UNWCC

CHARGE FILES

ETHIOPIA vs. ITALIANS

PAG - 3
REGISTERED NOS.

1 TO 10
REGISTERED NOS.

1 TO 10
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Submitted</th>
<th>Decision of Committee 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 MAR 1948</td>
<td>A on counts XXIII &amp; XXVI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LIST 80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE NO. 1, A-D.*

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

(Not to be translated.)

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

References to relevant provisions of national law.

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

A) Bombardment of Red Cross Hospitals and Ambulances on seventeen
different occasions from December 6th, 1935, to March 20th, 1936,
inclusive.

B) Bombardment of a number of undefended places from December 5th, 1935,
to April 17th, 1936, inclusive.

C) Use of poisonous gases against troops and civilians from the 22nd
December, 1935, onwards, greatly increased from March, 1936, onwards.

D) Destruction of several churches during December, 1935, and January,
1936.

TRANSMITTED BY The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (in the Ministry of
Justice of the Wolf State.)

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the War Crimes Commission.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Dessie</td>
<td>December 6th</td>
<td>American Red Cross Hospital seriously damaged. Five bombs on hospital; others on operating-tents of ambulance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Megelli S.</td>
<td>December 15th</td>
<td>Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulance No. 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Halki Didaka S.</td>
<td>December 22nd</td>
<td>Swedish Ambulance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Halki Didaka S.</td>
<td>December 30th</td>
<td>Swedish ambulance bombed and machine-gunned; 100 bombs; all tents destroyed and twenty-seven patients killed; Dr. Hylander, head of ambulance, wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bulale S.</td>
<td>December 30th</td>
<td>Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; five bombs dropped near ambulance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bulale S.</td>
<td>December 31st</td>
<td>Renewed attack on Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Dagahbur S.</td>
<td>January 4th</td>
<td>Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulance No. 1. At least fifty bombs and machine-gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Walia</td>
<td>January 15th</td>
<td>Ethiopian Red Cross Liaison Unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Makalle</td>
<td>January 16th</td>
<td>No. 3 Ambulance, Ethiopian Red Cross bombing and machine-gunning; eight wounded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Dessie</td>
<td>February 9th</td>
<td>Ethiopian hospital plane bombed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Bulale S.</td>
<td>February 11th</td>
<td>Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; eleven bombs and machine-gun fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Bulale S.</td>
<td>February 12th</td>
<td>Renewed bombing on Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; twenty-two bombs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Quoram</td>
<td>March 4th</td>
<td>British Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Quoram</td>
<td>March 5th</td>
<td>British Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Quoram</td>
<td>March 17th</td>
<td>Ethiopian Red Cross aeroplane destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Ilylan Serer S.</td>
<td>March 17th</td>
<td>Swedish Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Harrar S.</td>
<td>March 29th</td>
<td>Egyptian Red Crescent Hospital; fifteen bombs; Ethiopian Red Cross Hospital and French Hospital.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
b) Bombing of unoccupied villages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gondar</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>5th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeleo</td>
<td>26th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Ababa</td>
<td>28th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kobilia</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>2nd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Birecuta</td>
<td>3rd</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokota</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Addis Birecuta</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldia</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quoram</td>
<td>16th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quoram</td>
<td>19th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quoram</td>
<td>30th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chiliga</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megalo S.</td>
<td>5th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gomulicha</td>
<td>6th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Solele</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldia</td>
<td>9th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quoram</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>9th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Segerat</td>
<td>10th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldia</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quoram</td>
<td>17th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldia</td>
<td>19th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quoram</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrar S.</td>
<td>29th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: S = Southern Front.

Apart from the bombing of open towns, aeroplanes were used to bomb nearby villages and not only the flocks and herds of the peasants in places far from any military operations or concentrations.

C) Use of poisonous gases:

List of gas bombardments:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takkaze</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>24th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abba Aji</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>26th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borana S.</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>30th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Askole</td>
<td>December</td>
<td>31st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokota</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>10th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Askole</td>
<td>January</td>
<td>11th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megalo S.</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldia Road</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>23rd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aworam</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>1st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dagaour S.</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>17th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashangi</td>
<td>February</td>
<td>13th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldia</td>
<td>11th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldia</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robbo</td>
<td>12th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marcho</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combolicha</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lake Halk Convent</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donka Mikael</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldia</td>
<td>13th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donka Mikael</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldia</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marta</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldia</td>
<td>14th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Megalo S.</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guero S.</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ginnir S.</td>
<td>15th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quoram (twice)</td>
<td>17th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quoram</td>
<td>17th</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quoram</td>
<td>March</td>
<td>4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harrar S.</td>
<td>April</td>
<td>17th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: S = Southern Front.

The list is far from complete, because since the beginning of March, the Italians were systematically bombing every day, on the fringes of centres of civilian population, with gases prohibited by the gas protocol of 1929.

Note: S = Southern Front.

D) Destruction of religious buildings:

Churches in the Shafe during the retreat after the defeat of Adi Assef.

Churches in the Tsembien during the retreat from Tsembien.

Abdi Adsi

- January 13th
- January 20th
A. Bombing of Red Cross Hospitals and Ambulances.

The analysis by League of Nations Committee of Jurists, see here below.

Case No. 1.

Dessie December 6th.

a) Extract from Memorandum of March 2nd, 1936, from the President of the Ethiopian Red Cross to the President of the International Red Cross Committee (League of Nations Official Journal April, 1936, Annex 1552, Page 470):

"(Translation)

On December 6th, nine aircraft bombed the hospital of the American Adventist Mission, together with the Ethiopian Red Cross ambulances at Dessie. The statement attesting this violation by Dr. Belan, Dr. Loeb, Dr. Dassios and Dr. Hayen, as well as by a number of journalists and photographers and the representative of the International Red Cross Committee, makes it unnecessary to dwell on the facts of this case. But the following circumstances should be borne in mind. In spite of the affiliation of this hospital to the Ethiopian Red Cross, which was duly notified to the enemy, and in spite of the big Red Cross emblems clearly painted on the roof of the building and the tents of the ambulances together with other red crosses spread out on the ground, this hospital, full of sick persons, was hit by five bombs, which did serious damage to one of the wards. Other bombs completely destroyed the operating tent of Ambulance No. 2.


"(Translation)

It has been evident to us since hostilities began that the Italian Government has adopted the policy of destroying our people, not by the use of its own troops, but solely by that of mechanical means and of native troops recruited in Italian colonies. The Italian Government may indeed consider itself authorized to bombard us when we go out to share the sufferings of our soldiers and to defend our soil, but the bombardment of open towns such as Dafat, Gondar and of numerous villages inhabited by non-combatant peasants and containing neither troops nor means of defence, the killing of women and children, the bombardment of Red Cross hospitals, are undeniably violations of international law. This last action, which took place to-day at Dessieh, was established by four Red Cross doctors — namely Dr. Dassios, Dr. Loeb, Dr. Schuppler and Dr. Bellot — and by the representatives of the Associated Press, The Times, Reuter, Chicago Tribune and Daily Express. We have ourselves established the death of a woman and of two children, and the American hospital of Dessieh, which carries with authorization the marks of the Red Cross, has been seriously damaged. Although Italy has never respected the engagements which she has taken towards Ethiopia, we believe it to be our duty to ask you to communicate to the States Members of the League these new violations by Italy of international law and custom. — HAILE SELASSIE I.

With reference to the Emperor's telegram of yesterday, we have the honour to transmit the following declaration from the Red Cross:

'We, the undersigned doctors at the Tafari Makonnen American Hospital, Dr. S. Stadin and Dr. L. Loeb, Dr. D. Dassius, Dr. M. Malako Beyen, of No. 2 Red Cross dressing-station, Dr. M. Belau of No. 5 Red Cross dressing-station, and Dr. Schuppler and Dr. Ahum of No. 7 dressing-station, having our premises visibly marked with the international emblem of the Red Cross, make the following formal declaration. To-day, Friday, 6th December, at 7.11 a.m., three flights of Italian bombing aeroplanes consisting of four machines each flew over the town of Dessieh and dropped incendiary bombs, explosive shrapnel bombs and aerial torpedoes for one hour. We formally declare that the first explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped on all the Red Cross dressing-stations on which the international emblems were displayed in large numbers. In detail, five bombs were dropped on the Tafari Makonnen hospital building proper, which contained sixty-five sick and wounded men and had the Red Cross painted all over the roof. The instrument-room was completely burnt and destroyed by bombs, as were two wards by other bombs. The head nurse, Mil. Havig, has an open fracture of the left leg and her condition is serious. The annex to the hospital, 100 metres away, containing sick men, was hit. Although it flew the Red Cross flag, the surgical tent of No. 2 dressing-station (Dr. Loeb, Dr. Dassius and Dr. Malako), 20 metres from the hospital, was completely destroyed and set on fire by bombs and all the material was destroyed. We declare that in the enclosure containing the dressing-stations and the hospital, which is outside the town, the Red Cross emblems were in place and in large numbers. We protest against this inhuman act and stigmatise it before the whole civilised world, and we give notice to all Governments, to the League of Nations and to all religions that more than forty explosive and incendiary bombs were dropped in the enclosure, which was plainly visible, and that we have to deplore some scores of victims killed or wounded by this atrocious and cruel demonstration contrary to all Conventions. In witness whereof we sign the present document for purposes of formal record and evidence. Done at Dessieh, Ethiopia, December 6th, 1935.

(Signed) M. J. Sorenson, A. R. Stadin, M.D., Dr. M. S. Belau, Dr. L. Loeb, Dr. D. Dassius, M. Malako Beyen, M.D. - Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs.'

Case No. 2.

Negelli, December 15th.

Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 470):

"(Translation)

Nine days after the attack on Dessie, (December 6th), the fourth bombing took place of the Ethiopian Red Cross at Negelli."

Case No. 3 and 4.

Malka Didaka, December 22nd and 30th.

a) Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 470):

"(Translation)

This bombing was followed on December 22nd by a first attack on the Swedish ambulance at Malka Didaka; and the same ambulance was again bombed eight days later, on December 30th, in the same
place. On the morning of December 30th, ten aeroplanes flying 600 metres high bombed and machine-gunned the ambulance in question. Not less than 100 bombs were dropped, and they were followed by machine-gun fire. All the tents were destroyed. The operating-tent alone was pierced by 450 machine-gun bullets; twenty-eight patients were killed, and the Swedish mechanic Lundstrom was seriously wounded and died the following day. Dr. Hylander, the head of the Ambulance, was also wounded. The nearest troops were 5 kilometres away. In spite of these undisputed facts, to which Dr. Hylander and the representative of the International Red Cross Committee bore witness, Italy has attempted to justify her aggression on the pretext that it was a case of reprisals for the alleged decapitation of an Italian airman. If so, it is hard to see why the Italian airmen should have directed their attacks against an ambulance of the Swedish Red Cross, which was a very long way from the place where the alleged decapitation is said to have taken place. Realising the weakness of its argument, the Italian Government subsequently asserted that only one bomb was dropped. But authentic evidence is available to prove that no fewer than 100 bombs were dropped on the ambulance. The Italian Government also avers that the bombing was a matter of pure chance. The 450 machine-gun bullet-holes in the operating-tent made by shots fired at a height of 200 metres, and the fact that there were no troops within a radius of 5 kilometres that could have been the object of the bombing, are sufficient to refute such a contention. The Ethiopian Red Cross need not dwell further on these details, an official report of the attack having been drawn up by one of the representatives of the International Red Cross Committee in Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Red Cross ventures to express a hope that this report will be published and communicated to all national Red Cross societies.


"Three appendices.
Under cover of your letter of April 20th last, you were good enough to send me a copy of the Analysis of the Documents concerning the Conduct of the War in Ethiopia, which mentions the existence of reports from the Swedish Ambulance in Ethiopia.
With reference to that communication, I have the honour to send you herewith copies of the following documents relating to the Swedish Ambulance in Ethiopia - i.e.:

1) Note, dated January 14th, 1936, from the Swedish Minister in Rome to the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy;

2) Note, dated January 17th, 1936, from the Italian Under-Secretary-of State for Foreign Affairs to the Swedish Minister in Rome;

3) Note, dated March 4th, 1936, from the Swedish Minister in Rome to the President of the Council and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, with the following appendices:

a) Account of the circumstances of the bombing of the Swedish Red Cross Ambulance at Makka Dida (Melka Didad) on December 30th, 1935, photographic reproductions of a leaflet and of a sketch together with a list of the terms used on the sketch and the sketch underneath;


I must add that the Swedish Government, which is endeavouring to collect information regarding the attack on an ambulance unit at Ityian'zer on March 17th, 1936 (see page 8 of the above-mentioned analysis), is not yet in possession of definite information.
As the Swedish ambulance is mentioned in the analysis under the heading "Use of Vocal Gas" (IV.C.), I think it my duty to
inform you that the Swedish Government has indeed received certain information pointing to the use of gas, but has not felt called upon to open an enquiry into the matter and therefore is not in a position to supply you with any material on the subject.

(Signed) Richard Sandler.

Appendix 1.

Rome, January 16th, 1936.

In continuation of previous conversations on the subject, the Swedish Government has the honour to inform the Italian Government of the following facts.

An ambulance equipped by the Swedish Red Cross for work in Ethiopia which was sent to that country with the approval of the Swedish Government and after due notification of the Italian Government, was bombed by the air atSalka Bidaa, Province of Gorom, on December 30th last by Italian military forces. The bombing caused a considerable number of victims among the sick and wounded and staff of the ambulance. Among those killed was an ambulance orderly named Lundstrom, of Swedish nationality. Another Swedish national, Dr. Sjolander, the ambulance's doctor-in-chief, was wounded. The ambulance equipment was largely destroyed. The Swedish Government immediately requested the Italian and Ethiopia Governments, and also the Swedish nationals serving with the ambulance at the time of the attack from the air, for information concerning the facts of this serious incident. The particulars received were communicated to the Italian Government. They were, moreover, carefully examined by the Swedish Government itself, which now considers itself in a position to form a reasoned opinion of the facts in question, on the basis more particularly of the information supplied by the Swedish staff of the ambulance. The information which it has so far been able to obtain from the Italian authorities is not such as to lead it to alter that opinion.

The Swedish Government has thus reached the conviction that the Swedish ambulance was directly attacked by the Italian air forces. As this means that Swedish nationals were attacked by Italian forces not employed in rendering assistance in accordance with the 1929 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field, the Swedish Government considers it is duty to address to the Italian Government a formal protest against this act.

Various Italian communiques, together with a communication from General Graziani, officially transmitted to the Swedish Government, state that the bombing which had such disastrous consequences for the Swedish ambulance was a measure of reprisals adopted in consequence of breaches of the laws of which the Ethiopians are said to have been guilty. The Swedish Government is of opinion that such a reason cannot be held to justify the aggression committed against the ambulance.

As regards the activities of the ambulance, no evidence has been produced to support the allegation that it had in any way whatsoever misused the Red Cross emblem. The Swedish members of its staff have emphatically denied as baseless anything which may have been said to that effect. The Swedish Government has no reason to doubt the accuracy of their statements.

The Swedish Government, which has noted the Italian Government's regrets that Swedish subjects should have suffered from the bombing in question, assumes that it may rest assured that the enquiries set on foot by the Italian authorities with a view to establishing the responsibilities incurred will be rapidly proceeded with and that the aggression will be duly punished. The Swedish Government reserves its right to put forward subsequently any claims which it may regard as justified.
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Rome, January 17th, 1936-XIV.

No. 806.

To His Excellency M. Erik Sjöborg,
Swedish Minister, Rome.

Monsieur le Ministre,

I have the honour to reply to Your Excellency's note of January 14th last.

In our conversation of January 4th, I informed Your Excellency that the Italian Government was prepared to ask General Headquarters in Somaliland for all information which could throw light on the bombardment of December 30th last, during which the Swedish Red Cross ambulance was hit. The information received, which provides a reply to some of Your Excellency's questions, was communicated to you by me at our interview of January 12th.

His Majesty's Government is always ready to ask General Headquarters in Somaliland to send any other additional information, but it must most strongly repudiate the suggestion, made in Your Excellency's above-mentioned note, that the Swedish ambulance was directly attacked by the Italian air forces and was consequently the victim of an aggression.

In accordance with the international obligations assumed by Italy and the instructions issued in consequence, and moreover, in obedience to their own innate feelings of humanity, the Italian airmen, in the course of the military operations which Italy finds herself obliged to conduct in East Africa, make a point of respecting the Red Cross emblem, even when they have good reason to suppose (as has frequently been the case in the course of the operations) that the enemy is abusing it for warlike purposes.

It may, however, happen, as it repeatedly has happened in the past on all battlefields, that some formations bearing the Red Cross emblem may sometimes accidentally find themselves involved in military operations. No one regrets such an eventuality more than the Italian Government; and it is making every effort to see that it does not arise.

As appears from the statements and information received from Italian Headquarters, an example of such an incident is provided by the case of the Swedish ambulance, which was accidentally hit during the bombing of the tents pitched in its immediate vicinity, which Italian Headquarters had reason to believe were occupied by the chiefs of Ras Desta Damtu's army, and which were bombed in consequence of the barbarous torture and decapitation of an Italian prisoner who had fallen into the hands of the Ethiopian troops.

As I had occasion to inform Your Excellency, His Majesty's Government cannot but deplore this incident and wishes to take this further opportunity of expressing its regret that the Swedish Medical Mission should have been accidentally involved in the risks connected with the military operations during which it was accomplishing its mission in East Africa.

(Signed) Suvich.
Acting on my Government's instructions, I have the honour to communicate to you the following regarding the question referred to in my note of January 14th, 1936, and in the official letter which I received on January 17th in reply to that note.

The Swedish Government has carefully examined the information given by the Italian Government in the said note of January 17th, and in the verbal communications made to me by M. Suvich, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Italian Government's note points out that it may sometimes happen that some formations bearing the Red Cross emblem may find themselves accidentally involved in military operations, and that according to the statements and information received from Italian Headquarters, it was in an incident of this kind that the Swedish ambulance was involved. The latter is stated to have been accidentally hit during a bombardment of tents pitched in its immediate neighbourhood, which the Italian Headquarters had reason to believe were occupied by the chiefs of Ras Desta Damtu's army.

The Swedish Government agrees with the Italian Government that a Medical Mission may find itself accidentally involved in military operations and be hit during a bombardment, without the authors of the latter incurring any responsibility. On the other hand it cannot accept the Italian Government's contention that the bombardment of the Swedish ambulance on December 30th, 1935, constituted an incident of this kind. In its note of January 14th, it expressed the conviction that the ambulance was directly attacked by the Italian air forces. Although in its reply to the said note the Italian Government does not accept this conclusion, the supplementary information received from the Swedish staff of the ambulance obliges the Swedish Government to maintain that the ambulance was directly attacked by the Italian airmen, and that it constituted, so far as it has hitherto been possible to ascertain, the sole objective. A statement of the facts is attached to the present note. It is based on reports and sketches of the locality received from the Swedish doctor of the ambulance, and on evidence given by Swedish members of the ambulance on the occasion of the official hearing of witnesses by the Swedish Consul at Addis Ababa. A proces-verbal, drawn up by the said Consul and accompanied by an exchange of telegrams regarding it, is also attached to the present note. In the opinion of the Government, the above-mentioned statement clears up the essential circumstances of the incident.

Evidently this statement does not concord with the Italian Headquarters' brief communications, which hitherto constitute the only information supplied by authorised Italian sources. Thus the assertion in the military report that no bomb hit the ambulance itself, but that the damage was caused by fragments of bombs, which fell near the Red Cross camp, is contradicted and must be considered as directly refuted by the fact, now ascertained, that a large number of bombs - practically all of them, in fact - fell into the middle of the camp, killing or wounding numerous persons among the sick, the wounded, and the ambulance staff. The Headquarters' assertion that the attack was directed against a tent pitched in the vicinity of the camp is also contrary to the evidence of the witnesses, who unanimously state that there were no other tents than those of the ambulance camp for tens of kilometres around. Lastly, it has now to be regarded as established that, on the day of the occurrence, the weather was perfectly clear and that no error was therefore possible on the part of the airmen regarding the nature of the camp. The existence at this place of any objective for a bombardment other than the Swedish ambulance has not been established. Leaflets signed "Graziani" and proclaiming that the attack was in the nature of reprisals were thrown by the airmen into the actual camp of the ambulance. In this connection, attention should be drawn to the particularly important fact that the ambulance camp had already been attacked on December 22nd by Italian airmen, who had subsequently flown over it nearly every day, sometimes at a very low altitude.

The Swedish Government has noted with satisfaction the regret expressed by the Italian Government for the damage caused to
the ambulance and its unreserved declarations concerning its duty to respect the Red Cross emblem and the instructions given in consequence to the Italian airmen. Owing to the facts which appear to it to have now been established, however, it is obliged to conclude that these instructions were not obeyed by the military personnel responsible for the bombardment of December 30th. 

In consequence of the foregoing, the Swedish Government expresses the hope that the Italian Government, after taking cognisance of the information contained in the present note, will arrive on its own account at the same conclusion as itself on the actual facts and their interpretation. It maintains the request made in its previous note that the aggression committed against the Swedish ambulance should be duly punished. Lastly, it presumes that the Italian Government is prepared to pay compensation of an amount to be agreed upon between the two Governments, for the damage caused by the bombardment to Swedish nationals and property.

Sub-Appendix 1.

Account of the Circumstances of the bombing of the Swedish Red Cross Ambulance at Melka Dida on December 30th, 1935.

On December 21st, 1935, the Swedish ambulance reached Melka Dida on the Ganale Doria about 80 kilometres from Dolo. Owing to the torrid heat, the motor-lorries were immediately placed in the shade of a very thinly wooded palm-grove where the ground slopes down to the river. On the ground bordered by the palm-grove, two big Red Cross flags 2.1/2 x 2.1/2 metres were spread out and three flags 3 metres long attached to a rope stretched between two isolated palm-trees stripped of their leaves, the Red Cross flag being in the middle and the Swedish and Ethiopian on either side, so as to visible from a great distance.

(Sketch and meaning of signs on the sketch).

On December 22nd, two Italian aeroplanes appeared on the south-east horizon and, after a flight over the neighbouring area, flew towards the ambulance camp. One of the machines, following the line of the stream, dropped some bombs before, and a few others after, having flown over the camp; it dropped some bombs also north of the site and on the open ground to the south. The second machine, which came up from the south and kept rather low, opened machine-gun fire right above the camp, though it was impossible to see where the bullets had hit the ground. The aeroplane then wheeled round again above the camp at a lower altitude and machine-gunned the whole camp, between two of the lorries, quite close to Dr. Norup and the orderly Lundgren, and about 1 metre away from the orderly called Aga. When it fired its second volley, the aeroplane was about 200 metres up and the bullets hit the ground about 10 metres away from one of the Red Cross flags, stretched on the ground quite close to where five Swedes were standing. During the shooting the engine was cut out. This attack caused no damage.

Subsequently, Italian aeroplanes came over practically every day, but made no attack on the ambulance until December 30th. Meanwhile, the ambulance staff had made certain arrangements so as to be able to make a longer stay at that place. For instance, the side of the camp, which covered an area of about 125 x 250 metres, the longer side following the bank of the Ganale Doria, and the actual site of the tents measuring 75 x 75 metres, was marked out by fences and ropes. Near the river, still another Red Cross flag, 2.1/2 x 2.1/2 metres, was also laid out conspicuously on the ground. The three larger hospital tents of the eight ambulance tents were pitched in a very conspicuous spot on the level ground away from the wooded area along the river bank. The Red Cross emblem had been placed on three of the tents and also on the ambulances, which had been covered so far beyond the edge of the wood that they were clearly visible.
On December 26th, Ras Desta had come near enough to Malka Dida for the members of the ambulance to be able to have an interview with him in the jungle at about 5 kilometres' distance from the camp. On December 29th, an Italian aeroplane flew over the camp at a height of about 100 metres and on leaving fired a machinegun volley. On December 30th, the distance from the ambulance to the Ethiopian front line was about 20 kilometres and to Ras Desta's headquarters at least 5 kilometres.

There were no troops nearer the camp, although it sometimes happened that individual Ethiopian soldiers or groups of soldiers, while marching or during air raids, hid themselves even nearer in the wood bordering the river. The ambulance escort of five men was not quartered in a tent and always remained outside the camp fence, except when its commander called in the course of his duties. The ambulance tents were the only tents within a radius of many kilometres, and there were none either in the military formations or at Ras Desta's headquarters.

On December 30th, as on the preceding days, the sky was cloudless and the visibility excellent. About 7.30 that morning, four Italian aeroplanes came up along the Ganale Doria, flew over the camp from a south-easterly direction and dropped a few bombs in the wood. A little later six other aeroplanes in two groups of three, flying in close formation, came over from the south, where there was a clear view of the camp. These six aeroplanes started to bombard the ambulance as soon as they were above the camp, the attack being continued by the four machines above mentioned, which had returned from the north-west. The attack lasted, it was calculated, altogether about twenty minutes, including some pauses during which the aeroplanes made a half-turn and came back over the camp. It is hard to tell the exact height at which they were flying during the bombardment, owing to the surprise caused by their attack and the clouds of dust raised by the very first explosion, and also because no member of the ambulance had experience in estimating the height of an aeroplane's flight. It is, however, believed that, when the first bombs were dropped, the planes were between 500 and 700 metres up. The noise of the bombs falling resembled a peal of thunder. The number of explosions was estimated at about 100, the noise of the explosions partly overlapping. Almost all the bombs fell in the centre of the camp, where great destruction was done, while the ambulance escort, for instance, only some hundred metres away and the members of the staff who had time to take shelter at the edge of the wood or outside the latter remained unscathed. The number of bombs which fell directly into the camp was not counted. From the place where he fell, nearly in the centre of the camp, Dr. Nylander thinks that he counted some thirty holes. As a matter of fact, the bombardment had made larger or smaller holes all over the ground, the biggest being more than two metres deep. Several were used later for burying the dead and were thus filled up. Many incendiary bombs were noticed burning.

During the bombardment, twenty-eight persons were killed outright or died the same day, while the number of wounded was about fifty. The death-roll then rose to forty-two, all wounded or sick persons undergoing treatment by the ambulance or members of its staff. At least one of the hospital tents had received a direct hit from a bomb and the others were torn to pieces by splinters flying in all directions; two, for instance, were perforated with hundreds of big and small irregular holes evenly distributed over the whole of their surface. All the lorries had also been more or less damaged.

During the bombardment, the orderly Lundstrom, who was sitting at the time on one of the lorries, was hit in the face by a big shell splinter which carried away the inside of the lower and upper jaws. He succumbed to his wounds shortly after. The orderly Lundgren had his scalp pierced by a splinter, which grazed the skull. Dr. Nylander was injured in the back and left thigh and wounded by steel splinters in the right thigh and both knees.

After the bombardment, bacteriological and post-mortem investigations were undertaken, and the reports were made unanimous that the aeroplanes had fired incendiary bombs.
on January 16th, 1936, at the Bethsaida hospital at Adis Ababa, there took place a further hearing before the Swedish Consul at Adis Ababa of Dr. Prize Rylander, Doctor-in-chief of the Swedish Ambulance in Ethiopia, concerning the bombardment of the said ambulance by Italian air forces on December 29th, 1935, of which the Consulate was first informed by telegram on December 31st, 1935.

The above-mentioned hearing was recommended by a telegram from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm dated January 15th, 1936.

The other members of the staff of the ambulance being at a distance from Adis Ababa, it was only then possible to record in the present statement the evidence of Dr. Rylander. The previous repeated hearing of Father Josef Ovesson and Dr. Erik Sjöblom, both hềs, in the hands of Dr. Rylander, in which the description given by Dr. Jacob Ceroc, delegate of Geneva, have not resulted in any finding essentially modifying the statements of Dr. Rylander, which are, in the contrary, fully confirmed by the evidence of the above-mentioned persons.

Dr. Prize Rylander stated that he was born on February 2nd, 1895, and was domiciled at Stockholm, passed his examinations as Licentiate in Medicine in 1926 and was appointed as first assistant doctor of the central hospital for the province of Stockholm in 1935. He was appointed doctor-in-chief of the Swedish Ambulance in Ethiopia in 1936.

On the first place, the report dated January 6th, 1936, to the Central Committee of the Swedish Red Cross was examined. Place.- Dr. Rylander states that the Swedish ambulance was situated at Melka Dida, where it had arrived on December 21st, 1935; Melka Dida is situated on the west bank of the river Ganale at about 80 kilometers from the town of Dolo on the upper Juba River. Marking of the camp.- The camp was marked with three red cross flags measuring 2.1/2 by 2.11/2 meters spread on the ground and three flags measuring 3 meters-red cross, Ethiopian and Swedish-spread between two isolated trees stripped of their leaves. Three of the eight tents bore large red crosses on the roof. Dimensions of the camp.- The camping-ground had a total area of 1,378.275 meters, the longer side following the bank of the river; the actual ground on which the tents were pitched measured 75 x 75 meters. The camp was separated from the neighboring ground by an artificial hedge of thorn-bushes.

Distance from the military formations.- The distance of the ambulance from the first Ethiopian lines was about 20 kilometers and the distance from the headquarters of Ras Desta was at least 5 kilometers.

There were no troops at a lesser distance from the camp. Escort.- The escort, which consisted of five men, always remained outside the camp enclosure, except for some visits from its head in connection with service requirements.

Atmospheric conditions.- On December 30th, the sky was perfectly clear, as on the previous day, and visibility was extraordinarily good.

Number of aircraft.- The attack was carried out by ten aeroplanes in two groups of six and four machines each.

Direction of the attack.- The six aeroplanes which began the attack came from the south, where there was nothing to prevent them from seeing the camp. The four which took part later had previously flown over the camp from the south-east, then made a half-turn and returned from the north-west.

Height of the aeroplanes.- It is difficult to state at what height the machines were flying, on account of the sudden nature of the attack and the enormous clouds of dust raised by the first explosion. Dr. Rylander, however, thinks he may estimate the height at 500 to 700 meters, since on the approach of the machines he
raised his head to look at them and distinctly saw them throw the first bombs. Dr. Hylander points out that neither he nor any other member of the ambulance is accustomed to estimating the height at which aeroplanes fly.

**Duration of the attack.** The duration of the attack is estimated at about twenty minutes in all, with pauses during which the machines made a half-turn in order to return over the camp.

**Number of bombs.** The number of bomb explosions is estimated at about 100; the noise of the explosions partly overlapping.

**Direct hits.** The number of bombs which fell directly into the camp was not counted. Dr. Hylander thinks he counted about thirty holes from the place where he fell, approximately in the middle of the camp. Several bomb holes were used for the burial of the dead and were then immediately filled in. One at least of the medical tents was directly hit by a bomb, while the other tents were torn into shreds by the splinters which flew from all sides. It is difficult to state whether there were any ricochets; if so, they would have been caused by the rebound against objects situated in the camp. There were no stones on the ground, but only fine sand, which had not been beaten down hard.

**Number of killed and wounded.** Twenty-eight persons were killed immediately or died on the same day and about fifty were wounded. The number of dead as a result of the bombardment amounted afterwards to forty-two, all sick, wounded or members of the ambulance staff.

**Material damage.** All the tents were more or less in shreds, most of them to such an extent as to be rendered valueless, although it has been possible to make them provisionally fit for use. All the motor vehicles were more or less damaged, all the glass on them was splintered and the radiators of two of them were broken. It is proposed to have an estimate made by experts of the loss of value suffered by the motor vehicles. With regard to the damage caused to medicaments, instruments and other articles of equipment, the manager of the ambulance, Pastor Svensson, is preparing a list.

**Neighbourhood.** No other tent than those of the camp was situated on the ground, not even in the distant military formations or at headquarters. Headquarters and the troops were camping in natural grottos and caves dug out for the purpose, so that there were no tents for a distance of several tens of kilometres. The nearest were certainly those of the Italian troops themselves.

**No abuse of the red cross.** Dr. Hylander energetically denies having in any way abused the red cross, and states that there were neither European nor Ethiopian officers in the camp or even in the neighbourhood, with the exception of the escort, consisting of five men, which was outside the camping-ground (without a tent).

The attack not due to a mistake, but premeditated. The attack was undoubtedly premeditated. The following facts tend to confirm this:

1. For more than a week there had been daily reconnaissances
2. The Red Cross camp was the only camp with tents for many tens of kilometres around;
3. The dropping of bombs was concentrated on the camp: the escort, which was at a distance of only 100 metres from the camp, remained uninjured, while the devastation in the camp was terrible. The members of the staff who had time to hide on the edge of or outside the camp remained uninjured;
4. No other bombardment took place on the same day in this area;
5. The multigraphed communications thrown into the camp from the aeroplanes read, in translation, as follows: "You have transgressed the laws of kingdoms and nations by killing a captive airman by beheading him. According to law, prisoners must be treated with respect. Do not touch them. You will consequently receive the punishment you deserve. - GRAZIANI."

The object was revenge.

On being specially questioned, Dr. Hylander stated that he had nothing more to say and nothing to add to the above statement, and his hearing was accordingly concluded.


(Signed) Eino Nieminen, 
Consul of the Royal Swedish family.
Translation of an exchange of telegrams between the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Stockholm and the Swedish Consul at Addis Ababa, February 15th-17th, 1936:

1) Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Swedish Consul at Addis Ababa, February 15th, 1936:

"Has the evidence of H. Reilandt appearing in the statement been confirmed in your presence by other Swedish members of the ambulance? Which members?"

2) Swedish Consul at Addis Ababa to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 17th, 1936:

"Smith, Norup, Holm, Svensson, Allander, Lundgren, Joelsson confirm."

Case Nos. 5 and 6:

Bulale, December 30th and 31st.

a) Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 471):

"(Translation)

On the same day (December 30th), when these atrocities were committed, three Italian aeroplanes flew over and bombarded the Egyptian Red Crescent ambulance at Bulale, and again on the following day, December 31st. Five bombs were dropped near the ambulance on the first occasion, the farthest being 100 metres away.

b) Extract from a note from H.H. Nabil Ismail Daoud to the President of the Abyssinian Red Cross Society.


Your Excellency,

Again, the Italian aeroplanes did not fly over the mobile hospital at Bulale on December 10th, as alleged by Labib Hassan Ibrahim. But the Italian aeroplanes flew over Bulale on December 30th and 31st and dropped bombs and not circulars. Dr. Mohamed Ezzet's report, which I have now before me, fully confirms my personal memoirs in this connection.

(Signed) ISMAIL DACUDD."

