
1.	Aba (Monk)	Alamayohu	Magabi
2.	"	Waldasanbet	Mirfak
3.	"	Minfomaskal	Kes abath
4.	"	Baleto	Dawit Dagami
5.	"	Habtegabriel	Mirfak
6.	"	Gabreigziabher	Dawit Dagami
7.	"	Gabretadik	Nibat Astemari

May 1937

3) One day before the Italians came from many directions and encircled our monastery at Debra Libanos, in the month of Ginbot, 1929, I and a certain monk called Aba Gabramariam went out of Debra Libanos because we were afraid. I returned on the eighth day, after the Italians had completed their work and left. There I found that the Italians had taken all the monks - except those few who concealed themselves - away by trucks. I asked those few whom I found there and they told me the following, concerning the havoc done by the Italian army.

The Italian army encircled the whole area of the monastery and took all the monks, including the twelve school pupils - except the sick ones and those few who concealed themselves - as I have already mentioned above - to Debra Libanos and Fiecc. As far as my estimation is concerned, those monks and pupils taken by the Italian army were more than 2,000. It is clearly understood that the Italians have taken all these persons to Fiecc and Debra Libanos and murdered all of them, leaving only thirty children. After the liberation we, the people of the monastery, collected 80 quintals of skeletons, which remained from flood and wild animals. His Highness Ras Cassa, also collected many skeletons and submitted them to us.

Signature: Aba Woldemariam Ishete

Sworn before me on this the 23rd day of October, 1947.

Falosse Mengesha (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia."

e)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 4.

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Lij Haile Mariam Gazmu, age: 45 years, profession: employee at the Ministry of Finance, address: Duke of Harar Road, Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

May 1937

4) Statement concerning Debra Libanos Massacre.

On the 11th, 1929, a certain Italian called General Maliti who was commander of the Italian armed forces of Shoa came to visit Debra Libanos. As the province of Balala was under the administration of the commander of the Italian armed forces of Shoa, whose Head Quarters were at Debra Birahan, General Maliti came with a big army, convoy and camped in Fitcha.

At that time I was also to be found in Fitcha for my own private business. Then the next morning the General also took the armies who were there in Fitcha and moved towards Debra Libanos. As the 12th of Ginbot is the annual celebration of the monastery we also went with Colonel Garelli. We thought that we were going to honour the feast. When we arrived there the clerics sounded the bell and assembled wearing their festive church robes and received the General like they used to receive the King formerly.

After the General saw how they welcomed him, he said: 'As I was informed you used to be about 700, but now I see only 300 of you, now as I want to punish those who did not come to welcome me, you must stay in the church so that you may not be mixed with them.' Then he encompassed the church compound with his armies.

He had also previously made a bigger circle all round the mountain. General Maliti called Colonel Garelli separately and talked to him resentfully. When Colonel Garelli returned to us he said: 'The General is in a bad temper, so let us go.' Then we returned to a place called Chiagal.

Chiagal was a gate to Debra Libanos for the road which comes from Addis Ababa's direction. When we reached this said place Colonel Garelli said to us that the General had given him instruction to prevent anybody coming out. Then in the night time we heard shootings and I thought they were killing monkeys, but as I have heard later on, I was told that all that shooting was about the killing of monks and deacons who refused to go on the lorry. The majority of them were taken by lorries passed us and we thought that they were being taken to Addis Ababa, but when they reached a place called Shinkurt they were unloaded from the lorries and the adolescent ones were selected out of them and the rest were executed.

The remainder were taken to Debra Birahan. Then there the youngest ones were selected from among the healthiest and adolescent and the latter ones were also executed. After this when General Maliti was returning to Debra Birahan with his armies, his soldiers plundered all the properties and wealth of the church. Also as this church was the burial place of many nobles and dignitaries, the Italian soldiers in hoping to find old exhumed tombs. Then Colonel Garelli returned to Fitcha and I also returned to Fitcha.

This church was one of the wealthiest of all churches and monasteries of Ethiopia, and so the Italian armies plundered the properties of this church without leaving anything intact, they pillaged even the oldest books.

5) Colonel Garelli later on told us that Maliti reproached him of not being able to arrest a man who injured Graziani by a goat while passing through his province.

Signature: Tadesse Assegurta Gassau

Sworn before me on this the 3rd day of September, 1947.

Tadesse Assegurta (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia."

a)

EXTRACT FROM

"Affidavit No. 2."

(Copy)

I, the undersigned, name: Woizero Senedu Gabru, age: 31 years, profession: Vice Director at Itogus Menen school, address: Addis Ababa, do hereby lay out and say as follows:

'You are a prisoner now. You must follow the guard,' and I was brought away to the casern of Carabinieri on the compound of Dejazmatch Letibalu. There they gave me a separate, small room, without mixing with other prisoners.

When I told to the Marshal of Carabinieri that I was innocent of any crime, I was surprised when he said frankly: 'All educated people are dangerous to our government and your education is your crime.'

10. There I saw many things. For instance there was a little girl of about eleven years. One Italian brought her there saying that this girl knows where my colleague (he had disappeared) went. Then they tortured her by beating her until she was bleeding. Then she said that she had seen nothing. Then the Italian left her to be investigated. She passed the night there. Then I asked the guards there that she might be with me as I was alone. He left her there. Then I asked her and she told me that she knew nothing, they just took her from the street. Next morning that Italian came again and brought another child with him and this girl who passed the night there was again tortured and beaten. Another girl was brought by him and he said that he was mistaken about the first girl. I told the guard that the girl did not know anything and they were sorry with the Italian who was mistaken. The first girl was released and they kept the second.

In a house near me, in the cellar were kept many prisoners, dignitaries and ladies, the cellar was overcrowded. I used to see when the provisions were supplied. They used to inspect the food with the bayonets, which they had used for killing people. This was done when the guard was kind. They got no water. I got this information as these ladies used to come out in the evening and we used to meet them. My mother was later on kept there. My sister's son, Hailu Gabru was later on put among the prisoners in that cellar. There was an electric current with which they tortured people. My nephew was also tortured with that apparatus, and when they tortured him they used to ask him if he had sent a message to the Japanese in chiper to His Imperial Majesty. He told me that he was kept without any clothes. They used to provide him with a shawa when a visitor came. For five days I saw all sorts of torture and cruelty and I cannot mention all.

Signature: Senedu Gabru (signed)

b)

See Appendix 1. 1).

c)

See Appendix 1. 2).

a)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
CABINETTO - UFFICIO CEMA

TELEGRAMMA DI BRITO
Ufficio Mittente Gabinetto

N.1043 di prot.dell'Ufficio Mittente
Addis Abeba li 10 luglio 1936-KIV

Indicazioni di Urgenza: M.P.A.SU TUTTA LE M.P.A.
GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Per conoscenza: Stato Maggiore UFF.Politico
Dir.Sup.A.C.F. UFF.Informaz.

S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE ROMA

Text
(translated
into English)

6267 Cabinet // To 3175 // At my arrival some young
Ethiopians had not been shot // Hardly was determined
present alarming situation here than some fifteen were
arrested and others are being chased even if there has
not been any particular flagrancy to their charge //
However it was my intention to exile them to Danan camp on
the sea in Somalia // ever if no elements of guilt result
from investigations now going on //

G R A Z I A N I

Signature

p.c.c.
IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
(Mag. in serv. S.M. Alberto Mazzi)
A. Mazzi (signed)

b)

(The same as Appendix H h)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
CABINETTO - UFFICIO CEMA

Indicazioni di urgenza:
M.P.A.SU TUTTA LE M.P.A.
GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA DI BRITO
Ufficio Mittente:Gabinetto

Addis Abeba, li 21 marzo 1937-KV
N.3374 di prot.dell'Ufficio Mittente.

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.M.V.Gov.Son.
Sig.Capo di S.M.
Sig.Capo del Sup.CO.MR.
Sig.Governatore Addis Abeba
Sig.Capo UFF.Politico
Sig.Gen.Olivieri Capo Ufficio
Giust.Milit.

S.E. CAPO GOVERNO TRIPOLI

Text
(translated
into English)

1440 Cabinet // no 27/M.T.S. // I give Y.S. a formal
confirmation of the last paragraph of the telegram to
which I reply // From February 17th up to this day
324 summary executions have taken place, yet with guilt
always discriminated as proved // (I report three hundred
and twenty-four) of course without including into that
figure the repressions of the 19th and 20th of February //
I have further decided for sending to Danane (Dorale Somalia)
to the concentration camp existing there at the end of the
war 1.100 persons including men, women children belonging
to the prisoners captured during the last encounters and the
wounded and sick // I will also advise you for

0555

the content and letter of messages from ... about //

Signature

P.O.C.
p. IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
E. Rasol (signed)

c)

See Appendix I. d).

d)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNAMENTO ITALIANO
MINISTERO DELL'INTERNA SICURTÀ
No. 20561 di prot. Addis Abeba, 11 21 maggio 1957
AL COMANDO SUPERIORE C.C.R.R.
e, per conoscenza
AL GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'A.G.I. Sabotetto
ALLA DIREZIONE REGIONALE AFFARI POLITICI
ALL'UFFICIO REGIONALE MILITARE
AL COMANDO DELLA COMPAGNIA INTERNA C.C.R.R. = ADDIS ABEBA

Text
(translated
into English)

Following telegram no. 34584 of 19th instant from Giama, I
order that the families of the Pitauari brothers

ARAIÀ and FESLA GUSLAVIĆ

who have been executed without process shall be forwarded on
their arrival in Addis Abeba to the camp of Banane.

The command of the Internal Company "C.C.R.R." is to supply
the superior direction "A.A.P.P." with the necessary facts
for the compilation of the provisions in connection with the
matter.

Signature

STA P

IL GOVERNATORE GENERALE
Vice Re d'Etiopia

e)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 2.

I, the undersigned, name: Weizero Senedu Gabru,
age: 31 years, profession: Vice-Directress at Itogue Menen
School, address: Addis Abeba, do hereby take oath and say
as follows:

11) A few days later at three o'clock in the morning I was
waked up by a Carabinieri of Carabinieri. I then thought
that I was going to be killed. But it was not so they did
not want to kill me, I should go to be interrogated, but
I did not believe it. Then they sent me with a guard by car
to the Palace. I saw many cars escorted by Carabinieri
to and from. It was not yet dawn. There were
Carabinieri with bayonets guarding the way up. I could not
understand anything. I saw many dignitaries and ministers
in a very dirty condition and the Italians standing on
patrol. There were two guards for every prisoner and there
were about 300 prisoners. They searched everybody, I saw
that. They explained to me that I was not going to be killed
but you are going to be sent to Italy. Then I begged the
guard, as my house was near the Palace, to have one of my
own dresses with me, but they did not allow that. Then they
got about six ladies and we joined together. We were
according to the Italians investigated very badly in the
attempt, and very suspected. They were afraid as they thought
they were going to be killed. I saw many lorries with

15) About two years later we were told that we were going back to our country because we were for given. The prisoners were very excited and longing to be free again, but alas, as we entered Addis we were deadly disappointed. Ethiopians were rare to be seen in the roads. If seen another Italy, where had they gone, the owners of the country? Killed, informed and the rest put to another quarter of the city. In our hearts we envied those who remained in Italy and a psycho-logic had taken place in us.

16) When we left for Italy we were told, full of life and hope, during our internment the daily mortification and suffering had nullified us. We had no hope in our hearts, fear in our eyes, fear for our new companions that was the result of two and a half years imprisonment. Our people that we found in Addis were worse, their spirit was quite dead. They were frightened of spies and thus frightened to greet us, to talk to us. Even they did not dare to cry for their dead. In my opinion this crime of killing our spirit was worse than shooting our gears. At least their spirit was alive. Without any need of explanation we can find many witnesses to very cruel deeds, but I have tried to give only my personal experience.

Signatures: Gesenau Gabru

0557

(Appendix II.)

a)

See Appendix II. c).

b)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 11.

(translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Jacob Gaerie Leoul,
age: 35 years old, profession: Lieutenant Colonel,
address: Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

2) After the attempt at Graziani I was taken prisoner. First I had to stay in a Police station for three months. They kept me there without water and food for three days and they threatened me during the examinations, saying that they would kill me. There was cruel treatment of other prisoners. They tortured them and beat them. I saw their wounds and they told me that the Italians used to sprinkle water on them and then they lashed them. I even heard cries from other departments of the station when such treatment was going on. We were underfed in that station. We were only given black bread once a day, sometimes we got tea without sugar.

3) Then from that station I was transferred to St. George prison. There the treatment was the same and we were given the same food and with the same intervals. We were also given something like warm water under the pretext that it was soup, it was practically unseatable. The chief of the prison was Marshal Bellissimo of the Carabinieri. This prison used to receive prisoners sent from any department but especially from the Political Office, as I was myself. A house fit for housing fifty persons was filled up with three hundred. I can show you the department if you want. We were sleeping on each other. Many died because of the conditions in that prison. We were not provided with any blankets or such things, only a few of us were allowed to have a blanket of our own. I was allowed to take fresh air only twice a day immediately outside the building. Our toilet was inside the department, a 'tin' and of course that place and the smell of it made the conditions inside still worse. Almost everybody caught typhus in that prison. The infected persons were not taken to hospital and every morning we used to find five or six persons who had died during the night and sometimes even fifteen or so. An Italian doctor, Janusi, was, however, coming almost every day to give injections and medicine. That doctor is still alive and is working here. I was staying in that prison for one year. I was also caught by typhus and very sick. I can remember that at one time there were about 1,000 prisoners there.

I was summoned to the Political Office about three times. They put questions to me and acted somewhat like a court, but it was not a proper court. The prisoners did not get any information about the decisions directly, the result became known in other ways. The name of the investigator was Marciano. He knew the Ethiopian language. He had been resident in Ethiopia before the Italian invasion as a merchant.

4) They sent other persons to Somalia but they kept us informing us that we should be tried by a proper tribunal and get our punishment and they told us that they were sure that the tribunal would sentence us to execution. Then one day we were informed that we should be sent to Somalia and they took

us from the prison to Kalibi (outside Assis Ababa), a radio station which they had transformed into a concentration camp. I think we were the only men sent there at the same time. We stayed for about two months there. The treatment was about the same but our relatives were allowed to send us some provisions. We were living in tents inside barbed wire. The carabinieri were in charge also of that camp. When we were there some prisoners were brought from D-nano and they told us that they were promised to be released by the Italians. The Italians also told us that we were to be released together with the ones who came from D-nano.

5) In effect they released some of them as some of us but they sent us together with the other ones to Naura. Among us were two men and two men who had all come from D-nano and had been promised to be released. Naura is an island in the Red Sea about 60 miles East of Massaua (Ashlar Islands).

The most difficult thing there was the heat. In the shadow of the tent the temperature used to go up to 50°C. The Italians used to tell us that it was 10° above Massaua. There were death casualties every day from sunstroke. They used to force us to work. Except four of us the prisoners were forced to carry stones, wood, build houses and do other hard labour. We were working in the office. There were about 1,200 prisoners on that island. Political prisoners were 150 persons. The others were sentenced prisoners, some of them ordinary criminals, some of them e.g. inhabitants from Eritrea who had revolted against the Italians.

The supply of drinking water was not sufficient, some of the prisoners tried to dig for water or they took water from the beach, the result was that they fell sick and died. Many died from dysentery. The political prisoners were forced to do hard labour and were lashed when they tried to refuse, saying that they could not work like the criminals. When our relatives sent us money the Italians used to give us 15 lire a month from which we were allowed to buy a little more food.

Many prisoners on that island died from bad nutrition. A disease called 'paludism' was spread among the prisoners and they died from that. The doctor was living in Massaua and used to come to the island very rarely. Among the prisoners there was an Italian doctor (veterinary) D.L. Aloia Work. Four of us were allowed to take beds with us to that island but all the other prisoners were bound to sleep on the bare floor. The treatment of political prisoners and criminals was on the whole the same, but they used to sleep in separate quarters.

It happened when the prisoners were paid to a certain officer to receive instalments of the money sent to them that they were asked to take off their shoes and when some of them refused because of the hot ground and because they were used to wear shoes, some of them were sentenced to be kept in a separate dark cell for two or three months. This Italian was Captain Bartolli 'Residente' of the island and in charge of the prison. I think this was sorted under the Governor of Eritrea in Asmara. When doctor Aloia Work gave his resignation for the sick prisoners the Italians used to pierce and his directions were given to the people to work. There were also six females on that island, but of them we had only two. They were kept separately, but given the same treatment, food and so on as the others.

After nearly two years on that island I was sent to Asmara and was allowed to live there on the condition that I did not leave the city. Then I stayed until 1, in connection with the approach of the political forces, was allowed to return to Assis Ababa.

I will give you separately a list of witnesses from the police station at St. George's prison in Addis Ababa, from the concentration camp outside Addis Ababa and from ADESA.

Signature: Jacob Gabrie Leoul.

Sworn before me on this the 1st day of October, 1947.

Telesse Mengesha (English)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia."

c)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 19.

I, the undersigned, name: Doctor Tassuzzi Vittorio, age: 40 years old, nationality: Italian, profession: Doctor, address: Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

1) On September 14th, 1936, I arrived in Ethiopia. In the beginning, I was working in the hospital in Addis Ababa. It was a military hospital. I worked there until March 1937. Then I was transferred to be in charge of the Ataki and St. Georges prisons, as I had also in Italy been in charge of prisons. The chief of the prisons was Commendatore Macri who came here in order to organize the prisons. He was principal director and inspector of the organization of prisons at the Ministry of Justice in Italy. He came here with a staff of ten persons (some of them were Mellissimo, St. Georges prison, Staggacchetti, Ataki prison).

2) There were in St. Georges prison 300-1.000 prisoners as an average. The capacity of that prison was at that time no more than 600. In the beginning there were not many commodities in the prison because it was not yet organized. In the beginning the prisoners were not given any clothes but they got one blanket each. I started to work there when the organization had begun. At that time the prisoners were given meat three times weekly. They got two pieces of bread of the same quality which was given to the ascaris.

Criminals, political prisoners, moslems and christians were separated from each other, and the women were kept in a special department. In the beginning they were allowed to have one hour's walk every day, but as I saw that in some departments they were too many prisoners, I arranged that they could get two hours' walk daily.

There were cases of typhoid plus and recurrent fever. This sickness came from the lack of hygiene in the prison.

3) In the first period we had three or four deaths in one week. When the prison was too crowded we had four to five deaths daily. After some time we obtained from the Government a 'bonifica' station. We used to examine the new prisoners in a separate room before they were allowed to join the others.

In this way the number of deaths was decreased to a minimum. I observed that some prisoners were kept too long time in the prison before they were taken to the court, but that was a matter which did not concern me.

4) I cured some prisoners who had been whipped (not in the prison but outside). When I noticed such things it was my duty to make a report and this I also did. Sometimes some prisoners advised wounds from fighting or from killing.

somebody and they were naturally often wounded themselves. I have cured also this kind of prisoners and I made my reports. There was a lack of water, but we were doing all we possibly could to supply the prison with drinking water from outside.

5) The prisoners were supplied at first with food from their relatives but afterwards, as I saw that they got too much one day and less another, it was not good for their health, I allowed them to get food from their relatives three times a week only.

In the beginning there was no canalization and for this reason bins were used for W.C. purposes. Only in 1939 the prison was provided with W.C.

6) The chief of this prison was Stappacchetti, capo guardia, maresciallo. The prison had at that time about 700 prisoners. The Akaki prison was less crowded than St. Georges prison. The prisoners who were brought there were already condemned. The capacity of this prison was 500 prisoners. The prisoners were kept always in cells. They were allowed to walk in the fresh air one hour each day and the cells were opened also for one hour in the afternoon. The food was the same as in St. Georges prison. Also here we had cases of sickness but less than in St. Georges prison, because it was not so crowded. As in St. Georges prison there was also a lack of water at the beginning, but it was organized later on.

----- " x

d)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 10.

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Blatta Hokele Habte Michael, age: 52 years old, profession: Judge at the High Court of Ethiopia, address: Adis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

5) When Dejazmatch Fekre arisa and Dejazmatch Abara Kassa entered Adis Ababa, the Italians used to confuse the people for suspicion, and I was also arrested just about that time. On Makasa, 9th, 1928, (E.C.) Italian carabinieri (police) suddenly entered my house at 12 o'clock in the night and waked me up from bed, chained me and took me to Bogalisco. The persons who were taken to Bogalisco with me were Lidj Sanjaou Nassou, Ato Estefania Garzame, Ato Geto and Ato Gabre Mariam, who was Alaka Bertu's servant.

6) When we were loaded on the train they tied my both hands to other by wire. But the rest of the prisoners were tied in pairs together. We passed the day without food and arrived at a station called Hawash in the evening, where we passed the night also in the same circumstances without food and still tied by wire. Next morning we started and were taken to Dire Dawa. When arriving at Dire Dawa, we were directly taken to the prison district of the town, where we were put upon many other prisoners. This prison was completely full of bugs. No one was able to sleep in such terrible conditions. We stayed there for two or three days and then we were taken to Jamar tie in the same way. When

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0562

(Appendix I.)

When I was there, I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains.

11) In March, 1939, I was taken to the mountain camps. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains.

10) While I was still in the mountain camps, I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains.

9) In the month of June, 1939, I was taken to the mountain camps. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains.

8) In the month of July, 1939, I was taken to the mountain camps. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains.

7) In August, 1939, I was taken to the mountain camps. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains.

6) In September, 1939, I was taken to the mountain camps. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains.

5) In October, 1939, I was taken to the mountain camps. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains.

4) In November, 1939, I was taken to the mountain camps. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains.

3) In December, 1939, I was taken to the mountain camps. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains. I was told that the people who were arrested in the concentration camps were taken to the camps in the mountains.

0564

a)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNÒ GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ITALIANA
 SALI. OTTO-UFFICIO STAMPA
 Indicazioni di urgenza: PELLEGRINA DI STATO
 M.P.A. di TUTTA ITALIA M.P.A. Ufficio Mittente Gabinetto
 n. 2555 al prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente
 Addis Abeba, 9 marzo 1936 XV

TELEGRAMMA IN ITALIANO

Copia per conoscenza: Stato Maggiore
 Dir. Sup. A.C.P.
 Uff. Politico
 Uff. Informaz.

SAL. OTTO-UFFICIO STAMPA

Text
(Translated into English)

10550 Cabinet // reference your telegram regarding action column Paolotti while I expect with you my brave captain please give particulars if Abessa Surru has been brought at least to Eskempti // If affirmative it is advisable transfer him quickly here to Addis Abeba by air // Regarding second paragraph I consider more suitable simply execute all Amharas that the columns anyhow meet on the road because effort of persuasion on these will always be sterile // In this respect I remind you my disdainful meditation Arabian proverb saying // if you meet a snake you can just let it pass if you meet an Amhara smash his head // It is only to keep to this //

Signature

G. A. S. I

D.C.S.
 IL CAPO DI STATO OTTO
 Mussi

ST. P

b)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNÒ GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ITALIANA
 SALI. OTTO-UFFICIO STAMPA
 Indicazioni di urgenza: PELLEGRINA DI STATO
 M.P.A. di TUTTA ITALIA M.P.A. Ufficio Mittente Gabinetto
 GIACCHINI n. 2560 al prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente
 Addis Abeba, 11 marzo 1937-XV

TELEGRAMMA IN ITALIANO

Copia per conoscenza: S.E.V. Gov. Gen. Uff. Giust. Milit.
 Stato Maggiore Uff. Politico
 Dir. Sup. A.C.P. Com. Sup. C.C. RR.

S.E. S. A. S. I

Text
(Translated into English)

10550 Cabinet // reserved personal // To be deciphered to you // Re 2555 // about the presentation of numerous Amhara notables as ex-army officers // I order that they shall be all shot immediately according to the directions of the Duce repeated a thousand times as yet little observed by any // It is time to put an end to it // Y.S. say, keep in mind that those who have made an attempt at my life // which although being a disgraceful thing yet represents Italy // were all Amharas notables in the very same conditions who had not passed a little everywhere // Keep in mind also that I have already thought about the total destruction of Amharas notables as well that this measure should be completely carried out in your best interests // A better opportunity would not be likely to get up or down // Give assurance with the word 'shot' but let the assurance be serious // I trust if the full text of the present telegram to you the chief of government as I shall do the same with any answer that I.S. may give me on the matter //

Signature

G. A. S. I

D.C.S.
 IL CAPO DI STATO OTTO
 A. Mussi (signed)

ST. P

c)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNAMENTO DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
MINISTERO DELL'AFRICANA
STAFF
UFFICIO CENTRALE DI STATO
Ufficio Mittente: gabinetto

1.5450 di prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente.
Addis Abeba li 8 aprile 1937-IV

TELEGRAMMA AL PA. BEREA

Copia per conoscenza:	S.M.V. Gov. Gen.	Dir. Sup. A.C.F.
	Stato Maggiore	Intendenza AOI
	Superaereo	UFF. Politico
	Governatorato AA.	UFF. Giust. Mil.
	Comando Piazza	Com. Sup. CC. RM.

S.M. GILDOLO GEMER

Text
(translated
into English)

17606 Cabinet // Secret // Reference 2740 G.G.S. //
 I notice with true pleasure what Your Excellency communicates
 about situation zone Conta estera // but above all I am
 pleased to see that Y.E. has decisively absorbed instruction
 regarding manoeuvres of several columns converging on same
 target from distant bases like typical example operative
 cycle Arbajona // Chevenna // Jebano // Laghi // Gogetti
 // tomb of rebel leaders // Continue like that in all
 dependent territories // Apply converging manoeuvre //
 also planned movement of the troops in all directions //
 never let them get on ground in garrisons // adopt definite
 will to apply directions of Il Duce which tend to complete
 destruction of a basic elements in territories of Abyssinian
 conquest // give a pinch of more courage in this respect
 to the civilian officials who are closer to them and to
 column commanders who // from instinctive combatant
 generosity // are sometimes disposed to compromise for
 comprehensible sentiments // Be assured that going so Y.E.
 will certainly bring about complete tranquillity in your
 territory, having from now provided all troops and means
 necessary // This telegram transmitted for knowledge to
 S.M. Minister Colonies and to all governors //

Signature

p.c.c.
 p. IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
 S. Raselli (signed)

c)

See Appendix H e).

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO-UFFICIO SUPRA

Indicazioni di Urgenza:
M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE M.P.A.
GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Ufficio Mittente: Gabinetto

N. 5506 di prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente
Addis Abeba li 27 ottobre 1936-XIV

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza:	S.E. Vic. Gov. Gen.	UFF. Informazioni
	Com. Sup. Aviazione	Com. Piazza AA
	Stato Maggiore	UFF. Giur. Militare
	Governatorato AA	V. Com. Fusteria
	Dir. Sup. A.C.P.	Com. Sup. C.C. RR.
	UFF. Politico	

COLONEL-GABINETTO ROMA

per conoscenza:
S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE ROCCA' TRICTO - Via Aerea

Text
(translated into English)

22900 Cabinet // I communicate the full text of a telegram to-day sent to General Galina // quote // Yours 457/Op. // My lively satisfaction // It is necessary to continue the inexorable work of destruction of all // It is superfluous to add that raided cattle or any other value belong entirely to the detachments that carry out the raids // Unquote // N.E. Minister informed //

Signature

GR A Z I A N I

STAMP

p.c.c.
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. Mazzi (signed)

/

d

x

e

1

a)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 3.

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Ato Zena Oda, age: 51 years, profession: Translator in the Ministry of War, address: Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

C) I came to the political office in the Dedjazmatch Ubie compound. My chief was Princevalle. Later Princevalle was substituted by another man, a colonel whose name I cannot remember. I used to translate Ethiopians' applications, containing complaints about plundering, burning of houses, about lost relatives etc. I know that they used to arrest also women and children and alike people and send them to Akadisho, some priests also. There were so many sorts of complaints. The complainants were never given any compensation. The Italians had sequestered so many houses of the Ethiopians who were asking for the rents but many of them were never given any money. It was also practised that the Italians hired a house and when the proprietor came and asked for the rent he was just kicked away and at our office he did not get any support either. Although they used to take lands of Ethiopians under the pretext of assessment some of the owners received a small amount of money, many of them never got any money at all. Many Ethiopians got bankrupt because having lost a piece of land, they were sometimes given another as substitute and when they had built a house on that land, the Italians came again and chased them away.

Signature: Zena Oda

Sworn before me on this the 27th day of October, 1947.

Endasse Mar esha (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia"

b)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 3.

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Alamo Kitezza, age: 34 years, profession: Captain, Ethiopian Army, address: Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

7) As soon as the Italians heard about a shot or a quarrel in a village they sent their soldiers there and they burnt down the village and took the cattle from the peasants. My own cattle were taken on such occasions. It was like paying a tax - the Italians were plundering us each year and it is impossible to estimate how many cattle they stole.

8) I remember one occasion when Ras Dilla and General Gilly camped at Dulla Kovicha. This was in 1929. After having taken what they needed for their provisions, they stole 5,000 cattle from us on the pretext that we were concealing patriots but we were peaceful people. I was present and my father who was a local chief there was ordered to arrange for giving the cattle away.

Signature: Alamo Kitezza

Sworn before me on this the 27th day of October, 1947.

Endasse Mar esha (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia."

a) See Appendix C. 3).

b)

EXTRACT

Heading (in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
CA. INTERO-UFFICIO ROMA

TELEGRAMMA N. 15255
Ufficio Mittente Gabinetto

N. 15255 di prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente
Addis Abeba li 11 marzo 1937-IV

Indicazioni di urgenza: M.P.A. SU TUTTE
LE M.P.A. CRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza:	S.E.V. Gov. Gen.	Com. Piazza
	Dir. Capo S.M.	UFF. Giust. Mil.
	Superaereo	Intendenza AOI
	Dir. Sup. A.C.P.	Com. Sup. CC. NN.
	UFF. Politico	

S.E. - IRISTIC SUICIDIS ROMA

Text (translated into English)

13101 Cabinet // - - - - -
 At 17 hours the tricolor was hoisted on the Ghisi of Sala
 Dingai // The whole march zone was completely deserted //
 The population had gone away taking their cattle with them //
 All villages and isolated huts across the march road of
 the columns were levelled with the ground // For more than
 25 kms there does not remain a single house // - - - - -

Signature

p.c.a.
IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
A. Razzi (signed)

c)

EXTRACT

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
CA. INTERO-UFFICIO ROMA

TELEGRAMMA N. 15256
Ufficio Mittente Gabinetto

Indicazioni di urgenza: M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE M.P.A.
CRAZIANI N. 15256 di prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente.
Addis Abeba li 26 marzo 1937-IV

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza:	S.E.V. Gov. Gen.	Ufficio Politico
	Stato Maggiore	Com. Piazza NN.
	Superaereo	Intendenza AOI
	Dir. Sup. A.C.P.	Com. Sup. CC. NN.
	UFF. Giust. Mil.	

S.E. - IRISTIC SUICIDIS ROMA

Text (translated into English)

15257 Cabinet // News March 25th // - - - - -
 at Sciba Territory // - - - - -
 2) To what extent the treatment it reserved // Here the
 Government had received submissions // favourable to
 him in over 100 // the action was carried out with prudent
 silence // on the other hand there were innumerable
 rebels and the revolt is in full swing it was proceeded with
 great violence // For over 25 kms there has not been
 left stone on stone // some of the villages destroyed //

more than 4.000 tukuls in flames //; our losses // killed 31 // wounded 38 // Enemy losses // killed in battle 212 // shot 396 // Arms captured or handed over from March 9th to 24th // machine guns 5 // rifles 1.738 // The disarmament of Scioa has thus given // guns 2 // machine guns 105 // rifles 16.007 //

3) On the 24th in the Ficce sector // near Tullu // our irregulars have attacked 40 rebels with two machine guns // Our losses // 2 privates killed // Enemy losses // 2 killed and 2 shot // Tullu country // which had favoured rebels // has been levelled with the ground //

4) On the 24th shot in Debra Brehan barambaras Retta Gabremascal for treason //

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

p.c.c.
 IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
 A. Mazzi (signed)

d)

EXTRACT

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
 GABINETTO - UFFICIO CIFRA

Indicazioni di urgenza:
 M.P.A.SU TUTTE LE M.P.A.
 GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
 Ufficio Mittente Gabinetto

N. 3925 di prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente
 Addis Abeba li 19 maggio 1937-KV

Telegramma in Partenza

Copia per conoscenza: S.M.V. Gov. Gen. Ufficio Politico
 Stato Maggiore Off. Giust. Mil.
 Superaereo Com. Sup. CC. RR.
 Governatorat. A.A. Settore Debra Brehan
 Com. Piazza Settore Loggio
 Dir. Sup. A.C.P. Settore Ambo
 Intendenza A.C.

S.E. MINISTRI COLONIE ROMA
 per conoscenza:
 GOVERNO AS. ARA
 GOVERNO GONDAR
 GOVERNO HARAR
 GOVERNO BERSAGLIERI
 GOVERNO BASHA

Text
(translated into English)

25919 Cabinet // News May 18th // - - - - -
 Ex-Scioa Territory // Debra braham sector // Mass region has
 not the hard necessary healthy lesson it was worth //
 Military operations begun on the 7th instant may be looked
 upon as ended with full success // The repression spared
 only lower favourable to us displaying merciless rigour to
 those hostile towards us // All property of the Auraris
 family // the head of which Degias Auraris had assumed the
 rôle of quasi-us in succession of Haile Selassie who has
 gone abroad // has been destroyed // Rebels pursued
 surrounded when arrived in the valley by our strong and fast
 columns have very serious losses and have found that ditches
 and precipices thought to offer secure shelter inaccessible
 to us do not hinder our repression // Military action to-day
 ceases giving room to political action in order to normalize
 the situation, completing it with direct military control //
 Cooperative period may be summarized by the following facts //
 Rebels killed 2.191 among who about 50 chiefs and notables
 decisively hostile to us // Seized 2 guns // 3 machine guns
 // 1.225 rifles // besides considerable war materials such
 as munitions // gun powder etc. // 17.362 tukuls burnt //
 our losses // 30 killed // 71 wounded // The slightness

more than 4.000 tukuls in flames // our losses // killed 31 // wounded 38 // Enemy losses // killed in battle 212 // shot 396 // Arms captured or handed over from March 9th to 24th // machine guns 5 // rifles 1.738 // The disarmament of Scioa has thus given // guns 2 // machine guns 105 // rifles 16.007 //

3) On the 24th in the Ficce sector // near Tullu // our irregulars have attacked 40 rebels with two machine guns // Our losses // 2 privates killed // Enemy losses // 2 killed and 2 shot // Tullu country // which had favoured rebels // has been levelled with the ground //

4) On the 24th shot in Debra Brehan barambaras Retta Gabremascal for treason //

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

p.c.c.
 IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
 A. Mazzi (signed)

d)

EXTRACT

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
 GABINETTO - UFFICIO CIPRA
 Indicazioni di urgenza: TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
 M.P.A.SU TUTTE LE A.P.A. Ufficio Mittente Gabinetto
 GRAZIANI N.3923 di prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente
 - Addis Abeba li 19 maggio 1937-XV

Telegramma in Partenza

Copia per conoscenza:	S..V.Gov.Gen.	Ufficio Politico
	Stato Maggiore	UFF.Giust.Mil.
	Superaereo	Com.Sup.CO.RR.
	Governatorat.A.A.	Settore Debra Brehan
	Com.Piazza	Settore Hoggio
	Dir.Sup.A.C.P.	Settore Ambo
	Intendenza A.O.	

S.E. TRIGINTA SCOLONIA ROMA
 per conoscenza:
 ROVINEO ABISSIA
 SOGHIARO GONDAR
 SOGHIARO RAHAY
 SOGHIARO BOGHIARIC
 SOGHIARO BIRAN

Text
(translated into English)

25919 Cabinet // News May 18th // - - - - -
 Ex-Scioa Territory // Debra Brehan sector // Mens region has got the hard necessary healthy lesson it was worth // Military operations begun on the 7th instant may be looked upon as ended with full success // The repression spared only those favourable to us displaying merciless rigour to those hostile towards us // All property of the Auraris family // the head of which degiac Auraris had assumed the rôle of quasi-king in succession of Haille Selassie who had gone abroad // has been destroyed // rebels pursued surrounded when arrived in the valley by our strong and fast columns have very serious losses and have found that ditches and precipices thought to offer secure shelter inaccessible to us do not hinder our repression // Military action to-day ceases giving room to political action in order to normalize the situation, completing it with direct military control //

Operative period may be summarized by the following facts //

rebels killed 2,451 // seized about 50 chiefs and notables // 1,223 rifles // besides considerable war materials such as munitions // gun powder etc, // 15,302 tukuls burnt // our losses // 30 killed // 72 wounded // The slightness

of our losses compared to those of the enemy must be attributed to our great superiority in fire-arms // the ability of the patrols to manoeuvre and their fulminating speed // The attitude of officers and troop praiseworthy //

Signature

S R A Z I A M I

p.c.c.
IL CAPO DI GARNIZIONE
A. MAZZI (signed)

0571

a)

EXTRACT.

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ITALIANA
CABINETTO-UFFICIO ROMA

STAMP

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Ufficio Mittente: Gabinetto

N. 5202 di prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente
Addis Abeba li 21 ott. 1936-RIV

Indicazioni di Urgenza M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE M.P.A.
CRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN ASSENZA

Copia per conoscenza:	S.E.V. Gov. Gen.	Uff. Informaz.
	Com. Sup. Aviaz.	Com. Piazza A.
	Stato Maggiore	Uff. Cius. Militare
	Governatorato AA	Com. Sup. CC. RR.
	Dir. Sup. A. C. P.	
	Uff. Politico	

GOVERNO BRITANNA	ASABA
GOVERNO AMARA	GONDAR
GOVERNO HARAR	HARAR
GOVERNO SOALIA	MOGADISCIO
GOVERNO GAMBIA-SIDARA	ASHEREARIAS

Text
(translated
into English)

2210. Cabinet // I transmit integrally following telegram sent to-day Ministry Colonies and H.E. Minister Addis Abeba // quote // This mornig I have had a reprisal action accomplished by airplane under the direct command of H.E. Piana on ligne country Mount Zukuala and plain between East mountain and railway line Moggio-Hadava // In mentioned densely populated districts season movings of rebels and farmers took place during the last few days with usual cunning among subdued and not subdued (see identical phenomenon Cyrenalico) // In action twenty-five airplanes took part among which ten bombers // Villages were destroyed first with explosive and incendiary bombs and then with hypenite bombs // Particularly two large districts one situated on top and the other half-way slope Mount Zukuala were almost destroyed by action bombing airplanes // In mentioned countries are comprised two well-known monasteries whose prior were days ago presented himself at Moggio with several hundred of subjects to accomplish solemn act of submission while they have given refuge to rebels having recent attacks // As mentioned these actions will continue against all countries along railway regardless of so called submissions // In concurrence brigade Mariotti's action at large radius to destroy centres of rebels against railway // All this entered since long into the operative sphere of this command but it could not be started before for well-known reason rain and insufficient forces //

Aviation which all during the rainy season has made a wonderful contribution sustaining very serious losses (see telegram 21295) and to which we largely owe the political-military success at Iskerati // has nearly completed its effort the regrouping planned for the operations in progress under the vigorous impulses given by H.E. Piana personally // During the stormy period of the rains lasting to the beginning of October we have been able to make a fortnight after the cessing of the rains the whole military column on the air has been reconstituted its outfit following the will and the directions of the command // All will be able to stop it // Unquote //

Signature

.....
CRAZIANI

0572 (Appendix M.)

b)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ITALIANA
MINISTERO-UFFICIO CENTRALE

UFFICIO A DI STATO
UFFICIO ASSISTENTE COLONNELLO

NUMERO DI QUOT. DELL'UFFICIO ASSISTENTE.

ADIS ABABA 11 13 novembre 1936-IV

Indicazioni di Urgenza: M.F.A. SU WYDRE
M.F.A. CHABIANI

UFFICIO A DI STATO

Copia per conoscenza:	S.E.V. Gov. Gener.	Ufficio Informazioni
	Stato Maggiore	Com. Div. Pusteria
	Com. Sup. Aviazione	Com. Piazza AA
	Governo torato AA	UFF. Gius. Militare
	Dir. Sup. A.C.P.	Com. Sup. CC.MM.
	Ufficio Politico	

COLONNIA DI STATO ROMA

Per conoscenza

S.E.V. MINISTERO COLONIE ABISABA

Text
(translated
into English)

25429 Cabinet // General B. Lina dies on the 13th instant //
 quote // In the night to the 13th at 2 o'clock ascari
 company from Las Adas has made an ambush in the Garabou
 village about two hours from Las Adas where 2 all rebel
 groups has been reported // Shot 6 rebels // seized 3
 rifles // set fire to 30 tukuls and many shells // This
 mornig the local aviation has bombed tukuls on the North
 Eastern slopes of Mount Yerer where according to information
 from a captured notebook there were dispersed about 300
 surrendered men // This night the ascari battalion is making
 a night-march from Logio to Las Adas and another battalion
 is laying an ambush in the middle of the road between Akaki
 and Dukan // Unquote //

Signature

CHABIANI

SEA P

P.C.C.

IL CAPO DI CANTIERO
A. Mazzi (signed)

c)

See Appendix D. c).

d)

Heading
(in Italian)

EXTRACT
GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ITALIANA S/O
MINISTERO-UFFICIO CENTRALE

Assegnazione
Stat. Maggiore SA.

Provaienza Roma 11 30 Dicembre 1936 ore 21.00
Ricevuto 11 31 Dicembre 1936 ore 07.00

UFFICIO A DI STATO

Per conoscenza: Uff. Informaz.
 Dir. Sup. A.C.P. DEPARTAMENTO M.F.A.
 Sig. Gen/Le Intendente

UFFICIO CENTRALE SPA AGRICOLA ADIS ABABA

Text
(translated
into English)

19211) - - - - -
 Their intentions seem to be peaceful // To-morrow aviation
 will three over 3000 the mission directed to logistic
 taken on according to mine 39011/29 // Part arrears I have
 arranged for all aircraft of our disposal to carry out
 regularly in force about 1000 // Yesterday we to-day
 airforce combined whole neighbourhood to the south //

SI ABABA

CHABIANI

0574

a)

See Appendix N. c)

b)

EXTRACT from

"AS I Saw It No. 17.

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Abe Sabrawarion Wolde michael, age: 42 years old, profession: work, address: Debra Libanos, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

Area, the churches which were burnt by the Italians I witnessed by my own eyes the burning of St. Michael at a place called Tulle Bogio. This happened in the month of Negahit 1929. I cannot recall the exact month and the date but after one year of this happening, I saw the burnt building of St. Trinity Church at a place called Obaro, and I asked the countrymen how it was burnt and they told me that the Italians had burnt it.

Signature: Abe Sabrawarion Wolde michael.

Sworn before me on this the 25th day of October, 1947.

Spille (signed)

Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia."

March 1937

c)

EXTRACT

Reading
(in Italian)

GOVERNIO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
DI TUTTO-UFFICIO DELLA
Aree varie
Stam. Sign. G.S.
no. 36206 di prot. Debra Brehan, 11 25 maggio 1937-XV

Text
(translated into Italian)

RELAZIONE GENERALE
2122 op. -----
At Tolalu (Mens) to-day appeared for submission, handing over 14 rifles, chiefs and clergy of /./ churches in the pergonie district burned by us during the repression at Mens /./

Signature

GIULIO ALBERTI STAFF

d)

(Leaflet dropped - 2, were here)

(Translation)

Letter from Abbeo Amhar, "Archbishop" of Ethiopia, to the Christians living in Ethiopia, Old and Young, Priests and Chiefs.

Rejoice, for great joy has befallen us!

This is what it is: since the days of old, the women King's have the reputation of practicing justice and according attention to the church.

For instance, when King Menelik II had no light of sense worthy to be called a King of Ethiopia, she allowed herself, through her own ability, to be crowned by the Emperor (Archbishop), whilst the King, as a result of the King's Italian agreement, Ethiopia can attain the rank of her ancestors on a par with other monarchs of the world. In the Italian Government, full of compassion, we give us this solemn promise through the viceregent Marshal Caviglioli.

1) The Catholic religion may be preached everywhere without fear.

2) All churches will be scrupulously protected.

3) Those which have been destroyed will be rebuilt. Those which have been burnt down in searching for rebels will be reconstructed.

4) All property and estates in the possession of the Church will be restored to her as in the past.

5) The priests of all who serve in the house of God throughout the country receive food and clothing, and the Government is ready to grant to all who have not yet received them.

6) Authorization is given for the immediate liberation of the numerous clergy and monks who are imprisoned in the Territory of Caesar.

7) Pardon and the restitution of their belongings is accorded to all rebels dwelling in the bush and the mountains, if they submit and give up their arms.

O Priests, reflect upon all this, and advise and instruct the people.

And you, O rebels, who live in the bush and the mountains, if on account of you the churches are burnt and the old people, the women and children are massacred, if the country is destroyed, God will hear their cries and see their blood and will punish you. But if you cease to do wrong, we will obtain pardon for your faults in the past.

Every Christian ought to allow himself to be governed by the King chosen by God.

God has chosen Italy to govern Ethiopia. Consequently he who refuses to submit to the Italian Government is the enemy of God. To refuse to submit to the King that God has chosen is to revolt against Him.

May the curse of Ayyas fall upon those who do not hearken to these words.

Also, I give the following orders to all the heads of the Church and the priests:

(1) Not to give absolution to the rebels;

(2) Not to give them burial by the Church.

I will ensure that every priest who disobeys these orders.

Caesar 7th, 1936 (December 14th, 1937).

(Signed) Abene Archan,

"Archbishop" of Ethiopia.

TELEGRAMMA DI SOSTENUTA

Copia per conoscenza:	S.A.V. Gov. Gen. E. F. Informazioni
	Stato Maggiore
	Com. Sup. Aviazioni
	Governo Militare
	Dir. Sup. A. S. I.
	Ufficio Politico

COLONIA - SUDANESI ROMA

per conoscenza S.E. MINISTRO SUDANESI ASINARA

Text (translated into English)

25/20 against // U.S. East sends the following telegram dated 18th inst. // Quote // Sector sector // The three columns operating between the Galla and Barca Valleys to mop up rebels // yesterday rested to distribute provisions and munitions and were back wounded // They will probably rest to-day as well // because of the difficulty in getting there the necessary supplies // the rest is necessary also because the troops are very tired // Meanwhile the rebels are encircled on three sides and the fourth has been irritated // of course the area is very large and the ground very broken // Escape in small groups will thus always be possible // Fighting on the 5th the 9th and the 10th has shown the rebels setting up a dogged defence and understanding how to lose the fighting into areas that is favourable to them // This explains our losses // Rebel losses are however considerable and the fighting has split up their forces // Our two columns in the north have the strength of more than 1,000 rifles each regular and irregular and the south column Marchetti about 2,000 // So there can be no doubt about the exit // The different columns are continuing to receive submissions and are with good results // Unquote //

Signature

SECRET

S.O.S.
 IN CARTE DI SOSTENUTA
 A. LANZI

2)

SECRET

Heading (in Italian)

TELEGRAMMA DI SOSTENUTA PER SUE SUE ITALIA
 CA MINISTRO SUDANESI
 Pedagogia di urgenza: TELEGRAMMA DI SOSTENUTA
 S.A.V. Gov. Gen. E. F. Informazioni Ufficio Attente Gabinetto
 SUDANESI 7.517 di sost. dell'Ufficio Attente
 Addis Abeba 11 10 novembre 1956-NV

TELEGRAMMA DI SOSTENUTA

Copia per conoscenza:	S.A.V. Gov. Gen. E. F. Informazioni
	Stato Maggiore
	Com. Sup. Aviazioni
	Ufficio Politico

COLONIA - SUDANESI ASINARA

Text (translated into English)

25/25 against - - - - -
 2) Addis Abeba aviation will also have to - - - - - intensify the action in the east - - - - - fighting irregular and irregular elements as well as their objectives that U.S. will be able to // - - - - -

Signature

SECRET

S.O.S.
 IN CARTE DI SOSTENUTA
 A. LANZI (signed)

0579

b)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNAMENTO DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA
 MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA
 Indicazioni di Urgenza: TRASMISSIONE DI STATO
 UFFICIO CENTRALE DI STATO
 GRAZIARI M. 6516 al prot. dell'Ufficio mittente
Addis Abeba li 16 novembre 1936 XV
 TELEGRAMMA IN URTO

Copia per conoscenza: S.E. V. Gov. Gen. Uff. Informazioni
 Stato Maggiore Com. Div. Fusteria
 Com. Sup. Aviaz. Com. Piazza A.A.
 Governatore A.A. Uff. Giust. Mil.
 Dir. Sup. A.S.F. Com. Sup. CC. RR.
 Uff. Politico Colonia "Milano"

UFFICIO CENTRALE DI STATO ROMA
 per conoscenza:
 S.E. ILLSONA PASARUA

Text
(translated
into English)

25023 Cabinet // M.B. Kari wires this on the 16th instant //
 quote //:// "Cercor Central sector //:// Military action which with
 four large battles has reduced the rebel resistance between
 the Radaic valley and the Maren valley //:// is having its effects
 in the political field //:// our patrols are logging up the
 valley imposing submission with following disarming //://
 inevitably even large groups have fled westwards crossing
 hypritated zones //:// where they have no doubt left victims //://

Signature

G. R. I. A. I

p.c.c.
 IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
 A. Lazzi (signed)

b)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNAMENTO DELLA REPUBBLICA ITALIANA
 MINISTERO DELLA GUERRA
 Indicazioni di Urgenza: TRASMISSIONE DI STATO
 UFFICIO CENTRALE DI STATO
 GRAZIARI M. 6516 al prot. dell'Ufficio mittente
Addis Abeba li 23 nov. 1936 XV
 TELEGRAMMA IN URTO

Copia per conoscenza: S.E. Vices Gov. Gen. Uff. Informazioni
 S.E. Capo di S.M. Com. Div. Fusteria
 S.E. Piana Com. Piazza AA.
 Governatore AA. Uff. Giust. Militare
 Dir. Sup. A.S.F. Com. Sup. CC. RR.
 Uff. Politico

S.E. ILLSONA PASARUA ROMA

Text
(translated
into Italian)

27040 Cabinet - - - - -
 //:// Aviation Corps, these days will hammer without pauses
 with bombs of all sorts included those with gas the enemy
 regions //:// and I am supposed to be with his formations
 //:// I think that by these measures I shall build around these
 formations a circle of forces which will put the war in a
 critical situation //://

Signature

G. R. I. A. I

p.c.c.
 IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
 A. Lazzi (signed)

CONFIDENTIAL - SECURITY INFORMATION

... of the ... (M. ...) ... the ...