Case No. 7:

Dagahbur, January 4th.

a) Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 471):

"(Translation)

Quite oblivious to the disgust created by these attacks on December 30th, the Italian aeroplanes proceeded, on January 4th following, i.e., five days later, to bombard No. 1 Ambulance of the Ethiopian Red Cross at Dagahbur, which consisted of one Egyptian medical officer, one Egyptian orderly, two English attendants and Ethiopian stretcher-bearers. After dropping their bombs, the airmen machine-gunned the ambulance in question. At least fifty bombs were thrown, not only on the ambulance itself, but also on the personnel which had taken shelter in the trenches at a distance from the ambulance. The piece-de-raz of one of the doctors which he was holding when he dived into a trench was pierced by a small splinter. The Ethiopian Red Cross is in a position to assert that the
On January 15th, the Liaison Unit of Ambulances Nos. 2, 3 and 5 of the Italian Red Cross was bombed at Waldia. Though there were troops outside Waldia, which is an open town, there were none near the unit nor in the town, which was also bombed on the same occasion and on several occasions later.

Case No. 4

Lalibela, January 15th.

Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1936 Page 471).

(Translation)

On January 15th, the Liaison Unit of Ambulances Nos. 2, 3 and 5 of the Ethiopian Red Cross was bombed at Waldia. Though there were troops outside Waldia, which is an open town, there were none near the unit nor in the town, which was also bombed on the same occasion and on several occasions later.

Case No. 4

Lalibela, January 15th.

Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1936 Page 471).

(Translation)

Three days after this bombardment - i.e. on January 18th - No. 3 ambulance of the Ethiopean Red Cross was bombed north of Lalibela.

The Red Cross camp was situated in a tiny valley forming a triangle with some fifty metres long at the foot of the plateau which rises in front of Lalibela.

The ambulance itself was situated at the apex of this small valley and marked by a Red Cross flag. A similar flag was fixed right in the middle of the valley and another stood at the base of the triangle.

On January 17th, the day before the bombardment, a member of the ambulance staff standing beside the middle flag suddenly noticed a big, triple-engined plane flying about 200 feet above the Red Cross camp. At this distance he discerned one of the crew looking out of the cabin. The member of the ambulance staff immediately pointed out to him the flag beside him and signalled to the airman not to bomb the Red Cross camp. The latter signalled an acknowledgment.

The following day, January 18th, at 2 a.m., three triple-engined planes proceeded to bomb the camp for an hour. The first plane which dropped bombs bore the number 7, and the airman aimed specially at the Red Cross flag in the middle of the camp, the very flag which had been pointed out to the plane the evening before. The various bombs and marks of machine-guns bullets round this flag are evidence of the fact. Furthermore, eight Ethiopean women who were in the camp were wounded.

Later, about 2 p.m., three triple-engined planes flew over and bombed the ambulance for two and a half hours. After they left, thirty bombs were found near the Red Cross flag in the centre of the camp and there were also many traces of machine-gun bullets.

In this case there were two clearly premeditated bombardments in the first place, the Italian airmen were undoubtedly aware of the presence at this place of a Red Cross ambulance, since it had been pointed out to them during their reconnaissance flight on the previous day. Further, there were no troops in the neighbourhood to excuse the bombing. On the contrary, a member of the staff of the ambulance in question had seen and heard Ras Mulugheta, before the first bombardment, formally forbid any soldier to go near the Red Cross camp. It should be observed that throughout both bombardments not a single shot was fired on the planes from any firearm in the neighbourhood. There can only be one conclusion: both bombardments were carefully planned with the deliberate object of annihilating the Red Cross ambulance and its staff.
Cases No. 10.

Debre. February 9th.

a) Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1952, Page 471):

"(Translation)

On the morning of February 9th, the hospital plane of the Ethiopian Red Cross, parked in a field several kilometres away from the town of Debre, was bombarded by Italian planes from a height of 200 metres. It should be noted that a description and photograph of this hospital plane had been sent to Rome through the International Red Cross Committee.

b) Extract from report on my flight to Kworam on March 16th, 1936, and on the destruction of the airplane of the Ethiopian Red Cross Society, March 17th, 1936:

We instantly decided to try to save our own Red Cross plane, which we had camouflaged with a view to the fact that it had been bombed twice before on the Debre airfield, from only 200 metres, in spite of its having, at the time, its Red Cross emblems displayed.

(Signed) Carl Gustav von Rosen."

Cases Nos. 11 and 12.

Bulale. February 11th and 12th.

Extract from the above mentioned Memorandum (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1952, Page 471):

"(Translation)

Finally, on February 11th and 12th, two days after the last-named bombardment, the ambulance of the Egyptian Red Cross was bombed at Bulale. Five planes dropped eleven bombs on it during the first, and twenty-two during the second, bombardment. These bombs fell within five metres of the ambulance, which was also hit by machine-gun fire. It should be observed that the ambulance was flying, not only the Egyptian flag, but also the flags of the Red Cross and the Egyptian Red Crescent. The bombings of this ambulance were thus deliberate."

Cases Nos. 13 and 14.

Kworam. March 4th and 5th.

a) C.107.5.48, 1936 VII.

Telegram, dated March 5th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General.

(Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 5th, 1936.

Following our previous telegrams regarding bombing Red Cross units, I have to inform you that yesterday about noon an Italian aeroplane, S.62, after bombing the open town of Kworam killing non-combatants, proceeded towards British Red Cross ambulance situation three kilometres from the nearest military encampment. After circling over it nine times at a very low altitude, it dropped no fewer than forty large bombs, killing three wounded men under treatment by the ambulance and further seriously wounding four others, destroying material and damaging three lorries. In view of this fresh deliberate and barbarous bombardment of a Red Cross ambulance, the Ethiopian Government renews its previous protests.

Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."
C.109.M.49.1936.VII. 
Telegram, dated March 7th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (OFF. JOURNAL APRIL, 1936, ANNEX 1592, PAGE 437).
(Translation) "Addis Ababa, March 7th, 1936.

Ethiopian Government again enters protest against a second Italian bombing of the British Red Cross ambulance on March 5th near Quoram. There were happily no killed or wounded, as the staff, together with the sick and wounded, were removed from the ambulance before the bombing took place; Red Cross emblems and British flags - all of large dimensions - were, however, left prominently displayed all over the camp. It is impossible for Ethiopian and foreign Red Cross societies to continue their humanitarian work if they are obliged to abandon ambulances to escape bombing by Italian civilians. -

Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

b) C.116.M.55.1936.VIII. 
Telegram, dated March 11th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (OFF. JOURNAL APRIL, 1936, ANNEX 1592, PAGE 455):
(Translation) "Addis Ababa, March 11th, 1936.

In continuation of previous telegrams, Ethiopian Government formally protests against third bombardment of British Red Cross ambulance on March 5th near Quoram. Red Cross and British flags displayed. In view of bombardments of two previous days, Italy cannot deny knowledge of exact position of ambulance. Ethiopia appeals to all League Members against these barbarous aggressions cynically and deliberately prepared in pursuit of Italian war of civilization.

Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

c) C.123.M.68.1936.VII. 
Telegram, dated March 29th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (OFF. JOURNAL APRIL, 1936, ANNEX 1592, PAGE 457):
(Translation) "Addis Ababa, March 29th, 1936, 12 h.5.

In reply your telegram of February (March) 18th, I have the honour to state the following: On March 3rd, at 3 a.m., Italian aeroplane at altitude 1,000 metres flew over encampment British Red Cross Ambulance, No. 1 in uninhabited grassy and not rocky plain west of Quoram and 3 1/2 kilometres from the nearest troops. There were not thirty lorries, but only two belonging to some journalists and consequently not containing ammunition. On the other hand, four lorries belonging to that ambulance and all bearing large red crosses were bombed on that day on the Alamata road by Italian aeroplane flying low. The Ethiopian Government makes the most formal declaration that no shots were fired from the Red Cross encampment or from the neighbourhood at the aeroplane while it was flying over the encampment. On March 4th, between 8 and 9 a.m., aeroplane 62 flew over the encampment at altitude between 800 and 1,000 metres. The same aeroplane again flew over it at 10 a.m. About noon the same aeroplane returned, descending in circles on the encampment as if to land. Circling nine times it dropped forty bombs right in the middle of the encampment, killing seven wounded men, giving others additional wounds and destroying thirty-five tents, including the operation and sterilisation tents. No case was touched, but one of the journalists' lorries was burnt. The Ethiopian Government denies that the aircraft were fired upon. Italian bombardments were repeated on March 5th and 6th, again wounded wounded men who had presented themselves for treatment. The Italian reply, like that given at the time of the Italian bombardments of the Swedish ambulance at Malka Bida'a, is a tissue of lies.- Belatengueta. Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."
London, April 15th, 1936.

I am directed by Mr. Secretary Eden to transmit to you herewith, for the information of all States Members of the League of Nations, translation of a semi-official letter, as well as of the aide-mémoire referred to therein, addressed to His Majesty’s Ambassador in Rome by the Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on March 12th last concerning the bombing by Italian aircraft of British Red Cross Ambulance Unit No. 1 in the neighbourhood of Quoram, Ethiopia, on March 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th of this year.

2. I am also to enclose a copy of the note which Sir Eric Drummond handed to Signor Suvich on April 10th replying to the two Italian communications above mentioned.

(Signed) G.H. Thompson.

Letter from Signor Suvich to Sir E. Drummond.

My dear Ambassador,

I have the honour to refer to your letter of March 10th. Your Excellency had already sent me on the 7th and 9th instant two aide-mémoire to which I am replying in a corresponding aide-mémoire of to-day's date.

As Your Excellency will observe, it appears from the detailed information supplied by the General Headquarters in East Africa that fire was opened on the Italian aeroplanes on three successive days, the 3rd, 4th and 5th instant, from the British ambulance; in the attack on the 4th, the Italian aeroplane was struck in the fusilage; in the attack on the 5th instant, the aeroplane was in danger of being disabled. Information is lacking, however, about the occurrence on the 6th instant and it is being immediately asked for.

The information supplied by the Italian Headquarters shows the occurrences in their proper light and illustrates their logical development.

The Italian aircraft have as their objective the Abyssinian bands in the Quoram area. They cannot avoid flying over the area in which the ambulance is situated, since this constitutes the only normal route of transit in the enderta sector; but, as they are flying over the ambulance, they are made the target for shots coming from the latter.

In the present circumstances, the responsibility for the occurrence does not fall upon the Italian authorities, who have, on the contrary, every reason to regret it, but on the unit of the British ambulance.

It is unnecessary to assure you that no one more than the Italian Government sincerely desires that incidents of this nature should not occur and should not be repeated. Their cause would automatically be removed if, as I hope will be the case, the strictly neutral and humanitarian character of the mission to which they belong were observed by all the members of the ambulance.

(Signed) Suvich.
In reply to the aide-mémoire of the 7th and 9th instant, the Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform the British Embassy that His Excellency Marshal Badoglio has reported that an Italian aircraft on the 3rd instant sighted to the south of Quram, in the immediate neighbourhood of an Abyssinian encampment, a column consisting of about thirty lorries which were discharging boxes, and also a large baggage train which was equally loaded with boxes; in the centre was a large sheet stretched on the ground bearing the Red Cross emblem. On descending in order to ascertain what was the true nature of the above-mentioned transports, the Italian aeroplane was met in the neighbourhood of the sheet bearing the Red Cross, with a violent anti-aircraft fire. The machine returned to the camp on the 4th instant, and on this occasion it was made the target of anti-aircraft fire and struck in the fuselage. In consequence of this, they proceeded to the bombardment of the camp from which dense smoke arose, so as to lead one to think that there was a munitions dump there, as had been already suspected.

The Air Force Headquarters have formally declared that the lorries and the tents belonging to the encampment were unprovided with any Red Cross sign, which, as has been said, was only on the sheet placed on the ground.

On the 5th instant, also, an Italian aeroplane was struck and almost disabled by shots coming from the same locality.

The coincidence of locality and dates leads one to believe that the bombardment in question is the same as that in which, according to the statements of the British Embassy, a section of the British ambulance in Ethiopia was involved.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs must energetically protest against the most grave repeated and flagrant violations of the fundamental principles of the Geneva Convention, constituted by the fact that Italian aircraft in the neighbourhood of the insignia of neutrality were repeatedly fired on.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs expresses the hope that His Britannic Majesty's Government will urgently take steps by all possible means to ascertain how the British ambulance can have been thus gravely compromised in the repeated attacks against the Italian aircraft and that they will, in the meantime, see to it that the strictest measures are taken in order that incidents of this nature may not be repeated. It is not a question, as the director of the ambulance claims, of abandoning the Red Cross emblem, which is sacred among all civilised nations; it is a question of preventing provocative acts of war from being carried out from localities protected by this emblem.

The Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs will be grateful if the British Embassy will be so good as to communicate to them as soon as possible their reply in regard to the points raised in the present aide-mémoire, and, in particular, as to the measures which it may be possible to take to prevent the repetition of incidents which are all the more deplorable at the present moment.

The British Embassy may be perfectly sure that no unit of the British ambulance in Ethiopia will ever run any abnormal risk so long as it takes care to conform perfectly to conditions corresponding to the rules of the Geneva Convention.

Rome, March 12th, 1936. - Year XIV.
His Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rome.

Excellency,

I did not fail to communicate immediately to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom translations of the letter which Signor Suvich addressed to me on March 12th, and of the aide-memoire referred to therein, dealing with the several attacks made in the first week of March by Italian military aircraft on the British Red Cross Ambulance No. 1 operating in Ethiopia. I regret to inform Your Excellency that His Majesty's Government, after carefully considering the statements contained in these documents and comparing them with the reports furnished by the medical officer in charge of the ambulance, are unable to accept the Italian version of the facts as having any relation to what actually occurred.

Before proceeding to explain the reasons which have influenced His Majesty's Government in arriving at this conclusion, I have been directed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to remind Your Excellency that, on January 16th last, Mr. Ingram, at that time His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires in Rome, acting on instructions from His Majesty's Government, drew Signor Suvich's personal attention to the fact that the British Red Cross ambulance, the formation and despatch of which Signor Suvich had to the Italian authorities on November 16th last, had been diverted from service on the Ogaden front to the northern zone, and was then actually established at Dessie. As Mr. Ingram explained at the time, this information was given to the Italian Government with the belief that the Italian Government would be glad, in the light of certain then recent and unfortunate incidents (such as the bombing of the Swedish ambulance near Dolo in December) to know the locality of the British ambulance in case the military authorities were not already aware of its movements. It will be recalled that, having noted Mr. Ingram's communication, Signor Suvich took the opportunity to urge that, in view of the aforementioned recent occurrences, the ambulance should be placed at a reasonable distance from military concentrations. The observations made by His Excellency on this occasion were telegraphed on January 20th to His Majesty's Minister at Addis Ababa with instructions that they should be brought to the notice of the medical officer in charge of the ambulance, in order that all possible precautions might be taken, and Signor Suvich was informed accordingly on January 21st, with the information that the ambulance had left Dessie for Waldia with the probable intention of proceeding shortly to Quoram. Later, on February 20th, I handed Signor Suvich an aide-memoire showing, inter alia, the precautions taken by the ambulance while in the vicinity of Waldia. Its camp was placed about two miles by air, or three miles by road, from that village, and one and a half miles from the nearest Ethiopian encampment. There were displayed Red Cross ground flags 36 feet and 46 feet square; Red Cross, British and Ethiopian national flags were flown from three flagstaffs, and all tents and lorries were marked with the Red Cross emblem; at the same time, I requested that the Italian military authorities should be so informed, in order that all possible care might be taken to avoid an incident. At that date I was unaware that the ambulance either had moved, or was then about to move, to Quoram. Since, however, the medical officer in charge of the ambulance was careful, on establishing his camp at the latter place, to repeat all the precautions enforced at Waldia, this fact is of no particular importance, more especially as the Italian Government had been notified a month earlier that Quoram was likely to be the ambulance's ultimate objective.

I have dealt with the above points in some detail in illustration of the fact that His Majesty's Government exerted themselves to the utmost to acquaint the Italian Government with the movements of the ambulance. This was the only foreign hospital unit actually operating with the Ethiopian forces in the northern
advances zone; it was also very considerably larger than any purely Italianian Red Cross unit on that front. In these circumstances, and in the light of the information supplied to the Italian Government, His Majesty's Government are unable to under-
stand how any trained military air observer can ever have harboured illusions as to the identity of the plainly marked and substantial ambulances encamped as they noted in patrols over the quoran area.

4. According to the reports furnished by the medical officer in charge of the ambulance, three of his Red Cross lorries were deliberately bombed at 6 a.m. on March 3rd between quoran and Alessa. At noon on March 4th the camp of the British ambulance, two miles east of Lake Alessa and two miles from the village of quoran, was deliberately bombed, four patients being killed and several wounded. Such untimely material damage was done that the ambulance has since had to be withdrawn for reorganization and re-equipment. On March 7th, the very site, on which tents were still standing when the Italian armed forces left the main camp, although patients, stores, and ambulances had been moved elsewhere, the commanding officer considering it desirable to refrain from displaying their position by use of the red cross. On March 8th, the three lorries, on which foreign medical staff had been abandoned, was heavily bombed for the fourth time. The categorical nature of Mr. Teller's statements on the necessity and unparalleled nature of these attacks leaves no room for doubt as to their accuracy. Admissions that this was a mistake are belied, with anti-aircraft guns that were not used for anti-aircraft purposes, are denied categorically, as is the allegation that Italian anti-aircraft guns were in position in close proximity to the ambulances. In short, on the reliable evidence available, which it is understood has been substantiated by photographs taken on the spot at the time of the first raid - His Majesty's Government can only regard the pretensions advanced in Signor Sivuchi's letter as a mis-
understanding which accompanied it as due to the not unnatural desire of the officers responsible for the raids on the British ambulance to present excuses for their actions.

5. Apart, however, from the actual facts of the attacks, it is suggested in the communications under reply that no unit of the British ambulance service in Ethiopia would ever run any abnormal risk as long as it took care to operate in complete conformity with the rules of the Geneva Red Cross Convention of 1929. The implication clearly is that, in various ways which will be dealt with in detail below, the British ambulance laid itself open to hostile action on the part of Italian aircraft through its neglect of the rules laid down in the above-mentioned Convention. The provisions which appear to apply to this case are Articles 6, 7, and 8 of the Convention in question. Article 6 provides that medical formations which accompany armies in the field shall be respected and protected by the belligerents; Article 7 lays down that the protection to which medical formations are entitled shall cease if they are made use of, to permit actions harmful to the enemy. Article 8 provides that the following conditions are not to be considered to be of such a nature as to deprive medical formations of the protection guaranteed by Article 6 - viz. (1) that the personnel of the formation is armed, and uses its arms in its own defense, and (2) that, in the absence of armed orderlies, the formation or establishment is protected by a picket or sentries.

6. In the present instance, the Italian Government do not dispute that the ambulance was bombed by Italian aircraft - that is, on the facts clearly at the encampment which Italian air observers had noted was marked with a Red Cross. An attempt is, however, made to justify the attacks under Article 7 of the Red Cross Convention - that is to say, it is suggested that the ambulance was made use of to permit actions harmful to Italy. In these circumstances, it is necessary to examine the acts which are alleged to have produced this result. It is stated in the first place that certain lorries in the baggage train were unloading boxes at the ambulance. Assuming this to be a fact, it is impossible to argue that it involved any improper activity on
the part of an ambulance, which might well require, and does in fact require, many stores packed in boxes. It is then alleged that, when the Italian aircraft concerned descended to investigate what was happening, it encountered violent anti-aircraft fire. While it is emphatically denied that any such fire was, in fact, directed against the aircraft, His Majesty's Government are not aware of any rule of international law which provides that aircraft flying over enemy territory must not be fired at when they descend low to inspect encampments, even should the latter be marked with Red Cross emblems. It is, indeed, confidently assumed by His Majesty's Government that any Ethiopian aircraft which indulged in similar scouting activities over an Italian hospital area would be greeted with anti-aircraft fire from all sides. Secondly, it seems to be suggested that illegal use is made of a Red Cross ambulance to perform acts harmful to Italy within the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention of 1929 if there should be situated close to the ambulance either anti-aircraft artillery or Ethiopian troops. While again reiterating that neither Ethiopian forces nor anti-aircraft artillery were in a position of any proximity to the ambulance (the nearest Ethiopian troops on March 4th being two miles away), His Majesty's Government cannot accept any such interpretation of the gal issue raised. In this connection, I am to emphasize that no evidence is produced in the aide-memoire purporting to show that any of the ambulance's personnel, or the wounded or sick under their charge, were engaged in manning the anti-aircraft gun alleged to be close to the Red Cross insignia. Even if it were admitted, which it is not, that such a gun had been placed close to the ambulance, and that the bombs which struck the latter were intended for the former, it is nowhere suggested in the aide-memoire that the ambulance camp was struck by accident. Moreover, I am instructed to observe that, whatever the circumstances on the occasion of the first attack against the ambulance, it might well be argued that, on the second, third and fourth occasions on which it was attacked, the ambulance personnel might be entitled under Article 8, Section 1, of the 1929 Convention to fire at the aircraft, since in this case they would only be acting in self-defence, seeing that the ambulance had been deliberately bombed by Italian aircraft on the preceding day or days. However, no such firing by the ambulance personnel or from the camp of the ambulance took place. For all these reasons, His Majesty's Government are unable to admit that the Italian aide-memoire embodies any valid legal defence for the action of the Italian air force against the British ambulance, even on the supposition that the facts as set forth in that document are correct.

In conclusion, I have been instructed to request that Your Excellency will be so good as to furnish His Majesty's Government with a categorical assurance that clear and definite instructions have been issued to the Italian military authorities in Ethiopia that the air force operating under their command will in future exercise the utmost care to avoid attacks upon British Red Cross hospitals and ambulance units operating with the Ethiopian forces. In making this request, I am directed to add that His Majesty's Government reserve the right, at the appropriate time and in the appropriate manner, to claim compensation for the heavy material losses suffered by the British ambulance service in Ethiopia as the result of the deliberate attacks which form the subject of this correspondence.

(Signed) Eric Drummond.

(a) 32 (thirty-two) photographs showing the effects of the bombing of No. 1 Ambulance of the British Red Cross at Koram on March 4th, 1936. (See Appendix 10, Bombing of No. 1 British Red Cross Ambulance in the plain of Kwarum, March, 4th, 1937, Off. Journal June 1936, Annex 1937, Pages 631-642.)
a) C1.20.6.1,1936, VII.

(Translation) "Addis Ababa, March 16th, 1936.

The Ethiopian Government formally protests against the complete destruction by Italian bombardment of the aeroplane of the Ethiopian Red Cross on March 17th at ugorum, notwithstanding clear emblems and in spite of the previous communication to the enemy of the description of this aeroplane. This aggression has been established by a representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross, who describes it as intentional.

Keruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."


I took off from the Akaki Aerodrome, Addis Ababa, on Monday, March 16th, at 9:50 a.m., with Dr. Junod, delegate of the International Red Cross Committee, Geneva, and with one mechanic and a cargo of special drugs against gas-wounds, the Red Cross mail, etc., in the Fokker belonging to the Ethiopian Red Cross, marked with the regular signs, the photos of which had been transmitted to Geneva and to the Italian Government. Our orders were to deliver the medical material, etc., to the Red Cross Ambulance stationed at Kgorum and to bring back to Addis Ababa Dr. Van Schelven, of the Netherlands Red Cross Ambulance, who had been wounded.

We arrived at the Dessie airfield at 3:50 p.m., tanked petrol and started for Kgorum at 4:55 p.m., aiming at the Kgorum airfield at 6:05. A Government airplane had preceded us by half-an-hour and was already on the field when we arrived.

The same evening we were very graciously and cordially received by His Majesty the Emperor. His Majesty's Secretary, Ato Wolde Gulorguis, informed us, amongst other things, that the distance between the Ghebi (the Emperor's temporary residence) and places where the Dutch and British Ambulances were stationed was too far and too difficult to pass at night, so that we very reluctantly realised that we had to abandon all hopes of reaching Dr. Van Schelven and executing our plan in one night. I was all the more reluctant to act on Ato Wolde Gulorguis' suggestions in that I knew that it would be very difficult to camouflage any plane in country such as around Kgorum, let alone one so big and with such characteristic colours as our Fokker. Nevertheless, Ato Wolde Gulorguis assured Dr. Junod that it was quite possible and it was finally decided to camouflage the plane early next morning.

We spent the night at the Ghebi and next morning at 6:30 we were at the airfield and camouflaging our plane, which was stationed at a distance of about 200 metres from the Government plane that had been camouflaged by the employees of the Government.

At 7 a.m., we started on our way to the British Red Cross Ambulance. About 8 a.m., a second Italian plane, we counted three bombing machines. While we were having breakfast, our boy came up and told us that one plane was burning. At the same moment we saw the Government plane, which was being consumed by fire very rapidly.

We instantly decided to try to save our own Red Cross plane, which we had camouflaged with a view to the fact that it had been bombed twice before on the Dessie airfield, from only 200 metres, in spite of its having at the time, its Red Cross emblems displayed. So we rushed down into the plain as fast as we could, but we were obliged to hide ourselves several times for fear of being spotted by the Italian aviators. As soon as we were down on the big plain our progress was stopped by large waves of mustard gas (lewisite) dropped by the Italian flyers all around the Red Cross machine and..."
with which the air and the ground were saturated. About 10 a.m.
two further bombing-planes came over Khoram and altogether the
five of them dropped about 500 bombs over our airfield, but no
one touched it. We were near the airfield when, all of a sudden, three
new fighting machines appeared from the north. They flew very low,
down to about 20 metres, and proceeded to attack in good formation,
shooting at our plane with machine-guns about five times from
every direction. But still the Red Cross plane was standing where
it was, apparently untouched. Crossing large patches covered with
mustard gas, we finally managed to run up to our machine, with
the intention of taking off from the field, but on reaching it we
found its two tanks perforated and all the petrol gone. So it
was impossible for us to take off with it; we took away all the
camouflage in order to show the Italians the Red Cross sign. We
just had time to run away again to about 300 metres distance when
three Italian bombing-planes returned. They started bombing
operations at about 12.30 p.m., dropping about 300 bombs from an
altitude of about 300 metres for about one hour and a-half. The
last plane came down much lower, to about 200 metres, and dropped
something like ten incendiary bombs. After that, the same plane
turned back once more, still lower, down to about 100 metres,
but did not bomb again and flew away in the direction of Arba Min.
This time, Dr. Junod believed that the aviator had recognised the
Red Cross signs on our plane and had stopped bombing it in
consequence. We therefore went up to the Radio Station and Dr.
Junod called on the International Red Cross Committee, Geneva,
urging them to make the Italians stop bombing the Red Cross plane.
However, when we returned to the airfield at 3.30 p.m.,
we saw that our plane was burning, and we also saw three fighting
machines making attacks the same as they had done in the morning.
When they saw that they had succeeded in setting the Red Cross
plane on fire, they flew off. When I saw our burning machine, I
started to run towards it; but as I was about halfway on the field,
suddenly three new Italian planes appeared, probably when they
noticed that our plane was already on fire, and did not bomb again
- they started throwing bombs on the pack-mules that were on the airfield. I was
without cover at the time and unable to find a hiding-place. I had
to remain lying down flat on the ground. After half-an-hour the
planes flew off in the direction of Khoram, which village they
bombed with incendiary bombs.
When they had gone, I had time to go up to the burning Red
Cross machine in order to investigate if there was any possible
way of saving it. I found, however, that the plane was completely
burned with the exception of the engine, which might possibly have
been repaired. But as I had no tools, etc., at my disposal, I
had to abandon it.

On the next day (March 18th) we had ample occasion to
observe how the Italian planes dropped mustard gas (Yperite) in
liquid form. A liquid solution is squirted directly from the
planes, the gas falling like a light rain covering a large space
of ground and each drop that touches one's skin leaving a burn-
ound. We saw several hundred people, mostly civilians, old men,
women and children, with these dreadful wounds. I myself had my
left hand and wrist burned from touching a bush in passing which
had probably been sprayed with Yperite. I also had a sensation
of burning on my tongue and on the mucous membranes of my
respiratory organs.

We left Khoram on March 18th by lorry and arrived back at
Desale after travelling for two days. From there we returned to
Addis by a Government airplane.

(Signed) Carl Gustaf von Rosen.
Ethiopian Government formally protests to all Members of the League against bombardment on March 29th at Yian Soror by two Italian aeroplanes bearing big Red Cross emblems was bombed, machine-gunned and destroyed. Fortunately, no wounded or other damage, as wounded, drugs and instruments had been removed as a precaution from ambulance.

Belatengueta Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Case No. 17.

Harar, March 29th.

Telegram, dated March 29th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal April, 1936, Annex 1592 Page 457):

(Translation).

"Addis Ababa, March 29th, 1936, 17 h.

Reference my telegram dated December 2nd, 1935, regarding the demilitarisation of the town of Harar and its allotment as a hospital centre for wounded from the southern fronts, I have the honour to inform you that, after making a reconnaissancé flight over the town on March 26th and dropping next day lying propaganda to the effect that entrenched fortifications, gun-emplacements and military roads had been constructed there, the Italians bombed the open town on March 29th. The Ethiopian Government protests against this flagrant violation of Article 25 of the rules of Hague Convention No. IV of 1907. We have had no communication with Harar since the bombardment. Details will follow.

Belatengueta Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

C. 129. M. 68. 1936. VII.

Telegram, dated March 29th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General.

(Translation).

Addis Ababa, March 29th, 1936, 18 h. 35.

Reference last telegram I have the honour to communicate following details. This morning March 29th, at 7.30 a.m., thirty-seven enemy aircraft bombed and machine-gunned the open town of Harar for an hour. Number of casualties not yet known. Among the numerous buildings destroyed are the Church of St. Saviour, the Catholic Church, several of the French Catholic Mission's buildings, the French hospital and consular agency, the wireless station and the prison. Fifteen bombs also fell on the Egyptian Red Crescent Hospital. Ethiopian Red Cross Hospital hit by several bombs. Two explosive bombs fell near the enclosure of the Swedish Hospital. Ras Dafu'a's house, which formerly contained the Italian Consulate, was bombed. It should be noted that all the aforesaid hospitals were plainly marked with the Red Cross.

Belatengueta Heruy, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Analysis
by the Committee of Jurists of the Documents concerning the Conduct of War in Ethiopia, which have been communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations down to April 16th, 1936. (Off. Journal April 1936, Page 364).

Extract. Page 368.

"IV. ALLEGATIONS AGAINST ITALY.
A. Alleged Deliberate Bombing of Red Cross (Red Crescent) Hospitals and Ambulances.


The following is a summary of cases reported:

1. Adowa October 3rd Red Cross Hospital
2. Dessie December 6th American Red Cross Hospital seriously damaged; witnessed by foreign doctors and journalists. Five bombs on hospital; others on operating-tent of ambulance.
3. Negelli December 15th Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulance No. 4.
5. Malka Didaka December 30th Swedish ambulance bombed and machine-gunned; 100 bombs; all tents destroyed and twenty-seven patients killed; Dr. Hylander, head of ambulance, wounded. Report said to have been drawn up by representative of International Red Cross.
6. Bulale December 30th Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; five bombs dropped near ambulance.
7. Bulale December 31st Renewed attack on Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance.
Analysis

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2. Dessie December 6th
   - Ethiopian Red Cross Ambulance

3. Negelli December 15th
   - Swedish ambulance.

4. Manka Didaka December 22nd
   - Swedish ambulance bombed and machine-gunned; 100 bombs; all tents destroyed and twenty-seven patients killed; Dr. Hylander, head of ambulance, wounded. Report said to have been drawn up by representative of International Red Cross.

5. Manka Didaka December 30th
   - Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; five bombs dropped near ambulance.

6. Bulale December 30th
   - Renewed attack on Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance.
9. Waldia January 15th Ethiopian Red Cross Liaison Unit.
10. Makalle January 18th No.3 Ambulance, Ethiopian Red Cross; bombing and machine-gunning; eight wounded; special pains had been taken to indicate presence of this ambulance to the Italian aeroplanes.
11. Dessie February 9th Ethiopian hospital plane bombed.
12. Bulale February 11th Egyptian Red Crescent Ambulance; eleven bombs and machine-gun fire.
15. Quoram March 5th British Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned; finding it necessary thereafter to discard Red Cross insignia.
16. Quoram March 17th Ethiopian Red Cross aeroplane destroyed; witnessed by representative of International Red Cross.
17. Ilylan Serer March 17th Swedish Red Cross Ambulance bombed and machine-gunned.
18. Chilga March 20th British Field Ambulance No.2.
19. Harrar March 29th Egyptian Red Crescent hospital; fifteen bombs; Ethiopian Red Cross Hospital and French Hospital.

According to the memorandum of March 2nd, 1936 (pages 10-14), a representative of the International Red Cross witnessed (or investigated) some of these attacks (Dessie, December 6th, 1935; Swedish ambulance at Malka Didaka, December 30th and 31st, 1935), in which case he made a report to the International Committee.

In four cases (Malka Didaka, December 30th, 1935; Dagahbur, January 4th, 1936; Makalle, January 18th, 1936; Dessie, February 9th, 1936), an attack with machine-guns from a very low elevation or bombing from a very low elevation is alleged to have occurred. In the instance of the Bombing of the Ethiopian Red Cross ambulance at Makalle on January 18th, 1936, it is stated that reconnaissance on the preceding day had shown the Italians the presence of the ambulance and the absence of troops. The bombing at Quoram on March 17th of the Ethiopian Red Cross aeroplane is said to have been described as intentional by the representative of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

Regarding the bombing of Dessie Hospital and dressing-stations on December 6th, 1935, stated to be contained in an enclosure outside the town, the Ethiopian Government forwarded by telegram on December 7th (Document 6.724.250.1935) a declaration signed by six doctors. There is a controversy between the Italian Government and one of the doctors, Dr. M.S. Belau, who is alleged to be a person of very doubtful character. The character of the others has not been impugned."
PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE III. SUPPORT.

B. Bombing of undefended places.

The Analysis by League of Nations Committee of Jurists, see above.


(Translation.)


It has been evident to us since hostilities began that the Italian Government has adopted the policy of destroying our people, not by the use of its own troops, but solely by that of mechanical means and of native troops recruited in Italian colonies. The Italian Government may indeed consider itself authorised to bomb us when we go out to share the sufferings of our soldiers and to defend our soil, but the bombardment of open towns such as Debat, Gondar and of numerous villages inhabited by non-combatant peasants and containing neither troops nor means of defense, the killing of women and children, the bombardment of Red Cross hospitals, are undeniably violations of international law. This last action ...

HAILU SEBASIS I"

b) Extract from Telegram, dated March 5th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal, April 1936, Page 157):

(Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 5th, 1936.

Following our previous telegrams regarding bombing Red Cross units, I have to inform you that yesterday about noon an Italian aeroplane, S.62, after bombarding the open town of Quorom killing non-combatants, proceeded towards British Red Cross ambulances situated ...

HERUY, Minister for Foreign Affairs."


(Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 17th, 1936, 11 h. 15.

The Imperial Government formally protests to all the States Members of the League against the continual use by the Italians of asphyxiating and similar gases all along the northern front and during the bombardment of open towns in the interior of the country. These proceedings constitute the most flagrant breach of the Declaration of 1925. - HERUY, Minister for Foreign Affairs."


(Translation)

Reference my telegram dated December 26th, 1935, regarding the demilitarization of the town of Harer and its allotment as a hospital centre for wounded from the southern front. I have the honour to inform you that, after making a reconnaissance flight over the town on March 26th and dropping next day lying propaganda, the effect that enclosed fortifications, camouflages and military road had been constructed there, the Italians bombed that open town on March 26th. The Ethiopian Government protests against this flagrant violation of the article 22 of the rules of Hague Convention No. IV of 1907. We have had no communication with Harer since the bombardment. Details will follow. - Selassie HERUY, Minister for Foreign Affairs."
Telegram, dated March 29th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General (Off. Journal April 1936 Annex 1592 Page 1571): (Translation)

"Addis Ababa, March 29th, 1936, 12 H. 05."

Reference last telegram I have the honour to communicate following details. This evening, March 29th, at 7.30 a.m., thirty-seven enemy aircraft bombed and machine-gunned the open town of Hareran for an hour. Number of casualties not yet known. Among the numerous buildings destroyed are the Church of St. Saviour, the Catholic Church, several of the French Catholic Mission's buildings, the French hospital and consular agency, the wireless station and the prison. Fifteen bombs also fell on the Egyptian Red Crescent hospital hit by several bombs. Two explosive bombs fell near the enclosure of the Swedish hospital. Ras Fawu's house, which formerly contained the Italian Consulate, was bombed. It should be noted that all the aforesaid hospitals were plainly marked with the Red Cross. - Salutations MIII, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

e) Telegram, dated April 17th, 1936, from the Ethiopian Government to the Secretary-General. (Off. Journal April 1936 Annex 1592 Page 1536): (Translation)

"Addis Ababa, April 17th, 1936, 12 H. 05."

This morning, at 8 a.m., two Italian bombing aeroplanes flew over the open town of Addis Ababa for a long time, firing machine-guns and discharging rockets. The Ethiopian Government expects the enemy to allege that, during this attack, the said aeroplanes were riddled with bullets, the purpose being to fabricate a false pretext for bombing the town. The Ethiopian Government declares that during this aggression no shots were fired at the aeroplanes. The fact that Italian aeroplanes have flown over the town on four occasions and the fact that, during these attacks, machine-guns were fired and rockets discharged clearly show the enemy's intention of bombing this open town. - Salutations MIVF, Minister for Foreign Affairs."

f) Extract from statement, attached to Memorandum of March 2nd, 1936, from the President of the Ethiopian Red Cross to the President of the International Red Cross Committee (Off. Journal April 1936 Annex 1592 Page 1551): (Translation)

"Bombing of Open Towns."

The Ethiopian Red Cross calls the attention of National Red Cross Societies to the following facts:

The Press Secretary of the Italian Embassy in London stated on October 14th, 1935:

"I can assure you that Mussolini gave express instructions to our airmen that centres of civilian population were on no account to be bombed." According to a message broadcast from Berlin on October 21st, 1935, Count Ciano, Minister of Propaganda, stated at Asmara that:

"The Italian army has always endeavoured to spare the civilian population and it is easy for Italian airmen to recognize the Ethiopian fighting forces, which usually camp outside the inhabited areas."

The following passage is part of a telegram sent to the League of Nations by the Italian Government on December 15th, 1935:

"The Italian Government formally denies that any open town has ever been bombed by the Air Force in East Africa, since every action has always been directed solely against military columns and concentrations."

The Ethiopian Red Cross does not claim that the following list (not copied here) enumerates every instance of the bombing of open towns. Apart from such attacks, the Italian aircraft have flown everywhere, both over and behind the fronts, discharging explosive and
Incessant bombs hurled on peaceful peasant villages, massacres
in their thousands for all killing operations of conscription.

### Alleged Hostilities of Open Towns

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Town</th>
<th>Casualties</th>
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<td>February 1st</td>
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<td>November 1st</td>
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<td>March 1st</td>
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Apart from using aeroplanes to bomb open villages and now and then the
flares and gun-spots of the peasants in place after any military
operations of conscription.
PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN BRIEF.

C. Use of poisonous gases.

The Analysis by League of Nations Committee of Jurists, see here below.

a) Extract from Telegramme, en date du 30 Décembre 1935, de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Ethiopie au Secrétaire Général. (Journal Off. février 1936, Annexe 158/ Page 241):

"Addis Abeba, le 30 décembre 1935.

Maintenant, le 23 décembre, ils ont fait usage contre nos troupes, dans la région du Tchajae, des gaz asphyxiants et toxiques, ce qui constitue une nouvelle adjonction à la liste déjà longue des violations par l'Italie de ses engagements internationaux. Nous protestons énergiquement contre de tels procédés inhumains.

Abd al-Attas Ier, Empereur."

b) Télégramme, en date du 1er Janvier 1936, de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Ethiopie au Secrétaire Général. (Journal Off. Février 1936, Annexe 158/ Page 242):

"Addis Abeba, le 1er Janvier 1936.

Puisant suite à notre protestation en date du 30 décembre, nous portons à votre connaissance ce qui suit. Le 30 décembre encore, les Italiens après avoir bombardé violentement notre armée du sud ont fait usage de gaz toxiques. Au cours de ce même bombardement, les Italiens ont détruit complètement l'ambulance de la Croix-Rouge suédoise où étaient hospitalisés de nombreux blessés et blessés en dehors des signes conventionnels évidents. Le médecin chef de cette ambulance, le Dr Hylander, a été lui-même très gravement blessé. Après les bombardements de hôpital Addis, hôpital et ambulance suédoise, usage de gaz lilé le jour suivant immédiatement et asi-siant au nom de la civilisation son action inhumaine. Nous élevons de nouveau nos protestations les plus formelles contre les agissements criminels du Gouvernement italien au mépris de ses engagements internationaux.

Abd al-Attas Ier, Empereur."


"Paris, le 6 Janvier 1936.

D'ordre de mon Gouvernement, je pris l'avise de procéder à votre connaissance des faits suivants : l'ambulance suédoise prouve que le bombardement et la destruction de notre ambulance de la Croix-Rouge suédoise. Les autorités italiennes qui continuent leur politique de terreur, en assassinat et en bombardement de nos troupes de régulation, ont détruit la Croix-Rouge suédoise. La plus, les autorités italiennes n'apportent aucune excuse à ce bombardement démonstratif de la Croix-Rouge et nous avons le droit de faire allusion à ce bombardement dénoncé même par les autorités italiennes qui considèrent que la Croix-Rouge est un ennemi de l'armée. Nous avons le droit de faire allusion à ce bombardement dénoncé même par les autorités italiennes qui considèrent que la Croix-Rouge est un ennemi de l'armée.

Le Gouvernement italien a toutefois affirmé que la Croix-Rouge n'était qu'un cher compris dans les agissements ordonnés et non de la volonté du Gouvernement italien.

Ministre de l'Intérieur.

Ministre de l'Intérieur.

The Ethiopian Government hereby protests to all the States Members of the League against the continuance by the Italians of asphyxiating and similar gases along the northern front and during the bombardment of open towns in the interior of the country. These proceedings constitute the most flagrant breach of the declaration of 1925.- KENYU, Minister for Foreign Affairs."


To complete the evidence contained in its report, the Ethiopian Government has instructed its delegation at Geneva to lay before the Committee of Thirteen two new items of information:

1) A telegram in clear, just received, from its Government by the Ethiopian delegation states as follows: 'Please inform the League of Nations immediately that the Italians have also begun to use asphyxiating gases on the Ogaden front. On April 8th, they discharged gas on Dagabur and Hargobur. Seventy persons were affected; they are suffering horribly in the eye and lungs and from skin burns. Protest energetically against these inhuman and forbidden acts.'

(Signed) Wole Maryam, Ethiopian Minister."


I beg you to bring the following declaration, together with the documents attached thereto, to the knowledge of the Council and of all the Members of the League of Nations:

IV. The third document is a statement dated April 8th, 1936, by Doctor Schuppli, Head of Ambulance No. 3 on the use of
V. The fourth document is a report dated April 11th, 1936, on the use of poison gases, signed by Mr. Walter F. Holmes, correspondent of the Nordisk Telegraph Agency, Copenhagen, and The Times, of London.

VI. The fifth document is a report dated April 10th, 1936, on the use of poison gases, signed by Dr. John M. Kelly, Head of the British Red Cross Ambulance in Ethiopia.

VII. The sixth document is a report dated April 10th, 1936, on the use of poison gases, signed by Dr. John M. Kelly, Head of the British Red Cross Ambulance in Ethiopia.

VIII. The seventh document is a report dated March 24th, 1936, from a letter dated March 26th, 1936, from Mr. Smith.

IX. The eighth document, dated April 10th, 1936, is a list of places bombed with poison gases, with the dates of the bombing, during the period December 22nd, 1935-April 7th, 1936. The document reproduces the figures showing the consignments of poison gases to North Africa through the Suez Canal.

(Appendix III)

(Signed) Wolde Meryam, Ethiopian Minister.
Later in the same day I visited the town which the British Ambulance had been established at Kwaran, and saw there a number of persons suffering from the symptoms described in my own experience, were undoubtedly inflicted by the yellowish-green "mustard" gas. In these cases, I was informed, had been brought in during that day, whilst others had arrived on the two or three preceding days during which the base had been established there. A notable fact in these cases was that, whilst a number showed burns on the hands and shoulders caused obviously by falling liquid, a much greater number were severely injured in the legs and lower parts of the bodies. In the case of several persons, large areas of skin had been removed from the legs and thighs and some of these also had suffered extensive scars and painful burning of the genital organs. The cause of this particular form of injury is as follows. The gas was being dropped in large containers, one of which had actually been brought into the ambulance compound and was inspected and photographed by myself and colleagues. It was a torpedoeshaped object of a total length of about four feet. On striking the ground, the base of the container becomes detached and from a bottle within is released a quantity of liquid amounting, I estimate, to about 40 lb. In the dense bush, this liquid is scattered on ground and foliage and remains there for a considerable period. I am informed that its corrosive quality persists for some two or three days. Not only crops but peasants passing through the bush on their usual occupations and going into enclosures comes in contact with contaminated foliage sustain the terrible injuries described above.

During the subsequent months which I spent at Kwaran and in the neighborhood of Lake Anshangi, I witnessed daily bombardments by Italian aeroplanes in which gas-bombs were very frequently used. In addition to the containers already described, the Italian flying over Kwaran Plain at relatively low altitudes used the method of spraying from the machine. This method causes possibly more widespread injury and is certainly more difficult to escape from than the dropping of gas-shells. From the fine rain of corrosive liquid which descends from the plane there seems little protection unless possibly something in the nature of a diving suit were devised, but in any case Ethiopian soldiers and peasants are not provided with even the most elementary forms of mask or protective clothing. Consequently, large numbers of them, subjected to this form of attack, receive ghastly injuries to head, face and upper parts of bodies. I may mention as an example that, one evening when I was riding across Kwaran Plain shortly after such a gas attack, I came upon the British Ambulance Officers Atkinson administering first aid to victims. It had been necessary to send men down from the care in which the Ambulance was then located because many of the victims had been blinded by the gas-spraying and could not go up into the vehicles for treatment. Atkinson told me that it was a daily occurrence for the Ambulance to send officers down to the plain to treat victims thus incapacitated. On the evening in question, whilst I was present, Atkinson treated fully 100 cases of burning by corrosive liquid. Another example of injury by gas within my own experience occurred when the British Ambulance Officers Captain Townsend Stephens and Dr. Argoy went to the assistance of the crew of the British Red Cross plane which was bombed by the Italian while lying on the open ground at Kwaran.

The officers found themselves gasping through a mass of mustard gas and both shortly afterwards when I met them showed marked indications of inhalation of the vapour, whilst Captain Townsend Stephens suffered slight but distinct burns on his throat. Among the natives also during my stay in the region of Kwaran were streaming back from the battle north of Tellaha and in the Teshien were a great proportion of gas victims, many were suffering from gangrenous gums owing to the lack of facilities and materials for treating the effects of gas at the front.

All the facts here recorded were observed by me in company with other European officers.

(Signed) Walter H. Holmes.

Correspondent of The London Telegraph Agency, Copenhagen.

The Times at the Northern Front.

Neutra's Current, April 13.
Appendix 6.
British Ambulance Service,
A.D.H.C. (Ethiopia) No. 3,
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

Report on the use of gas on the northern front.

In the latter half of February, while the British Ambulance Service was situated at Addis Ababa, several cases of severe burns from mustard gas were treated. These cases had made their way from the front. On February 21st, 22nd and 23rd, about 150 cases of severe burns from mustard gas were treated by the advance unit of the British Ambulance Service in Ethiopia near Alamata. Many of these patients were women, children and infants. The burns of the large majority of them had been contracted locally. During the three days while the unit was situated near Alamata, several mustard gas bombs were dropped in the region.

Between March 7th and March 23rd, while the unit was situated in the region of Lake Ashangi, between 200 and 300 cases of burning by mustard gas were treated by the unit. Many of these had been temporarily blinded, and a special clinic, about a mile away from the unit where the shooting had been most severe, had to be held, as the victims, being blind, were unable to find their way to the Ambulance. While the unit was in this situation, mustard gas was frequently used in the vicinity.

A large number of the burns treated were of a very severe and terrible nature.

(Signed) John M. Kelly,
Commandant,
British Ambulance Service in Ethiopia.

Appendix 7.
Yerga Alem, March 12th, 1936.

To the International Red Cross,
Addis Ababa.

The following will be a statement of gas bomb being used by the Italians today at Yerga Alem.

At 6 a.m. two trimotor Italian bombing planes went over Yerga Alem. At 6 a.m. two patients were brought owing to our camp, both suffering from severe irritation of the eyes with epiphora and blepharospasm and strong irritation of the mucous membranes of the nose and throat. One of them had also a bullous burn of the skin of the cornea in both feet.

We immediately left for the town, as we heard that more persons were injured. We found four persons suffering from exactly the same symptoms as regards eyes, nose and throat. All six patients, who were very suffering, were put into our hospital.

On investigation of the spot where the bomb exploded, we found a hole by 3 metres in diameter and 1 1/2 metres deep. Judging by the three pieces of the bomb that we found in the hole, we should say it to have been 75 cm. long and about 30 cm. in diameter, made up of 2 mm. thick sheet-steel welded together. The grass around the hole for about 3 metres was faded, not burned. We enclosed a little sample of the powder found nearby. There was a distinct smell of mustard up to 30 metres from the spot. No rain had fallen since the bomb dropped, but the wind had been rather strong in the afternoon.

The injured persons were located 10-20 metres from the exploding bomb.

(Signed) Gunner Ullman.

1936 - March 20th - Today we have treated furthermore fifteen patients injured from the gas-bomb yesterday. All those patients had bullous burns of the face and legs, and a few in the face. These burns had all characteristics of burns from mustard gas. I have taken the photo of these burns on the enclosed film in 32 and 3. With the experiences of these patients, please forward the whole film to the Norwegian Red Cross, Oslo.

(Signed) Ullman.
Appendix B.

April 10th, 1936.

As a sequel to the list, with dates, of gas bombardments carried out by the Italians in flagrant violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the list is far from complete, because since the beginning of March the Italians have been systematically bombing every day, on the fronts and on centres of civilian population, with gases prohibited by that Protocol:

Taihase December 22nd K’oram March 17th
Anba Alagi December 26th K’oram March 18th
Borana December 30th Erge Alam March 17th
Mukale December 31st Erge Alam March 1st
Sokota January 10th Inda Meholi March 20th
Makale January 21st Inda Meholi March 30th
Megale February 16th K’oram April 4th
Wallia Road February 27th K’oram April 5th
K’oram March 15th K’oram April 6th
Yilan Serer March 17th K’oram April 7th

It is also desirable to give statistics of consignments of gas to outlying areas which have passed through the Suez Canal: Between June 25th and December 25th, 1935, there passed through the Suez Canal, consigned to Massawa:

265 tons of asphyxiating gas;
45 tons of mustard gas;
9,413 gas-bombs.

On January 4th, at 6.35 a.m., the S.S. Sicilia passed through the Suez Canal carrying:

4,700 asphyxiating and tear-gas bombs.

Analysis

by the Committee of Jurists of the Documents concerning the Conduct of the war in Ethiopia which have been communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations down to April 16th, 1936. (Off. Journal April 1936, Page 364):

Excerpt: Page 364.

"C. Use of Poison Gas.

1. Ethiopian Allegations of Use of Gas.


Document C.N.1.70,1936 gives the following list of
Excerpt from letter from Rev. Smith, Sudan Interior Missionary at Yerga Alem (March 16th, 1936):

"Yesterday, gas has dropped here. Two containers; one exploded, one unexploded. Over thirty people were affected. We have been working on them yesterday and to-day at M.E.C. camp. Seems to be mustard gas mixed with another gas."

(Translation)

We give herewith a list, with dates, of gas bombardments carried out by the Italians in flagrant violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The list is far from complete, because since the beginning of March the Italians have been systematically bombing every day, on the fronts and on centres of civilian population, with gases prohibited by that protocol:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Takala</td>
<td>December 22nd</td>
<td>Khorum</td>
<td>March 17th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assa Aliaji</td>
<td>December 26th</td>
<td>Khorum</td>
<td>March 16th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Borana</td>
<td>December 30th</td>
<td>Yerga Alem</td>
<td>March 17th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makale</td>
<td>December 31st</td>
<td>Yerga Alem</td>
<td>March 21st</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokota</td>
<td>January 10th</td>
<td>Inda Meholi</td>
<td>March 27th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makale</td>
<td>January 21st</td>
<td>Inda Meholi</td>
<td>March 30th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Magalo</td>
<td>February 16th</td>
<td>Khorum</td>
<td>April 4th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waldia Road</td>
<td>February 27th</td>
<td>Khorum</td>
<td>April 6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khorum</td>
<td>March 16th</td>
<td>Khorum</td>
<td>April 6th</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yian Serer</td>
<td>March 17th</td>
<td>Khorum</td>
<td>April 7th</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is also desirable to give statistics of consignments of gas to East Africa which have passed through the Suez Canal: Between June 25th and December 25th, 1935, there passed through the Suez Canal, consigned to Massawa:

- 255 tons of asphyxiating gas;
- 45 tons of mustard gas;
- 7,463 gas-bombs.

On January 4th, at 6:35 a.m., the S.S. Sicilia passed through the Suez Canal carrying:

- 4,700 asphyxiating and tear-gas bombs.

Analysis

By the Committee of Jurists of the Documents concerning the Conduct of the war in Ethiopia which have been communicated to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations deem to April 16th, 1936. (Off. Journal April 1936 Page 364):

Extract Page 376:

"C. Use of Poison Gas:

1. Ethiopian Allegations of Use of Gas.


Document C. 161 M. 38. 1936 gives the following list of
During the last four bombardments of Quoram (April 4th to 7th), the town is said to have been literally drenched with gas. The gas most frequently used is said to be mustard gas (yperite). Use of gas against the troops is alleged to have occurred in the Somali region in December 23rd, and against the Somalian army on December 30th, in the northern section of operations in January, continuously all along the northern front in March, on Debaghur and Wadabunsh (on the Ogaden front on April 8th), with resulting injury to eighty persons.

### Alleged Import of Gas to Massawa.

The memorandum reproduced in document C.155.4.91.136 states that, between June 25th and December 25th, 1935, 45 tons of mustard, 265 tons of asphyxiating materials and 7,483 gas bombs, and on January 4th, 1936, 4700 gas bombs passed the Suez Canal on their way to Massawa.

### Statements from Non-Ethiopian Sources regarding Actual Cases of Casualties from Gas.

- **(a)** Statement of Dr. Nelly, of the British Red Cross, that, between March 1st and March 31st, he treated about a hundred serious cases of mustard-gas burns, a statement supported by photos showing gas burns, which were taken on March 4th and are in the possession of the British Minister at Addis Ababa.

- **(b)** Signed statement by Dr. V.C. Maudie, of the British Ambulance, that, between March 1st and March 31st, he personally saw and treated several hundred men, women and children who were suffering from mustard-gas burns.

- **(c)** Report that there exists an authenticated report of the Norwegian ambulance (southern front) proving that, on March 19th, twenty-one cases of mustard-gas burns were caused by one bomb.

- **(d)** Report that the Swedish ambulance has reported treating cases in December on the southern front.

- **(e)** Report that Dr. Junod, of the International Red Cross, and Count von Pass (Swedish Red Cross Pilot) saw gas used at Quoram on March 17th and suffered from it. Dr. Junod sent a report to the International Committee.

- **(f)** Report that Dr. Trakhl, an Irishman attached to the Ethiopian army sanitary service at Massawa and serving with the Somalian Red Cross Ambulance Staff, has made a statement in London that, in the last week of December and the first week of January, about thirty cases of mustard-gas burns were treated by the ambulance.
D. Destruction of religious buildings.

The Analysis by League of Nations Committee of Jurists, see here below.


En plus des violations par les Italiens des lois et coutumes de la guerre qui ont été détaillées à la Société des Nations, ils ont, lors de leur retraite récente dans le Shire et dans le Tsembien, brûlé les églises et procédé à l'extermination systématique de la population civile.

HAILI SELASSIE I°, Empereur."
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1. Alleged Origin of Red Cross Units.

The Ethiopian note gave a list of encampments of military units, which either never took place or have already been freely denied, or were cited in which no Red Cross workers were present, or were major incidents, occurring in the course of legitimate military operations. I was referred to various communications upon the subject.


Open and uninvaded places were ever bombed, but only military concentrations and bridges. It is an old knowledge, however, that the so-called "towns" in Ethiopia are nothing but collections of huts, usually built of wood and mud. In these settlements, the inhabitants congregate and keep up a sustained rifle and anti-aircraft fire against the Italian forces, which rule over the area.

In any case, the list of so-called town bombards was completely imaginary. Many of them do not exist, and no war of the dates given in the note took place. In some cases, such as those of Andan, Asa Amla, Bal Artam, Guna, Male, Mawara, Anag, Gherla, and Segherat, bombs were dropped upon concentrations of armed men outside the inhabited areas, and often some kilometers distant from them.

The same remarks apply to churches, which, in Ethiopia, are often merely huts surrounded by a cross.

3. Alleged Use of Car.

The statements in the Ethiopian note contained many falsehoods. I would refer to my note of May 14th, 1936, but may at the same time point out, as an illustration of the reliability of these statements, that:

- Complaint was made of the bombing of towns with antiaircraft guns on December 31st, 1935, and January 1st, 1936, at which time the town had in the possession of the Italian troops, having been occupied since November 29th, 1935.
- Complaint was made of the transport of gas by the R.M. Italian, a ship which, according to information received, was used exclusively for the transport of troops, and therefore could not carry explosives, for which special equipment is necessary.
- Complaint was also made of the transport of gas by the s.M. Genova, which was alleged by the Italian forces having passed through the port of Massul on January 19th, 1936, whereas it has been ascertained that the vessel in question sailed on her first voyage to the Atlantic from Naples on February 27th, 1936, carrying nothing but motor vehicles and foodstuffs.

League of Nations Journal, July, 1936, Page 772.)
PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

A) Bombing of Red Cross Hospitals and Ambulances:
   See Appendix I.

B) Bombing of underground places:
   See Appendix II.

C) Use of poisonous gases:
   See Appendix III.

D) Destruction of Churches:
   See Appendix IV.
NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender’s own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.
   Mussolini was commander in chief of all Italian forces in East Africa. The relations to Mussolini are illustrated by himself in his book "La Guerra d'Etiopia". See Appendix V under 1). His relations to Traversi, the commander of the Southern Front may be inferred from an extract from "Con Dio alla guerra in Etiopia" by General Quirino Accellini, see Appendix V under 2).

As to the case of the, there is an official statement from the Southern Front, see Appendix V under 1). The doings of the Red Cross and of the Medical staff were so persistent that the High Command and the Command in Somalia cannot possibly deny that such actions were a method of warfare ordered or at least approved by them. The same applies to the destroying of churches on the Southern Front.

b) The probable defence.
   Here is reference to the above quoted Analysis by the Committee of Jurists, Part V: "Italian answers to Ethiopian allegations" (League of Nations Journal, April 1936, page 372) and to Part 3 of "Memorandum of the Italian Red Cross" (see Appendix V2), containing in a condensed form the Italian observations in the matter.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.
   Reasonably complete, but the collecting of evidence, especially in the form of affidavits, continues. Possibly even other charges can be brought against the accused.
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

ETHIOPIAN CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 2 A-D (of 2 B)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.</th>
<th>Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Not to be translated.)</td>
<td>R. MAZZALI, Rosolphi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshal of Italy (General)</td>
<td>Commander of the Forces in Somalia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(In Italian: maresciallo d'Italia. - generale - Comandante delle Forze della Somalia.)</td>
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<table>
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<th>Date and place of commission of alleged crime.</th>
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<td>During the Italian invasion of Ethiopia.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1935 - May 1936.</td>
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<td>A number of places on the Southern Front.</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<td>A) XXXI. Deliberate bombardment of hospitals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B) XXX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C) XXXI. Use of poisonous and asphyxiating gases.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1936).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Third part chapters 12 and 5. Fourth part chapter 6.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preface articles 11 and 12.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

A) Listing of Red Cross Hospitals and Ambulances on nine different occasions from December 16th, 1935, to March 29th, 1936, inclusive.
B) Listing of a number of undefended places from February 6th, 1936, to March 29th, 1936, inclusive.
C) Use of poisonous gases against troops and civilians from December 30th, 1935, onwards, increased from March 1936 onwards.


* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the secretariat state.
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

ETHIOPIAN CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 2 A-C *(of 2 2)

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

D. I. A. M. I. A.T. I., Rosolmo

General of the Italian Forces in Somaliland.

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

During the Italian Invasion of Ethiopia
October 1935 - May 1936.

A number of places on the Southern Front.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

A) XVI. Deliberate bombardment of hospitals.
B) XIX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.
C) XCVI. Use of poison gas in military operations.

Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930).
Third part, Chapters 14 and 15, Fourth part, Chapter 6.
References to relevant provisions of national law.

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

A) Bombing of Red Cross hospitals; in Amba Gela on nine different occasions from December 1935, to March 30th, 1936, inclusive.
B) Bombing of a number of undefended places from February 5th, 1936, to March 30th, 1936, inclusive.
C) Use of poison gas against troops and civilians from December 30th, 1935, onwards, increasing from March 30th onwards.

TRANSMITTED BY: [Signature]

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the Secretariat.
PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

See Case No. 1 (Cholera) A-C, the incidents on the Southern Front.
NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

See Case No. 1 (Camejlo).
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 22

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

D. R. A. C. I. A. T. I., Rodelolpho

General of the Italian Armed Forces, Viceroy of Ethiopia

(In Italian: Marchese di Italia.
Governatore Generale e Vice Re d'Ethiopia.)

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, time of Graziani's governorship, viz. 26th May, 1936-26th December 1936, inclusive.

A great number of places all over Ethiopia. Concentration camps outside Ethiopia.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

1, III, VII, VIII, XIV, X, XV, XVII, XVII, XIV, X, XV, XVI, XIX.

Ethiopian Penal Code (as of 1930). Third part, Chapters 9 and 12. Fourth part, Chapters 1, 2, and 3. Article 117, art. 12.

References to relevant provisions of national law.

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Systematic terrorising during Graziani's governorship involving crimes of any kind, e.g. murder and massacre, mutilation and burning of whole districts, frequent use of gas, relentless killing of captured patriots, deportations to concentration camps.

TRANSMITTED BY

[Signature]

(For the Use of the Secretariat)

Registered Number.

Date of receipt in Secretariat.

[Signature]

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the Governorate.
PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

I. MANNER OF MURDER— ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS.

1) Summary execution of captured or surrendered patriots. This policy was consistently adopted during Italiani's government.
2) Mass killing of native populations in connection with the pillaging of inhabited districts.
3) The putting to death of thousands of persons, the plundering and burning which took place in Addis Ababa on the day of the attempt on Italiani (April 18, 1936) and the subsequent rape, and the deportation of Italiani's followers to the country (see antiterrorist measures).
4) The killing in May 1937 of all wards and vendors of the monastery at Debra Birhan and the plundering of the monastery.

III. TORTURE OF CIVILIANS.

Torture was often used at examinations in police stations and in prisons.

VII. PERSECUTION OF CIVILIANS.

Frequent and wanton deportations of civilians to camps in Italian Somalia (Jennebe, Adibra, Amsa) and Italy (African).

VIII. INTERVENTION OF CIVILIANS UNDER INHUMAN CONDITIONS.

Many camps and prisons inside and outside Ethiopia were used for internment of civilians, who there suffered from bad nutrition and unsanitary hygienic conditions and other forms of ill-treatment.

IX. ATTEMPT TO GENOCIDALIZE THE INHABITANTS OF AFRICAN TERRITORY.

The Italians aimed at the complete extermination of all Italians, especially the destruction of the Ahraric element.

XIII. ALLIANCE.

See under I 2), 3) and 4).

XIV. CONFISCATION OF PROPERTY.

See under I 2), 3) and 4).

XV. INSTITUTION OF CONTRIBUTIONS AND REQUISITIONS.

Land, houses, cattle, etc., were frequently seized or requisitioned without proper compensation.

XVI. INSTITUTION OF COLLECTIVE PENALTY.

See under I 2), 3) and 4).

XVIII. CIVILIAN DEPORTATION AND DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY.

In connection with operations against patriot forces regularly were carried out by destroying, in vast regions whole villages and other inhabited places (see also under I 2) and 3).

XX. ALLIANCE— REFERENCE TO UNAFFECTED AREAS.

All deportations were carried out on a large scale and consisted also abnormally, places retaining an ill-defined objective.

X. MASS DEPORTATION OF AFRICAN INHABITANTS.

Mass deportations of whole districts, i.e., usually did not spare women and children.

XVII. USE OF VILLAGES AND WELL-DEFINED AREAS.

See under I 1) of this.

XIX. ALLIANCE— COMMANDMENT AND USE OF FORCES.

See under I 1) of this.
a) Il I° Anno dell’Impero
published by:
Governo Generale A.O.I.
Stato Maggiori
Allegato al I° Volume
Pages 21-22

Heading
(In Italian)

Il MESSAGGERO IN FAMIGLIA

Mittente: S.E. Comandante F.A. - GIGLIGA.
Destinatari: S.E. Ministro Colonie - S.E. Badoglio.
Data di presentazione: 14 maggio 1936 - XIV.

Text
(translated into Italian)

6501 6502 May 14th at 21 hours. Yesterday afternoon our native company working on the road GIGLIGA-HORER at 36 km from GIGLIGA was attacked by groups of armed Abyssinians. The attackers were driven back with serious losses and six prisoners. Our losses six killed and 12 wounded all natives. Through by message spread everywhere by means of aircraft and by messengers I have told Ethiopian chiefs and privates that after the fall of the Empire of Haile Selassie, those who dared to commit hostile actions against our troops would be considered as rebels and treated as such, while I guaranteed immunity to those who have surrendered, so I have given orders that the prisoners taken shall be shot immediately. Of this I have notified chiefs and soldiers who have not yet received by means of another appropriate message which will be spread by aircraft and messengers. And I have warned them that this fate will befall without mercy all those who hereafter in any way commit actions of rebellion. Arms hitherto sequestrated at Harer 1,500 rifles, 11 machine guns of various type, 5 guns of various calibre, considerable quantity of munitions. In the Dire Dawa zone raids operated by armed Abyssinian groups continue harming the populations.

signature

GRAZIANI

b)

Heading
(In Italian)

MESSAGGERO DI STATO

Asseggnato ufficiale

S.E. GRAZIANI

Da Roma il 3 giugno 1936 XIV Ore 14.45
Ricevuto il 6 giugno 1936 XIV Ore 2.45

Text
(translated into English)

6495 J./. J. /./ All the rebels who are taken prisoners shall be shot J./. J.

signature

MUSCOLI
GOVerno Generale dell'Africa Orientale Italiana
GADGIONI-UGLIO CIGNA

RACCOMANDA DI STATO

Ufficio Ufficiale, Allegato
N. 5046 di prot. dell'Ufficio Ufficiale
Adria Apena il I ott. 1936 - XIV

Indicazioni di Urgenza

RACCOMANDA DI ANNULLA

Copia per conoscenza: S.O.V. Gov. Genere. Com. Sup. Aviazione
Stato Maggiore Governatore Generale

Uff. Governatore

Uff. Governatore

Uff. Governatore

Uff. Governatore

Comando lettera Nord Orientale

Comando lettera Centrale

Comando lettera Cerchio Ferroviario

Comando Ricerca di Adria

17/21 Cabinet // I communicate for your information the following telegram sent today to the governor of the sector east of the railway // "Maj. L.T. G. C. in C. (Nesta) wired as follows // "I ask you to inform me if natives proved to be rebels and having taken part in the new serious attempt against the railway are to be shot" // "I repeat to V. and those under you the strict orders from the War Office, many times stressed by me that all those responsible in any way of revolt under whatever form are to be shot immediately // If they continue to expose uncertainty and receive no clear orders to immediately repatriate of the command responsible // It is time to put an end to all kinds of weakness, when our civilian soldiers continue to be barbarously tortured. // From now on I order reports to be sent to me from time to time about those matters // a telegram is given for information to Rome // Office of Military Justice informed // "Insegna //

SALUTE

W. A. M. N. III

A. E. A.
The following order is transmitted:

To: All Commanders-in-Chief

Subject: Order for the Capture of Notable Persons

Due to the revolts in the region, orders have been received to capture all rebels involved, including notable individuals such as chiefs, simple men, or anyone suspected of assisting the rebels. 

Consequently, let all commanders execute this order immediately. 

1. Capture all rebels, notable persons, chiefs, simple men, or any others suspected of assisting the rebels. 
2. Let all commanders consider the following:
   a. If someone is captured, they should be interrogated to determine their true intentions.
   b. If it is clear they assist the rebels, they should be immediately arrested.

3. Let all commanders be aware that this order is only issued in the context of the current revolts. 

4. Let all commanders ensure that this order is communicated to all subordinates.

Please acknowledge receipt.

Signature

[Signature]

[Date]
(Graziani 2d)

Appendix B.

1. 0536

a) GOV VINO GENERALE D'ITALIA A.C.T.

MILITARE DI SISTEMA

R.0073 del prot.Uff. Intendenza

Ufficio Intendenza: cabina 2.

Add. Abba 11 Dicembre 1936 XV


PIL'CO

TELEGRAMMA IN PELLICANIA


Dir.Sup.A.C.P.Uff. Politico

Gen.Pusterla A.A. Uff.Diplomatici

Gen.Aiazz A.A. Uff.Diplomatici

Gen.Sup.032 Intendenza A.A.