... the ... (M. ...) ... the ...

I, the undersigned, being a duly qualified ...

Notary Public for the State of ...

WITNESSED my hand and seal this ... day of ... 19...

SEAL

CONFIDENTIAL

of nature

... the ... (M. ...) ... the ...

(M. ...)

... the ... (M. ...) ... the ...

CONFIDENTIAL

... the ... (M. ...) ... the ...

... the ... (M. ...) ... the ...

(M. ...)

0580

(M. ...)

Copia per conoscenza: (cont.)	Governatorato AA	Settore Debra Brehan
	Com. Piazza AA	Settore Koggio
	Dir. Sup. AA. PP.	Settore Ambo
	Intendenza A.C.	

S. E. MINISTRO AFRICA ITALIANA	ROMA
per conoscenza:	
GOVERNO	ASMAHA
GOVERNO	BENDAN
GOVERNO	EMAR
GOVERNO	MOGADISCIO
GOVERNO	SISIA

Text
(translated into English)

27500 Cabinet - - - - -
 Debra Brehan sector // From to-day aviation bombers un-
 ceasingly the rebel stronghold in the Densaba zone in order
 to destroy incandiate terrorize // It will moreover study
 the possibility of flooding the stronghold with hyprite //

Signature

p.c.c.
 IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
 A. Mazzi (signed)

G R A Z I A N I

(Translation)

ROYAL LAW DECREE 1ST OF JUNE, 1936-XIV. N.1019.

Order and administration of Italian East Africa.

(Published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale of June 13th, 1936-XIV N.136)

CHAPTER I.

Political administrative organization of Italian East Africa.

Art. 1.

The territories of the Empire of Ethiopia, of Eritrea and of the Somalia constitute Italian East Africa.

This has legal personality and is governed and represented - in the name of the King Emperor - by a Governor General, who has the title Viceroy of Ethiopia.

Art. 2.

The Empire of Ethiopia is composed of:

- 1) The Government of Amhara, center Gondar,
- 2) The Government of Galla Sidamo, center Gimma,
- 3) The Government of Harar, center Harar,
- 4) The Governatorate of Addis Ababa, which is constituted as municipal administration, under a Governor depending directly of the General Government. (From 11/11-37 Government of Scioa)

Every Government and the Governatorate of Addis Ababa are given legal personality.

Art. 5.

The Governor General, Viceroy, depends directly and exclusively of the Minister of the Colonies. He represents the King Emperor in the Italian East Africa and is the supreme leader of the administration of the same.

The Governor General, Viceroy can reprieve and change sentences, in the name and on behalf of the King Emperor, for subjects of the Italian East Africa, condemned by any ordinary or extraordinary judicial organ of the Italian East Africa.

To the Governor General, Viceroy may be delegated, with regard to the territories depending of him, the faculties regarding the Government of the King.

The Governor General, Viceroy has under his orders all the armed forces in the territories and in the territorial waters of the Italian East Africa.

Art. 6.

For grave reasons of public order or security the Governor General Viceroy can, after authorization by the Minister of Colonies, institute special courts with jurisdiction on the entire Italian East African territory or on part of it. He may also decree that some crimes be judged by the special courts according to the rules and applying the punishments fixed by the legal code for the army in time of war.

Art. 7.

The Governor General, Viceroy has under his immediate orders a Vice Governor General and a Chief of the General Staff.

Art. 8.

The Governor General Viceroy has at his disposal a cabinet directed by a colonial official of the Government roll and formed by officials and employees of the colonial rolls and by officials of the armed forces.

Art. 9.

In case of vacancy, absence or hindrance for the Governor General Viceroy, the direction of the Government General is confided to the Deputy Governor General. In case of vacancy or hindrance for the Deputy Governor General the Minister for the Colonies decides who is to assume the direction of the General Government.

Art. 10.

The Deputy Governor General assists the Governor General Viceroy in carrying out all his functions, and supervises - in particular - all civil and political services of the Italian East Africa.

Art. 11.

At the head of each of the five Governments in which the Italian East Africa is divided there is a Governor.

Art. 12.

The Governors depend on the Governor General Viceroy and carry out the general political, administrative or military directions issued by the Minister of Colonies and transmit them to the local Powers. They cooperate directly with the local Powers in the execution of the ordinary Governmental functions.

Art. 13.

The Governors are entrusted with the instructions given by the Governor General Viceroy - in the exercise of the administrative functions - to the local Powers. In the execution of these instructions, they are assisted by the local Powers. In the exercise of their administrative functions, they have at their disposal the armed forces placed at their disposal by the local Powers.

Art. 14.

The Governors are entrusted with the instructions given by the Governor General Viceroy - in the exercise of the administrative functions - to the local Powers. In the execution of these instructions, they are assisted by the local Powers. In the exercise of their administrative functions, they have at their disposal the armed forces placed at their disposal by the local Powers.

Art. 17.

The Commander of the troops is nominated by Royal Decree on proposal by the Minister for the Colonies, together with the Minister of War and after hearing the Governor General Viceroy.

He is the adviser of the Governor on military matters, supervises the defence of the territory, proposing necessary measures and has the other functions established in the military regulations of the Italian East Africa.

Art. 21.

The Governor General Viceroy and the Governors cannot correspond with the administration of the State except through or with the authorization of the Minister for the Colonies.

Art. 22.

With the General Government is established a General Council, presided by the Governor General Viceroy and composed of:

The federal secretary of the National Fascist Party of the capital of the Italian East Africa.

The above mentioned officials - for single services of the General Government - may be called by the Governor General Viceroy to take part in the Council, with consultative votes, when matters are discussed which are of their competence.

IN CASE OF EMERGENCY
CALL THE FOLLOWING NUMBER
1-800-555-1212

1 1 1 1 1

Signature

of course, the first thing I should mention is that I am
writing to you regarding the matter we discussed in my
last letter. I am sorry that I have not been able to
provide you with the information you requested. I have
been busy with other matters, but I will make sure to
provide you with the information you need as soon as
possible. I am sure that you will understand my
situation. I will contact you again in the near future.
Thank you for your patience and understanding.

Post
(Please send
into the
Post)

For information: 800-555-1212, V.P. 1212, 1212.

1 1 1 1 1

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1212-1212-1212

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

- I. Warfare and massacres - systematic terrorism.
- 1) Summary execution of captured or surrendered patriots.
In general, see Appendix A.
Some patriot chiefs, see Appendix B.
Some other examples, see Appendix C.
 - 2) The killing of native populations in connection with the pillaging and destruction of whole districts.
Some examples, see Appendix D.
 - 3) The Gran'ni-massacres, see Appendix E.
 - 4) The massacre at Debra Libanos, see Appendix F.
- III. Torture of civilians.
Examples, see Appendix G.
- VII. Deportation of civilians.
Examples, see Appendix H.
- VIII. Internment of civilians under inhuman conditions.
Examples, see Appendix I.
- XII. Attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory.
Examples, see Appendix J.
- XIII. Pillage.
Examples, see Appendix D, E and F.
Another example, see Appendix K.
- XIV. Confiscation of property.
XV. Exaction of illegitimate or exorbitant contributions and requisitions.
Examples, see Appendix L.
- XVII. Imposition of collective penalties.
Examples, see Appendix D, E and F.
- XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
Examples, see Appendix D and L.
Some other examples, see Appendix M.
- XIX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.
Examples, see Appendix N.
- XX. Wanton destruction of religious buildings.
Examples, see Appendix O.
- XVI. Use of asphyxiating or noxious gases.
Examples, see Appendix P.
- XXIX. Ill-treatment of wounded and prisoners of war.
Examples, see Appendix A, C and I. C).

NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

The powers of the Governor General and Vice-Roy were laid down in a Royal Decree of June 1st, 1936, see Appendix 3 particularly Articles 5, 12, 13 and 21. This decree regulated also his position in relation to the Minister for the Colonies. As to the relations between Graziani and Lessona, then Minister for the Colonies, some illustration may be derived from a cable from Graziani to Lessona in June 1936, see Appendix 11.

b) The probable defence.

Flea of general order from Mussolini and the necessity of using the utmost rigour in order to break the resistance of the "rebels" and pacify the country.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. The enormous scope of Graziani's criminal activities has here been indicated by way of examples only. The evidence of atrocities directly ordered by him or resulting from a policy laid down by him is already overwhelming, and more will be forthcoming.



X
X
3
51

0589

7880/E/36/3

LESSONA.

Date Submitted	Decision of Committee I
4 MAR 1948	On 'S' for complicity in systematic terrorism.
31 MAR 1948	LESSONA to remain on S. APTS CHECKED LIST 80.

R. Ziv.

7880/E/36/3

10th March, 1948.

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION.

Additional information and evidence to
Ethiopian Case 7087 (Cerulli) submitted
by the Ethiopian Government.

IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION
LONDON.

6 Princes Gate,
S.W. 7.

25th March, 1948.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of the text
of the affidavit referred to in the letter addressed to you by
Baron Leijonhufvud on the 19th March, 1948.

I am, Sir,

Yours sincerely,

(Sgd) (Blatta) KETEMEM YEVELEME MESSIAS.

Minister.

Colonel G. A. Ledingham,
Secretary General,
United Nations War Crimes Commission,
Lansdowne House,
Berkeley Square,
London, W.1.

30th March 1948.

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION.

Additional information and evidence to
Ethiopian case: 7887 (Cerulli), submitted
by the Ethiopian Government.

IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION,
LONDON.

No. 498/40.

EMLEGATI N.
LONDON.

No. 72. Pour Blatta Ephrem. Reference votre 62. Pour Leijonhufvud. Le suivant est résumé de affidavit de Asfaha Wolde Mikael qui est envoyé par première valise diplomatique aérienne et aussi par poste aérienne ordinaire citation J'étais interprète de Cerulli Octobre 1936 à Decembre 1937 en Italie et jusqu'en mai 1939 à Addis-Abéba. En Italie Cerulli était d'abord Secrétaire-Général à disposition du Ministère Colonies comme expert politique éthiopien et ensuite nommé directeur affaires politiques A.O.I. A eu tout le temps pleine confiance et constant accès personnel Mussolini et Lessona qui suivaient invariablement ses conseils sur questions éthiopiennes. J'eus l'occasion examiner archives Ministère Colonies et me souviens spécifiquement avoir vu ordre préparé dans département Cerulli et signé Mussolini qu'à l'occupation d'Addis-Abéba jeunesse instruite éthiopienne devait être liquidée. Connaissant Amharique et ayant connaissances personnelles parmi éthiopiens importants Cerulli interrogeait personnellement prisonniers éthiopiens arrivant en Italie et les classifiait selon leur degré de danger pour intérêts italiens. Position de Cerulli à Rome pendant massacre Graziani était si influente qu'il aurait pu limiter terreur mais il choisit de ne pas intervenir. Mon opinion basée sur paroles et actes et Cerulli est qu'il approuva violente politique de Graziani. Comme Vice Gouverneur de l'A.O.I. Cerulli avait pleine autorité Aosta étant seulement nominalement son supérieur. A ma connaissance Cerulli n'essaya jamais d'intervenir ou de s'informer dans aucun des cas d'atrocités qui étaient soumis à son attention. A l'occasion importante résistance de Debre Berhan Cerulli assumait commandement direct sur champ de Bataille d'opérations militaires telles que la disposition des prisonniers de guerre et contrôle de population locale. La soi-disant modération de la terreur sous Aosta limitée aux villes principales et régions sous domination directe de garnisons militaires mais situation dans régions d'active résistance des patriotes relativement inchangée pendant période Aosta Cerulli. Fin Citation.

0592

6, Prince's Gate,
London, S.W.7.

19th March, 1948.

Copy

Dear Colonel Ledingham,

With reference to the decision, taken by Committee I on 4th March, 1948, to adjourn the Ethiopian case, No. 7887, (Cerulli) pending receipt of additional evidence from Addis Ababa, I have the honour to send you herewith a copy of a deciphered cable to be forwarded to Committee I.

The full text of the affidavit, from which the cable quotes extracts, has been sent from Addis Ababa both by diplomatic bag and by ordinary mail. It ought to arrive here within a week, and thus before the last meeting of Committee I. As soon as it has been received, the Imperial Ethiopian Legation will hand it to you to be considered by Committee I.

I take the liberty to request, most respectfully, that Committee I, when taking up again the case, No. 7887, should also reconsider Case No. 7880 (Lessona) with a view to listing him, if possible, on A. instead of B. These two cases are connected and it seems as if the affidavit, mentioned

Colonel G.A. Ledingham,
Secretary General,
United Nations War Crimes Commission,
Lansdowne House,
Berkeley Square,
London, W.1.

/s/rove

above, confirms the opinion of the Imperial Ethiopian Government that Lessona was so much implicated in the policy of systematic terrorism as to be listed on A. In case Cerulli should not be listed on A, and not even on B, the alternative request is made that he be listed as a witness.

I beg to refer to a short Memorandum on these two cases which I have the honour to enclose for the consideration of Committee I.

I have, Sir, the honour to remain,

Very truly yours,

ERIK MELJORNHEVUD,

Advocate General
of the
Imperial Ethiopian Government.

Corm

MEMORANDUM

REGARDING THE ETHIOPIAN CASES

No. 7880 (LESSONA)

and

No. 7887 (CERULLI)

LESSONA

Lessona was Under-Secretary for the Colonies from 1929 to 11th June, 1936, when he was appointed full Minister for the Colonies. As Under-Secretary he took part in the preparations of the aggression against Ethiopia as can be seen from his book, "Verso l'Impero". His powers and duties as Minister were defined in the Decree the Italians issued on 1st June, 1936, i.e. a few weeks after the occupation of Addis Ababa.

According to this Decree — see Page 4 and Appendix Q. in Case No. 7879 E/lt.2 D(Graziani) to which case reference is made in the charges-sheet for Lessona — the Governor General Viceroy (Graziani) depends directly and exclusively from the Minister for the Colonies (Article 5). Special judicial measures can be taken by the Governor General Viceroy after authorisation by the Minister for the Colonies (Article 6). The Governors (of the provinces) depend from the Governor General Viceroy and carry out the general political, administrative or military directions given by the Minister for the Colonies and transmitted to them by the Viceroy (Article 12). They correspond directly with the Minister for the Colonies for the ordinary Government questions (Article 13). The Commander of the Corps is nominated by Royal Decree on proposal by the Minister for the Colonies, together with the Minister of War and after hearing the Governor General Viceroy (Article 17).

The Governor General Viceroy and the Governor cannot correspond with the administration of the State except through or with the authorisation of the Minister for the Colonies (Article 21).

These extracts from the Decree of the "Order and Administration of Italian East Africa" show Lessona's responsibility constitutionally for what took place in Ethiopia. It was clearly within his competence to interfere with Graziani's command. The next question is whether he did or did not take steps to prevent crimes from being committed. There is not any sign of such steps from his side. The policy, laid down from the very beginning, seems to be clear from the cable (Appendix R to the second charges-sheet for Graziani) from Graziani to Lessona in which Graziani, referring to his record in Lybia, asks for a certain freedom of action. May it be mentioned here that Graziani is well known for the brutality and slaughter in Lybia under his command, and so as "the hyena of Lybia". As is pointed out in Page 4 of the charges-sheet for Lessona, Lessona was then continuously informed by Graziani of all steps taken and of steps going to be taken. There are, in the Graziani case only, a great number of cables addressed by Graziani to Lessona, and there are several, addressed to the Governors or Generals and, in Lessona's absence, to his Ministry, in which Graziani ends: "His Excellency the Minister informed". Lessona visited Ethiopia in the autumn, 1936, on an inspection tour.

That Lessona was an active Colonial Minister seems to be indicated also in the cabled extract from the statement by the interpreter of Cerulli, who was a central figure in

Lessonna's Ministry. And when Mussolini prepared for a new policy in Ethiopia, he removed Lessonna from office, presumably because Lessonna was too much implicated in the previous policy of systematic terrorism.

In view of all this it is requested, most respectfully, that Lessonna be listed on A, instead of on B, for systematic terrorism, since he was apparently "an accessory to, abetted, took a consenting part in, was connected with plans and enterprises involving" the commission of the different atrocities which took place in Ethiopia during his time as Minister for the Colonies.

CERULLI

This case is closely connected with the Lessonna case as far as concerns Cerulli's time as Colonial Official in Rome. Reference may be made to what is stated under (a) in Page 4 of the charges-sheet for Cerulli: "The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position", paragraph A. Reference may also be made to the cabled extract from the statement by Cerulli's interpreter (and of course to the statement in full, if it should arrive before Committee I considers the case). What has been said of Lessonna in the last paragraph above is applicable also to Cerulli, who should therefore, it is respectfully submitted, be listed on A. for systematic terrorism during the time in question.

As to Cerulli's time as Vice-Governor General of Italian East Africa, reference may be made to paragraph B. in Page 4 of the charges-sheet for Cerulli and to the statement by the interpreter of Cerulli. It is respectfully submitted that Cerulli was in his most influential capacity of Vice-Governor General at least "an accessory to, abetted, took a consenting part in, was connected with plans and enterprises involving" the commission of crimes, and that

he should also in respect of this period be listed on A. for the systematic terrorism, which was still exercised in Ethiopia during the time in question.

The United Nations London Information Centre has upon enquiry informed us that Cerulli has never been a member of the United Nations Secretariat.

London,

19th March, 1948.

ERIC LEIFJOHNSTAD.

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ADDRESSED TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE ETHIOPIAN MINISTER IN LONDON

Le suivant est l'attestation déclarée par ASFAHA WOLDE MIKAEL, qui sera envoyée par première valise diplomatique et aussi par poste aérienne ordinaire:-

"J'étais interprète de Cerulli d'octobre 1936 à décembre 1937 en Italie, et jusqu'à mai 1939 à Addis Abéba.

"En Italie, Cerulli était d'abord Secrétaire-Général à la disposition du Ministère des Colonies comme expert politique sur l'Ethiopie et ensuite nommé Directeur des Affaires Politiques d'Afrique Orientale Italienne. A eu tout le temps pleine confirmation et constant accès personnel de Mussolini et Lessona, qui suivaient invariablement ses conseils sur questions éthiopiennes. J'ai eu l'occasion exceptionnelle archives Ministère des Colonies et me souviens spécifiquement avoir vu l'ordre préparer l'occupation d'Addis Abéba. La jeunesse instruite éthiopienne devra être liquidée. Connaissant Amharic et ayant connaissance personnelle parmi Ethiopiens importants Cerulli interrogeait personnellement prisonniers éthiopiens arrivant en Italie et les classifiait selon leur degré de danger pour intérêts italiens.

"Position de Cerulli à Rome pendant massacres Graziani a été si influent qu'il avait pumais il choisit de ne pas intervenir.

"Mon opinion, basé sur les paroles et actes de Cerulli, est qu'il a approuvé violemment politique de Graziani. Comme Vice-Gouverneur d'Afrique Orientale Italienne Cerulli avait pleine autorité. Aosta était seulement nominalement son supérieur. A ma connaissance, Cerulli n'essayait jamais d'intervenir ou de s'informer dans aucun des cas d'atrocités qui avaient été soumis à son attention.

"A l'occasion importante de résistance de Debre Berhan, Cerulli assumait commandement direct sur champs de bataille des opérations militaires, tels que la position des prisonniers de guerre et contrôle de population locale.

"La soi-disant modération de la terrorisation sous Aosta limitait aux villes principales et régions sous direct contrôle de garnisons au milieu desitué dans région d'activité résistance de patriotes relativement inchangée pendant période Aosta Cerulli.

"Faire citation."

N.B. Where the above telegram is not clear, this is indicated by the use of three (or more) dots.

6, Prince's Gate,
 London, S.W.7.
 20th March, 1948.

(For the Use of the Secretariat)

0599

Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

7880/E/IC/3

16 FEB 1948

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

ETHIOPIAN CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 3 *

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

(Not to be translated.)

LESSONA, Alessandro
Minister, Secretary of State for the Colonies
(later Italian Africa).
(In Italian: Ministro Sottosegretario di Stato per le Colonie - Africa Italiana.)

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Lessona's time as Colonial Minister, viz. 11th June 1936-20th November 1937, inclusive. A great number of places all over Ethiopia. Concentration camps outside Ethiopia.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

See Case No. 2 D (Graziani)

References to relevant provisions of national law.

See Case No. 2 D (Graziani)

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

See Case No. 2 D (Graziani).

TRANSMITTED BY

the Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (in the Ministry of Justice, Addis Ababa)

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the accusing State.

(29655) W.P.252 4 5,000 5/45 A. & E. W.Ltd. GP.685
(30449) W.P.1153 17 5,000 10/45

Director General of the Ministry of Justice

PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

See Case No. 2 D (Graziani)

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

See Case No. 2 D (Graziani)

(7879/E/96/2)

NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision ; (b) the probable defence ; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

See Case No. 2 D (Graziani)

Lessona was continually informed by Graziani of all steps taken or going to be taken and must be considered an accessory to the systematic terrorism to which the Ethiopian people was subjected. He visited Ethiopia during Graziani's governorship.

b) The probable defence.

See Case No. 2 D (Graziani).

The difficulty in keeping a tight rein over a man of Graziani's temperament.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

See Case No. 2 D (Graziani).

Possibly even other charges may be brought against Lessona, e.g. of atrocities committed during the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, when Lessona was Undersecretary of State for the Colonies.



0603

7881/E/26/4

CORTESE

Date Submitted	Decision of Committee I
4 MAR 1948	A for mass murder

CAPTS CHECKED LIST 80

R.2

7881/E/26/4

(For the Use of the Secretariat)

0604

Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

7881/E IC/4

16 FEB 1948

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

ETHIOPIAN CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 4 *

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

(Not to be translated.)

CORTI S.M., Guido

Federal Secretary of the National Fascist Party of the capital of the Italian East Africa.

(In Italian: Segretario federale del Partito Nazionale Fascista della capitale dell'Africa Orientale Italiana).

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

February 1937.

Adis Abeba.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

References to relevant provisions of national law.

I. Murder and massacres - systematic terrorism.

XIII. Pillage.

XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.

Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930).

Third part Chapters 5, 9 and 12.

Fourth part Chapters 1, 2 and 6.

Preface Articles 11 and 12.

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Putting to death of thousands of persons, plundering and burning in Adis Abeba on the way of the attempt on Graziani (February 19th, 1937) and the two following days. (The so called Graziani-massacre).

TRANSMITTED BY Division for War Crimes Commission (in the Ministry of Justice, Adis Abeba)

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the accusing State.

(20655) W.P.2524 5,000 5/45 A. & E. W. Ltd. GP.685 (30449) W.C.P. 1183 17 5,000 10/45

Director General of the Ministry of Justice

PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

The organization of the massacre was systematic. The stopping of telegraphic and telephonic communication, in order to prevent people from giving any information to Europe, the closing of the shops, and the evacuation of the streets, were precautionary measures, carried out between 11 a.m., when the bomb had been thrown, and 6 p.m. If the first shooting, in the courtyard and around the Palace, from which hardly a single Ethiopian had escaped alive, occurred under the immediate fear and panic spread by the bomb thrown at Graziani, the massacre which started in the night was carefully prepared during seven hours.