S.E. MINISTRO COLONI

ROMA

25206 Cabinet // Following mine 25205 I communicate the following wire to-day from H.E. Excellency Firenze Bialillo // quote // with lively satisfaction I report that after a number of intense uninterrupted efforts by my troops on the night of 19 hours the bollo band Captain Parello managed after a day of difficult siege to capture in the caves over Tassina valley Dejac Condelsen who was shot at 21.50 hours the same day // Captain Parello is at work arresting and disarming the suite of the Dejac // Abuna Isaac who had been reported to be with the Dejac turns out not to have been in his company // Further reports later on // Unquote // I hope I shall be able in a few days to announce definitely the position of the remaining two sons of Ras Casia // Operations to that end are as in well-known already in progress //

C. K. A. Z. A. N. I

b) Extract from

"Affidavit No. 4"

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Liq Haile Mariam Saziu, age: 65 years, profession: employee at the Ministry of Finance, address: Duke of Harwar Road, Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

1) In the month of May, 1928, (E.C.) after the Italians occupied Addis Ababa, I stayed with the sons of Ras Kasu, Dedajatmatch Abura Kasu and Dedajatmatch Azebo Kasu for 3 months under their demands. Then in the same year in the month of Italian the Italian army marched towards Mitola from all directions in a pincer movement, an army under general Trachia from Debre Bicanan, an army under general Belil and two small forces from Abbo and an army under colonel Parello from Addis Ababa. During these happenings I surrendered myself to General Trachia in a place called
Wobari. The very day I submitted myself to the general, a messenger of Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa, called Tadzoe, brought a message from Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa to General Trachia, and the context of the message was as follows:

'To the Commanding Officer of the Italian Army,
comming from Debrabarahan Camp:

I have already communicated with all formalities of surrendering. As the armies which are coming towards us, you are burning the houses and plundering the cattle and property of peaceful countrymen whom I look after as my countrymen. So I try to defend their property and life so may defeat my peacefulness, I respectfully draw your attention to stay all these actions of killing people and burning the houses of countrymen without active.'

Abara Kassa (signed)

2) The messenger returned back without receiving reply for the message. The armies camped in the country where I was appointed by countrymen to look after. Then the General kept me in their camp from going home, and sent me to Dedjazmatch with the following message:

'To Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa.

I was glad to see from a message sent by you about your concluding an agreement with Orasiani. If you are really a peaceful man assemble your soldiers on Pitche and receive in a peaceful parade and if you comply with this, I assure you on behalf of my Government, that your life will be saved.'

Thinking that this letter will be a hope for him to be safe, so I took the letter and gave to Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa while he was in Pitche in Dedjazmatch Mandräd's house covertly. He read the letter, and after making agreement with his nobles in reply he wrote the following letter:

'To General Trachia.

As you have assured me of our salvation in your letter to me, we will assemble our armies and will receive you by peaceful parade in a place called Bidigon.

Abara Kassa (signed)"

I took this letter and gave it to General Trachia while he was camping in a place called Shanka.

Then the very day, the army which was coming with Sea Haliu, from Abbo came over Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa's camp and he was obliged to retreat to the nearer part of the country as so in the evening next day he was not present to meet General Trachia at the appointed place Bidigon. Nevertheless to continue their contemplation to conclude agreement they communicated with Har Haliu, and the letter sent them one of his personal representatives, called Hitaura Tafere to receive them. Then his highness himself received them at the outskirts of the town Pitche and then they were brought to the camp were General Trachia was camping. Then they arrived there, the General came out of his tent and received them, after which he took them in his tent and offered them chair to sit on. After this he ordered them coffee and went outside without reproaching them.
Just immediately Italian carabinieri came and took them away. The people who came with them were also encompassed by Italian soldiers and disarmed. Then they were taken to the big hall in the town and were released the next morning.

We thought they took Dedjazmatch Abara Kassa and Dedjazmatch Asefale Wassen Kassa to other part for a safe custody. But in the evening at about 7 o'clock, we heard shots being fired in the center of the town, when we asked the native, we heard the news about their death.

The population of the town were agitated and felt uneasy the whole night about such atrocious and cruel act.

In the morning, I went to General Truchlia's camp and stood in far distance from it. Then the General called me and asked me if I was sorry about last night's act. I said: 'You are a General and perhaps you know better than I do about the interest of your Government. Is this the way your Government respects its words? In my opinion you will have to correct your mistakes which you have done to-day for many centuries to come.' Then he said: 'What shall I do? Trustiani orders me to do so by this telegram', and so he showed me a telegram, written in cipher of which I did not know the content.

After this I requested him if they may show us the corps from where they have been thrown, so that we shall bury them in the church. In reply to my request he allowed us by saying that 'without crying, and making noises you may bury them', and so we buried both corpses in St. George's cathedral.

Signature: Haile Mariam G zaman
Sworn before me on this the 3rd day of September, 1947.

Tadesse Mengasha (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.

[Appendix D.]

Cabinet-Ufficio Cifra
n. 100, vl. post. Uff. Mnt.

Addis Abeba, 21 November 1936 XV

Indicazioni di Vincenza: M.P.A.M. TURN IN M.P.A. RAMA

TELIGRAMMA DI STATO

Regina Etiopia, 21 Novembre 1936

Copie per conoscenza: S.M.V. Governo Uff. Informazioni
Supcrierao Uff. Mnt

Il CIECO

D.V. MINISTRO COLONI

Da: IL CAPO DI CIBRA

1936

To: Cabinet

In to-day's action the brothers Avara and his companion have been captured. In obedience to my orders they were shot at dusk on the piazza at Mierce. Galala situation liquidated.
The Governor General Vice-Regal of Ethiopia

The Supreme Direction of Political Affairs to the General Government of Italian East Africa to give to Lieutenant Alberto Spogli of the Headquarters the amount of 10,000 lire as a prize for the capturing an "Allian" of the two rebel chiefs Naive Bekele and Habreman.

Adde Aste 20, Giugno 1927-KY

A. G. G. G.

Signature

Translation

Bando Tacci - Capture of Ras Basta.

At dawn on the 20th Ras Basta's den was surrounded. After short fighting the ras renounced from any further resistance and surrendered asking for mercy.

Towards the end of the day he was shot.

The news was rapidly spread in all the Empire by means of the following telegram:

"To Gen. Scarneglie. After ignoble attempt on the 19th divine justice has visibly announced its condemnation making one of the chiefs still rebels. After Akilella also Bekele World and then Habreman have fallen, today Ras Basta was captured and killed by colon Tacci. Give maximum diffusion."
a)

MESSAGGIO DELT'EPOCA CRISTIANA ITALIANA
GABINETTO-UFFICIO S.D.I.

TELEGRAMMA A MANO

Ufficio Rettore GABINETTO
N. 310 di prot. dell'Ufficio Rettore.
Addio Abeba 25 giugno 1936-XIV

PER CONOSCENZA:

Uff. Super.

Col. Super.

Car. Gen.

Avvocato

Militare

ALS COLONNA MILITARE DELLO SOTTO

Addio Abeba

b)

MESSAGGIO DELT'EPOCA CRISTIANA ITALIANA
GABINETTO-UFFICIO S.D.I.

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO

Ufficio Rettore Gabinetto
Addio Abeba 25 ottobre 1936-XIV

INDICAZIONI DI URGENZA M.P.A.SU TUTTA LE M.P.A. BRASILIANI

TINDICAZIONI IN PARTE

Copia per conoscenza:

Col. Super. Aviazione

State Maggiore

Governorato A.A. V. Com. Posteria


Ufficio Politico

CABINETTO

ROMA

per conoscenza:

E.M. ERIPOSTO COLONNA MAGNABALDI (Via Aerea)

25/10 Gabinetto I. General Trachcia sends the following telegram coded with instant code: ...

Debra Ibna: ...

Major Angelini with the 10th company has carried out reconnaissance North of the Turanavi Zone not rebel group
which had left, leaving two killed and an uncontrolled number of wounded. Captured 200 cables. On our part no losses. Motorized column which was to have passed Debra Brehan yesterday is still at the station because of yesterday's rain. Debra Brehan: This morning, the repentant traitor treasure presented himself with his son to ask for his nephew's release. After being examined in the afternoon, the rebels and also the Recent Amr and brother Ade with two followers were shot. The well-known brigands Debra Cristo and Sciano: The motorized column with supplies which left Debra Brehan this morning arrived in due order. For Debra Brehan, this morning's arrival arrived in due order. After being examined in the afternoon, the rebels and also the Recent Amr and brother Ade with two followers were shot. The well-known brigands Debra Cristo and Sciano: The motorized column with supplies which left Debra Brehan this morning arrived in due order. The execution produced no unfavorable comments on a very crowded market place. An officer: Shot the well-known brigands Debra Cristo and Sciano: The motorized column with supplies which left Debra Brehan this morning arrived in due order. For Debra Brehan, this morning's arrival arrived in due order. 

Signature

GAMAL I

IL CATE O GABBETTO
A. Masri (signed)

MS.283

TRANSMITTED BY STATE

Provenienza: Berbera II 23/1/1927 Ore 22.00

Accettato II 23/1/1927 Ore 22.10

Decifrato

NS/50 TUTTE LE ETA/

TRANSMITTED IN ARRIVO


OTT.Milit.

OTT.Politico

Sovereign General

ADISS ABABA

6027 Political./.

Re yours 2621./.

As Your Excellency knows we were 200, I say 500 chiefs and privates were killed in the first times in the battle who had surrendered at our mercy or had abandoned fitsuradi Bahada and had presented themselves for submission./.

Later on to favour the dissolution of the formations which had passed the Heib Souladi with fitsuradi Bahada and proceeded eastwards, I asked Your Excellency when I came to Adiss Abeba to be authorized to grant the life to those cain in for submission./.

Your Excellency agreed in a line of a various and concluded with the word: "well done"./.

Thus up for fitsuradi Bahada I took upon myself to promise security of life if he handed over rifles and the captured aircraft, according to my telegram. I was to march on the 22nd of March which I sent from Abeba itself./.

On the basis of the above-mentioned directions I have ordered to confiscate and to columns which they published in the middle of the valleys which from Gecacc descend to the Sooladi to favour submissions promising majority of life and submission and residents thus had various submitted rebels among whom a soldier who was with his band at Gecacc with two small battalion write letters to rebel chiefs./.

Some letters were even counter signed by our officers./.

It was due solely to propaganda that 4,000 persons with about 200 chiefs and privates left the area and submitted, handing over about 2,000 rifles./.

I permit myself to stress the importance of the result obtained also for the reason that a great part of these submittees could have reached Somaliland with
Schade or delivered battle increasing the bandits
which might have given us serious troubles and
difficulties, especially during the rains. As matters
stand the mass shooting of 50 chiefs would have
injurious effects on the efforts for pacifying creating
a mistrust in the word of the Government. It may be
added that many of these submitted have relatives in the
fellizzari band and in the Ashara battalions. Already
where I had all the culprits put into concentration camp,
the rumour was spread that the Government had shot all
the chiefs. Residents pointed out to me that at the
Gendarmerie notification erased panic and excitement also
because leaders who in the name of the Government had
promised safety feared the vendetta. For these reasons
I beseech Your Excellency to let the Court procedure be
harried through, assuring you that it will be very
severe and will end with capital punishment for more
compromised and dangerous chiefs. Wizards and
soothsayers will be shot without trial.

M A S I
a)

**Heading**

GOVINO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA

**Text**

6116 Cabinet /./ Re mine 6250 /./ Gala during the night all the line from Addis Abeba to Hadama /./ But during the night rebels have destroyed the water conduit House that supplies Hadama with water where consequently there is actually a severe shortage /./ I have given immediate orders to General Gallina in the matter in order to have the conduit repaired /./ Anyhow the line Hadama-Haassen was yesterday practicable and I think this may be a way of supply if the repairation of the water conduit should be delayed /./ General Gallina to whom I transmitted the complete directives of H.E. Chief of Government 6103 has proceeded to set fire to all native houses encountered on his direct march from Akabi to Hadama moreover shooting all rebels captured and spreading terror in the zone /./

**Signature**

p.d.o.

IL CAPO DI CANTINE

Mag. Inserv. S.I.

A. Rand

b)

**Heading**

GOVINO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA

**Text**

23760 Cabinet /./ Following mine 23067 /./ The columns of General Santatti and Major Lomuti marching different ways on the 25th October last met north of Mount Deboasi without meeting any resistance except some short fires by some armed men left to guard the cattle /./
the older people came to me and said: Do not fight, otherwise you will be the cause of ruin. Then I left that place in order to go to the town called Medaazait and stayed there. In the evening I went down searching for my brothers and son. I found all the villagers burnt down and almost all the people were killed. Some of the remaining people were mutilated. Their breasts and also their genital organs were cut. More than one-tenth of the water on their way to death.

Immediately afterwards I found my son and asked him about my brothers. He told me that Lij' Abdo was fighting but he did not know whether he is alive or dead. Then I met one of the injured countrymen who told me that Lij' Abdo is safe and had left that night. Tullahun Shankut was captured and Isaac Shankut was fighting with the enemy but he did not think that he was alive. Later on I also learnt that he was dead. The brother, Tullahun Shankut, who was captured came with our captured cattle after three days. In 1929 I passed the whole month of June in that country, helping the injured countrymen to take them to the cave and providing them with water and by collecting the skeletons of those who were killed. I cannot tell you in detail all about the massacre which took place, but I think approximately 6,000 people were killed. Some of those who are alive cannot keep their minds and some cannot work due to the loss of their hands. You can get the exact number of the people who were killed in the massacre from the Governor General of the country. The area over which the massacre took place and where the burning and destroying was performed, was quite a big area - in length from Medaazait to the end of Harazte, in dire from Nowat to Inchir. I think the length of the area is approximately 150 kilometres. I have been told that the Italians were water amount of General Haletti on the northern side and General Hail on my side.

Signature: Tencea Shankut

Sworn before me on this the 17th day of August, 1947.
Tencea Yangesha (signed),
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.

Note: June 1929 Ethiopian Calendar = June 1927.

(Translation)

"Affidavit No. 5."

2) Then the above mentioned patriots retreated back to Harazte, but we resisted against the enemy coming through our own country desert. Simultaneously, we moved through Mezzait to Dire. From 2nd, June 1929, while we were camping in Medaazait, in a place called Harazte.

Note: June 1929 Ethiopian Calendar = June 1927."
I was present on the 11th of February, 1937, when Graziani intended to distribute alms at the Palace, at 6 o'clock in the evening. I went there with two journalist friends Giambattista Sanna and Ettore Savarino, who were to report on the event and record it.

I met, however, Major Felavecino and I introduced Hailie Selassie Guga to him. Felavecino told me to take Hailie Selassie Guga to Bardiana, an Italian official interpreter who was supposed to introduce Hailie Selassie Guga to Graziani, so that Hailie Selassie Guga should present him his compliments. After the introduction had taken place I was tired, I saw the people outside the Palace and some who should receive Hailie Selassie Guga, with a friend Liduccio Abraham and Doctor Ricciardi to another corner of the Palace.

We were talking something about Africa, all of the sudden we heard an explosion. This must have been shortly after 1 p.m., as we had just made the Palace leave, which used to leave at 1 o'clock. When we heard that explosion we thought it was a shot from a gun and we thought that the celebration was over and went towards that place. We noticed that there was a big disorder, because some people were rushing towards the Palace and some were rushing to come outside the Palace compound. My chief, Conte de la Porta ordered me to retire with some Ethiopian priests and we tried to reach the Northern gate but when we arrived there Italian soldiers were posted there and the soldiers told us that they had order to shoot any Ethiopian who tried to come out through that gate so I had to return with the priests and I locked them in the cellar under some offices close to there and I also ordered some orderlies to take protection there and took myself position at the side of an Italian soldier above. Then there came soldiers with arms and hand grenades searching for Ethiopians in all buildings. The priests and the orderlies were hidden and as regards myself the soldier explained that this is an insurgent and he has come on duty and he shall not be harmed.

When I took care of the priests, I had heard shooting outside the Palace building. Cars going here and there, people running, machine guns firing, it was a big disorder. Ethiopians running from Italians, Italians running from Ethiopians. The Italians apparently suspected that the rebels had come to the city. It had been said before that Fan Beida would menace the city and that the Ethiopian patriots would come and kill every Italian.

I stayed at the Palace till four o'clock. At four o'clock some "muggia" came and took me to the Girl. At the 8th Conte de la Porta came with Capitano Bechis. I then took the "muggia" to the room of the Chief of the Palace. At that time all the notables were grouped in that room. It was an order issued now that any one who came outside the Palace without a written permit was to be shot. Before the attempt on Graziani there was a standing official order between the Italians that if some rebels came to the city, every Ethiopian must stay inside his house if he was found circulating in the streets, he should be shot.
De la Porta and Bachi took me in a car and I went with them to the seat of the Fascists, to their office, because de la Porta who was a Fascist had received an order to go there. There we met the secretario federale Guido Cortese, a great number of Fascists were present at the office and they were saying: 'Comrades, today the day in which we should show our devotion to our Vice Roy by reacting and destroying the unbelievers within three days. Within three days I give you carta bianca to destroy and kill and do what you want to the unbelievers.'

They went out well equipped with their arms, and started their work. People who were not arrested by the carabinieri and found in their houses or in the streets were killed. I went together with de la Porta and Avolio, director superior of political affairs of all East Africa, in a car and I saw with my own eyes burning houses, I heard the Italians cry 'civiltà italiana'. I have seen young boys coming out from burning houses, the Italian pushed them back into the fire. Then we went to the Western side of the City to the Raito Gioruguis bridge. Up to that bridge we had seen those burning houses, killing people. Then on the Western side not a single house was burnt. The American Legation had assembled all their neighbours in their compound. One Fascista that was the very same that Cortese (who did not like the order from Cortese) stopped us at the bridge saying: 'I do not want any help from the blackshirts, I will do this myself.' From there we went to the ex-Belgium Legation where Avolio was living, and then to de la Porta's house at the end of the street, and we took a walk in Vararri street. Cortese spoke now that they were burning houses. To recollect everything is difficult because I had nearly lost my senses when seeing what was going on.

The next day, Saturday, the Italians were still burning houses (small houses). On the bigger houses they wrote down their names to keep for themselves. They broke the doors and went in looting. They could not find a single man to kill, the ones who were not killed were arrested or had run away. They said it is 'hygiene' to destroy small houses so they went on destroying. During the day I could not go out but during the night I went out with de la Porta in a car. At about 6.30 p.m. on Saturday we saw the flames from the petrol tank they tried to put St. George Cathedral on fire. The windows broke from the heat, but the building survived.

The next day, Sunday, they tried to bomb the cathedral. An order was given for a special plane to bomb the cathedral, but the same day in the evening an order was given from Graziani to stop everything and this order was not carried out. Graziani sent a note saying: 'By the grace of God I am feeling well. Stop the hostilities.'

On Friday evening I was called to the Palace to the President of the Military Court, General Olivieri to act as interpreter. People who were brought before that court were shot, afterwards many of us were asked if I thought of the attempt against Graziani and I said, this is something which may be made by mere persons and not a conspiracy of the people and because of that you ought not to punish the people in name. This I said to Carlo Avolio and Graziani de la Porta.
The bomb had been thrown at 11 a.m. A few minutes later Blackshirts, Carabinieri and soldiers were running all over the town, ordering every shopkeeper to close his doors, and everyone else abroad to return home. In an hour there were no more people in the streets. Postal and telegraphic communications were suspended in the Palace and the neighbouring streets for within about 400 yards' radius the ground was covered with the dead.

Cortese convoked the Blackshirts to the set of the Fascio - the office to a consultation, the others to wait for orders. Soon they aged from the Fascio in every direction, fully armed. Everyone in the town was on a prey to terrified anticipation, bit what really happened was worse than any had feared. I am not saying, for it is true, that blood was literally streaming down the streets. The corpses of men, women and children, over which vultures hovered, were lying in all directions. Great flames from the burning houses illuminated the African night.

The stopping of telegraphic and telephonic communication, in order to prevent people from giving any information to Europe, the closing of the shops, and the evacuation of the streets, were precautionary measures, carried out between 11 a.m. and 6 p.m. If the firing started in the courtyard and around the Palace occurred under the immediate fear and panic spread by the bomb thrown at Graziani, the massacre which started in the night was carefully prepared during seven hours, and cannot thus be excused.

During that awful night, Ethiopians were thrust into lorries, heavily guarded by armed Blackshirts. Revolvers, truncheons, rifles and daggers were used to murder unarmed black people, of both sexes and all ages. Every black person seen was shot, bundled into a lorry and killed, either in the lorry or near the Emperor's Palace, sometimes even at the moment when he met the Blackshirts. Blackshirts houses were searched and then burnt with their inhabitants inside. To quicken the/ time, brandy and oil were used in great quantities. The shooting never ceased all night, but most of the murders were committed with daggers and truncheons. Whole streets were burned down, and if any of the occupants of the houses ran out from the lorry they were machine-gunned or stabbed with orders of 'leave. Once.' from the lorries in which groups of prisoners were brought up to be murdered near the Palace the blood flowed on to the streets, and again from the lorries as round the town, 'Leave. Now.'

I shall never forget that I saw the Italian officers, in their luxurious cars, driving through the barricaded streets, talking and laughing as though they could have a vacation, the ordinary civilians being the only ones allowed to speak. I was too young to call it war.

The Emperor's house was intact. Outside, the streets were covered with burned corpses. In the street we heard the sound of truncheons, daggers, and guns, but each of these orders, each shot, a scream or firing of a rifle meant another cruel murder.

It was a mass murder of men, women and children, and also an insane slaughter of animals. Ethiopia was turned into a garden, which became a field, and then into a town whose inhabitants were then machine guns.
If anything can increase the horror of the bloody sight of thousands of dead, it is the feeling that we ourselves are safe, but that there are people not killed because they are enemies fighting with weapons against reason, but defenseless civilians being murdered, as the massacre, which I have in the present work, that while the lorries were still collecting the dead bodies from the streets, while the blood was still oozing on the ground, Blackshirts were already running to the bank of Italy to change the trailers they had used to the gold and silver ornaments, from the heads of Ethiopian women they had killed.

No decent man could tell these things without reluctance, to reveal that they were done by white men like himself. But it is my duty to speak; it is my duty to tell that lorries were covered and driving with blood, that Blackshirts put a stick from behind between the feet of running black men, in order to throw them to the ground, the more easily to murder them. It is my duty to say that I have seen in a ladys split open by a truncheon so that their brains pushed out; that murder was accompanied by the most horrible mutilation possible to imagine; that murder was accompanied by robbery; that the massacre was so systematic that three places in the town were appointed for the collection of corpses.

Fanatics in groups of four or five, heavily armed, again and again attacked a single unarmed Ethiopian. Machine-guns were used even against women. No means of destroying human life was neglected on the night of the 19th of February, 1937.

A second night of massacre followed. I was again in my room. Since the beginning of the massacre I had kept my Ethiopian servant there with me, forbidding him even to show himself at the window, no sight of him by an Italian might have meant his death. He had a little house beside mine, which was spared on the first night, but burned on the second. He sat during those terrible hours quite speechless, and with his head in his hands. I dared not ask him what he thought.

The killing was done in the night to prevent photographs being taken. If any white person ventured into the streets he was stopped at every corner and searched to see if he had a camera on him. The houses of white people were visited by Italian soldiers, who confiscated cameras.

There was military aviation in the town and those officers were disillusioned that they had not been able to share the glory of the Blackshirt action on the 19th. So they were ordered to bomb the surroundings the next night, in order that they too should have their part in the massacre.

I have had many Italians in my surgery who told with great pride how many black people they had killed. One of them was very modest, he had killed only two. Others killed, or pretended to have killed eighty or a hundred. I have heard them praising themselves for having stolen four or five hundred trailers in one night. Fan-hunting was a much appreciated sport.

The hours of daylight between the first and the second night of the massacre, I shall never forget. We knew already before nightfall that the horror was not at an end, proclamations in Italian appeared in the streets, announcing that more dead would flow: 'Uranians has historic show his good heart to the Ethiopians, to-night he will show them his immense power.'
The second night resembled the first in every way, except for some bombing around the town.

In the days which followed one could see black people meeting in the streets, embracing each other and putting a hundred questions. It was a surprise to any Ethiopian in Addis Ababa to know that one or other of his relations or friends was not dead.

The massacre was closed by an incident which I relate, still trembling at the mere thought of it. A venerable Coptic priest had survived the war, the first terrible period of the occupation, and even the massacre of the 15th and 20th of February. He was still alive on the 1st, when the Italians finally stopped killing and robbing, though he was one of the men against whom the fascist daggers were aimed. When the Italian authorities became aware that he was still alive, Cortese convoked the murderers to the seat of the Nazio. An order was given to Gallini, one of the most able daggere, to stab the Coptic prelate. The priest was surprised in a devoted prayer to the One who hears the cry of suffering humanity. While the Prelate was kneeling in prayer, Gallini stabbed him with his dagger from behind, and retired with the satisfaction of one who had done his job.

It was also the 15th and 20th of February that most of the black intelligentsia perished. These cultured, educated, young Ethiopians, with whom our relations were so friendly before the invasion, had no part in the war; first because their learning and their position assured them a certain influence over their compatriots; secondly, because many of them possessed in their homes objects of value, especially from Europe, which the murderers distributed among themselves.

In a domiciliary search, ostensibly for British hand grenades, a group of Italians entered a humble Ethiopian home near the Nekemte bridge. Of course they found no hand grenades, but there were thatchers, except for safety in a money-box these were confiscated as a trophy of war, victory and civilization. In the same room they found a picture of the Emperor Haile Selassie, for this symbol the whole family were condemned to death. In a few minutes the house was in flames, and it returned the members of the family locked inside. Their desperate cries were heard, but the Italians did not move from the place till they had ceased; they were anxious that none should escape the fire.

APPENDIX E

TRANSLATION FROM THE ADDIS ABABA TELEGRAPH, FEBRUARY 23, 1936.

Translation of the unassailiated, name: Captain Hicks Kingsted, age: 34 years old, profession: commanding officer of the First Brigade, whereas Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and declare as follows:

I state the following facts of the massacre which took place on the 15th of February last, because of the attempt on Emperor's life, as follows:

1. Nobles and inhabitants of the town of Addis Ababa where ordered to assemble at the Nekemte palace on Yekatit 12th, on St. Michael's Day. Just before the day, the palace was attacked by the enemy. As the general order exploded, explosions were heard. After there was a big confusion and people flee over the town.

2. Our commanding officer at the first sight, called Yekatit 12th, without knowing the palace, told us that we must go where the fire and smoke is. We turned back to start fire.
0543

a) Just when we arrived there we saw the Italian soldiers intentionally, so our officers ordered us not to put out the fire, saying that he understood what it was all about.

b) While still standing there we saw many people being killed by Italians while trying to escape from burning houses.

c) The Italians divided themselves into different formations, while some of them were gathering and collecting the corpses, others threw them on the trucks. They were gathering the corpses from the roads with iron racks. Even among the persons who were pulled by iron racks many were alive.

Furthermore I saw Italian soldiers being photographed while standing on the dead bodies of their victims. The burning of houses and killing of the people which started on Friday at about 12 o'clock (A.M.) continued up to Monday morning. Therefore many persons, difficult to calculate their number, were killed and I saw also many houses burnt.

d) We fire brigade section were especially ordered not to put out the fires from any other houses except the Italian ones. Then we understood that their scheme for committing atrocities was a big one. While a part of them was trying to blow up a building at St. George's cathedral compound in a town house, I saw, while standing at the fire brigade, a certain Italian sergeant, called pursuing the priest and killed him with a pistol. On Friday night many fascist officers assembled in the compound of St. George's cathedral. They sprinkled many drums of petrol on the cathedral and threw incendiary bombs all the night.

e) There were - at least - 10,000 persons detained in Fit-har prison, deprived of water and food. On the third day of the attempt, i.e. on Monday, we took drinking water with us and went to visit the prisoners. There, when they were struggling to quench their thirst, the Italians struck them with daggers and stabbed them with bayonets.

Signature: Tekla Birgida.

Sworn before me on this the 12th day of January, 1940.

Salmon
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.

EXTRACT FROM "Abyssinia 1935-6"

I, the undersigned, name: Edward Carabedian, age: 37 years old, nationality: Ethiopean, profession: merchant, address: 13, General Cuminginan Street, Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

4) I was present in Addis Ababa the day when the attempt on Graziani's life took place. That day I left my home in General Cuminginan Street in the morning in order to go to my work at about 9 o'clock. I left my house and went to my shop where I was informed by all people I met that an attempt on Graziani's life had been affected. This morning there was a great movement of Italians in the streets. I heard people comments from some of them, saying that they were waiting orders for reprisals. In the afternoon I heard them saying that the 'Federale' ordered them to call on indicated places in groups. In the evening at about 5 o'clock they began. I saw them with my own eyes, to beat every Ethiopian they met in the streets with anything they could find. These Italians were civilians. They were using what they could find, as cudgels etc. This was going on until the circulation of gas cloud was finished. I learnt from some of the Italians that they had received orders to burn different Ethiopean quarters. They were burning...
I entered my house at about 7.30 p.m. Next morning I heard that many Ethiopians had been killed during the night when the Italians were burning their houses and during the second I saw the following things.

The following day I started to go to my work at 9 o'clock but there was a great panic and Ethiopians were running from everywhere without self-control. The Italian blackshirts were pursuing them and beating them. Then I saw this and decided to return to my house where I found my mother weeping and a group of Italians who had entered my house. They tried to get hold of our waiter. My mother had hidden him and they could not find him. They left our house and went to our neighbours' houses and did the same thing. Another group had entered the house of Blatta Ayele Gebre (now vice governor in the province of Harrar) who was at that time my neighbour. They had caught him and tried to tear him to pieces. They were doing the same to all our neighbours. Naturally I saw that the Italians were beating them as much as they could. This day I did not go out from my house but from there I heard much shooting and I saw burning houses all around. On the third day I went to my shop. This time there were no Ethiopians to be seen in the streets, but many Italians were circulating. I heard many of them saying that they had burnt such and such places and that they had murdered so many Ethiopians. It seemed as if the reprisals had continued also in the interior. In Addis Ababa itself from that day on during some months they used to arrest many Ethiopians.

Signature: Edouard Carabedian.
Sworn before me on this the 10th day of January, 1943.

Tadesse Mengesha (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.

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EXTRACT from
Affidavit No. 10.

(Translation)
I, the undersigned, name: Blatta David Ogarsqui,
aged: 40 years, profession: ex-governor T. Adde, President of Ethiopico-Eritrean Unity Association, Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

Then in 1937 on the 10th of February I was home; I was just going home at about 10 o'clock when a carabinieri got hold of me and asked me where I was going. I told him that I was going home. He took me to the carabinieri station. When I passed the streets I noticed that something was in disorder, people were running up and down and troops were moving, especially the fascists. I was examined at the station and I was asked if I had been at the palace in the morning. Then they told me to go out on the compound. There I found about one thousand people. This was close to the Adane bridge, where the police station road is nowadays. Then the same day people were brought with lorries, they were taken without distinction and most of them were bleeding from hitt. The fascists used to throw them down from the lorries. Some of them raised them to the river, whereas they were thrown into the Wolda river and these are the Italian shot in front of us. All houses, lucchi, which were in front of us, were burning. The next day even I was still in that compound that burned. I heard the continued noise and noise went to our compound. In the evening, however, they vanished and in the next day there was no place at all. On Saturday I went back to the compound of the Fascists they had
24/M 2. It has been reported by the press that during the days following the Allied declaration, "Long live independent Armenia" before they died. I do not know if this is true in such reports."

LESSON

Reading

GOVERNAMENTO DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA

CABINETTO - UFFICIO CIMA

TRANSMISSION OF STAFF

Ufficio di Prova: CABINETTO

Il 3603 di prot. dell'Ufficio Pittore. Anno assicurato il 29 marzo 1937-XV

Indicazioni di urgenza: A.P.A. 3039

C. A. GAZIANI

RACCOMANDO


Direttore A.C.I. Ispettorato d'Arm.

Uff. Politico del Lavoro A.C.I.

MINISTRO COMUNE

per conoscenza:

MINISTRO COMUNE

Roma

14/12/1937 Cabinet /.

Text (translated into English):

about report second part of telegram which I cannot deny that some executed Abkhazians have cried before dying: "Long live independent Armenia"/. However I beg to state that executions ordered in consequence of mentioned attempts are made in individual cases and nobody - I say nobody - can witness them."

Signature

A.S.C.

1. IL CABINETTO

(undecipherable signature)

b)

Reading

GOVERNAMENTO DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA

CABINETTO - UFFICIO CIMA

TRANSMISSION OF STAFF

Ufficio di Prova: CABINETTO

Il 3603 di prot. dell'Ufficio Pittore. Anno assicurato il 29 marzo 1937-XV

Indicazioni di urgenza: A.P.A. 3039

C. A. GAZIANI

Roma
I give you a formal confirmation of the last paragraph of the telegram to which I replied yesterday. From February 14th up to this day 324 summary executions have taken place, yet with guilt always discriminated and proved. (I repeat three hundred and twenty-four) of course without including into that figure the repressions of the 16th and 20th of February. I have further provided for sending to Danane (Danane Somalia) to the concentration camp existing there after the end of the war 1,100 persons including men, women children belonging to the prisoners captured during the last encounters and who represent Amhara people of no particular value but who for the moment had better be hindered from roaming about.

Graziani
March 1937

In the month of Kebribit, 1939 (A.D.), I cannot remember the exact date, a few Italian soldiers came to the monastery. There they called seven distinguished monks by their names and took them away. After this, these monks did not return to the monastery, but from the information we got later on, we were told that they were put in Debra Brehan, made prisoner, and died there of some illness. We assume that they have died and commenced their death.

The names of the above seven monks are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>General Title</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Aya (monk)</td>
<td>Abebe</td>
<td>Bergi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Selassie</td>
<td>Makar gets</td>
<td>Kifit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kifit</td>
<td>Melkaschel</td>
<td>Kea Tchit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Abate</td>
<td>Batola</td>
<td>Kifit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Ideke</td>
<td>Habte, amino</td>
<td>Batha Aramdo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>G.Agabishar</td>
<td>Gabrel Meaker</td>
<td>Batiy Dagni</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Aya</td>
<td>Gabrel Meaker</td>
<td>Most Atemari</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

May 1937

One day before the Italians came from many directions and encircled our monastery at Debra Libanos, in the month of Gabet, 1929, I and a certain monk called Aya Selassie went out of Debra Libanos because we were afraid. I returned on the eight day, after the Italians had completed their work and left. There I found that the Italians had taken all the monks - except those few who concealed themselves - away by trucks. I asked those few monks I found there and they told me the following, concerning the havoc done by the Italian army.

The Italian army encircled the whole area of the monastery and took all the monks, including the twelve school pupils - except the sick one - and those few who concealed themselves - as I have already mentioned above - to Debra Brehan and Finco. As far as my estimation is concerned, those monks and pupils taken by the Italian army were more than 2,000. It is clearly understood that the Italians have taken all those persons to Finco and Debra Brehan and murdered all of them, leaving only thirty children. After the liberation, we, the people of the monastery, collected 50 quintals of skeletons, which remained from flood and wild animals. His Highness New Zevis, also collected many skeletons and sent them to us.

Signature: Aya Woldeamanu Ichete
Sworn before me on this the 23rd day of October, 1947.
Tadesse Mengesha (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.

(c) EXTRACT FROM "AFFIDAVIT ASH.

(Translation)

In the year 1939, on the 23rd day of October, Aya Woldeamanu, a monk of the monastery of Ichete, was captured and taken prisoner by the Italian army. After his release, he was able to return to the monastery and was able to provide the information as follows:

[Further details of the affidavit, including the names of those captured and other relevant information, are omitted for brevity.]
May 1937

Statement concerning Debra Libanos Massacre

On the 11th, 1937, a certain Italian called General Melilli was the commander of the Italian armed forces of Ethiopia. As the commander of the Italian armed forces of Ethiopia, General Melilli came with a big convoy, convoy and camped in Ficheb.

At that time I was also to be found in Ficheb for my own private business. Then the next morning, the General also took the people who were there in Ficheb and moved towards Debra Libanos. As the 11th of Melilli is the annual celebration of the sanctuary, we also went with Colonel Sarcelli. We thought that we were going to honour the festival. When we arrived there the clergy sounded the bell and assembled wearing their festive church robes and received the General like they used to receive the King formerly.

After the General saw how they welcomed him, he said:

"As I was informed you used to do about 700, but now I see only 500 of you, now as I want to punish those who did not come to welcome me, you must stay in the church so that you may not be mixed with them." Then he encompassed the church compound with his aides.

He had already, also a bigger circle all round the mountain. General Melilli called Colonel Sarcelli separately and talked to him secretly. When Colonel Sarcelli returned to us, he said: "The General is in a bad temper, so let us go." Then we returned to a place called Chimang.

Chimang was a gate to Debra Libanos for the road which goes to Addis Ababa's direction. When we reached this said place, Colonel Sarcelli told us that the General had given him instruction to prevent anybody coming out. Then in the night time we heard shooting and I thought they were killing monkeys, but as I have heard later on, I was told that all that shooting was about the killing of men and women who refused to go on the lorry. Most of them were taken by lorries passed us and we thought that they were being taken to Addis Ababa, but when they reached a place called Chimang they were unloaded from the lorries and the adolescent ones were selected out of them and the rest were executed.

The remainder were taken to Debra Abrahm. From there the youngest ones were selected from among the healthiest and adolescent and the latter ones were also executed. After this, the General Melilli was returning to Debra Abrahm with his aides, his soldiers plundered all the properties and wealth of the church. Also at this church was the burial place of many nobles and dignitaries, the Italian soldiers in horion, to intensify their terror. Then colonel Sarcelli returned to Ficheb and I also returned to Abanos.

This church was one of the wealthiest of all churches and monasteries of Ethiopia, and so the Italian armed forces plundered the properties of this church without leaving anything. It was, many pillows even the oldest books.

2) Colonel Sarcelli later on told us that Melilli reproached 1 of our aides to arrest a man who injured himself by a shot while passing through his province.

Signature: 

Adele Marie Dana

Born before me this 2nd day of September, 1907.

Taddese Kidane (sign) 

Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.
I, the undersigned, named Senaka Senaka Silva,
aged 31 years, profession: Vice Director of the "Lanka School" and Head of the 1st House, do hereby state the following:

"You are a prisoner now. You must follow the guard, and I am brought away to another concern. I saw Carabinieri on the compound of Bagamatchabatibalu. There they gave me a separate, small room, without mixing with other prisoners.

When I told the Carmelites of Carabinieri that I was innocent of any crime, I was surprised when he said frankly: All educated people are dangerous to our Government, you are educated, you are a crime."

10. There I saw many things. For instance there was a little girl of about eleven years. The Italian brought her there saying that this girl knows where my colleague (he had disappeared) went. Then they tortured her by beating her until she was died out. Then she said that she had seen nothing. Then the Italian left her to be investigated. She passed the night there. Then I asked the guards there that she might be with me as I was alone. They left her there. Then I asked her and she told me that she knew nothing, they just took her from the street. Next morning that Italian came again and brought another child with him, and this girl who passed the night there was again tortured and beaten. Another girl was brought by him one day and said that he was mistaken about the first girl, but they tortured her, and the guard that the girl did not know anything, and they were angry with the Italian who was mistaken. The first girl was released and they kept the second.

In a house near us, in the cellar were kept many prisoners, men, women, and ladies, the cellar was overcrowded. I used to see when the provisions were supplied. They used to inject into the food with the bayonets, which they had used for killing people. I was done when the guard was kind. They got no food. I used to meet them. My mother was latter on kept there. By sister's son, Raulo Cabrera was latter on put among the prisoners in that cellar. There was an electric current with which they tortured people. My nephew was also tortured with this apparatus, and then they tortured him they used to ask him if he had sent a message to the Japanese in chiper to his Imperial Majesty. He told me that he was kept without any clothes. They used to provide him with a shaving when a visitor came. As afterwards I saw him in some of torture and cruelty which I cannot write down.

Signature: Senaka Silva (on the)"
HEADING

ITALIAN geben Daten \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

CABINET - UFFICIO STORICO

PER CONOSCENZA:

STATO MAGGIORI

DIR. CAP. R.P.

G. Politico

MINISTRO CULT.RE

Roma

6267 Cabinet \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

A.D. 1077 \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

At my arrival news young

Etiopeando has not been put / \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

present situation here than some fifteen were

arrested and others are being charged even if there has

not been any particular part in their charge / \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

However it was my intention to while here to Gran Can in

the sun in Zanzibar / \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

or if no elements of guilt result

from investigations now done / \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

G. M. A. Z. A. M. I

b)

The same as Appendix B \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

CABINET - UFFICIO STORICO

PER CONOSCENZA:

STATO MAGGIORI

DIR. CAP. R.P.

G. Politico

MINISTRO CULT.RE

Roma

6267 Cabinet \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

A.D. 1077 \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

(\(\text{[in Italian]}\)

IL CAPO DEI DI STATI

(.\(\text{[in Italian]}\)

I. I. I. \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

Signed)

TEXT

(Translating into English)

I have been informed / \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

of the last paragraph of the telegram to

which I replied / \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

that the official report states that the
camp as described was not true / \(\text{[in Italian]}\)

(\(\text{[in Italian]}\)

fifteen and twenty-four) of persons without a single event that

figure further described for sending to Japan (former Somalia)
to the concentration camp exist, which has been of the

military personnel included. As, as children belong to the

patrician or other high social status and are in

he was not released if not unless the actual value of the

The consent and better or necessary thing passing about /.

(p. 11)

See Appendix 1, c).

Text (translated into English)

Two days after the capture of Massawa, I ordered that the families of the Eritrean brothers who have been executed without process shall be forwarded on their arrival to Asmara to the camp of Eritrean. The command of the Internal Company "Cle.") is to supply the superior direction "n.R." with the necessary facts for the compilation of the provisions in connection with the matter.

Extract from "Affidavit No. 3.

I, the undersigned, name: Olivero Dandu Selimo, age: 21 years, profession: Vice-Brother at League Neon School, address: Asmara, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

11) A few days later at three o'clock in the morning, I was waken up by a marauding of Cambani. I then thought that I was going to be killed, but it was not so they did not want to kill me. I went to the Internato, but I did not believe it. Then they sent us with a glance by car to the Ibada. I saw many Cambani and Cambani in the Ibada. It was not safe. There were Cambani with bayonets guarding the way up. I could not understand anything. I saw many journalists and artists and the Cambani standing, and there were two cars for every Cambani and there were about 100 prisoners. They searched everybody. I saw that. They explained to us that I was not going to be killed but you are going to be sent to Italy. Then I became so happy from that, I was able to have one of my own doctors with me, but they did not allow that. When they got about and lifted me and we joined together. We were according to the Cambani instructions very badly in the attempt, not even surprised. They were saying that they thought they were going to be killed. I was many times with
15. About two more weeks later we were told that we were doing well enough to be transferred to another hospital. This was because the psychological damage had caused us a lot of stress and we needed a more controlled environment. During our transfer, we were placed in a secure facility where we could be monitored and treated. The staff there was very experienced and we were given the best care possible.

16. During our stay in the hospital, we were given medication to help us cope with our symptoms. We were also given therapy sessions to help us deal with our trauma. The therapy sessions were very helpful and we learned a lot about ourselves.

In our hearts, we knew that this was not the end. We had to keep fighting. We had to keep going. We had to keep living. We had to keep fighting for our lives. We had to keep fighting for our sanity.
I, the undersigned, name: Jacob Jacobi, locality, age: 33 years old, profession: Lieutenant Colonel, address: Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

2) After the attempt at Addis Ababa I was taken prisoner. First I had to stay in a police station for three months. They kept us there without any food for three days and they threatened us during the examinations, saying that they would kill us. There was cruel treatment of other prisoners. They tortured them and beat them. I saw their wounds and they told me that the Italians used to sprinkle water on them and then they flogged them. I even heard cries from other departments of the station when such treatment was going on. We were prisoners of that station, so we only got black bread once a day, sometimes we got tea without sugar.

3) Then from that station I was transferred to St. George prison. There the treatment was the same and we were given the same food and with the same intervals. We were also given something like warm water under the pretext that it was soup. It was practically untraceable. The chief of the prison was Marshal Beghelli of the Carabinieri. This prison used to receive prisoners sent from any department but especially from the political office, as I was myself. A house fit for housing fifty persons was filled up with three hundred. I can show you the department if you want. We were sleeping in such conditions. Many died because of the conditions in that prison. We were not provided with any blankets or such things, only a few of us were allowed to have a blanket of our own. I was allowed to take fresh food in a bag and I immediately outside the building, our toilet was inside the department, I had and of course that place and the smell of it made the conditions inside still worse. Almost everybody caught typhus in that prison. The infected persons were not taken to hospital and every evening we used to haul five or six persons who had died during the night and sometimes even fifteen or so. An Italian doctor, Januari, was, however, doing almost everyday the injections and medicine. That doctor is still alive and is working here. I was staying in that prison for one year. I was also caught by typhus and very sick. I can remember that at one time there were at least 1,000 prisoners there.

I was summons to the political office about three times. They put questions to me, and acted somewhat like a court. The prisoners did not get any information about the investigations directly, the result became known in the main. The name of the investigator was Lazard. He knew the Ethiopian language. He had been resident in Addis Ababa before the Italian occupation. He has been resident in Addis Ababa since that date as a resident.

They sent other persons to become prisoners, but they kept us prisoners. In case we should be tried by a proper tribunal and at our punishment and they told us that they were sure that the tribunal would condemn us to execution. Then one day we were informed that we should be tried by a proper tribunal.
us from the Simon to Bali (outside our isle), a radio station which they had transferred into a concentration camp.

When we arrived there we were put off the boat. The island was about 400 yds. by 140 yds. The President was about the same size but our relatives were allowed to send us once provision. We were living in tents inside because wire. The inmates were in charge also of that camp. When we were there some inmates were brought from Bonaire and they told us they were promised to be released by the Italians. The Italian also told us that we were to be released together with the ones who came from Bonaire.

In effect they released some of them as some of us but they sent us to others. All the other ones to Bonaire. Among us were two nurses and this is what later we were supposed to be released. They are in jail in the red sea area about 12 km from Paramaribo (Julian Islands).

The conditions there was the heat. In the shade temperature was 35 C. The inmates used to tell us that it was 10 C above normal. There were more death casualties every day for example. The heat to force us to work, except four of us we were forced to carry strong bags of coal, food, bedding and all other kinds of labour. We were working in the office. There were about 1600 prisoners on that island. Political prisoners were there were 1200 persons. There were several political prisoners, some of them on ordinary original, some of them on political prisoners and had revolted against the Italian.

The supply of drinking water was not sufficient, none of the prisoners tried to ask for water or they took water from the sea, but the result was that they fell sick and died. Many died from dysentery. Political prisoners were forced to do hard labour and were flogged when they tried to refuse, saying that they could not work like the criminals. When one relatives came to see the Italian man to give us 15 lire a month from the money he gave, the Italian man to get a little more food and some prisoners that was under the nutrition.

A certain Italian officer was the doctor and used to work in the island very rarely. Once the prisoners there was a sick Italian doctor (veterinary). The doctor died. Four of us were allowed to take bear with us to that island but all the other prisoners were forced to always to carry their own, a difficult task of political prisoners and civilians and on the whole the case, and they used to sleep in separate quarters.

It happened that the prisoners were said to a certain officer to receive shipments of the money sent to them that they were asked to take off their shoes and then some of them to the doctor for care. Because they were used to wear shoes, some of them were sentences to be kept in a separate cell for ten or three months. This Italian was certain Italian officer. The doctor was in charge of the. I think that was under the governor of the island. Almost all of them knew or unknown for the inmates the Italian used to tell us his directions on how to use the bear. There were also six Italian and told us to be with them. They were kept separate and from the same treatment. One had to go to the washroom.

After nearly two months in the island I was sent to the other islands to live there on the island. After I came back we were all as he arrived. Now I stayed until , in connection with the island and also the condition of the Italian forces, we always kept returning to the island and also the island and the situation.
I will give you immediately a list of inmates from the prison station St. George, now in April 1947, from the concentration and camp areas here in the camp.

Signature: Jacob Mariaachel.

Sworn before me on this the 1st day of October, 1947.

Jorge A. Baumb (Sworn)
Judge of the High Court of Mindanao.

EXTRACT FROM "ARMS in as an Intensified Political Prison Subject to Distress and Suffering"

In the meantime, name: Doctor Manuel Victorio, 28 years old, nationality: Italian, profession: doctor, address: 303 Atea, so here, take oath and say as follows:

1) On September 1st, 1947, I arrived in 8t.Gloria. At the beginning I was taken in the hospital. I was a political prisoner. I was arrested in March 1947, then I was transferred to be in charge of the Ataulf prison. I was in charge of the prisoners, as I was also in Italy been in charge of prisoners. The chief of the prison was a saturation guard who came here in order to organize the prisoners. He was principal

2) There were in St. George prison 500-1,000 prisoners as an average. The capacity of that prison was of that time no more than 600. In the beginning, there were not many inmates in the prison because it was not yet organized. In the beginning, the prisoners were not given any clothes but a blanket each. I started to work there when the organization had begun. At that time the prisoners were given meat three times a week. They got two pieces of bread at the same quality which was given to the inmates.

3) Initially, political prisoners, male and female, were separated from each other, and the women were kept in a special department. In the beginning, they were allowed to have one hour's walk every day, but as I saw that in some departments they were too many prisoners, I arranged that they could get two hours' walk daily.

4) There we much of sickness and many who have fever. This sickness came from the lack of hygiene in the prison.

5) In the first month we had three or four deaths in one week. When the prison was too crowded, we had four to five deaths daily. After some time we obtained from the Government a 'Bonifacio' station. We used to examine the new prisoners in a Bonifacio room before they were allowed to join the others.

6) In this way the number of deaths was reduced to a minimum. I observed that new prisoners were kept too long in the prison before they were taken to the court, but that was a matter which did not concern us.

7) I saw some prisoners who had beenWhipped (not in the pulpit but outside). When I noticed such things it was my duty to make a report and this I also did. Sometimes some prisoners evolved sounds from fright or from killing.
nobody and they were naturally often wound up themselves. There was one block of prisoners and I knew of reports. There was a lack of water, but we were doing all we possibly could to supply the prison with drinking water from outside.

5) The prisoners were supplied at first with food from their relatives but afterwards, as I saw that they got too much one day and less another, it was not good for their health. I allowed them to get food from their relatives three times a week only.

In the beginning there was no sanitation and for this reason bins were used for P.O. purposes. Only in 1939 the prison was provided with A.I.

6) The chief of this section was Stefano Chetino, care manager, Caraccio. The prison had at that time about 700 prisoners. The actual prison was less crowded than St. Mogens prison. The prisoners who were brought there were already condemned. The capacity of this prison was 500 prisoners. The prisoners were kept always in cells. They were allowed to walk in the fresh air one hour each day and the cells were cleaned also for one hour in the afternoon. The food was the same as in St. Mogens prison. There was a case of sickness but less time in St. Mogens prison, because it was not so crowded. As in St. Mogens prison there was also a lack of water at the beginning, but it was organized later on.

4) EXTRACT from "Affidavit No. 16."

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, Name: Alaksa Nevalo. I have been a commerce 1930, residing in 1935. I have an occupation as a merchant and a shopkeeper. I have been to a police station several times, as was Alaksa Nevalo, and have had my case handled there, and have had my case handled there.

5) When Dejasmatu, a local man and Dejasmatu, a local man, entered Alaksa Nevalo, the Italian police used to confuse the people for suspicion, and I was also arrested just about that time. On 7th of September, 1935, (A.D.) the Italian police (polizia) suddenly entered my house at 12 o'clock in the night and made me up from my bed, and took me to the police station. The persons who were taken to the police were Alaksa Nevalo, Alaksa Nevalo, and Alaksa Nevalo.

6) When we were locked in the train they tied my both hands to other 5 times. But the rest of the prisoners were tied in pairs together. We passed the day without food and it was a situation as if in the prison. We passed the night also in the same conditions without food and still tied up with. Next morning we started and were taken to Alaksa Nevalo. When arriving at Alaksa Nevalo, we were directly taken to the same place as the time, where we were kept. Not many other prisoners. The prison was completely full of water. We were unable to sleep in such terrible conditions. I stayed there for ten or twelve days but I was never taken to clear the in the police way. Then
text
I notice with true pleasure that Your Excellency communicates about situation most contd activities, but above all I am pleased to see that H.M. has decisively ordered instruction relating manoeuvres of several columns converging on same target. From all data bases like typical simple offensive cycle Ankara / Chevanna / Tobruk / Lephi / Goletti /.. then of rebel leaders / Continue like that in all dependent territories / Apply converging manoeuvres / also solved problem of the troops in all directions / may set them the positions in situations / adopt definite will to apply directions of H.M. which tend to complete destruction of a main element in territories of African conquest / give a much of new courage in this respect to the civilian authorities who are closer to them and to column commanders who / from instinctive constant generosity / are no longer disposed to compromise for comprehension sentiments / be assured this is H.M. will certainly bring about complete tranquillity in your territory, having thus now provided all troops and means necessary / This telegram transmitted for knowledge to H.M. Minister Colonies and to all governors /
Distribuzione della missione italiano-spagnola.

Indicazioni di scrivania:
Telegrafia di Stato
Ufficio Rittente: Cabinet

Cabinet:
1956 al prot. dell'Ufficio Rittente
Adice anche 11 27 ottobre 1956-XIV

Telerammin: in Partenza

Copia per conoscenza:
S.M. V.I.G. Gen. Uff. Informazioni
Com. Sup. Aviazione Com. Piatta AA
Goveratore AA V. Com. Tattica
Dir. Sup. R.P. Com. Sup. AA
Uff. Politico

Colonnino-Mazetti

copy conoscenta:
S.E. INISITRIO COLONNINO ROMA - VIA Acri

Text:
RECO Cabinet // I communicate the full text of a telegram today sent to General Calzina // quote // then // quote // in lively satisfaction // it is necessary to continue the inexorable work of destruction of all // it is superfluous to add that sacked cattle or any other value belongs entirely to the inhabitants that carry out the raids // unquote //

R.W. Minister informed //

U - A - W - X - MI

Signature
P.D.C.
IL CASO DI COLONNINO
A. Massi (signed)
Affidavit No. 1

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Bekele Woldemariam, age: 51 years, profession: Translator in the Ministry of War, address: Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

(a) I came to the political office in the Bogazmach Police compound. My title was Frinaveval. Later Frinaveval was substituted by another man, a colonel, name here I cannot remember. I used to translate Ethiopian applications, contain complaints about plundering, burning of houses, about lost relatives etc. I know that they used to arrest also women and children and alike people and send them to jail without giving reasons. There were so many sorts of complaints. The complainants were never given any compensation.

(b) The Italians had questioned so many house of the Ethiopians who were in jail for the rents but many of them were accused even for any money. It was also practiced that the Italians hired a house and then the proprietor came and asked for the rent he was just kicked away and at our office he did not get any support either. Although they used to take lands of Ethiopians under the pretext of assessment some of the owners receives a small amount of money, many of them never get any money at all. Many Ethiopians get bankrupt because having lost a piece of land, they were sometimes given another as substitute and when they had built a house on that land, the Italian came again and chased them away.

Signature: Bekele Woldemariam

Sworn before me on this the 27th day of October, 1947.

Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia

Affidavit No. 2

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Haile Kibret, age: 34 years, profession: Captain, Ethiopian Army, address: Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

(a) As soon as the Italian knew about a shot or a quarrel in a village they sent their soldiers there and they burnt down the village and took the cattle from the peasants. In case cattle were taken on such occasions. It was also a tax, the Italian were plundering us each year and it is impossible to estimate how many cattle they stole.

(b) I remember one occasion when we dialled on General Kelly camp at Addis Ababa. This war in 1935. After having taken that they needed for their provisions, they stole 10,000 cattle from us and on the pretext that were concealing cattle but we were peaceful people. I was present when putting me was a local chief there was accused because I was asking the cattle away.

Signature: Haile Kibret

Sworn before me on this the 25th day of October, 1947.

Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.
0568

a) See Appendix C.6).

b) EXTRACT

Headqu.
(of the Italian)

GIOVANNI CORSO, DELL'ARTIGLIA, CURATORIA ITALIANA

TRIDENTORI DI S.S.

UFFICIO RITTENTE CABINETTE

V. 3° 2°, di seg. dell'Ufficio Rittente

Addio Addio 21 Dicembre 1937-AV

Indicazioni di urgenza: U.P.A. CO TUTTE

EN. F.A. CAVALLI

TELEGRAPHE DI PARISETTA


Date

(Translated

12.12.21 - 12.12.21

The population had gone away taking their cattle with them. All villages and isolated buildings across the main road of the columns were leveled with the ground. For more than 25 km there does not remain a single house.

Signature

IN NAME OF RITTENTE

A. RANZI (signed)

c) EXTRACT

[Document]

Indicazioni di urgenza: UFFICIO RITTENTE CABINETTE

AV. 19.19.21 di seg. dell'UFFICIO RITTENTE

CUGIANI

Addio Addio 21 Dicembre 1937-AV

TELEGRAPHE DI PARISETTA


Date

(Translated

12.12.21 - 12.12.21

In the area of the Italian

A. RANZI (signed)
more than 4,000 pukuls in flames // our losses 1/ killed
31 // wounded 38 // enemy losses 1/ killed in battle 212//
shot 54 // Arms captured or handed over from March 9th to
21th 72 // machine guns 5 // rifles 1,735 // the disarmament
of Selon has thus given // guns 2 // machine guns 105 //
rifles 16,067 //
3) On the 24th in the Ficce sector // near Tullu // our
irregulars have attacked 40 rebels with two machine guns //
Our losses // 2 privates killed // Enemy losses // 2 killed
and 2 shot // tullu country // when had favoured rebels //
has been levelled with the ground //
4) On the 24th shot in Debra Brehun barembaras Ratta
Guarmarres for treason //

Signature
P.G.C.
IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. Gonz (signed)

d)

EXTRACT

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA CIDENTALE ITALIANA
CABINETTO - UFFICIO CITRA

Indicazioni di urgenza:

Ufficio Ufficiale Gabinetto
P.R. DU CURTE LE. / F.A.
GRAZIANI

ITALIA DI STATO
Ufficio Ufficiale Gabinetto

Adresso Abbe 21 19 maggio 1937-N

Ufficio per conessiona: AGA

per conessiona: GABIT.

TEXT (translated
into English)

by the 7th instant may be looked
upon as ended with full success // The repression spared
only those few families to be in favour, service men or
those hostile towards us // all property of the Akaria
family // the load of which on the Auraria has Shared the
role of quasi - guns in succession to mill Selassie who has
tons abroad // has been destroyed // Rebels pursued
armaments and arrived in the valley by our strong and fast
column have very serious losses we have found that itedes
no resistance, that with fire and shelter immovable,
to us do not hinder our repression // Military action to-day
ceased armed men to political action in order to normalize
the situation, // Over and above may be summarized by the following facts //
whole killed 301, damage work 50 tanks and notalas
essential battle house // Seizd 2 uns // 7 machines uns
// Three miles // in all // 4000 people // 1421 pounds captured //
Our losses 12 killed // 71 wounded // 54 killed //
more than 4,000 tukuls in flames; our losses: killed 31, wounded 38; Enemy losses: killed in battle 212, wounded 365; arms captured or handed over from March 9th to 24th: machine guns 5, rifles 1,730; the disarmament of Scioa has thus given: guns 2, machine guns 165, rifles 16,006.

2) On the 21st in the Mace sector: near Tullu: our irregulars have attacked 90 rebels with two machine guns.

Our losses: 2 privates killed; Enemy losses: 2 killed and 2 wounded; total, which had favoured rebels, has been levelled with the ground.

8) On the 24th shot in Debra Brehan barakbaras Retta:

Signature
IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
A. Mazi (signed)

EXTRACT

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL’AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
CABINETTO - UFFICIO CIRCA
Indicazioni di urgenza:
N.P.A. SU TUTTE LE I.R.A.
Ufficio Matteo Gabinett
GRAZIANI

F. 5003 ai protocollo dell’Ufficio Matteo Gabinett
Anna Scobia 19 maggio 1937

Heading (in Italian)

Copia per conoscenza:
S.../...Gov.Gen.
Stato Maggiore
Supersorveglia
Superintendenza A.A.
Com.Ardia
Intendenza A.A.

 изготовление

Copia per conoscenza:
N.C.A.
Obiettivo
Obiettivo
Obiettivo
Obiettivo

Text (translated into English)

25/11 cabinet: news may 10th. military operations begun on the 7th instant may be looked upon as ended with full success. the repression spared only in favour of those displaying merciless cruelty to those hostile toward us: all property of the Abbara family: the basis of which. during the war has assumed the role of a quasi-genus in succession of male Solaske who has been arrested, rebel pursuit pursued throughout the valley by our strong and fast columns have very serious losses and have found that kitchens and guides thought to offer secure shelter inaccessible to us do not hinder our repression. military action to-day causes living room to political motion in order to normalize the situation existing in the area; military control. operations carried may be summarized by the following facts: 16 privates killed, 200 wounded, 40 killed in battle, 2 machine guns, 10 machine guns, 100 machine guns, 100 rifles, 100 rifles, 100 rifles. all about 1937.
of our losses compared to those of the enemy must be attributed to our great superiority in fire-power, the ability of the patrols to manoeuvre and their culminating speed. The attitude of officers and troops prepossessing.

Signature

S. R. G.

IL CAPO DI GRANATTO

A. Mazzai (signed)
Tentativo di dettagliata descrizione delle condizioni italiane.

Il Test del 25 ottobre 1936, citato riferendosi alla situazione in Italia, sembra indicare una situazione di crisi economica o politica. La menzione di "1.4 ento" potrebbe riferirsi a una data specifica o a un numero. La frase "Tentativo di dettagliata descrizione delle condizioni italiane" suggerisce che l'elaborazione potrebbe essere un tentativo di fornire un'analisi più dettagliata delle condizioni attuali in Italia.

Tuttavia, senza una lettura più accurata e completa del testo, è difficile stabilire con precisione le intenzioni esatte dell'autore. La natura della situazione è chiaramente di natura politica o economica, ma bisogna considerare che le condizioni specifiche e il contesto storico di quei giorni possono influenzare la comprensione del testo.
b)

(TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH)

HEADQUARTERS ITALIAN ARMY

General Gellingo

Osservanza date: 11th November 1942

--

Date: 11th November 1942

Ufficio Informazioni

State Major

Com.Pr. East Africa

Informazione

Com.Opera East Africa

Comando

Informazioni"
c) ORLANDO FRANCO ANCONAVILLA A.O.I.
15° Reggimento Stato Maggioro

Per maggiori dettagli si rinvia al n. 2 del presente rapporto.

Roma, 15.1.1937 - XV

A R.E. IL VESCOVO D'ITALIA
AL SINDACO DELLA CITTÀ
AL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
AL CAPO DI STATO MAJORITY
AL MINISTRO DELLA GUERRA

(per via aerea)

AL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORO MINISTRO DELLA GUERRA A.O.I. ADDI ABBAGLIA

APPENDICE 3

Text

[Translated into English]


As usual, no contact, nor exchange of fire. No enemy movement.

In this sector, the gunners of the Tuscana bocca group of tanks did not fire the shells they were carrying at this moment.

Explosives released: 12 bombs of 18 kg and 1,000 shots for each plane.

Signature

STAF

General: TAGGIACO

Unreadable signature

DARDAST

GUARDIE SUPREMO AERONAUTICA A.O.I.
10° Reggimento Stato Maggioro

Per maggiori dettagli si rinvia al n. 2 del presente rapporto.

Roma, 15 gennaio 1937 - XV

A R.E. IL VESCOVO D'ITALIA
AL SINDACO DELLA CITTÀ
AL CAPO DI STATO MAGGIORE
AL CAPO DI STATO MINISTERO
AL MINISTRO DELLA GUERRA

Addio Abbiglia

Text

[Translated into English]

In this sector, the troops only fired against the land occupied by the natives who did not fire at the sight of the planes. At one place, not clearly identified, about 50 huts from Bocca on the way, the same natives took refuge in a group of huts. They were bombarded. 50 huts in flames.

Signature

Addio Abbiglia

[Transcribed]
a) See Appendix X. c).

b) EXTRACT FROM

(Correlation)

I, the undersigned, name: Antonio Salvo Nicosia, age: 42 years old, profession: cook, address: Benevol, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

March 1937

Among the buildings which were burnt by the Italians I witnessed was one next to the church of St. Michael at a place called "Loiico". This happened in the month of December 1919. I cannot recall the exact month and the date but I do recall that I saw the burning of St. Michael Church from a place named "Sambu", and I asked the countryman how it was burnt and they told me that the Italians had burnt it.

Signature: Antonio Salvo Nicosia.

Sworn before me on this 20th day of October, 1977.

Judge of the High Court of Bolivia.

(c) EXTRACT

(In Italian)

I, Antonio Salvo Nicosia, declare under penalty of perjury of the penalties of law, that what I am about to say is true and correct.

Sworn before me, 12th day of July 1957.

(Translation)

[Translation of sworn statement in Italian]

[Translated into Italian]

Signature

(d) (Notarized copy - see above)

[Notarization]

Notary: Antonio Aurelio, "Archbishop" of Xilupi, to the Christian lighting up the soul of Xilupi, Friar of the Order:

"Here, you must hear me carefully:

This is what I am telling you today, the son of the Patriotic Republican Justice and:

1. I am witness to the burning.

2. I am witness, Antonio Aurelio, the lighting up of the soul and the son of the Patriotic Republican Justice to the witness to the burning.

I swear, under penalty of law, that what I have said is true and correct.

Sworn in the presence of this witness, 12th day of July 1957.

(Translation)

[Translation of notarized statement in Italian]

[Translated into Italian]

Signature
1) The edict which has been promulgated everywhere without fear.
2) All churches will be solemnly venerated.
3) Those which have been destroyed will be rebuilt.
4) Those which have been burnt down in worship, for parties will be not restrained.
5) All ecclesiastical estates in the possession of the Church will be restored to her as in the past.
6) The priests are all to be now; in the house of God, but the curacy receive for any office, if the government is going to grant to all who have not yet received them.
7) Authorization is given for the immediate liberation of the numerous clergy and monks who are imprisoned in the territory of Caesar.

Pardon all the restitution of their belongings is announced to all rebels living in the bush and on the mountains, as they submit and live up their area.

8 Priests, reflect upon all this, and advise and instruct the people.

And you, O rebels, who live in the bush and the mountains, if on account of you the churches are burnt and the old people, the women and children are massacred, if the country is destroyed, God will hear their cries and see their blood and will punish you. But if you cease to do wrong, we will obtain pardon for your faults in the past.

Every Christian ought to allow himself to be governed by the king chosen by God.

God has chosen Paul to govern Ethiopia. Consequently he who refuses to submit to the Italian government in the name of God. To refuse to submit is to defy God that has chosen is to revolt against him.

Say to the ears of Aywor fall upon those who do not listen to these words.

Also, I give the following orders to all the heads of the church and the priests:

(1) Not to give absolution to the rebels;
(2) Not to give them burial by the church.

I will enforce until every priest and bishop in these words.

S Pirates 7th, 1913 (December 11th, 1917).
(Reler) A. P.濃洋手,
"Archbishop" of Ethiopia.
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5552 1/662 I trasm. attiggi a

corpo militare

con miss. del 11 settembre 1955

v'7

9250

<<

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a:

b:

c:

d:

2.

2.

2.

2.

""
Nel frattempo 11% di 17% della popolazione italiana

(Signato)

0579
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>0581</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

***English Translation***

The evacuation of the area around the capital city of Sine-Sou is now complete. The rebels have been removed from the area, and the government forces are in control. The fighting has been intense, but the government has managed to hold its ground. The civilian population has been evacuated, and the city is currently secure. The government is now focusing on rebuilding and restoring order to the area.

---

**Notes:**

- The operation has been a success, and the government can now focus on the next phase of reconstruction.
- The civilian population is grateful for the government's efforts to protect them.
- The area has suffered significant damage, and repairs will be needed for weeks to come.

---

**Signature:**

[Signature]

---

**Date:**

[Date]

---

**Location:**

[Sine-Sou, Sine Region]
Debra Brehan sector ./ From today aviation bombers unceasingly bomb the rebel stronghold in the besieged zone in order to control incessant terrorism./ It will remove study the possibility of landing the stronghold with supplies ./

P. D. B.

IL CARO DI MILITO
A. Bassi (signature)
POLITICAL ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION OF ITALIAN EAST AFRICA.

Art. 1.

The territories of the Empire of Ethiopia, of Eritrea and of the Somaliland constitute Italian East Africa.

This has legal personality and is governed and represented in the name of the King Emperor — by a Governor General, who has the title Viceroy of Ethiopia.

Art. 2.

The Empire of Ethiopia is composed of:

1) The Government of Aksum, center Gondar,
2) The Government of Galla Sidamo, center Gima,
3) The Government of Harer, center Harar,
4) The Governorate of Addis Ababa, which is constituted as municipal administration, under a Governor depending directly of the General Government. (From 11/11-37 Government of Scien)

Every Government and the Governorate of Addis Ababa are given legal personality.

Art. 5.

The Governor General, Viceroy, depends directly and exclusively of the Minister of the Colonies. He represents the King Emperor in the Italian East Africa and is the supreme leader of the administration of the same.

The Governor General, Viceroy can reprieve and change sentences, in the name and on behalf of the King Emperor, for subjects of the Italian East Africa, condemned by any ordinary or extraordinary judicial organ of the Italian East Africa.

To the Governor General, Viceroy may be delegated, with regard to the territories depending of him, the faculties regarding the Government of the King.