Ethiopians were thrust into lorries, guarded by armed Blackshirts. Revolvers, truncheons, rifles and daggers were used to murder unarmed Ethiopians, of both sexes and all ages. Ethiopian homes were searched and then burnt with their inhabitants inside. The shooting never ceased all night, but most of the murders were committed with daggers and truncheons. Whole streets were burned down, and if any of the occupants of the houses ran out from the flames they were machine-gunned or stabbed. The murder was accompanied by robbery.

A second night of massacre followed, which resembled the first in every way except for some bombing around the town carried out by the military aviation.

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

See Case No. 2 D (Graziani) under I. 3).

NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

As Federal Secretary of the Fascist Party Cortese held an influential position and he played a leading rôle during the Graziani-massacre. It is not quite clear from the evidence collected, who took the initiative to the massacre, but evidence clarifying this point is expected to be forthcoming.

b) The probable defence.

The necessity of punishing "in a model way" such an action as the attempt at the life of Graziani.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. Many affidavits have been taken but more evidence will be collected. Possibly even other charges may be brought against Cortese.



NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

As Federal Secretary of the Fascist Party Cortese held an influential position and he played a leading rôle during the Graziani-massacre. It is not quite clear from the evidence collected, who took the initiative to the massacre, but evidence clarifying this point is expected to be forthcoming.

b) The probable defence.

The necessity of punishing "in a model way" such an action as the attempt at the life of Graziani.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. Many affidavits have been taken but more evidence will be collected. Possibly even other charges may be brought against Cortese.



0608

7882/E/26/5

7

NASI

Date Submitted

Decision of Committee I

4 MAR 1948	A on counts <u>I + XXVI</u> only	CARDS	CHECKED LIST 80
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7882/E/26/5

(For the Use of the Secretariat)

0609

Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

7882/E/IC/5

23 FEB 1948

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

ETHIOPIAN CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 5. *

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position. (Not to be translated.)	<p>N A S I, Gu. Lielmo</p> <p>General, Governor of Harar, Vice Governor General of Italian East Africa and Governor of Shoa, Commander of military operations.</p> <p>(In Italian: Generale, Governatore del Harar, Vice Governatore Generale dell'Africa Orientale Italiana e Governatore dello Scioa, Comandante delle operazioni militari.)</p>
Date and place of commission of alleged crime.	<p>During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Nesi's time as Governor of Harar, viz. up to May 1st, 1939.</p> <p>A number of places in the province.</p>
Number and description of crime in war crimes list. References to relevant provisions of national law.	<p>I, XII, XIII, XIV, XVIII, XVI.</p> <p>Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930)</p> <p>Third part Chapters 5 and 12</p> <p>Fourth part Chapters 1, 2 and 6</p> <p>Preface Articles 11 and 12.</p>

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Terrories during Nesi's governorship in Harar, involving crimes of many kinds, e. . . killing of captured patriots, pursuit of native population by air raids, plundering and burning of whole districts, use of . . .

TRANSMITTED BY

The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (in the Ministry of Justice, Addis Ababa)

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the ~~applying~~ State.

(29656) W.L.P.252 4 5,000 5/45 A. & E. W.Ltd. Gp.685
(30449) W.L.P.1183 17 5,000 10/45

Director General of the Ministry of Justice

PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

- I. Murder and massacres - systematic terrorism.
- 1) Summary execution of captured or surrendered patriots.
 - 2) Other forms of terrorizing the native population. Air raids were for instance often carried out against civilians and cattle.
- XII. Attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory.
The Italians aimed at the elimination of the Ethiopian chiefs and they restricted the possibilities for the Ethiopian youth to receive education.
- XIII. and XIV. Pillage and confiscation of property.
The property of the civil population was frequently seized without proper compensation.
- XV. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
In connection with operations against patriot forces reprisals were carried out by destroying, in vast regions whole villages and other inhabited places.
- XVI. Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases.
Gas was used to support the operations against the patriots.

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
G. B. 1000-101011 GENOVA

UFFICIO DI STAMPA
UFFICIO Edificante: GABRIELLO

2.2.2 (1) di prot. dell'Ufficio Edificante.
Addiz. N. 1000 di 3 marzo 1937 XV.

Indicazioni di urgenza: S. S. A. SU TUTTE LE
S. S. A. GABRIELLO

MANUSCRITTA N. 10000000

Copia per conoscenza: S. S. V. Gov. Gen. Uff. Giust. Mil.
Sig. Capo S. S. Uff. Politico
Dir. Sup. A. C. I. Com. Sup. C. C. M. R.

S. S. AFRICA RO. COLONIE. E. C. I. A.

Text
(translated
into English)

11077 Cabinet // Re mine 10/25 I communicate the full text from H. S. Nasi of the 2nd instant with which he has given directions to the dependent commands about the treatment of rebels captured in fighting or presenting themselves leaving rebel formations // I fully approve the directions in question // quote // H. S. the Viceroy has demanded absolute rigorous observance of the directions of the Duce for the treatment of the rebels // Consequently I give you orders to shoot all // I say all // rebels notables, chiefs, simple men, either captured in action or presented, leaving their formations or isolated fugitives or cunning elements hiding among the local populations or who even though they have not taken active part in the revolt yet are suspected of bad faith or guilty of favouring rebels in a concrete way or only intentionally or if they hide arms // Women are of course excluded // except in particular cases // and children // The commanders addressed will give necessary directions to depending commands and proceed meanwhile to execute elements captured hitherto or who are found in conditions exposed by the above // In particular // I allude // regarding the Cubeddu column // to the nobles or Amhara formerly of rank in the regular troops // about whom the marconigram from Colonel Berio // As to Colonel Santini and Colonel Marengo // the immediate application of the present orders regards particularly rebel elements fleeing from Dale North of Sobeli // Commanders addressed will give me immediate assurances with the word 'Shot' // and communicate to me as soon as possible measures taken and which they will take after time in accordance with these orders // in dubious cases contact me // It is evident that the application of these orders is to be made to companies of columns and detachments and sectors and subsectors and garrisons and not // I say not // to shot to single individuals // The command of the armed forces is ordered to give due directions also to the military authorities of the various commanderies and residences //

GABRIELLO

Signature

In case of ...
unreadable signature

0613

hundred horses and mules // 30 prisoners captured were shot
 to-day // taken many women and children // Pursuit and
 mopping up has continued until the evening // Airforce has
 contributed in an efficient and bold way with reconnoitring
 // bombing // machine gunning // Enemy losses hitherto
 ascertained 500 killed // among whom fitaurari safera //
 our losses one officer seriously wounded // Lieutenant Magno
 Damiano of the 4th Colonial infantry // one subaltern
 wounded // Two Lybian ascari killed and three wounded //
 two killed and five wounded among our Galla cavaliers // At
 the brigade command have presented themselves // Grasmac
 Ilma Macare former commander of a battalion of regulars from
 Sale // At the end of last September he had repeatedly
 written to General Cubeddu asserting his intention to submit
 // he could not carry out the intention because he was
 hindered by the rebels // This Grasmac asserts he has later
 been imprisoned by Balade and managed to flee only yesterday
 during the fighting // he reports that in the fighting took
 part fitaurari Ganad and Sciabeka Asfau and the pseudo degiac
 Abebe and grasmac safera with another 200 armed men and 50
 machine guns // I have given orders to General Cubeddu //
 that after drawing out of Ilma Macare all the indications that s
 he thinks will be valuable for future operations and especi-
 ally for ascertaining the number of heavy arms and the
 complicity of the chiefs and notables of Bali, he is to shoot
 him // Berio column // continuing its march towards Ghigner
 // last night reached Andona // 40 kms from Ghigner // On
 the whole zone of operations violent weather hinders move-
 ments and connections // To-day and to-morrow the operating
 columns will be supplied with provisions from the air //
 yesterday one machine failed to return to the base at Irgalem
 // Energetic searching // Patrols Arussi and Cercer guard
 the fords // ready to shoot at fugitives who might try to
 escape across the river // Unquote //

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

P.C.C.
 p. IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
 unreadable signature "

c)

Reading
(in Italian)

"GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'A.O.I.

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
 Assegnazione
 STATO MAGGIORE GG.

GABINETTO-OFFICIO CIFRA
 N.154/4

Provenienza S.E. Nasi li 4 marzo ore 16.00 1937
 Ricevuto il 4 marzo ore 18.00

TELEGRAMMA IN ARRIVO

Per conoscenza: SUPERAEREO
 INTENDACI
 DIR.SUP.ACP.
 UFF.POLITICO

DECIFRATO M.P.A.

GOVERNO GENERALE STATO MAGGIORE
 GOVERNO GENERALE GABINETTO
 GOVERNO
 COMANDO FORZE ARMATE

ADDIS ABEBA
 ADDIS ABEBA
 HARRAR
 HARRAR

e. per conoscenza:
 SUA ECCELLENZA GELOSO
 COMANDO FORZE ARMATE SOMALIA
 SUPERAEREO
 INTENDENZA A.O.I.
 INTENDENZA A.O.I.

GIERA
 MOGADISCIO
 ADDIS ABEBA
 ADDIS ABEBA
 DIRE DAUA

Text
(translated
into English)

2020 m/Op.//// From the questioning of prisoners
 it is clear that rebel forces in front of the Berio column are
 made up of some hundreds of armed men commanded by grasmac

0614

Imbura from Ghigner, reinforced by other forces coming from the Cololcia region and by 500 soldiers under Fitaurari Tesslera who arrived yesterday morning on the spot ././ Rebel losses ascertained amount to 200 killed among whom grasmac Balata and 15 prisoners who were immediately executed ././ Our losses ././ underlieutenant Nizzolo of 10th Libyan battalion seriously wounded and lieutenant Cherubini of the Libyan Artillery Section slightly wounded ././ 13 native soldiers killed and 25 wounded ././ The population continues to re-enter Goba ././ On the 2nd another 200 rifles captured ././ Fitaurari Tesemma from Ghigner and cagnasmac Ghesau who presented themselves were immediately executed along with all other elements who had appeared ././/./

Signature

N A S I "

d)

Reading
(in Italian)

"STAMP
GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO - UFFICIO CIFRA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Ufficio mittente GABINETTO
N.3196 di prot.dell'Ufficio
mittente
Addis Abeba li 8 marzo 1937-XV

Indicazioni di urgenza
M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE M.P.A.

GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza:

S.E.V. Gov.Gen.	Uff.Giust.Milit.
Stato Maggiore	Intendenza A.O.I.
Superaereo	Com.Piazza SA.
Dir.Sup.A.C.p.	Com.Sup.CC.RR.
Uff.Politico	

S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE

ROMA

Text
(translated
into English)

11974 Cabinet ././ Mopping up in the Gurè region where took place the fighting of the Cubeddu column on the 5th led to the capture of 130 armed men who have been shot and many women and children from the rebel caravan ././ Seized 150 rifles and one machine gun ././ Berio column because of the high water in the Dara Combo torrent has not yet been able to reach Gurè ././ Aircrafts have bombed the valleys of escape of the rebels north of Mount Abinas with efficient result ././ On the left Scabeli under group dubat placed of Abul Cassim has surprised rebel regulars exploring the fords of the river ././ Killed 10 rebels and sent 11 more to the sector command to be questioned after which they will be shot ././ Recovered 25 very new 'Mauser' and 150 shots for each armed man ././ Our patrols dubat have passed on to the right bank of the river to try to get into touch with the rebels ././ Informers and our patrols confirm the splitting up of the rebels in the difficult and busy valleys of Mount Abinas and Mount Cubaie ././ Supply of provisions and munitions from the air by the division 'Libia' ././ As soon as the troops have got supplies an adequate force will proceed to occupy Ghigner ././

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

P.C.C.
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. Mazzi (signed)

STAMP "

0615

Reading
(in Italian)

"GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO UFFICIO CIFRA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Assegnazione

STATO MAGGIORE GOVERNO GENERALE
No. 25903 di prot.
Harrar, li 14 aprile 1937-XV^o

GOVERNO GENERALE = GABINETTO ADDIS ABEBA
GOVERNO GENERALE = STATO MAGGIORE ADDIS ABEBA

Text
(translated
into English)

1914/Op/13 (.) Following my 3800 (.) Prisoners captured on the
eleventh declared that Banade (,) with other chiefs (,) at the
first stage of the fighting (,) fled into the bush towards the
frontier (.) According to later information Banade with Lucria
and Tafara and Belaccio and about 150 fugitives arrived early
in the day at the English frontier at Baramo (.) The mopping
up of the battle field confirms that a total defeat has been
inflicted to the rebels (,) of whom 132 killed were counted
on the spot (,) moreover many other scattered men and numerous
wounded have been executed with the prisoners (.) One machine-
gun and 200 rifles and 150 mules besides much food and a great
quantity of booty were taken (.) Continuing the mopping up
action in the district another 26 fugitives captured today
were executed (.) Our patrols are out in all directions to
capture scattered groups which try to attain the Harrar
frontier (text unclear) (.) Divers groups who had abandoned
fitaurari Banade continue to present themselves (.)

Generale N A S I

SIAMP "

Signature

f)

Reading
(in Italian)

"GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO UFFICIO CIFRA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Mittente: GABINETTO

N.6616 di prot.
Addis Abeba li 22 aprile 1937 XV.
TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.E.V. Gov. Gen.
Stato MAGG.
Dir. Sup. ACP
Ufficio Polit.
Com. Sup. CCRR.

Text
(translated
into English)

S.E. MINISTRO AFRICA ITALIANA ROMA
21212 Cabinet // H.E. Nasi has wired // Quote // 6246
Commission for clearing concentration camps in Bale and
Harrarino where all the rebels were concentrated who after
the operations in Bale surrendered without condition //
after ending the examination of the number of submitted
amounting in all to about 4.000 // has arrived at the
following conclusions // Firstly // Proposes to report to
the court martial // the number of 53 elements // old
chiefs or rebel leaders // already submitted and then again
returned to the rebels // or else instigators or authors of
raids and attacks // Secondly // Proposes for confinement
elements numbering 170 mostly chiefs and nobles // politi-
cally undesirable and priests // sooksa ers // and wizards
as per telegram 15649 of March 22 from that general govern-
ment // Thirdly // Proposes to forced labours on the roads
with police guard // elements numbering 14 // simple
soldiers in the ranks of the rebels and who are because of
their youth and their robust physical strength better kept
out of the circulation and put to use // Fourthly // has
proposed in a liberty 745 elements simple privates never sub-
mitted // peasants forced to follow rebel chiefs // slaves
// and finally people advanced in age and of weak physical

conditions //.. Finally //.. was put into liberty and sent to original places about 2,000 among whom women and children //.. Sixty //.. was shot without trial at sea & chiefs from the Serapi //.. traitors //.. submitted there //.. Please wire me if the 170 men mentioned under secondly can be sent to the Demane camp in Somalia //.. Unquote //.. I have answered like this //.. Quote //.. As yours 6246 //.. I order that the 54 elements mentioned in the first paragraph be shot without trial if they are too numerous to make a process //.. Equally are to be shot all the bootleggers and wizards except the priests mentioned in the second part //.. The rest of the 170 are to be sent to Demane after direct agreement with the Somali government //.. No observations for the rest //.. Please give me assurance with the word "liquidazione" //.. Unquote //..

S O M A L I

S.C.C.
 IL CAPO DI MESSAGGIO
 S. Scelli (signed)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ITALIANA
 CAPOMESSAGGIO-UFFICIO CERCA
 N. 20528.
 TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
 Provvedimento numero 11 23/4/1957 Ore 22.00
 Ricevuto 11 23/4/1957 Ore 22.30.
 ENCIMMATO
 RIA/ IN TUTTA LA RPA

TELEGRAMMA IN ARRIVO

Per conoscenza: Dir. Adm. Dist. Milit.
 CC.MR. Uff. Politico

GOVERNO GENERALE ADESO ADESA

Text
(translated into English)

6403 Political //.. As yours 20211 //.. As Your Excellency knows well 600 I say 600 chiefs and privates were killed in the first times in the valley who had surrendered at our mercy or had themselves submitted and had presented themselves for submission //.. Later on to favour the dissolution of the formations which had passed the Uol Sebelle with the Sitauri Bahade and proceeded eastwards, I asked Y.E. when I came to Adde Awele to be authorized to grant the life to those who, for submission //.. Y.E. agreed in a line of a "parole" and concluded with the word "relativita" //.. Thus as for Sitauri Bahade I took upon myself to promise security of life to the captured over killed and the captured alive, according to what was said on the 22nd of June 1957 I sent to the Uol Sebelle //.. On the basis of the above mentioned agreement I was obliged to advise "ad" to columns which they withdrew to the hills of the valleys which the General Serapi had the Sebelle to favour submissions promising security of life to the captured and submitted as had various submitted before and I received the same with the "ad" at Serapi the second day of submission with letters to which I had //.. The letters were then countersigned by our officers //.. It was as solely to propagate that 4,000 persons were shot 200 chiefs and notables left alive as admitted, but in fact about 2,000 killed //.. I am in great trouble for the reason that a great part of those submitted could have reached Somalia if they were or delivered with increasing the conditions which I had to live as serious troubles and difficulties, especially during the winter //.. As other things I am in trouble of the kind which are inevitable effects of the efforts for submission in Somalia //.. I am in great trouble for the reason that a great part of those submitted live

0617

(A. J. ...)

relatives in the ...
 // Always when I had all the prisoners put into concentra-
 tion camps the rumors were spread that the Government had shot
 all the ... // ... pointed out to me that at the
 Jersey that police created panic and commotion also because
 leaders who in the name of the Government had promised safety,
 feared the vendetta // For these reasons I beseech I.E. to
 let the court procedure be carried through, assuring you that
 it will be very severe and will end with capital punishment
 for the ... and dangerous ... // Wizards and
 soothsayers will be shot without trial //

Signature

N A S I

relatives in the Reichstag and in the various Detachments
// Although there I had all the evil vents put into concentration
the camp had reason was reason that the Government had shot
all the trials // Residents pointed out to me that at the
beginning that notice created panic and commotion also because
leaders are in the name of the Government had promised safety,
fears the vendetta // For these reasons I beseech U.S. to
let the court procedure be carried through, assuring that
it will be very severe and will end with capital punishment
for the traitors and dangerous enemies // Wizards and
soothsayers will be shot without trial //

St. Nazare

N A S I

Faint header text at the top of the page, possibly including a date or reference number.

Section of text in the upper middle part of the page, containing several lines of illegible characters.

Section of text in the middle of the page, appearing as a separate block.

Main body of text in the lower middle section, consisting of multiple lines of illegible characters.

Section of text located below the main body, possibly a signature or a specific reference.

Section of text in the lower part of the page, containing several lines of illegible characters.

Section of text in the bottom left area, possibly a footer or a concluding note.

Large number '0618' printed at the bottom center of the page.

Faint text at the bottom left, possibly a page number or reference.

Faint text at the bottom right, possibly a page number or reference.

Vertical text on the right side of the page, possibly a margin note or a list of items.

... in the ...
... of the ...

(Gen. ...)
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0613

(MIST)

0620

SECRET

a)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO CENTRALE DELL'ETIOPIA
MINISTERO DELLE GUERRE

Indirizzo di Roma:
M.P.A.

MINISTERO DI STATO
UFFICIO CENTRALE DI STATO

... Direzione di Stato, Ufficio Attente.
... Roma 14 11 1956-IV

MINISTERO DI STATO

Copia per:

C.M.V. Col. Gen.
Com. Sup. Aviazione
St. Maggiore
Governo Civile
Dir. Sup. A.C.P.

UFF. Politico
UFF. Inform. Interni
Com. Difesa A.A.
UFF. Bus. Mil.
Com. Sup. C.C.M.

S.E. MINISTERO COLONIALE ROMA

Text
(translated
into English)

1115 Cabinet // General Tassiterra vice of the 12th //
Quote // Those sent on patrol action 4 is again returned
at 15 hours without seeing a trace of armed men // Informants
confirm the gravity of rebel losses, causing them to retreat
to the interior of the zone // To-morrow I will carry out
reconnoitring in force in the zone south of railway //
Situation calm // Unquote // Dire Dawa aviation to-day
carried out offensive patrol over the zone across the railway
at Malca Gilo // On request of General Tassiterra CA 133 in
Dire Dawa has had groups of tribals and natives in flight
15 kms West the Malca Gilo country.

Signature

F T A T T A T I

S.E.C.
EL CAPO I IN STATO
(Ten. Col. in serv. di
S.M. Alberto Masini)
A. Masini

b)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO CENTRALE DELL'AMERICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
MINISTERO DELLE GUERRE

Indirizzo di Roma:
M.P.A. X UFFICIO DI STATO
MINISTRI

MINISTERO DI STATO
UFFICIO ATTENTE STATISTICO

... Direzione di Stato, Ufficio Attente.
... Roma 14 11 1956-IV

MINISTERO DI STATO

Copia per:

C.M.V. Col. Gen.
Com. Sup. Aviazione
St. Maggiore
Governo Civile
Dir. Sup. A.C.P.

UFF. Politico
UFF. Inform. Interni
Com. Difesa A.A.
UFF. Bus. Mil.
Com. Sup. C.C.M.

S.E. MINISTRO

EL CAPO I IN STATO

Text
(translated
into English)

... Direzione di Stato, Ufficio Attente.
... Roma 14 11 1956-IV

... Direzione di Stato, Ufficio Attente.
... Roma 14 11 1956-IV

0621

(A report...)

c)

SECRET

(Translation)

... ..
... ..
... ..

... ..

... ..

Copies for reference:	Gen. Gov. Gov.	Gen. Gov. Aviation
	State Sec. Sec.	Governor A.A.
	Min. Sec. A.A.	Min. Police
	Min. Education	Gen. Sec. A.A.
	Min. Sec. Health	Gen. Sec. Sec.

... ..

Text
(Translated into English)

... ..
 On the 12th instant
 following my telegram
 precision
 at 12 hours
 overcame
 in all in the two days
 killed and 32 wounded
 cattle
 killed have been escorted
 towards the south and west
 groups of rebels
 to await baggage
 provided for the construction
 Unquote

Signature

... ..

S.C.C.
IN CAPI DE CABINETO
A. Maszi

SECRET
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

DATE: 10/15/54
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

(TOP SECRET)

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

(TOP SECRET)

[Illegible typed text]

(TOP SECRET)

[Illegible typed text]

(TOP SECRET)

Text
(Translated
into English)

11.09/0p// ... that ... the 10th ...
... military ...
... rebel resistance
... is having
... our ...
... following
... have fled westwards
... where they have ... left
victims ...

Signature

SECRET

IN ...
A. Ladd (M. ...)

c)

SECRET

Reading
(in Italian)

GOVERNAMENTO ITALIANO ...
CABINETTO-UFFICIO STAMPA
N. 17600
Assessorato Superiore
Previdenza Naver 11 11 marzo ore 11.30, 1937
Ricevuto 11 12 marzo ore 09.15

TELEGRAMMA IN ARABO

per conoscenza: Stanz. M.F.A. SU TUTTE LE R.P.A.
Direz. ASP.
Intend. Uff. Polit.

- | | |
|----------|------------------|
| Uff. ... | ADDES ANBA |
| | MARCA DANEGGIA |
| | ADDES ANBA |
| | ADDES ANBA |
| | IRGALIC-ANBA-IMI |
| | CIWA DAUA |
| | IMAR |
| | KOLI |
| | AFGIOMA |

Text
(Translated
into English)

11.09/0p// As already reported to Y.S. this morning rebel
formations ...
led by ...
Cassae // Tula // ...
Anbau // ...
caga // ...
may thus prove to be ...
armed men 1.000 ...
in the caravan a very great number of cattle 15 machine guns
100 rifles // It has been a long uninterrupted passage
between our lines of ...
This is the result of the military action carried out from
February 22 until to-day ...
action with ...
with it // ...
accomplished ...
and political ...

Signature

SECRET

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

- I. Murder and massacres - systematic terrorism.
1) Summary execution of captured or surrendered patriots.
In general, see Appendix A.
Some examples, see Appendix D.
2) Other forms of terrorizing the native population.
Examples, see Appendix D a) and c).
- XII. Attempt to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory.
Examples, see Appendix C.
- XIII. and XIV. Plunder and confiscation of property.
Examples, see Appendix D b) and c).
- XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
Examples, see Appendix D.
- XXVI. Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases.
Examples, see Appendix E.

NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision ; (b) the probable defence ; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

As Governor of the province of Marar Nasil according to the Decree of June 24th, 1936, depended on the Governor General Viceroy, had to carry out the general, political, administrative or military directions given by the Minister for the Colonies and transmitted to him by the Viceroy and corresponded directly with the Minister for the Colonies for the ordinary Government questions. He directed - following the instructions given by the Governor General Viceroy - the politics and the administration in the territory of his jurisdiction. He had at his disposal the armed forces placed in the territory (Nasi was even the commander of them).

b) The probable defence.

Plea of superior orders. Reference to "Il mio Credo", a pamphlet containing some of Nasi's circular orders (after the Graziani period), in which he condones such acts as torture, summary executions or razzias.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. There are, however, several affidavits recently taken in the Marar province that have not yet been translated into the Arabic. The collection of evidence continues.

Possibly also other charges may be brought against Nasi, e.g. concerning his title as Vice-Governor General.



0626 7883/E/26/6

PIRZIO BIROLI

Date Submitted Decision of Committee I

<p>4 MAR 1948</p>	<p>A for murder use of poisonous gases</p>	<p>CARDS CHECKED R. S. CHECKED</p>	<p>LIST 30 LIST 30</p>
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7883/E/26/6

(For the Use of the Secretariat)

0627

Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

7883/E/IC/6.

28 FEB 1948

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

ETHIOPIAN CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 6.*

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

FIRZIO BIRCOLI, Alessandro

General, Governor of Adhara

(Not to be translated.)

(In Italian: Generale, Governatore dell'Adhara)

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Firzio Bircoli's time as Governor of Adhara, viz. up to the end of 1937.

A number of places in the province.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

I, III, VIII, XIII, XIV, XVII, XIX, XXVI.

References to relevant provisions of national law.

Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930)

Third part Chapters 5 and 12

Fourth part Chapters 1, 2 and 6

Preface Articles 11 and 12.

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Terrorism during Firzio Bircoli's governorship in Adhara, involving crimes of many kinds, e.g. killing of captured patriots and of civilians, pillage, destruction of whole districts, use of gas.

TRANSMITTED BY The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (in the Ministry of Justice, Addis Ababa)

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the receiving State.

(29655) W.P.252 4 5,000 5 45 A. & E. W.Ltd. Gp.685 (30449) W.P.1183 17 5,000 10/45

Director General of the Ministry of Justice

PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

- I. Murder and massacres - systematic terrorism.
Summary execution of captured or surrendered patriots and killing of civilians, often after torture.
- III. Torture.
See under I.
- VIII. Deportation of civilians.
The population of one district was removed to another.
- XIII and XIV. Pillage and confiscation of property.
The property of the civil population was frequently seized without proper compensation.
- XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
In connection with operations against patriot forces, reprisals were carried out by destroying in vast regions whole villages and other inhabited places.
- XIX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.
See under XVIII.
- XVI. Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases.
Gas was used to support the operations against patriots and to terrorize the civil population.

Faint, mostly illegible typed text, possibly a report or memo, with some words like "L'Espresso" and "L'Espresso" visible.

Handwritten notes or signatures on the left margin, including the word "L'Espresso".

Signature

Handwritten notes or signatures on the left margin.

Section of typed text, possibly a header or introductory paragraph, with some words like "L'Espresso" and "L'Espresso" visible.

- U.S. Politico
- Mr. Informant
- Mr. Pictoria
- Mr. Piazza A.
- Mr. Sinst. Lit.
- Intelligence HQ.

Handwritten notes or signatures on the left margin.

Main body of typed text, containing several paragraphs of faint, mostly illegible text.

Signature

... ..

... ..

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d)

EXTRACT from

"MARTINOVITZ, S. M."

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name:

1) I took part in the

... ..

... ..

Statement

Statement

I, the undersigned, name: Alberto de la Cruz,
born: 1912, profession: Merchant,
do hereby state as follows:

1) In 1935 (A.D.), when the Italians came to invade Ethiopia, I was a soldier (sergent) in the Italian army. In the same year, in the month of August (April 1936), I entered Gondar and stayed there for some months, after which I went to Amara on leave, hearing about the death of my wife. On my return, I went directly to Sabra Tabor and stayed there for six months. Then hearing that the inhabitants of Gondar, Bahir and Lalisa were exterminated cruelly, Colonel Saroni sent me to the resident of Gondar, called Captain Guatani. As I arrived there, Captain Guatani also arrived immediately at Gondar from Bahir. On the third day, after entering Gondar, I saw the said Captain torturing to death with hot iron Yalson Rodim, Mangista and the Asafaon Bahir, all saying that they had concealed arms.

2) In the month of October, 1936 (A.D.) (October 1937), Major Sasso who was commander of Italian Battalion, went to Gondar and surrounded Pitsarari Gondarsson Kigabu, arrested him and brought him to Sabra Tabor, where he was hanged after many torments, while four women who came with him were prepared for execution. I informed Colonel Saroni about it and saved them.

3) In the month of August, 1937 (A.D.) (August 1937), when the Italian troops went to the country called Guelisa near Gondar, where there were guerrillas, under the command of Captain ... I also went with them as a soldier of the ... First we passed through Gondar and burned a house of a guerrilla at ... which we continued our march. After a day's march, guerrillas fired at us, when we arrived at ... Then we hid ourselves under a structure of ... for four days. On the fifth day Colonel Saroni sent three soldiers with supply of ammunition for ... to us. While they were on their way to ... guerrillas seized the ammunition and their arms and they arrived at ... in Gondar. All soldiers of the country, ... guerrillas and brought ... guerrillas, ... to us, when we were camped at ... The Italians ... them by ... without ... Then, the ... his execution. Colonel ... there were ... I explained ... the ... showed ... they have ... of ...

of nature: ...
... of January, 1938.
... (signed)
... and ...

SUMMARY

SECRET
published by
GOVERNMENT A.C.I.
Allegato al II Volume
Page 278.

Original
(in Italian)

SOMMARIO IN ITALIANO

Mittente: E.S. Alfredo Sirilli - Londra
Destinatario: Governo Generale Staggliore - Addis Abeba,
Data di presentazione: 27 gennaio 1937 - IV.

Text
(translated
into English)

464. Following line 459. Morrin, an action continues
in the Harabat region. Districts in the Harabat territory
destroyed. The zone is situated between Havia Araba Cola.
Topographical map 1:400,000. This zone has always supported
brigandage. Wife of brigand chief Uola Toscana captured.
Seized 17 rifles and 220 shots. Have ordered population to
be deported to Abat. The fertile Harabat territory will
be put under the government. Further communications to be
sent later on.

... church ... arrived ... stopped ... instant ...

SECRET

SECRET

...
...
...
A. Mari (signed)

c)

EXTRACT
SI I^o ANNO LUIS' H'ERNO
published by
Governor Generale A.O.I.
State Maggiore.
Allegati al II^o Volume.
Page 278

(Translation)

182. Following 161. on the 24th destruction of the districts in the Marchat territory is carried on. The latter set on fire contained a great number of cartridges. It is clear that the present regulation demands the brigand chief did not do otherwise. It is also proved that in Marchat preparations were made for an attack against our workers on the road from ... 57 natives have been shot. Among them those who on the 26th lived at our Banda Sion. Seized 10 rifles. ... Amara Susquai. Amara Susquai district proved to be involved in all the bloodsheds taking place in the ... further news later.

d)

EXTRACT
SI I^o ANNO LUIS' H'ERNO
published by
Governor Generale A.O.I.
State Maggiore.
Allegati al II^o Volume.
Page 273.

(Translation)

187. ... near the ...
...
...
...
...

SECRET
 No. 17
 published by
 Governor General
 State of
 All rights reserved.
 Page 100.

Handwritten
 (1933-1934)

Text
 (translated
 into English)

SECRET

Attested: ...
 Destitute: ...
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 ... local ...
 ... with ...
 ... on the ...
 ... in ...
 ... to ...
 ... with ...
 ... at ...
 ... the ...
 ... to ...
 ... by ...
 ... of ...
 ... of ...

Signature

SECRET

GOVERNATO GENERALI DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA

1/10/42

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1/10/42

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1/10/42

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PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

- I. Murder and massacres - systematic terrorism.
Examples, see Appendix A.
Another example, see Appendix D b).
- III. Torture.
Examples, see Appendix A c) and e).
- VIII. Deportation of civilians.
See Appendix B.
- XIII and XIV. Plunder and confiscation of property.
Example, see Appendix C.
Another example, see Appendix A d).
- XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
Examples, see Appendix D.
- XIX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.
Example, see Appendix D a).
- XXVI. Use of bacteriological and gaseous weapons.
Examples, see Appendix E.
Evidence of policy, see Appendix D a).

NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision ; (b) the probable defence ; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

As Governor of the province of Adara Pirzio Biroli according to the Decree of June 1st, 1936, deposed of the Governor General Viceroy, had to carry out the general, political, administrative or military directions given by the Minister for the Colonies and transmitted to him by the Viceroy and corresponded directly with the Minister for the Colonies for the ordinary Government questions. He directed - following the instructions given by the Governor General Viceroy - the politics and the administration in the territory of his jurisdiction. He had at his disposal the armed forces placed in the territory (Pirzio Biroli was even the commander of them).

b) The probable defence.

Plea of superior orders.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. There are, however, several affidavits recently taken in the province in question that have not yet been translated from the Adamic. The collecting of evidence continues.

Possibly also other charges may be brought against Pirzio Biroli.



0640

7884/E/26/7

GELOSO

Date Submitted

Decision of Committee I

4 MAR 1948

A on all
counts except XIX ~~and XX~~ LIST 80

7884/E/26/7

0640

7884 / E / 26 / 7

GELOSO

Date Submitted

Decision of Committee I

4 MAR 1948

A on all
counts except XIX ~~LIST 80~~ LIST 80

7884 / E / 26 / 7

(For the Use of the Secretariat)

0641

Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

7884/E/IC/7

23 FEB 1948

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

ETHIOPIAN CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 7.*

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

(Not to be translated.)

G. S. L. O. S. O., Carlo

General, Governor of Galla Sidamo.

(In Italian: Generale Governatore dei Galla e del Sidamo.)

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Celoso's time as Governor of Galla Sidamo, viz. up to September 9th, 1938.

A number of places in the province.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

I, XIV, XVIII, XIX, ~~XXI~~, XXVI

References to relevant provisions of national law.

Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930)

Third part Chapters 5 and 12

Fourth part Chapters 1, 2 and 6

Preface Articles 11 and 12.

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Terrorism during Celoso's governorship in Galla Sidamo, involving crimes of many kinds, e.g. execution of captured patriots, killing of civilians, destruction of whole districts, burning of undefended places, use of gas.

TRANSMITTED BY The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (via the Ministry of Justice, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia)

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the Receiving State.

(29655) W.P.2524 5,000 5/45 A. & E. W.Ltd. GP.685
(30449) W.P.1153 17 5,000 10/45 " " " "

Director General of the Ministry of Justice

PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

- ✓ I. Murder and massacres - systematic terrorism.
Summary execution of captured, or surrendered patriots,
killing of civilians in connection with destruction of whole
districts.
- x)
- ✓ XIV. ~~XXXX~~ Confiscation of property.
Confiscation of cattle when carrying out operations.
- ✓ XVII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
In connection with operations against patriot forces
reprisals were carried out by destroying in vast regions
whole villages and other inhabited places.
- ✓ XIX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.
Air bombardments were carried out on a large scale and
comprised also, intentionally, places containing no military
objectives.
- ✓ XXVI. Use of blistering and asphyxiating gases.
Gas was used in operations against patriot forces.

x)

- XII. Attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of
occupied territory.
Destruction of historic elements.

a)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNAMENTO ITALIANO - MILITARE ITALIANO
MILITARE ITALIANO

1. 31940

11.11.43

Area missiones: Adige

Spedizione in Ab. a. 11.11.43 ore 00,10
Misure: 11.11.43 ore 05,30

IN OMNIA

Per conoscenza: Dir. 3.03.3.01. Dir. 3.03.3.01.1.
S. S. Piazza Dir. 3.03.3.01.1.
DIREZIONE: Dir. 3.03.3.01.1.

CAPITANO Rossi In. 11.11.43

per conoscenza:

GENERALI FACCENDA ANTONIO ADDESSA

Text
(translated
into English)

11.11.43 // U.S. Chief of Government orders reprisals over
the zone where on the 5th November this year the crew of
our No 37 fell with glory // As soon as you arrive at
Adels enter news about the heroic end of our airmen, who
disappeared at a place named, near Adels and were castrated
treated with cruelty and left unburied // Destroy the whole
locality with iron and fire // Shoot all inhabitants,
confiscate all cattle give notice that on Salazar's
Adels and his officers the burial of our heroes I put a
prize of 500 dollars for air landing over alive or dead //
Show what are the possibilities of the air force to intervene
in making reprisals // I inform you, that to the zone and
the first goal of the next band per the Italian to
Adels // Take steps to prevent possible incidents between
the two columns of our troops // report //

Signature

11.11.43 stamp

b)

SUBJECT

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNAMENTO ITALIANO - MILITARE ITALIANO
MILITARE ITALIANO

Indicazioni di organza:

11.11.43

M.P.A. SU TUTTA LA M.P.A.

M.P.A.

URAGANI

M. 3079 di prot.

11.11.43

MILITARE ITALIANO

Copia per conoscenza:

S. S. 7.03.3.01

Com. Piazza

S. S. 7.03.3.01

Dir. Giust. M.

S. S. 7.03.3.01

Intendenza A. S.

S. S. 7.03.3.01

Com. 3.03.3.01.1.

Dir. 3.03.3.01.1.

Dir. 3.03.3.01.1.

11.11.43

11.11.43

per conoscenza:

11.11.43

Text
(translated
into English)

11.11.43 // U.S. Chief of Government orders reprisals over
the zone where on the 5th November this year the crew of
our No 37 fell with glory // As soon as you arrive at
Adels enter news about the heroic end of our airmen, who
disappeared at a place named, near Adels and were castrated
treated with cruelty and left unburied // Destroy the whole
locality with iron and fire // Shoot all inhabitants,
confiscate all cattle give notice that on Salazar's
Adels and his officers the burial of our heroes I put a
prize of 500 dollars for air landing over alive or dead //
Show what are the possibilities of the air force to intervene
in making reprisals // I inform you, that to the zone and
the first goal of the next band per the Italian to
Adels // Take steps to prevent possible incidents between
the two columns of our troops // report //

Signature

a)

(In Italian)

SERVIZIO CENTRALE DI SICUREZZA
 DIREZIONE CENTRALE
 Via ...
 Roma, il ...
 Ufficio ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...

Text (Translated into English)

...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...

Signature

(Signed)

b)

(In Italian)

...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...

Text (Translated into English)

...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...

Signature

c)

(In Italian)

...
 ...
 ...
 ...
 ...

Text (Translated into English)

Copy of document	Submitted	by
(cont.)	Governor G. A.	Colonel G. A.
	Colonel G. A.	Colonel G. A.

Text
(Translated
into English)

S. E. GREGG G. A. G.

2701 G. A. G. / I have note / I have
 complete, and I would like to refer, to me to give you
 a report, how I think, and how that troops of this
 movement show / I recommend is to quell without mercy
 and eliminate rebels' le. / I am co. G. A. G.

Signature

G. A. G. G. A. G.

G. A. G.
 G. A. G. G. A. G. G. A. G.
 A. G. G. (signed)

1)
SOMMARIO

Heading
(in Italian)

AVVISO CONCERNE SOSTITUZIONE SINDACATO ITALIANA

TESTO

UFFICIO ATTENTE INDIRIZZO

UFFICIO ATTENTE INDIRIZZO
A. S. ROMA 11 2 aprile 1937 - XV

Indicazioni di urgenza: U.F.A. 30704 in U.F.A. 30704

UFFICIO ATTENTE INDIRIZZO

UFFICIO ATTENTE INDIRIZZO:	S. S. / Gen. Gen.	UFFICIO ATTENTE INDIRIZZO
	Stato Maggiore	UFF. Giust. Mil.
	Supermerco	Gen. Piazza
	UFF. Sp. A. S. P.	Gen. Sp. S. P.
	UFF. Politico	

S. S. / GEN. GEN. UFF. ATTENTE INDIRIZZO

Text
(translated
into English)

16502 Cabinet // News April 1st // - - - - -
 Dalla Sigara Government //
 1) Corriere column reports the entire region of Bari // a
 village about 75 kms south-east of Bari // Vanguard column was
 received with intense fire // and presently the main force
 began a violent fight // which lasted about 1 hour // rebels
 // estimated at about 100 regulars and 1000 irregulars // forced
 // our line to retreat to the surrounding hills // The whole
 country destroyed because of the rebel // among losses 210
 killed // among which 100 killed in the colours of the ex-
 ceptus regulars // prisoners declare that the regular rebels
 were 170 commanded by a captain //

Signature

ALITALIA S.

p.c.c.
 IL CAPO DI CANTIERO
 A. Lazzi (signed)

2)
SOMMARIO

Heading
(in Italian)

AVVISO CONCERNE SOSTITUZIONE SINDACATO ITALIANA

TESTO

UFFICIO ATTENTE INDIRIZZO

Indicazioni di urgenza: U.F.A. 30704 in U.F.A. 30704
 U.F.A. 30704 in U.F.A. 30704
 U.F.A. 30704 in U.F.A. 30704

UFFICIO ATTENTE INDIRIZZO:	S. S. / Gen. Gen.	UFFICIO ATTENTE INDIRIZZO
	Stato Maggiore	UFF. Giust. Mil.
	Supermerco	Gen. Piazza
	Governatore Mil.	Gen. Sp. S. P.
	Gen. Piazza	

S. S. / GEN. GEN. UFF. ATTENTE INDIRIZZO

Text
(translated
into English)

17715 Cabinet // News April 2nd //
 Dalla Sigara Government //
 1) Corriere column reports the entire region of Bari // a
 village about 75 kms south-east of Bari // Vanguard column was
 received with intense fire // and presently the main force
 began a violent fight // which lasted about 1 hour // rebels
 // estimated at about 100 regulars and 1000 irregulars // forced
 // our line to retreat to the surrounding hills // The whole
 country destroyed because of the rebel // among losses 210
 killed // among which 100 killed in the colours of the ex-
 ceptus regulars // prisoners declare that the regular rebels
 were 170 commanded by a captain //

0647 (Appendix B)

conspicuously white, and telescope // During operations
Corraso and Centre columns raised 1.25" miles and 1.50" in
// but at hills in other several miles // of
of which I will record //

Signature

P.S.
IN CAR. OF [unclear]
A. [unclear] (signed)

0648

a)

EXTRACT

Heading
(in Italian)

"TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA C/O
GABINETTO-UFFICIO CIPRA N 30353
Assegnazione
STATO MAGGIORE EG.
Provenienza Bordo li 30 Dicembre 1936 Ore 21.00
Ricevuto il 31 Dicembre " Ore 07.00
TELEGRAMMA IN ARRIVO
Per conoscenza: UFF. INFORMAZIONI UFF. POLITICO
DIR. SUP. A.C.F. SUPERABREO
SIG. GEN/LE INTENDENTE

Text
(translated
into English)

DECIFRATO M.P.A.
GOVERNO GENERALE STAMAGGIORE ADDIS ABEBA
392414 /./ - - - - -
Their intentions seem to be peaceful /./ To morrow aviation
will throw over Soddu the message directed to degiac
Makonnen according to my 390414/29 /./ Furthermore I have
arranged for all aircraft at our disposal to carry out re-
prisals in force around Lake Soddu /./ Yesterday and to-day
airforce bombarded Cofole and neighbourhood to the south /./
GELOSO

Signature

STAMP "

b)

Heading
(in Italian)

COMANDO SUPERIORE AERONAUTICA A.O.I.
I° Reparto Stato Maggiore
Irgalem, 15.1.1937. XV.
A S.E. IL VICERE' D'ETIOPIA IRGALEM
AL GOVERNO GALLA SIDAMO UONDO
AL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE GOVERNO
GENERALE IRGALEM
AL CAPO DI GABINETTO DI S.E. IL VICERE' IRGALEM
(per via aerea)
AL CAPO UFFICIO POLITICO GOVERNO GENERALE A.O.I. ADDIS ABEBA

Text
(translated
into English)

Air REPORT January 15th, 1937 XV = No. 3.
2 No. 37 17-10 offensive patrolling of zone between
Buscire torrent and Maganamo torrent.
Report unguarded cattle but no armed movement.
Bombarded and machinegunned groups of tukuls on which
similar action had been carried out this morning. Explosives
released: 12 bombs of 12 kilos and 1.000 shots for each
plane.

Signature

d'ordine
Generale MAZZUCCO
Unreadable signature

STAMP "

c)

EXTRACT.

Heading
(in Italian)

"COMANDO SUPERIORE AERONAUTICA A.O.I.
I° Reparto Stato Maggiore
Irgalem 15 gennaio 1937/XV
A S.E. IL VICERE' IRGALEM
AL GOVERNO GALLA SIDAMO UONDO
AL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
Gov. GENERALE IRGALEM
AL CAPO DI GABINETTO DI S.E. IL VICERE' Irgalem
AL CAPO UFFICIO POLITICO GOV. GENERALE ADDIS ABEBA

Text
(translated
into English)

Air-reports 15/1 1937/XV = N. 2

 In the region traced only small patches of land sparsely
 inhabited by the natives who did not flee at the sight of the
 plane. Only at a place, not clearly indentified about 50 km.
 from Dodola on the road, did some natives take refuge in a
 group of tukuls. They were bombarded. Tukuls in flames.

Signature

a'ordine
 GENERALE MAZZUCCO
 (SIGNED: MAZZUCCO)

STAMP"

d)

EXTRACT

Reading
(in Italian)

"CORANDO SUPERIORE AERONAUTICA A.O.I.
 1° Reparto Stato Maggiore

Irgalem 21 gennaio 1937/XV

A S.E. IL VICERE'	IRGALEM
AL GOVERNO GALLA SIDAMO	UONDO
AL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE GOV.GENERALE	IRGALEM
AL CAPO DI GABINETTO DI S.E. IL VICERE'	IRGALEM
AL CAPO UFFICIO POLITICO GOV.GENERALE	ADDIS ABBEBA

Text
(translated =
into English.)

Air report 21/1 1937/XV = N. 2

= 1 Ca. 133 10;00 - 13.10 offensive patrol in support of the
 Navarrini, Zambon and Pascolini columns. Reports many groups
 of natives with cattle on their way towards our lines evident-
 ly in order to surrender. Located and bombarded natives with
 cattle who tried to hide themselves at the view of the planes.
 Explosives released: 6 bombs of 31 and 100 small bombs.

= 2 Ca. 133 10 - 14 offensive patrol activity Guriè zone.
 Observed natives on horseback. Bombardment carried out.
 Reaction with antiaircraft fire from rifles. Machine hit and
 radiotelegraphist wounded (arm wounded with fracture of ulna).
 Explosives released: 12 bombs 31 and 336 small bombs.

= 3 Ca. 133 Repeated above mentioned action as reprisals.
 Guriè and surrounding country bombarded. Explosives released:
 10 bombs and 504 small bombs.

Signature

GENERALE MAZZUCCO
 Unreadable signature. "

a)

EXTRACT

Heading
(in Italian)

"GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO-UFFICIO CIFRA

S.A.F.

TELEGRAMMA DI S.A.F.
Ufficio mittente GABINETTO
N. 5913 di prot. dell'ufficio mittente
Addis Abeba li 16 novembre 1936-XV
Indicazioni di urgenza: M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE
M.P.A. GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA
Copia per conoscenza: S.E.V. Gov. Gener.
Capo S.A.F.
Com. Sup. Aviazione
Ufficio Politico

SOA ECONOMIA GELOSO AGENZIA ARIAN

Text
(translated
into English)

25/95 Cabinet /./ - - - - -
3) Addis Abeba aviation will also from to-morrow intensify
the action from the north bombing and hypnotizing Ingalem
and Agheresalem and Allava as well as other objectives that
M.E. will indicate /./

Signature

p.c.c.c
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. Mazzi (signed) "

G R A Z I A N I

b)

EXTRACT

Heading
(in Italian)

"GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO UFFICIO CIFRA TELEGRAMMA DI STATO

N. 6944 di prot. dell'Ufficio mittente GABINETTO

S.A.F.

Addis Abeba li 23 nov. 1936 XV
Indicazioni di Urgenza
M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE M.P.A.
G. AZIANI

Telegramma in partenza
Copia per conoscenza: S.E. Vice Gov. Gen. Sig. Capo di S.A.F.
S.E. Pinna Governatorato AA.
Dir. sup. A.C.F. Off. Politico
Off. informazioni Com. div. Pusteria
Com. piazza AA. Off. gius. militare
Com. sup. CC. RR.