The Governor General, Viceroy has under his orders all the armed forces in the territories and in the territorial waters of the Italian East Africa.

Art. 6.

For some reasons of public order or security the Governor General Viceroy can, after authorization by the Minister of Colonies, institute a special courts with jurisdiction on the entire Italian East African territory or on part of it. He may also decree that cases should be judged by the special courts according to the rules and applying the punishments fixed by the legal codes for the army in time of war.
Art. 7.

The Governor-General, Vicereine and under his immediate control a Vice-Governor-General and a Chief of the General Staff.

Art. 8.

The Governor-General, Vicereine has at his disposal a Cabinet directed by a colonial official of the Government staff and formed by officials and employees of the colonial rules and by officials of the armed forces.

Art. 9.

In case of vacancy, absence or hindrance for the Governor-General, Vicereine, the direction of the Government General is continued by the Governor-General, Vicereine.

In case of vacancy or hindrance for the Governor-General, the Minister for the Colonies decides who is to assume the direction of the General Government.

Art. 10.

The Governor-General, Vicereine assists the Governor-General, Vicereine in carrying out his duties, in particular - all civil and political services of the Italian part Afrique.

Art. 11.

At the time of each of the five Governments in which the Italian part Afrique is divided there is a Governor.

Art. 12.

The Governor-General, Vicereine and carry out the general, critical, administrative or military directions given by the Minister of Colonies and those which he can give to the Governor-General Vicereine directly with the aim of ensuring the cooperation of the ordinary government.

Art. 13.

The Governor-General, Vicereine is in charge of the Government's plan for the development of the territories under his administration, that can intervene in the general Government only in order to the whole, when the Government, Vicereine himself, the Governor-General or the Colonial staff, can decide about their administration by applying the Law 1376. They have at their disposal the means of execution of the provisions above and for this purpose they act in the most suitable manner, with the Barton of the authorities and of the military forces.

Art. 14.

The Governor-General, Vicereine and the other officials of the Government's plan for the development of the territories under his administration, can intervene in the general Government only in order to the whole, when the Governor-General, Vicereine himself, the Governor-General or the Colonial staff, can decide about their administration by applying the Law 1376. They have at their disposal the means of execution of the provisions above and for this purpose they act in the most suitable manner, with the Barton of the authorities and of the military forces.
Art. 17.

The Governor-General is nominated by Royal Decree on proposal by the Minister for the Colonies, together with the Minister of War and after hearing the Governor-General Viceroy.

He is the advisor of the Governor-General in military matters, supervises the defense of the territory, proposing necessary measures and has the other functions established in the military regulations of the Italian East Africa.

Art. 21.

The Governor-General Viceroy and the Governors cannot correspond with the administration of the State except through or with the authorization of the Minister for the Colonies.

Art. 22.

With the General Government is established a General Council, presided by the Governor-General Viceroy and composed of:

- The Federal Secretary of the National Fascist Party of the capital of the Italian East Africa.

- The above-mentioned officials - for single services of the General Government - may be called by the Governor-General Viceroy to take part in the Council, with consultative votes, when matters are discussed which are of their competence.
PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

I. Atrocities committed on the civilian population.

1) Summary execution of captured or surrendered civilians.
   Examples, see Appendix A.

2) The killing of active population in connection with the
   pillage of the homes of these civilians.
   Examples, see Appendix B.

3) The crimes—murder, etc.
   Examples, see Appendix C.

II. Torment of civilians.

Examples, see Appendix D.

III. Deportation of civilians.

Examples, see Appendix E.

IV. Intentional situation of civilians on an inhuman condition.

Examples, see Appendix F.

V. Attempts to functionally isolate the inhabitants of occupied territories.

Examples, see Appendix G.

VI. Pillage.

Examples, see Appendix H, Part I.

VII. Destruction of property.

Examples, see Appendix H, Part II.

VIII. Abstraction of personal property.

Examples, see Appendix H, Part III.

IX. Arson—burning of churches, homes, etc.

Examples, see Appendix I.

X. Antisemitic and religious violence.

Examples, see Appendix J.

XI. Use of poisonous and incapacitating gases.

Examples, see Appendix K.

XII. Ill-treatment of women and children.

Examples, see Appendix L and K. A.
NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

b) The probable defence.

Plan of general order for Mussolini and the necessity of using the army of our in order to break the resistance of the "rebels" and pacify the country.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. The general scope of Mussolini's criminal activities must have been indicated in any of examples only. The evidence of atrocities almost ordered or him or resulting from a policy laid down by him is already overwhelming, and more will be forthcoming.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Submitted</th>
<th>Decision of Committee 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 MAR 1948</td>
<td>On 'S for complicity in systematic tenon in S.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 MAR 1948</td>
<td>LESSONA to remain on S.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7880/E/36/3
United Nations Office of the Human Rights Commissioner,

Additional information and evidence to Ethiopian Case 7667 (Cerilli) submitted by the Ethiopian Government.

6 Minnes Gate,
Leeds.

28th March, 1948.

Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of the text of the affidavit referred to in the letter addressed to you by Baron Leijonhufvud on the 18th March, 1948.

I am, Sir,

Yours sincerely,

(Adj)(Matte) KURTH TUNDE MERRIAM,
Minister.

Col. G. P. Laddingham,
Secretary General,
United Nations War Crimes Commission,
Lambeth House,
Berkeley Square,
London, S.W.1.
20th March 1948.

UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION.

Additional information and evidence to Ethiopian case: 7867 (Cerulli), submitted by the Ethiopian Government.

INTERNATIONAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION,
LONDON.

Dear Colonel Ledingham,

With reference to the decision, taken by Committee I on 4th March, 1943, to adjourn the Ethiopian case, No. 7807, (Corulli) sending receipt of additional evidence from Addis Ababa, I have the honour to send you herewith a copy of a deciphered cable to be forwarded to Committee I.

The full text of the affidavit, from which the cable quotes extracts, has been sent from Addis Ababa both by diplomatic bag and by ordinary mail. It ought to arrive here within a week, and thus before the last meeting of Committee I. As soon as it has been received, the Imperial Ethiopian Legation will hand it to you to be considered by Committee I.

I take the liberty to request, most respectfully, that Committee I, when taking up again the case, No. 7807, should also reconsider Case No. 7808 (Kikosa) with a view to listing him, if possible, on A. instead of B. These two cases are connected and it seems as if the affidavit, mentioned

Colonel G.A. Ledingham,
Secretary General,
United Nations War Crimes Commission,
Landowen House,
Berkely Square,

above, confirms the opinion of the Imperial Ethiopian Govern-
ment that Leonean was so much implicated in the policy of
systematic terrorism as to be listed on A. In case Corulli
should not be listed on A, and not even on S, the alternative
request is made that he be listed as a witness.

I beg to refer to a short memorandum on these two
cases which I have the honour to enclose for the consideration
of Committee I.

I have, Sir, the honour to remain,

Very truly yours,

ERIK LEIJONHOFVUD,
Advocate General
of the
Imperial Ethiopian Government.
Lessons was Under-Secretary for the Colonies from 1929 to 11th June, 1936, when he was appointed full Minister for the Colonies. As Under-Secretary he took part in the preparations of the aggression against Ethiopia as can be seen from his book, "Verso l'Impero". His powers and duties as Minister were defined in the Decree the Italians issued on 1st June, 1936, i.e. a few weeks after the occupation of Addis Ababa.

According to this Decree — see Page 4 and Appendix Q. in Case No. 7879 & it.2 (Graziani) to which case reference is made in the charges-sheet for Lessons — the Governor General Viceroy (Graziani) demands directly and exclusively from the Minister for the Colonies (Article 5). Special judicial measures can be taken by the Governor General Viceroy after authorisation by the Minister for the Colonies (Article 6). The Governors (of the provinces) depend from the Governor General Viceroy and carry out the general political, administrative or military directions given by the Minister for the Colonies and transmitted to them by the Viceroy (Article 12). They correspond directly with the Minister for the Colonies for the ordinary Government questions (Article 13). The Commander of the Corps is nominated by Royal Decree on proposal by the Minister for the Colonies, together with the Minister of War and after hearing the Governor General Viceroy (Article 17).
The Governor General Viceroy and the Governor cannot correspond with the administration of the state except through or with the authorization of the minister for the Colonies (Article 21).

These extracts from the Decree of the "Order and Administration of Italian East Africa" show Lessona's responsibility constitutionally for what took place in Ethiopia. It was clearly within his competence to interfere with Graziani's command. The next question is whether he did or did not take steps to prevent crimes from being committed. There is not any sign of such steps from his side. The policy, laid down from the very beginning, seems to be clear from the cable (Appendix A to the second charges-sheet for Graziani) from Graziani to Lessona in which Graziani, referring to his record in Libya, asks for a certain freedom of action. May it be mentioned here that Graziani is well known for the brutality and slaughter in Libya under his command, and so as "the hyena of Libya". As is pointed out in Page 4 of the charges-sheet for Lessona, Lessona was then continuously informed by Graziani of all steps taken and of steps going to be taken. There are, in the Graziani case only, a great number of cables addressed by Graziani to Lessona, and there are several, addressed to the Governors or Generals and, in Lessona's absence, to his Ministry, in which Graziani ends: "His Excellency the Minister informed". Lessona visited Ethiopia in the autumn, 1936, on an inspection tour.

That Lessona was an active Colonial Minister seems to be indicated also in the cable extract from the statement by the interpreter of Cerulli, who was a central figure in
Lessona's Ministry. And when Mussolini prepared for a new policy in Ethiopia he removed Lessona from office, presumably because Lessona was too much implicated in the previous policy of systematic terrorism.

In view of all this it is requested, most respectfully, that Lessona be listed on A, instead of on B, for systematic terrorism, since he was apparently "an accessory to, abetted, took a consenting part in, was connected with plans and enterprises involving" the commission of the different atrocities which took place in Ethiopia during his time as Minister for the Colonies.

CERULLI

This case is closely connected with the Lessona case as far as concerns Cerulli's time as Colonial Official in Rome. Reference may be made to what is stated under (a) in Page 4 of the charges-sheet for Cerulli: "The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position", paragraph A. Reference may also be made to the cabled extract from the statement by Cerulli's interpreter (and of course to the statement in full, if it should arrive before Committee I considers the case). What has been said of Lessona in the last paragraph above is applicable also to Cerulli, who should therefore, it is respectfully submitted, be listed on A for systematic terrorism during the time in question.

As to Cerulli's time as Vice-Governor General of Italian East Africa, reference may be made to paragraph B. in Page 4 of the charges-sheet for Cerulli and to the statement by the interpreter of Cerulli. It is respectfully submitted that Cerulli was in his most influential capacity of Vice-Governor General at least "an accessory to, abetted, took a consenting part in, was connected with plans and enterprises involving" the commission of crimes, and that
he should also in respect of this period be listed on
A. for the systematic terrorism, which was still exercised
in Ethiopia during the time in question.

The United Nations London Information Centre has
upon enquiry informed us that Gerulli has never been a
member of the United Nations Secretariat.

London,
15th March, 1943. ERIK LEIFSONSHVIL.
Le suivant est l'attestation déclarée par ASFAHA WOLDE MIKAIL, qui sera envoyée par première valise diplomatique et aussi par voie aérienne ordinaire:

"J'étais interprète de Cerulli d'octobre 1936 à décembre 1937 en Italie, et jusqu'au mai 1939 à Addis Abéba.


"Position de Cerulli à Rome pendant massacres Graziani a été si influent qu'il avait eu ……mais il choisit de ne pas intervenir.

"Mon opinion, basé sur les paroles et actes de Cerulli, est qu'il a approuvé violemment politique de Graziani. Comme Vice-Gouverneur d'Afrique Orientale Italienne Cerulli avait pleine autorité. Aucune était seulement nominalement son supérieur. A ma connaissance, Cerulli n'essayait jamais d'intervenir ou de s'informer dans aucun des cas d'atrocités qui avaient été soumis à son attention.

"À l'occasion importante de résistance de Debre Derham, Cerulli assurait personnellement direct sur champ de bataille des opérations militaires, tels que la position des prisonniers de guerre et contrôle de population locale.

"La nouvelle modération de la terrortisation sous Aosta limitait aux villes principales et régions sous direct contrôle de garnisons au milieu de …..situe dans région d'activité résistance de patriotes relativement inchangée pendant période Aosta-Cerulli.

"Fin citation."

N.B. Where the above telegram is not clear, this is indicated by the use of three (or more) dots.

20th March, 1946.
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 7

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>意大利语：名]被指控的罪名，其军衔或职务。</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D.A.S.C.C.A., Alessandro</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minister, Secretary of State for the Colonies (after Italian Africa).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Not to be translated.)

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>意大利语：日期和地点。</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, December 1936 to April 1937.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>意大利语：案号和描述。</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See Case No. E 2 (Crassani)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References to relevant provisions of national law.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>意大利语：相关法律条文的参考。</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>See Case No. E 2 (Crassani)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

See Case No. E 2 (Crassani).

TRANSMITTED BY

[Signature]

The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (in the Ministry of Justice, Addis Ababa)
PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

See Case No. 2 B (Grassland)
PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

See Case No. 3 D (Spanish)

(7879|E|56|2)
NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

See Case No. 2 D (Graniani).

Lessona was continually informed by Graniani of all steps taken or given to be taken and that be considered as necessary to the systematic terrorising to which the Ethiopian people was subjected. He visited Ethiopia during Graniani's Government.

b) The probable defence.

See Case No. 2 D (Graniani).

The difficulty is keeping a tight hand over a man of Graniani's temperament.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

See Case No. 2 D (Graniani).

Possibly even other charges may be brought against Lessona, e.g., of atrocities committed during the Italian invasion of Ethiopia, such Lessona as Undersecretary of State for the Colonies.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Submitted</th>
<th>Decision of Committee 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 MAR 1988</td>
<td>A for murder</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

List 50
Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.
(Not to be translated.)

- Federal Secretary of the National Fascist Party of the capital of the Italian East Africa.
- (In Italian: Segretario Federale del Partito Fascista della capitale dell'Africa Orientale Italiana).

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

- February 1937.
- Addis Ababa.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

- I. Murder and mass murder - systematic terrorism.
- XIV. Wanton destruction of property
- Table I of Penal Code (as of 1938).
- Third part Chapter I, Art. 12.
- Fourth part Chapter I, Art. 12.
- Preceding Articles 11 and 12.

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Putting to death of thousands of persons, plundering and burning in Addis Ababa on the way of the attempt on mission (February 17th, 1937) and the two following days. (See so called Grignani-massacre).
PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

The organization of the massacre was systematic. The stopping of telegraphic and telephonic communication, in order to prevent people from giving any information to others, the closing of the shops, and the evacuation of the streets, were precautionary measures carried out between 11 and 11:30 p.m. The bodies of those killed and those who were found around them, from which hardly a single Ethiopian had escaped alive, occurred under the immediate fire and panic spread by the bombs thrown at Orasiani, the massacre which started in the night was carefully prepared during seven hours.

Ethiopians were thrust into lorries, guarded by armed Blackshirts. Revolvers, trenchcoats, rifles and daggers were used to murder unarmed Ethiopians, of both sexes and all ages. Ethiopian houses were searched and then burnt with their inhabitants inside. The shooting never ceased all night, but most of the murders were committed with daggers and trenchcoats. Whole streets were burned down, and if any of the occupants of the houses ran out, they were machine-gunned or stabbed. The murder was accompanied by robbery.

A second night of massacre followed, which resembled the first in every way except for some bombing around the town carried out by the military aviation.
PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

See Case No. 2 P (Graziani) under I. 3).
NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

As Fagiol Secretary of the Fascist Party, Cortese held an influential position and he played a leading role during the Craniani-massacre. It is not quite clear from the evidence collected, who took the initiative to the massacre, but evidence clarifying this point is expected to be forthcoming.

b) The probable defence.

The necessity of punishing "in a model way" such an action as the attempt at the life of Craniani.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. Many affidavits have been taken but more evidence will be collected. Possibly even other charges can be brought against Cortese.
NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

As Federal Secretary of the Fascist Party, Cortese held an influential position and he played a leading role during the Graziani-massacre. It is not quite clear from the evidence collected who took the initiative to the massacre, but evidence clarifying this point is expected to be forthcoming.

b) The probable defence.

The necessity of punishing "in a modéle way" such an action as the attempt at the life of Graziani.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. Many affidavits have been taken but more evidence will be collected. Possibly even other charges may be brought against Cortese.
Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

Not to be translated.

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

References to relevant provisions of national law.

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Terrorist during Nazi's government, in Harar, involving crimes of many kinds, e.g., killing, of captured patriots, burning of native population by air raid, plundering, and burning of whole districts, day or night.
PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

I. TERRORISM AND SYSTEMATIC FRIGHTENING.
   1) Summary execution of captured or surrendered patriots.
   2) Other forms of terrorising the native population. Air raids were for instance often carried out against civilians and cattle.

XII. Attempts to communalise the inhabitants of enemy territories.
   The Italians aimed at the elimination of the Ethiopian chiefs and they restricted the possibilities of the Ethiopian youth to receive education.

XIII. and XIV. Expropriation of property.
   The property of the civil population was frequently seized without proper compensation.

XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
   In connection with operations against patriot forces reprisals were carried out by both sides, in vast regions whole villages and other inhabited places.

XVI. Use of destrous and annihilating means.
   Gas was used to suppress the operations against the patriots.
TEXT
"In the name of the Queen, and in the interest of the public peace and security, the following orders are given for the protection of the inhabitants and for the prevention of any disturbance."

The Governor-General of the territories of the Sudan, in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty, has, in the interest of the public peace and security, the following orders are given for the protection of the inhabitants and for the prevention of any disturbance."

The Governor-General of the territories of the Sudan, in accordance with the instructions of His Majesty, has, in the interest of the public peace and security, the following orders are given for the protection of the inhabitants and for the prevention of any disturbance."
L'Air Force has contributed in an efficient and bold way with reconnaissances, bombing, machine gunning, and airdroppings. Losses incurred by the rebels were about 360 killed, 500 wounded, and 300 captured. Among those captured were some Franco-Somali, one officer severely wounded, one soldier of the 4th Colonial Infantry, one Italian officer wounded, two Lybian assari killed and three wounded, two killed and five wounded among our Galla cavalry. At the brigade command we have presented ourselves. Grammac Ilia, a former commander of a battalion of regulars from Male, in an efficient and bold way with reconnaissances tried to escape with one officer severely wounded, and losses among his men. During the fighting, he reports, the fighting took part to south near Danak and Sahaba Ashfa and the pseudo degiac Abebe and Grammac Sahfa with about 200 armed men and 50 machine guns. I have given orders to General Gubbada, that after drawing out of Male, the indications that he thinks will be valuable for future operations, especially for ascertaining the number of heavy, arms and the complications of the tribes and notables of Bali, he is to meet him, and to be informed by Boulde and managed to flee only yesterday. At the end of September, he had repeatedly written to General Gubbada, assuring him of the intention to submit, he could not carry out the intention because he was hindered by the rebels. This Grammac assures he has later been imprisoned by Boulde and managed to flee only yesterday. Yesterday, General, the whole zone of operations violent weather hindered movements and connections, 10-day and to-morrow the operating column will be supplied with provisions from the air. Yesterday, one machine failed to return to the base at Legalse, energetic searching, Patrols Arussi and Cercer guard the roads, ready to shoot at fugitives who might try to escape across the river. 

Graziani

p. Il G. L. di Gabinetto

unreadable signature

P.D.C.C.

reading

(in Italian)

"GOV. GEN. DALL'A.O.I.

CABINETT-UFFICIO CIGA

A.194/4

Provenienza S.M. Basi 14 marzo ore 10.00

nicavato

11 4 marzo ore 10.00

Per conoscenza:

SUPERASSO

INTEGRAZ.

DIN.SUFACE.

EFF.PERITICO

DECIFRATO M.F.A.

GOV. GEN. DALL'A.O.I.

GOV. GEN. DALL'A.O.I.

GOV. GEN. DALL'A.O.I.

CABINETT-UFFICIO CIGA

DIN.SUFACE.

INTEGRAZ.

ASSAGGIO

CABINETT-UFFICIO CIGA

DIN.SUFACE.

INTEGRAZ.

INTEGRAZ.

DIN.SUFACE.

INTEGRAZ.

INTEGRAZ.

INTEGRAZ.

GOV. GEN. DALL'A.O.I.

GOV. GEN. DALL'A.O.I.

GOV. GEN. DALL'A.O.I.

SUPERASSO

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INTEGRAZ.
Gainer, reinforced by other forces coming from the Gobola region and 6,500 soldiers under Fitaurari, arrived yesterday morning on the 5th. /\ Rebel losses ascertainment amount to 200 killed among whom 40 were killed and 15 prisoners who were immediately executed */ six losses */ underlieutenant Rizzolo of 10th Libyan battalion severely wounded and lieutenants Cherubini of the Libyan Artillery Section slightly wounded */ 13 native soldiers killed and 25 wounded */ The population continues to re-enter Goba */ On the 2nd another 200 rifles captured */ Fitaurari, cagnasens Gneis who presented themselves were immediately executed along with all other elements who had appeared */ ...

K A S I "

"STA.2"

GOVERNO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
CABINETTO - UFFICIO CIFRA

TELEGRAFICO DI STATO
Ufficio Attente Genebra
A.190 di post. dell'ufficio attente
Addis Abeba 11 e marzo 1937-XXV

Indicazioni di urgenza
M.P.A. SO TUTTE LE M.P.A.

GRAZIANI

TELEGRAFICO IN PARIENZA

Copia per conoscenza:
S.G.V. Sov.Gen.
Stato maggiore
Superiore
Superiore A.C.P.
Uff. Polizie
S.I. MIN. ORORE MIN.

Add. Stato Maggiore
Add. Superiore
Add. Superiore A.C.P.
Add. Uff. Polizie

ROMA

TEXT (translated into English)

119/4 Cabinets */ Hopping up in the Qurè region where took place the fighting of the Cabezdu column on the 5th led to the capture of 130 armed men who have been shot and many women and children from the rebel caravan */ Seized 150 rifles and one machine gun */ Berio column because of the high water in the Tara Combo torrent has not yet been able to reach Qurè */ Aircrafts have bombed the valleys of escape of the rebels north of Koun Abinas with efficient result */ On the left Scobili under group batallion placed of Abdl Cassim has surprised rebel regulars exploring the fords of the river */ Killed 10 rebels and sent 11 more to the sector command to be questioned after which they will be shot */ Recovered 25 very new Mauser and 150 shoes for each armed man */ Our patrols despatch have passed on to the right bank of the river to try to get in touch with the rebels */ Informers and our patrols confirm the splitting up of the rebels in the difficult and bushy valleys of Mount Abinas and Koun. Cabaio */ /\ Supply of provisions and munitions from the air by the division "Libia" */ As soon as the troops have got supplies an adequate force will proceed to occupy Gigner */

GRAZIANI

IL CAPO DI CABINETTO
A. Gneiss (segreto)

B.A.F."
1914/09/13 (.) Following at 3.000 (.) prisoners captured on the eleven (.) declared that Basmode (.) with other chiefs (.) at the first stage of the fighting (.) flee into the bush towards the frontier (.) According to later informations Basmode with Maria and Isanno and Delacce and about 150 fugitives arrived early in the day at the angilmas frontier at Baraco (.) The reporting of the battle field confirms that a total defeat has been inflicted to the rebels (.) of whom 112 killed were counted on the spot (.) Moreover many other scattered sun and wounded have been executed with the prisoners (.) one machine-gren and 200 rifles and 150 rifles besides much food and a great quantity of beef were taken (.) Concluding the fighting action in the other sector another 20 fugitives captured today were executed (.) Our patrols are out in all directions to capture scattered groups which try to attain the narrar frontier (next unclear) (.) Diverse groups who had abandoned Basmode Basmode continue to present themselves (.)

Signature

Generale A. A. I
S. A. F

Cabinet/Office


S. A. F. Ministero AFRICA ITALIANA
Roma 23215 Cabine (.) M. M. Masi has wired (.) Quote (.) 6246

Translated

Commission for clearing concentration camps in Soce and

Arriving where all the rebels were concentrated who after

the operations in Bale surrendered without condition (.)

after ending the examination of the number of submitted

amounting in all to about 4.000 (.) has arrived at the

following conclusions (.) First (.) Proposes to report to

the over, partial (.) the number of 53 elements (.) old

chiefs or rebel leaders (.) already submitted and then again

returned to the rebels (.) or else instigators or authors of

raids and attacks (.) Second (.) Proposes for confinement

elephant numbering 140 (.) chiefs and notables (.) militari

unmeasurable and presents (.) assassins (.) and pirated

as per telegram 15/09 of Sarco 22 from that general govern-

ment (.) Third (.) Proposes to forced labours on the roads

with police guards (.) elephant numbering 14 (.) single

soldiers in the ranks of the rebels and who are because of

their age and their robust physical strength better adapted

of the circulation and put to use (.) Forth (.) Proposes

the liberation (.) elephant simple prisoners never con-

scrous (.) elephant of forced to follow rebel chiefs (.) slaves

(.) and finally people advanced in age end of war. physical
conditions // virtually // the put into liberty and sent to
conditions under which women and children //
likewise // the sink almost trial at noon a month into the
school, where // and attended // please write me
if the // on provision may secondly can be sent to the
California // in Julia // Enquirer // x were answered like
this // quote // in yours effective // I was that the 54
elements mentioned in the first paragraph be not without
bulk if you are too numerous to have a reader // Equally
are to be sent all the oathsworn may exclude except the
priests violated in the second part // The rest of the
issue is to be sent to Congress after a present with the
family agreement // an observation for the rest // these
live in ignorance into the word "liquidations" // Enquirer //

P.S.

JULIA...
relatives in the Philippines and in the United States. I had all the evidence put into congratula-
tion. Later the rumors got worse that the government had shot
in the streets. A vendetta existed and I was until the
Jews who were created panic and commotion also because
leaders are in the name of the government and promised safety,
leave the vendetta. For these reasons I received information
let the court proceed be carried through, ensure that
prosecutor proceeded but dangerous affair. All the
mourners and

M A X

N A T
relatives in the Rishikesh grounds in the recent event. However, I am sure that the investigation will show all the facts. 

I must also mention that the situation is very sensitive and the police are taking all necessary measures to ensure security. I believe that these measures will prevent any further incidents. 

Thank you for your attention.
bulletin no. 133

contingent in somalia

general sorensen

annunziata to amarillo

12th march 1932

colonial

1035 cabinets

translated to english

these raids are usual actions in colonial relations

they enable us to confirm the gravity of rebel losses, causing them to retreat to the interior of the zone.

to-morrow i will carry out reconnoitering in force in the zone north of rail

before that action

sorana aviation to-day carried out effective attacks over the zone across the rail

at melo ella

on request of general terenzi

in sorana armed groups of tribes and natives in it.

1st has test to melo ella country.

then

united states department of state

regarding a claim

united states department of state

melby son of melby vs. united states

united states department of state

melby son of melby vs. united states

united states department of state

melby son of melby vs. united states

united states department of state

melby son of melby vs. united states

united states department of state

melby son of melby vs. united states
To the Indian Agent.

Following is a report of the recent action near the 4th instant. Repel the 4th instant, the American column occupied 45 miles of the enemy's column and arrived only in the evening. Overcome in the evening, difficulties of terrain. Our losses in the ten days, 1 officer wounded, 7 killed and 39 wounded, 139 natives. Captured many cattle. Follow our columns from the rear direction from the Salinas. About a number of rebel losses in killed and wounded. The Indians and cattle retreated towards the south and west through the valley of the Salinas and the mountains. Pursued by the Indians. Great groups of rebels. According to information, 170 men and 45 women and 300 children. The natives and informers column try to find out the groups to finish the campaign. To carry troops at rest in reached positions to await battle. If artillery which have ret behind the range of the fire. The supply of the column is made partly by miles and partly on Indian shoulders.
Task

18:05/05/43 // As already reported to you... the morning rebel

(by translated)

formations again. Our West forces appeared for capitation

led by balahavar Allah Doda Khari. Allah told: & quoted

Sahara // Tula & was met with // Anni Sendi & the

Arabs. // The Arab Dode Doda // // The Arab Dode Doda //

The Arab Dode Doda // // The Arab Dode Doda //

This is the result of the optimum action taken. From

February 05 till today. We have the optimum results.

We are waiting and continue our positive action

with our forces that culminates the rebel formations

to make complete and massive a decisive to finish.

With / // The good reputation of the is of

using the full potential in all areas. We civil

and political organisation, we want no further difficulties...

Manchrè

In memory of

A. Cari (11.10.60)

Reading

Cemil // Taimur Khani // // In the end of White

September 21 11 came 1977

Governor: // As // 12 sample 20.12

per sonosenca: // Stabara // M.A.A.B. 0.16 M.K.H.

General: // 0.16 M.K.H.

Cemil // Taimur Khani // // In the end of White

September 21 11 came 1977

Governor: // As // 12 sample 20.12

per sonosenca: // Stabara // M.A.A.B. 0.16 M.K.H.

11 Cemil Khani // // In the end of White

September 21 11 came 1977

Governor: // As // 12 sample 20.12

per sonosenca: // Stabara // M.A.A.B. 0.16 M.K.H.
PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

I. MURDER AND HANGINGS - SYSTEMATIC TERRORISM

1) Summary execution of captured or surrendered patriots.
   In general, see Appendix A.
   Some examples, see Appendix B.

2) Other forms of terrorising the native population.
   Examples, see Appendix D, E, and F.

XII. Attempt to pacification the inhabitants of occupied territory.
     Examples, see Appendix B.

XIII. and XIV. Millage and confiscation of property.
        Examples, see Appendix D, E, and F.

XVIII. Actual devastation, destruction of property.
        Examples, see Appendix D.

XXVI. Use of torture and execution, etc.
       Examples, see Appendix A.
NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused, in view of his official position.

As Governor of the province of Harar, Rasl. according to the Decree of June 1st, 1926, depended on the Governor General Vicerey, and to carry out the general, political, administrative or military directions given by the Minister for the Colonies and transmitted to him by the Vicerey and corresponded directly with the Minister for the Colonies for the ordinary Government questions. At directed - following the instructions given by the Governor General Vicerey - the politics and the administration in the territory of his jurisdiction, he had at his disposal the armed forces placed in the territory (Nafi and even the Commander of them).

b) The probable defence.

Plan of superior orders. Reference to "Il mio Deapo", a pamphlet containing some of Rasl's circular orders (after the "Musa" period), in which he condemns such acts as torture, summary executions etc. Similar.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Assessing complete. There are, however, several cases without complete information. Some places that have not yet been translated into English. No indication of evidence continued.

Possibly also other matters may be brought against Rasl, e.g., concerning the Vicerey Vicerey Governor General.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Submitted</th>
<th>Decision of Committee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 MAR 1948</td>
<td>A for murder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>false 6 poison</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SASSO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Date Submitted:** 4 MAR 1948

**Decision of Committee:** A for murder, false 6 poison, SASSO
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

CHARGES AGAINST

WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Rank and Unit, or Official Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TANZILO DI ROLFI, Alessandro</td>
<td>General, Governor of Asmara</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(In Italian: Generale, Governatore dell'Asmara)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and place of commission of alleged crime.</th>
<th>Date and Place</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Tanzilo Di Rolfi's time as Governor of Asmara, Via. up to the end of 1937.</td>
<td>A number of places in the province.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number and description of crime in war crimes list.</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I, III, VIII, X, XII, XV, XVII, XE, XVI.</td>
<td>Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1936)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Third part, Chapters 5 and 12.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fourth part, Chapters 1, 2, and 6.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Preface, Articles 11 and 12.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Terrorism during Tanzilo Di Rolfi's governorship in Addis, involving crimes of war.His role in anti-Jewish, anti-Christian, anti-civilian, anti-Jewish, killing of Jews, etc. of war.

TRANSMITTED BY

The Ethiopian War Crimes Commission (In the Ministry of Justice, Addis Ababa)
PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

I. Massacre and mass murder - systematic homicide.
   Summary execution of captured or surrendered patriots and
   killing of civilians, often after torture.

III. Torture.
   See under I.

VIII. Deportation of civilians.
   The population of one district was removed to another.

XIII and XIV. Killings and confiscation of property.
   The property of the civil population was frequently seized
   without proper compensation.

XVIII. Vector devastation and destruction of property.
   In connection with operations against patriot forces, reprisals
   were carried out by destroying in vast regions whole villages
   and other inhabited places.

XIX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.
   See under XVIII.

XXVI. Use of lethal gases and gassing attacks.
   Gas was used to support the operations against patriots and
   to terrorise the civil population.
Extract from...

Translation:

...on April 9, aged 36 years, professional hunter, Mackay, rank enlisted in the province of North Dakota, a short time before the war began...
According to...

2.

In the months of November, 1857 (January 1857), Major Charles Thevenot received a double attack, which he says was from the muck of a hill, and was mortally wounded. He was taken in a village of the Turkish army, and brought back to the town where he died. He was buried in a garden on the outskirts of the town, but his body was later removed to a place more convenient. Major Thevenot was a brave and noble officer, and his death was a great loss to the Turkish army. He was buried in a garden on the outskirts of the town, but his body was later removed to a place more convenient.

3.

On the 18th of December, 1857, the Sultan sent three soldiers with a supply of ammunition and other supplies to the town. They were on their way to the town, but were stopped by the ammunition and other supplies. They were later removed to a place more convenient. On the 18th of December, 1857, the Sultan sent three soldiers with a supply of ammunition and other supplies to the town. They were on their way to the town, but were stopped by the ammunition and other supplies. They were later removed to a place more convenient.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12/16/1944</td>
<td>Cross Roads</td>
<td>Occupation of the area by U.S. forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/16/1944</td>
<td>Cross Roads</td>
<td>Arrest of 72 German soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/16/1944</td>
<td>Cross Roads</td>
<td>Execution of 72 German soldiers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/17/1944</td>
<td>Cross Roads</td>
<td>Trenches are dug as a defensive measure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/18/1944</td>
<td>Cross Roads</td>
<td>Troops are patrolled during the night.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/19/1944</td>
<td>Cross Roads</td>
<td>Troops are ordered to maintain a state of readiness.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12/20/1944</td>
<td>Cross Roads</td>
<td>Troops are ordered to remain on alert.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/1/1945</td>
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<td>Troops are ordered to remain on alert.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/2/1945</td>
<td>Cross Roads</td>
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<td>1/3/1945</td>
<td>Cross Roads</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/4/1945</td>
<td>Cross Roads</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/5/1945</td>
<td>Cross Roads</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/6/1945</td>
<td>Cross Roads</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/7/1945</td>
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<tr>
<td>1/8/1945</td>
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<td>1/9/1945</td>
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<tr>
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<td>1/11/1945</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes:**
- Troops are ordered to maintain a state of readiness.
- Troops are ordered to remain on alert.
- Occupation of the area by U.S. forces.
- Arrest of German soldiers.
- Execution of German soldiers.
- Trenches are dug as a defensive measure.
- Troops are ordered to remain on alert.