S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE

Text
(translated
into English)

2/94 Cabinet /./ - - - - -
4. /./ Aviation during these days will hammer without
pauses with bombs of all sorts included those with gas the
busy regions where Ras Imbiru is supposed to be with his
formations /./ I think that by these measures I shall build
around these formations a circle of forces which will put
the ras in a critical situation /./

Signature

p.c.c.c.
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. Mazzi "

G R A Z I A N I

0651

c)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO UFFICIO GIURA
N. 29917

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Assegnazione
SIG. CAPO STATO MAGGIORE GOVERNO GEN. G.

Provenienza COL. PRINCEVALLE li 24 Novembre ore 19,15 1934
Ricevuto il 24 Novembre ore 20,40

TELEGRAMMA IN ARRIVO

Per conoscenza =DECIFRATO= MASSIMA PRIORITY ASSOLUTA
S.E. FIRMA GOVERNO GENERALE STATO MAGGIORE
UFF. POLITICO
UFF. INFORMAZ. ADDIS ABABA
DIR. SUP. A.C.F.

Text
(translated
into English)

110/./ Information given by three Salabat
Seddaccia confirms the serious losses suffered on the 22nd
by the rebels who should even have had one of their chiefs
killed /./ it is however not known who it is. I confirm,
however, the agreement with H.M. Miotto about an air
bombardment that is to be made to-morrow also with hyprite
of this region following indications given him by the guide
including the Cossa country where fitaurari LECLE AB is
known to be. I also want some plane to fly over Sciage in
Caffa (N.W. Sciaradda, map /50.000) as a demonstration to
induce degiac Talé Gulelatie to hasten his presentation.

Signature

PRINCEVALLE

STAMP "

a)

EXHIBIT from

"Affidavit No. 2.

I, the undersigned, name: Woizero Benedu Gabru, age: 31 years
profession: Vice Directress at Itegue Menen School, address:
Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

Has Inera had about 500 men, officers and soldiers. We
started to go to Leketem as we did not know that the Italians
had already occupied Leketem. On our way we met a group of
the resistance and they told us that Leketem was occupied
and that they were forced to go away. The whole group (1.000
altogether) was very well trained. We decided to go to
Leketem all the same, that is to stick to the previous plan.
But already before we reached Leketem we found a big
Italian resistance group and some of them were Galla people
and they asked us not to go this way. We got a letter from
Habe Mariam: 'Please do not come this way, I am forced to
fight against you, please find another way.' But the
decision was to fight. There was a little fight. Many
Italians and some Galla. It seemed as if we had won this
little battle.

We did not try to go further. We decided to go to Gimma
(Kantiba Tanna Gashaw) and further to Kaffa. Near Agara on
the way to Gimma we were bombed with gas. Many of the popula-
tion came to me for treatment, they were suffering and they
could not see, as they apparently were injured by mustard gas
I had felt the smell also. A great part of the cattle was
poisoned and swollen. This happened in December, 1934. When
we were on the way to Gimma we met the Kantiba and he told
that the Italians were already in Gimma. They said they
wanted to join us. Also many civilians joined us. (Women and
children.) This made it more difficult for the group to act.

Signature: Benedu Gabru (signed) "

(Geloso)

0652

Appendix B.

" Reading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO-UFFICIO CIFA

TELEGRAMMA DI STAO
UFFICIO TELEGRAMME: GABINETTO

S.A.I.

1.5450 di prot. dell'Ufficio di. lence.
Addis Abeba li 6 aprilo 1937 - XV

TELEGRAMMA IN FARENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.E.V. Gov. Gen. Dir. Sup. A.C.P.
Stato Maggiore Intendenza AOI
Superaereo Uff. Politico
Governatorato AA. Uff. Giust. Mil.
Comando Piazza Com. Sup. CC. RR.

S.E. GELOSO

GIMBA

Text
(translated
into English.)

1/800 Cabinet // Secret // Reference 2/40 G.G.S. //
I notice with true pleasure what Your Excellency communicates
about situation zone Conta etcetera // but above all I am
pleased to see that H.E. has decisively absorbed instruction
regarding manoeuvres of several columns converging on same
target from distant bases like typical example operative
cycle Arbagoma // Chevenna // Jebano // Laghi //
Gogetti // tomb of rebel leaders // Continue like that in
all dependent territories // Apply converging manoeuvre //
also feigned movement of the troops in all directions //
never let them get gangrenous in garrisons // adopt
definite will to apply directions of Il Duce which tend to
complete destruction of Amharic elements in territories of
Abyssinian conquest // give a pinch of more courage in
this respect to the civilian officials who are closer to
them and to column commanders who // from instinctive
combatant generosity // are sometimes disposed to compromise
for comprehensible sentiments // Be assured that doing so
Y.E. will certainly bring about complete tranquillity in
your territory, having from now provided all troops and means
necessary // This telegram transmitted for knowledge to
H.E. Minister Colonies and to all governors //

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

R.C.C.
p. IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
E. Maneli (signed) "

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

- I. murder and massacres - systematic terrorism.
x) Some examples, see Appendix A.
- XIV. Confiscation of property.
One example, see Appendix A a).
- XVIII. wanton devastation and destruction of property.
Examples, see Appendix B.
Another example, see Appendix A a).
- XIX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.
Examples, see Appendix C.
Another example, see Appendix A a).
- XXVI. Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases.
Examples, see Appendix D.

x)

- XII. Attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory.
See Appendix B.

NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision ; (b) the probable defence ; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

As Governor of the province of Galla Sidamo Seloso according to the Decree of June 1st, 1936, depended of the Governor General Viceroy had to carry out the general, political, administrative or military directions given by the Minister for the Colonies and transmitted to him by the Viceroy and correspond directly with the Minister for the Colonies for the ordinary Government questions. He directed - following the instructions given by the Governor General Viceroy - the politics and the administration in the territory of his jurisdiction. He had at his disposal the armed forces placed in the territory (Seloso was even the commander of them).

b) The probable defence.

Act of superior orders.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Heard by the lists. There are, however, several affidavits recently taken in the province in question that have not yet been translated from the Amharic. The collection of evidence continues.

Possibly also other charges may be brought against Seloso.



0655 7885/E/96/8

GALLINA.

Date Submitted

Decision of Committee I

4 MAR 1948

A on all counts
except XIX

RESUBMITTED LIST 80

7885/E/96/8

(For the Use of the Secretariat)

0656

Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

7885/E/IC/8

23 FEB 1948

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

CHARGES AGAINST WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 2. *

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

(Not to be translated.)

PAOLO BIANCHI, Sebastiano

General

(In Italian: Generale)

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

July 1936-June 1937, inclusive.

Many places in central Italy.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

I, III, VIII, XXVI, XXX, x x vj

References to relevant provisions of national law.

Art. 10 of Law No. 100 (of 1930)

Art. 10 of Law No. 5 (of 1930)

Art. 10 of Law No. 1, 1930

Art. 10 of Law No. 12

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Gallia (and subordinate officers) under the command of the Italian Government were operating against biological patriots, e. . . execution of captured patriots, massacre of civilians, plundering, etc. during the whole districts.

TRANSMITTED BY

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the issuing State.

(29655) W.P.2524 5,000 5/45 A. & E. W. Ltd. Gp. 685
(30449) W.P.1153 17 5,000 10/45

Director General of the Ministry of Justice

PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

- I. Murder and massacres - systematic terrorism.
 Summary execution of captured patriots, massacres and mutilation of civilians and other acts of spreading terror.
- III. Porture of civilians.
 See under I.
- IV. Pillage.
 Plundering, especially the pillage of cattle.
- XVIII. Systematic destruction of property.
 In connection with operations against patriot forces republicans were directed not only to destroy in vast regions whole villages and other inhabited places.
- XIX. Confiscation of property - abandoned places.
 All houses and other places in which there were found places containing no military objection.

XXVI. Use of deleterious asphyxiating gases.

(Gallina)

Appendix A.

0658

a)

Reading
(in Italian)

"GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO e UFFICIO CIFRA = UFFICIO MILITARE: GABINETTO :

N. 1050 di proc. Addis Abeba, li 11 luglio 1935 (XIV

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Per conoscenza:
Segr. Generale S.M.
DIRSUP. AA.CC.PP.
UFFICIO POLITICO
UFFIC. INFO/MI
COM. MIL. SCIOA
UFF. GIUST. MIL.
COM. SUP. RR. CC.
COM. AVIAZIONE

M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE M.P.A.
S.M. MINISTRO COLONIE ROMA

Text
(translated
into English)

0310 Cabinet // Re my 0250 // Calm during the night all the line from Addis Ababa to Hadama // But during the night rebels have destroyed the water conduit house that supplies Hadama with water where consequently there is actually a severe shortage // I have given immediate orders to General Gallina in the matter in order to have the conduit repaired // An hour the line Hadama-Hadase was yesterday practicable and I think this may be a way of supply if the reparation of the water conduit should be delayed // General Gallina to whom I transmitted the complete directives of H.M. Chief of Government 0103 has proceeded to set fire to all native houses encountered on his direct march from Akaki to Hadama moreover shooting all rebels captured and spreading terror in the zone //

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

P.C.C.
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
Magg. in serv. S.M.A. Mazzi.

STAMP "

1-17-36

S. J.
...	...
...	...
...	...
...	...

... fifteen hours ... Gallina ...
 ... back ... into the ...
 ... execution of ...
 ... of this ...
 ... It can be declared ...
 ... because of ...
 ... that is a very ...
 ... repression activities ...
 ... All ... have ...
 ... against ...
 ... Mailu is carrying ...
 ...

...
 ...
 ...
 ...

c)

EXTRACT from "Affidavit No. 15.

I, the undersigned, name: Blatta Maile Wolde Kidan, age: 50 years old, profession: President of the Land Court, address: Ministry of Interior, Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows: - - - - -
 6) - - - - -
 Then in the month of Tikimit (October 1936) I went to my land which is situated in the locality of Chafedonsa. While I was still there, an Italian army which was passing through Shankora and Minjar to Bishoftu arrived at Chafedonsa, and found that there was a market in a place called Gorro. As the people all over the country were plundered of everything they had by the army and were starving they came to the market from the surrounding country to buy provisions. When these people were returning from the market after marketing, the Italian army fathered all civilian who had no rifles at all, including mother who carried their babies on their back and shepherds who were found round there, in a hollow place and machinegunned them. The corpses were lying one on the other en masse so some persons came out on the third day. The corpses of those

0660

who were shot remained there unburied. As this Italian army came on this market on its way to Bischofa, it proceeded. The commander of this army was called General Gallina.

d)

Heading
(in Italian)

"GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO - UFFICIO CIFRA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO

Ufficio Mittente: GABINETTO

N.5512 di prot.dell'Ufficio Mittente.

Addis Abeba li 27 ottobre 1936-XIV

Indicazioni di Urgenza: M.P.A. SU TUTTE

LE M.P.A.

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza:	S.E.V.Gov.Gener.	Uff.Informaz.
	Com.Sup.Aviatz.	Com.Piazza AA.
	Stato Maggiore	Uff.Giust.Milit.
	Governatorato AA.	V.Com."Pusteria"
	Dir.Sup.A.C.P.	Com.Sup.CC.RR.
	Uff.Politico	

Colonie - Gabinetto ROMA

per conoscenza:

S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE MOGADISCIO (Via Aerea)

Text
(Translated into English)

22984 Cabinet // Column General Mariotti has set fire to about 500 huts // More than 100 natives were shot because found in the snepners' huts // Captured 350 cattle // At seven o'clock in the morning it set out for Bocau // R.E. Minister informed //

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

STAMP

p.c.c.
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. Mazzi (signed) "

e)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO UFFICIO CIFRA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO

Ufficio Mittente

N.5008 di prot.dell'Ufficio Mittente GABINETTO

Addis Abeba li 5 nov. 1936 XV

Indicazioni di Urgenza

M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE M.P.A.

Telegramma in partenza GRAZIANI

Copia per conoscenza:	S.E. Vice Gov.Gen.	Stato Maggiore
	Com.sup.aviazione	Governatorato AA.
	Dir.sup.A.C.P.	Uff.politico
	Uff.informazioni	Com.div.Pusteria
	Com.piazza AA.	Uff.gius.militare
	Com.sup.CC.RR.	

COLONIE - GABINETTO ROMA

per conoscenza.

S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE VIA AEREA

Text
(Translated into English)

24213 Cabinet // On the 4th of November General Gallina today by the Mariotti brigade I have parolled the South-eastern and Eastern slopes of Mount Terer with a view to carry out repressive action over the entire zone where rebels had still been reported // The brigade has been out the whole day pushing nearly to the top of Terer // Found no organized resistance // Set fire to many huts and the village of Sellassie // Shot 4 natives and seized 21 rifles and about 100 oxen // Unquote // R.E. Minister informed //

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

p.c.c.
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. MAZZI

0661

1)

MINAC. 8 000

"Affidavit No. 5.

I, the undersigned, name: Lij Abebe Shankut, age: 40 years, profession: Governor of Ambo, Address: Ambo, do hereby state and say as follows:

2) When the above mentioned patriots retreated towards Candabara. But we resisted against the enemy moving through our own country, desert. In 1929 we moved through Badabagi to Girra. Sane 2nd, 1929, 1) while we were camping in Badbagi, in a place called Zirala I and Lidj Wandemagegnehu Ashome went for hunt with 2 servants. there we saw Italian troops and Galla tribesmen in many columns, the first full, on horse backs marching towards the country where we were. then as the countrymen were busy ploughing and gathering their crops I warned them by shouting as far as my voice could reach, saying that an army was marching towards them.

But the countrymen have been previously told that the Italians were coming only for inspection, so they were waiting ready to welcome them peacefully. Specially when the Italian army arrived there they instructed the people to shout hilariously to show their merriments so that the ones who were not present might be assembled. Then after all the countrymen were assembled together, these Italian soldiers chopped the people with cutting weapons as 'Panga' and mutilated male his delicate sexual organ and female her breast. Worse than this they used to operate the stomachs of pregnant females and take out the conceived baby and if the creature was male they cut his delicate sexual organ. They also burned all the houses of the countrymen, without leaving a single house standing and plundered all the properties and wealths. These atrocities took place in Harabet from Kimitet up to Gerren in Girra from Asrish up to Insaro.

In my opinion I think not less than 7,000 people were killed in this accident. If it is necessary to know the exact amount of properties plundered and the number of people killed one can find it from the countrymen. Even now there are many people who are invalidated because of mutilation, and there are also many people including children, who are unable to keep their urine. I was told later on the name of the Italian commander who was responsible for these atrocities. He was General Gallina.

Note: Sane 1929 Ethiopian Calendar = June, 1937.

Signature: Abebe Shankut."

Heading
(in Italian)

a)
GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO - UFFICIO CIFRA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Ufficio Mittente: GABINETTO
N. 5500 di prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente.
Addis Abeba li 2/ ottobre 1936-XIV
Indicazioni di Urgenza: L.P.A. SU TUTTE
LE R.P.A.
GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.E. Vic. Gov. Gen. Uff. Informazioni
Com. Sup. Aviazione Com. Piazza AA
Colonie-Gabinetto-Roma Stato Maggiore Uff. Gius. Militare
per conoscenza: Governatorato AA V. Com. Pusteria
S.E. Ministro Colonie Dir. Sup. A.C.P. Com. Sup. CC. RR.
Aogadiscio-Via Aerea Uff. Politico

Text
(translated
into English)

22980 Cabinet // I communicate the full text of a telegram
to-day sent to General Galina // Quote // Yours 45//Op.//
My lively satisfaction // It is necessary to continue the
inexorable work of destruction of all // It is superfluous
to add that raided cattle or any other value belong entirely
to the detachments that carry out the raids // Unquote //
A.E. Minister informed //

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

STAMP

p.c.c.
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. Mazzi (signed)

Heading
(in Italian)

b)
GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO UFFICIO CIFRA

N. 534 di prot. dell'
Ufficio Mittente

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Ufficio Mittente-GABINETTO

Addis Abeba li 17 nov. 1936 XV
Indicazioni di Urgenza: L.P.A. SU TUTTE
LE R.P.A. GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.E. Vice Gov. Gen. Uff. informazioni
Stato Maggiore Com. div. Pusteria
Com. sup. aviazione Com. piazza AA.
Governatorato AA. Uff. gius. militare
Dir. sup. A.C.P. Com. sup. CC. RR.
Uff. politico Com. colonna Milano

COLONIE - GABINETTO ROMA
per conoscenza
S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE ASLARA

Text
(translated
into English)

25853 Cabinet // On November 15th General Gallina wires //
quote // At the first hours this morning the second battalion
left for the top of Yerer with a view to attempt the capture
of the famous saint // Arrived at 7 hours near the Yerer
cliff 3 kms North-East of Yerer Sillasi after passing over ab-
solutely impracticable ground had an encounter with about 30
rebels killing 17 of them and seizing 3 rifles // There was
also set fire to about 100 tukuls // Among the dead there is
an old man with dignified appearance whom it has however been
impossible to identify // Photos have been made of the dead
man which will be sent as soon as possible // On our part
one ascari seriously wounded // Battalion re-entered at 15.30
bringing 200 raided cattle // unquote //

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

STAMP

p.c.c.
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. Mazzi

(Gallina)

0662

Appendix B.

a)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO - UFFICIO CIFRA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Ufficio Mittente: GABINETTO
N. 5500 di prot. dell'Ufficio Mittente.
Addis Abeba li 27 ottobre 1936-XIV
Indicazioni di urgenza: R.P.A. SU TUTTE
LE R.P.A.
GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.E. Vic. Gov. Gen. Uff. Informazioni
Com. Sup. Aviazione Com. Piazza AA
Colonie-Gabinetto-Roma Stato Maggiore Uff. Gius. Militare
per conoscenza: Governatorato AA V. Com. Pusteria
S.E. Ministro Colonie Dir. Sup. A.C.P. Com. Sup. CC. RR.
Mogadiscio-Via Aerea Uff. Politico

Text
(translated
into English)

22900 Cabinet /./ I communicate the full text of a telegram
to-day sent to General Galina /./ Quote /:/ Yours 4577 Op. /./
My lively satisfaction /./ It is necessary to continue the
inexorable work of destruction of all /./ It is superfluous
to add that raided cattle or any other value belong entirely
to the detachments that carry out the raids /./ Unquote /./
R.E. Minister informed /./

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

STAMP

p.c.c.

IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. Mazzi (signed)

b)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO UFFICIO CIFRA

N. 5534 di prot. dell' UFFICIO MITTENTE
TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
Ufficio Mittente-GABINETTO

Addis Abeba li 17 nov. 1936 XV
Indicazioni di Urgenza: R.P.A. SU TUTTE
LE R.P.A. GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.E. Vice Gov. Gen. Uff. informazioni
Stato Maggiore Com. div. Pusteria
Com. sup. aviazione Com. piazza AA.
Governatorato AA. Uff. gius. militare
Dir. sup. A.C.P. Com. sup. CC. RR.
Uff. politico Com. colonna Milano

COLONIE - GABINETTO ROMA
per conoscenza
S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE ASLARA

Text
(translated
into English)

25853 Cabinet /./ On November 15th General Gallina wires /./
quote /:/ At the first hours this morning the second battalion
left for the top of Yerer with a view to attempt the capture
of the famous saint /./ Arrived at 7 hours near the Yerer
cliff 3 kms North-East of Yerer Sillasi after passing over ab-
solutely impracticable ground had an encounter with about 30
rebels killing 17 of them and seizing 3 rifles /./ There was
also set fire to about 100 tukuls /./ Among the dead there is
an old man with dignified appearance whom it has however been
impossible to identify /./ Photos have been made of the dead
man which will be sent as soon as possible /./ On our part
one ascari seriously wounded /./ Battalion re-entered at 15.30
bringing 200 raided cattle /./ unquote /./

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

p.c.c.

IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. Mazzi

STAMP

0664

returned about 12 hours, going via DUKAN //

Singapore

3.3.0.
SI 510
A. [unclear] (12.00)

3.3.0.

0665

a)

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
GABINETTO - UFFICIO CIFRA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO

Ufficio Mittente Gabinetto

N. 354 di prot. dell-Ufficio Mittente.

Addis Abeba li 13 novembre 1936-XV

Indicazioni di urgenza: M.P.A. SU TUTTE LE M.P.A. GRAZIANI

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTENZA

Copia per conoscenza:	S.E.V. Gov. Gener.	Ufficio Informazioni
	Stato Maggiore	Com. Div. Pusteria
	Com. Sup. Aviazione	Com. Piazza AA
	Governatorato AA	Uff. Gius. Militare
	Dir. Sup. A.C.F.	Com. Sup. CC. RR.
	Ufficio Politico	

COLONIE GABINETTO

ROMA

per conoscenza

S.E. MINISTRO COLONIE ASMARA

Text
(translated
into English)

25429 Cabinet ././ General Gallina wires on the 13th instant
 ././ Quote ././ In the night to the 13th at 2 o'clock ascari
 company from Las Addas has made an ambush in the Gafabasu
 village about two hours from Las Addas where small rebel
 groups had been reported ././ Shot 6 rebels ././ seized 8
 rifles ././ set fire to 30 tukuls and many snells ././ This
 morning the local aviation has bombed tukuls on the North
 Eastern slopes of Mount Merer where according to information
 from a captured notebook there were dispersed about 600
 surrendered men ././ This night the ascari battalion is
 making a night-march from Moggio to Las Adda and another
 battalion is laying an ambush in the middle of the road
 between Akaki and Dukan ././ Unquote ././

Signature

G R A Z I A N I

p.c.c.

IL CAPO DI GABINETTO

STAMP "

b)

Heading
(in Italian)

"TELEGRAMMA DI STATO
GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'A.O.I.
GABINETTO-UFFICIO CIFRA N. 35252

Assegnazione
STATO MAGGIORE GG.

Provenienza A D D A S li 1/ Dicembre ore 21,15 1936

Ricevuto li 1/ Dicembre ore 22,45

TELEGRAMMA IN ARRIVO

Per conoscenza: SUPERABREO UFF. POLITICO

UFF. INFORMAZ. DIR. SUP. A.C.F.

GOVERNO GABINETTO

ADDIS ABEBA

GOVERNO STATO MAGGIORE OPERAZ.

ADDIS ABEBA

Text
(translated
into English)

01646 / Op. ././/./ Informer to the
 Hadama garrison reports that fitaurari Ubicet still should
 be in the Faracassa country with about 500 men and 20
 machine guns, and who should have the intention to attack
 our garrison in Sirè ././ Tomorrow I will send aviation for
 repression action to the Faracassa and Gune zone 40 km. North
 East Sirè ././ Sirè garrison already informed ././

Signature

G A L L I N A

STAMP "

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

- I. Unnecessary destruction - excessive destruction.
Examples, see Appendix A.
- III. Torture or civilians.
See also, see Appendix A.F).
- XIII. Plunder.
Examples, see Appendix B.
Another example, see Appendix A.C).
Another example, see Appendix J.S).
- XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
Examples, see Appendix C.
Other examples, see Appendix A.a) and e).
Another example, see Appendix B.D).
- XII. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.
Examples, see Appendix D.

NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision ; (b) the probable defence ; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

The offences committed either on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority.

b) The probable defence.

Flea of superior orders. The necessity of using the utmost rigour in order to break the resistance of the "rebels".

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. The collecting of evidence continues, however. Possibly also other charges may be brought against the accused.



0668

7886/E/96/9

TRACCHIA

Date Submitted

Decision of Committee I

4 MAR 1948

A

LIST 80

7886/E/96/9.

0668

7886/E/96/9

TRACCHIA

Date Submitted

Decision of Committee I

4 MAR 1948

A

LIST 80

7886/E/96/9.

(For the Use of the Secretariat)

0669

Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

7886/E/II/9

23 FEB 1948

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

CHARGES AGAINST WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 9 *

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

(Not to be translated.)

2nd Lt. G. S. ...
General. Commander in the Debra Berhan sector.
(In Italian: generale. Comandante nella settore Debra Berhan)

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

June 1936-March 1937, inclusive.
Debra Berhan sector of central Ethiopia.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

References to relevant provisions of national law.

I. Murder and massacres - systematic terrorism.
XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930).
This part Chapters 5 and 12.
Fourth part Chapters 1, 2 and 6.
Proviso Articles 11 and 12.

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Enemy used illegitimate methods of warfare when operating against the patriot forces, e.g., execution of captured or surrendered patriots, acts of terrorism against civilian population, especially the destroying of whole districts.

TRANSMITTED BY The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (in the Ministry of Justice, Addis Ababa)

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the accused State.

(29655) W.P.252 4 5,000 5 45 A. & E. W.Ltd. GP.685
(39449) W.P.1153 17 5,000 10 45

Director General of the Ministry of Justice

PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

- I. Murder and massacres - systematic terrorism.
Summary execution of captured patriots, killing of civilians and other forms of terrorizing the native population.
- XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of properties.
In connection with operations against patriot forces reprisals were carried out by destroying in vast regions whole villages and other inhabited places.