**Location:** Cross Roads
(Translation)

32. Following M.C., on the 27th destruction of the district in the Spanish territory is completed. The latest report from the contains a great number of atrocities. It is clear that the current rebellion armada is led and chief. The new massacre was carried out against our workers on the road. Two Conchita natives have been shot, and their bodies are on the road. At our Conchita station, a native native man has been found dead. A native woman has also been killed. In all, the bloodshed is widespread. Another new letter

(Translation)

57. Have returned from our last expedition. There were some enemy positions. The reports from our Spanish friends say that the enemy soldiers have been hand-to-hand near the houses. The reports from our Spanish friends are not reliable. They are not reliable. They are not reliable. Therefore, we have decided to begin the next phase. The reports from our Spanish friends are not reliable. Therefore, we have decided to begin the next phase.
translated
into English

239.  Lend small "Kintosh" cannon.  Number has, also,
the following: a man of strength and a pole, on the
such means consisting of a complete department of material
and equipment, with which the equipment is to be
sufficiently effective - or the point to be calculated
or the first.  Equipment consists of 9 or 10 men.

This does not necessarily mean the experience of John Smith,
and some indications have served the troops with
success, etc.  The same indications were not overused.
As also interest, indications were the best only if the indications
were investigated, etc. I I say quit the arms before ever,
such a fire, etc. Again at the end of operations a with
PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

1. Murder and massacre — systematic terroristic.
   Examples, see Appendix A.
   Another example, see Appendix B.

XII. Famine.
   Examples, see Appendix A.

XIII. Deportation of civilians.
   See Appendix A.

XIII and XIV. Village and confiscation of property.
   Example, see Appendix C.
   Another example, see Appendix A.

XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
   Examples, see Appendix D.

XIX. Deliberate bombardment of undefended places.
   Example, see Appendix D.

XXVI. Use of lethalxious and enslaving gases.
   Examples, see Appendix E.
   Evidence of poison, see Appendix D.

0638
NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

As Governor of the province of Ardura Pirsio pirollo according to the decree of June 1st, 1936, Secretary of the Governor General Viceroy, had to carry out the general, political, administrative or military directions given by the Minister for the Colonies and transmitted to him by the Viceroy and corresponded directly with the Minister for the Colonies for the ordinary Government questions. He directed - following the instructions given by the Governor General Viceroy - the politics and the administration in the territory of his jurisdiction. He had at his disposal the armed forces placed in the territory (Pirsio Piroli was even the commander of them).

b) The probable defence.

Rica of superior orders.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. There are, however, several affidavits recently taken in the province in question that have not yet been translated from the Italian. The collecting of evidence continues.

Possibly also other charges may be brought against Pirsio Piroli.
Date Submitted | Decision of Committee I
---|---
4 MAR 1948 | A on all counts except XIX, as directed. LIST 80.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Submitted</th>
<th>Decision of Committee I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 MAR 1948</td>
<td>A on all counts except XIX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 7

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

G. L. & C., Carlo

General, Governor of Alassio.

(In Italian: Generale Governatore del Genova.)

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Alessio's time as Governor of Genova, viz. up to September 8th, 1936.

A number of places in the province.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

I, XIV, XCVII, XXX, XCVI.

References to relevant provisions of national law.

Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1934).

Third part, Chapters 5 and 12.

Fourth part, Chapters 1, 2, and 6.

Preface Articles 11 and 12.

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Terrorism during Alessio's governorship in Genova, involving orders of summary executions, destruction of civilians, destruction of whole districts, burning of undefended places, use of gas.

TRANSMITTED BY

[Signature]

* Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the Registering State.

[Director General of the Ministry of Justice's Signature]
PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

1. Murder and massacre - systematic terrorism.
   A series of executions of captured or surrendered patriots, killing of civilians in connection with destruction of whole districts.

XIV. Confiscation of property.
   Confiscation of cattle when carrying out military.

XXIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
   In connection with operations against partisan forces, widespread fire carried out by destroying in vast regions whole villages and other inhabited places.

XXIV. Deliberate barbarism of unoccupied places.
   Air bombardments were carried out on a large scale and acquired size, intentionally, places containing no military objectives.

XXVI. Use of poisonous and mechanically killed gas.
   Gas was used in operations against partisan forces.

XII. Attempts to dispossess the inhabitants of property.
   Destruction of homes of civilians.
[TRANSLATED]

CAPTAIN COOFLYN

TRANSLATED

Description:

[TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH]

As soon as you arrive at Adelaide ask about the stores and one of our sailors, who disappeared at a place known as Mount Remarkables, was found dead. This whole locality is still inaccessible, and I must advise you to stay. I also think that the whole nation should be informed of this incident. It is a sad day for us and a sorry end to all our hopes. I ask that you take immediate steps to prevent any further incidents between our two nations.
conveniently located cylinder above.

During operations

Corrado and Paone worked inside the cylinder and

they collected several samples when they removed

several objects from within.

Title

IN CAT. OF SEPTIMAL

A. Brand (writer)
a) EXTRACT

READING

(Telgrafia di Stato)

Governo Generale dell'Africa Orientale Italiana C/C
CA-MTU-Ufficio Cifra n° 30/353

Assegnazione

STATE REZESIONE MG.

Provenienza: Condo 11-30 Dicembre 1936 ORE 21.00

Ricevuto: 11-31 Dicembre " ORE 01.00

TELEGRAMMA IN ARRIVO

Per conseguenza: UFF. INFOSAZ. UFF. POLITICO

DIN. SUP. A.C.I. Sostramico

OSS. DI S.E. IL VICE-STATO

DSCRITTO M.P.A.

GOVERNO GENERALE STATO MAGGIORE

ADDIS ABBABA

Text (translated into English)

390414. /...-

Their intentions seem to be peaceful. /...- To morrow aviation will throw over Soddu the message directed to degiac kobbene according to my 390414/29. /...- Furthermore I have arranged for all aircraft at our disposal to carry out reprisals in force around Lake Soddu. /...- Yesterday and to-day airforce bombarded Osbole and neighbourhood to the south. /...

Signature

GULI, REMO

B) REPARTO STATO MAGGIORE

Comando Superiore Aeronautica A.C.I.

1° Reparto Stato Maggiore

Irgeles, 15.1.1937 XV

A S.E. IL VICE-STATO

IRGAELES

AL GOVANO GENERALE SIDARIO

CONDIG

AL CAPO DI STATO REZESIONE GOVERNO

GONERALE

AL CAPO DI GABINETTO DI S.E. IL VICE-STATO

(L'ufficio aerea)

AIR REPORT January 15th, 1937 XV = No. 3.

Text (translated into English)

Air report January 15th, 1937 XV = No. 3.

2 No. 1/10 offensive patrolling of zone between Busplire torrent and Inganno torrent.

Report unguarded cattle but no armed movement.

Bombardéed and machinegunned groups of tukuls on which similar action had been carried out this morning. Explosives released: 12 bombs of 12 kilos and 1,000 shots for each plane.

Signature

d'ordine

Generale LAZZUCO

unreadable signature

C) REPARTO STATO MAGGIORE

Comando Superiore Aeronautica A.C.I.

1° Reparto Stato Maggiore

Irgeles 15 gennaio 1937 XV

A S.E. IL VICE-STATO

IRGAELES

AL GOVANO GENERALE SIDARIO

CONDIG

AL CAPO DI STATO REZESIONE

GOVERNO

AL CAPO DI GABINETTO DI S.E. IL VICE-STATO

AIR REPORT 15/1 1937 XV = N. 2

Text (translated into English)

Air report 15/1 1937 XV = N. 2
In the region traded only small patches of land sparsely inhabited by the natives who did not flee at the sight of the plane. Only at a place, not clearly identified about 50 km from Dado on the road, did some natives take refuge in a group of tukuls. They were bombed. Tukuls in flames.

Signatures:

GENERAL Mazzucco
(STAFF: Mazzucco)

Text (translated into English):

Air report 21/1 17/2/XV = No. 2

1 Ca. 133 1000 - 13:10 offensive patrol in support of the Navarrini, Zabon and Pascolini columns. Reports many groups of natives with cattle on their way towards our lines evident in order to surrender. Located and bombarded natives with cattle who tried to hide themselves at the view of the planes. Explosives released: 3 bombs of 3.1 and 100 small bombs.


3 Ca. 133 repeated above mentioned action as reprisals. Suku and surrounding country bombarded. Explosives released: 10 bombs and 504 small bombs.

Signature:

GENERAL Mazzucco

Unreadable signature.
La sigla AA indica "Aviazione Aerea"

**A.**

Il ministro degli esteri

**B.**

29/9 Gen. Cab. 4.

Aviation during these days will continue without pause with lots of air stuff included those with gas. The enemy regions will be likely to be within our formations./.

Graziani

**C.**

Il capo di Gabinetto

A. Mazzi (signed)
Affidavit No. 2.

I, the undersigned, name: Woizero Bénédo Gabru, age: 31 years profession: Vice Directress at League Indian School, address: Addis Abeba, here and say, as follows:

As there had about 300 men, officers and soldiers. We wanted to go to Bekkata as we did not know that the Italians had already occupied Bekkata. On our way we met a group of the resistance and they told us that Bekkata was occupied and that they were forced to go away. The whole group (1,000 altogether) was very well trained. We decided to go to Bekkata all the same, that is to stick to the previous plan, but already, before we reached Bekkata we found a big Italian resistance group and some of them were Galla people and they asked us not to go this way. We got a letter from Hadey Mariam: 'Please do not come this way, I am forced to fight against you, please find another way.' But the decision was to fight. There was a little fight. Many Italians and some Galla, is seemed as if we had won this little battle.

We did not go to go further. We decided to go to Simma (Hamada Yanna Subanaw) and further to Kaffa. Near Agara on the way we were bombed with gas. Many of the population came to me for treatment, they were suffering and they could not see, and they apparently were injured by instead gas I had felt the smell also. A great part of the cattle was poisoned and swollen. This happened in December, 1935. When we were on the way to Simma we met the Italians and he told that the Italian were already in Kaffa they wanted to join us. Also many civilians joined us. (Women and children) this made it more difficult for the group to act.

Signature: Bénédo Gabru (signed)
GEOA
(in Italian)

GEOA DELLA AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
CAPITOLARE DELLE GEOA

GEOA DI S.A.R.
UFFICIO ATTIVO: GEOA

GEOA 5430 di prot. dell'ufficio diplomat.
Addio Acqua il 9 aprile 1937 - X

GEOA IN FAMENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.I.N.A. Ge.O. Fine Div. Sig.A.C.F.
Giovanelli Imp. Intendenza A VI
S.C.O.R. Governo AA. Eff.Politico
Comando Piazza Com. Sig. NIC.R.

S.E. GEOA

I notice with true pleasure what Your Excellency communicates into English about situation zone Coma ecco era / but above all I am pleased to see that the has decisively absorbed instruction regarding manoeuvres of several columns converging on same target from distant bases like typical example operative cycle Arbegona --/-- Chevena --/-- Jelma --/-- baghi --/-- Goletti --/-- tomb of rebel leaders --/-- Continue like that in all dependent territories --/-- Apply converging manœuvres --/-- also feigned movement of the troops in all directions --/-- never let them get gangrene in garrisons --/-- adopt definite will to apply directions of IL Duce which tend to complete destruction of Amharic elements in territories of Abyssinian conquest --/-- give a pinch of more courage in this respect to the civilian officials who are closer to base and to custom commanders who --/-- from instinctive combatant generosity --/-- are sometimes disposed to compromise for comprehensible sentiments --/-- Be assured that doing so I will certainly bring about complete tranquillity in your territory, having from now provided all troops and means necessary --/-- this telegram transmitted for knowledge to H.E. Minister Colonies and to all governors --/

Signature

GEOA

1/Co Cabinet // Secret // Reference 2/45 C.G.S. //

(translated)

P. IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
E. Amendelli (signed) "
PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

1. Tampered with invoices - applicable to Section 131.

2) Note example, see Appendix A.

XIV. Destruction of documents.
One example, see Appendix A.

XVIII. Detonate devastation and destruction of property.
Examples, see Appendix B.
Another example, see Appendix A.

XX. Call forth the sympathy of public opinion.
Example, see Appendix C.
Another example, see Appendix A.

XVI. Use of deleterious and nauseating smell.
Examples, see Appendix B.

XII. Attempts to dehumanise the inhabitants of occupied territories.
See Appendix B.
NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

4) The degree of responsibility in view of official position.

As Governor of the province of Selmas Eduardo Selomo according to the Decree of June 1st, 1936, commander of the Governor General's forces, had to carry out the general, political, administrative, and military instructions given by the Minister for the Colonies and transmitted to him by the Viceroys and correspondents directly with the Minister for the Colonies for the colonial Government matters. Instructed following the instructions from the Governor General Vicerey - the politics and the administration in the territory of his jurisdiction, he was a liaison officer and the armed forces station in the territory - Selomo was even the commander of them.

5) The probable defence.

This is to disagree orders.

6) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete. More as, however, several affidavits recently taken in the province in question that have not yet been translated from the Arabic. The collection of evidence continues.

Possibly also other matters may be brought against Selomo.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Submitted</th>
<th>Decision of Committee 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 MAR 1948</td>
<td>All counts except XIX</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**LIST 80**

7885 E 36/8
| Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position. | NOT TO BE TRANSLATED |
| Date and place of commission of alleged crime. | July 1942-June 1943, inclusive. Any place in central Africa. |
| Number and description of crime in war crimes list. | 234, 456, 789, 123, 456, 789, 123 |
| References to relevant provisions of national law. | Article 62, Section 2 (as amended) |

**SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.**

Deliberations on crimes or atrocities of war

*Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the Receiving State.*

Director General of the Ministry of Justice
PARTICULARS OF ALLEGED CRIME

xxvi. Use of deadly incapacitating gases.
Gatto Cabinet. // He has 025c // Calm during the night all the line from Addis Ababa to Hadama // But during the night rebels have destroyed the water conduit house that supplies Hadama with water where consequently there is actually a severe shortage // I have given immediate orders to General Gallina in the matter in order to have the conduit repaired // An now the line hadama-Hadase was yesterday practicable and I think this may be a way of supply if the reparation of the water conduit should be delayed // General Gallina to whom I transmitted the complete directives of M.A. Chief of Government SIG has proceeded to set fire to all native houses encountered on his direct march from Akaki to Hadama moreover shooting all rebels captured and spreading terror in the zone //

Signature

GRAZIANI

IL CAO DI GABINETTO

CAGG. IN SERV. M.A. AKAKI.

STAFF
In the undersigned, name: Haile Wolde Kidan, age: 50 years old, profession: President of the Land Court, address: Ministry of Interior, Addis Ababa, do hereby take oath and sa., as follows: ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ——— ———

Then in the month of Tilmint (October 1930) I went to my land which is situated in the locality of Chafedunsa. While I was still there, an Italian army which was passing through Charsara and Singer to Blidof also arrived at Chafedunsa, and found that there was a market in a place called Gorro. As the people all over the country were plundered of everything they had by the army and were starving they came to the market from the surrounding country to buy provisions. When these people were returning from the market after buying, the Italian army fathered all civilian who had no rifles at all, including mother who carried their babies on their back and shepherds who were found there, in a hollow place and machinegunned them. The corpses were lying one on each other on same so that persons came out on the third day. The corpses of those...
who were shot remained there unburried. An Italian army came on this market on 12th Aug to Biancof, is proceeded. The commander of this arm was called General Gallina.

b)

GALLINA

(180660)

GOVANO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA

GABINETTO - UFFICIO CIPRA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO

Ufficio Mittente: GABINETTO

Addis Abeba 11 27 ottobre 1939-XIV

Indicazioni di Urgenza: A.P.A. SU TUTTE LE A.P.A.

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTEZENA


Colonia - Gabinetto per conoscenza:

S.R.M. MINISTRO COLONIA

MOSADISCO (Via Asen)

22732 Cabinet */. Column Gallina has set fire to about 500 locals */. more than 100 natives were shot because found in the shepherds' nets */. Captured 350 cattle */. At seven o'clock in the morning it set out for Sports */. A.M. Minister informed */.

GRAZIANI STAFF

IL CASO DI GABINETTO

A. Gallina (Signed)

c)

READING

(180660)

GOVANO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA

GABINETTO UFFICIO CIPRA

TELEGRAMMA DI STATO

Ufficio Mittente

Addis Abeba 11 nov. 1939 XV

Indicazioni di Urgenza: A.P.A. SU TUTTE LE A.P.A.

TELEGRAMMA IN PARTEZENA


Colonia - Gabinetto per conoscenza:

S.R.M. MINISTRO COLONIA

VIA ANKA

2421 Cabinet */. On the 4th of November Gallina

(Translated into English)

...as the Gallina brigade I have patrols and South-eastern and eastern slopes of hills. Gallina will have a view to carry out reprisal action over the entire zone where rebels still been reported */. The brigade has been on the whole day, patrolling near the top of the hill */. And no organized resistance */. Set fire to some huts and the village of Gallina */. Shot 4 natives and seized 31 rifles and about 100 of ammunition */. (signed) */. A.M. Minister informed */.

GALLINA

IL CASO DI GABINETTO

A. Gallina (Signed)
I, Abebe Shanku, make this affidavit as follows:

Then the above mentioned soldiers retreated towards Sandanger. On 2nd June, 1937 we rested against the enemy, moving through our own country, when on 29th June we moved through Badagari to Gilla.

While we were camping in Badagari, in a place called Zira, 1 and Lidj Wandagemen came and went for henequens with 2 crews. There we saw Italian troops and Malian tribesmen in many columns. One of the heads fell, on horseback, marching towards the columns. Where we were, then all the countrymen were bad, unconscious and gathering their crops I warned them by shouting as far as my voice could reach, saying that an army was marching towards them.

But the countrymen have been previously told that the Italians were coming only for inspection, so they were waiting ready to welcome them peacefully. Specially when the Italian men arrived where they instructed the people to shout hilariously, to show their arrangements so that the ones who were not present might be assembled. When all the countrymen were assembled together, these Italian soldiers chopped the people with cutting weapons as 'Tenga' and mutilated male his delicate sexual organ and female her breast. Worse than this they used to separate the aunts and the nuns and the conceived baby and if the creature was male they cut his delicate sexual organ. They also burned all the houses of the countrymen, without leaving a single house standing and plundered all the properties and wealth. These atrocities took place in number from Kalisi up to Pirra from Arrin up to Insero.

In my opinion I think not less than 7,000 people were killed in this accident. If it is necessary to know the exact amount of properties plundered and the number of people killed one can find it from the countrymen. Even now there are many people who are invalidated because of mutilation, and there are also many people including children, who are unable to keep their own name. I was told later on the name of the Italian commander who was responsible for these atrocities. He was General Gallina.

Signature: Abebe Shanku.

Note: Sand 1937 Malodian Calendar = June, 1937.
CABINETTO - UFFICIO CIFRA

TELEGRAFIA DI STATO
ufficio assistente: CABINETTO
R. 356 di prot. dell'ufficio assistente,
Addis Abeba 1/11 ottobre 1936-XV
indicazioni di urgenza: II.A.A. TUTTE
in A.P.A. GRAZIANI

TELEGRAFIA IN PARIENZA

Com.sup.Aviazione Com.piazza AA
Colonia-Cabinetto-Regia Stato Maggiore Uff.Giu. Militare
per conoscenza: Governo Corpo AA V.Con.c Pastoria
S Ministro Colonia Diret.A.A.C.F. Com.sup.CC.R.
Megadiscio-Via Aerea Uff.politico

Testo
(Translated into English)
22/06/36 Cabinet /\ I communicate the full text of a telegram
to-day sent to General Galina /\ quote /\ 45/06/36/Op. /\ 
my lively satisfaction /\ it is necessary to continue the
inexorable work of destruction of all /\ it is superfluous
add that raid cattle or any other value belongs entirely
to the detachments that carry out the raids /\ Unquote /\ 
A.M. Minister informed /\ GRAZIANI

Signature
P.C.C.
IL CAFO DI CABINETTO
A. Rassi (signed)

b)

CABINETTO - UFFICIO CIFRA

TELEGRAFIA DI STATO
ufficio assistente: CABINETTO
R. 354 di prot. dell'ufficio assistente
Addis Abeba 1/11 nov. 1936 XV
indicazioni di urgenza: II.A.A. TUTTE
in A.P.A. GRAZIANI

TELEGRAFIA IN PARIENZA

Copia per conoscenza: S.a.Vice Gov.Gen. Uff.informazioni
Stato Maggiore Com.div.Pusteria
Com.sup.Aviazione Com.piazza AA
Uff.Giu.militare Diret.A.A.C.F. Com.sup.CC.R.
Colonia - CABINETTO Uff.politico
Com.colonna Milano

Testo
(Translated into English)
On November 15th General Galina wires /\ left for the top of yerer
with a view to attempt the capture
of the famous castle /\ Arrived at /\ hours near the yerer
cliff 3 km north-east of yerer Silla cf after passing over absol-
ute inpracticable ground had an encounter with about 30
rebels killing 17 of them and seizing 3 rifles /\ There was
also set fire to about 600 stables /\ Among the dead were
an old man with dignified appearance whom it has however been
impossible to identify /\ Photos have been made of the dead
man which will be sent as soon as possible /\ On our part
one ascari seriously wounded /\ battalion re-entered at 1530
brining 200 raid cattle /\ Unquote /\ GRAZIANI

Signature
P.C.C.
IL CAFO DI CABINETTO
A. Rassi
29/11 Cabinet // I communicate the full text of a telegram to-day sent to General Galina // quote //. //

My lively satisfaction //. // It is necessary to continue the inexorable work of destruction of all //. // It is superfluous to add that raided cattle or any other value belongs entirely to the detachments that carry out the raids //. // Unquote //. //

IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. Kazzi (signed)

Text
(Translated into English)

On November 15th General Galina wired //. // At the first hours this morning the second battalion left for the top of Terer with a view to attempt the capture of the famous saint. //. // Arrived at // hours near the Terer cliff 3 kms North-East of yerer Silia ed after passing over absolutely impracticable ground had an encounter with about 30 rebels killing 1/ of them and seizing 3 rifles //. // There was also set fire to about 100 cattle //. // Among the dead there is an old man with dignified appearance whom it had however been impossible to identify //. // Photos have been made of the dead man which will be sent as soon as possible //. // On our part one ascarì seriousl_ wounded //. // Battalion re-entered at 15.30 bringing 20 raid cattle //. // Unquote //. //

IL CAPO DI GABINETTO
A. Kazzi (signed)
Heading
(in Italian)

Segretario Generale dell'Africa Orientale Italiana
Ufficio - Ufficio Cifra

Teletex: ADRIE DI SIAO
Ufficio Assistenze Gabinetto
N. 354 di prot. dell'Ufficio Assistenze.
Addis Abeba 11 13 novembre 1936

Indicazioni di ordine:

TUTTE LE N.P.A. GRAZIANI

Text
(translated into English)

Copia per conoscenza: S.V.Gov.Gener.
Stato Maggiore
Com.Div.Pusteria
Com.Sup.Aviatio
Governatorato AA
Uff.Stato Ministro
Dir.Sup.A.G.A.
Comm. O.C. A.
Ufficio Politico

COLEGIO GABINETTO

Addis Abeba

S.E. MINISTRO COLONIA ASIAA

25429 Cabinet /* General Gallina wires on the 13th instant */

Quote /* . */ in the night to the 13th at 2 o'clock ascari company from Las Addas has made an ambush in the Gabacease village about two hours from Las Addas where small rebel groups and been reported /*. */Show rebels /*. */ seized a rifles /*. */ set fire to 30 tukuls and eight wells /*. */ This morning the local aviation has bombed tukuls on the North eastern slopes of Mount Serer where according to information from a captured notebook there were dispersed about 80 surrendered men /*. */ This night the ascari battalion is making a night-march from Moggi to Las Adda and another battalion is laying an ambush in the middle of the road between Adiaki and Dukan /*. */

Signature

GALLINA

IL CAPO DI GABINETTO

b)

Heading
(in Italian)

TENETRAZIA DI STATO

Segretario Generale dell'Africa Orientale Italiana
Gabinetto-Ufficio Cifra N. 35252
Assegnazione
SIAO - ASSISE 89.
Provenienza A D D 18 il 1/ Dicembre ore 21,15 1936
Ricezione il 1/ Dicembre ore 22,45

Text
(translated into English)

OL 463 / Op. /*. */ ............................ /*. */ Informer to the Gabacease country reports that the Gabacease Udolet still would be in the Gabacease country with about 500 men and 20 machine guns, and who should have the intention to attack our garrison in Sirè /*. */ Tomorrow I will send aviation for repression action to the Gabacease and Guns zone 40 km. North east Sirè /*. */ Sirè garrison already informed /*. */

Signature

GALLINA
PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

I. [Text not legible]

II. [Text not legible]

III. [Text not legible]

IV. [Text not legible]

V. [Text not legible]

VI. [Text not legible]

VII. [Text not legible]

VIII. [Text not legible]

IX. [Text not legible]

X. [Text not legible]
NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position. The offence was either on his own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority.

b) The motive for action.

The necessity of doing, the almost obvious in order to break the resistance of the "hostile".

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete. The collecting of evidence continued, however. Possibly also other charges may be brought against the offender.
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

CHARGES AGAINST WAR CRIMINALS

CASE No. 2.

Name of accused, his rank and unit, or official position.

(Not to be translated.)

Date and place of commission of alleged crime.

June 1936-March 1937, inclusive.

Debra Berhan sector of central Ethiopia.

Number and description of crime in war crimes list.

1. Murder and wanton destruction and devastation of property.

References to relevant provisions of national law.

Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930), Title IV, sections 12, 13, 876, 892, 893, 920, 921, 922.

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Terroristic and illiterate methods of warfare were operating against the patriot forces, e.g., massacre of cultured or surrendering patriots, acts of terroristic against civilian population, especially the destroying of their district.

TRANSMITTED BY

[Signature]

[Stamp]

*Insert serial number under which the case is registered in the files of the National Office of the Accused State.
I. Murder and massacre - systematic terrorism.
Summary execution of captured patriots, killing of civilians and other acts of terrorizing the native population.

XVIII. Exponent description of destruction of property:
In connection with operations against patriot forces reprisals were carried out by destroying vast regions, whole villages and other inhabited places.
Sri. L.

Dear Sir,

Further to my letter of the 10th instant, allowing the appeal, I have the honour to report the latest information in the case.

The investigation of the recent incident of a Colombo officer's death has indicated that the case was, in fact, an excellent example of a case of self-defense. The officer was known to be an excellent officer and has always conducted himself with great care and respect for the law.

The investigation has also revealed that the incident was a result of an unprovoked attack by a group of individuals who had been previously involved in similar incidents. The officer was acting in self-defense and has been exonerated from any blame.

In view of the facts as presented, it is recommended that the officer be rewarded for his act of self-defense.

Yours faithfully,

[Signature]
TRANSLATION

5. The undamaged, ruinous Elas Mile Great Dam,
with its stream, decorated and adorned at the entrance of the
city, adjacent, Elas Mile Great Dam, with its stream, do hereby
take one and say as follows:

1) In the month of Shaban, 1367 A.H. (May 1936) after
the Babylon occupied the city and planted the date of
the Rasas, called Jamshed Akbar Rasas and Be Jamshed Akbar
Rasas twice for nineteen days among their grounds. Then in
the month of Safar, 1368 A.H. (November 1936) the Babylonian army entered
toward the Elas Mile Great Dam. In its interior and around the Babyloni
army an army called Rasas, an army called Rasas, an army and an army called
Rassas from the Arab. The Rasas and the Arab joined and
against a strong force in a place called Rasas. No words
were said between them. The Rasas and the Arab
called Rasas, called Rasas. The Rassas called Rasas, called Rasas, called Rasas
against a strong force in a place called Rasas. The Rasas and the Arab
were joined and fought against the Rasas and the Arab
in the month of Shawwal, 1368 A.H. (September 1936), and
in the month of Zil-Hajj, 1368 A.H. (October 1936), and
the month of Dhu-l-Hijjah, 1368 A.H. (November 1936), and
the month of Dhu-l-Maher, 1368 A.H. (December 1936). In these
months were joined and fought against the Rasas and the Arab,
in the month of Shawwal, 1368 A.H. (September 1936), and
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the month of Dhu-l-Maher, 1368 A.H. (December 1936). In these
months were joined and fought against the Rasas and the Arab,
I was 100% correct. My previous understanding was correct. Thank you for the clarification.

J. F.

I can confirm that the letter was given to the officer inside the tent, and he did not receive it.

Stefano Manca (translated):

I took that letter and gave it to General Trouille.

The General was inside his tent, with General Trouille. I went to the tent and gave the letter to the General. I was not present at what happened. I don't have any further information to add.

I am not familiar with the term "introductory note." It seems to be a term used in formal documentation or correspondence.

The General received the letter and then fired it in the direction of the tent. When they arrived, there was a general out of his tent and received them.

I am not sure if the General fired the letter in the direction of the tent.

The General was inside his tent, and I didn't receive any letter. I am not sure if the General fired the letter in the direction of the tent.

The General received the letter in the tent and then fired it in the direction of the tent.

I am not sure if the General fired the letter in the direction of the tent.

The General received the letter in the tent and then fired it in the direction of the tent.

I am not sure if the General fired the letter in the direction of the tent.

The General received the letter in the tent and then fired it in the direction of the tent.

I am not sure if the General fired the letter in the direction of the tent.
O676 (Appendix A)

I. What Are Your Methods of Work?

Answer: We use a combination of manual and automated methods for our work. Our team consists of a mix of experienced professionals and new graduates. We employ state-of-the-art technology to enhance our efficiency and accuracy.

II. What Are the Benefits of Your Methods?

Answer: Our methods provide several benefits, including increased productivity, reduced errors, and improved customer satisfaction. We also save time and resources by automating repetitive tasks.

III. What Are the Challenges?

Answer: While our methods offer many advantages, we do face some challenges. These include the need for continuous training and adaptation to new technologies, as well as the potential for system failures or errors.

IV. What Are Your Future Goals?

Answer: Our future goals include expanding our services to new markets, improving our technology, and maintaining a strong focus on customer satisfaction.

V. What Are Your Strategies for Achieving These Goals?

Answer: To achieve our future goals, we plan to invest in ongoing training for our team, develop new technologies, and continuously monitor and improve our performance metrics.
1. The situation on the Italian front was tense, with the Italian Army occupying strategic positions. In the village of Sotto la Corte, the village of the Italian Army, many civilians were casualties. The Italian soldiers were shooting at random, causing fear and panic among the civilians. The Italian Army was also known to be using heavy artillery and machine guns.

2. A certain man called Pepe De Rosa was shot at and wounded by Italian soldiers while strolling in the village. He was suffering from a bullet in his hand. It is believed that the Italian Army was responsible for the shooting. Pepe De Rosa was a well-known figure in the village and was known for his courage and bravery. Despite the situation, he continued to help the civilians in any way possible.

Additional: The situation was critical.

Date: 23rd day of October, 1940.
PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

I. Murder and Assasinnation - Systemic Feature

Relevant, see Appendix A and Appendix B, i), ii), iii) and iv).

Relevant, see Appendix B.
NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

The offence committed either on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority.

b) The probable defence.

The probable defence.

Time of superior orders. The possibility of using the utmost of our in order to break the resistance to the "rebels".

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete. The collection of evidence contained, however, possibly also other charges may be brought against the accused.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date Submitted</th>
<th>Decision of Committee I</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 MAR 1948</td>
<td>Adjourned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 MAR 1948</td>
<td>S for complicity in systematic terrorism</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Sir,

I have the honour to forward herewith copy of the text of the affidavit referred to in the letter addressed to you by Baron Leijonhufvud on the 19th March, 1948.

I am, Sir,

Yours sincerely,

(Batta) EPRIAM TEWELDE ALEMU

Minister.

Colonel G.A. Ledingham,
Secretary General,
United Nations War Crimes Commission,
Lansdowne House,
Berkeley Square,
IMPERIAL ETHIOPIAN LEGATION
LONDON

DELIGATION
LONDON.

N° 72. POUR BLATTA ETHIOPIE. REFERENCE VOTRE 62. POUR
LEJONHVFVUD. LE SUIVANT EST RESUME DE AFFIDAVIT DE ASFAHA VOLBE
NIGER QUI EST ENVOY PAS PREMIERS VALISE DIPLOMATIQUE ETHIOPIE ET
AUSSI PAR POSTE AERIENNE ORDINAIRE CITATION J'ETAI INTERPRETE DE
CERULLI OCTOBRE 1936 A DECEMBRE 1937 EN ITALIE ET JUSQU'EN MAI 1939
A ADDIS-ABEBE. EN ITALIE CERULLI ETAIT D'ABORD SECRETARI GITAL
A DISPOSITION DU MINISTERE COLONIES COMME EXPERT POLITIQUE ETHIOPIE
ET ENSEIGNE MINISTER DESSERTERIE POLITIQUES A.O.I. A SA TOUT LE
TEMPS PLEINE CONFIANCE ET CONSTANT ACCEP PERSONNEL SISOLINI ET
LESSONA QUI SUIVAIENT INVARIALEMENT SES CONSEILS SUR QUESTIONS
ETHIOPIENNES. J'ÉCRIS D'OCASION EXAMINER ARCHIVES MINISTÈRE COLONIES
ET ME SOUVENIR SPECIFIQUEMENT AVOIR VU UNE PREPARE DANS DEPARTEMENT
CERULLI ET SISOLINI QUI A L'OCCUPATION D'ADDIS-ABEBE JEUNESSE
INSTRUIRE ETHIOPIENNE DEVAIT ETRE LIQUIDE. COMMANDE ETHIOPIE
ET AYANT CONNAISSANCES PERSONNELLES PARMI ETHIOPIENS IMPORTANTS
CERULLI INTERROGERAIT PERSONNELLEMENT PRISONNIERS ETHIOPIENS ARRIVANT
ITALIE ET LES CLASSIFIAIT SELON LEUR DEGRE DE DANGER POUR INTERETS
ITALIENS. POSITION DE CERULLI A ROSE PENDANT MASSACRES GRAZIANI
ETAIT SI INFLUENTE QU'IL AURAIT PU LIMITER TERRORER MAIS IL CHOISIT
DE NE PAS INTERVENIR. SON OPINION FONDEE SUR PAROLES ET ACTES DE
CERULLI EST QU'IL APPROVA VIOLENCE POLITIQUE DE GRAZIANI. COMME
VOCAL GOUVERNEMENT DE L'A.O.I. CERULLI AVAIT PLEINE AUTORITE AOSTA ETAIT
SEULEMENT NOMINALEMENT SON SUPERIEUR. A MA CONNAISSANCE CERULLI
NE ESAYA JAMAIS D'INTERVENIR OU DE S'INFORMER DANS AUCUN DES CAS
D'ATROCITES QUI ETAIENT SOUS A SON ATTENTION. A L'OCCASION
IMPORTANT DE RESISTANCE DE BERUAN CERULLI ASSURER COMMANDEMENT.
DIRECT SUR CHAMP DE BATAILLE D'OPÉRATIONS MILITAIRES TELLES QUE
LA DISPOSITION DES PRISONNERS DE GUERRE ET CONTROLE DE POPULATION
LOCALE. LA SOI-DISANT MODERATION DE LA TERRROR SOUS AOSTA
LIMITÉE AUX VILLES PRINCIPALES ET RÉGIONS SOUS DOMINATION DIRECTE
DE GARNISONS MILITAIRES MAIS SITUATION DANS RÉGIONS D'ACTIVÉ
RÉSISTANCE DES PATRIOTES RELATIVEMENT INCHARGÉS PENDANT PÉRIODE
AOSTA CERULLI. FIN CITATION.