Extract from letter, written by an Italian officer in
(translation)

Personal and
Private.

Dear Friend,

I am writing you to tell you that Colonel [Name] is not
in the [Location] and that he has been seen by
the [Location] and [Location] and [Location] and [Location]
and you know the [Location] for the actual [Location] [Location] to
[Location].

I must confess to you that Colonel [Name] is not
in the [Location] in the aspect of a concentration of force, his
task has been to be an excellent soldier. The two
encounters his battalions have had of late are very favourable
with rebel forces have been of course favourable to us
that the effects of it are visible, felt and will be felt.
But you know that I judge things from another point of view.
And those days in which my old knowledge of things as
person was allowed to be torn at the idea of the actual
situation, my convictions have been confirmed.

But what is my view is not favourable to us is the
prolongation of this state of 'excitation'. If you saw the
scene you would be convinced. Debra Bredan, where on May 11th
more than 2,000 people gathered for the market and which was
very crowded is 'empty, literally empty'. There are the
chiefs' surrenders, but what use are they if their
dependents are out of town, for in strong groups of
'suspected' in our eyes with equal influence on the
neighbouring populations. There is for instance North of
Debra Bredan the [Location] road, near [Location], but which
is not pacified because of the fugitives from Debra Bredan,
where the ascaris camped in the middle of the country,
have literally destroyed the [Location] market, where the country
is a [Location] camp of [Location] and [Location]. So that the inhabitants
have [Location] away.

Towards [Location] we [Location] and an encounter with people not
from [Location], [Location] and [Location] in the [Location]. They
have [Location] well, and this is excellent. But as the country
people returned from their [Location] like [Location] from the
[Location], Colonel [Location], in [Location] not [Location] of it, has [Location]
[Location] [Location] and [Location]. What do you then want these
unlucky people to do, [Location] not [Location] left? They
[Location] [Location] and [Location] all [Location] some isolated people or
some weak group, they try to [Location] the damage suffered.

But, some will object, at least the [Location] people knew
about the [Location] and [Location] [Location] as [Location], but
this [Location] [Location] of this state of [Location] that should
not [Location] [Location], [Location] not suffer the [Location]
[Location]. They have [Location] [Location] [Location] [Location], very
officially, [Location], but for example [Location] was destroyed for
[Location]. These [Location] are very [Location].

With all [Location],
[Location] [Location]

Yours affectionately,
[Location] [Location]

... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..

Signature

ATTACHED
... ..
... ..
... ..
Page 26.

(Translation)

Heading
(in Italian)

... ..
Mittente:
Destinatario:
Data di presentazione:

Text
(translated into English)

... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..
... ..

Signature

... ..

c)

Heading
(in Italian)

ATTACHED
... ..
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Text
(translated into English)

... ..
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... ..

Indonesian language text, possibly a title or header.

1)

(in Italian)

Indonesian text block, likely a list or set of instructions.

Text (translated into English)

Main body of Indonesian text, appearing to be a report or narrative.

Signature

Signature or name in Indonesian

Additional text or address below the signature

1)

(in Italian)

Second block of Indonesian text, similar to the first.

Text (translated into English)

Final block of Indonesian text at the bottom of the page.

0677

(Appendix A)

The following information was obtained from the records of the
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management, on
the subject of the land in question, to-wit: The land in
question is situated in the County of ... State of ...
and is owned by ... The land is ...
The land is ...
The land is ...

.....
.....
.....

... On ... At ...

In CAPS of ... A. Maari.

c)

...

"..."

(Declaration)

I, the undersigned, ... as follows:

1) When the ... 2) A certain man called ...

Signature: ...

... 1977 ...

c)

... 1977 ...

... 1977 ...

Faint, mirrored text at the top of the page, likely bleed-through from the reverse side.

(MAY 1952)

(J)

Faint mirrored text in the upper middle section.

(MAY 1952)

Faint mirrored text in the middle section.

Main body of faint, mirrored text, appearing as bleed-through from the reverse side of the document.

(MAY 1952)

Faint mirrored text in the lower middle section.

Faint mirrored text in the lower middle section.

Faint mirrored text in the lower middle section.

Faint mirrored text in the lower middle section.

(MAY 1952)

(c)

Faint mirrored text in the lower section.

(MAY 1952)

Main body of faint, mirrored text in the lower section.

(MAY 1952)

Text
(Translated
into English)

15227 Cabinet // News March 25th //
General reports // ... 10th inst.

At 10 ... molecular ...
... killed ...
... well-known ...

Signature

G I A Z I A W I

P.O.O.
A. Rossi (off)

Text
(in Italian)

Indicazioni di competenza: ...
Ufficio Militare ...
Anno 1937-38

Copia per conoscenza: S.M.V. Sov. Sec. Ufficio Politico
Stato Maggiore Com. Piazza AA.
Superiora Intendenza AO
DIP. Sup. M. C. F. Com. Sup. CC. RR.
UFF. Dist. Mil.

Text
(Translated
into English)

15227 Cabinet // News March 25th //
1) Cavalli column re-entered ...
2) ... of the ...
... killed ...

Signature

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

- I. Murder and massacres - systematic terrorism.
Examples, see Appendix A and Appendix B b), c), d), e) and f).
- XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
Examples, see Appendix B.

NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision ; (b) the probable defence ; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

The offences committed either on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority.

b) The probable defence.

Flea of superior orders. The necessity of using the utmost rigour in order to break the resistance of the "rebels".

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. The collection of evidence continues, however. Possibly also other charges may be brought against the accused.



0684

7887 / E / 96 / 10

CERULLI

Date Submitted

Decision of Committee I

4 MAR 1948

Adjourned

R. B. W.

31 MAR 1948

S for complicity
in systematic
terrorism

CATS CHECKED LIST 80

7887 / E / 96 / 10

S. Blatta

0685 117 ✓



IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION
LONDON

6, Prince's Gate,
S.W.7.

25th March, 1948.



Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of the text of the affidavit referred to in the letter addressed to you by Baron Leijonhufvud on the 19th March, 1948.

I am, Sir,

Yours sincerely,

(Blatta) EPHREM TEWELDE MEDHEN

Minister.

Colonel G.A. Ledingham,
Secretary General,
United Nations War Crimes Commission,
Lansdowne House,
Berkeley Square,
London, W.1.



0686 No. 498/40

IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION
LONDON

ETLEGATION

LONDON.

No. 72. POUR BLATTA EPHREM. REFERENCE VOTRE 62. POUR
LEIJONHUFVUD. LE SUIVANT EST RESUME DE AFFIDAVIT DE ASFAHA WOLDE
MIKAEL QUI EST ENVOYE PAR PREMIERE VALISE DIPLOMATIQUE AERIEENNE ET
AUSSI PAR POSTE AERIEENNE ORDINAIRE CITATION J'ETAIS INTERPRETE DE
CERULLI OCTOBRE 1936 A DECEMBRE 1937 EN ITALIE ET JUSQU'EN MAI 1939
A ADDIS-ABEBA. EN ITALIE CERULLI ETAIT D'ABORD SECRETAIRE GENERAL
A DISPOSITION DU MINISTERE COLONIES COMME EXPERT POLITIQUE ETHIOPIEN
ET ENSUITE NOMME DIRECTEUR AFFAIRES POLITIQUES A.O.I. A EU TOUT LE
TEMPS PLEINE CONFIANCE ET CONSTANT ACCES PERSONNEL MUSSOLINI ET
LESSONA QUI SUIVAIENT INVARIABLEMENT SES CONSEILS SUR QUESTIONS
ETHIOPIENNES. J'EUS L'OCCASION EXAMINER ARCHIVES MINISTERE COLONIES
ET ME SOUVIENS SPECIFIQUEMENT AVOIR VU ORDRE PREPARE DANS DEPARTEMENT
CERULLI ET SIGNE MUSSOLINI QU'A L'OCCUPATION D'ADDIS-ABEBA JEUNESSE
INSTRUITE ETHIOPIENNE DEVAIT ETRE LIQUIDEE. CONNAISSANT AMHARIQUE
ET AYANT CONNAISSANCES PERSONNELLES PARMY ETHIOPIENS IMPORTANTS
CERULLI INTERROGEAIT PERSONNELLEMENT PRISONNIERS ETHIOPIENS ARRIVANT
ITALIE ET LES CLASSIFIAIT SELON LEUR DEGRE DE DANGER POUR INTERETS
ITALIENS. POSITION DE CERULLI A ROME PENDANT MASSACRE GRAZIANI
ETAIT SI INFLUENTE QU'IL AURAIT PU LIMITER TERREUR MAIS IL CHOISIT
DE NE PAS INTERVENIR. MON OPINION BASEE SUR PAROLES ET ACTES DE
CERULLI EST QU'IL APPROUVA VIOLENTE POLITIQUE DE GRAZIANI. COMME
VICE GOUVERNEUR DE L'A.O.I. CERULLI AVAIT PLEINE AUTORITE AOSTA ETANT
SEULEMENT NOMINALEMENT SON SUPERIEUR. A MA CONNAISSANCE CERULLI
N'ESSAYA JAMAIS D'INTERVENIR OU DE S'INFORMER DANS AUCUN DES CAS
D'ATROCITES QUI ETAIENT SOUMIS A SON ATTENTION. A L'OCCASION
IMPORTANTE RESISTANCE DE DEBRE BERHAN CERULLI ASSUMA COMMANDEMENT

DIRECT SUR CHAMP DE BATAILLE D'OPERATIONS MILITAIRES TELLES QUE
LA DISPOSITION DES PRISONNIERS DE GUERRE ET CONTROLE DE POPULATION
LOCALE. LA SOI-DISANT MODERATION DE LA TERREUR SOUS AOSTA
LIMITEE AUX VILLES PRINCIPALES ET REGIONS SOUS DOMINATION DIRECTE
DE GARNISONS MILITAIRES MAIS SITUATION DANS REGIONS D'ACTIVE
RESISTANCE DES PATRIOTES RELATIVEMENT INCHANGEE PENDANT PERIODE
• AOSTA CERULLI. FIN CITATION.

AFGERES.

A faint circular stamp is visible, partially overlapping the word 'AFGERES.'. To the right of the stamp, there is a handwritten signature or set of initials, possibly 'JH'.

D. P. Stachi

0688

1/14



IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION
LONDON

6, Prince's Gate,
London, S.W.7.

19th March, 1948.



Dear Colonel Ledingham,

With reference to the decision, taken by Committee I on 4th March, 1948, to adjourn the Ethiopian case, No. 7887, (Cerulli) pending receipt of additional evidence from Addis Ababa, I have the honour to send you herewith a copy of a deciphered cable to be forwarded to Committee I.

The full text of the affidavit, from which the cable quotes extracts, has been sent from Addis Ababa both by diplomatic bag and by ordinary mail. It ought to arrive here within a week, and thus before the last meeting of Committee I. As soon as it has been received, the Imperial Ethiopian Legation will hand it to you to be considered by Committee I.

I take the liberty to request, most respectfully, that Committee I, when taking up again the case, No. 7887, should also reconsider Case No. 7880 (Lessona) with a view to listing him, if possible, on A. instead of S. These two cases are connected and it seems as if the affidavit, mentioned

Colonel G.A. Ledingham,
Secretary General,
United Nations War Crimes Commission,
Lansdowne House,
Berkeley Square,
London, W.1.

/above



IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION
LONDON

above, confirms the opinion of the Imperial Ethiopian Government that Lessona was so much implicated in the policy of systematic terrorism as to be listed on A. In case Cerulli should not be listed on A, and not even on S, the alternative request is made that he be listed as a witness.

I beg to refer to a short Memorandum on these two cases which I have the honour to enclose for the consideration of Committee I.

I have, Sir, the honour to remain,

Very truly yours,

Erik Leijonhufvud
ERIK LEIJONHUFVUD,

Advocate General
of the
Imperial Ethiopian Government.



IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION
LONDON

0690

MEMORANDUM

REGARDING THE ETHIOPIAN CASES

No. 7880 (LESSONA)

and

No. 7887 (CERULLI)

LESSONA

Lessona was Under-Secretary for the Colonies from 1929 to 11th June, 1936, when he was appointed full Minister for the Colonies. As Under-Secretary he took part in the preparations of the aggression against Ethiopia as can be seen from his book, "Verso l'Impero". His powers and duties as Minister were defined in the Decree the Italians issued on 1st June, 1936, i.e. a few weeks after the occupation of Addis Ababa.

According to this Decree — see Page 4 and Appendix Q. in Case No. 7879 F/It.2 D(Graziani) to which case reference is made in the charges-sheet for Lessona — the Governor General Viceroy (Graziani) depends directly and exclusively from the Minister for the Colonies (Article 5). Special judicial measures can be taken by the Governor General Viceroy after authorisation by the Minister for the Colonies (Article 6). The Governors (of the provinces) depend from the Governor General Viceroy and carry out the general political, administrative or military directions given by the Minister for the Colonies and transmitted to them by the Viceroy (Article 12). They correspond directly with the Minister for the Colonies for the ordinary Government questions (Article 13). The Commander of the Corps is nominated by Royal Decree on proposal by the Minister for the Colonies, together with the Minister of War and after hearing the Governor General Viceroy (Article 17).

The Governor General Viceroy and the Governors cannot correspond with the administration of the State except through or with the authorisation of the Minister for the Colonies (Article 21).

These extracts from the Decree of the "Order and Administration of Italian East Africa" show Lessona's responsibility constitutionally for what took place in Ethiopia. It was clearly within his competence to interfere with Graziani's command. The next question is whether he did or did not take steps to prevent crimes from being committed. There is not any sign of such steps from his side. The policy, laid down from the very beginning, seems to be clear from the cable (Appendix R to the second charges-sheet for Graziani) from Graziani to Lessona in which Graziani, referring to his record in Lybia, asks for a certain freedom of action. May it be mentioned here that Graziani is well known for the brutality and slaughter in Lybia under his command, and so as "the hyena of Lybia". As is pointed out in Page 4 of the charges-sheet for Lessona, Lessona was then continuously informed by Graziani of all steps taken and of steps going to be taken. There are, in the Graziani case only, a great number of cables addressed by Graziani to Lessona, and there are several, addressed to the Governors or Generals and, in Lessona's absence, to his Ministry, in which Graziani ends: "His Excellency the Minister informed". Lessona visited Ethiopia in the autumn, 1936, on an inspection tour.

That Lessona was an active Colonial Minister seems to be indicated also in the cabled extract from the statement by the interpreter of Cerulli, who was a central figure in

Lessona's Ministry. And when Mussolini prepared for a new policy in Ethiopia he removed Lessona from office, presumably because Lessona was too much implicated in the previous policy of systematic terrorism.

In view of all this it is requested, most respectfully, that Lessona be listed on A, instead of on S, for systematic terrorism, since he was apparently "an accessory to, abetted, took a consenting part in, was connected with plans and enterprises involving" the commission of the different atrocities which took place in Ethiopia during his time as Minister for the Colonies.

CERULLI

This case is closely connected with the Lessona case as far as concerns Cerulli's time as Colonial Official in Rome. Reference may be made to what is stated under (a) in Page 4 of the charges-sheet for Cerulli: "The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position", paragraph A. Reference may also be made to the cabled extract from the statement by Cerulli's interpreter (and of course to the statement in full, if it should arrive before Committee I considers the case). What has been said of Lessona in the last paragraph above is applicable also to Cerulli, who should therefore, it is respectfully submitted, be listed on A. for systematic terrorism during the time in question.

As to Cerulli's time as Vice-Governor General of Italian East Africa, reference may be made to paragraph B. in Page 4 of the charges-sheet for Cerulli and to the statement by the interpreter of Cerulli. It is respectfully submitted that Cerulli was in his most influential capacity of Vice-Governor General at least "an accessory to, abetted, took a consenting part in, was connected with plans and enterprises involving" the commission of crimes, and that

he should also in respect of this period be listed on A. for the systematic terrorism, which was still exercised in Ethiopia during the time in question.

The United Nations London Information Centre has upon enquiry informed us that Cerulli has never been a member of the United Nations Secretariat.

London,
19th March, 1948.

Erik Leijonhufvud
ERIK LEIJONHUFVUD.



0694

IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION
LONDON

TELEGRAM FROM THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ADDRESSED TO HIS EXCELLENCY THE ETHIOPIAN MINISTER IN LONDON

Le suivant est l'attestation déclarée par ASPAHA WOLDE MIKAEL, qui sera envoyée par première valise diplomatique et aussi par poste aérienne ordinaire:-

"J'étais interprète de Cerulli d'octobre 1936 à décembre 1937 en Italie, et jusqu'à mai 1939 à Addis Abéba.

"En Italie, Cerulli était d'abord Secrétaire-Général à la disposition du Ministère des Colonies comme expert politique sur l'Ethiopie et ensuite nommé Directeur des Affaires Politiques d'Afrique Orientale Italienne. A eu tout le temps pleine confirmation et constant accès personnel de Mussolini et Lessona, qui suivaient invariablement ses conseils sur questions éthiopiennes. J'ai eu l'occasion exceptionnelle archives Ministère des Colonies et me souviens spécifiquement avoir vu l'ordre préparer l'occupation d'Addis Abéba. La jeunesse instruite éthiopienne devra être liquidée. Connaissant Amharic et ayant connaissance personnelle parmi Ethiopiens importants Cerulli interrogeait personnellement prisonniers éthiopiens arrivant en Italie et les classifiait selon leur degré de danger pour intérêts italiens.

"Position de Cerulli à Rome pendant massacres Graziani a été si influent qu'il avait pumais il choisit de ne pas intervenir.

"Mon opinion, basé sur les paroles et actes de Cerulli, est qu'il a approuvé violemment politique de Graziani. Comme Vice-Gouverneur d'Afrique Orientale Italienne Cerulli avait pleine autorité. Aosta était seulement nominalement son supérieur. A ma connaissance, Cerulli n'essayait jamais d'intervenir ou de s'informer dans aucun des cas d'atrocités qui avaient été soumis à son attention.

"A l'occasion importante de résistance de Debre Berhan, Cerulli assumait commandement direct sur champs de bataille des opérations militaires, tels que la position des prisonniers de guerre et contrôle de population locale.

"La soi-disant modération de la terrorisation sous Aosta limitait aux villes principales et régions sous direct contrôle de garnisons au milieu desitué dans région d'activité résistance de patriotes relativement inchangée pendant période Aosta Cerulli.

"Faire citation."

N.B. Where the above telegram is not clear, this is indicated by the use of three (or more) dots.

6, Prince's Gate,
London, S.W.7.
20th March, 1948.

D. L. ...

0695

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W. 1.

16th March, 1943.

(2 8157/317/32)

CONFIDENTIAL.

Dear Colonel Redingham,

Would you please refer to your manuscript letter of the 27th March to O'Grady, as in that a telegram should be sent to the United Kingdom Representative at the United Nations, to ask whether the Secretary-General would have any observations on Hariso Serilli being placed on a list of witnesses for ... cases as requested by the Ethiopian Government.

Following on our telephone conversation a telegram was sent to the King on the lines of the draft enclosed with your letter. We have now received a reply to the effect that Department of the Secretary-General's Private Office in New York has told the United Kingdom Delegation that no-one of the name of Hariso Serilli is employed on the United Nations Secretariat.

You asked us in our telephone conversation whether, should it be shown that Hariso Serilli was not on the United Nations Secretariat, there would be any objection from the Foreign Office point of view to his being placed on the list of witnesses for the cases as proposed. This has been considered, and I can confirm that there would be no objection.

Yours sincerely,
F. D. W. Brown

(F. D. W. Brown)

Colonel J. Redingham,
Foreign Office, ...
London, W.1.

DE LITAWSKI ✓

0696

Colonel Ledingham.

On Saturday morning the Foreign Office (Mr. Brown) rang up to say that they had just received a telegram from New York ~~to~~ in reply to their enquiry as to whether Enrico Cerulli was a member of the staff of UNO.

The telegram was to the effect that:

The representative of the Secretary General's Private Office told the United Kingdom representative that no one of this name is employed on the U.N. Secretariat.

B. Gould-Adams.

13.3.48.

0697

Despatched to Mr. O'Grady
on 5 March '48

DRAFT

CYFER

From: Foreign Office

To: British Delegate United Nations

CONFIDENTIAL SIR ROBERT CRAIGIE CHAIRMAN OF RELEVANT COMMITTEE
INFORMS ME THAT ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT WANT PLACE ENRICO CERULLI
ON LIST WAR CRIMINALS FOR CRIMES DURING ITALO ETHIOPIAN WAR
1935-1936 STOP CERULLI THEN OCCUPIED SUCCESSIVELY POSITION OF
CHIEF POLITICAL OFFICE EAST AFRICA AND DIRECTOR GENERAL POLITICAL
AFFAIRS IN MINISTRY COLONIES ROME AND OF VICE GOVERNOR GENERAL AND
PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR IN ETHIOPIA STOP AT PRESENT EMPLOYED BY UNITED
NATIONS SECRETARIAT STOP WAR CRIMES COMMISSION OF OPINION EVIDENCE
SUBMITTED NOT SUFFICIENT STOP AS ALTERNATIVE ETHIOPIANS PRESSING
FOR PLACING CERULLI ON LIST OF WITNESSES ALLEGING HE MUST HAVE
KNOWN AS ACCOMPLICE OF NUMEROUS CRIMES NAMELY MURDER AND MASSACRES -
TORTURE - INTERNMENTS - DENATIONALISATION - PILLAGE - CONFISCATION
AND DESTRUCTION PROPERTY - USE OF POISON GASES STOP CASE ADJOURNED
PENDING SUBMISSION FURTHER EVIDENCE WHICH EXPECTED WITHIN SEVEN
DAYS STOP PLEASE INFORM SECRETARY GENERAL AND ADVISE ME WHETHER
HE WISHES TO MAKE ANY OBSERVATIONS BEFORE THE CASE COMES UP IN A
WEEK OR TEN DAYS STOP

Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

7887/E/IC/10

23 FEB 1948

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

ETHIOPIAN CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 10 A-B. *

<p>Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position. (Not to be translated.)</p>	<p>CERULLI, Enrico Chief of the Political Office for East Africa in the Ministry for the Colonies. Director General of Political Affairs. Vice Governor General of Italian East Africa and Governor of Shoa. (In Italian: Capo dell'Ufficio Politico per l'A.O. presso il Min. delle Colonie. Direttore generale Affari Politici. Vice Governatore Generale dell'A.O.I. e Governatore Dello Scioa.)</p>
<p>Date and place of commission of alleged crime.</p>	<p>A. During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Cerulli's time as Colonial Official in Rome, viz. until December 15th, 1937. B. During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Cerulli's time as Vice Governor General, viz. December 15th, 1937-April 30th, 1939, inclusive. A number of places all over Ethiopia. Concentration camps outside Ethiopia.</p>
<p>Number and description of crime in war crimes list. References to relevant provisions of national law.</p>	<p>A. See Case No. 3 (Lessona). B. I, III, VIII, XII, XIII, XIV, XVIII, XX, XXVI. Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930). Third part Chapters 5, 9 and 12. Fourth part Chapters 1, 2 and 6. Preface Articles 11 and 12.</p>

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

- A. See Case No. 3 (Lessona).
- B. During Cerulli's time as Vice Governor General of Italian East Africa still many war crimes were committed, e.g. killing of captured patriots, pillaging, confiscation and devastation of property, use of gas, continuation of the policy of denationalization.

TRANSMITTED BY The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (in the Ministry of Justice, Addis Ababa)

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the accusing State.

Tasewal Legou
Director General of the Ministry of Justice

PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

- A. See Case No. 3 (Bossona).
- B. I. Murder and massacres.
- 1) Summary execution of captured or surrendered patriots. This practice adopted during Graziani's governorship, was continued even afterwards.
 - 2) Even other forms of terrorism were still practised, e.g. killing of civilians, often after torture, raiding and burning.
- III. Torture of civilians.
See under I. 2).
- VIII. Internment of civilians under inhuman conditions.
The conditions in the concentration camps were still bad.
- XII. Attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory.
The policy of denationalisation changed a little but the suppressing of the national feelings of the Ethiopians continued in many ways.
- XIII. Pillage.
- XIV. Confiscation of property.
Raiding and confiscation of especially cattle were frequently carried out until a new decree was issued in January 1940 (the preceding decree was from 1937).
- XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
In connection with operations against patriot forces such acts took place as reprisals.
- XX. Wanton destruction of religious buildings.
During their raids and operations of reprisals the Italians did not spare the churches.
- XXVI. Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases.
Gas sometimes came to use also after Graziani had been removed.

(Cerulli)

0700 Appendix B I.

1 a)

Heading
(in Italian)

COPIA

Uoliso, li 12 Gennaio 1939-XVII.