AFGERES.
Dear Colonel Ledingham,

With reference to the decision, taken by Committee I on 4th March, 1948, to adjourn the Ethiopian case, No. 7887, pending receipt of additional evidence from Addis Ababa, I have the honour to send you herewith a copy of a deciphered cable to be forwarded to Committee I.

The full text of the affidavit, from which the cable quotes extracts, has been sent from Addis Ababa both by diplomatic bag and by ordinary mail. It ought to arrive here within a week, and thus before the last meeting of Committee I. As soon as it has been received, the Imperial Ethiopian Legation will hand it to you to be considered by Committee I.

I take the liberty to request, most respectfully, that Committee I, when taking up again the case, No. 7887, should also reconsider Case No. 7800 (Lessona) with a view to listing him, if possible, on A. instead of S. These two cases are connected and it seems as if the affidavit, mentioned

Colonel G.A. Ledingham,
Secretary General,
United Nations War Crimes Commission,
Lansdowne House,
Berkley Square,
above, confirms the opinion of the Imperial Ethiopian Government that Lessona was so much implicated in the policy of systematic terrorism as to be listed on A. In case Cerulli should not be listed on A, and not even on S, the alternative request is made that he be listed as a witness.

I beg to refer to a short Memorandum on these two cases which I have the honour to enclose for the consideration of Committee I.

I have, Sir, the honour to remain,
very truly yours,

ERIK LEIJOHUFVUD,
Advocate General of the Imperial Ethiopian Government.
LESSONA

Lessona was Under-Secretary for the Colonies from 1929 to 11th June, 1936, when he was appointed full minister for the Colonies. As Under-Secretary he took part in the preparations of the aggression against Ethiopia as can be seen from his book, "Verso l'Impero". His powers and duties as minister were defined in the Decree the Italians issued on 1st June, 1936, i.e. a few weeks after the occupation of Addis Ababa.

According to this Decree — see Page 4 and Appendix Q. in Case No. 7879 F It.2 D(Graziani) to which case reference is made in the charges-sheet for Lessona — the Governor General Viceroy (Graziani) depends directly and exclusively from the Minister for the Colonies (Article 5). Special judicial measures can be taken by the Governor General Viceroy after authorisation by the Minister for the Colonies (Article 6). The Governors (of the provinces) depend from the Governor General Viceroy and carry out the general political, administrative or military directions given by the Minister for the Colonies and transmitted to them by the Viceroy (Article 12). They correspond directly with the Minister for the Colonies for the ordinary Government questions (Article 13). The Commander of the Corps is nominated by Royal Decree on proposal by the Minister for the Colonies, together with the Minister of War and after hearing the Governor General Viceroy (Article 17).
The Governor General Viceroy and the Governor cannot correspond with the administration of the State except through or with the authorisation of the Minister for the Colonies (Article 21).

These extracts from the Decree of the "Order and Administration of Italian East Africa" show Lessona's responsibility constitutionally for what took place in Ethiopia. It was clearly within his competence to interfere with Graziani's command. The next question is whether he did or did not take steps to prevent crimes from being committed. There is not any sign of such steps from his side. The policy, laid down from the very beginning, seems to be clear from the cable (appendix R to the second charges-sheet for Graziani) from Graziani to Lessona in which Graziani, referring to his record in Libya, asks for a certain freedom of action. It may be mentioned here that Graziani is well known for the brutality and slaughter in Libya under his command, and so as "the hyena of Libya". As is pointed out in Page 4 of the charges-sheet for Lessona, Lessona was then continuously informed by Graziani of all steps taken and of steps going to be taken. There are, in the Graziani case only, a great number of cables addressed by Graziani to Lessona, and there are several, addressed to the Governors or Generals and, in Lessona's absence, to his Ministry, in which Graziani ends: "His Excellency the Minister informed". Lessona visited Ethiopia in the autumn, 1936, on an inspection tour.

That Lessona was an active Colonial Minister seems to be indicated also in the cabled extract from the statement by the interpreter of Cerulli, who was a central figure in
Lessona's Ministry. And when Mussolini prepared for a new policy in Ethiopia he removed Lessona from office, presumably because Lessona was too much implicated in the previous policy of systematic terrorism.

In view of all this it is requested, most respectfully, that Lessona be listed on A, instead of on S, for systematic terrorism, since he was apparently "an accessory to, abetted, took a consenting part in, was connected with plans and enterprises involving" the commission of the different atrocities which took place in Ethiopia during his time as Minister for the Colonies.

CERULLI

This case is closely connected with the Lessona case as far as concerns Cerulli's time as Colonial Official in Rome. Reference may be made to what is stated under (a) in Page 4 of the charges-sheet for Cerulli: "The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position", paragraph A. Reference may also be made to the cabled extract from the statement by Cerulli's interpreter (and of course to the statement in full, if it should arrive before Committee I considers the case). What has been said of Lessona in the last paragraph above is applicable also to Cerulli, who should therefore, it is respectfully submitted, be listed on A, for systematic terrorism during the time in question.

As to Cerulli's time as Vice-Governor General of Italian East Africa, reference may be made to paragraph B. in Page 4 of the charges-sheet for Cerulli and to the statement by the interpreter of Cerulli. It is respectfully submitted that Cerulli was in his most influential capacity of Vice-Governor General at least "an accessory to, abetted, took a consenting part in, was connected with plans and enterprises involving" the commission of crimes, and that
he should also in respect of this period be listed on A. for the systematic terrorism, which was still exercised in Ethiopia during the time in question.

The United Nations London Information Centre has upon enquiry informed us that Cerulli has never been a member of the United Nations Secretariat.

London,

19th March, 1948.  

ERIK LEIJONHUFVUD.
Le suivant est l'attestation déclarée par ASPANA WOLDE MIKELI, qui sera envoyée par première valise diplomatique et aussi par poste aérienne ordinaire:

"J'étais interprète de Cerulli d'octobre 1936 à décembre 1937 en Italie, et jusqu'à mai 1939 à Addis Abéba.

"En Italie, Cerulli était d'abord Secrétaire-Général à la disposition du Ministère des Colonies comme expert politique sur l'Ethiopie en raison de son poste de Directeur des Affaires Politiques d'Afrique Orientale Italienne. A eu tout le temps de la première confirmation et de faveur un accès personnel à Mussolini et ses conseillers, qui étaient invariablement ses conseillers sur des questions éthiopiennes. J'ai eu l'occasion exceptionnelle, à des fins de la préservation des archives Ministère des Colonies, de me souvenir spécifiquement avoir vu l'ordre préparé d'occupation d'Addis Abéba. La jeunesse instruite éthiopienne devra être liquidée. Connaissant Amharic et ayant connaissance personnelle parmi éthiopiens importants Cerulli interrogait personnellement prisonniers éthiopiens arrivant en Italie et les classifiait selon leur degré de danger pour intérêts italiens.

"Position de Cerulli à Rome pendant massacres Graziani a été si influent qu'il avait pu...... mais il choisit de ne pas intervenir.

"Mon opinion, basé sur les paroles et actes de Cerulli, est qu'il a approuvé violemment politique de Graziani. Comme Vice-Gouverneur d'Afrique Orientale Italienne Cerulli avait pleine autorité. Aosta était seulement nominallement son supérieur. A ma connaissance, Cerulli n'essayait jamais d'intervenir ou de s'informer dans aucun des cas d'atrocités qui avaient été soumis à son attention.

"À l'occasion importante de résistance de Debre Serhen, Cerulli assumait commandement direct sur champs de bataille des opérations militaires, tels que la position des prisonniers de guerre et contrôle de l'opposition locale.

"La soi-disant modération de la terroisation sous Aosta limitait aux villes principales et régions sous direct contrôle de garnisons au milieu de ....situe dans région d'activité résistance de patriotes relativement inchangée pendant période Aosta Cerulli.

"Faire citation."

N.B. Where the above telegram is not clear, this is indicated by the use of three (or more) dots.
Dear Colonel Reddaway,

I am pleased to inform you of my receipt of the telegram from Colonel Byrnes asking whether the Secretary-General would have any objections to the inclusion of the names of Mr. White and Mr. Mott along with the names of other Council members on a list to be submitted for approval to the United Nations Secretariat.

Following our telephone conversation, a telegram was sent to the United Nations Secretariat asking permission to submit the list to the United Nations Secretariat. The response was favorable, and the list was sent.

You may be aware that our position on the Council's representation in the United Nations Secretariat is clear. We believe that the United Nations Secretariat should reflect the membership of the Security Council.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Adm. Bloom
Colonel Ledingham.

On Saturday morning the Foreign Office (Mr. Brown) rang up to say that they had just received a telegram from New York in reply to their enquiry as to whether Enrico Cerulli was a member of the staff of the United Nations.

The telegram was to the effect that:

The representative of the Secretary General's private office told the United Kingdom representative that no one of this name is employed on the U.N. Secretariat.

E. Goold-Adams.

15.5.48.
CONFIDENTIAL

SIR ROBERT CRAIGIE CHAIRMAN OF RELEVANT COMMITTEE INFORMS ME THAT ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT WANT PLACE ENRICO CERULLI ON LIST WAR CRIMINALS FOR CRIMES DURING ITALO ETHIOPIAN WAR 1935-1936 STOP CERULLI THEN OCCUPIED SUCCESSIVELY POSITION OF CHIEF POLITICAL OFFICE EAST AFRICA AND DIRECTOR GENERAL POLITICAL AFFAIRS IN MINISTRY COLONIES ROME AND OF VICE GOVERNOR GENERAL AND PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR IN ETHIOPIA STOP AT PRESENT EMPLOYED BY UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT STOP WAR CRIMES COMMISSION OF OPINION EVIDENCE SUBMITTED NOT SUFFICIENT STOP AS ALTERNATIVE ETHIOPIANS PRESSING FOR PLACING CERULLI ON LIST OF WITNESSES ALLEGING HE MUST HAVE KNOWN AS ACCOMPlice OF NUMEROUS CRIMES NAMLY MURDER AND MASSACRES - TORTURE - INTEGRITY - DENATIONALISATION - VILLAGE - CONFISCATION AND DESTRUCTION PROPERTY - USE OF POISON GASES STOP CASE ADJOURNED PENDING SUBMISSION FURTHER EVIDENCE WHICH EXPECTED WITHIN SEVEN DAYS STOP PLEASE INFORM SECRETARY GENERAL AND ADVISE ME WHETHER HE WISHES TO MAKE ANY OBSERVATIONS BEFORE THE CASE COMES UP IN A WEEK OR TEN DAYS STOP
UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION

CHARGES AGAINST ITALIAN

CASE No. 10 A-B

SHORT STATEMENT OF FACTS.

A. During Cerulli's time as Vice Governor General of Italian East Africa still many war crimes were committed, e.g., killing of cultural patriots, pillaging, confiscation and devastation of property, use of slave, expropriation or the policy of ethnicisation.

B. During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Cerulli's time as Colonial Official in Rome, viz., until December 16th, 1937.

C. During the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, Cerulli's time as Vice Governor General, viz., December 16th, 1937-April 30th, 1939, inclusive.

A number of places all over Ethiopia. Concentration camps outside Ethiopia.

References to relevant provisions of national law.

A. Sec. Case No. 3 (Lessona).

B. I, III, VIII, XIV, XVIII, XX, XXVI.

Ethiopian Penal Code (of 1930).

Third part Chapters 5, 8 and 12.

Fourth part Chapters 2, 4 and 6.

Ireland Articles 11 and 12.
A. See Case No. 3 (Hosanna).

B. I. Murder and percussion.
   1) Summary execution of captured or surrendered patriots. This practice adopted during Branzini's governorship was continued even afterward.
   2) Even other forms of terrorism were still practised, e.g., killing of civilians, often after torture, burning and crucifixion.

III. Torture of civilians.
See under I. 2).

VIII. Arson of civilians under inhuman conditions.
The conditions in the concentration camps were still bad.

XI. Attempts to denationalise the inhabitants of occupied territory.
The policy of denationalisation changed a little but the suppressing of the national feelings of the Ethiopians continued in many ways.

XIII. Pillage.

XIV. Condemnation of property.
Raiding and confiscation of especially cattle were frequently carried out until a new decree was issued in January 1940 (the preceding decree was from 1937).

XVIII. Wanton devastation and destruction of property.
In connection with operations against patriot forces such acts took place as reprisals.

XX. Wanton destruction of religious buildings.
During their raids and operations of reprisals the Italians did not spare the churches.

AXVI. Use of deleterious and asphyxiating gases.
Gas sometimes came to use also after Branzini had been removed.
Appendix B.L.

1 a)

SOPR

DA COMANDO TRUPPE SEITORE OCCIDENTALE

AT COMANDANTI COLONNE OPERANTI ET COMMISSARI DI GOVERNO

No.1944/40. // During the last days two acts of serious illegality have taken place, committed by officers and functionaries towards natives who have been shot without previous observance of judicial procedure //.

I remind you //:

Primo //: Individuals who are not killed in action or are not surprised in flagrancy are not to be submitted to summary procedure and killed //. They are to have the treatment prescribed by the regulations of the Vice-Roy or to be denounced to the judicial authority for the measures of its competence //.

Secondo //: Acts of this kind began revolt last year with well-known consequences and repercussions, perpetuating the general conviction about the absolute lack of judicial security on the part of the authority //.

I prescribe that the commanders of units and detachments as well as the regional authorities bring the contents of this telegram to the knowledge of their own dependents for their observance in order to avoid penal procedure against them in case of new infractions //.

CONFIRM //.

--

1 b)

COMANDO TRUPPE DEL GOVERNO DELLO SCIA

STATO MAGGIOR


CIRCOLARE

(DIRAMAZIONE Fino AL COMANDO DI FLOTONE)

I eagerly recommend that the rebels surrendering in battle or who are captured in any other way, shall not be shot, but confined.

It is necessary to put an end to the legend that our troops do not spare even those who surrender, which is always an act of cowardice, also in order not to push the others to desperate resistance which today they do not wish to set up.

Regarding the prisoners you bring me, I count them, while as to the number of killed which you report, I believe little.

Finally these prisoners may supply us with precious forced labour.

--

2 a)

EXTRACT from "Affidavit No. 3."

(Translation)

I, the undersigned, name: Afo Zenm Oda, age: 38 years, profession: Translator in the Ministry of War, address: Addis Abeba, do hereby take oath and say as follows:
9) After the Duke of Aosta had arrived many people were released from prison, and the Italian propaganda talked of a relax of the policy, but in the country there was no change. Only in the bigger towns. In the interior the cruelty continued. For example under the pretext that they had got some guerrillas at the Mount Ererra they were given permission to kill everybody, many of whom were women, children and aged, in that district. This was, I think, about three years after the occupation. I know of this massacre because some of the servants to my relatives, aged women, were killed in the massacre and I have heard about it from persons who succeeded to escape. The houses in that province were destroyed completely, even crops. I heard that about 500 people were killed in that district. General Nasi was there at that time.

Signature: Zena Oda
Sworn before me on this the 27th day of October, 1947.
Tadesse Kangesta (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia

2 b)

Extract from letter to His Majesty the Emperor (League of Nations Journal, May-June 1939, page 550):

The following is the text of the leaflets which the new Governor, Amedeo di Savoia, Duke of Aosta, has caused to be disseminated throughout Ethiopia in face of the hostility of the entire country:

"Hear! These aeroplanes which you see flying in the sky, and which are capable of hurling death and desolation, and these armies which you see marching upon the earth, have come to strengthen the work of pacification and peace. If, therefore, you hasten to deliver up your arms to our military chiefs, you will be pardoned, but, if you do not do so, I shall cause terror to rain down from the sky upon you, your goods and your kindred, who will necessarily include women, children and old men, and I shall destroy you all."

2 c)

Extract from letter to His Majesty the Emperor (League of Nations Official Journal, January 1939, page 14):

(Translation)
To His Majesty Haile Selassie,
Eleet of the Lord, Emperor of Ethiopia.

Notes on Italian Atrocities. - At Genna-Mekotena, on July 11th, 1933 (Haile Selassie 18th), 200 people were burnt alive by the Italians, and on July 21st, 1933 (Haile Selassie 19th), they burnt 150 people.

On August 9th, 1936 (Haile Selassie 3rd), the Italians arrived unexpectedly in the district of Aja Pasellidas and invaded the churches at the time of the celebration of Mass. They cut the throats of the priests and the worshippers, including women and children, and set fire to the churches of three villages. There was not a living soul left in this district.

In the town of Ronst, priests and choristers, among them Fagnanath Addese, were executed like cattle, seated on burning-hot metal plates (used in Ethiopia for toasting bread).
In addition, the Italians employed other methods, such as

*branded persons with red-hot irons and put out their eyes in the same way; another method was to shave every hair of their heads; another was to pull out their nails with pincers and knock out their teeth with hammers. When drinking they amused themselves by making fun of those whose eyes they had put out.*

Formerly they obliged persons to dig their own graves and then shot them down with machine-guns.

Now, however, they say that in this way the Ethiopians die too quickly without giving the Italians time to be amused. "Since they kill us with their clubs", say the Italians, "we must do the same to them." They then began immediately to torture our people — for a week, two weeks, until they died. At last the Ethiopians could stand it no longer and rose up against them. With Lij Haqan, Lij Desta and Bahamara, Lemma at their head, they fought against the enemy — the men with their axes and the women with sickles. With the arms captured at the close of this first battle, the Ethiopians were able successfully to confront an attack by five battalions.

At the news of these victories, the Italian garrisons of Negelle had to leave their positions and retreat to Gaant. But whilst on the way they were attacked by our warriors; they abandoned their loads and took refuge with the captain, the chief officer of Gaant. He and Lieutenant de Sedie then sent Dedasmatch Yemor to Debre-Tabor, where he was put to death with his son, his eldest brother and his youngest brother, as well as eleven other chieftains.

In the district of Modja, Kagnamatch Gared and his son, as well as numerous other persons, were put to death.

At Estie, the Italians executed Blata Kebbede, also his brother Fitiaouari Tessema and numerous other persons.

At Debre-Tabor the Italians assembled the people together and made them dig their own graves and then buried them alive.

Senie 17th, 1930 (June 27th, 1938).

Your humble Servant,

HAIKHA HAILU
Archpriest of Debre-Tabor and Gondar.

2 d)

Heading

(Tal Italian)

COMANDO TRUPPE DELL GOVERNO DELLO SCIA
STADO MAGGIONE
N.1160 protop. Addis Abeba, 6 marzo 1940-XVIII
OGGETTO: "Voglio assari, non voglio razziatori".
CIRCONVANCE

DIRIGAZIONE INVIATI AL COMANDANTI DI PLUTONE

Text

(Ta nlad translation into English)

It may be said that the moment has arrived to act against those nests of rebel formations which fed with absurd hopes by a very active foreign propaganda, have not wanted to believe in my offers of peace.

Yet, before giving orders to begin these police operations, I want to express my will to all the troops that will be called upon to take part in it.

Nothing new: simple repetition of the conceptions expressed and stressed by me several times already.
1) The campaign is undertaken against rebels and not against the poor populations of the regions haunted and plundered by them.

So I do not admit on any condition, raids, fires, acts of violence, ill-treatments which surely would not hit those whom we want to hit.

2) The Commanders of battalions, of bands, and of smaller district units must hinder and repress these crimes for which in every case, they are personally responsible, for I do not admit the responsibility to be put on others. To be responsible means to pay; pay in disciplinary way and, if indicated by the case in a penal way.

3) The mentioned commanders without detriment to the eventual following penal or disciplinary actions, must in every case on the spot, compensate at the expense of those guilty, or collectively at the expense of the detachment, the losses suffered.

4) The population, which in the main have returned to their land, have rebuilt their houses, prepared the soil for new sowing have shown trust in us. That trust should be strengthened and confirmed by the aacaris who are fed, clothed, paid by the Italian Government, which they also represent.

They have nothing else to do than be honest men, and they will know how to be that if they are supported and guided by that iron will of the officer. But it is necessary that the officer should first be convinced that in fact it is not true that colonial warfare and raidings are synonymous and that colonial troops "cannot subsist" without raidings.

These dangerous supermen, bearers of very catching microbes, I have already been discreetly sending away many, and I have decided to continue.

Moral: I want to aim at the rebels, I will not create new implacable ones and I am even inclined to let some of the old ones escape rather than repeat the errors and the crimes which colonial history quotes as the reasons for the revolts in all times and in all countries.

Signature

II GENERALE DI CORPO D’ARMATA COMANDANTE
GIOVANNI NASI
As my visits and from the bulletins I continue to notice that instructors and assistants have above all the ambition to extend elementary instruction for the natives or at least to teach our language to as many children as possible.

This is a fundamental political mistake that tends to create a class of unskilled individuals, who, because of the only fact that they possess a mask of education, will then refuse to work in the fields, quite as we are told in our own colonial experience and by that of other countries. They are attracted by the towns, ask for Government employment, compete with the nationals in trades that should be reserved to the latter, decidedly constituting a class of discontented, or, even worse, of rebellious people.

As I have already said on other occasions it is only for the sons of chiefs and major notabilities that we ought to reserve the strictly necessary education, for these can later succeed in the duties of their fathers, serve us as interpreters and hold modest employments in the offices.

However, while for obvious reasons we cannot allow together close the door of public education for the youth of the lower social classes, we can and we ought to close very well the door to special courses, e.g., those for interpreters, and in general we should avoid to make propaganda and still worse, to influence the families to send their sons to the Italian schools.

This principle, which can be absolute in the country, ought of course to be subject to many exceptions in the large towns (Harar and Dire Dawa).

Also with regard to native orphans it is erroneous politics, for the same reasons as mentioned above, to establish orphan asylums, where you will always at last live their habits that do not belong to their race or their social class.

Instead these orphans should be cared for by entrusting them to relatives, or to any native families, who, under our control and at a modest monthly price, can bring them up in the very surroundings in which they afterwards have to live and work.

It is superfluous to add that the present direction is of very secret character and should be applied without divulging the real motives.
At my visits and from the bulletin I continue to notice that
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extend elementary instruction for the natives or at least to
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control and at a modest monthly price, can bring them up in
the very surroundings in which they afterwards have to live
and work.
It is superfluous to add that the present direction is of
very secret character and should be applied without divulging
the real motives.
This Ministry has read with great interest the report No.106315 of May 29th.

It contains a sincere and realistic analysis of the causes of the political situation created in the territories of your Government, causes traced back to the following mistakes:

1) Having destroyed the wise organisation of 1936, based on few chiefs of real importance, who had partly approved of our occupation, to replace it by the subdivision of the territory in an infinity of small districts, entrusted to new men without followers, to a great extent imported from Eritrea and consequently ignorant of the needs, customs and mentality of the dependent people;

2) Having upset the administration of justice among the natives, applying, without correction, rules not made for the Amhara Government;

3) Having excluded the natives from every economical activity and every employment;

4) Having shown a lack of sense for comprehension and graduation in the settling of the question of cults, and having exaggerated when putting the domains under the state;

5) Having used rigorous measures excessively and arbitrarily;

6) Having identified race policy with a policy of bad treatment and subduing.

Signature

p.c.

IL SOTTOSSEGRETARIO DI STATO
F/to Teruzzi

Col. Angelo Adorni
Adorni (signed)

(c) EXTRACT

GOVEMO GENERALE DELL'AFRICA ORIENTALE ITALIANA
DIREZIONE SUPERIORE DEGLI AFFARI CIVILI
N.78602 di prot. Addis Abeba, 11 26 ottobre 1939

Obietto: Programmi di insegnamento delle scuole per sudditi coloniali

Text: During the last meeting of the Governors full assent was given to the conception, inspiring the directions issued several times from this Government General, that
the schools of all kinds established for the subdued peoples of A.O.I., ought above all to aim at this goal: to train the pupils for the cultivation of the soil or to become qualified workers (not specialized) in order to create gradually native skilled craftsmanship for all fields of labour where, for reasons of climate, surroundings or race prestige, the use of Italian labour is not admissible or convenient and for the purpose of securing reduced cost of labour and production in general by estimating the value of native labour.

Signature

IL GOVERNATORE GENERALE
A. di Savoia
A. di Savoia (signed)

GOVERNO GENERALE A.O.I.
Direz.Sup.AA.AC.
ADDIS ABABA
p.o.c. Paolatto (signed)
Address: Addis Abeba, January 19th, 1940 – XVIII

Raiding, carried out by our national or colonial detachments, employed in colonial police operations was justifiable in the past because of the exceptional need for rigorous proper to an act of reimbursement and punishment against rebel populations. At this moment, with the political situation stabilized and with the active commercial and agricultural life now manifesting itself in all parts of the Empire, the system of raiding and confiscation of animals and things to the damage of the population, ought to have no more reason to subsist.

Respecting and recognizing the right of private ownership which, as has been put at the base of the economic organization of Ethiopia, it is time to put an end to the system of the past and establish among these people a civil discipline stimulating their progress.

For this reason I give orders:

1) All the directions issued in the past by Governments in the respective territories and by the former Intendencia of the A.O.I. in circular no. 10790 dated September 17th, 1937, regarding war booty, cease to be in force on the date of this circular;

2) In all the territories of the Governments of the Empire it is forbidden for all regular national or colonial detachments, for irregular bands, for the bands of Commissariats and residences (sebanjas, guards, privates, copies etc.) as well as for every other armed detachment (guards of finance, guards of the forests, police bands etc.) to undertake actions of raids and confiscation of cattle and of things in general to the damage of the native population. All that may have been taken by units employed in colonial police operations is to be restituted to the legitimate owners;

3) It is forbidden for the commanders of the troops to pay premiums, even if promised before, for animals and things raided by the dependent units.

Signature

IL VICE-GERENTE D'ETHIOPIA GOVERNATORE GENERALE DELL'A.O.I. COMANDANTE SUPERIORE DELLE FORZE ARMATE

Order: All the directions issued in the past by Governments in the respective territories and by the former Intendencia of the A.O.I. in circular no. 10790 dated September 17th, 1937, regarding war booty, cease to be in force on the date of this circular;

A TUTTI GLI EMMI DEL PRESIDIO ADDIS ABABA AT COMANDI DI SETTORE E REGI SETTI

you are requested to arrange for the orders of M.E. the Vice-Government to be strictly observed.

Signature

IL CASSIO DI STATO MAGGIORE

COMANDO TRUPPE DEL R. GOVERNO DELLO STATO

(stamped) guarini (signed)
"Affidavit No. 6.

I, the undersigned, name: Lidj Abebe Shankut, age: 60 years, profession: Governor of Amba, address: Amba, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

3) Same 22nd, 1930 (30th June 1930), we fought against the enemy troops who were camping on the hill called Kora and forced them to retreat and join other Italian troops who were camping in Aggbot. Next day, same 23rd, Italian air planes came and burned the country by many bombardments, and many innocent countrymen were also killed in that action.

5) Ras Ababa wrote us a letter inviting us to meet him in a country called Mayu, so in Tiket 26th, 1931 (6th November 1930), I, Bedjazmatch Teshone Shankut, Lidj Haile Shankut, and Bedjazmatch Dante Nazasha went to meet him here. The Italian troops wanted to occupy the hill of Kollash, so it moved towards it in a pincer movement, one column under the command of General Lorenzini and one column of Muslim troops under the command of Colonel Fusskili from Fitche Petera front and innumerous troops were also moving towards the place competently. We saw those troops plundering all the properties of countrymen and burning villages including churches, while moving towards the said place. We patriots also reacted competently to take up our position and clash with the enemy in a place called Taado. There I was wounded in three places. The enemy killed my brother, Haile Mariam Shankut in action; cut his neck, put it on a stick and took his head with them as a show for their trophy.

While bombarding all the country round there, their infantry also burnt so many famous churches by torches. In the same month Tiket 27th, 1931, the enemy defeated the patriots and occupied the said place, after burning the compounds round there.

Signature: Abebe Shankut

Sworn before me on this the 6th day of September, 1947.

Tadesse Nancesha (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.
I, the undersigned, name: Denazamat Bekroma Shankut, age: 45 years, profession: Governor of Debre Sina, address: Debre Sina, do hereby take oath and say as follows:

5) At that time I had about 1,400 patriots and asked them if we should stay where we were and continue to fight or proceed to another part of the country. 900 patriots decided to stay where they were and continue to fight, so in the month of Megabit 1371 (March 1939) we took all the aged people, children and females, including my family, to the cave called Amataea Washa. We also took our provisions to the cave beforehand. In my opinion I think there were inside the cave approximately 3,000 people in all - including children, aged and females. As the enemy pursued us to the cave we defended our position with weapons we had possessed. For seven days the enemy launched many attacks in vain, and were repelled without inflicting any casualties on our side. On the eighth day the Italians climbed the cliff and from that cliff they sent down a ball like iron tied by thick wire and they took it in our position. During these seven days the Italians continuously shelled our position by cannon and bombs. After seeing this I informed all the patriots that the Italians were going to throw poison gas. As I was told that lemon and urine were good to contaminate poison gas, I also informed the same to the patriots. Then in the morning five cylinders were sent down and the Italians in front of us shot at them till they burnt before the cylinder reached the ground. Then different colours of smoke - blue, yellow etc. came out of these cylinders. The Italians fired their cannon in a group and turned the whole of the smoke into the cave. Then strange smell began to permeate inside the cave. One or two hours afterwards many of the people went as, killed each other and many died. We tried to take the rifles from the dead men and put them in a separate place in the cave. My eyes were also contaminated by poison gas so I decided to go out and inflict casualty on the enemy. I took 107 of the patriots who also decided to do the same and came out, while the shooting still continued. When I came to a little stream close by, I heard some of my men who were insane telling the Italians about my escape and the Italians began to look for me strictly by searchlight. Then here I decided to attack one of their trenches and so after attacking I was wounded. In this fight all save four of us were killed in action. The force of the bomb which wounded me threw me from the edge of the valley, where I remained unconscious for a little while. Then the four patriots who were alive encouraged me and tried to take me to the desert, but because of the darkness, my legs slipped and I fell down the cliff, so we missed each other. After a short time I got back my consciousness and feeling in my pocket found my whistle. When I blew my whistle those patriots whom I missed heard the whistle and came to me, after which they tried to take me to the desert. We met the assembled patriots who were staying in the vicinity as they had heard the shooting and coming; then they took me to the desert with them.

6) I hear from four people who stayed very far inside the cave and took came out on the fourth day after we had left, that the Italians went into the cave three days after we had left an killed with daggers and axes all the minimal people, including my father and sister. The other ones who were still alive were taken up to the top of the cliff, including my family, tied together and shot. One of the people who was shot at on the cliff escaped.
After the liberation I went to the same cave again and found 424 heads inside it and outside the cave I filled 9 sacks of skeletons and bones. In all I filled 14 sacks and buried them in the St. George's Church in a place called Tharat. I think approximately 1260 people were killed - inside and outside the cave, but as all the people of the country were sheltered inside the cave, I am quite sure that an inestimable number of people were killed. I have been informed that the Italian commander was a certain Italian called Colonel Lorenzini, who was afterwards killed in action in Keren; and certain Italian commanders called Lieutenant Brugnara and Major Bruschilli, but I am sure also that there were many Italian commanders whom I do not know.

Signature: Teshome Shankut
Sworn before me on this the 17th day of August, 1947.
Tadesse Mengesha (signed)
Judge of the High Court of Ethiopia.
PARTICULARS OF EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT

A. See Case No. 7 (Lesse).

B. I. Murder and massacre.
   1) Document showing that summary executions had been
      frequent, see Appendix B, I, a-b.
      Other examples, see Appendix B, I, d-e.
   2) Some examples, see Appendix B, I, e.

III. Torture of civilians.
      Some examples, see Appendix B, I, e.

VIII. Internment of civilians under inhuman conditions.
      For example, see Case No. 2 (Grusani), Appendix I.

XII. Attempts to deport or exile the inhabitants of occupied territory.
      Evidence of the policy, see Appendix B, XIII.

XIII. Killings.

XIV. Destruction of property.
      Evidence of the policy, see Appendix B, XIII, XIV.
      See also Appendix A, I, e.
      See also Appendix A, VIII.

AVIII. Mass destruction and destruction of property.
       Some examples, see Appendix B, AVIII.
       See also Appendix B, I, c and d.

XX. Mass destruction of religious buildings.
    One example, see Appendix B, I, c.
    Another example, see Appendix XXI.

XXVI. Use of deleterious and debilitating gases.
      One example, see Appendix B, XXVI.
NOTES ON THE CASE

(Under this heading should be included the view taken as to (a) the degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position, e.g., was offence committed on the offender's own initiative, or in obedience to orders, or in carrying out a system approved by authority or a legal provision; (b) the probable defence; (c) whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.)

a) The degree of responsibility of the accused in view of his official position.

A. Cerulli, who had been attached to the Italian Legation in Addis Ababa 1928-1930, was 1932-1937 First Chief of the Political Office of East Africa in the Ministry of the Colonies, then Director General of Political Affairs. He took part in many international negotiations concerning Ethiopia and he must as a Central Colonial Official under whose supervision he has been much involved in the Ethiopian Affaire during the time when Graziani was Governor General of Italian East Africa.

Cf. Case no. 3 (Lassena).

B. As vice Governor General of Italian East Africa, Cerulli should, according to the decree of June 1st, 1936, assist the Governor General in carrying out all his functions, and supervise - in particular - all civil and political services of the Italian East Africa. Cerulli must therefore be considered to share, with the Governor General, the responsibility for the numerous war crimes, committed when Cerulli held the important position of Vice Governor General (later on combined with the Governorship of Shoa).

b) The probable defence.

The necessity of mitigating the rigorous measures only gradually.

c) Whether the case appears to be reasonably complete.

Reasonably complete. However, the investigations carried out so far by the Ethiopian War Crimes Commission have concentrated upon the Graziani-period. Very few documents have also fallen into the hands of the Ethiopian in respect of the Duke of Aosta-period. Affiliates are now taken upon personal. The latter period, e.g., the interpreter of Cerulli, residing far from Addis Ababa, will be heard within a short time.

Possibly even other charges may be brought against Cerulli, e.g., if atrocities were committed when he was Governor in Harrar (from May 1st, 1953).