DA COMANDO TATTICO SETTORE OCCIDENTALE

AT COMANDANTI COLONNE OPERANTI ET COMMISSARIATI DI GOVERNO

Text
(translated
into English)

No.4944/M. // During the last days two acts of serious illegality have taken place, committed by officers and functionaries towards natives who have been shot without previous observance of judicial procedure //

I remind you //:

Primo // Individuals who are not killed in action or are not surprised in flagrancy are not to be submitted to summary procedure and killed // They are to have the treatment prescribed by the regulations of the Vice-Roy or to be denounced to the judicial authority for the measures of its competence //

Secondo // Acts of this kind began revolt last year with well-known consequences and repercussions, perpetuating the general conviction about the absolute lack of judicial security on the part of the authority //

I prescribe that the commanders of units and detachments as well as the regional authorities bring the contents of this telegram to the knowledge of their own dependents for their observance in order to avoid penal procedure against them in case of new infractions //

CONFIRM //

Signature

GENERALE MARTINI

1 b)

Heading
(in Italian)

COMANDO TRUPPE DEL GOVERNO DELLO SCIOA
STATO MAGGIORE

N.1440 di prot. Op.

Oggetto: "Prigionieri". Addis Abeba, li 17 marzo 1940-XVIII

CIRCOLARE

(DIRAMAZIONE FINO AL COMANDO DI PLOTONE)

Text
(translated
into English)

I eagerly recommend that the rebels surrendering in battle or who are captured in any other way, shall not be shot, but confined.

It is necessary to put an end to the legend that our troops do not spare even those who surrender, which is always an act of cowardice, also in order not to push the others to a desperate resistance which to-day they do not wish to set up.

Regarding the prisoners you bring me, I count them, while as to the number of killed which you report, I believe little.

Finally these prisoners may supply us with precious forced labour.

Signature

IL GENERALE DI CORPO D'ARMATA
COMANDANTE DELLE TRUPPE
GUGLIELMO NASI

2 a)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 8.

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Apo Zena Oda, age: 34 years, profession: Translator in the Ministry of War, address: Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

9) After the Duke of Aosta had arrived many people were released from prison, and the Italian propaganda talked of a relax of the policy. But in the country there was no change. Only in the bigger towns. In the interior the cruelty continued. For example under the pretext that they had got some guerillas at the Mount Errar they were given permission to kill everybody, many of whom were women, children and aged, in that district. This was, I think, about three years after the occupation. I know of this massacre because some of the servants to my relatives, aged women, were killed in the massacre and I have heard about it from persons who succeeded to escape. The houses in that province were destroyed completely, even crops. I heard that about 500 people were killed in that district. General Nasi was there at that time.

Signature: Zena Oda

Sworn before me on this the 27th day of October, 1947.

Tadesse Mangesha (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia

2 b)

Extract from letter to His Majesty the Emperor (League of Nations Journal, May-June 1938, page 550):

The following is the text of the leaflets which the new Governor, Amedeo di Savoia, Duke of Aosta, has caused to be disseminated throughout Ethiopia in face of the hostility of the entire country:

"Hear! These aeroplanes which you see flying in the sky, and which are capable of hurling death and desolation, and these armies which you see marching upon the earth, have come to strengthen the work of pacification and peace. If, therefore, you hasten to deliver up your arms to our military chiefs, you will be pardoned, but, if you do not do so, I shall cause terror to rain down from the sky upon you, your goods and your kindred, who will necessarily include women, children and old men, and I shall destroy you all."

14 Yekatit, 1930 (February 21st, 1930). (Signature)

2 c)

Extract from letter to His Majesty the Emperor (League of Nations Official Journal, January 1939, page 14):

(Translation)

To His Majesty Haile Selassie,
Elect of the Lord, Emperor of Ethiopia.

Notes on Italian Atrocities. - At Menna-Meketewa, on July 14th, 1938 (Hamle 7th, 1929), 200 people were burnt alive by the Italians, and on July 21st, 1938 (Hamle 14th), they burnt 180 people.

On August 9th, 1938 (Nehassie 3rd), the Italians arrived unexpectedly in the district of Aja Fassilides and invaded the churches at the time of the celebration of Mass. They cut the throats of the priests and the worshippers, including women and children, and set fire to the churches of three villages. There was not a living soul left in this district.

In the town of Ebnat, priests and chieftains, among them Kagnasatch Kebede, were executed like martyrs, seated on burning-hot metal plates (used in Ethiopia for toasting bread).

In addition, the Italians employed other methods, such as the following, for torturing people to death.

They branded persons with red-hot irons and put out their eyes in the same way; another method was to shave every hair of them dry; another was to pull out their nails with pincers and knock out their teeth with hammers. Whilst drinking they amused themselves by making fun of those whose eyes they had put out.

Formerly they obliged persons to dig their own graves and then shot them down with machine-guns.

Now, however, they say that in this way the Ethiopians die too quickly without giving the Italians time to be amused. "Since they kill us with their clubs", say the Italians, "we must do the same to them." They then began immediately to torture our people - for a week, two weeks, until they died. At last the Ethiopians could stand it no longer and rose up against them. With Lij Engeda, Lij Desta and Balambaras Lemma at their head, they fought against the enemy - the men with their axes and the women with sickles. With the arms captured at the close of this first battle, the Ethiopians were able successfully to confront an attack by five battalions. At the news of these victories, the Italian garrisons of Negella had to leave their positions and retreat to Gaent. But whilst on the way they were attacked by our warriors; they abandoned their loads and took refuge with the captain, the chief officer of Gaent. He and Lieutenant de Sedie then sent Dedjasmatch Yemer to Debre-Tabor, where he was put to death with his son, his eldest brother and his youngest brother, as well as eleven other chieftains.

In the district of Modja, Kagnasmach Gared and his son, as well as numerous other persons, were put to death.

At Estie, the Italians executed Blata Kebbede, also his brother Fitaourari Tessemma and numerous other persons.

At Debre-Tabor the Italians assembled the people together and made them dig their own graves and then buried them alive.

Senie 17th, 1930 (June 27th, 1938).

Your humble Servant,

HALEKA HAILU

Archpriest of Debre-Tabor and Gondar.

2 d)

Heading
(in Italian)

COMANDO TRUPPE DELL GOVERNO DELLO SCIOA
STATO MAGGIORE

N.1160 prot.op.

Addis Abeba, 6 marzo 1940-XVIII

OGGETTO: "Voglio ascari, non voglio razziatori".

CIRCOLARE

DIRAMAZIONE FINO AI COMANDANTI DI PLOTONE

Text
(translated
into English)

It may be said that the moment has arrived to act against those rests of rebel formations which fed with absurd hopes by a very active foreign propaganda, have not wanted to believe in my offers of peace.

Yet, before giving orders to begin these police operations, I want to express my will to all the troops that will be called upon to take part in it.

Nothing new: simple repetition of the conceptions expressed and stressed by me several times already.

1) The campaign is undertaken against rebels and not against the poor populations of the regions haunted and plundered by them.

So I do not admit on any condition, raids, fires, acts of violence, ill-treatments which surely would not hit those whom we want to hit.

2) The Commanders of battalions, of bandas, and of smaller district units must hinder and repress these crimes for which in every case, they are personally responsible, for I do not admit the responsibility to be put on others. To be responsible means to pay: pay in disciplinary way and, if indicated by the case in a penal way.

3) The mentioned commanders without detriment to the eventual following penal or disciplinary actions, must in every case on the spot, compensate at the expense of those guilty, or collectively at the expense of the detachment, the losses suffered.

4) The population, which in the main have returned to their land, have rebuilt their houses, prepared the soil for new sowing have shown trust in us. That trust should be strengthened and confirmed by the ascaris who are fed, clothed, paid by the Italian Government, which they also represent.

They have nothing else to do than be honest men, and they will know how to be that if they are supported and guided by that iron will of the officer. But it is necessary that the officer should first be convinced that in fact it is not true that colonial warfare and raidings are synonymous and that colonial troops "cannot subsist" without raidings.

These dangerous supermen, bearers of very catching microbes, I have already been discretely sending away many, and I have decided to continue.

Moral: I want to aim at the rebels, I will not create new more implacable ones and I am even inclined to let some of the old ones escape rather than repeat the errors and the crimes which colonial history quotes as the reasons for the revolts in all times and in all countries.

Signature

IL GENERALE DI CORPO D'ARMATA COMANDANTE
GUGLIELMO NASI

a)

Heading
(in Italian)

R. GOVERNO DELL'HARAR
Direzione Affari Civili e Politici - Sezione Politica
RISERVATA PERSONALE
N.25767 di prot. Politici Harar, 5 giugno 1958/XVI.
Oggetto: "Indirizzo per l'istruzione degli indigeni."

Text
(translated
into English)

TO ALL COMMISSARIES, RESIDENTS, VICE RESIDENTS,
CARABINIER LIEUTENANTS.

At my visits and from the bulletins I continue to notice that Commissaries and Residents have above all the ambition to extend elementary instruction for the natives or at least to teach our language to as many children as possible.

This is a fundamental political mistake that tends to create a class of decayed individuals, who, because of the only fact that they possess a mask of education, will then refuse to work in the fields, quite as we are taught by our own colonial experience and by that of other countries. They are attracted by the towns, ask for Government employment, compete with the nationals in trades that should be reserved to the latter, decisively constituting a class of discontented, or, even worse, of rebellious people.

As I have already said on other occasions it is only for the sons of chiefs and major notabilities that we ought to reserve the strictly necessary education, for these can later on succeed in the duties of their fathers, serve us as interpreters and hold modest employments in the offices.

However, while for obvious reasons we cannot all together close the door of public education for the youth of the lower social classes, we can and we ought to close very well the door to special courses, e.g. those for interpreters, and in general we should avoid to make propaganda and still worse, to influence the families to send their sons to the Italian schools.

This principle, which can be absolute in the country, ought of course to be subject to many exceptions in the large towns (Harar and Dire Dawa).

also with regard to native orphans it is erroneous politics, for the same reasons as mentioned above, to establish orphan asylums, where you will always at last give them habits that do not belong to their race or their social class.

Instead these derelicts should be cared for by entrusting them to relatives, or to any native families, who, under our control and at a modest monthly price, can bring them up in the very surroundings in which they afterwards have to live and work.

It is superfluous to add that the present direction is of very secret character and should be applied without divulging the real motives.

Signature

IL GOVERNATORE
(Geo. Guglielmo Nasi)

GOVERNO DEL HARAR
Segreteria particolare di
S.E. il Governatore

a)

Heading
(in Italian)

R. GOVERNO DELL'HARAR
Direzione Affari Civili e Politici - Sezione Politica
RISERVATA PERSONALE
N.25767 di prot. Politici Harar, 5 giugno 1938/XVI.
Oggetto: "Indirizzo per l'istruzione degli indigeni."

Text
(translated
into English)

TO ALL COMMISSARIES, RESIDENTS, VICE RESIDENTS,
CARABINIERE LIEUTENANTS.

At my visits and from the bulletins I continue to notice that Commissaries and Residents have above all the ambition to extend elementary instruction for the natives or at least to teach our language to as many children as possible.

This is a fundamental political mistake that tends to create a class of decayed individuals, who, because of the only fact that they possess a mask of education, will then refuse to work in the fields, quite as we are taught by our own colonial experience and by that of other countries. They are attracted by the towns, ask for Government employment, compete with the nationals in trades that should be reserved to the latter, decisively constituting a class of discontented, or, even worse, of rebellious people.

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However, while for obvious reasons we cannot all together close the door of public education for the youth of the lower social classes, we can and we ought to close very well the door to special courses, e.g. those for interpreters, and in general we should avoid to make propaganda and still worse, to influence the families to send their sons to the Italian schools.

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It is superfluous to add that the present direction is of very secret character and should be applied without divulging the real motives.

Signature

IL GOVERNATORE

(Gen. Guglielmo Nasi)

GOVERNO DEL HARAR
Segreteria particolare di
S.E. il Governatore

b) EXTRACT

Heading
(in Italian)

Copia.
MINISTERO DELL'AFRICA ITALIANA
N.106815 di prot.Politici Roma 6 Luglio 1939-XVII

Text
(translated
into English)

Re: Organization of native hierarchy.
To the Amhara Government GONDAR
and for information:
To the Government General of the A.O.I. ADDIS ABEBA

This Ministry has read with great interest the report
No.184982 of May 29th.

It contains a sincere and realistic analysis of the causes
of the political situation created in the territories of
your Government, causes traced back to the following mistakes:

- 1) Having destroyed the wise organisation of 1936, based on few chiefs of real importance, who had partly approved of our occupation, to replace it by the subdivision of the territory in an infinity of small districts, entrusted to new men without followers, to a great extent imported from Eritrea and consequently ignorant of the needs, customs and mentality of the dependent people;
- 2) Having upset the administration of justice among the natives, applying, without correction, rules not made for the Amhara Government;
- 3) Having excluded the natives from every economical activity and every employment;
- 4) Having shown a lack of sense for comprehension and graduation in the settling of the question of cults, and having exaggerated when putting the domains under the state;
- 5) Having used rigorous measures excessively and arbitrarily;
- 6) Having identified race policy with a policy of bad treatment and subduing.

Signature

IL SOTTOSEGRETARIO DI STATO
F/to Teruzzi

p.c.c.
IL CAPO DELL'UFFICIO POLITICO
(Col. Angelo Adorni)
Adorni (signed)

c) EXTRACT

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
DIREZIONE SUPERIORE DEGLI AFFARI CIVILI
N.78602 di prot. Addis Abeba, 11 26 ottobre 1939
Anno XVII

Oggetto: Programmi di insegnamento
delle scuole per sudditi coloniali

Al Governo dell'Eritrea	Asmara
Al Governo della Somalia	Mogadiscio
Al Governo Dell'Amara	Gondar
Al Governo del Harar	Harar
Al Governo dei Galla e Sidama	Ginna
Al Governo dello Scioa	Sede

p.c.
Al Ministero dell'AFRICA ITALIANA
Direzione Generale degli Affari Civili Roma

Text
(translated
into English)

During the last meeting of the Governors full assent
was given to the conception, inspiring the directions
issued several times from this Government General, that

the schools of all kinds established for the subdued peoples of A.O.I., ought above all to aim at this goal: to train the pupils for the cultivation of the soil or to become qualified workers (not specialized) in order to create gradually native skilled craftsmanship for all fields of labour where, for reasons of climate, surroundings or race prestige, the use of Italian labour is not admissible or convenient and for the purpose of securing reduced cost of labour and production in general by estimating the value of native labour.

Signature

IL GOVERNATORE GENERALE

A. di Savoia

A. di Savoia (signed)

GOVERNO GENERALE A.O.I.

Direz. Sup. AA. CC.

ADDIS ABABA

p.c.c. Pauletto (signed)

(Cerulli)

0707

Appendix B.
XIII, XIV.

Heading
(in Italian)

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
STATO MAGGIORE - DIREZIONE SUPERIORE DEI SERVIZI
N. 45096 di prot. Servizi -

Text
(translated
into English)

Object: Paying for raided cattle.

Addis Abeba, January 19th, 1940-XVIII

----- Addresses -----

Raiding, carried out by our national or colonial detachments, employed in colonial police operations was justifiable in the past because of the exceptional need for rigour proper to an act of reimbursement and punishment against rebel populations. At this moment, with the political situation stabilized and with the active commercial and agricultural life now manifesting itself in all parts of the Empire, the system of raiding and confiscation of animals and things to the damage of the population, ought to have no more reason to subsist.

Respecting and recognizing the right of private ownership which by us was put at the base of the economic organization of Ethiopia, it is time to put an end to the systems of the past and establish among these people a civil discipline stimulating their progress.

For this reason I give orders:

- 1) All the directions issued in the past by Governments in the respective territories and by the former Intendenza of the A.O.I. in circular no. 13740 dated September 13th, 1937, regarding war booty, cease to be in force on the date of this circular;
- 2) in all the territories of the Governments of the Empire it is forbidden for all regular national or colonial detachments, for irregular bandas, for the bandas of Commissariates and Residences (zebanjas, guards, privates, gogles etc.) as well as for every other armed detachment (guards of finance, guards of the forests, police bandas etc.) to undertake actions of raids and confiscation of cattle and of things in general to the damage of the native population. All that may have been taken by units employed in colonial police operations is to be restituted to the legitimate owners;
- 3) it is forbidden for the commanders of the troops to pay premiums, even if promised before, for animals and things raided by the dependent units.

Signature

IL VICERE D'ETIOPIA GOVERNATORE GENERALE DELL'AOI
COMANDANTE SUPERIORE DELLE FORZE ARMATE
F/to Amedeo di Savoia

Heading
(in Italian)

COMANDO TRUPPE DEL R. GOVERNO DELLO SCIOA
STATO MAGGIORE
N. 1/ 701 di prot. Serv/ Addis Abeba 29 Gennaio 1940-XVIII
A TUTTI GLI ENTI DEL PRESIDIO ADDIS ABEBA
AI COMANDI DI SETTORE LORO SEDI

Text
(translated
into English)

..... you are requested to arrange for the orders of H.E. the Vice-Roy to be strictly observed.

Signature

STAMP D'ORDINE
IL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
(Ten. col. di S.M. E.M. Guarini)
Guarini (signed)

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 6.

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Lij Abebe Shankut, age: 40 years, profession: Governor of Ambo, address: Ambo, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

3) Sane 22nd, 1930 (30th June 1938), we fought against the enemy troops who were camping on the hill called Kora and forced them to retreat and join other Italian troops who were camping in Argibot. Next day, Sane 23rd, Italian air planes came and burned the country by many bombardments, and many innocent countrymen were also killed in that action.

4) Ras Ababa wrote us a letter inviting us to meet him in a country called Wayu, so in Tikemt 26th, 1931 (5th November 1938), I, Dedjazmatch Teshome Shankut, Lidj Haile Shankut, and Dedjazmatch Dante Mashasha went to meet him here. The Italian troops wanted to occupy the hill of Kollash, so it moved towards it in a pincer movement, one column under the command of General Lorenziny and one column of Muslim troops under the command of Colonel Bruskilli from Fitcha Petera front and innumerable troops were also moving towards the place competently. We saw these troops plundering all the properties of countrymen and burning villages including churches, while moving towards the said place. We patriots also rushed competently to take up our position and clash with the enemy in a place called Tamo. There I was wounded in three places. The enemy killed my brother, Haile Mariam Shankut in action; cut his neck, put it on a stick and took his head with them as a show for their trophy.

While bombarding all the country round there, their infantry also burnt so many famous churches by torches. In the same month Tikemt 27th, 1931, the enemy defeated the patriots and occupied the said place, after burning the compounds round there.

Signature: Abebe Shankut

Sworn before me on this the 6th day of September, 1947.

Tadesse Mengesha (signed)

Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.

EXTRACT from

"Affidavit No. 3.

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Dejazmatch Teshoma Shankut, age: 49 years, profession: Governor of Debre Sina, address: Debre Sina, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

5) At that time I had about 1,400 patriots and asked them if we should stay where we were and continue to fight or proceed to another part of the country. 900 patriots decided to stay where they were and continue to fight, so in the month of Megabit 1931 (March 1939) we took all the aged people, children and females, including my family, to the cave called Amatagna Washa. We also took our provisions to the cave beforehand. In my opinion I think there were inside the cave approximately 3,000 people in all - including children, aged and females. As the enemy pursued us to the cave we defended our position with weapons we had possessed. For seven days the enemy launched many attacks in vain, and were repelled without inflicting any casualties on our side. On the eighth day the Italians climbed the cliff and from that cliff they sent down a ball like iron tied by thick wire and they took it back again. During these seven days the Italians continuously shelled our position by cannon and bombs. After seeing this I informed all the patriots that the Italians were going to throw poison gas. As I was told that lemon and urine were good to decontaminate poison gas, I also informed the same to the patriots. Then in the morning five cylinders were sent down and the Italians in front of us shot at them till they burst before the cylinder reached the ground. Then different colours of smoke - blue, yellow etc. came out of these cylinders. The Italians fired their cannon in a group and turned the whole of the smoke into the cave. Then strange smell began to permeate inside the cave. One or two hours afterwards many of the people went mad, killed each other and many died. We tried to take the rifles from the mad men and put them in a separate place in the cave. My eyes were also contaminated by poison gas so I decided to go out and inflict casualty on the enemy. I took 167 of the patriots who also decided to do the same and came out, while the shooting still continued. When I came to a little stream close by, I heard some of my men who were insane telling the Italians about my escape and the Italians began to look for me strictly by searchlight. Then here I decided to attack one of their trenches and so after attacking I was wounded. In this fight all save four of us were killed in action. The force of the bomb which wounded me threw me from the edge of the valley, where I remained unconscious for a little while. Then the four patriots who were alive encouraged me and tried to take me to the desert but because of my eyes being contaminated with poison gas, and because of the darkness, my leg slipped and I fell down the cliff so we missed each other. After a short time I got back my consciousness and feeling in my pocket found my whistle. When I blew my whistle those patriots whom I missed heard the whistle and came to me, after which they tried to take me to the desert. We met the assembled patriots who were staying in the vicinity as they had heard the shooting and come; so they took me to the desert with them.

6) I heard from four people who stayed very far inside the cave and who came out on the fourth day after we had left, that the Italians went into the cave three days after I had left and killed with daggers and axes all the blinded people, including my father and mother. The other ones who were still alive were taken up to the top of the cliff, including my family, tied together and shot. One of the people who was shot at on the cliff escaped.

After the liberation I went to the same cave again and found 424 heads inside it and outside the cave I filled 9 sacks of skeletons and bones. In all I filled 14 sacks and buried them in the St. Georges Church in a place called Tharat. I think approximately 1260 people were killed - inside and outside the cave, but as all the people of the country were sheltered inside the cave, I am quite sure that an inestimable number of people were killed. I have been informed that the Italian commander was a certain Italian called Colonel Lorenzini, who was afterwards killed in action in Keren; and certain Italian commanders called Lieutenant Brugnara and Major Bruschili, but I am sure also that there were many Italian commanders whom I do not know.

Signature: Teshome Shankut

Sworn before me on this the 17th day of August, 1947.

Tadesse Mangesha (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.

PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

- A. See Case No. 7 (Lessona).
- B. I. Murder and massacres.
- 1) Documents showing that summary executions had been frequent, see Appendix B. I 1) a-b.
Other examples, see Appendix B. I 2) c.
- 2) Some examples, see Appendix B. I 2) a-d.
- III. Torture of civilians.
Some examples, see Appendix B. I, 2) c.
- VIII. Internment of civilians under inhuman conditions.
For examples, see Case No. 2 D (Graziani), Appendix I.
- XII. Attempts to denationalize the inhabitants of occupied territory.
Evidence of the policy, see Appendix B. XII.
- XIII. Pillage.
- XIV. Confiscation of property.
Evidence of the policy, see Appendix B. XIII, XIV.
See also Appendix B I 2) d.
See also Appendix B. XII b.
- XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
Some examples, see Appendix B. XVIII.
See also Appendix B. I 2) a and d.
- XX. Wanton destruction of religious buildings.
One example, see Appendix B. I 2) c.
Another example, see Appendix XVIII.
- XXVI. Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases.
One example, see Appendix B XXVI.

NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision ; (b) the probable defence ; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

A. Cerulli, who had been attached to the Italian Legation in Addis Ababa 1926-1931, was 1932-1937 first Chief of the Political Office for East Africa in the Ministry for the Colonies, then Director General of Political Affairs. He took part in many international negotiations concerning Ethiopia and he must as a Central Colonial Official under Lessona have been much implied in the Ethiopian Affairs during the time when Graziani was Governor General of Italian East Africa.

Cf. Case no. 3 (Lessona).

B. As vice Governor General of Italian East Africa, Cerulli should, according to the Decree of June 1st, 1936, assist the Governor General Viceroy in carrying out all his functions, and supervise - in particular - all civil and political services of the Italian East Africa. Cerulli must therefore be considered to share, with the Governor General, the responsibility for the numerous war crimes, committed when Cerulli held the important position of Vice Governor General (later on combined with the Governorship of Shoa).

b) The probable defence.

Plea of superior orders. The necessity of mitigating the rigorous measures only gradually.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. However, the investigations carried out so far by the Ethiopian War Crimes Commission have concentrated upon the Graziani-period. Much less documents have also fallen into the hands of the Ethiopians in respect of the Duke of Aosta-period. Affidavits are now taken down regarding the latter period, e.g. the interpreter of Cerulli, residing far from Addis Ababa, will be heard within a short time.

Possibly even other charges may be brought against Cerulli, e.g. if atrocities were committed when he was Governor in Harrar (from May 1st, 1939).

